In the circumstances, it was clear that there was no further use in China attempting to carry out her part of the bargain since the Japanese Government was pursuing a deliberate and defiant policy of ignoring the authority of the League and extending and consolidating its illegal occupation of China’s north-eastern provinces. However, in order to make its position perfectly clear the Chinese Government communicated to the Council, in a letter dated November 12th, a summary of the arrangements it had made for taking over the occupied areas in Manchuria in compliance with the obligations it had assumed under the Council resolutions. The following extracts from this letter may be quoted:

"In pursuance of the resolution of October 24th of the Council of the League of Nations, the Chinese Government has taken necessary steps for taking over different places in Manchuria now under the occupation of Japanese troops as well as for making such arrangements as will ensure the safety of the lives and property of Japanese subjects in evacuated territory.

"On November 1st, the Chinese Government announced the appointment of a commission for the reoccupation of evacuated territory in the north-east provinces, which is composed of seven members—namely, Dr. Wellington Koo (Chairman), General Chang Tso-liang, M. Chang Chun, M. Wu Tlieh-Chen, Dr. Lo Wen-Kan, M. Tang Er-Ho and M. Liu Chih. This Commission will be entrusted with the work of arranging with the representatives to be designated by the Japanese Government necessary details regarding the evacuation and reoccupation as well as the actual taking over and rehabilitation of evacuated places.

"In executing their task, the members of the Commission will request the representatives appointed by the different Powers to associate with them as closely as possible. It is expected that these representatives will observe the workings of the Commission in relation to reoccupation, accompany its members to the places for actual reoccupation and remain in such places until they are sure that peace and order are effectively maintained. All necessary facilities will be accorded to these foreign representatives and all information regarding evacuation and taking over of the evacuated territory will be given to them without delay.

"The best disciplined soldiers, gendarmes and police will be, upon selection by the Commission, despatched by the Chinese Government to places to be actually taken over. For the effective maintenance of peace and order after evacuation and reoccupation of each place, the Chinese Government will authorise the Reoccupation Commission to proclaim martial law when it is deemed necessary, and enforce it for a short period of time, during which any disturbance of peace or any act of violence against the life and property of residents will be severely dealt with according to martial law.

"Special precautions will be taken for ensuring the safety of all Japanese nationals. In view, however, of the many dangerous acts incompatible with the maintenance of peace recently committed by Japanese subjects in various parts of China, especially in Manchuria, the Japanese Government is expected to warn Japanese subjects in evacuated territory against taking any undesirable course of action so as to ensure the successful execution of measures of protection by the Chinese Government."

(Document C.84I.M.42I.193I; Official Journal, December 1931, page 2547.)

The Assembly Committee has asked the Chinese Government what steps it proposes to take in the future to secure the execution of the resolutions of September 30th and December 10th. The Chinese Government states herewith that the arrangements mentioned in the above letter still stand, and that it is, as throughout the conflict, ready at any moment to enter into discussions for implementing these arrangements and for co-operating with the League in devising whatever supplementary arrangements on the spot may be regarded as desirable.

Conclusion.

It is clear from the above summary of events that the principal obstacle to an agreement has been the different interpretations put by each party upon what constitutes effectively assuring "the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals" in Chinese territory outside the railway zone. The Chinese Government’s interpretation, which was explicitly endorsed by several members of the Council in the discussions on October 23rd and 24th referred to above, was, as the President, M. Briand, put it, that the conditions of security which should be established should “make it certain that Japanese nationals and their property will not be subject to reprisals” after the troops had left.

"Troops are about to leave a territory which they have administered, in which they have organised municipal services, police and various administrative departments. These various bodies have to be replaced. But that can be settled after a few hours’ or at most a few days’ discussion."

Such discussions, he pointed out, concerned police measures, administrative measures, possibly military measures—all questions which can rapidly be settled. That is, the Chinese Government submits, the natural interpretation of safety for lives and property. Unfortunately, the Japanese Government persists in reading into this phrase a programme for a political and economic protectorate of Manchuria, which the Chinese Government is to be compelled to accept in direct negotiation under the pressure of Japanese military occupation.
A. MEMORANDUM, DATED APRIL 26TH, 1932, FROM THE CHINESE DELEGATION TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

[Ref.A.28.]

A MEMORANDUM ON THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF MANCHURIA.

In the light of certain statements made in the Japanese Government's note (document C.357.M.208.1932) it seems desirable to supplement the communication of the Chinese Government dated April 13th (document C.372.M.213.1932) on the steps taken by the Chinese Government to put into effect the Council resolutions of September 30th and December 10th. An account is given here of the main developments in Japanese policy in Manchuria since September 18th, with a view to casting light upon the relation between this policy and Japan's assurances to the League and treaty obligations. This account is based on the communications from the Chinese Government to the League since the beginning of the conflict and reference will be made in each case to the appropriate documents.


The trouble in Manchuria started, it will be remembered, owing to the alleged removal of one or two rails from the South Manchurian line by Chinese on the night of September 18th. No proof has ever been forthcoming of this assertion, which the Chinese Government denies in toto, and the Japanese Government refused the neutral investigation requested from the beginning by the Chinese Government. Neutral evidence shows that there was no interruption in traffic on the South Manchurian Railway on the night in question, and indeed Japanese troop trains were despatched to the spot before the time at which the alleged incident occurred (see documents C.591.1931, tel. 10; C.627.1931, tel.28; C.677.1931, tel.45; C.733.1931, tel. 79).

The Japanese Government made a number of assurances to the Council of the League in the next few days. These assurances were summed up as follows by the President of the Council in a statement made to the Assembly on September 29th, after submission to the Japanese delegate:

"I only wish to allude to several essential points: first, the affirmation by the Japanese Government and by its representative that it never had or will have any intention of occupying Manchuria militarily; secondly, the fact that the Japanese Government has on several occasions insisted before the Council on its intention to withdraw as soon as possible the Japanese forces to within the railway zone gradually as the safety of its nationals and their property is effectively guaranteed; thirdly, the fact that this intention has, according to the declaration made yesterday to the Council by the Japanese representative, been during the last two days translated into definite action and that outside the railway zone Japanese troops are only stationed in a few localities."

Owing to the refusal of the Japanese Government to accept a League Commission of Enquiry as desired by the Chinese Government, it was difficult for some time to get reliable information from the spot. But the subsequent information obtained and transmitted to Geneva by the Chinese Government makes it clear that from the first day of the Japanese outbreak the plan of occupation proceeded swiftly and smoothly without any pause or hesitation, and in utter disregard of the statements made by the Japanese Government to the League.

The fact that Japan has militarily occupied practically the whole of Manchuria and that this occupation took place in flat defiance of Japan's obligations under the Covenant, the Nine-Power Treaty and the Pact of Paris, of her assurances quoted above and of the obligations she accepted in the Council resolution of September 30th, to withdraw her troops and to take steps to prevent any aggravation or extension of the conflict, scarcely needs demonstration.

(a) The Capture of Tsitsihar. But it may be recalled that certain supplementary pledges were likewise made and broken as incidents in the general policy of treaty-breaking which began on September 18th and continues to this day. Thus Japanese troops were sent northward to the Nonni River bridgehead on the ground that the bridge must be repaired. The repairing of bridges on Chinese territory hundreds of miles from the South Manchurian railway has, of course, nothing to do with the safety of Japanese lives and property. But the real motive of the move was plain from the beginning, for the Japanese troops were accompanied by irregular forces under a Japanese protege, General Chang Hai-Peng, whom it was the desire of the Japanese to make the Governor of Heilungkiang Province, the northernmost of the Manchurian provinces

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1 See Annex XV, Communication No. 2.
2 See Annex XV, Communication No. 3.
and the only one which at that time retained its lawful Government, the others having been
overthrown by Japanese forces and replaced by Japanese-controlled puppet authorities (for
details see below). The lawful Governor had actually come to an arrangement with the Japanese
Consul in Tsitsihar, the capital of Heilungkiang, by which he undertook to repair the bridge
in question himself, thus making the Japanese pretext even more transparent. The subsequent

In document C.800, the Japanese Government stated:

"Despatch of Japanese troops to Chiang-chiao is due to the urgent necessity of repairing
Nonni bridge, and the Commander of Kwantung army has received definite instructions
to withdraw his troops upon completion of repair work and not to go further than bridge."

Two days later, on November 8th (document C.813), the Japanese Government stated that:

"According to report received by the Ministry of War, Japanese troops after occupying
Tahsing at mid-day on 6th instant have ceased to advance northwards. Reinforcements
which had not yet rejoined them have also stopped their northward march. Advance of
Japanese troops towards Nonni river is due solely to necessity of protecting the work of
repairing the bridge, which will last about a fortnight. The Government is firmly resolved,
as it has already stated, to recall these troops as soon as the work is terminated."

In a communication dated November 7th (document C.812.M.402.1931) the Chinese
Government summarised the situation as follows:

"The following information just received clearly reveals the fact that the Japanese
military concentration at the Nonni River bridgehead is in pursuance of the deliberate
policy of the Japanese Army Command of driving out the representatives of the lawful
Chinese Government throughout Manchuria and substituting the rule of persons and groups
maintained by the Japanese themselves.

"On November 6th, Major Shideyoshi Hayashi, representing the Japanese Army Command
in the Kwantung Peninsula, informed General, er, the Chairman of the Heilungkiang Provincial
Government, that the Japanese troops will cease hostilities only if General Ma surrenders
his post to Chang Hai-Peng, who will set up a committee for the maintenance of order.

"This is a further step in the progress so clearly depicted in the information circulated
to the Members of the Council during the last few days, and which I venture to recapitulate:

1. The Memorandum of November 3rd (document C.789, page 5) states:

"The Chairman of the Provincial Government of Heilungkiang, the northern most of the
Manchurian provinces, was visited by a representative of General Honjo, with the demand
that he repair the bridge over the Nonni River within a week, failing which it would be
repaired by the Japanese with the help of troops. This move was undertaken in order to
facilitate the crossing of the river by the Japanese protégé, Chang Hai-Peng, who is preparing
to attack Heilungkiang. Later, two Japanese representing General Honjo, called upon
the Chairman of the Heilungkiang Provincial Government, and told him that Japan could
not recognise his authority because he had been appointed by the Chinese Government,
and ordered him to hand over his office to Chang Hai-Peng, on pain of being turned out
by force."

2. The Note of November 5th (document C.798, pages 1 and 2) states:

"For some time, the Japanese military authorities have been supporting Chang Hai-Peng
against the lawful government of the province of Heilungkiang. In pursuance of this policy,
the Japanese recently demanded that the bridge over the Nonni River on the northermost
section of the Taonan-Angangchi line should be repaired. The Chinese Provincial Government
then came to an agreement with the Japanese Consul in Tsitsihar as to the immediate repair
by the Chinese authorities of this bridge. But Major Hayashi, representing the Japanese

1 See Official Journal, December 1931, page 2538.
9 See Official Journal, December 1931, page 2551.
Army Command in the Kwantung Peninsula, called on the Provincial Government on
November 1st, and informed it that whether or not it was capable of repairing the bridge
the South Manchurian Railway had decided to send men on November 4th to repair it under
the protection of Japanese troops. He added that Japan was determined to change the
political situation in Heilungkiang by force and regardless of the resolution of the Council
of the League of Nations. The Japanese Consul replied to the expostulations of the Chinese
authorities that he could not check these activities.

"Japanese troops have accordingly been despatched to the Nonni River bridge, with the
ostensible object of assuring the repair of the bridge, but actually in order to act as a screen
for Chang Hai-Peng's irregulars and to facilitate their advance into Heilungkiang. This
has created a dangerous situation about the Nonni River bridgehead with the prospect of
clashes between the troops of General Ma, representing the authority of the Provincial
Government of Heilungkiang, and the irregular forces put into the field by the Japanese.
Any such development would lead to an advance by Japanese troops to Tsitsihar and the
cutting of the Chinese Eastern Railway."

3. The note of November 5th (document C.799) 1 pointed out that armed clashes between
the Japanese troops and their irregular allies on the one hand and the forces of General Ma on
the other had actually begun, and added:

"In the last few days, six Japanese troop trains have arrived at the bridgehead, with
the obvious purpose of affording support to the advance of Chang Hai-Peng and his
irregulars into Heilungkiang, with the object of stirring up trouble in this province."

This summary of events makes it clear that the ostensible object of repairing the bridge
is merely a pretext, for not only is it unusual to repair bridges with the aid of artillery, infantry
and bombing-planes, but the Japanese military authorities actually overrode an agreement between
the Chinese Provincial Government and the Japanese Consul in Tsitsihar and insisted upon
repairing the bridge by these extraordinary and provocative means after General Ma had under-
taken to do so himself. This concrete example casts a vivid light on the proceedings of the Japanese
military in Manchuria and shows how on the pretext of maintaining law and order they are
everywhere destroying the authority of the lawful Chinese Government and under the guise of
'committees for the maintenance of peace and order' or other aliases are setting up and main-
taining, at Mukden, Kirin and other points under Japanese occupation, the arbitrary rule of persons and groups who are the puppets and creatures of the Japanese Army Command.

This policy is creating and fomenting disorder in Manchuria. It is also a violation of
Article 10 of the Covenant and Article 1 of the Washington Nine-Power Treaty. It is a flat
denial of the Council's injunctions and dishonours Japan's repeated and solemn promises before
the Council to do nothing that would aggravate or extend the conflict.

On November 11th, the Chinese Government told the Council that:

"... the Japanese military authorities have not abandoned their ambition to
overthrow the Provincial Government of Heilungkiang and replace it by creatures of their
own, as they have already done in Mukden and Kirin, and that the situation about the Nonni
River bridgehead remains grave.

"General Honjo, the Japanese Kwantung Army Commander, notified General Ma,
the Chairman of the Heilungkiang Provincial Government, on November 8th, that he should
state what were his intentions before midnight, if he wanted to prevent Japanese troops from
entering Tsitsihar.

"At noon of November 8th, Major Shideyoshi Hayashi, representing General Honjo,
notified the Heilungkiang Provincial Government that the only way to maintain order
and to avoid further fighting was for General Ma to surrender his post to Chang Hai-Peng
'by peaceful means'."

(Document C.833.M.413.1931. 2)

On November 12th (document C.842.M.422.1931) 3, the Chinese Government further reported
that the Heilungkiang Provincial Government had received an ultimatum at noon the same day
from General Honjo, the Japanese Commander-in-Chief, requesting General Ma, the Chairman
of the Provincial Government, to resign and evacuate Tsitsihar immediately.

On the next day, November 13th (document C.848.M.427.1931) 3 the Chinese Government
gave further details of the continuing advance of the Japanese Army across the Nonni River bridge
and their open declaration that they intended to occupy Tsitsihar and to seize the administration,
and added:

"In bringing the above to your attention, I beg to point out the flagrant and barefaced
manner in which the Japanese military are violating the solemn undertaking repeatedly given
to the Council by the Japanese Government to refrain from aggravating or extending the
conflict and are revealing as worthless the assurances given to the President of the Council

1 See Official Journal, December 1931, page 2542.
by the Japanese Government as recently as November 8th, only four days ago (document C.813.M.403:1931.VII)\(^1\), to the effect that Japanese troops after occupying Tahsing at mid-day on November 6th had ceased to advance northwards and reinforcements on the way had also been stopped.

"The Japanese Government on the same occasion assured the President of the Council that the advance of Japanese troops towards the Nonni River was due solely to the necessity for protecting the work of repairing the bridge. This statement is impossible to reconcile with the proceedings of General Honjo and his emissaries as revealed in the above despatch and my previous note."

On November 15th (document C.860.M.438:1931)\(^2\), the Japanese Government admitted what it was no longer possible to deny—namely, that its troops were in fact engaged in a campaign to occupy Tsitsihar. The usual pleas of self-defence and preventing a conflict between Chinese and Japanese troops were advanced in extenuation of this action.

It may be recalled that the Japanese Government also gave pledges in Washington, London and Paris not to take Tsitsihar, and that nevertheless the town was occupied practically at the same moment as the Council met in November, and a puppet Government duly installed in this as in other occupied provinces.

(b) The Fall of Chinchow. — The second incident in the development of Japan’s policy of treaty-breaking military occupation which involved the breaking of further specific pledges was the occupation of Chinchow. Chinchow, in south-west Manchuria, was made the temporary capital by the lawful Government of Manchuria, which had been driven out from Mukden; the destruction of this Government and the driving out of its head, Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, was the real though unavowed object of the Japanese occupation. As early as October 8th, therefore, Japanese aeroplanes dropped the following proclamation on Chinchow and followed up this gesture by the bombing of the town as an earnest of their intentions:

"Chang Hsueh-liang, the most rapacious and wanton, stinking youth, is still failing to realise his odiousness and has established a Provisional Mukden Government at Chinchow to plot intrigues in the territories which are safely under the rule of the troops of the Great Japanese Empire, when the heart of the Manchurian mass is no longer with him, his ground is lost and the four provinces of the north-east are going to revolt against him. The Imperial Army, which, in accordance with the principles of justice, is endeavouring to safeguard its interests and to protect the masses, will never recognise the Provisional Government of Chang Hsueh-liang at Chinchow, and therefore it is obliged to take drastic measures to suppress such a Government. The people of Chinchow should submit to the kindness and power of the army of the Great Japanese Empire and should oppose and prevent the establishment of Chang Hsueh-liang’s Government, otherwise they will be considered as decidedly opposing the army of the Great Japanese Empire, in which case the army will ruthless destroy Chinchow. The people of Chinchow are hereby enjoined carefully to consider their situation and to take such decisions as they will deem wise."


Chinchow, it must be remembered, is two hundred miles from Mukden and was at the time far outside the Japanese area of occupation. Attention should be drawn particularly to the efforts to incite the population to revolt against its lawful Government and the statement that “the four provinces of the north-east”, that is, the whole of Manchuria, were going to revolt. In general the terms of the proclamation are impossible to reconcile with the avowed objects of Japan’s policy—protecting the lives and property of Japanese subjects, let alone Japan’s treaty obligations—and are clear proof of the intention to establish a Japanese protectorate in Manchuria. That intention has been steadily pursued since September 18th and is still being pursued.

The subsequent developments which led up to the occupation of Chinchow are well known. In the resolution of the Council of December 10th, Japan re-affirmed her pledge under the resolution of September 30th, not to aggravate or extend the conflict and undertook to “refrain from any initiative which may lead to further fighting and loss of life”. The Japanese Government further gave assurances to the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France that its forces would not take the city of Chinchow. As the American Secretary of State put it in his note of December 27th, 1931, to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs:

"Your Excellency will remember that on November 24th, in response to my representations through Ambassador Forbes, you assured me with the concurrence of the Minister for War and the Chief of Staff that there would be no movement of Japanese troops in the direction of Chinchow and informed me that orders to that effect had been given to the Japanese troops."

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\(^1\) See Official Journal, December 1931, page 2567.


\(^3\) See Official Journal, December 1931, page 2475.
Nevertheless Chinchow was taken and this matter was not discussed at the January Council meeting, only because attention was taken up by the developments at Shanghai that culminated in the Japanese attack on that city.

II. Seizure of Railways and Means of Communication.

The first step of the Japanese Army of occupation was to seize railway headquarters, telegraph and telephone administrations, wireless stations, etc., so as to gain control of all means of transport and communication. Thus, on September 21st, the Chinese Government reported (document C.586.M.233.1931): ¹

"Kirin-Changchun Railway seized: Japanese announced it will be managed by South Manchuria Railway which latter has sent 130 employees to Kirin to take over Chinese line. Yingkow, Antung, Changchun, Fushun, and many other towns have been seized by Japanese who have cut all telephone, telephone and wireless . . . . Japanese troops also seized Huangkutun, Santunchiao, and seized railway quarters Peking-Mukden Railway there, driving out all employees. Also seized many locomotives, cars belonging railway."

On September 23rd, the Chinese Government reported (document C.591.M.235.1931): ²

"Kirin station demolished by heavy gun-fire. Kini-Changchun Railway under control of South Manchuria Railway and Taonan-Angangchi, Tahushan-Tunglia, Liaoyuan-Taonan-Sulan-Shenyang-Hailun Railways taken."

On September 28th, a further communication (document C.627.M.251.1931) ³ gave the following information:


Document C.634.M.253.1931: ⁴

"British railway employees Peking-Mukden Railway at stations near Mukden constantly abused by Japanese who are endeavouring to take over control operation of railway gradually extending further southwards."

Document C.668.M.276.1931: ⁵

"On September 29th, Japanese troops seized machinery department, telegraph office and engineering department belonging to the Peking-Mukden Railway in Huang-Ku-Tung."

Further details of the extension and consolidation of Japanese control of Chinese railways involving the driving out, imprisonment or even death of Chinese employees and the substitution of Japanese, generally from the South Manchurian Railway, is given in Documents C.733 and C.789.1931, and C.110.1932.

III. Destruction of Property, Terrorising the Population, Killing of Officials.

From the outset, the invading Japanese army practised a policy of ruthless terrorism. The bombing of undefended open towns is too well known to require comment. What was done in Chapei at Shanghai was merely a sample of what the Japanese did all over Manchuria in order to "prepare" the towns they were about to occupy.

The general character of the methods used by the Japanese army of occupation may be gathered from the following quotations:

Document C.586.M.233.1931, ⁶ September 21st, reports great destruction of Chinese property and lives at Changchun; it is feared that the city is half in ruins:

"Following bombardment of city by Japanese troops last evening, fire broke out in several sections and a later despatch received here this afternoon states that, while Japanese
are in complete control of situation there, conflagration continues unchecked. Magistrate's office, bureau of foreign affairs, bureau public safety and several other public buildings have gone up in flames while numerous other small private buildings have likewise been razed to ground. Death toll includes Brigadier-Commander Fu, whose unit was garrisoning Changchun and vicinity at time of Japanese invasion. Approximate casualties among Chinese soldiers and civilians estimated 600 while over 1,000 now under detention by Japanese military. . . . Changchun Commissioner of Public Safety, Commander of Special Border Guards, Chairman of Municipal Committee and several officials reported killed."

Document C.591.M.235.1931, September 22nd, says:

"Kirin occupied by Japanese troops six o'clock yesterday evening and all official buildings seized. General Hsyita, Chang Tsohsiang's Chief-of-Staff, Commissioner Ma of Agriculture and Mining and 24th brigade Commander Chang-Ysochu made prisoners. . . . Chinese barracks burned by Japanese troops. Besides killing several Chinese officials, Japa-
nese soldiers also slew their families and buried alive over one hundred wounded Chinese soldiers. . . . New railway depot of Peking-Mukden Railway, cost over million dollars, entirely ruined. Streets of commercial area Mukden being re-named. Conditions at Huang-kutung even worse; communication organs, banks and money exchanges have been confis-
cated. Unscrupulous Koreans rob and plunder Chinese houses. Japanese soldiers after
setting fire Changtu camp put to death over one hundred soldiers."

In another telegram contained in the same communication to the Council, it is reported that
Japanese troops occupied Kowpangtze on September 19th. "Gunfire caused heavy casualties
among Chinese civilians and peasants. . . . Japanese aeroplanes making demonstrations
over Shenyang and Sinmin dropping bombs on innocent inhabitants." At Changchun, "inci-
diary fires lit by Japanese soldiers who taking advantage of confusion looted and plundered.
Peitaying camp and part of buildings of North-Eastern University razed to ground, students
being dispersed. More than a hundred Chinese police murdered in cold blood while number
deaths among civilians cannot be ascertained. Students who offered remonstrances were
bayoneted. Japanese 'mayor' is now in charge of Mukden."

Document C.604.M.242.1931, September 24th, says:

"Massacre of Chinese in Kirin city even more serious than in Mukden. Chinese civil
and military officials were ruthlessly killed; about 200 met their death. Streets of Kirin
have been re-named in Japanese. Railway guards of Kirin-Changchun Railway have been
totally disarmed by Japanese troops; many Chinese civilians in Changchun slain. Chouyu-
ping, director of Changchun Municipal Administration, found lying dead on roadside with
seven bullet wounds fifty-one bayonet cuts; fifteen members of his family were also butchered.
When first occupied Changchun Japanese troops bommed city twenty times in five hours,
ruining large number houses . . . . Over 5,000 Chinese fallen victims to Japanese thirst
for blood in Mukden; three Japanese aeroplanes flying over city scattered handbills announcing
to inhabitants that Japanese are going to hold Liaoning (Mukden) province permanently
and that Chinese should keep quiet and carry on their business. Following appointment of
Colonel Dohibara as 'mayor' of Mukden, various municipal organs there are undergoing
reorganisation, Mukden to be re-named Shengking or incorporated with Kwantung district.
Japanese announce Chinese merchants must resume their business at once. Fifteen million
dollars reserve funds of frontier bank have been seized by Japanese. Machine-guns mounted
on city walls, trenches have been dug at commercial area outside cils. Livoning Provincial

"Confirmed report. . . . Brigadier-Commander Fu together with all members of family
including five-year old son, found with stomach slit open, killed by Japanese troops following
bombardment of Changchun."

Document C.627.M.251.1931, September 28th, mentions that when the Japanese occupied
Tungliao junction "scores of innocent people were killed. Official buildings, private residences
plundered."

Much further evidence could be adduced but that already given clearly establishes the existence
of a deliberate Japanese policy (practically avowed in the proclamation dropped by Japanese
aeroplanes at Chinchow, contained in document C.604.M.299.1931 and quoted above) of (a)
terrorising the population in the occupied areas (b) driving out, imprisoning or slaughtering the

1 See Official Journal, December 1931, page 2460.
representatives of the lawful Chinese Government; and (c) setting up Japanese-controlled puppet authorities in their stead.

IV. Fomenting Disorder.

Part of the policy of terrorism has been to stir up disorder as an excuse for extending Japanese occupation. Here, too, a great deal of evidence was communicated by the Chinese Government from an early stage of the conflict. For instance, document C.679.M.286.1931 contains the following information:

"Japanese are busily arming Mongols in several places. Wire from Chengchiatun says Mongols concentrated at Taling-Chen are starting independence movement under inspiration Japanese. Chief of Young Mongol Party been approached by Japanese to declare independence. Commander Mongol army been coerced to assume command of Mongol forces in district under title of Commander-in-Chief of Autonomous Mongol Army. They are marching on Chengchiatun within few days. First instalment arms supplied by Japanese consists 3,000 rifles, 1,000,000 rounds ammunition, 4 trench mortars, 4 mountain guns with ammunition, 2 aeroplanes—all from Mukden arsenal."

Documents C.718, C.724 and C.789 contain further details of Japanese instigation of disorder and the use of bandits and irregulars both Mongol and Chinese to make trouble as an excuse for further occupation.

The same policy was adopted for the purpose of stirring up disorder along the Peking-Mukden railway (document C.627.1931; tels. 29, 31, 32).

A further step in this policy was Japanese fomentation of disorder at the great port of Tientsin, which is known as the "Shanghai of North China". One of the objects of this action, which led to a good deal of bloodshed, was, as is explained below, to frighten the youthful Puyi into acquiescing in the Japanese demand that he should leave the Japanese concession at Tientsin to a good deal of bloodshed, was, as is explained below, to frighten the youthful Puyi into acquiescing in the Japanese demand that he should leave the Japanese concession at Tientsin and accept the risk of becoming Japan's nominee as head of the Japanese puppet government in Manchuria.

The course of events at Tientsin is clearly indicated in the following communications from the Chinese delegate to the Council of the League (document C.827.M.40.9, November 10th):

"The following information, just received from my Government, reveals the bloodshed and disorder at Tientsin as but as further step in the policy of the Japanese authorities of suborning the dregs of the population in order to foment revolt against the Chinese Government.

"On November 7th and 8th, the Chinese authorities received information indicating that the Japanese had decided to utilise elements among the Chinese population hostile to the Government, so as to disturb peace and order in Tientsin and Peiping before November 16th. On the morning of November 8th, it was reported that the Japanese distributed more than 500 small arms to anti-Government Chinese. On the night of November 8th, at half-past ten, more than two thousand men, in separate groups and flaunting Japanese flags, issued from the Japanese Concession and made surprise attacks on the police stations in Sampeikwan and Heikwanse which are contiguous to the Japanese Concession in Tientsin and also that in Nankai which is contiguous to the Japanese barracks. They had planned to proceed to the Provincial Government and the Municipality as well as to the Public Safety Bureau. Fortunately effective defence measures had been taken by our police so that order was quickly restored. At four o'clock on the morning of the 9th, when the irregular forces from the Japanese Concession had been mastered by the Chinese police, the Japanese Commander at Tientsin requested General Wang, Chairman of the Hopei Provincial Government, by telephone, to withdraw Chinese military and police forces to a distance of three hundred metres from the Japanese Concession by 6 a.m. General Wang asked the reason for this request and pointed out that there was no military force but only Chinese police and members of the Public Safety Bureau; as they were at that very moment doing their duty by putting an end to the disturbance precisely within the three-hundred-metre zone it was difficult to order their withdrawal.

"The Japanese authorities at 5.30 again pressed their demand upon the Provincial Government. This time, as the irregulars had either returned to the Japanese Concession or been killed or captured, General Wang ordered the withdrawal to take place as requested before 6 a.m. Nevertheless, at 6.30 a.m., the Chinese city was suddenly bombarded by more than thirty shells, coming from the direction of Haikwanse, the Japanese barracks and the garden of the Japanese Concession. The Japanese Commander excused himself when asked by the Chinese authorities for an explanation by saying that he knew nothing about the incident. But to the representatives of other nations he is said to have explained..."
that it was due to a clash between the 29th brigade of the Kirin Army and the police force and members of the Public Safety Bureau at Tientsin. It is a sufficient commentary on this explanation to point out that there is no Kirin Army at Tientsin, nor, for that matter, any 29th brigade in the Kirin Army."

Document C.834.M.414.1931, November 11th, says:

"I have received the following further evidence in support of the statement contained in my note of yesterday (document C.827.M.409.1931.VII. of November 10th) that the disorders in Tientsin were instigated by the Japanese military authorities;

"On November 7th and 8th, Hopei Provincial Government was informed that the Japanese Military Headquarters in Tientsin had been giving arms and ammunition to notorious characters, such as Li Lien-hsiang and Chang Pi, with instructions to organise a force of plain-clothes irregulars and plan an attack on the headquarters of the Provincial Government, the Municipal offices, and the Bureau of Public Safety, on November 8th. The Consuls in Tientsin were accordingly informed of these reports and precautionary measures were taken. The result was that when the irregulars erupted from the Japanese Concession on the evening of November 8th, as described in my previous note, they were repulsed, but only after fierce fighting, in which they made a counter-attack and for a time held the 6th Chinese police station in the 1st police district and the 6th Chinese police station in the 2nd police district. A dozen prisoners were made who corroborated the report that the attack had been instigated by the Japanese. The arms taken from these prisoners were of Japanese make. On examining a shell fired from the Japanese Concession to the Chinese city it has been found bearing following words 'made 15th year Taisho'."

"On the morning of November 10th, a motor-car coming from the Japanese Concession to the Chinese city was searched by the Chinese police who found therein 15 rifles and 20,000 rounds of ammunition, all made by the Mukden Arsenal, which was seized by the Japanese troops on the night of September 18th and occupied by them since that date. In the same motor-car there were also hand-grenades bearing the following words '15th year Taisho'." ("15th year Taisho" is Japanese chronology and refers to the reign of the Emperor.)

Further information is contained in documents C.847 and C.868 which is quoted below.

The Japanese denial of being in any way responsible for the disorders at Tientsin is contained in the same communication (document C.878) as the Japanese denial of any intention of using Puyi for establishing a puppet Government in Manchuria. Both denials are of equal value.

V. Setting up of Puppet Authorities.

Instances of the policy of setting up puppet authorities have already been given in connection with the account of the events preceding the capture of Tsitsihar and are contained among the data quoted to illustrate the development of the Japanese policy of terrorism. The following further instances which are inseparable from Japanese preparations for a permanent stay in Manchuria, may be quoted:

Document C.592.M.236.1931:


Document C.627.M.251.1931, despatch No. 30:


1 See Official Journal, December 1931, page 2545.
hunger strike. Asked to sign document admitting Chinese soldiers had first launched attacks
South Manchuria Railway, Tsang flatly refused declaring he rather lose head than affix signature on fabricated document."

Document C.661.M.272.1931:1

"Japanese-owned Chinese language newspapers inciting north-eastern public self-government and independence. Responded by few disappointed politicians and speculative local rogues."

Document C.733.M.338.1931:2

"The Japanese Army is feverishly consolidating its hold on all the principal towns of Manchuria, outside the railway zone, northward including Kirin and Taonan, from Chosen on the east into Mongolia on the west. They are trying to induce the Mongolian princes to sign away their rights and to set up an independent government under Japanese protection. The Japanese Army is rooting out at all centres the Chinese civil government, who are offering no resistance, and are forcing unwilling Chinese individuals to organise puppet independent governments in all the main areas. They openly refuse to recognise Chinese national and civil authority in Manchuria."

The Japanese have seized the reserves and deposits of the larger Chinese banks, the records of corporations and large quantities of both military and industrial supplies. They are feverishly extending their telegraph and telephone systems.

"The Japanese have occupied every Chinese public office in Antung, excepting the Customs House, which has Europeans in it. They have, however, placed a guard over the Chinese Customs Superintendent, and are denying him freedom of action. The Chinese banks have been seized and are now operated by them. They have arrested the Superintendent of Schools, and are forbidding the teaching of Sun Yat Sen's principles."

"The Japanese Army occupied Kirin, seventy-nine miles east of the South Manchuria Railway zone, on September 19th. They seized and hold the telegraph office, the telephone office, the wireless stations, the provincial arsenal, the water-works, the local office of the Bank of China, the Kirin Provincial Bank, police headquarters and branch headquarters of the Kuomintang Party, and all other public offices. The non-military population was subjected to an exhaustive search. Troops and military cadets were disarmed, and arms and munitions were removed from the Chinese arsenal, including modern rifles, field guns, heavy guns, military motor trucks. They are building a large flying field at Kirin. They impressed certain Chinese and dictated the formation there of a civil government independent of the Chinese provincial and national authorities. The Japanese Army has taken possession of the provincial treasury."

The Council, it will be recalled, requested its Members to obtain information from their representatives on the spot as to the situation in Manchuria. A most important communication from the German Government is contained in document C.752.M.351.1931:3

"Municipal administration of Mukden handed over on October 20th to the Mayor Chao Hsin-Po. Former provincial authorities being re-installed; financial and industrial services and traffic commission will soon follow suit. Question of the Governor undecided. All new authorities have, like the Banks of Issue, received Japanese advisers, who are for the most part influential high officials of the South Manchuria Railway."

In documents C.7894 and C.7935 of November 3rd and 4th, the Chinese Government adduces evidence as to the seizure of the salt revenues, of which more will be said below, and other matters that lead it to the conclusion that "it is now clear that the Japanese Army of occupation is pursuing a deliberate policy of trying to substitute for the authority of the Chinese Government the rule of various groups and individuals set up and maintained by the Japanese themselves".

As early as November 18th, the Chinese Government reported to the Council that a plot was on foot by the Japanese authorities to use the young Puyi, the ex-emperor of the former Manchu dynasty, who had for years been living in the Japanese Concession at Tientsin, as a Japanese tool in the establishment of a pseudo-government in Manchuria. This information is contained in document C.868.M.466.19316, from which the following passages may be quoted:

"Since the forcible occupation of various places in the north-eastern provinces, the Japanese military authorities have been frequently instigating or utilising bandits, rebels and other undesirable elements to disturb local peace and order as well as to organise illegal governments which are usurping administrative powers under the protection or coercion of the Japanese troops.

"It has been lately reported that during the recent disturbance in Tientsin created by insurgent rioters who made use of the Japanese Concession as a base of occupations, the ex-Emperor Puyi of the former Manchu dynasty was kidnapped and escorted by the Japanese troops."

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1 See Official Journal, December 1931, page 2479.
from the said Concession to Mukden for establishing a bogus government with himself proclaimed as emperor.

“The National Government has already declared to the League of Nations and to the Governments of friendly Powers that the Chinese Government and people will not recognise any illegitimate institutions established in subversion of China’s administrative integrity in those places of the north-eastern provinces which remain under the occupation of Japanese troops. In the event that establishment of Puyi’s bogus government is confirmed, the National Government will regard such government as a seditious institution and at the same time as an auxiliary organ of the Japanese Government in disguise, while all acts of such government which are necessarily illegal will be repudiated by the National Government.”

The next day, November 19th, the Japanese Government (document C.878.M.454.1931) stated that it denied formally:

“. . . any participation by the Japanese authorities in a movement for the restoration of the ex-Emperor Puyi. The Japanese authorities have, on the contrary, always discouraged any attempt of this kind. According to a telegram received from our Consul-General at Tientsin, the ex-Emperor Puyi did not feel himself to be in safety, having been frequently threatened and having even had two bombs sent to him in a parcel on November 6th. He fled during the Tientsin riots without the knowledge of the Japanese authorities.”

At an early stage in the development of the puppet government policy, the Japanese Government declared that:

“Reports from Manchuria state that various separatist movements have broken out. Regarding these movements as purely Chinese affairs, to be dealt with by the inhabitants of Manchuria themselves, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs gave formal instructions to the Japanese Consular authorities in those regions on September 27th, 1931, that Japanese residents must be strictly forbidden to take part in these movements” (document C.676.M.283.1931, of October 7th).

In document C.357.M.208.1932, the Japanese Government gives an extremely tendentious account of the formation of the puppet Government designed to obscure the clear fact that the whole movement has been engineered and controlled from the outset by the Japanese army of occupation. But even this account contains the following significant passage:

“The Japanese forces are at present providing the forces of this Government in a friendly spirit with such assistance as they may need to restore and maintain order and tranquillity.”

On February 9th, M. Sato announced in a public meeting of the Council, and was duly recorded as so stating in the roneoed verbatim records, that an “independent” Government had been established in Manchuria and added “the setting up of this autonomy in Manchuria has been supported by Japan”. M. Sato spoke in French and the French verbatim record reports him as follows: “Le Japon a donné son appui à l’établissement de cette indépendance.”

In the printed Minutes, where each delegation corrects its own contribution to the discussion, the Japanese delegation made a very significant change. The printed Minutes read: “Japan has regarded favourably the establishment of Manchuria’s independence.” The corrected Minutes however, do still contain unchanged the second half of M. Sato’s statement in the Council when he announced that “our invested capital in Manchuria is too considerable to make it possible for us to accept any system of government in that country. We cannot acquiesce in an arbitrary system of government, one that jeopardises this capital which represents very large sums of money.”

Under Article 10 of the Covenant, Japan is pledged to respect China’s territorial integrity and political independence and under Article 1, paragraph 1, of the Nine-Power Treaty she has undertaken to respect China’s sovereignty, independence and territorial and administrative integrity. The announcement of Japanese policy officially made by the Japanese delegate to the Council of the League of Nations is clearly impossible to reconcile with these treaty obligations. And if the doctrine were admitted for a single moment that a country is entitled to dictate what sort of government there should be in the territory of another country, in order in the view of the former country to safeguard its investments in that territory, there would be an end to international order and peace.

VI. Seizing Coal Mines, Land, Salt and Customs Revenues.

Japanese occupation very soon developed an economic aspect. In addition to controlling banks and commercial establishments, the Japanese authorities seized coal mines and land, and went on to confiscate the salt and Customs revenues.

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1 See Official Journal, December 1931, page 2584.
3 See Annex XIV, Communication No. 4.
4 See Official Journal, March 1932 (Part I), page 364.
Some of the evidence has been already referred to in previous sections, but the following may be added:

Document C.661.M.272.1931, October 5th:

"Escaped banker from Mukden states, first, business firms there closed again because disorder and damages caused by Japanese troops and Koreans although they had repeatedly resumed business under Japanese compulsion. Banks still closed including Hong-Kong Shanghai Bank, National City Bank New York."

Document C.743.M.343.1931, October 21st:

"The Frontier Bank and the Three Eastern Provinces Bank at Mukden have re-opened for business, under severe restrictions imposed by the Japanese military authorities now occupying that city.

"These restrictions include the following rules, that a supervisor for each bank must be appointed from the Japanese army, that there be special investigators from time to time, that business must be suspended at any time at the discretion of the Japanese army, that the employment of all bank officials be subject to the approval of the Japanese army and that no business regarded as injurious to the interests of the Japanese army may be transacted."

Document C.838.M.418.1931, November 12th:

"A Japanese detachment of fifty soldiers with machine-guns has seized an important Chinese mine—the Fuchowan colliery of the North-Eastern Mining Corporation. The Japanese immediately appointed a Japanese superintendent and Japanese advisers in all departments, while compelling the Chinese staff to remain. This mine is a privately-owned commercial enterprise, belonging to a group of Chinese Banks and individuals, and was started three years ago with a capital of three million silver dollars. It produces 250,000 tons of anthracite per year, and has been coveted by the Japanese for a long time. The mine is situated near Dairen, but outside of the leased territory. The seizure is an act of pure spoliation, with no shadow of legal justification."

Document C.839.M.419.1931, November 12th:

"The Japanese military authorities, who seized all the official documents at Mukden and Kirin after driving out the representatives of the lawful Chinese Government and substituting puppet governments of their own, are now altering and forging land deeds and mining licences in favour of Japanese. Over 2,000 landowners in Mukden alone have already suffered in this fashion.

"A typical instance is a proclamation by the so-called Shiuwo Agricultural Company, one of the mushroom growths of the Japanese occupation, addressed to Chinese land-owners stating that:

"Estate at Tsekwantum, West of Mukden, sold by original owner King, who sold to Lee and Yang in 1914, then Lee and Yang leased to Japanese, Koga and Watenabe, who transferred rights to this company. All land deeds, plans and other evidences are in our possession. You are cultivating our land without our consent which is illegal. If you want to continue the cultivation, come to us before November 6th and sign new contract of lease, otherwise said estate will be leased to others.—(Seal) Shiuwo Agricultural Company, October 31st."

"Thus the Japanese occupation, as time passes, not only extends the area occupied but increases its hold on the country. Undertaken ostensibly to protect the lives and property of Japanese subjects, it began by destroying all the Chinese organs of government and supplying Mongol bandits and other disaffected elements with arms and went on to instal Japanese advisers in banks and commercial establishments, setting up puppet administrations under Japanese control, and to seize the salt revenues and other monies. It has now gone on to seize private property, such as coal mines, and carry out large-scale falsifications of title deeds to land."

1 See Official Journal, December 1931, page 2470.
As regards the seizure of the salt revenues the details are contained in document C.789,\(^1\)
C.793,\(^2\) C.810,\(^3\) C.818,\(^4\) and C.852.\(^5\)

The first reports of the seizure of the salt revenues by Japanese soldiers with fixed bayonets acting under the orders of Japanese advisers, were denied by the Japanese Government in document C.811.M.401;\(^6\) the Japanese Government in this communication stated that the Chinese Committee for the Maintenance of Order at Mukden asked the Newchwang Salt Revenue Office to hand over the balance of the tax receipts and the latter "agreed to send the said balance, together with the net balance of the tax to be collected. Thus the allegation that the Japanese military authorities have forcibly seized the revenue from the salt tax is entirely unfounded. The Japanese military authorities have entirely refrained from interfering in purely Chinese affairs, assuming that there was no reason to object to the Mukden Chinese Committee for the Maintenance of Order, which discharges these duties in the place of General Chang Hsueh-liang, receiving the balance in question from the Newchwang Salt Revenue Office, which is also a Chinese organ."

The Chinese Government thereupon communicated to the League a very detailed statement (document C.852.M.430.1931, November 13th)\(^7\) from Dr. Frederick A. Cleveland, Associate Inspector-General of the Salt Revenue, in which he gave a minute description with names, dates and times, of the proceedings of the armed Japanese detachments that broke into the district offices of the Salt Revenue, held up and covered the Salt Inspection Office's personnel, told them not to move and then took possession of their accounts and cash. He further gave the names of the Japanese army paymasters who had accompanied these detachments and given receipts for the money taken and concluded his report by stating that photostatic copies of the receipt by Japanese officers for the money taken at Newchwang were being furnished to the foreign delegations in China.

This was too much even for the Japanese to deny so that the next communication from the Japanese Government (document C.863.M.441.1931, November 17th)\(^8\) admitted that the Japanese military authorities had indeed done what they were accused of doing and attempted to justify this action by an argument the gist of which was that they objected so strongly to the way in which the Chinese Government used its own revenues for the purposes of its own administrative expenditure that "it is perfectly comprehensible that in these exceptional circumstances the Japanese military authorities should have interfered with the despatch of funds... Accordingly the action of the military authorities in intervening to transfer the surplus revenue of the Chinese Salt Tax Office to another Chinese body cannot be regarded as unjustifiable."

The despatch closes with the following assertion:

"The Japanese Government considers that the measures taken by the military authorities are in no way contrary to the resolution of the Council of the League of September 30th or to the declaration made by the Japanese representative at the Council meetings of October 24th and 25th."

This statement was presumably made with reference to the following statement by the President of the Council (M. Briand) in a communication to the Japanese Government dated November 5th (document C.810.M.400.1931)\(^9\) from which the following passages may be quoted:

"The Chinese representative refers in particular to the seizure by the Japanese military authorities of part of the salt revenue of Newchwang, which is said to be only the first of other operations of the same nature.

'Your Excellency will remember that, in paragraph 5 of the Council Resolution of September 30th, the Japanese Government had already undertaken to ' adopt all necessary measures not to extend the incident or aggravate the situation'. At the meetings of the Council on October 23rd and 24th, moreover, Your Excellency spontaneously renewed on several occasions the formal assurance that the Japanese Government intended 'to bring back its troops within the railway zone as soon as it could regard the safety of its nationals and the protection of their property as effectively assured', Japan for her part being prepared to facilitate by all the means in her power the 'pacification' which appeared to her to be indispensable for the fulfilment of this condition of security formulated by herself.

'It is obvious that acts of the kind reported, such as the seizure of the salt revenue cannot be related to the safety of Japanese nationals and the protection of their property and that they would therefore be incompatible with the undertakings entered into before the Council and with the spontaneous assurances recorded by it."

Japan is adopting a similar course with regard to the Customs revenue. The evidence is contained in the following documents:

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\(^{1}\) See Official Journal, December 1931, page 2538.
\(^{3}\) See Official Journal, December 1931, page 2524.
\(^{5}\) See Official Journal, December 1931, page 2527.
\(^{6}\) See Official Journal, December 1931, page 2524.
\(^{7}\) See Official Journal, December 1931, page 2526.
Documents A.(Extr.).37; A.(Extr.).39; A.(Extr.).72; A.(Extr.).78; and A.(Extr.).92, give a detailed account of how Japanese advisers of the so-called “independent” Government have compelled the commissioners of Customs at Antung and Newchwang to hand over their funds and have taken charge of the Customs services. It is further reported that “the Japanese are arranging a Customs Union of the three eastern provinces with Japan, thus completely severing Manchuria from China and attaching it to Japan.”

The usual denials (documents A.(Extr.).60.1932 and A.(Extr.).96.1932) have been issued by the Japanese Government. The first denial admits the main charge—namely, that a Japanese so-called adviser is interfering with the Chinese Customs Service, and both denials will no doubt in due course meet the same fate as the various Japanese assurances, denials and pledges which have abounded since September 18th.

It is scarcely necessary to point out that this interference with Customs and Salt Revenues is a further violation of Article 10 of the Covenant and Article 1 of the Nine-Power Treaty. It may be added, that as these two revenues are the security for a number of China’s foreign and domestic loans, the Japanese interference in addition to being illegal is doing serious harm to the interests of foreign bondholders of Chinese loans.

VII. Present Position.

Six months of Japanese misrule and oppression have plunged China’s once-prosperous eastern provinces into chaos and ruin.

Some of the evidence is contained in the communications to the League from the Chinese Government since the outset of the conflict. For instance, document C.634.M.252.1931, September 28th reports:

“Foreigners arriving from Mukden describe conditions terrible, people in state of terror rapidly becoming foodless, no money owing to banks being closed by Japanese. All shops closed.”

The foreign Press prints almost daily accounts of the guerrilla war raging throughout the territory enjoying the blessings of Japanese “order”.

The Times, London, of March 1st, prints an article from a correspondent in Manchuria from which the following passages may be quoted:

“The first and most serious effect of the military coup of September 18th, 1931, when Mukden was seized, was the immediate paralysis of the established Chinese authority, both in the capital and in the country. Whether intended or not, the consequences for the millions of inhabitants during the succeeding months have been disastrous. The mechanism of trade and commerce has been thrown out of gear at a time when, among other causes, the world slump in prices had already led to widespread financial depression. Worse still, the country became infested with roving bands of brigands, horse and foot. It is true that during normal years brigandage is endemic in the land, though held in constant check by the authorities. But now, owing to the dissolution of the greater part of the provincial army, lawlessness with its attendant savagery prevails throughout vast areas, causing untold agony to the respectable classes of the community, especially to the modest Chinese women.

“Until the breakdown of authority in September the taking of life by the robber bands was rare. It was the Japanese initiative which gave rise to a state of insecurity, likely to continue either until the invaders spread their military control throughout the whole vast extent of Manchuria, which is twice the size of Japan, or until the legitimate Chinese authority is permitted to return.”

The Manchester Guardian, of March 11th, prints an article by a Mukden resident in which the following passage occurs:

“The ‘order, security, progress and development’ that Japan has set up are not welcome. We see scores of chimney-stacks standing gaunt, department stores employing from fifty to two hundred shopmen each with hardly a customer, pawnshops and distilleries afraid to open their doors, doing only a letter business through barred windows one foot square. Hundreds of mansions are empty. A foreigner can have a twenty-roomed house, servants, coal, electricity, motor-car, rent free, if he will only live there as watchman. Labourers, masons, joiners, all trades are completely stopped, and so tragic and desperate is the fate of the poor who cannot flee that in Mukden city, one of the granaries of the world, free food depots have

1 See Annex XIII, A, Communications Nos. 2, 3, 7, 9 and 10.
2 See Annex XIII, B, Communications Nos. 1 and 2.
had to be organised. The ruin is complete; her citizens are little interested in the academic question of to whom or what her former prosperity was due. A foreign invader has upset it all, of that there is no question, and race hatred has burst out anew.

"Whether Japan’s action on September 18th was justified is another question, but at the bar of history Japan will inevitably be called upon to answer for her share in the red ruin that has since spread like a disease through the province."

The Morning Post, of April 13th, publishes a despatch from its Harbin correspondent revealing, not only the appalling disorder in Manchuria but the way in which the Japanese are controlling the puppet government:

"At the present moment, it cannot be said that the results of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria have proved very satisfactory, as there are still large bands of demoralised soldiers who refuse to recognise the new State, and there are also hundreds of thousands of Chinese residents who are not in accord with the present government. . . Unless the Japanese can clear the district of these demoralised soldiers within the next two to three weeks, it will be hopeless to make an attempt in spring or summer. . . .

"Until the country is entirely cleared of those who are against the new Manchukuo State, it cannot be said that the Japanese scheme has really succeeded.

"Though the new State is said to be Chinese, the administration of the country is at the present moment not in the hands of the Chinese, but in the hands of the Japanese advisers. There is not one administrative organ in the country, down to the smallest police station, which has not now a Japanese adviser at the head of the staff, and without him the Chinese nominal head is unable to do anything at all.

"Whether the Chinese will continue to serve under the Japanese, or whether there will be a revolt which might result in great bloodshed, remains to be seen, and it will take all the tact and astuteness of the Japanese who control the situation to prevent trouble arising, as the ordinary Chinese citizen is deeply incensed at the Japanese occupation of his country."

For months the Japanese Government has been pouring communications into the Secretariat as to the fearful and growing disorder in the territory under Japanese military occupation. M. Sato, in an interview in the News Chronicle of March 18th, is reported as saying:

"In ten years we shall establish order and security in Manchuria."

It is clear that, on the one hand, the Japanese are preparing to stay in Manchuria, and, on the other, that they are utterly incapable of maintaining order on Chinese territory. It is obvious on the face of it that order can only be maintained where the Government has the allegiance of the population. The three eastern provinces have an area greater than France and Germany combined, and a population of 30 millions, mostly sturdy peasants who hate the alien tyranny set up by the Japanese invaders and consider it a patriotic duty to combat that tyranny by every means at their disposal. In this view, they have the full moral support of the whole Chinese nation, a people of 400,000,000. They know that the Chinese Government will never consent to sign any treaty with Japan so long as the illegal occupation continues: they know that China is supported in this attitude by the whole civilised world and this knowledge increases their strength and resistance.

To complete the picture, reference may be made to the speech recently made by M. Matsudaira, the Japanese Ambassador in London, when he said, as reported in The Times, of April 7th, that "the Manchurian affair had its root deeply embedded in history and Japanese political and strategical interests were involved in it as well as economic interests . . . This statement confirms the view always held by the Chinese Government that the real object of Japanese policy was not to assure economic co-operation with China, since such co-operation can be promoted only by peace and good neighbourly relations between the two countries, but is directed to establishing a political protectorate over Manchuria.

VIII. Conclusion.

The facts speak so eloquently for themselves that no comment is necessary. In his letter to Senator Borah of last February, the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Stimson, declared that "a situation has developed which cannot under any circumstances be reconciled with the obligations of the Covenants of these two treaties (the Pact of Paris and the Nine-Power Treaty) and that if the treaties had been faithfully observed, such a situation could not have arisen.

We believe that this situation would have been avoided had these Covenants been faithfully observed and no evidence has come to us to indicate that a due compliance with them would have interfered with the adequate protection of the legitimate rights in China of the signatories of those treaties and their nationals.

The Chinese Government has no doubt that the Assembly shares the view of the United States Government that has just been quoted, and will not hesitate to state that the present situation is incompatible with the Covenant and would not have arisen if the Covenant had been observed. Such a statement would merely, indeed, constitute an application of the principles enunciated in the
Assembly resolution of March 11th, making it perfectly clear that any change in the political, administrative or fiscal relations between China's eastern provinces and the rest of China effected or maintained by foreign support or taking place on Chinese territory, which is under foreign military occupation, is contrary to Article 10 of the Covenant and Article 1 of the Nine-Power Treaty, and so cannot be recognised by any member of the League as valid or effectual.

A further unavoidable conclusion from adopting the view already expressed by the United States, as to the nature of the present situation and from applying the principles contained in the Assembly resolution of March 11th, is that the appearance of a so-called "independent" government in the occupied territory in no way releases Japan from her obligation to put an end to a situation incompatible with the Covenant by withdrawing her troops. Nor does it release the other members of the League from their obligation under Article 10 of the Covenant to preserve China's territorial integrity and political independence against external aggression.


A.(Extr.).64.1932.VII.
[Extract.]

1. LETTER, DATED MARCH 18TH, 1932, FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE ACTING PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL.

Geneva, March 18th, 1932.

In execution of the mandate given to him at its meeting of March 17th, the President of the Special Committee of the Assembly has instructed me to inform you that, referring to the penultimate paragraph of the Assembly's resolution of March 11th, the Committee would attach great importance to receiving at the earliest moment which the Council may find possible any reports which may reach the Council from the Commission appointed by its resolution of December 10th, 1931. In particular, the Committee desires to receive information as soon as may be possible in regard to the general situation in Manchuria. The Committee would be most grateful to you if, in your capacity as President of the Council, you would consider what steps may be taken in order to give effect so far as is possible to the wishes which it has expressed.

(Signed) Eric Drummond,
Secretary-General.

A.(Extr.).64.1932.VII.
[Extract.]

2. REPLY, DATED MARCH 18TH, 1932, ADDRESSED ON BEHALF OF THE ACTING PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY.

Geneva, March 18th, 1932.

I have the honour, on behalf of the President of the Council of the League of Nations, to acknowledge receipt of the letter dated March 18th which you addressed to him through my intermediary on behalf of the Special Committee of the Assembly. The President of the Council is communicating this letter without delay to the Members of the Council and also to the Commission of Enquiry which was appointed by the Council by its resolution of December 10th, 1931.

(Signed) Eric Drummond,
Secretary-General.
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ABBREVIATIONS.

Art. = Article  
Ass. = Assembly  
Cl. = Council  
Comm. = Commission  
Cttee. = Committee  
Conf. = Conference  
Del. = Delegation  
Govt. = Government  
Int. = International  
Memo. = Memorandum  
Para. = Paragraph  
Resol. = Resolution  
Sec. Gen. = Secretary-General  
Tel. = Telegram  
U.S.A. = United States of America

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