It is desirable that this naval police force should be supplemented by some modern craft, much larger and better armed. This fleet should include at least 8 destroyers of 800 tons each and 8 torpedo boats of 250-300 tons each, organised in 4 divisions of 4 units each. The naval police should be placed under the command of the frontier guards. The naval police on the Danube should consist of 3 flotillas of 4 motor-boats each, based on Ruschuk, Lom, and Widin.

V. Air Clauses. In conformity with the provisions of Articles 89 and 94 of the Treaty of Neuilly, the Bulgarian Military Flying Corps was abolished. It should, however, be recognised that, in addition to the purely military objects which a flying corps is chiefly designed to fulfil, it may be very useful for maintaining order in the interior and particularly for the suppression of smuggling. If Bulgaria had possessed a well-organised flying corps, it could have been successfully used on several occasions during the last few years, e.g.:

1. In 1919, on the occasion of the riots and disturbances in the interior.
2. In 1920, on the occasion of the general railway strike.
3. Against brigandage and smuggling on the frontiers.
4. In May 1921, on the occasion of the recent attempts to carry out smuggling by aeroplanes.

Owing to the absence of a military air force, Bulgaria has suffered considerable loss, which has affected both the exchequer and individuals, during the last few years. Having been admitted to membership of the League of Nations, Bulgaria has had to adhere to the International Air Convention. She has in consequence assumed certain obligations in regard to the maintenance of air police for the great international air routes which traverse her territory (see Articles 204-212 of the Treaty of Peace).

Bulgaria accordingly requests permission to organise three air squadrons based on Sofia, Varna and Yamboli respectively, and also two naval air squadrons based on Varna and Burgas respectively; each squadron to consist of four machines.

CONCLUSION.

In submitting these observations for the consideration of the Assembly, the Bulgarian Government trusts that it will be recognised that the arguments set forth above, upon which it has based its request for a revision of the military, naval and air clauses of the Peace Treaty, are well founded. These clauses should, it is submitted, be modified on the following general lines:

1. The recruiting of the Bulgarian armed forces should be carried out under the compulsory system; military service should not exceed two to three years.
2. The total number of soldiers allowed for the regular army should be increased by 10,000; that of the frontier guards and gendarmerie by 5,000.
3. The proportion of officers should be raised to 1:15 of the total strength of the armed forces.
4. Bulgaria should be allowed to maintain a military school for the training of N.C.O.s.
5. The naval police should be increased to a minimum of 8 destroyers of 800 tons each, 8 torpedo boats of 250-300 tons each, and 12 motor-boats of 100 tons each.
6. Permission should be given for the formation of three squadrons of aeroplanes and two squadrons of seaplanes to assist the naval police and the frontier guards.

It is hoped that these suggestions, which are of vital importance for the Bulgarian nation, will be favourably considered by the League of Nations. By allowing Bulgaria to maintain an armed force, however small, recruited under the compulsory system, the League would enable our State to exist under normal conditions, and would ensure a peaceful and tranquil future for our people.

I have, etc.,

For the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs:

(Signed) P. Janoff,
Minister of Justice ad interim.

His Excellency
Monsieur Paul Hymans,
Acting President of the Council of the League of Nations,
Geneva.
Your Excellency,

In reply to your C. L. 54, dated June 12th, 1922, I have the honour to bring to your notice the observations relating to the requirements of the geographical situation and special circumstances of the Czechoslovak Republic which the Czechoslovak Government thinks well to submit in connection with the proposals to be made by the Temporary Mixed Commission, with a view to the drawing-up of a scheme for the reduction of national armaments.

For many reasons the Republic is placed in an exceptionally difficult position as regards the defence of its territory. The chief of these reasons are as follows:—

The frontiers of the Republic are very considerable in length (2,500 kilometres); the natural obstacles protecting the frontiers are, generally speaking, of small value.

The vital centres of the country are all very close to the frontier, a fact which is inevitable owing to the shape of the territory. In case of war, they would be exposed to immediate bombardment from the air or even to gunfire.

Relations between the various parts of the Republic would become most uncertain in the event of war, as the lines of communication between them are few and are very exposed by reason of their proximity to the frontiers.

It will be sufficient to point out, for instance, that the only satisfactory means of communication between Bohemia and Eastern Slovakia is the Prague-Ces-Trebova-Zilina Railway; only part of this line is double track; it runs only some 30 kilometres to the south of the Kladsko Basin, and skirts the frontier in the Tesin district.

This scanty and extremely vulnerable system of communications renders it particularly difficult for the Republic to concentrate its forces in any threatened region.

On the other hand, the neighbouring countries possess near the frontiers of the Republic a highly developed system of communications, excellently adapted to offensive operations. A brief examination of a railway map will make this plain to the least-experienced eye.

It need only be pointed out here that Bohemia is, as it were, hemmed in by a German double-track line with numerous branch lines running to the frontier, and that the double-track from Budapest to Satoraljaujhely and its branch lines running to the Slovakian frontier afford the Magyars opportunities of manoeuvring which the Republican armies are far from possessing.

In order to realise clearly the serious disadvantages under which the Republic labours in respect of communications, it should also be borne in mind that the vital centres (industrial and other) of the Republic and the lines of communication being, as stated, very near the frontier, a bombing squadron of enemy aeroplanes could carry out several flights in one day between its base and the objectives assigned to it in Czechoslovak territory. It would thus obtain results equal to, or at least approaching, those which might be expected of an aerial force two or three times as great in numbers or in transport capacity.

It is clear that any limitations which have been or may be imposed on the commercial aviation of the possible enemies of the Republic in regard to the radius of activity, transport capacity, etc., of the machines are in part rendered illusory by the proximity of the important objectives which these machines would find in Czechoslovak territory.

It should also be borne in mind that the Republic might in certain conceivable circumstances be isolated, by reason of its geographical situation (the uncertainty of communications with its allies and the difficulties of providing all kinds of supplies).

The effect of all these circumstances, namely —

The proximity to the frontier of all the vital points of the country;

The scanty and extremely vulnerable system of communications;

The great advantages which possible enemies of the Republic might derive from communications peculiarly adapted to offensive operations —

is that a surprise attack could easily be made on the Republic and that such an attack, even if carried out with small forces, might in a short space of time obtain considerable success, the consequences of which might be irreparable.
The Republic has no other means of countering this danger than by maintaining a peace strength sufficient to protect the frontiers at a moment’s notice. The Republic could not even fall back upon the expedient of evacuating the threatened area in order to concentrate its forces in the rear, or at least it could do so only in certain special contingencies, on which it is obviously impossible to base the whole system of national defence.

The problem of the organisation of national defence thus presents extreme difficulties for the Republic. Doubtless other countries experience similar difficulties, but it may confidently be asserted that in none of them are these difficulties more acute.

It is only right that this peculiar position should be recognised when considering the extent of the military effort which the Republic has made, and may make in the future, in order to safeguard its independence.

As regards the statement as to which part of the total military forces of the Republic is intended to meet the requirements of domestic order, it is impossible to give such a definition, since it is actually on the external situation that these requirements depend.

I have the honour to be, Sir, etc.,

(Signed) Edouard Beneš,
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

To His Excellency the Acting President of the Council of the League of Nations, Geneva.

REPLY OF ESTHONIA

(Translation.)

MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ESTHONIA.

TALLINN, July 8th, 1922.

Your Excellency,

With reference to my letter of May 13th last, No. 7304, I have the honour to bring to Your Excellency’s notice the statement in question:

Geographically, Esthonia is situated on the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea, behind which lies Russia, with its special State organisation. It is well known that Communism has aggressive tendencies and employs all possible means to extend its influence over fresh territories.

Moreover, there exists in Esthonia a minority whose aims are opposed to those of the Esthonian people, and who, should occasion arise, would find sympathisers abroad.

It is with these conditions that Esthonia is obliged to reckon. Esthonia has no aggressive intentions, and the sole object of her military forces and her defensive preparations is the preservation of her independence and freedom.

The organisation of her military forces is based on the principle of the maintenance of a standing skeleton army, in which all young and physically fit citizens receive military training. Taking into consideration the total population (1 ½ millions), the length of active military service (1 ½ years) and the fact that each year’s contingent of young men numbers about 8,000, the permanent military forces may be put at about 12,000 men.

To this figure must be added the officers, military officials and non-commissioned officers serving beyond the compulsory period, about 3,000 men in all.

The maintenance of the forces (military, naval and air), the construction of the necessary barracks and the purchase of material for training and defence absorbs about 30 per cent. of the total budget of the State, three-quarters of the total expenditure being for ordinary expenditure. This serious burden is imposed on Esthonia by her geographical and political situation.

To ensure internal order, Esthonia maintains at present about 1,500 police officers.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) Ant. Pip.

His Excellency Monsieur Paul Hymans,
Acting President of the Council of the League of Nations.
REPLY OF FINLAND

(Translation.)

MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

No. 8938

Helsingfors, July 10th, 1932.

Sir,

In a letter dated April 13th last, giving effect to the resolution of the Second Assembly of the League of Nations, you requested the Finnish Government to furnish a statement of the considerations it might wish to urge in regard to the requirements of its national security, its international obligations, its geographical situation and its special circumstances; and, in particular, to indicate separately the police and military forces which it considers indispensable for the preservation of domestic order, and the expenditure thereby entailed.

In a letter dated June 12th last, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs furnished you with the data asked for in a Questionnaire of November 29th, 1921.

This letter of June 12th informed you, among other things, that in peace-time the conscripts of one class only are called up each year, and that the number of men called up for military service in 1921 was 30,904, of whom 17,281 were declared fit for active service.

The expenditure on national defence, which amounted to 35,197,110 Swiss francs in 1921, was 13.8% of the budget total; taxation for national defence came to 10.55 Swiss francs per head of the population, and that of all taxation was 76.35 Swiss francs per head.

Finland, with a total area of 387,580 square kilometres, has a population of 3,335,237; her land frontiers are 3,040 kilometres long and her coastline 1,654 kilometres.

Before answering the question as to the number of fighting men and the quantity of munitions required for the national security of Finland, we must first consider the extent of her frontiers and her exceedingly exposed situation, which, from the Middle Ages onwards, has meant that Finland has often been a battlefield. One of her neighbours, Russia, who is not a Member of the League of Nations, and whose political organisation is founded on a system fundamentally different from those of the Western Powers, possesses a considerable army a portion of which, acting in concert with the Baltic Fleet, might constitute a menace to Finland.

The figures quoted, and a cursory examination of the map, will suffice to show that the Finnish Army has been reduced to the minimum required for the defence of the country's frontiers.

The estimates for national defence mentioned above are also quite low, in view of the fact that it was not until 1918 that Finland began to organise her army and to construct her fortifications, and particularly if one bears in mind the amount of material of all kinds which has had to be imported for these purposes at most unfavourable rates of exchange.

With regard to the strength of the armed forces required for the maintenance of internal order, I am informed by the competent authorities that, owing to the general political situation, they cannot give exact figures. There are, however, no troops in Finland intended solely for police duties.

I have, therefore, in view of the above, the honour to express the firm conviction of the Government of the Finnish Republic that, considering her situation and general political conditions, Finland cannot at present reduce her defence forces without at once endangering her own independence, and thereby the security of the Northern States.

I have the honour to be, etc.,

(Signed) Carl Enckell.

Sir Eric Drummond,
Secretary-General of the League of Nations,
Geneva.
REPLY OF FRANCE

France’s armaments must meet at the same time the international obligations which arise from the application of the Treaties and the requirements of the security of the country, including her colonies.

* * *

The obligations arising out of the application of the Treaties are at present as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Men.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rhine Provinces</td>
<td>92,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance of order in the Saar</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance of order in Upper Silesia and at Memel</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation of Constantinople and the Straits</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandates for Syria, the Cameroons and Togoland</td>
<td>42,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approximate total</td>
<td>160,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No other European Power has assumed such extensive international obligations. France continues, however, with determination to fulfil her engagements towards her Allies, and it may be said that through the position which she occupies on the Rhine, owing to the relative importance of her military forces, she is bearing the heaviest burdens arising out of the application of the Treaties in Western Europe.

At Constantinople she is assuring, on an equal footing with Great Britain and Italy, the maintenance of the neutrality of the Straits.

In Asia, where she has received a mandate for Syria, her forces have had to undergo severe fighting, and there is no assurance that they will not again be involved in fighting if, in the Near East, there is any prolonged delay in the establishment of peace conditions.

Similarly, in Africa, it is her duty to ensure the maintenance of order and peace in Togoland and the Cameroons.

* * *

As regard her own security, France is obliged:

(1) to protect her colonial empire;
(2) to maintain internal order;
(3) to assure the integrity of her national territory against an enemy from without.

(1) Protection of our Colonial Empire.

Our Colonies and Protectorates require for their occupation and, in some cases, pacification:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Colony</th>
<th>Men.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>85,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria and Tunis</td>
<td>75,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other colonies</td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>230,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Morocco, pacification is still far from complete. The native population is still easily incited to rebellion, against which we must uphold the Sultan’s authority; the submission of certain warlike tribes is both too recent and too uncertain to allow us at present to contemplate a too-hasty reduction of our forces.

In the south of Algeria and Tunis, we are compelled to maintain large military police forces over a very wide frontier on account of the raids of desert robbers and the difficulties caused by tribes which are frequently at war with one another. Finally, France’s own population is so small that she is forced, even in peace-time, to prepare for the utilisation of her North African man power, in case she should need to carry out a general mobilisation to repel an attack from without.
The total of our requirements abroad, that is to say, the obligations arising from the application of the Treaties and from the occupation of the French colonial possessions, amounts therefore to 160,000 plus 230,000 = 390,000 men.

(2) Maintenance of Internal Order.

Unlike certain other Powers, France has no units specially designed for the maintenance of internal order. Apart from the gendarmerie and the Republican Guard (23,000 men in all), the first employed for police duties and the enforcement of the law, the second restricted to ceremonial duties in Paris, the maintenance of internal order, which requires a minimum of 125,000 men, falls largely upon the Army.

(3) Defence of the Country against foreign Enemies.

In the present state of European politics, the special position of France has so often been misunderstood that the French Government feels bound to define it clearly in this communication to the Commission.

France has always desired peace. She has proved this by silently bearing a terrible wound in her side for nearly fifty years. She made the most strenuous efforts to avoid the last war, and, in order to make it impossible, she even denuded her frontiers, and was the last to mobilise in a Europe seething with armed forces. But, maimed, impoverished, in the presence of her numberless graves and her all-too-few cradles, five times invaded in a century and a quarter, France would fall short of her elementary duty of defence and her mission as a champion of order, peace and liberty, if she did not look toward her newly recovered frontier and take the necessary precautions against the possibility of another catastrophe.

France and almost the whole world wish for peace. But in Germany, conquered only yesterday, is there really a unanimous desire to preserve peace? A terrible wave of violence, which breaks out almost daily and does not stop short of periodical murder, shows that there are still too few brave spirits in that country to stem the tide of destruction. And although the German Government, which the French Government is seeking to help in its task, condemns such manifestations, there is no indication, alas! that it has the necessary strength to check them. Germany, it seems, does not accept her defeat. It is true that, with the exception of a very few whom we should be happy to see becoming more numerous, no German considers the Treaty of Versailles as anything but an intolerable injustice, a monstrous abuse of force, a peace “of shame and violence,” against which every means of resistance is justified. Thus the idea of revenge, systematically directed against France, supported daily by a Press under the influence of the Pan-Germans, and by militarist manifestations of every kind, which no authority has yet been strong enough to suppress, is making continuous progress among the mass of the people.

Moreover, the causes of strife which might arise in the near or more-distant future are many; it seems that time, far from removing them, cannot but multiply them. They are, to mention only the chief of them:—

From the political standpoint:—

The States bordering on Germany, recently created by the Peace Treaties, partly at her expense;
Upper Silesia, whose frontiers, in the eyes of most Germans, are only provisionally fixed;
The Saar, where we are still thirteen years from a plebiscite, which will probably be disputed if it is favourable to us;
Austria, whose attachment to the Empire is still preached and hoped for throughout Germany;
Russia, which is drawn towards Germany by a common hatred of Poland, and the colonisation of which is already being prepared by the great German industrial interests with their usual systematic thoroughness.

From the economic standpoint:—

The extraordinary economic growth of Germany and the resultant need for expansion, which were the fundamental reasons for the war of 1914. The same causes seem destined to produce in the future the same effects as in the past, for not only has German industry not been destroyed, but it has developed considerably, and has to-day attained a power such as it had never known before.

All these reasons render a conflict still possible. However firm may be the desire of France to avoid such a conflict, she would fail in her duty if she neglected to provide against it.

* * *

In view of these possibilities, it is desirable to consider the military potentialities of Germany
The Treaty of Versailles and the agreements which followed it authorised Germany to maintain:

1. The Reichswehr . . . . . . . 100,000 men
2. The Schutzpolizei. . . . . . . 150,000 men

If we can regard the Schutzpolizei as consisting, at the lowest estimate, of 40,000 to 45,000 police, it must also be remembered that it includes 100,000 old soldiers or non-commissioned officers, and 5,000 to 6,000 officers.

In spite of everything, Germany has eventually succeeded in establishing the standing army of 200,000 men and more which she made such efforts to obtain upon the conclusion of the Treaty of Versailles.

The Reichswehr and the Schutzpolizei, though differently armed, are recruited in the same way. Under various pretexts (suppression of disorder, combating fire or floods, etc.), the second receives military training like the first, generally in accordance with the same regulations. Both form in reality reserves of officers and non-commissioned officers, excellently trained and well disciplined, among whom all the traditions of the old German army are sedulously maintained.

These bodies can at any moment organise and officer considerable forces; no army in the world has so huge and perfect a framework for mass mobilisation.

The population of Germany can very easily be mobilised. At present there are 7,000,000 men who are trained, since they fought in the war. As these men reach the age limit, younger generations will take their place. With this object in view, efforts are being made in Germany to encourage the gregarious instinct in the youth of the country and the innate love of military pageant; Government support is given to athletic clubs, physical training is made compulsory, and it is used for the purpose of inculcating into the young men the most indispensable rudiments of military training.

This training would, it is true, need to be completed in case of mobilisation, but to gain the time needed Germany has succeeded in organising reserves of volunteers who can be ready at very short notice. These volunteers are:

1. The members of the societies of old soldiers and of young men (Kyffhäuserbund, regimental unions, agricultural colonies, athletic clubs, etc.).

   The "Baltikum" adventure, the mobilisation in March 1920 against the Communists of the Ruhr, the levying of the Freikorps of Hosfer for the protection of the Germans in Upper Silesia, show how easily and how quickly the mobilisation of volunteer units could be carried out. After each of these operations, the procedure employed has been improved. The latest, that of Upper Silesia, has shown the Allied troops the progressive but very rapid formation of a veritable army of 40,000 men, organised in divisions, brigades and regiments, provided with artillery and aeroplanes, an army with a front line and base organisation, the mobilisation and movements of which were systematically effected.

2. The "Technische Nothilfe," which consists of about 300,000 men, a civilian organisation ready to provide all the technical troops required by the army.

Command.

The command of the army by the officers who have fought in the war is assured for the present and for many years to come. Frequent lectures given at the Reichswehrministerium, tactical studies of every kind, Kriegspiele carried on in which all the staffs take part, frequent examinations organised by the seven Wehrkreise (Reichswehr districts) and numerous skeleton manoeuvres, all bear witness to the great intellectual activity which exists in all ranks of the military hierarchy.

The war academy for the instruction of staff officers has been abolished, but a similar school has been formed in each of the military districts. Furthermore, the recruitment of the officers for the future army is very actively carried on by the universities, which are in close touch with the officers’ organisations.

Material.

Although Germany is rich in men, the effective which she can put in the field will depend, at least for some years, on the extent to which she can arm them.

---

1 The Kyffhäuserbund comprises more than three million members, all ex-combatants.
The activities of the Commissions of Control have resulted in temporarily restricting her powers in this direction, but there can be no doubt that, as soon as these Commissions are reduced or withdrawn, it will be relatively easy to replenish the necessary stocks of material.

The war factories existing in Germany will not be the only ones contributing to this replenishment. Experience has shown that certain peace-time industries can be adapted, almost without modifications, to the manufacture of war material; for example, 75% of the explosives employed by the Germans during the last war came from their chemical factories. Moreover, some of the principal German firms have bought or created establishments in the neighbouring countries; they are able, even now, to manufacture war material of every kind without infringing the Treaty of Versailles. Researches are being carried out in every branch of science with a view to applying them to war; professorships, laboratories and materials for experiment have been retained or established, with a liberality out of place in a nation which professes to be disarmed and whose finances are in a precarious condition.

There will never be any lack of portable arms; they are too easy to conceal. Moreover, the Reichsheer is richly endowed with service material in good condition, which could be used for arming the first units to be mobilised.

The provision of artillery for the larger units would present difficulties which, although serious, would not appear to be insuperable. There can be no doubt that the German command will endeavour to conceal material from the investigations of the Commissions of Control, as, indeed, it has been constantly trying to do since the Treaty came into force, and to manufacture new material as soon as the supervision is relaxed. It will form depots in other countries, thanks to the factories in the possession of its trusts, and if the manufacture of war material is begun before the general mobilisation, the great power of German industry will enable it to produce before the beginning of hostilities a large proportion of the indispensable material for a considerable number of large units.

Finally, as regards aviation the army can always be supplied with some of the necessary machines by the transformation of commercial or sporting aeroplanes into war machines; chasers and scouts will be constructed abroad, if the restrictions imposed on the German Air Force and the control exercised do not allow them to be constructed in Germany itself.

* * *

MOBILISATION.

It cannot be said that mobilisation would be impossible in Germany, should the occasion arise. Although, as the result of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany is at present unable to place all her forces in the field simultaneously, as in 1914, she could, if she desired war, mobilise by echelons. Thanks to the system of "multiplication of divisions," a very considerable number of divisions could be mobilised in less than a month. The other echelons would follow at intervals which would be closer in proportion as the period of political tension had been deliberately prolonged. Moreover, it must be remembered that the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control will have disappeared. Mobilisation would be covered by the "Schutzpolizei," reinforced by volunteers.

* * *

Thus Germany has the double advantage of greater industrial strength and a population one-third more numerous than France. France, therefore, must safeguard her self by securing superiority in the matter of time. A rapid deployment of her forces can alone allow her in case of attack to benefit by the real advantage which the Treaty of Versailles provides, in preventing Germany from carrying out, as in 1914, a simultaneous mobilisation of all her forces.

For this purpose — and all the new Technical Councils of the French Government are unanimous on the point — it is necessary to maintain in time of peace in France and on the Rhine thirty-two divisions with the corresponding auxiliary services (heavy artillery, aviation, liaison and communication troops, service corps, etc.). Of these thirty-two divisions,

six (92,000 men) should be on the Rhine and twenty-six (335,000 men) should be on French soil.

Total: 427,000 men.

By adding to the 335,000 men stationed in France:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commitments abroad</th>
<th>Troops of occupation for the colonies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>160,000 men</td>
<td>230,000 men</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

390,000 a total of 725,000 men would be reached.

The French Government, being anxious to impose as light a military service as possible on its population, and wishing to include in its calculations the troops returning from Silesia, and to reduce its military forces in the colonies to the strict minimum, has fixed its total requirements at only 600,000 men.

In this way, the total forces necessary for French territory, which should be 335,000 men, would be reduced to 300,000. The deficit would be made good by the 10,000 men to be obtained.
from Upper Silesia and by troops made available by reductions in the armies in the colonies, to be effected at a future date which cannot yet be fixed.

The 690,000 men of the French army may be divided as follows:

- 100,000 professional soldiers,
- 375,000 conscripts,
- 205,000 North African and colonial natives,
- 10,000 foreigners

Total 690,000

Of this total:

- 150,000 men will be stationed abroad in order to ensure the execution of the Treaties of Peace,
- 205,000 will occupy the colonies,
- 335,000 will remain in France

Total 690,000

The immediately available part of the French army in time of peace will be made up in practice as follows:

- 335,000 men in the interior;
- 92,000 men on the Rhine.

Total 427,000

The Government considers that at this cost only can it attain a superiority in the matter of time which will discourage any aggressive tendency.

This result, which will be attained when the laws now being discussed by Parliament are passed, constitutes a considerable step in the direction of disarmament as compared with the situation in 1914.

In this connection, a comparative study of a few figures will be useful in order to show the effort made by France since the war to reduce her armaments within the limits compatible with the requirements of her security and her international obligations.

The French forces have varied as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Infantry Companies</th>
<th>Cavalry Squadrons</th>
<th>Artillery Batteries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>2,878</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>826</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>2,486</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>880</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The number of officers in the regular army, which reached 47,000 at the end of 1919, had been reduced to 38,700 on January 1st, 1922. It will be further reduced this year by about 2,000.

The following table shows the number of units of infantry, cavalry and artillery at the beginning of 1914 and at present:

Except as regards artillery, and in spite of the commitments abroad of the French army, a reduction of nearly 400 companies of infantry and 100 squadrons of cavalry has therefore already been effected.

The total credits granted to the War Department, both under the budget and by the supplementary estimates, have been as follows:

- In 1920 6 milliards
- 1921 5.4 milliards
- 1922 approximately 4.5 milliards, showing a further reduction.

Between 1920 and 1922, France has therefore reduced her military expenditure by 1.5 milliard francs, or by one quarter.

When the heavy international obligations imposed on France by the application of the Treaties are considered, the full extent of such an effort in the way of reduction of armaments will be appreciated.
The situation arising out of the war has imposed obligations on France with regard to the maintenance of the political stability of Europe. The presence of large French forces on the Rhine not only applies pressure which obliges Germany to respect the Treaties she has signed, but it affords considerable moral support to the young nations of Central Europe which have arisen since the war, and it contributes largely to giving France the necessary authority for maintaining the principles of order and justice, and for securing their observance.

The military force of France is at present the essential factor of peace in Europe; France would be glad to reduce it, after the terrible sufferings she has undergone; but she cannot be asked to do so as long as the germs of war, to which we have drawn attention, continue to exist.

REPLY OF GREAT BRITAIN

OFFICES OF THE CABINET,
2, WHITEHALL GARDENS,
S. W. I.

LONDON, July 24th, 1922.

The Secretary to the Cabinet presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, and with reference to the letter from the Acting President of the Council of April 13th last, C. L. 32, is directed to forward herewith a statement in regard to naval, military and air defence requirements.

It is regretted that it was not possible to furnish the statement by an earlier date.

STATEMENT.

I

NAVAL.

1. The security of the British Empire is dependent on the safeguarding of its lines of communication by the Navy.

2. The requirements in this respect are far greater than that of any other nation, and are so well known that no useful purpose would be served by enumerating them.

3. At the Washington Conference, Great Britain agreed to the reduction of her naval power to the lowest limits compatible with these responsibilities and no further reduction could be agreed to.


II

MILITARY.

1. The most satisfactory way in which the information required can be supplied is in tabular form. For this purpose two tables are attached. Table A gives the latest available figures connected with the British Empire, excluding the Dominions which are Members of the League, and shows its area, population, man-power and military forces as anticipated for purposes of Estimates 1922-23. Table B shows a comparison between the items given in Table A and similar items for seven foreign countries, as nearly as can be ascertained.

2. From Table B it will be observed that the number of troops per square mile of territory in Great Britain is very much smaller than the number maintained per square mile by any other foreign country, with the exception of the United States of America. Also, it will be noticed that the British percentage of troops to man-power (considering white troops and white man-power only) is very much smaller than that of either Belgium, France or Russia, and is not considerably greater than that of Italy or Japan. And here it should be especially observed that nearly half of the British white troops are irregular troops, i. e., Territorials, a condition which does not obtain in the case of any of the above-mentioned nations, with the exception of Italy.

Retained in the archives of the Secretariat.
3. It will be seen in Table A that the total regular force maintained in Great Britain is in the neighbourhood of 111,000 men. It must not be lost sight of, however, that this force, whose chief rôle is the supplying of drafts for the units overseas, is consequently very largely composed of recruits and young soldiers under training. Consequently, the British forces cannot possibly exercise the same immediate influence on European affairs as could a Continental army of equivalent size.

4. Another striking point emerges from a close examination of Table A. If semi-permanent and temporary liabilities be eliminated from the portion headed "Imperial Troops", it will be found that His Majesty's Government maintain some 170,800 native troops among a total native population of 386,558,000 souls. Taking the available man-power as being one-sixth of this total, the remarkable figure of .27 per cent. is arrived at. In other words, only one native out of every 400 of military age is employed as a soldier, and only one native out of every 2,500 of the total native population.

5. Taking the case of India only, it is found that the total armed force, British and Indian, which is employed represents only .06 per cent. of the total native population, or less than one soldier per 1,500 souls.

### Table A.

**Statement Showing Forces and Resources of the British Empire 1922 Imperial Troops.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Area (approximate)</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Estimated Man-power</th>
<th>Forces</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>square miles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Native</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>121,633</td>
<td>46,000,000</td>
<td>7,500,000*</td>
<td>111,000</td>
<td>190,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7,650,000</td>
<td>178,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Permanen</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Liabilities</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonies</td>
<td>2,451,513</td>
<td>668,000</td>
<td>30,280,000</td>
<td>150,000 (white only)</td>
<td>8,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt and Sudan</td>
<td>1,364,400</td>
<td>16,278,000</td>
<td>12,700</td>
<td>72,000</td>
<td>145,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1,802,629</td>
<td>320,000,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Semi-Permanent Liabilities:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>13,742</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irak</td>
<td>143,250</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7,800</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>5,897,149</td>
<td>46,738,000</td>
<td>390,008,000</td>
<td>7,650,000</td>
<td>178,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Estimated at one-sixth of population.
† Estimated at one-fifth of population.

---

### Table B

**Percentage of White Troops to White Man-power.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Area in square miles</th>
<th>Area including Foreign Possessions</th>
<th>Estimated Man-power (white only)</th>
<th>Forces maintained in Peace</th>
<th>Ratio of all Troops to area including Foreign Possessions</th>
<th>Percentage of White Troops to White Man-power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>111,373</td>
<td>930,000</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
<td>130,000 men</td>
<td>1 man to 7 square miles</td>
<td>10.8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>213,000</td>
<td>4,550,000</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>792,000 men *</td>
<td>1 man to 5.7 square miles</td>
<td>10.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td>9,000,000</td>
<td>100,000 men</td>
<td>1 man to 1.8 square miles</td>
<td>1.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>115,000</td>
<td>725,000</td>
<td>7,900,000</td>
<td>175,000 white / total</td>
<td>1 man to 3.6 square miles</td>
<td>2.2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>140,200</td>
<td>247,067</td>
<td>12,900,000</td>
<td>256,000</td>
<td>1 man to .9 square miles</td>
<td>2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>7,462,000</td>
<td>8,172,000</td>
<td>15,000,000</td>
<td>1,267,000</td>
<td>1 man to 6.4 square miles</td>
<td>8.4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>3,026,800</td>
<td>3,743,300</td>
<td>23,000,000</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>1 man to 25 square miles</td>
<td>6.25 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>121,633</td>
<td>5,897,149</td>
<td>7,650,000</td>
<td>593,800</td>
<td>1 man to 10 square miles</td>
<td>3.9 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Probably about 30 % native troops.
Two tables are attached showing, A, the relative strength in aircraft of the British Empire, excluding the Dominions which are Members of the League, and the Principal Powers, and B, the proportionate area and population per machine.

Personnel has been disregarded as being of small value for purposes of comparison, owing to the fact that Great Britain is the only Power with a separate Air Force, the aviation personnel of other countries forming part of the Army and Navy, and sharing with them the services of supply, medical, etc.

### TABLE A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Area in square miles</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Aircraft with Service Units (excluding reserves)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>Foreign Possessions</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>121,633</td>
<td>46,000,000</td>
<td>46,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonies</td>
<td>2,451,513</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt &amp; Soudan</td>
<td>1,354,400</td>
<td>320,000,000</td>
<td>320,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1,802,629</td>
<td>13,724</td>
<td>143,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>137,244</td>
<td>143,250</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5,897,149</td>
<td>46,822,641</td>
<td>390,008,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Population of Foreign Possessions.

### TABLE B

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Square miles per aeroplane and seaplane</th>
<th>Population per aeroplane and seaplane</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Home</td>
<td>Foreign Possessions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>88.4</td>
<td>408,585.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonies</td>
<td>29,660.8</td>
<td>25,751.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt and Soudan</td>
<td>857.9</td>
<td>1,557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1,557</td>
<td>387,267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>1,557</td>
<td>387,267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16,024.9</td>
<td>3,743,300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Population per aeroplane and seaplane in Foreign Possessions.

† Approximate.
11

REPLY OF GREECE

[Translation.]

Geneva, June 13th, 1922.

Sir,

In reply to your letter of April 13th, I can only refer you to my letter of April 10th. For the reason stated therein, i.e., the continuance of the war with Turkey, it is impossible, until peace is finally concluded, for the Greek Government to foresee the requirements of its national security, its other requirements and the police and military forces which it considers indispensable for the preservation of order in the country.

I am, etc.

(Signed) V. DENDRAMIS,
Director of the Permanent Greek Secretariat.

12

REPLY OF HAITI

[Translation]

REPUBLIC OF HAITI.
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

PORT-AU-PRINCE, May 17th, 1922.

Your Excellency,

In your letter of April 13th last, you were good enough to draw the attention of this Department to the Resolution adopted by the second Assembly of the League of Nations relating to the preparation of a plan for the reduction of national armaments. You added that the Council considered it desirable that, in carrying out this work, the Special Commission should, as far as possible, take into consideration the views of the Governments concerned; and you therefore requested me to furnish a statement of the considerations relating to the requirements of the national security of the Republic of Haiti, of its geographical situation and of its special circumstances, and to indicate separately, as far as possible, the police and military forces regarded as indispensable for the internal needs of the State and the expenditure entailed thereby.

I fully appreciate the lofty aims by which this communication from the Council of the League of Nations is inspired, and have great pleasure in complying with so wise a request, particularly as I shall not need to detain the Council’s attention for long.

The insular situation of the Republic of Haiti, together with the special conditions resulting from the Agreement concluded on September 15th, 1916, between her and the United States of America, have indeed spared the Haitian Government the need of maintaining military forces in the strict sense of the term; nevertheless, the exigencies of her internal security oblige it to maintain under arms a force of gendarmerie numbering 2,533 men, for the maintenance of whom — and of the Coast Guards — a sum of 801,063 dollars is allocated each year in the Budget of the Republic.

I take this opportunity of expressing my sincere good wishes for the complete success of the work of the Temporary Commission and have the honour to be

Your Excellency’s, etc.

(Signed) DEJEAN.

His Excellency
The President of the Council of the
League of Nations,
Geneva.
REPLY OF ITALY

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF ITALY.

Rome, July 17th, 1922.

Your Excellency,

With reference to your letter No C. L. 54. 1922. IX, which you were good enough to forward to me on June 12th, I beg to submit herewith a statement on the military and police forces which, in the estimate of the Royal Government, are indispensable for the safety of Italy, as well as on the expenses entailed by them.

I have the honour, etc.

(Signed) SCHANZER.

His Excellency Monsieur QUINONES DE LEON,
President of the Council of the League of Nations.
Geneva.

(Translation.)

STATEMENT.

Faithful to her traditions and inclinations, Italy is loth to anticipate — even in the unfortunate event of a future war — the necessity of direct military intervention on her part. She cannot, however, be blind to the fact that the world is still in a state of unrest, and that consequently she might, in a possible future, be called upon to provide — were it only as a precautionary counter-measure — for the more adequate protection of her frontiers.

Until the beneficent activities of the League of Nations have taken more definite shape, the Italian military organisation must reckon with the possibility of having to take precautions of a defensive nature. For reasons inherent in the geographical and topographical peculiarities of her frontier zones and owing to the fact that certain vital centres of her national life lie close to her frontiers, Italy must at all costs provide for a prompt and effective defence of those frontiers.

Italy is also obliged to take into account the numerous forces and very considerable resources which she will have to divert for the protection of her seaboard and her islands. These latter cannot, in view of the obviously unfavourable conditions of their geographical configuration, rely for protection on the Navy, which is already more than sufficiently burdened by the duty of fighting the main body of possible enemy naval forces and of protecting sea communications which are of such essential importance for Italy, forced, as she is, to obtain her raw materials of every kind from overseas.

The requirements of the Colonies — which are still far from able to provide for their own defence or to afford any assistance to the mother-country — must also be taken into consideration, as, in time of war, communication between Italy and her Colonies cannot be established on a secure basis; the home country has therefore to detach permanently considerable forces and material to meet this need.

If the military situation of Italy as explained above is borne in mind, and if the technical aspects of the Italian mobilisation are taken into consideration, it will be seen that Italy cannot but continue to maintain in time of peace a certain number of military units which, though their effective strength may be reduced, will nevertheless be such as to constitute a nucleus for the formation of those large units, capable of rapid mobilisation, that are essential for her defence.

To confine our calculations to the infantry, which, after all, constitutes the largest section of the Army, Italy has to maintain in time of peace at least some 50 brigades of infantry, each consisting of two regiments, and every regiment containing two full battalions and one skeleton battalion (this would reduce the Italian infantry, which, excluding Alpini and Bersaglieri, counted fully 288 battalions prior to 1914, to a strength of about 200 battalions).

Since each battalion would in time of peace consist of about 500 men, the total strength to be budgeted for under the heading of infantry, including the special corps of Alpini and Bersaglieri, amounts to at least 120,000 men.

Assuming the absolute necessity of assigning this quota of men to the infantry, it follows that the total forces to be budgeted for cannot be less than 250,000 men. This estimate will
certainly leave no liberal margin to make adequate provision for other arms and special branches of the service, particularly the artillery, the engineers and the Air Force, all of which underwent a far greater development during the late war than it was possible to foresee, and which the progress of technical knowledge will tend to increase still further.

The above-mentioned figure of 250,000 men exactly corresponds with the present yield of one annual draft of recruits, including the small number of permanent elements which the Italian Army possesses. As it is hoped that military training may be completed in one year, it follows that the exigencies of military defence can be reconciled with Italy’s policy of reducing the burden of military service to the bare minimum necessary for the physical and intellectual preparation of her citizens.

As regards the expenditure required for such an army, it may be observed that the keep of one soldier costs very nearly 3,000 lire per annum, and that therefore the sum of about 750 million lire would have to be allowed in the budget for the maintenance of these 250,000 men.

Since experience has shown that the grand total of a military budget amounts on an average to two and a-half times more than the actual sum estimated for the forces themselves, Italy’s military budget will need to be somewhere in the neighbourhood of 2 milliards. Naturally, however, such figures do not include extraordinary expenditure incurred from time to time in renewing on a large scale the principal armaments and in fortifying the most important and exposed points of the frontier. Experience also shows that the average sum required for extraordinary expenditure may be estimated at something between a quarter and a fifth of the ordinary budget. Thus, the expenditure required for the army, according to the very lowest computation, based entirely on the requirements for the training of her citizens, and without any other special increase in view of war, may be fixed for Italy at from 2,400 to 2,500 millions.

The special colonial troops which Italy has begun to organise in her Colonies are not yet in a position to ensure the defence of the latter. Nevertheless, in the foregoing estimate, the possibility of having to employ a larger number of home forces, to meet exceptional conditions obtaining in the Colonies has not been taken into consideration; and therefore any legitimate contribution for this purpose would have to be deducted from the forces estimated as necessary to sustain the nucleus required for mobilisation of the number of large units which has been shown to be indispensable for the defence of the frontiers.

Italy possesses police and customs forces proportionate to her present requirements, consisting of rather more than 120,000 men, of whom about 60,000 are Carabinieri Reali (Royal Carabineers), 30,000 men belonging to the Guardia di Publica Sicurezza (Public Safety Police) and roughly the same number belonging to the Guardia di Finanza (Customs Guards).

It should, however, be made clear that the Carabinieri Reali, the Guardia de Publica Sicurezza and the Guardia di Finanza cannot be regarded, except in a slight degree, as a force which could be employed for combatant purposes, any more than other reservists who can be re-called to the colours in case of need. These police corps, the first of which is the only one capable of being partly employed on police duty with the army when mobilised, are not as a matter of fact constituted into units possessing an organisation which answers to tactical requirements; they are not armed in the same way as the infantry troops, and they are not trained for combatant work, or any mass work under a single tactical command, with a view to attaining any tactical objective.

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REPLY OF JAPAN

[Translation.]

PARIS, July 4th, 1922.

Sir,

In reply to your letter of April 13th, 1922, in which you were good enough to ask my Government to furnish you with a statement on the considerations which it might wish to urge in regard to the requirements of its national security, its international obligations, its geographical situation and its special circumstances, and also to indicate separately the military and police forces which it might consider indispensable for the preservation of domestic order and the expenditure entailed thereby, I have the honour, in accordance with instructions from my Government, to make the following reply:

The Japanese Government, in its desire to see the maintenance of universal peace and an increase in human prosperity, has taken as a standard for the limitation of its armaments the minimum essential for purposes of national defence. Consequently it would be able to reduce its armaments to a minimum, in strict conformity with the spirit of the Covenant of the League of Nations, while taking into due account considerations of national security, international obligations, its geographical situation and special circumstances.
In the first place, with regard to naval forces, the Japanese Government, at the time of the Washington Conference, undertook to effect a reduction, and it firmly intends to carry out sincerely the terms of this Convention together with the other Powers. Further, with regard to the limitation of its army, the Japanese Government is at present engaged in elaborating a scheme the scope of which will depend upon the degree of political tranquillity in those countries with which Japan is in close relationship.

The police forces required in Japan in time of peace for the purpose of maintaining domestic order are determined by the size of the population and vary accordingly. Under the present system police agents are appointed in the following proportions: one for each 300 to 800 inhabitants in the towns, and one for each 600 to 2,000 in the provinces. The other police officials are appointed in sufficient numbers to ensure the carrying out of control and other duties. The above mentioned officials maintain order in the interior of the country with the help of other organisations necessary to the police.

The total expenditure entailed by these police services, according to the official enquiry of May 20th, 1921, amounts to 61,967,899 yen per year, exclusive of expenditure on police officials of higher rank.

The Japanese Government also employs the military forces required for purposes of national defence to maintain domestic order; hence it is difficult to answer the question relating to the amount of military forces required for the exclusive maintenance of domestic order.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) K. Ishii,
Japanese Ambassador.

His Excellency Monsieur Quiñones de León,
Acting President of
the Council of the League of Nations,
Geneva.

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REPLY OF LATVIA

LATVIAN MINISTRY
FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
RIGA.

Riga, August 5th, 1922.

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated April 13th, in which you transmitted to us a decision of the Council of the League of Nations to request every Government to furnish a statement of the considerations which it might think it desirable to submit regarding the requirements of its national security, its international obligations and its geographical situation. In a letter, dated June 12th last, the Acting President of the Council of the League of Nations again called the attention of the Latvian Government to this decision.

The Latvian Government thoroughly investigated the question raised by this decision of the Council, but to its deep regret, it was unable to furnish you with its reply within the period which you originally specified.

In reply to your letter of April 13th, I have the honour to inform you that my Government welcomes with the most genuine interest the scheme for a general limitation of armaments, and follows with the keenest sympathy all steps taken by the League of Nations which can be regarded as likely to lead to an effective and simultaneous limitation of armaments in all countries.

I am glad to be able to inform you that Latvia, faithful to the principles embodied in the Third Resolution adopted by the Assembly of the League of Nations at its meeting on December 14th, 1920, has begun to reduce her armaments.

As we had the honour to inform you in a letter, dated April 29th, 1922, the Latvian Government is endeavouring gradually to curtail its military expenditure. Thus this expenditure, which in 1920 represented 27% of the expenditure of the State, amounted in 1921 only to 16%, and in 1922 only to 14.4% of the entire expenditure. In this manner, the military burdens are reduced to the lowest level consistent with Latvia’s obligation to safeguard her sovereignty and defend the integrity of her frontiers.
The policy of Latvia is essentially a policy of peace, but the Latvian Government recognises the fact that armaments can be effectively limited and that Latvia can carry out a comprehensive scheme for the reduction of armaments only if all the neighbouring countries accept a common and definite plan for the reduction of armaments. This agreement might assume the form of a general treaty laying down detailed provisions with regard to the limits of the armed forces which each of the contracting parties would undertake not to exceed, and it should contain reciprocal engagements regarding the number of soldiers maintained under arms.

The geographical situation of our country, which is surrounded by many other States, renders our policy for the reduction of armaments dependent upon that of our neighbours, and this dependence is still further accentuated by our somewhat lengthy coast-line (494 kilometres), by the fact that our land frontiers in no sense constitute a natural barrier against external aggression, and again by the fact that Latvia's immediate neighbours include States which do not belong to the League of Nations and whose adhesion to the ideals and aims of the League of Nations is therefore highly problematical.

Hence it follows that armaments can be effectively limited only by an international agreement.

The Latvian Government also attaches very great importance to the limitation, by an international convention, of the traffic in and the manufacture of arms and munitions.

Any limitation merely of the number of armed men in a country does not imply a genuine reduction in the armaments of that country so long as the latter contains inexhaustible supplies of arms and munitions. Most citizens in modern States are familiar with the art of war and they acquire a knowledge of this art not only during their period of service with the colours but often, also, in various athletic associations. They can therefore be mobilised rapidly and at any moment, provided a sufficient supply of arms and munitions is available.

The Latvian Government is therefore of opinion that the limitation of the traffic in and manufacture of arms and ammunition is the most effective method of securing a reduction in armaments.

Finally, in the view of the Latvian Government, the recognition of a territorial status quo for all countries — a recognition which is in complete harmony with the Covenant of the League of Nations — will simplify the solution of the problem of the limitation of armaments.

The object of Article 10 of the Covenant is to provide a certain guarantee for the Members of the League of Nations against military attacks from outside which threaten their territory or their independence.

No agreement exists with regard to the scope of the obligations respecting the guarantee mentioned in Article 10, and regarding the conditions under which the guarantee may be invoked. We are therefore of opinion that it would be desirable to declare, by means of a Convention concluded between all States, that the principle of the maintenance against any external aggression, of territorial integrity and political independence forms an integral part of international public law; and at the same time to define the scope of the obligation respecting this guarantee and the conditions under which it might be invoked.

As regards the military forces intended to guarantee our national security, I have the honour to inform you that the Permanent Armaments Commission of the League of Nations agreed that the naval force indispensable for Latvia should consist of 4 destroyers, 4 submarines and 1,500 mines, and her land forces of 20,000 soldiers permanently under arms.

We are of opinion that, in view of the present political situation, these figures really represent the minimum necessary in time of peace.

In the desire, however, to manifest its pacific intentions towards its neighbours, the Latvian Government at present maintains a military force below this minimum.

Thus, the land forces of Latvia at present amount to only 19,500 armed men, and her naval forces consist merely of one destroyer.

As regards the military and police forces indispensable for the preservation of domestic order, we believe that a force of 5,000 armed men will suffice.

I am, etc.

(Signed) Z. A. Meierovics.

His Excellency the President of the
Council of the League of Nations,
Geneva.
REPLY OF LITHUANIA

[Translation.]

MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF LITHUANIA.

Kovno, July 13th, 1922.

No. 16612.

Your Excellency,

In reply to the letter from the President of the Council of the League of Nations, dated June 12th, 1922, C. L. 54, 1922, IX, with regard to a scheme for the reduction of national armaments, I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that:

(1) The frontiers of Lithuania measure about 1,597 kilometres, that is to say: the frontier between Lithuania and Latvia measures 590 kilometres; that established with Soviet Russia by the Moscow Treaty of July 12th, 1920, 570 kilometres; the remainder of the frontier as far as Germany, which was not defined in the said Treaty, measures, in a straight line, perhaps 30 kilometres; the frontier between Lithuania and Germany covers 387 kilometres; and the distance along the Baltic Sea is 20 kilometres. In view of the absence of natural obstacles which might help to defend these frontiers and to render approach difficult, it is indispensable, for the purpose of guarding them, to maintain in time of peace three regiments of frontier guards, or 5,800 men.

(2) Lithuania consists almost entirely of a plain, crossed here and there by low hills; and there are no important natural obstacles either on her frontiers or in the interior of the country which might present difficulties for military operations; large armies could therefore be manoeuvred in Lithuania with perfect ease.

Accordingly, in order to be prepared against attack, Lithuania is compelled, even in peace-time, to provide military training for all physically fit men without exception, and to maintain a system enabling her to call all citizens to arms in the shortest possible time, to organise them and to train them for their active service.

(3) The circumstances explained in paragraph 2 above in themselves make the defence of the country difficult, but they derive an added importance from the peculiar situation of Lithuania, surrounded by three neighbouring Powers — Russia, Poland and Germany, each of which, considered separately, is far more powerful from every point of view than Lithuania.

For this reason it is essential for the defence of the country that Lithuania should maintain in peace-time a contingent of troops numbering at least 30,000 men, whose duties must include the maintenance of public order within the country.

As regards the expenditure required for the upkeep of the Lithuanian Army, it is very difficult, in view of the instability of the exchanges, to make a definite statement at present.

I have the honour to be, etc.,

(Signed) T. JURGUTIS,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

His Excellency Monsieur J. QUIÑONES DE LEÓN,
President of the Council of the League of Nations, Geneva.
REPLY OF LUXEMBURG

[Translation.]

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. LUXEMBURG, July 1st, 1922.

I4/3/22a.

Sir,

In reply to the request contained in Your Excellency's letter of April 13th last, I have the honour to state below the considerations regarding the question of the reduction of armaments which the Grand-Ducal Government feels called upon to submit, in respect of the special points referred to by the Temporary Commission.

 Entirely surrounded as it is, by France, Belgium and Germany, the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg, with its area of 259,000 hectares and its population of 264,000, has never been and never will be able to defend its territory by force of arms against its powerful neighbours. It has therefore always based its security on the faith of treaties and on the respect due to its independence and sovereignty. The war did not change these conditions, which, together with the principle of neutrality laid down in the Constitution, prevent the Grand-Ducal Government from assuming military obligations of an international nature. The Grand-Duchy, therefore, is not a party to any military treaty with another country. It forms part of the League of Nations, and as the League does not impose on any country the obligation to maintain an army or to take active part in international military operations of any kind, the Grand-Duchy has no international military obligations.

The armed forces of the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg, which are intended solely to maintain internal order and security, are at present composed of a company of gendarmes 182 strong (officers included), and 250 volunteers commanded by four officers.

Post-war events, however, have proved the inadequacy of these forces to maintain order under all circumstances. A change in the present situation is therefore in contemplation, and the draft of a bill to this effect has been submitted to the competent authorities. This draft does not affect the composition of the gendarmerie, which will be maintained at its present strength: but the voluntary system would be superseded by universal compulsory service in a police force. This police force would consist of a maximum of 3,000 men, drafted in levies of 300 men each at the rate of 1,000 men annually. The length of service is fixed at three years. During this period the men would undergo a course of instructional training lasting 90 days in the first year and would undergo further training for 15 days in each of the two following years. In the intervals of these periods of training, the men will return to their homes or will remain at the disposal of the Government, which has the power to mobilise the whole or a part of this force in the event of serious disturbances, or in case of emergencies. The force normally under arms will number 500 men, together with instructors.

The annual expenditure involved by the police force will amount to about 2 million francs.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) REUTER.

To His Excellency Monsieur Paul Hymans,
Acting President of the Council
of the League of Nations,
Geneva.
REPLY OF THE NETHERLANDS

[Translation.]

DUTCH LEGATION. BERNE, August 21st, 1922.

Sir,

In a letter dated April 13th, 1922, the acting President of the Council of the League of Nations was good enough to ask the Government of the Netherlands to furnish, for the use of the Temporary Mixed Commission for the Reduction of Armaments, a statement of the considerations which it might wish to submit with regard to the requirements of its national security, its international obligations, its geographical situation, and its special circumstances, and, in particular, to indicate separately, as far as possible, the police and military forces which it considers necessary for its internal security, and the expenditure entailed thereby.

In reply to this request, I am instructed to transmit to you herewith the statement required.

I have the honour to be, Sir, etc.

(Signed) A. BAUD,
For the Minister.

To Sir Eric DRUMMOND,
Secretary-General, League of Nations,
Geneva.

STATEMENT.

I. INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.

The Netherlands have undertaken no international engagements of a military character.

II. GEOGRAPHICAL SITUATION.

A. The Netherlands.

From a military point of view, the geographical character and situation of the Netherlands are chiefly determined:—

1. By the land frontiers, which are about 400 kilometers long and are quite open, irregular and without natural obstacles of any importance. These frontiers would greatly facilitate the operations of an invading army;

2. By the coast-line, which is about 350 kilometers long, is easy of access in many places and provides good harbours. It is washed by the North Sea, the most important sea-route between the Bight of Heligoland and the Baltic Sea on the one side, and the Atlantic and the Channel ports on the other side;

3. By the fact that several navigable international waterways flow through the Netherlands and reach the sea in their territory;

4. By the narrowness of the territory, which necessitates special provisions for its defence.

Furthermore, it must be remembered that the Netherlands are situated at the northern extremity of a possible battle front in Western Europe, and that the great estuaries can be used as bases for offensive naval operations, or as lines of advance into the Continent. In case of a European war, this gives the territory of the Netherlands a special strategic importance.

B. The Dutch Indies.

From a strategical standpoint, the geographical character and situation of these islands are determined chiefly by the fact that they form an extensive insular territory situated upon the most important lines of communication between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific.
From what has already been said with regard to the geographical character and position of the Netherlands and the Dutch Colonies, it follows that, in order to assure its national safety and the maintenance of its neutrality, the Kingdom urgently requires an army and a fleet of sufficient strength.

III. SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES.

With regard to the special circumstances which the Netherlands might urge, it should be pointed out that the Colonies to be defended are at a considerable distance from the mother-country.

IV. INTERNAL SECURITY.

A. The Netherlands.

At present the maintenance of internal order is entrusted to the following forces:—

1. The national and local police forces;
2. Certain special units of the Army.

In 1922, the expenditure entailed by the national police forces (including the Royal Mounted Police and the military police), was about 13,500,000 florins.

B. The Colonies.

For the maintenance of internal order and security, the following troops are available and indispensable:—

1. In the Dutch Indies, the Colonial Army and the armed police forces;
2. In Surinam and in Curacao, certain units of the Colonial Army.

The cost of the armed police forces in the Dutch Indies amounts, in round figures, to 7 million florins per annum.

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REPLY OF NORWAY

[Translation.]

MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

CHRISTIANIA. July 31st, 1922.

Sir,

In his letter of April 13th last, the Acting President of the Council of the League of Nations was good enough to request the Royal Government to furnish a statement of the considerations which it might wish to urge in regard to the requirements of its national safety, its international obligations, its geographical situation and its special conditions, and, in particular, to indicate separately the police and military forces which it considered indispensable for the preservation of domestic order, and the expenditure thereby entailed.

In answer to that letter, I have the honour to inform you that:—

The Defence Commission of 1920 (La Commission de Défense de 1920) was appointed in order to study and put forward proposals for the future organisation of the defence of the Kingdom, taking into special consideration the circumstances mentioned in the letter of the President of the Council. (See the memorandum which accompanied the letter addressed to you by M. Michelet on May 12th, 1921.) The work of the Commission has not yet been completed, and the Government of the King does not, therefore, consider that at the present moment it can express a definite and detailed opinion with regard to the defensive forces which it considers indispensable in order to guarantee the national safety of the country.

The Government of the King will therefore limit itself to the following remarks of a general character.

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1 This letter was distributed to the members of the Temporary Mixed Commission on June 7th, 1921.
There is no country amongst those with which Norway can be compared, as regards its political and military situation, in which military expenses are so low as in Norway. It would therefore be much more difficult for Norway to effect an important reduction of its expenses than for any other of the countries which are placed in a similar situation.

As for the special conditions which are particularly important in order to settle the effective which are necessary for the defence of the country, I would draw your attention to the fact that the land frontiers of this Kingdom are very long, and its sea-board even longer. Moreover, communications between its different provinces are often too little developed or too liable to be cut in case of war.

As for the police and military forces which are absolutely indispensable for the internal security of the Kingdom, my Government desires me to put forward the following considerations:

In the history of Norway, it is very seldom that recourse has been had to military force in order to keep internal order. There is no special organisation in existence (such as corps de gendarmerie, etc.) for the keeping of order in the interior and along the frontiers, nor is it likely that the establishment of such a corps will be necessary in the future. If the information requested is an indication of the expenses entailed by the keeping of public safety in the interior of the country, the only answer that could be given is that normally there are no other expenses than those caused by the civil police.

Finally, it must be noticed that Norway has no other international relations likely to influence the organisation of its defence than those arising from her membership of the League of Nations.

I would, however, add that, in virtue of the Convention signed between Norway and Sweden on October 26th, 1905, a neutral zone has been established on both sides of the common frontier.

I have the honour, etc.

(Signed) Joh. Ludv. Mowinckel.

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REPLY OF POLAND

[Translation.]

WARSZAWA,
June 28th, 1922.

Your Excellency,

In accordance with the Resolution of the Second Assembly of the League of Nations and Your Excellency’s Note of April 13th, 1922, I venture to submit a statement of the views of the Polish Government on the requirements of Polish national security, and also on the geographical situation and special conditions of Poland.

The Polish Government has followed with the keenest interest the progress achieved by the League of Nations in its beneficent work for international peace, and will gladly do its utmost to help in the attainment of this end. It therefore readily avails itself of the opportunity of meeting the wishes expressed by the League of Nations, by supplying it with all essential information regarding Poland’s military establishment. Only recently, the Polish Government transmitted to the Secretariat without delay its replies to the questionnaires of the League dated March 8th, 1921, and April 25th, 1921.

In its untiring efforts to fulfil the steadfast desire of the entire Polish nation by pursuing a policy of pacific evolution, the Polish Government has already made considerable reductions in its armed forces and military expenditure, within limits compatible with the security of the country.

The demobilisation of the army has reduced the strength from 960,000 in 1920 to the present peace footing of 260,000 men.

The reduction of the war budget as shown in the reply to the Note from the Council of the League of Nations dated January 12th, 1922, amounts to at least 50% as compared with the army of 1920.

The invitation sent to the Polish Delegate to sit on the Temporary Disarmament Commission was welcomed by Polish public opinion, which desired that in this important question Poland should work hand in hand with the other States under the direction of the League of Nations. She would thus be in a position to take part in the scientific preparation of the plan of general disarmament prepared by the Temporary Mixed Commission, and also in the search for methods of putting this plan into practice step by step, with the gradual development of normal international relations in Europe.
The attached memorandum is a statement of the reasons which have led the Polish Government to reduce its armed forces. I consider that it may also prove helpful in throwing further light upon the main features in the special situation of certain States Members of the League of Nations. These States, while limiting their armed forces, both in the interest of the general cause of peace and also in order to lighten the burdens which weigh upon their own peoples, cannot lose sight for a single moment of the inexorable demands of practical reality, which impose upon them the obligation of reconciling the programme of the limitation of their armed forces with the conditions essential to their own security.

I have the honour to be, etc.,

(Signed) S. ASKENAZY,
Delegate to the League of Nations.

His Excellency
Monsieur QUIÑONES DE LEÓN,
President of the Council of the League of Nations,
Geneva.

[Translation.]

WARSAW, June 26th, 1922.

STATEMENT.

In the recommendation of the Second Assembly of the League of Nations, the Governments of States forming part of the League are invited to express their opinions on the possibility of reducing armaments, taking into account their national security, international engagements, geographical situation and special circumstances.

In reply to this recommendation, the Polish Government has the honour to submit the following considerations:

GEOPGRAPHICAL SITUATION.

General Situation.

Poland’s geographical situation renders the defence of the country extremely difficult. For centuries the main European roads leading from the west, south-west and south to the vast territories extending from the Gulf of Finland and the White Sea as far as the steppes of the Black Sea have met in Poland.

All the natural arteries of communication crossing Poland intersect each other in a relatively small area, not more than 300 kilometres wide from the middle Vistula, between its junction with the San and the mouth of the Vistula.

Her central situation, in relation to her neighbours, who are able to use Polish territory as an essential means of communication, does indeed bring to Poland considerable political and commercial advantages, but it also involves her in the necessity of being always on her guard and prepared to defend herself. The past has taught us that possession of a territory as important as Poland from the commercial and military points of view has always roused the cupidity of neighbouring Powers, a cupidity increased with every indication of the weakness of the Polish State.

In all the wars waged by Poland against the aggressions of her neighbours, the regions of the middle Vistula were the chief aim of the operations of enemy invaders. This was the case in the campaign of 1656, when Warsaw was threatened by the Swedes and Brandenburgers from the north, the Muscovite troops from the north-east and the Cossacks from the south. It was the case again in the Polono-Russian and Polono-Prussian wars of 1792 and 1794, and those of 1831 and 1920.

In the world war, the Austrian and German offensives of 1914-15 were, for similar reasons, concentrated on the territory adjoining this part of the Vistula. Once the occupation of the middle Vistula by the Central Empires was completed, Russia not only definitely lost the greater part of Poland, but her troops, despite their numerical superiority, were effectively held in check.

Position of the Economic Centres and Natural Wealth of the Country.

To the difficulties of defence due to the geographical situation of Poland must be added the necessity of defending the frontier territories which are essential to preserve the life of the nation. In the first place, the coal-bearing region must be considered. The only deposits of coal in Poland are situated in the extreme south-west, on the actual frontier between Poland and Germany, in the neighbourhood of Sosnowiec, west of Krakow and in Upper Silesia. The new Polono-German frontier in Upper Silesia as also the former frontier, bisects the coal region in such a way that the pit-heads are not only not visible from the other side of the frontier, but many of them are actually within rifle range. Poland’s neighbours, on the other hand, possess deposits at a great distance from the frontier, — the Germans in Westphalia and Saxony, and the Russians in the basin of the Don.
In this territory are found, besides coal, the Polish deposits of zinc and lead, and also a large proportion of the iron ore beds which extend west of Czestochowa as far as Upper Silesia. The Polish iron ore deposits further from the frontier are to be found along the northern slopes of the mountains of the Holy Cross. The copper deposits in the same region are comparatively poor and cannot be worked unless Upper Silesian coal — the only coke-producing coal in Poland — can be brought to them.

The chief industries — particularly the metal-working and chemical industries — are, owing to the situation of the raw materials, mainly grouped on the territory bordering the frontier. Except for a few metal-working factories around Warsaw, in the Holy Cross mountains and the northern slope of the Carpathians, all the great industries of Poland are concentrated within the restricted area of Upper Silesia, and also in the neighbouring region of Sosnowiec and Czestochowa, which can easily be invaded from the German side in a day or a day and a-half's march; moreover, most of this region would actually be under fire from the neighbouring States without any need for the latter's troops to cross the frontier.

Communications.

The lines of communication in Poland are naturally directed towards a common centre and therefore the strategic lines of attack of her enemies are directed towards the same centre. Further, the natural wealth of Poland is scattered in outlying districts. It follows, therefore, that the Polish system of communication is inadequate, and does not fulfil any of the requirements dictated by natural conditions. This situation is due to the fact that, since the partition of Poland, the economic life of each of the three former parts of Poland — Russian, German and Austrian — has developed quite independently of the other.

In consequence of the pronounced tendency of each of the three Partitioning States to stifle the economic life of Poland in general, and in particular to prevent any possible contact between the three parts of the country, virtual zones of isolation, deprived of any means of mutual communication, have been formed between Russian Poland on the one hand, and Galicia and the province of Posen on the other. Up to the time of the Great War, there were only two lines of railway — the Warsaw-Vienna and Brody-Radziwillow-Zdolbunowo lines — along the whole frontier between Galicia and Polish Russia, a distance of more than 450 kilometres. The termini of the other lines were situated on the frontier at Szcyucin, Nadbrzezie, Belzec (Tarnobrzeg), Sokal and Stojanow. Similarly, along the frontier between Russian Poland and the province of Posen — a distance of about 300 kilometres — only one railway existed.

As a result of the policy of isolation pursued by the Partitioning States, in the territory of the Polish Republic, communication between the principal centres of Poland is effected by means of secondary and very devious routes. The distance, as the crow flies, between Warsaw and Posen is only 280 kilometres, whereas until recently the route by rail amounted to 390 kilometres. Between Warsaw and Lvov the direct distance is only 350 kilometres, but the distance by rail is 558 kilometres, that is to say, 60% longer. A long time will be required before the consequences of this policy of the Partitioning States can be eliminated.

Communications with Foreign Countries.

As regards communications with allied States, the position of Poland is equally unfavourable. Communication between Poland and non-neighbouring States can only be carried on through the narrow Polish corridor leading to the Polish littoral, 70 kilometres in length, and the Port of Danzig. This sole means of communication might be cut off by an invader in a few days.

Apart from the Polish corridor, Poland could, if attacked during a war, utilise to a certain extent the ports of her allies, Roumania and Latvia, of course, subject to the consent of their Governments. But here again considerable difficulties would be encountered in safeguarding communications. The corridor connecting Poland with Latvia is as long as the Danzig corridor; it is moreover, situated far from the centre of the country, so that, in spite of its greater width, it is no less difficult to guard. Access to the Roumanian ports is obtained along the south-eastern frontier of the country in the immediate neighbourhood of the Polish-Ukraine frontier. Land transit cannot be considered as safe in view of the fact that it depends on the consent of several States, viz., Czechoslovakia, Austria and Switzerland, or Czechoslovakia, Austria and Italy, or Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Serb-Croat-Slovene State, and Italy.

Geographical Conditions of the Eastern Frontier.

The above-mentioned difficulties of defence become even more evident when it is remembered that the territory of Poland is surrounded on its three most accessible sides by States which have remained outside the League of Nations and which have refused to enter into any obligations with regard to causing new wars and the tendency towards bringing about a universal social upheaval (Russia and Germany). The actual frontier between Poland and Soviet Russia extends for a distance of 3,072 kilometres — that is, less than one-third — in Polesia offer any natural defence. Poland possesses only a small part even of this latter territory, which, owing to its swamps, might form for her a comparatively defensible frontier region. Most of it is situated in Russia — a fact which greatly diminishes its value from the point of view of strategic defence. Moreover, this area can and will always be turned by the Russians. Russia, unlike Poland, can in fact utilise her part of Polesia for the purpose of offensive operations, because she possesses a railway there which divides Polesia from north to south, and also several
very convenient natural roads. Polesia, moreover, is by no means an impassable region. In dry summers and in winter it does not offer any great difficulties for the passage of troops.

**Geographical Conditions of the Western Frontier.**

Again, in the south-west, the west, and part of the north, Poland borders upon Germany along a distance of 1,552 kilometres, of which 574 kilometres are situated to the north along the enclave of East Prussia. This frontier along its whole length possesses no natural obstacle of any kind, except for some dozen kilometres of marshy ground on the Oder. There are no swamps or lakes or forest areas, still less mountains. On the other hand, West Prussia is protected in the south — that is to say, from the Polish side — by the barrier of the lakes and forests of Mazuria (Wald and Seesperre), and this barrier, already fairly strong by nature, was further strengthened during the recent war by formidable artificial obstacles which are at present kept up with the greatest care. Although more than 100 kilometres of the frontier between the Danzig corridor and East Prussia are formed by the Vistula, this river cannot be considered as of any value as an obstacle, as Polish territory beyond it, in an easterly direction, does not exceed 150 kilometres in width before the other German frontier is reached near Chojnice; in the event of war this frontier would obviously be threatened at the same time as the Prussian frontier. It is difficult to conceive of any effective defence of the frontiers on two fronts in a corridor having an average width of 150 kilometres, which, moreover, is reduced in the north to a width of only 45 kilometres for a distance of 300 kilometres as the crow flies. It should be added that the frontiers of this corridor are only 175 kilometres, and in some cases 140 kilometres distant from great German military centres such as Stettin and Königsberg, which would form excellent bases of operations.

The same considerations apply to the whole of the Western frontier, the chief centres of the Polish State lying in proximity to that frontier: Warsaw is scarcely 125 km distant as the crow flies from West Prussia. Along the whole of the Polish frontier on the Oder, and immediately to the East on the German side, there lies a dense system of double-track railways. This railway system may at any moment be used as a basis of operations against Poland. It includes the main lines of Stettin, recently entirely reconstructed, Küstrin, Frankfort-on-Oder, Guben Grünberg, Glogau, Breslau and Opole, and the secondary lines of Prenzlau, Eberswalde, Berlin, Kottbus, Górlitz and Liegnitz. On the Polish side, on the other hand, apart from Poznań (Posen), Thorn with Bydgoszcz-Bromberg, and Łódź, there is nothing to set against this network of railways, in view of the inadequacy of the lines of communication between the Western provinces and the rest of the country.

**Ratio of the Length of the Frontier to the Area and to the Density of the Population.**

The conditions of Poland are much less advantageous than those of her neighbours with regard to the ratio between the length of the frontier to be defended and the area and population of the country. Whereas the Reich contains 38,653 inhabitants per kilometre of the Germano-Polish frontier, Poland only has 17,397 to set against that figure. In comparison with Russia, the proportion is even more unfavourable: for every kilometre of the Russian frontier there are 87,273 citizens of the Soviet Republics, and only 24,545 Poles. Moreover, it must be remembered that almost the whole frontier line of Poland, except the 70 km. of coast-line, requires simultaneous defence, and that two-thirds of the frontier must be regarded as more or less threatened. Germany is not in a similar position, still less is Russia; the part of their frontiers exposed to danger is only an insignificant fraction of the whole, so that these States will always be in a position to maintain the greater proportion of their military forces on the very borders of Poland.

The geographical situation of Poland may be characterised shortly in the following manner:

1. A flat country, unprovided with natural obstacles both on nine-tenths of the threatened frontiers and along the lines of communication, which, with the exception of two near the borders, lead from the circumference to the centre of Poland, thus offering advantages for a concentric advance of enemy forces.

2. The mining centres and most of the industrial centres, without which it would be quite impossible to maintain the life of the country, are situated on the circumference.

**Special Conditions of External Relations.**

It is essential — and the Polish Government cannot pass the matter over in silence — to draw attention to the still unsettled relations existing between the Polish State and the countries in its immediate neighbourhood.

Although the Treaty of Riga has determined and defined the reciprocal relations between Poland and her Eastern neighbours, Russia and the Ukraine, neither public opinion nor the Government, which is responsible to the nation, can forget that it is within the boundaries of the Russian State that the headquarters of the Executive Committee of the Third International are situated, whose admitted and openly proclaimed object is to bring about a social revolution throughout the world, and particularly in neighbouring countries, first of all in Poland.

The immediate neighbourhood of the Federated Republic of Russian Soviets, which is in possession of a very large army, places Poland in quite a different position from that in which she would be if States belonging to the League of Nations were her neighbours.

Owing to the contiguity of the western frontier of Poland with that of the German Reich, the Polish Government, without any desire to interfere in German affairs and without the slightest intention of accusing anybody, nevertheless feels bound to point out that its appre-
ensions are justified, in view of many facts tending to show that the disarmament of Germany
which, in Part V of the Treaty of Versailles, was declared to be indispensable in order to arrive
at a general limitation of armaments, is at present still very far from complete.

After the Great War, Poland resumed her place among European States by virtue of the Treaty
of Versailles, and regained the provinces which during long years had lain under a foreign yoke.
The disinclination of her neighbours to accept this new state of affairs might manifest itself in
such ways as to create difficulties in the normal development of those friendly relations between
Poland and her neighbours, which the whole country desires, but which are still systematically
obstructed by powerful parties in Germany. These facts necessitate the greatest circumspection
on the part of the Polish Government in reducing to a minimum the military forces capable
of ensuring the effective defence of its frontiers.

Inadequacy of Moral Guarantees.

In considering the characteristics, already referred to, of the two States bordering on Poland,
it should be added that neither are Members of the League of Nations. Consequently, the legal
and moral obligations set forth in the Covenant for ensuring the pacific settlement of disputes
between Members of the League of Nations have no binding force either for Germany or for Soviet
Russia.

If the frontiers of Poland are compared from this point of view with those of other States, the
disadvantageous position of Poland is self-evident.

Whereas, for example, the length of exposed frontier-line in Poland is 2,624 km., it is only
240 km. in the case of France, and 260 km. in the case of Italy.

Special Internal Conditions.

Apart from these considerations regarding external conditions, there exist grounds for appre-
nension arising out of the internal situation of Poland.

In comparing the potential military strength of Poland and that of the States which, like
her, only regained their independence after the Great War with the military forces of all other
States, the inferiority of the newly created States in this connection must be admitted.

The States with military traditions, which devoted all their efforts to the development of
their fighting forces, and particularly those which took an active part in the Great War, have at
their disposal, even after a considerable measure of disarmament, a large number of troops trained
on a uniform system; they possess an experienced administrative organisation, and abundant
technical resources, as well as munition factories, asphyxiating gases, aircraft and tanks, and
finally they have control of workshops actually used, or available if necessary, for the needs of
the army and for purposes of war.

Poland lacks these resources, or at any rate she only possesses them to a very limited extent.

Neither does she possess well-trained reserves. The number of soldiers who served in the
ranks of the Polish Army from the date of mobilisation in 1918 up to the conclusion of the Treaty
of Riga, was quite inadequate for the requirements of the country and in comparison with the
forces of the neighbouring States; moreover, it could not be regarded as numerically equivalent to
the troops at the disposal of the States which took an active part in the Great War. Whereas
during the war as large a proportion as 20% of the population of those States served in the army,
the greatest strength attained by the Polish Army during the campaigns of 1919 and 1920, hardly
amounted to 600,000 men, viz., 3.55% of the population.

The improvised character of the army, all the organisation of which has had to be created
and for the training of which the most elementary instruction has been found necessary,
seriously lessens the fighting value of the soldiers who have served in the ranks of the Polish Army.

The position is similar with regard to war supplies. The Great War left Poland denuded
of stores. The war material at the disposal of the army during the war against Soviet Russia was
scarcely sufficient to meet the most pressing requirements.

The military factories in a position to supply the needs of the army are at present in an
embryonic state. Only very vigorous efforts could supply this deficiency to a certain extent, and
even then time would be required. At the present moment this inferiority exists, and is the cause
of quite exceptional conditions which must be taken into account in giving an outline of the
position.

Conclusions.

The considerations mentioned above explain clearly the difficult and exceptional position
of Poland. Poland is justly proud of her historic rôle as the defender of Western civilisation and
of the achievements of peace against the dangers of invasion and of war.

In order to play her part as defender, she is compelled to make perpetual efforts and permanent
sacrifices.

The difficult position in which she is placed cannot, however, destroy her faith in the realiza-
tion of peace among the nations or prevent her from working to achieve this end.

Natural conditions themselves urge Poland to co-operate in attempts to regulate international
relations without resorting to force of arms.

Poland, of all European States, has the greatest interest in the realisation of universal peace
and disarmament.
The idea of disarmament is welcomed as warmly by Government circles as by the whole Polish nation without exception.

**Strength and Organisation of the Military Forces of Poland.**

With a view to solving the difficult problem of ensuring to the State the forces indispensable for its defence, the Polish Government, while making as large reductions as possible in the active strength of the army and in the military budget, decided upon the following figures:

- 30 divisions of infantry,
- 10 brigades of cavalry,

with a two years' period of military service and a peace strength of 275,000 men.

These troops constitute the military force required for the protection of the frontiers in case of mobilisation, and are the cadres of the reserve units.

Further, the Polish State, with a view to keeping order, maintains a police force and also a certain number of Customs officials at the disposal of the Ministry of the Interior. The total of these police and Customs forces which, moreover, are not called upon to undergo military instruction and which are not under the control of the Military Authorities, is not higher than 60,000 men.

In consideration of the general geographical situation of Poland, her open frontiers, the density of her population, the consequences of her prolonged enslavement and finally the necessity for establishing uniform methods of work in the army, it must be stated that this total of 275,000 men is an indispensable minimum required to safeguard the most essential interests of the State.

**II**

**POLISH DELEGATION**

**ACREDITED TO THE**

**LEAGUE OF NATIONS**

**No. 2194**

[Translation]

Sir,

Having considered the proposals of Lord Robert Cecil relating to a general extension of the principles of the Washington Conference, I have the honour, by order of my Government, to submit herewith, in continuation of my note of June 28th last, a statement of the considerations of the Polish Government bearing on the requirements of Poland's national security, her international obligations, her geographical situation, and her special position in regard to naval requirements.

I have the honour to be, etc.,

(Signed) ASKENAZY.

His Excellency

Monsieur QUIÑONES DE LEÓN,

Ambassador, Acting President of the Council of the League of Nations.

[Translation]

**MEMORANDUM**

The considerations set forth in the Polish Government's memorandum dated June 26th last with regard to the exigencies of national security, international obligations, the geographical situation and the special conditions of Poland in relation to the question of land disarmament, show that the Republic of Poland is also specially interested in the solution of the problem of naval disarmament.

It must, however, be pointed out that the negotiations between the Principal Powers at Washington could only be brought to such a satisfactory conclusion by reason of the fact that the development of their naval forces had arrived at a point beyond which it was difficult to advance without gravely compromising the economic existence of those States.

The general considerations which prevailed at the Washington Conference could not properly be applied to Poland, a State which has been reconstituted as a result of the Great War. It would not therefore be just to require her to accept, as the basis of her naval policy, the principle of the status quo at sea as it existed in November 1921.

Poland, which has a population of approximately 27 million inhabitants within an area of 386,000 sq. km. cannot occupy the position assigned to her in Europe alike from a political and
from an economic point of view until she can make use in perfect safety of the sea routes which connect Poland with the rest of the world. It should be observed that this security must be assured to her without reference to the good-will or ill-will of her immediate neighbours.

Seeing that the possibility of limiting the defensive forces of a country is in direct relation to the strength of the offensive forces of the neighbouring countries, Poland is compelled not only to maintain but also to increase her present naval forces.

In view of the fact that the free use at all times of sea routes is an essential corollary of free access to the sea, the Polish Government feels compelled to ensure for Poland the development of a naval force which, though moderate, shall yet be sufficient to safeguard the security of her coast-line to the extent that is considered necessary by the States which already possess a navy.

Poland, which only desires the application to herself of the most elementary right of equality between nations, cannot be suspected of aggressive designs, if only by reason of the geographical configuration of her coast-line.

It will be realised from what has already been said that the Polish naval forces will in every case be so greatly inferior to the naval forces of the Great Powers that they could not, even in the future, play any important part in the establishment of naval equilibrium.

Poland merely seeks to obtain security within the limits of her frontiers as well as the full enjoyment of freedom at sea.

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REPLY OF THE SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE

DELEGATE OF THE SERB-CROAT-SLOVENES
TO THE ASSEMBLY
OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

[Translation.]

Sir,

In a letter dated April 13th, the Council of the League of Nations was good enough to request the Royal Government to furnish "a statement of the considerations it may wish to urge in regard to the requirements of its national security, its international obligations, its geographical situation and its special conditions."

The Royal Government has examined with all attention this request of the Council and has instructed me to give you the following answer:

The people of the Kingdom of the Serb-Croat-Slovenes, and more especially that part of it which lies in the old Kingdom of Serbia and which has had to suffer three successive wars since 1912, cannot but congratulate itself upon the noble efforts made by the League of Nations with a view to a progressive reduction of armaments.

Nevertheless, apart from the requirements of its national defence, the Royal Government feels bound to draw the attention of the Council to the following considerations:

A. National Safety.

The Kingdom of the Serb-Croat-Slovenes possesses frontiers with seven different States, three of which are ex-allies of the Central Powers. Amongst these are some which have not fulfilled their international obligations and which, moreover, cannot be said to be in a stable internal situation.

B. Geographical Situation.

The frontiers of our State are extremely developed and their length is great as compared with the figure of our population. The total length of our frontiers is no less than 4,000 kms., of which 1,800 kms. are common frontiers with ex-enemy States.

C. Special Conditions.

1. The political situation in the neighbouring States, as in Central Europe generally, is not yet well established.

2. The barracks, hospitals, Pasteur Institutes, geographical services, etc. — which, though under military management, are intended for public service — have been destroyed by the enemy in the course of the last war. Their repair and reconstruction naturally entail considerable expense, which burdens the budget of the War Ministry to the prejudice of real military expenses.

3. The population of the recently liberated provinces having as yet had no adequate military training, and in some cases no military training at all, it is indispensable to give them some instruction, however elementary in character, with a view to the defence of the country.

4. Following upon the systematic devastations carried out during the war by our enemies, the army has to take a considerable part in the reconstruction of the devastated regions —
re-establishment of communications, rebuilding of bridges, etc. The army will thus be obliged to lend its hand in the reconstruction of the territory for several years to come. Moreover, in some cases it has to fulfill the duties of customs guards and of gendarmerie, thus again increasing the budget of the War Ministry, instead of, as in ordinary times, that of other departments.

5. Despite the reasons given, which entail exceptional expenditure, the Royal Government, ever faithful to the peaceful spirit of its people, and desirous on the other hand to help in the great effort of the League of Nations, has considerably curtailed the budget of the War Ministry. Thus the military expenditure which in 1921 amounted to 140,125,000 gold francs, has been reduced to 70,500,000 gold francs for 1922.

No comparison with the military budget for 1912 is possible, since Serbia was at that time a country of 50,000 sq. kms. and 3 million people, while to-day the Kingdom of the Serb-Croat-Slovenes covers 250,000 sq. kms. and is populated by about 12 million inhabitants.

The effort made by the Kingdom of the Serb-Croat-Slovenes in the direction of disarmament will best be appreciated once it is noticed that the military expenditure of Switzerland, the surface of which is six times smaller and the population three times less numerous, amounts to 60 million gold francs.

The law on military organisation, which has not yet been voted on account of the requirements of the new constitution, will be inspired in the same peaceful spirit which has led the Government to reduce the military expenditure for this year by about 50%.

I have the honour to be, Sir, etc.

(Signed) M. Yovanovitch,
Delegate for the Kingdom of the Serb-Croat-Slovenes.

The Acting President of the Council
of the League of Nations,
Geneva.

22

REPLY OF SIAM

ROYAL LEGATION OF SIAM.
DIV. C. No 101.

PARIS, JUNE 30TH, 1922.

Sir,

His Siamese Majesty's Minister for Foreign Affairs has, by telegraph, instructed me to acknowledge receipt of your letter No. C.L. 32. 1922.IX, under date April 13th, 1922, and in reply to state that His Siamese Majesty's Government have no particular observations to submit with regard to the views relating to the requirements of the national security, international obligations, geographical situation, and any special circumstances of Siam, except that they wish to assure the Council and the Temporary Mixed Commission that their armed force is maintained exclusively for defence and for maintaining internal peace and order or for the police purposes and that they have no intention to be aggressive at all. They are therefore ready to welcome any proposal made by the Commission which is calculated to prevent international aggression and to preclude the maintenance of force for the purpose other than those of defence and internal police. Such proposal will always receive their most careful and sympathetic consideration.

His Siamese Majesty's Government wish further to point out that at the present time, when the organisation of the administration of the country on modern lines is being worked out and not yet completed, the Army is employed in many civil undertakings, for example:

(1) Medical. The personnel of the Red Cross is drawn from the Army Medical personnel;
(2) The Military Engineering Corps is employed on railway construction;
(3) The Military Survey Department is engaged on the cadastral survey of the country;
(4) The Military Aeronautical Department is developing aviation for commercial and postal purposes.

If compulsory service exists in Siam, it is in great part with a view to helping to educate the people, not only to teach them lessons of discipline but also how to read and write and all other branches of general education.

For the reasons above and owing to the above special circumstances of Siam, it is extremely difficult, if not actually impossible, to draw hard — and — fast lines as to the definite number of military and police force considered indispensable for the preservation of domestic order and
also the expenditure entailed thereby. Such determination of the force can be effected only when the requirements in the matter of preservation of domestic order are definitely known, that is to say, only in the case of countries whose administrative organisation is fully developed, which, as has already been said, is not the case of Siam. From this point of view, the latter is still in the stage of transition and realisation. However, His Siamese Majesty's Government sincerely hope that, with the above explanation of the special circumstances of Siam and the above assurances of their pacific intentions, the Commission will agree with them that there is no necessity to reduce the existing armed force of Siam.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your obedient servant,

(Signed) Luang Bhasha Parivatra,
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

Monsieur Paul Hymans,
Acting President of the Council of the League of Nations,
Geneva.

REPLY OF SWEDEN

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

STOCKHOLM, August 28th, 1922.

Sir,

In a letter dated August 7th, M. Quiñones de León, Acting President of the Council of the League of Nations, asked me — in conformity with a resolution passed by the Council at its session of July 20th — to furnish you as soon as possible with the statement of the Swedish Government concerning the requirements of her national security, geographical situation, etc., which was asked for in M. Hymans' Note of April 13th last.

In reply, I have the honour to inform you that the Commission mentioned in my letter of June 27th last, which has been entrusted with the examination, in its entirety, of the question of the future organisation of Sweden's national defences, has not yet been able to draw up its report. I shall certainly communicate the contents of this report to you as soon as it is published, which will probably be before the end of the present year. Under these circumstances, the Swedish Government much regrets that it is still not in a position to furnish you with detailed information on this question.

It desires, however, to emphasise that, in all probability and in view of all the circumstances mentioned by the Council of the League of Nations, the above-mentioned Commission will be able to propose appreciable reductions in Sweden's military budget — beyond those already effected — of the extent of which I have already had the honour to inform you in my letter of March 20th last.

I have the honour, etc.

(Signed) Branting.

Sir Eric Drummond,
Secretary-General of the League of Nations,
Geneva.
FEDERAL POLITICAL DEPARTMENT,
Foreign Affairs Section.

BERNE, July 8th, 1922.

Sir,

In a letter of April 13th last, confirmed by a letter of June 12th, the Council of the League of Nations asked the Government of the Confederation to send it "a statement containing such considerations as it might wish to submit with regard to the requirements of its national security, international obligations, geographical situation and special circumstances, and, in particular, indicating separately (as far as possible) the police and military forces which it considers essential for its internal security and also the expenditure thereby involved."

The Federal Council has carefully considered this request and has instructed us to reply as follows:—

Switzerland is fundamentally a peaceful State, and must therefore give her unreserved support to the efforts made by the League of Nations to secure the gradual reduction of armaments. Nevertheless, it is an imperative duty for Switzerland to take the measures necessary for self-defence in case of attack. She cannot, moreover, lose sight of the fact that the Act of November 20th, 1815, recognising and guaranteeing the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland and the inviolability of her territory — an Act which was confirmed in the Declaration of London dated February 13th, 1920 — places upon Switzerland an obligation to ensure by her own means the inviolability of her territory and the maintenance of her neutrality. Her frontiers are very extensive in comparison with her population, and she is therefore compelled to maintain as large and as well-equipped an army as possible. This necessity is also a result of her geographical situation. She is more exposed to the risk of becoming a theatre of war than countries which are not, as she is, situated in the centre of Europe. In addition, she is surrounded by strongly-armed States — a fact which renders it still more imperative for her to maintain at a certain standard her state of military preparedness.

Her army, which is merely militia, is organised on a comparatively restricted basis. The training of recruits, for instance, amounts only to a period of 65 days for the infantry, 75 for the artillery and 90 for cavalry, and the period of service afterwards performed by soldiers varies from 88 to 112 days, extended over a period of more than 12 years. Similarly, as regards her actual armaments, the condition of her army is very far from that of the armies of other countries. She does not even possess such war material as is generally admitted to-day to be absolutely essential. Thus, she possesses no heavy artillery at all, her air fleet is inadequate, she has no automatic arms for infantry, mine-throwers, "canons d'accompagnement" for infantry, flame-projectors or any of the material necessary for protection against poison gas. It should be added that the sections of Customs officials and the police force, which in other countries are organised on the military model and form a fighting force by no means negligible, are entirely separate from the army in our country, so that their assistance could not be counted upon for military operations.

Though all military activity was interrupted during the years 1919 and 1920, and was then resumed on a very small scale, army training is proceeding to-day on more extensive lines; but neither the number of recruits nor the term of service is on the same scale as that maintained before the war — although this scale is prescribed by law. Amongst the principal measures passed with a view to reducing still further the military burdens of the country, reference should be made in the first place to the postponement for one year of the period of liability for military service, the army being thereby deprived of a whole class of trained troops; also, stricter regulations have been introduced with regard to recruiting, as a result of which only 55% of the men of military age were declared fit for service, whereas in previous years this proportion was 70 to 72%; lastly, the courses of training provided for the older levies, etc., have been abolished. The question whether it will be possible to make still further restrictions is at present under discussion. Before our military establishment is re-organised, certain proposals to this effect will probably be submitted to Parliament in the present year.
As regards the present organisation of the Swiss army, we would refer to the documents which we have already sent to the Disarmament Section of the Secretariat of the League of Nations.

In any case, and apart from any measures which may still be taken towards reducing her military burdens, Switzerland at present possesses a military establishment which, compared with others, is extremely small. She is therefore justified in the belief that if the States Members of the League of Nations reduced their armaments in the same proportion, the problem of disarmament would be almost, if not entirely, solved.

I have the honour to be, etc.,

Federal Political Department:
(Signed) Motta,

To the Acting President
of the Council of the League of Nations,
Geneva.
ANNEX III

REPORT ON LORD ESHER'S PROPOSAL.

The Commission considered Lord Esher's scheme in so far as it comes within the scope of Article 8 of the Covenant, which defines the object to be attained and the methods to be followed when drawing up a scheme for the reduction of armaments.

1. The Commission fully realises the great value of Lord Eshers' initiative, but it does not consider that it is possible to accept a system for the reduction of armaments, such as that of Lord Esher's, based on co-efficients chosen in an arbitrary manner.

Under Article 8 of the Covenant, the calculation of the requirements of national safety constitutes one of the essential bases for the reduction of armaments. The first factor to be considered when drawing up such an estimate consists of the replies of the various Governments with regard to their requirements.

At the same time, the Commission would like to call attention to the following points:

An estimate of the requirements of the national safety of any country cannot be complete unless it be based on an appreciation of the dangers threatening that country, that is to say, unless it takes into account the forces of neighbouring States and their political tendencies, nor yet should such an estimate ignore the assistance that might be given by other States.

2. However such an estimate is made, the Commission is of opinion that it would be desirable immediately to take the necessary steps to find a method whereby the value of the national forces of each State can be readily estimated. The Commission discussed the method proposed by Lord Esher, which consists in taking as the unit of measure an arbitrarily chosen numerical strength of 30,000 men. The Commission is of opinion that mere numerical strength alone does not express the military force of a State as, in modern warfare, in which man acts through war material, the combination constituting the armed unit is composed of certain proportions of men, or organising staffs, and of material.

The question as to how these proportions can be estimated, not with a view to imposing a standard unit on existing armics, but in order to be able to calculate the respective value of those armies, should be considered by the Permanent Advisory Commission, to which Lord Esher's scheme has been submitted by the Council.

The Commission suggests that it might be possible to take as a unit of measure the combination of a certain strength and certain fixed sum of money representing the remaining factor of armament.

3. The Commission examined the possible scope of and methods for a limitation of land armaments.

(a) The Commission is of opinion that such a limitation should affect peace-time armaments only since there can be no question of limiting the effort made by a country should it carry out a national mobilisation.

(b) The Commission recognises that if a limitation is to be effective, it is necessary that it should simultaneously affect the strength of the troops (men or cadres) and material either directly or by an indirect method of financial limitation. Nevertheless, it considers that it is unable to give a final opinion on this matter before having received the technical report from the Permanent Advisory Commission.

(c) Lastly, the Commission considered the necessity, when dealing with the whole armed forces of a State, of distinguishing between the uses to which they might be put. It was of opinion that limitation should apply to the whole of the land forces intended for the defence of the mother-country, excluding those acknowledged to be necessary for the occupation or defence of colonies and those devoted to the carrying out of international obligations of such a nature or duration that they would be unable to take part in the defence of the mother-country. A special agreement supplementary to the general reduction agreement should be made for the militation of colonial forces.

To sum up, the Commission cannot approve Lord Esher's scheme, but is of opinion that the idea suggested in the scheme of fixing a method of estimating peace-time strengths is justified.

It believes that the limitation of armaments must be imposed on the peace-time strength, bearing in mind the essential factors on which such strength is based.

It is of opinion that this limitation should not apply to forces that are not utilised for the defence of the metropolitan area of each State.

Finally, it is of opinion that a special supplementary agreement should be contemplated for the limitation of forces used to maintain order and in the defence of colonial possessions.
Statement by Admiral the Marquis de Magaz, Spanish Naval Representative, on the subject of the extension of the Washington Naval Treaty to non-signatory Powers Members of the League of Nations.

The short period given us to consider the three schemes which have been brought forward with regard to this problem has not been such as to allow of this question being fully considered in official circles. I have therefore received no instructions from my Government and I am also without information as to the opinion of the Naval Staff. The following remarks are therefore of a purely personal nature.

The scheme submitted to the great Naval Powers at Washington was freely discussed by them. They came to an agreement on some of the proposals laid before them after having made certain changes in them, but they also rejected many others.

It is therefore advisable to make use of the same methods when we proceed to the extension of the Treaty, since a scheme can only have any value if it has been freely discussed and generally accepted; it will be contrary to the sentiments of independence and national dignity to impose a Treaty wholly prepared and ready to be signed on the Governments.

It might perhaps have been preferable merely to invite certain Powers to adhere to the Washington Treaty without giving any figures, but since expert technical opinion of the Permanent Advisory Commission on the three schemes submitted has been asked for, and as all of them contain figures, it is impossible not to mention this subject.

The Washington Treaty was one concluded by States which had attained the zenith of their naval power. But, on the contrary, the States to which it is now desired to extend the Treaty are, for the most part, very far from having reached such a position, and some of them are even only commencing their naval development. It would not, therefore, be just to base the extension of the Treaty on the forces at present possessed by the second-class Powers; it is even possible that, if this were the procedure adopted, most of them would not accept an invitation to discuss the scheme.

On the other hand, there is so much difference between the armaments of the Washington Signatory Powers and those of other Powers, that the former are in no danger if they lay down limits for the others which will certainly not be reached.

When fixing such figures we may take it for granted that the armaments allowed at Washington are the minimum compatible with the national safety of the Signatory Powers, and estimate those of other Powers by means of comparisons derived from a study of the provisions of Article 8 of the Covenant.

Let us consider the case of Spain as an example of the method to be followed.

At present Spain has no intention of building capital ships as defined by the Washington Treaty. But, on the contrary, the States to which it is now desired to extend the Treaty are, for the most part, very far from having reached such a position, and some of them are even only commencing their naval development. It would not, therefore, be just to base the extension of the Treaty on the forces at present possessed by the second-class Powers; it is even possible that, if this were the procedure adopted, most of them would not accept an invitation to discuss the scheme.

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Let us consider the case of Spain as an example of the method to be followed.

At present Spain has no intention of building capital ships as defined by the Washington Treaty. It is therefore almost certain, in view of the short duration of the said Treaty and the slow progress of shipbuilding in our country, that she will not exceed the maximum tonnage fixed for her by the most restricted of the preliminary drafts submitted.

She cannot, however, enter into engagements for the future which, being contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations, would fix a limit for her naval power proportionately more restricted than that which the five Powers which signed the Washington Treaty freely granted to themselves.

In a general way Spain's requirements are, from a geographical point of view, identical with those of Italy; in fact, both are peninsulas having coasts on two seas, several islands, Protectorates on the north coast of Africa and several more distant colonies (in the case of Italy Erythrea and in the case of Spain Spanish Guinea and Rio de Oro). We must obviously take other circumstances into consideration, but, from a geographical point of view, the only one which should exercise a deciding influence on the composition of a nation's fleet is the consideration of what that nation considers necessary for its national safety and compatible with its economic strength, that is to say, with funds that it is able to devote to the realisation of its ideal.

The case of Spain from this point of view is absolutely clear.

The law of May 31st, 1907, which laid the foundations of Spain's naval renaissance, stated in its 19th paragraph:—

"This first programme for naval re-building is fixed at three ships of about 15,000 tons, not because this number was regarded as sufficient but because it has merely been taken as the departure point for the future development of the fleet;"
and in paragraph 22:—

“It is expected that in a few years the nation will be able to maintain a fleet of nine battleships with the necessary auxiliary ships.”

It is also stated that the naval programmes would be brought forward successively every seven to eight years.

It was with this idea that in June 1913 the second stage of naval development, which was chiefly to consist of three units of 21,000 tons, was entered upon. This programme was published in the Gaceta de Madrid (Official Journal).

Parliament made no difficulty about granting the necessary credits, but unfortunately the European War prevented the programme from being carried out. It was therefore decided in 1915 to devote the sums voted by Parliament to the improvement of naval bases, for the construction of submarines, etc.

Had the War not occurred, we should now have six capital ships and, further, the third programme, which, like the first two, was to include three capital ships, would be under construction.

These forces are so necessary to us that at present we have the greatest difficulty in providing for our most urgent needs, although we keep several ships in commission which, in view of their age, should long ago have been struck off the navy list.

If we compare the proportion of their general budget that the Maritime Powers devote to their navies with that of Spain, it will easily be seen that we have the necessary economic resources for the upkeep of such a fleet.

If, therefore, we are to remain faithful to the method followed at Washington and the spirit of the Covenant, we cannot go farther, when we renounce our intention of developing our naval power, than the following limits: the suppression of units more than twenty years old that are present in our possession, and the abandonment of the third naval programme which should have been at present under construction; but we must regard the second programme as carried out, thus bringing into our tonnage in capital ships the three España and the three 21,000-ton battleships provided for in the 1913 programme, or a total base tonnage of about 108,000 tons, which might be reduced to 105,000 tons to get a multiple of 35,000.

The proportion between the tonnage of aircraft carriers to capital ships in the Washington Treaty is about one-third in the case of France and Italy. Following this rule, the maximum for Spain should be fixed at 35,000 tons. It might even be reduced to 33,000, which would be the tonnage for an experimental unit.

The reasons brought forward to justify certain exceptions in the case of France and Italy also fully apply to Spain, since its naval construction was interrupted during the War to the same degree as those Powers, and even to a greater degree.

For these reasons we beg to submit the following draft Resolutions:—

1. The Naval Sub-Commission considers that there is no necessity to modify the Washington Treaty for the purpose of extending it to other Powers; it is only necessary to consider the maximum tonnage which each State should possess and what exception should be made.

2. The Sub-Commission considers that it would not be equitable to base a maximum limit of tonnage on the existing forces of Non-Signatory Powers, in view of the fact that the fleets of many of these Powers are considerably below the requirements of their national security.

3. The Sub-Commission can draw up figures of the tonnage necessary for each State, based on a comparison of the geographical and general situation of the Powers signatory and non-signatory to the Washington Treaty.

4. Such figures, however, can only have a provisional value and serve as a basis of discussion.

Statement by Rear-Admiral Penido, Brazilian Naval Representative, on the subject of the extension of the Washington Naval Treaty to Non-Signatory Powers Members of the League of Nations.

The short time at our disposal for the examination of the drafts submitted by the representatives of three countries signatory to the Washington Treaty, as the basis of a Convention for the application of the principles of the said Treaty to the States Members of the League of Nations, as well as the fact that I am placed at a considerable distance from the Brazilian Admiralty, will explain why I am not able to furnish the Sub-Commission with my Government's opinion on this subject, which is so important for the naval power of my country. I hope, however, to be able to do so, perhaps before the Third Assembly in September.

I can assure the Sub-Commission, however, that all steps and proposals concerned with world peace are always favourably received in Brazil.

My country's policy towards her neighbours has always been one of the most absolute loyalty and disinterestedness. Brazil has never entered into a conflict except when driven to it by the provocation or intolerance of an adversary. The action of her military forces has always been directed against men and not against nations.
Brazil was the first country to protest against the invasion of Belgium, and her people were so sympathetic to the cause of the Allies that Brazil ranged herself on the side of the defenders of the principles of civilisation in spite of Brazil's commercial interests and of the consequences which her attitude might entail.

Great causes have always been favourably received in Brazil.

The constitution of Brazil has established arbitration as an obligatory solution in questions involving international disputes and by this method disputes with ten of Brazil's neighbours on questions concerning frontiers have been settled in the broadest possible spirit.

In view of such considerations, I can state that Brazil has no idea of aggression in the question of the organisation of her naval power.

In one of his recent speeches to the armed forces in my country, President Pessoa said: "There is no thought of hostility in the international policy of Brazil. Peace is now our greatest ally and will continue to be so in the future, but no people can answer except for itself on questions connected with ideas, national passions and tendencies of thought. It cannot know to what extent other peoples entertain feelings of humanity and civilisation. This is the cause of the present state of unhappy uncertainty, and the present need of maintaining and keeping equipped military forces. This will last until such time as the peoples understand the necessity of definitely abandoning violent procedure in the settlement of their quarrels and of trusting to international justice, just as in civil life private individuals trust to the justice of the law."

My country's policy being defined in this way, I can, without difficulty, and with the greatest sincerity submit to you in my personal and professional capacity the observations which seem to me to be reasonable on the subject of the drafts which have been presented for our technical consideration.

M. Rivas-Vicuna, who represents Chile on the Temporary Mixed Commission, made certain observations, of which you are all cognisant, on the subject of the application of the principles of the Washington Treaty to the South American countries.

I also think that the co-efficients proposed in the various drafts do not make sufficient allowance for the importance, the necessities and the actual situation of Brazil, where conditions differ essentially from those of European nations.

In view of the immense extent of her coastline, the organisation of her naval power, in accordance with the general evolution of material in other navies, has a vital interest for her existence and for her internal needs.

In his last message to Parliament, the President of the Republic said: "Practically all the units of our existing fleet have reached the maximum limit of their existence."

The cruisers Floriano and Deodoro, of 3,162 tons, constructed in 1895, are considered useless, and will have to be replaced by other more powerful units.

The Minas Geraes and the Sao Paulo, constructed in 1908, have already passed the halfway mark of the limits established for the useful life of a war vessel.

Brazil, which has so large a coastline and an area of more than 8 million square kilometres, does not possess a single capital ship constructed according to the improvements introduced as a result of the Great War. How then can a ten year truce be imposed upon her, which would prevent her from replacing her old vessels and from completing her naval programme? The programme submitted in 1908 provides for the construction of a cruiser of 28,000 tons. Since Brazil's lines of communication with eighteen of her States are almost exclusively maritime, in view of the imperfect character of the communications in the interior, her Navy must be equipped in such a way as to defend her seaborne commerce and her lines of communication, which, as you well know, are the essence of strategy.

The situation of Brazil is therefore very different from that of the Great Powers, which have been forced to increase, improve and equip their navies in view of the Great War. This necessity became so burdensome for their budgets that their statesmen were obliged to adopt a solution which has benefited their own internal economy, the peace of the world, and the interests of humanity at large.

You are well aware of the fact that it is precisely for such reasons as I have indicated to you that Article 8 of the Covenant provides in one of its paragraphs as follows:

"The Members of the League recognise that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations."

Pending the instructions of my Government, and pending submission to you of its views on the subject before you, I feel sure that you will consider the observations which I have just submitted in a personal capacity with your usual spirit of wisdom and tolerance.

During the fourth meeting of the Naval Sub-Commission, Admiral Penido requested that the following summary of the reasons which had prompted him to make the above declarations should be attached to the Commission's Report to the Council:

"Whereas the situation of the States signatory to the Washington Treaty, is, as I have explained in the observations on the case of Brazil which I have submitted to the Sub-Commission, altogether different from that of the South American States;
"And whereas the Representatives of the Signatory Powers who were — with the exception of Japan — authors of the various draft schemes submitted to the Sub-Commission have rejected the proposal which Admiral MAGAZ and I submitted to the Sub-Commission, which proposal was to establish, as the basis of discussion, the principles contained in Article 8 of the Covenant concerning the requirements of national security, geographical situation, and international obligations;

"And whereas, as an expert of the League of Nations, I cannot depart from the organic principles of the existence of the League, I abstain from participation in the drawing up of the Draft Convention, which Convention is not compatible with the requirements and with the naval defence of my country."
ANNEX V

DRAFT CONVENTION

for the Extension of the Washington Naval Treaty
to the Non-Signatory Powers of the League of Nations.

Albania, Argentine, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Esthonia, Finland, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Latvia, Liberia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Persia, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, Salvador, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, Siam, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, Uruguay, Venezuela, having taken note of the Naval Agreement entered into at Washington by certain Powers, and desiring also to contribute to the maintenance of the general peace and to prevent competition in armaments;

Have resolved, with a view to accomplishing these purposes, to conclude a Convention to impose limitations on their respective naval armaments corresponding to those agreed to at Washington, and to that end having appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

Who, having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

CHAPTER I.

Article 1. — The High Contracting Parties agree to limit their respective Naval Armaments as provided in the present Convention.

Article 2. — The High Contracting Parties may retain respectively all vessels of war built or building on November 12th, 1921, of which those exceeding the limitations prescribed for the future by the present Convention are specified in Chapter II, Part I.

Article 3. — No new capital ships shall be constructed or acquired by any of the High Contracting Parties except replacement tonnage for the vessels specified in Chapter II, Part 1, which may be constructed or acquired as specified in Chapter II, Part 2.

Ships which are replaced in accordance with Chapter II, Part 2, shall be disposed of as prescribed in Part 3 of that Chapter.

Article 4. — The total capital ship replacement tonnage of each of the following High Contracting Parties shall not exceed in standard displacement for Argentine 81,000 tons (82,290 metric tons); for Brazil 45,000 tons (45,714 metric tons); for Chile 35,000 tons (35,560 metric tons); for Denmark 13,000 tons (13,206 metric tons); for Greece 36,000 tons (36,571 metric tons); for Netherlands 26,000 tons (26,412 metric tons); for Norway 16,000 tons (16,254 metric tons); for Spain 81,000 tons (82,290 metric tons); for Sweden 62,000 tons (62,984 metric tons).

Note. — Article 4 has been drafted in strict accordance with the principles of the status quo. Nevertheless, the majority of the Members of the Naval Sub-Commission feel bound to call the attention of the Council to the resulting inequality between the respective naval forces of the three South American States: Argentine, Brazil and Chile, whereas, from a technical and general consideration of the circumstances of these States, they consider that they should logically have equivalent naval forces, the total tonnage in capital ships remaining, however, below 80,000.

Article 5. — No capital ship exceeding 35,000 tons (35,560 metric tons) standard displacement shall be acquired by, or constructed by, for, or within the jurisdiction of, any of the High Contracting Parties.
Article 6. — No capital ship of any of the High Contracting Parties shall carry a gun with a calibre in excess of sixteen inches (406 millimetres).

Article 7. — The High Contracting Parties may not construct aircraft carriers except within a total tonnage limit equal to one-third of their total tonnage in capital ships.

Article 8. — The replacement of aircraft carriers shall be effected only as prescribed in Chapter II, Part 2, of the present Convention.

Article 9. — No aircraft carrier exceeding 27,000 tons (27,432 metric tons) standard displacement shall be acquired by, or constructed by, for, or within the jurisdiction of any of the High Contracting Parties.

Article 10. — No aircraft carrier of any of the High Contracting Parties shall carry a gun with a calibre in excess of 8 inches (203 millimetres). If the armament carried includes guns exceeding six inches (152 millimetres) in calibre the total number of guns carried, except anti-aircraft guns and guns not exceeding 5 inches (127 millimetres), shall not exceed ten. If alternatively the armament contains no guns exceeding six inches (152 millimetres) in calibre, the number of guns is not limited.

In either case the number of anti-aircraft guns and of guns not exceeding 5 inches (127 millimetres) in calibre is not limited.

Article 11. — No vessel of war exceeding 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons) standard displacement, other than a capital ship or aircraft carrier, shall be acquired by, or constructed by, for, or within the jurisdiction of any of the High Contracting Parties.

Vessels not specifically built as fighting ships nor taken in time of peace under Government control for fighting purposes, which are employed on fleet duties or as troop transports or in some other way for the purpose of assisting in the prosecution of hostilities otherwise than as fighting ships, shall not be within the limitations of this article.

Article 12. — No vessel of war of any of the High Contracting Parties hereafter laid down, other than a capital ship, shall carry a gun with a calibre in excess of eight inches (203 millimetres).

Article 13. — No ship to be scrapped after replacement in accordance with the present Convention may be reconverted into a vessel of war.

Article 14. — No preparations shall be made in merchant ships in time of peace for the installation of warlike armaments for the purpose of converting such ships into vessels of war, other than the necessary stiffening of decks for the mounting of guns not exceeding 6 inches (152 millimetres) in calibre.

Article 15. — No vessel of war constructed within the jurisdiction of any of the High Contracting Parties for a non-contracting Party shall exceed the limitations as to displacement and armament prescribed by the present Convention for vessels of a similar type which may be constructed by or for any of the High Contracting Parties.

Article 16. — If the construction of any vessel of war for a non-contracting Party is undertaken within the jurisdiction of any of the High Contracting Parties, such Party shall promptly inform the Council of the League of Nations of the date of the signing of the contract and the date on which the keel of the ship is laid; and shall also communicate to the Council the particulars relating to the ship prescribed in Chapter II, Part 2 (b), 4 and 5, of the present Convention.

Article 17. — In the event of a High Contracting Party being engaged in war, such party shall not use as a vessel of war any vessel of war which may be under construction within its jurisdiction for any other Power or which may have been constructed within its jurisdiction for another Power and not delivered.

Article 18. — Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes not to dispose by gift, sale, or any mode of transfer of any vessel of war in such a manner that such vessel may become a vessel of war in the Navy of any foreign Power.

Article 19. — The rules for determining tonnage displacement prescribed in Chapter II, Part 4, shall apply to the ships of each of the High Contracting Parties.
CHAPTER II.

PART I.

List of Capital Ships at present possessed by the High Contracting Parties

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Names</th>
<th>Tonnage</th>
<th>Names</th>
<th>Tonnage</th>
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<td>5,002</td>
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PART 2.

Replacement.

The replacement of capital ships and aircraft carriers shall take place according to the following rules:

(a) Capital ships and aircraft carriers twenty years after the date of their completion may be replaced by new construction, but within the limits prescribed in Article 4 and Article 7. The keels of such new construction may be laid down not earlier than seventeen years from the date of completion of the tonnage to be replaced, provided, however, that no capital ship tonnage shall be laid down until ten years from November 12th, 1921.