LEAGUE OF NATIONS

REPORT

of the Temporary Mixed Commission on Armaments.
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In accordance with the resolution of the last Assembly, the Temporary Mixed Commission has continued during the year 1922 the work with which it was entrusted by the First Assembly. The work carried out during this year has confirmed it in the impression which it tried to convey in the preliminary paragraphs of its Report for 1921.

The problem of disarmament still appears to it as one of the most difficult which confront the League of Nations, and, despite its difficulties, as one which must be the object of its constant attention and its most persistent efforts. As was the case last year, the main obstacle with which the Temporary Mixed Commission has had to contend in its efforts to bring about some measure of disarmament is the general situation of the world, its instability and the prudence with which all countries must consider proposals for disarmament.

The year 1922 witnessed a clearly defined effort to reach a solution of this difficult problem in a somewhat restricted area, both geographical and technical. The Conference of Washington approached the question of the limitation of naval armaments and that of the solution of certain political problems in the Pacific.

The conventions resulting therefrom are well known.

A similar effort is to be observed in the Pan-American Congress which will meet in Santiago de Chile.

Despite these manifestations of the spirit of international co-operation which is seen at work in the world, the general situation is still too unfavourably affected by the after-effects of the last war. The three Great Powers, the immense military importance (actual or potential) of which was mentioned in the Report of the Commission for last year, are still outside the League. This fact in itself might suffice to hinder, if not altogether to block, several of the activities to which, on the instructions of the Assembly, the Temporary Mixed Commission has given its attention. Moreover, the memory of the war still maintains in many States a feeling of insecurity, which is represented in the candid statements in which, at the request of the Assembly, several of them have put forward the requirements of their national security, and the political and geographical considerations which contribute to shape their policy in the matter of armaments.

Despite the scarcely favourable conditions under which, on the whole, the Temporary Mixed Commission has worked, it has nevertheless been able to make fairly satisfactory progress on a certain number of points. Moreover, while its attention had so far been limited to problems of a special nature, the Temporary Mixed Commission has at last been able to tackle the central problem itself: that of the reduction of armaments. During the three sessions of the year it has examined no less than two series of schemes having this aim in view: one series aiming at the extension of the principles of the Treaty of Washington on the limitation of naval armaments to the Members of the League that were not parties to that Treaty, and another series aiming at establishing the principles on which land armaments might be limited by means of a system of mutual guarantee.

Finally, the statistical enquiry which, at the suggestion of the Temporary Mixed Commission, was the object of a resolution of the Second Assembly, has already resulted in the collection of important military, political and geographical documents, which define the situation in each country in the matter of armaments, and which it was necessary should be at the disposal of the League of Nations before attempting any practical reduction.

On other points, however, such as the traffic in arms, connected with the ratification of the Convention of St.-Germain, the state of affairs, as will be explained further on, has not improved.

On the whole, the Temporary Mixed Commission considers that the documents and proposals submitted to the Council and the Assembly, though not a decisive step towards the solution of the delicate problem the consideration of which has been assigned to it, still mark real progress, which will, no doubt, be followed by fruitful work.
I. LIMITATION OF NATIONAL EXPENDITURE ON ARMAMENTS.

At its second session, the Assembly of the League of Nations adopted the following resolution:

"Subject to the conditions set out in the recommendations of the First Assembly, the recommendation that Members of the League should undertake not to exceed, for the next two financial years following the present year, the sum total of expenditure on military, naval and air forces provided for in the budget of that year, be again forwarded to all Members of the League, together with a statement showing the replies already received to this recommendation."

The Council endorsed this resolution, and the Secretary-General wrote to the Members of the League on January 17th, 1922, enclosing a copy of the recommendation contained in the resolution, and a statement of the replies received by the Secretariat.

An annex1 is appended, showing in column form the replies received to both the recommendation of the First Assembly and the decision of the Second Assembly. It will be seen that, leaving aside the States whose military status is settled by the Peace Treaties, most of the Governments show their willingness to reduce their military expenditure as much as possible, either in deference to the Assembly’s recommendation or owing to the general economic crisis now being experienced all over the world. Many of them, however, hesitate to pledge themselves as suggested in the recommendation of the Assembly.

In the course of the discussion of this situation before the Commission, one of its members, M. Lebrun, pointed out that it was of less importance to ascertain whether the States were prepared in advance to submit to certain general regulations, thus relinquishing a portion of their freedom of action, than to acquire information on their present expenditure and ascertain whether they conformed to the recommendations of the Assembly. He therefore proposed that, without awaiting the completion of the very comprehensive and detailed work of the Sub-Committee on Statistics, the characteristic features of the military expenditure of the States should be grouped in tables.

This was the origin of the resolution which was adopted by the Temporary Mixed Commission and approved by the Council in the following terms, at the meeting in July:

"The Commission proposes to submit to the next Assembly, in the form of tables which can be readily understood and which will be annexed to its report, the following information:

1. The reduction in military expenditure effected in accordance with the Recommendation of the First Assembly by the various States in 1913 and 1922 compared with the amount of previous budgets;

2. The difference between such expenditure in the years 1913 (pre-war) and 1922 expressed in terms both of paper currency and gold;

3. The relative importance of military budgets as compared with ordinary budgets during the three typical years 1913-1918-1922, a distinction being drawn between the actual military budgets (Army, Navy, Military Aviation, Colonies) and the same budgets minus the exceptional expenditure due to the war or to international obligations."

The tables thus prepared and approved by the Commission, as well as an explanatory note on the conclusions that might be drawn from them, are the object of a special volume annexed (A. 31a).

The explanatory note which accompanies these tables rightly points out that, owing to the differences in the systems of public book-keeping adopted by various States, it is advisable to be cautious in drawing comparisons between the figures corresponding to the different countries.

The Commission therefore are of opinion that the work begun must be continued and developed in order to present, if possible, comparable figures at a later date.

The intention of the Commission in presenting this preliminary study was to furnish a documentation which should show the change in military expenditure, as well as the particular tendency of each country in this respect. Given the importance attached to this question by

1 See Annex I.
the First and Second Assemblies from the point of view of disarmament, and by the Financial Conference of Brussels from that of the financial situation of the world, it seems that a study of the changes undergone by the military budgets during the last three years, in comparison with pre-war figures, must present a special interest.

The Commission drew from these tables the following conclusions:

(a) On the whole the estimated defence expenditure for the financial year 1922 (or 1922-23) shows a reduction as compared with the actual expenditure incurred in the two previous financial years.

(b) In appreciating the significance of this reduction, due consideration must be given, however, to the fact that, since the year 1920, in many of the countries concerned, there has been a falling off in war charges, owing to the operations connected with demobilisation, and also to the fact that in many countries there has been a considerable decrease in the prices of raw materials' II. STATISTICAL ENQUIRY.

I. FIRST RESULTS OBTAINED IN THE COURSE OF THE ENQUIRY.

The Second Assembly, recognising that the final and general limitation of armaments provided for in Article 8 of the Covenant is dependent on certain preliminary conditions, decided that a statistical investigation should be carried out with regard to the armaments of the various countries for the years 1913 and 1921, on the basis of the programme which was published in the Report for 1921.

The Secretariat, under the control of the Temporary Commission and of the Council, was entrusted with the carrying out of this programme. In case of need it might invite the co-operation of competent correspondents in the different countries, the choice of these correspondents being left to the Armaments Section under the direction of the Temporary Commission.

The Secretariat was authorised to publish from time to time, with the consent of the Temporary Mixed Commission and of the Council, reports on the partial results of its investigation, without waiting till the results of the statistical enquiry should have been fully co-ordinated.

The Third Sub-Committee (on statistics) was formed to control the carrying out of the programme formulated above and was authorised to meet separately. Two of its members, M. Janssen and M. Benini, were specially appointed by the Committee to follow the progress of the statistical enquiry.

On February 22nd, 1922, the Secretariat was authorised to appoint the correspondents provided for by the decisions of the Assembly. The difficulties which have been encountered in finding thoroughly qualified experts have been so considerable that up to the present the Secretariat has only been able to obtain collaborators from Italy, Belgium, France, Greece, Switzerland, Great Britain (both for Great Britain itself and for the Dominions), Chile and Japan.

As the result of the request which was addressed to the Governments, in accordance with the Assembly's resolution, a very considerable number of official documents relating to the laws governing military organisation, etc., has been received from most States; these documents, however, generally refer to the pre-war period.

In order to supplement this information, documents obtained directly by the Secretariat were consulted, viz., reports of parliamentary debates, draft budgets, year-books, etc.

Reliable unofficial documents were also consulted, care being taken, however, to distinguish clearly the information thus obtained.

At its July session the Sub-Committee investigated the work done by the Secretariat, and found that:

In a certain number of States new laws relating to army organisation were being prepared in 1921, some of them being actually under discussion.

In the majority of the countries which were constituted or considerably changed as a result of the late war, the existing military organisation had not yet received legal sanction.

The Sub-Committee therefore passed the following Resolution:

"The Sub-Committee finds that, owing to the fact that the laws governing army organisation are undergoing far reaching modifications and that delays have occurred in publishing the analytical results of the returns obtained, the year 1921 cannot be taken

1 See preface of separate volume (A. 31a giving the first results of the statistical enquiry."

as a basis for comparison with the pre war period. The Sub-Committee has therefore decided to propose that the year 1922 should be substituted for 1921."

**

As will be seen from the programme adopted, the Assembly had provided that two lines of investigation should be followed, viz.:

1. The collection of data based on official publications and other sources of public information.
2. The sending of a questionnaire to the Governments which are Members of the League of Nations.

At its last session the Committee stated that it was impossible to obtain from the official publications of the various countries certain data which were necessary for the programme of the enquiry. It therefore begged three of its members to prepare a questionnaire which, if approved by the Council, might be sent to all the Governments.

The questionnaire suggested by this Sub-Committee included the following points of the statistical programme in which the year 1922 has been substituted for 1921:

II. Effectives in time of peace (officers and other ranks): army and gendarmerie or police; land and sea forces, both home and colonial. Number of large units (divisions) and small units (companies, squadrons, batteries).

V. Numbers of men capable of being mobilised in time of war and number of units in the land and sea forces at home and in the colonies (large units and small units).

VI. Material actually in use and in the depots of the land and sea forces.

\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{Land Forces.} \\
&\quad \{ \text{Guns (heavy, field, howitzer, anti-aircraft).} \\
&\quad \{ \text{Rifles.} \\
&\quad \{ \text{Machine-guns.} \\
&\quad \{ \text{Tanks.} \\
&\quad \{ \text{Army aircraft.} \\
&\text{Sea Forces.} \\
&\quad \{ \text{Warships, with their armament.} \\
&\quad \{ \text{Naval aircraft.} \\
\end{align*}
\]

At first a somewhat comprehensive list of questions had been drawn up, which included various important items, such as industrial mobilisation and stocks of munitions. After discussion, it was decided that these should be omitted. On the other hand, in the course of its investigations, the Committee, though adhering to this decision, came to the conclusion that the resources of a State in raw materials, and the potential development of its sea transport services and its industries, are essential elements of its military efficiency; the Committee therefore decided to add these points to the questionnaire.

The Secretariat, requested to co-ordinate the data obtained from the published documents, has already begun its investigations. It is also collecting information regarding the wealth, revenues and economic resources of the various States, in so far as these items are necessary in estimating the other economic factors. The volume annexed to this Report, and answering the purposes above stated, is intended as the first series of data obtained from the enquiry and includes the following items:

I. Summary of the organisation of the work done by the Secretariat; collection and examination of documents; classification of data; résumé of the principal sources from which the information regarding each State is derived.

II. Geographical and demographical data which may possess a certain value as natural factors affecting the military power of each State.

III. Technical military data referring, for the reasons given above, exclusively to the pre-war period (1913-1914), but treated in such a way as to enable them to be compared with existing data concerning the armaments of the various States and with the boundaries which they have acquired since the war.

IV. Budgetary data concerning expenditure connected with national defence before and since the war.\(^1\)

\(^1\) For convenience in consulting them, it is proposed to distribute budgetary data in a separate brochure.
The Commission expresses its admiration of the Secretariat's work and the conscientious way in which it has gathered together all these statistical data, which are as bulky as they are complex. This work has succeeded in revealing in a most striking way the complications and difficulties encountered in the consideration of the problem of the reduction of armaments by dealing with the matter from a purely statistical point of view.

The Committee, in transmitting the statistics to the Council, considers it necessary to point out, and even to lay stress upon, the fact that this work should be received with the following observations.

It should be noted first of all, on account of the various changes in size and population which the old countries have undergone, and the creation of new countries under the terms of the Treaties of Peace, any direct comparison between the figures for 1913 and those for 1922 is rendered impossible.

About 80,000,000 Europeans have changed nationality during this period. Consequently, an attempt has been made to estimate what would have been the military strength of each country in 1913, at that date, it had already been in possession of the frontiers which have been assigned to it since the great war. Indeed, no comparison can be carried out unless the year 1913 and the years following upon the war have first been made comparable, however artificially; otherwise, all attempts at reaching a comparison with the last pre-war year must be abandoned.

For this reason, failing any better method, it was thought possible to base this estimate upon a purely arithmetical foundation, though it was not possible to take into account the entirely different political conditions and the unknown international reactions which this hypothesis itself implies, nor the modifications of an essentially military and technical character, which are an inevitable result of the many changes in frontiers.

It is evident, for example, that no comparison can be drawn between the forces of one country and the length of its land frontiers, without taking into consideration the considerable difference inherent in the natural characteristics of those frontiers from a defensive point of view. It is no less certain that the length of a land frontier cannot be added to that of a sea frontier without introducing the question of a combination of naval and land forces, and that every attempt at determining the necessary forces for the defence of these frontiers would lead to arbitrary hypotheses.

The same remark applies to all attempts to express by a number the value of an increase or diminution of territory by combining the number for the population and that for the area, both multiplied by certain coefficients.

To sum up: there is no accepted common measure which will permit an estimate of the resources of soldiers, war material, population and area, economic strength and geographical conditions.

Generally speaking, it seems necessary to draw a very clear distinction between original statistics which represent actual facts and the application or combination of these statistics. It is essential that the League of Nations should have at its disposal in its archives, for use in individual cases, a complete collection of these original statistics, beginning at the end of the pre-war period (even if the pre-war figures can only be used separately) and starting again after the war.

Statistical enquiries may usefully contribute to the collection of this documentation, but it should not be imagined that such documentation, however complete, can be made the foundation on which a scheme for the reduction of armaments could be built.

The Temporary Mixed Commission has therefore the honour of presenting to the Council a provisional draft comprising the first series of statistics in regard to armaments. With the permission of the Council, the Commission proposes to invite the Secretariat to circulate these documents, together with the present report, to the Members of the Permanent Advisory Commission on Military, Naval and Air Questions, and also to the different Governments and to a certain number of military and statistical experts in the different countries, in order to collect any useful observations which might be suggested. This document would also remain at the disposal of those Members of the Assembly who would wish to consult it.

2. — STATEMENTS RECEIVED FROM THE DIFFERENT COUNTRIES ON THE REQUIREMENTS OF THEIR NATIONAL SECURITY, GEOGRAPHICAL SITUATION, INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS AND SPECIAL CONDITIONS.

The role of statistics as a descriptive element of the state of the armaments of a country is, however, limited.

"It is not enough", said the President, M. Viviani, "to report in writing proofs that one country has as many soldiers as another, although its population is smaller; it is not enough to say that one country expends such-and-such a sum on its military and naval budget, and that another does not spend so much. Equality of expenditure is not always a proof of equality of strength. A country which has no enemies, and which, by its natural frontiers and by its distance from all the battlefields of the world, has nothing to fear, is not so likely to have a strong army as a country which has enemies, or
which has had, or may have, enemies. The element of national security must therefore enter into the scope of enquiries of the Sub-Committee."

Such considerations inspired, no doubt, Article 8 of the Covenant, the first two paragraphs of which are to the effect that:

"The Members of the League recognise that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations."

"The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and special circumstances of each State, shall formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several Governments."

Such are the considerations which decided the Second Assembly to beg that each of the Governments should "furnish a statement of the considerations it may wish to urge in regard to the requirements of its national security, its international obligations, its geographical situation and its special conditions".

Up to the present, twenty-four Governments have answered:

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1. Consideration of these statements as a whole has clearly revealed, not only the sincere desire of the Governments to reduce national armaments and the corresponding expenditure to a minimum, but also the importance of the results already achieved. These facts are indisputable, and are confirmed, moreover, by the replies received from Governments to the Recommendation of the Assembly regarding the limitation of military expenditure.

It is no doubt regrettable that in their statements all the Governments have not supplied equally precise information regarding their land, sea and air armaments; for, while it is necessary to draw a distinction between these armaments for the purpose of the investigations now in progress, it is not possible to consider them apart from one another when they are regarded from the important point of view of national security.

2. The second conclusion which we have been obliged to draw is that real difficulties of a temporary or permanent nature stand in the way of that reduction in armaments which is universally desired. The consideration of these difficulties permits at least of certain definite facts being brought out regarding points which deserve the attention of the League of Nations.

Certain Governments, in their statements, have considered with special care the geographical, demographical and economic aspects of armaments which are of a nature to assist the 3rd Sub-Committee in its statistical enquiry.

Their views as to the length and nature of frontiers, extent of territory, situation of vital centres, arrangement of communications and situation with regard to the great international highways, bring into clear relief both the importance of these factors in the defensive organisation of States and the difficulty of indicating by means of mathematical formulae the influence which must be assigned to them. The same holds good with regard to the considerations which refer to history and the lessons which must be learned from it.

The Statistical Sub-Committee's opinion that the year 1921 could not be regarded as a normal year from the point of view of the reorganisation of armed forces is also confirmed. Several Governments have, indeed, called attention to the important modifications which were being made at the time when they were drawing up their replies, and pointed out that in all cases these modifications were intended to lead to a reduction of armaments and that their armaments were solely for defensive purposes.

3. However, even before this reorganisation has been effected, it is possible to note that there is a marked tendency towards a scale of armaments lower than that of 1913, and which even now complies with the recommendation of the First Assembly that "the first steps towards a reduction of armaments should be taken without delay."

The consideration of these statements shows indeed the extent of the reductions in armaments which have already been carried out:

- Italy has disbanded 88 battalions and reduced the period of military service.
- France has reduced the period of military service by half, and disbanded 400 companies and 100 squadrons, a reduction equivalent to about 200,000 men.

1 See the text of these Statements in Annex II.
We may perhaps recall here the information which it would have been interesting to find in the statements of all the naval Powers, namely, the reduction in their war tonnage as compared with that in existence or in course of construction at the date of the Armistice; these reductions amount to 55% in the case of Great Britain, 41% in the case of Italy, 59% in the case of Japan, and 36% in the case of France. 1

4. The resolution of the Assembly required statements to be made in regard to the international obligations created by the Treaties of Peace. These obligations, indeed, only concern a limited number of States, but they are sufficiently heavy and absorb in the case of Great Britain more than 27,000 men, and in the case of France 160,000 men, or nearly one quarter of her army. And not one of the least difficulties of the problem is the necessity of reconciling the new burdens imposed by the Treaties of Peace with the aim which they pursue in another direction: the reduction of armaments.

In this connection, in view of the essentially political character of the problem of the reduction of armaments, the especial importance attached by all the Governments to political factors must be emphasised.

Their importance is increased by the unrest which still reigns as a result of the sweeping changes which have recently been made in the map of Europe.

The idea which predominates in certain States, such as France, Belgium and Poland, is to obtain the execution of the Treaties on which depend their economic reconstruction and their national security or existence. Some of the States mentioned above, as well as others, such as the Baltic States, are alarmed by the proximity of large countries, such as Russia and Germany, which are not Members of the League of Nations. The execution of the Treaties of Peace, on which depends the future of Europe, may be said to be the primary cause of the anxiety which is the chief obstacle in the way of the desire of certain Governments to reduce their national armaments.

5. Furthermore, the Colonies play a considerable part in determining what forces are indispensable to each State. Their size, their distance, their population, the difficulties of communicating with them, and their internal situation are all factors which must be taken into consideration.

Thus, France has fixed the forces necessary for the security and the defence of her colonies at 205,000 men (more than a quarter of her army), while Italy draws attention to the insufficiency of the local forces of the colonial forces, and the necessity of reinforcing them from home should the occasion arise. Great Britain sets aside 274,000 men for the same purpose and only regards her home army as a reservoir for her overseas detachments. It would be desirable for the other States possessing colonies to furnish similar indications in regard to the forces employed for their occupation.

6. The resolution of the Assembly referred to one more point: the establishment as far as possible of a distinction between the forces intended for the maintenance of order and the forces whose purpose was to provide for defence against an attack from outside. As might be anticipated, this distinction cannot be absolute. The majority of the Governments have indicated the forces which they judge to be indispensable for the maintenance of order and have specified that they were composed in part of police forces or specialized gendarmerie whose cost of upkeep was high, and that they partly relied on the utilisation, if necessary, of the army. But there are profound differences of organisation in the different countries.

Thus, Italy has at her disposal a force of 120,000 men (carabiniers, Royal Guard of Public Safety, and customs officials); France has 23,000 gendarmes, to be reinforced if necessary by 100,000 men from the army; while Poland provides for the employment of 60,000 men, Estonia 1,500, Latvia 5,000, Albania 2,008, Haiti 2,533, and South Africa 10,250.

Other States, such as Finland, Lithuania and Bulgaria, make no distinction between military and police forces. Japan reckons its police forces on a basis of one man per 300 to 800 inhabitants in towns, and per 600 to 2,000 inhabitants in the country. Belgium states that her gendarmerie has always been sufficient for the maintenance of order, but that it is of no account as a military force. These differences in the organisation of police forces are reflected in the methods of calculating the expenses of their upkeep, either in the war budget, as in France, or in other budgets, as in Italy, for example.

Moreover, nearly every State has made known the minimum force which it considers as indispensable, on the one hand, for the maintenance of order, and on the other for the formation of its peace-time army. Some countries justify their military organisation by basing themselves, not on their peace-time armaments, but on the potential military strength of their possible adversaries.

7. Finally, in reply to the question of the Assembly in regard to her “special circumstances”, Greece argued that the prolongation of the state of war with Turkey did not allow her to decide what forces would be necessary for her security once peace was establishe; Luxemburg observed that her security depended on the respecting of the Treaties and of her neutrality; Siam pointed out the numerous works of public utility carried out by her army; Austria merely referred to the definite obligations imposed by the Treaty of Trianon; Bulgaria renewed her request for a modi-

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1 When the naval tonnage has been reduced to the replacement tonnage provided for in the Treaty of Washington, these percentages will become: Great Britain 59%, France 50%, Italy 43%, Japan 57%.
fication of the military organisation imposed upon her by the Treaty of Peace, as being impossible for her to carry out.

8. The foregoing considerations have, in most cases, been supplemented by a short summary of the important difficulties in the situation of the various countries as regards their industrial capacity and their economic development. These observations have been rendered necessary on account of the character which modern warfare has assumed and of the essential part which industrial factors play in such warfare.

9. Most Governments have concluded their reports by a statement as to their military expenditure and the reductions, often very considerable, which they have been able to effect.

In short, these reports, with one or two exceptions, have generally dealt with the different points raised in the Resolution of the Assembly:

National security,
International obligations,
Geographical situation,
Special circumstances,
Police forces, military forces and corresponding expenditure.

Some of these statements are incomplete; but the data which they furnish, taken as a whole, have lifted the problem out of the sphere of pure theory, and provide a solid basis for the labours of the League.

By making it clear to what an essential degree this is a problem of a political nature, rather than a technical one, they have shown the value of statistical enquiry in its true light. They provide a precise conception of that potential military force which, on account of the character assumed by warfare between nations in arms, each State possesses below the only visible surface of its peacetime armaments — a potential force which depends upon factors so diverse and so variable, bound up as they are with its history, its geography, its economic development and even with its peculiar national character, that it can never be adequately expressed in figures.

Almost all the Governments who have replied indicate the point beyond which, under present circumstances, they cannot go in the matter of disarmament without danger to themselves and to the peace of the world. They emphasise the difficulties which they are still encountering and which hinder the execution of their clearly expressed intentions; but as these difficulties are above all of a political nature, it may be hoped that the League of Nations will be able to assist them in diminishing and in finally eliminating them.

Exchange of Information.

It may be of interest to point out that, on the whole, these statements, which the various Governments had been asked to furnish for wholly different reasons, constitute in fact "an interchange of information" not unlike that which is suggested in the last paragraph of Article 8 of the Covenant. The attention of the Commission has thus been drawn to this article.

On the proposal of M. Jouhaux, the Temporary Mixed Commission has considered the advisability of requesting the Council to consider the question of the exchange of military, naval and air information in accordance with the last paragraph of Article 8 of the Covenant.

The Temporary Mixed Commission has adopted on this subject the following resolution:

"The Temporary Mixed Commission begs the Council to consider whether the time has not come to discuss the application of the paragraph of Article 8 of the Covenant relating to the exchange of military information between the States Members of the League."

III. PROPOSALS FOR THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS.

During its second session the Assembly of the League of Nations adopted the following resolution:

"That the Temporary Mixed Commission be asked to make proposals on general lines for the reduction of national armaments, which, in order to secure precision, should be in the form of a draft treaty or other equally definite plan, to be presented to the Council if possible, before the Assembly next year."
As a result of this resolution, the Temporary Mixed Commission was asked to submit to the Council proposals for the reduction of national armaments, in the form of a draft treaty or other equally definite plan, as early as possible before September 4th, 1922.

In the course of the third session a definite proposal for the reduction of land armaments, submitted by Lord Esher, and a draft resolution by Rear-Admiral Segrave with the object of extending the application of the Naval Treaty of Washington to States Members of the League, which had not signed that Treaty, were brought before the Commission. The consideration of these two plans was postponed by the Commission until its fourth session.

During this last session in July last, Lord Robert Cecil submitted to the Commission a proposal for a General Pact for Guarantees, based on mutual assistance and intended as the preliminary condition of a general reduction of armaments.

Lieut.-Col. Réquin and the Marquis de Saluzzo also, in their turn, submitted plans for the extension of the Naval Treaty of Washington, similar to Vice-Admiral Segrave’s plan.

The Commission, therefore, found that it had before it three proposals, two relating to the reduction of land armaments (Lord Esher’s plan and Lord Robert Cecil’s proposals), and the third relating to the limitation of naval armaments (plans of Admiral Segrave, Lieut.-Col. Réquin and the Marquis de Saluzzo).

1. Plans suggested by Lord Esher and Lord Robert Cecil

As regards the first two proposals, the Temporary Mixed Commission decided to appoint a special committee to consider Lord Esher’s plan and investigate the consequences which the application of Lord Robert Cecil’s proposals would entail.

This Committee, composed of:

Lord Robert Cecil (Chairman),
Lieut.-Col. Réquin,
General Marietti,
M. Janssen,
Col. Lohner and
General Inagaki,

met in London from August 3rd to August 5th, and at Geneva on August 30th. It drew up a report, which the Temporary Mixed Commission adopted, and the preamble of which is reprinted below.

"Before commencing to examine the propositions of Lord Robert Cecil and Lord Esher, the Special Committee thinks that it would be useful to fix the position of this study in the general programme of the work of the Temporary Mixed Commission.

"The Committee hopes that the returns supplied by the Governments will make it possible to draw up a preliminary table of the reductions in armaments which they have made, and is of opinion that the work of the Temporary Commission can, with great advantage, be continued on the basis of such returns.

"The programme of the Commission will be as follows:—

"(1) To utilise these returns in carrying out an enquiry into the influences exercised over the present armaments of the different States by circumstances affecting their national safety and other conditions enumerated in Article 8 of the Covenant.

"(2) To continue its investigations into the means by which the League of Nations can induce the different Governments to consent to fresh reductions in armaments.

"The Committee would classify such means under two heads:—

(a) By its political action the League of Nations can eliminate the causes leading to the existence of certain armed forces and thus abolish such armed forces themselves.

(b) By the joint assistance for which the Covenant provides, without, strictly speaking, organising it, the League of Nations can offer certain guarantees of security to its members.

"These considerations have led the Committee, after considering Lord Esher’s scheme, to note favourably his proposal for finding a common measure by which armed forces might be estimated. This is a technical question, which would have to be submitted to the Permanent Advisory Commission for discussion.

"The question raised in section (b) above has led the Committee back to the enquiry with which it was entrusted, namely, an enquiry into the practical consequences involved by the actual and complete putting into force of the principle of mutual guarantees proposed by Lord Robert Cecil. The Committee, recognising that this proposal is in accordance with the spirit of the Covenant, and was made with a view to rendering the mutual assistance implied by the Covenant really effective, declared itself in complete sympathy with the spirit of Lord Robert Cecil’s
proposal. In submitting this report to the Temporary Mixed Commission, the Committee would like to emphasise the fact that nothing in this report should in any way affect the complete validity of all Treaties of Peace or other existing inter-State agreements. For this reason, the Committee did not think fit to express an opinion with regard to the respective value, from the point of view of the maintenance of peace, of the general proposals submitted to it for consideration and of the existing regional defensive agreements for securing the maintenance of peace recognised in Article 21 of the Covenant.”

(a) Lord Esher’s Scheme.

Lord Esher’s proposal, submitted to the deliberations of the Temporary Mixed Commission at its third meeting in February 1922, is printed below.

“In the report of the Third Committee (dated September 27th, 1921) of the Assembly of the League of Nations, the following recommendation was adopted:

‘That the Temporary Mixed Commission be asked to make proposals on general lines for the reduction of national armaments, which, in order to secure precision, should be in the form of a draft treaty or other equally definite plan, to be presented to the Council if possible before the Assembly next year.’

“I do not believe that it would be profitable to draft a treaty. The alternative, however, which is to draw up an ‘equally definite plan,’ is well within the competence of the Temporary Mixed Commission. The valuable information, statistical and other, collected by the Sub-Committee, enable this attempt to be made. Its urgency is manifest if the work of the Commission in a concrete and practical form is to be presented to the Assembly this year.

“In venturing to propose the following draft Resolutions as a basis of discussion, I have not thought it necessary to mention the suggestions — such, for example, as a budget basis of comparison — which do not appear to be capable of practical application.

“The Resolutions which I desire to lay before the Commission for their consideration at their next session are as follows:

“(1) That the size of standing armies in time of peace should be restricted on a numerical basis.

“(2) That the restriction should be fixed by ratio, following the naval precedent at Washington.

“(3) That the ratio should be confined to metropolitan forces, leaving each country to fix the forces required by it for colonial and overseas defence.

“(4) That within six months of the ratification of a treaty fixing the ratio, the High Contracting Parties shall reduce their standing military and air forces maintained within the metropolitan area in times of peace to the scale set forth in paragraph 9, and shall agree that the scale will not be exceeded for a period of ten years.

“(5) That the term ‘standing military and air forces’ shall be held to include all military and air personnel of all ranks serving either voluntarily or compulsorily in the metropolitan areas, with the regular military and air forces, all police forces permanently armed, and all permanent staffs of reserve or territorial forces, but shall not include the reserve or territorial forces.

“(6) That the Permanent Advisory Commission of the League shall be reconstituted and strengthened, under a Chairman to be appointed by the Government of the French Republic.

“(7) That it shall be the duty of the Permanent Advisory Commission to report to the League any infringement of the Treaty embodying these agreements, and to prepare such plans as may be necessary for its enforcement.

“(8) That the Permanent Advisory Commission be authorised to nominate naval, military and air attachés, who shall be given by the Governments to which they are accredited such facilities and information regarding armaments as may from time to time be required by the Commission.

“(9) That the fixed ratio of the standing military and air forces shall be as follows, taking 30,000 men of all ranks as the unit:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serb-Croat-Slovene State</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>Poland</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>Portugal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Roumania</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“N.B. — The forces of Germany, Austria, Bulgaria and Hungary to remain as defined in the Treaty of Peace.”
This proposal was not discussed by the T. M. C. until its fourth session in July 1922. The Commission appointed a Sub-Committee to examine the scheme, and, at the same time, proposed that the technical aspect of the question be submitted to the Permanent Advisory Commission. This was agreed to by the Council, and the latter Commission transmitted through the Council the technical opinion asked for. The Temporary Mixed Commission, in the course of its 5th session, having heard the Permanent Advisory Commission's opinion, as well as a memorandum by Lord Esher suggesting a postponement of the consideration of his scheme, adopted the Sub-Committee's report, including the following resolutions:

"The Commission cannot approve Lord Esher's scheme, but is of opinion that the idea suggested in the scheme of fixing a method of estimating peace-time strengths is justified."

"It believes that the limitation of armaments must be imposed on the peace-time strength, bearing in mind the essential factors on which such strength is based."

"It is of opinion that this limitation should not apply to forces that are not utilised for the defence of the metropolitan area of each State."

"Finally, it is of opinion that a special supplementary agreement should be contemplated for the limitation of forces used to maintain order and in the defence of colonial possessions."

(b) Lord Robert Cecil's Proposals.

Lord Robert Cecil's proposals, as they were adopted by the Temporary Mixed Commission, are as follows:—

"1. No scheme for the reduction of armaments can ever be really successful unless it is general.

2. In the present state of the world, the majority of Governments would be unable to accept the responsibility for a serious reduction of armaments unless they received in exchange a satisfactory guarantee of the safety of their countries.

3. Such a guarantee can be found in a general defensive agreement between all the countries concerned, binding them to provide immediate and effective assistance in accordance with a pre-arranged plan in the event of one of them being attacked, provided that the obligation to render assistance to a country attacked shall be limited in principle to those countries situated in the same part of the globe. In cases, however, where, for historical, geographical, or other reasons, a country is in special danger of attack, detailed arrangements should be made for its defence in accordance with the above-mentioned plan.

4. It is understood that the whole of the above resolutions are conditional on a reduction of armaments being carried out on lines laid down beforehand, and on the provision of effective machinery to ensure the realization and the maintenance of such a reduction."

Having taken note of the report of the Sub-Committee mentioned above, the Commission decided to approve these proposals, and to adopt the following draft presented by the Committee on the consequences of the scheme if it were applied:—

"1. At its third session at Paris, the Temporary Mixed Commission referred to its Second Sub-Commission four resolutions, based on the principles that disarmament to be effective must be general, and that no State could be expected to reduce its armaments unless it were given reasonable security that, by doing so, it would not expose its people to aggression from outside. In other words, the resolutions recognized that the establishment of mutual confidence is an essential condition of the reduction of armaments and that it involves the conclusion of a Treaty of mutual guarantee among all States which agree to reduce their armaments.

2. The purpose of such a Treaty of mutual guarantee cannot be to provide absolute security from attack from without for the States which agree to it. In a prolonged war, it is certain that each of the belligerents will mobilize and put into the field the whole of its national strength, whether it has agreed, before the outbreak of war, to a reduction of armaments or not. To guarantee to every State absolute security against the results of a long war is not practicable. In this matter, as in all questions connected with the reduction of armaments, it is essential to keep clearly in mind the distinction between the two periods into which a war, which resulted from an act of aggression occurring after a general and mutual reduction of armaments, would be divided.

The first period, which may be called Period A, would be that in which each of the belligerents would mobilize and put into the field only those forces which it had been able, under its reduction agreement, to prepare in time of peace. The second period, which may be called Period B, would be that in which steps would be taken to put into the field forces mobilized and trained after the outbreak of war. The first period would probably be of a few months' duration; the second would begin with the entry of the first war-trained troops, and would continue until each belligerent had mobilized its full national strength.

In order to render a real reduction of armaments possible, the mutual guarantee must be such as would prevent a State from being totally defeated during Period A. In this connection it is important to remember that, in view of the international guarantee, by the mere fact of a general and mutual reduction of armaments, every Power would enjoy a measure of security similar to that which it possessed before such general and mutual reduction took place. In the second
place, it must be noted that the guarantee given by the States which would support any State attacked would create a very dangerous situation for an aggressor. If the guarantee were to prove as effective as the Committee hopes, it would be almost certain that the aggressor would be overwhelmed during Period A, and in this way the purpose of the guarantee would be achieved.

3. Just as confidence on the part of Governments and peoples is essential to the effective carrying through of a reduction of armaments, so for the prevention of unjustified attack it is necessary that a possible aggressor should fully realise the consequences which his aggressive action would bring upon him. The Committee therefore considers it desirable that a Treaty of mutual guarantee, if drawn up, should include a clear statement to the effect that the purpose of the Treaty is:

(a) To ensure that the aggressor shall in the long run have no chance of victory.
(b) To ensure that the aggressor shall not be able, by sudden military action, to achieve his purpose and to present the League of Nations and the signatory States with a fait accompli.
(c) To make a possible aggressor realise that the signatory States will not only defend the State which is attacked, but will also take the offensive and punish the attacker if the latter has violated Article 13 of the Covenant.

4. If the above principles are to be effective, a solution must be found for the two problems, and the necessary machinery provided:

(a) When an outbreak of war has occurred, there must be some means of determining, within the briefest possible delay, which State is the aggressor. Machinery must be found by which this decision can be taken within a delay of not more than four days.
(b) Machinery must be devised by means of which material military aid can be brought without the delay which might prove fatal to the State which is attacked.

5. For determining the State which is the aggressor, the Committee suggests the following plan:

(a) The Council of the League must decide which State is the aggressor.
(b) The Council should not be obliged to take a unanimous decision, as the unfavourable vote of one State might prove fatal to the State attacked. The Committee suggests that the Council should be able to take the required decision by a strong majority, e.g., three-quarters.
(c) The Council should take the decision at the earliest possible moment, not exceeding four days from the date when the Secretary-General received notice.
(d) The decision which the Council has to take is not on the merits of the dispute between the States concerned but on the question as to which of them has committed the first act of war. It should, therefore, be laid down by the Treaty that whichever State has deliberately violated the territory of the other State shall be deemed to be the aggressor.
(e) For the purpose of deciding which State is the aggressor, the Council might, if necessary, send an expert commission to enquire into the facts of the situation on the spot, and to report immediately.

6. For the purpose of bringing, without undue delay, effective military assistance to a State which was attacked, the Committee suggests that the following principles may be laid down:

(a) It is not possible to prepare in advance detailed military plans for international action, accepted by all the States entering into a Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, to repel aggression in every conceivable case.
(b) It is not even possible to establish an international general staff to consider such plans in advance.
(c) The Permanent Advisory Commission cannot serve in any way as an international staff.
(d) It is also important to bear in mind that if a general and mutual reduction of armaments is carried through, the forces of an aggressor State will not be unopposed, but will immediately be met by an army of the country which is attacked and which, during period A at least, should be able to make some defence.

7. The Committee therefore suggests machinery based on the following lines:

(a) An appeal to the League might come in the first place from the State which is attacked or from any State which regards itself as in a dangerous international position. This State should approach the Council of the League, stating:

the danger against which it should be protected;
the forces which it can itself provide to meet the danger during period A;
the total forces which it required during Period A to enable it to defeat the enemy;
and from what States it proposes that these forces should be drawn.

(b) It would be within the power of the general staff of such a State to make plans in advance for the utilisation of the forces to be provided by the other signatory States to meet any given contingency which they may foresee. This will expedite the effective use of such forces.
(c) The Council, with the assistance of the Permanent Advisory Commission, should consider the demands put forward by the threatened State and should consider whether these demands are reasonable and practicable. If so, they should be forwarded immediately by the Council to the Governments of the States concerned, with an invitation to these States to make provision for the forces required.

(d) A military Power should be put in charge of the organisation of the assistance to be brought by the guarantor States to the State which is attacked. This Power might either be the Power which is attacked itself or another Power.

The Council, advised by the Permanent Advisory Commission, should give the necessary mandate to the Power which it considers best fitted to carry out the task.

(e) The form of assistance may vary in each particular case; but the attention of the Temporary Mixed Commission is drawn to the following:

1. Various forms of economic pressure are provided for in the Covenant, and can be readily applied.

2. In the case of armed assistance, certain forces, such as aircraft and warships, are the most readily available, and, therefore, the most likely to be asked for and to be effective in the initial stages of the war;

3. The availability and time of intervention of land forces will depend on the extent to which preliminary arrangements have been made possible.

8. Résumé. — As has already been pointed out, the object of the above is to enable States to reduce their armaments, while providing for them a measure of security at least as great as that which they now enjoy.

The following steps are, therefore, desirable:

i. The conclusion of a general agreement between States to furnish support against an aggressor; this agreement should be not less binding than a similar one made between State and State;

2. The reduction of their armaments within limits which shall leave national security unimpaired, not only for one State but for all other Signatory States.

Unless the agreement to furnish support is incorporated in a definite plan of support, framed to meet possible contingencies within a certain time, it will not have the binding nature that such agreements have between State and State; it will not be regarded with confidence; and the whole object of the Treaty, the reduction of armaments, will not be achieved. The Assembly should give its opinion on the following point, an opinion on which Governments will have to decide: It is important that it should be recognised that, to achieve these purposes, the States entering into the obligations of this Treaty will require to maintain certain elements of armed forces for use at the call of the Council of the League."

2. PROPOSALS FOR THE EXTENSION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE WASHINGTON NAVAL TREATY TO NON-SIGNATORY STATES MEMBERS OF THE LEAGUE.

As stated above, the Commission, during its last two sessions, had considered three schemes aiming at the extension of the principles of the Washington Treaty to the non-signatory Powers, presented respectively by Admiral Segrave, Marquis de Saluzzo and Lieut.-Col. Requin.

Generally speaking, the Commission declared itself in favour of the extension of the principles of the Washington Treaty to non-signatory States, and, on account of the technical nature of the three drafts that were submitted to it, requested the Council to refer them to the Permanent Advisory Commission for examination by its Naval Sub-Commission.

The Commission also requested the Council to bring these proposals to the notice of Members of the League of Nations; this has been done by document C. L. 84, 1922, IX.

At its session of July 1922, held in London, the Council invited the Naval Sub-Commission to present its report as soon as possible and to forward it direct to the Second Sub-Committee of the Temporary Mixed Commission.

The Naval Sub-Commission met in Geneva on July 24th, under the chairmanship of Admiral the Marquis of Magaz, the Spanish Naval Representative. It has amalgamated the three schemes that were put before it, in conformity with the resolution of the Council, and has forwarded its report of July 27th, 1922, to the Members of the Council, as well as to the Members of the Second Sub-Commission of the Temporary Armaments Commission.

The Report of the Naval Sub-Commission is printed below:

"The Washington Treaty amounts to a carrying-out of the principles of limitation of armaments enunciated in the Covenant, so far as the signatory Powers are concerned.

The main obstacle which, up to the date of the above Agreement, prevented the Permanent Advisory Commission from dealing with the reduction of Naval Armaments, was the fact that all great Powers are not Members of the League (see Permanent Advisory Commission, Report to the Council, dated December 4th, 1920). The signature of the Washington Treaty has, however, now removed this obstacle to progress.

"At the outset of the Commission's deliberations, it became clear that there was a certain divergence of view as to the principles upon which an extension of the Washington Treaty to
non-signatory Members of the League should be based. The majority of the Members, consisting of the Representatives of the signatory Powers of the Washington Treaty, was of opinion that the Convention should be mainly based upon the principles of maintaining the status quo.

The Representatives of Spain and Brazil (the former speaking in a purely personal capacity), however, held the view that the principle of the status quo was neither the most important nor the most acceptable basis of the proposed Convention. In their view this principle should be subordinated to the principles of national security (which, they pointed out, had been expressly recognised at Washington by the insertion of a clause providing for the revision of the Treaty in the event of the national security of one of the Contracting Parties being imperilled), of geographical situation, and of special circumstances. They further held that the Commission, as a body of the League of Nations, was bound by the terms of Article 8 of the Covenant to fix the limit of the Naval Forces of the remaining Members of the League by means of suitable comparisons, based upon the geographical situation and the circumstances of each State.

The following summary of the views of the minority was submitted to the Commission as a suggested basis for its discussions:

1. The signatory States of the Washington Treaty were not all Members of the League of Nations. They were, therefore, free to come to agreements without taking account of the provisions of the Covenant.

The only object of our meeting, on the other hand, is to give our opinion as experts of the League of Nations, and since we are bound by the Covenant we can only act in accordance with it.

2. The representatives of the Powers at Washington were politicians. They could, therefore, base their agreements on purely arbitrary principles. We are experts, and must therefore base our opinions on scientific principles.

3. Since certain States have fixed the limit for their naval armaments, we must take it for granted that this limit is the minimum compatible with their national safety. Otherwise, under Article 8 of the Covenant, they would be obliged still further to reduce their armaments.

Our only task, therefore, is to fix the limit of the armed forces of the remaining Members of the League by means of suitable comparisons based on geographical position and on the conditions laid down in Article 8 of the Covenant. Should these limits not be acceptable for political reasons, it would be the task of the politicians to alter them.

When the Commission rejected these propositions by four votes to two, Admiral Penido, Representative of Brazil, found himself unable to co-operate further in the examination of the various draft schemes before the Commission, in view of the fact that they were not, in his opinion, compatible with the requirements of the geographical situation, the special circumstances, and the security of his country. He, therefore, abstained from further participation in the various votes taken during the discussion of the Commission.

With the object of devising a formula which should, as far as possible, comprise the views of all Members of the Commission, the French Representative, on behalf of the representatives of the signatory Powers, brought forward proposals embodying the principles upon which the Convention should be based. After discussion, these proposals were agreed to in the following form as a preamble to the draft Convention:

The Commission, being of opinion that:

1. In the absence of exact information with regard to the special requirements of each State, it was not possible for them to find a more practical basis for estimating replacement tonnage than the status quo on November 12th, 1921, which was the basis adopted at Washington;

2. There was also no occasion for them to propose modifications of the principle of the status quo at the present moment, in view of the fact that only two of the States concerned are represented at the present Session of the Naval Sub-Commission of the Permanent Advisory Commission and that, consequently, only those two States could be in a position to put forward their views as to the special circumstances of their respective countries;

3. It would be difficult at this moment to fix the tonnage for States which have come into existence since the war;

Are agreed:

That just as for special reasons and in well-defined cases it was laid down in the Washington Treaty that certain exceptions to the general principle contained therein should be allowed, so, when the International Conference, which is to settle finally the conditions under which the scheme is to be applied, is convened, account should be taken of the particular needs and conditions put forward by each State with a view to making such modifications in this scheme as may appear justified.

At the same time the Representatives of the four signatory Powers drew up a single Draft Convention based on the three drafts originally referred to the Commission.

1 Detailed declarations by these two Members are attached. See Annex IV.
"After discussion, the Spanish Representative declared his ability to accept the suggested preamble and the draft convention subject to the following reservations:

1. His remarks did not bind his Government. He was speaking purely personally.
2. Subject to this reservation, he accepted the draft convention with the exception of the note to Article 4.
3. He made reservations on the subject of the tonnage allocated to Spain.

"The Commission, therefore, having studied the drafts put before it, as well as the general aspects of the subject, is enabled to submit to the Council the accompanying draft convention embodying proposals for the extension of the Washington Treaty to other States Members of the League.

"This draft convention deals only with those sections of naval armaments which form the subject of the Washington Treaty. This fact confines the direct limitation of total tonnage to those States which at the present moment possess capital ships (see chapter II, Part 1).

"It may here be said that the definition of a capital ship for the purpose of this Convention is a vessel which exceeds 10,000 tons' displacement or which carries a gun with a calibre in excess of 8 inches (203 mm.).

"There are, however, certain provisions in the Washington Treaty and in this draft convention which limit the size and armament of other ships, preparations made in merchant ships in time of peace for conversion to war purposes, etc. The Commission, consequently, considers, in addition to the above-mentioned States, all Members of the League whose armaments are not already fixed by the Washington Treaty should also be parties to the Convention.

"In the list of signatories thus obtained will be found certain States whose naval armaments are already fixed under Article 1 of the Covenant of the League of Nations or by the Peace Treaties; it is not suggested that the limitations laid down in this draft Convention should supersede those already agreed to by these States, but that they should be accepted by the said States in so far as they are applicable and are additional to the limitations already accepted.

"The Convention itself is, of course, based entirely on the Washington Treaty, which has been altered as necessary for the purpose in view. The main difference is that, whereas the Washington Treaty was, first, a Treaty to carry out definite reductions of the large navies, and, secondly, a Treaty to impose limitations for the future, this Convention can only be one imposing future limitations, and so eliminating the unknown factor and preventing competition in navies or the fear of such competition.

"This results from the fact that the States concerned have already quite a small tonnage of capital ships, and, consequently, as the limitations on existing tonnage only apply to capital ships, it is hardly practicable to propose any immediate reduction or sensational scrapping. Hence, the main idea of this Convention is the elimination of the unknown and the prevention of future competition or the fear of such competition.

"The principle of the Naval Holiday is introduced in the chapter on replacement; this follows the precedent of the Washington Treaty, one of the main achievements of which was the agreement to stop the construction of capital ships for ten years.

"Certain Articles deal with the aircraft carrier tonnage that may be maintained by certain Powers. It may be objected that these proposals admit of an increase of tonnage, but they amount in fact to a limitation on future development of a new and experimental type of ship, as did the similar clauses of the Treaty of Washington.

"The Commission would here point out that by "definition" an aircraft carrier is a vessel of over 10,000 tons' displacement, and there is no limit on vessels for use with aircraft which are under this tonnage.

"Throughout the Convention the principle has been adopted of all transactions in connection with the Convention taking place through the Council of the League of Nations.

"The Commission finally proposes that the Council should invite the States Members of the League of Nations to give their plenipotentiaries to the International Conference on Naval Armaments the necessary powers to adhere to the "Treaty for the Protection of the Lives of Neutrals and Non-Combatants at Sea in Time of War," signed at Washington on February 6th, 1922.

The Temporary Armaments Commission does not consider that action on its part can in any way bind the various States to which its members belong, and recognises that the responsibility for the acceptance of any eventual limitation of armaments must rest entirely with the Government Representatives at the International Conference proposed in the report of the Permanent Advisory Commission. At the same time, the Commission considers that the Draft Agreement annexed to this report would serve as a suitable basis for the discussions of this Conference, and is consequently of opinion that it should be forwarded to the States concerned for examination.

The Temporary Armaments Commission therefore adopts the following resolutions:

1. The Temporary Armaments Commission recommends that the Council should extend the principles of the limitation of naval armaments contained in the Washington Naval Treaty to the States non-signatory to that treaty who are Members of the League.

2. The Temporary Armaments Commission forwards to the Council the Permanent Advisory Commission's technical report on this subject, together with a draft convention.
with regard to the putting into force of this limitation. It recommends that this report and these draft agreements should be sent to the various Governments for consideration.

(3) The Temporary Armaments Commission recommends that the Council and the Assembly should convene as soon as possible an international conference at which the question of the extension of the Washington Naval Treaty might be discussed, and any agreement which had been decided upon regarding this limitation might be drawn up.

(4) The international conference will be in a position to consider what measures should be taken with regard to States which at present do not possess any naval forces.

IV. OTHER RESOLUTIONS.

(Washington Conference.)

Despite the grave political difficulties from which the world is suffering at present, the spirit of international co-operation aiming at peace, which inspire the League of Nations, can also be observed at work in other places. The Commission is glad to have been able to welcome during its two last sessions two events due to this spirit. One of them belongs to the past, the other must come about in the near future. We mean to refer to the Conference of Washington, and to the Pan-American Congress of Santiago.

At the suggestion of the Temporary Mixed Commission, the Second Assembly had declared that "no complete scheme of reduction of armaments can be carried out without the co-operation of the United States, Germany and Russia. In particular, the naval strength of the first-named Power makes any scheme of naval disarmament impossible without her support, and it is for that reason, among others, that the Committee warmly welcomes the forthcoming Conference at Washington, and trusts that it may be fruitful in securing a large measure of reduction of armaments." In view of the successful conclusion of the Washington Conference, the Temporary Commission decided at its fourth session to express in its general report to the Council and Assembly its satisfaction at the work accomplished at Washington in connection with the reduction of naval armaments.

(Pan-American Conference at Santiago.)

Upon the proposal of M. Alcalá-Zamora, the Commission unanimously adopted the following resolution:

"The Temporary Mixed Commission notes the declarations made at its 4th Session by M. Rivas Vícuna, on behalf of the Chilian Government, and welcomes with interest the Chilian Government's intention of submitting the question of disarmament to the Pan-American Congress which is to meet at Santiago in March 1923.

"The Commission expresses the hope that this Congress may arrive at practical solutions capable of being fitted into the more general scheme of disarmament which is the subject of the Commission's own labours."

On this subject, M. Rivas Vícunia made the following statement to the Committee:

"The Commission's resolution will act as a powerful stimulus to the action which the New World proposes to undertake on the same lines with that of the Continent of Europe and it will in particular form a further bond of union and co-operation between countries which, although separated by the ocean, cherish the same ardent desire for peace and justice.

"While seeking for a solution of regional problems, they do not lose sight of those questions which affect the well-being of the nations as a whole.

"The principles on which the Covenant of the League of Nations is based, the important work accomplished by the Washington Conference and by the Armaments Commission itself, will serve as a basis and will provide a valuable documentary foundation for the work of the Pan-American Conference and will once more make clear to history the advantages of international co-operation."

It should be pointed out that in its report the P.A.C. "proposes to the Council to invite States belonging to the League of Nations on the occasion of the International Conference on Naval Armaments to give their plenipotentiaries the powers necessary to adhere to the Treaty on the Protection of the Lives of Neutrals and Non-Combatants at Sea in Time of War' signed at Washington on February 6th, 1922." (Senator Root's proposal).

The T.M.C., taking note of the above report, has only examined and retained that part which deals with the reduction of armaments and of the draft agreement annexed thereto (C. 477 and C. 477 [a]).
SPECIAL QUESTIONS.

V. DESTRUCTION OF SURPLUS STOCKS OF MUNITIONS.

The Second Assembly requested the Temporary Mixed Commission to consider "the steps that may eventually have to be taken for the destruction of the surplus stocks."

At its seventeenth session, the Council invited the Permanent Advisory Commission to undertake a preliminary investigation of the question.

The opinion of the Permanent Advisory Commission might be summed up as follows:—

"In certain ex-belligerent countries the question is entrusted under the Treaties of Peace to Commissions of Control.

"In the case of other ex-belligerent States stocks have been reduced by the Governments concerned to the minimum which, in their opinion, is indispensable for national mobilisation. At present an increase in stocks of munitions is of far less importance for a State than the development of its plans for an eventual industrial mobilisation."

To sum up, the Commission notes that the question has already been settled by the various countries concerned and that the surplus stocks which undoubtedly existed at the close of the world-war have, during the three and a-half years which have elapsed since that date, been destroyed or liquidated, or are in process of liquidation.

At the close of its fourth session the President of the Temporary Mixed Commission submitted to the Council the following conclusions which were adopted by the latter on July 20th, 1922:

"The Temporary Mixed Commission took note of the report of the Permanent Commission and of the satisfactory measures taken by the various States for the liquidation of these stocks. This first question has been settled in accordance with the desire of the Second Assembly."

VI. USE OF TOXIC GAS IN WAR.

I. PUBLICATION OF DISCOVERIES.

The following resolution was adopted by the Second Assembly:—

"That the Temporary Mixed Commission be asked to examine whether it is advisable to address an appeal to the scientific men of the world to publish their discoveries in poison gas and similar subjects, so as to minimise the likelihood of their being used in any future war."

The Temporary Mixed Commission considered the question at their 3rd, 4th and 5th Sessions. At the 4th Session it was decided to ask the Committee on Intellectual Co-operation to advise "as to the methods by which the co-operation of scientific men might be enlisted in carrying out the Resolution of the Assembly."

The Committee on Intellectual Co-operation at a meeting held on 5th August, 1922, adopted the following Resolution:—

"The Committee on Intellectual Co-operation regrets its inability to suggest methods by which scientific men throughout the world can be induced to publish their discoveries concerning poisonous gases and the development of chemical warfare."
At their 5th Session the Temporary Mixed Commission again considered the matter and arrived at the conclusion that an appeal of this nature is not a practical measure and would not achieve the objects aimed at.

The main reasons which led the Commission to these conclusions may be summarised as follows:

(a) Publication of discoveries would probably have results contrary to the general trend of legislation in the world, which is to regulate and control the distribution of lethal weapons both for internal use in a State and for export (see Arms Traffic Convention 1922 and recent State domestic legislation).

(b) Any invention with regard to the use of gas to be employed in war must be tested on a large scale. This can only be done by scientists who work under government orders and with government subsidies. Such scientists would naturally be above all experts in this work and in so far as they work under government orders, would, of course, carry out their investigations under an absolute pledge of secrecy to the government which they serve.

It can only be hoped, therefore, that the less dangerous inventions will be published and this course would be worse than no publication at all since it would tend to produce a certain feeling of false security.

(c) Even if the really important inventions were published by the scientists of some countries, there could be no method of ensuring that the same should be done by all. The effect of this would be, in the event of war, to place those countries who responded to the appeal at a disadvantage as compared with those who did not, because the latter would have the advantage of the discoveries of the former while retaining their own for themselves.

The Temporary Mixed Commission consequently adopts the following resolution:

"The Temporary Mixed Commission considers that no useful purpose would be served by the addressing of an appeal to the scientific men of the world to publish their discoveries in poison gas and similar subjects and are of opinion that it is not advisable to make such an appeal.

"The Temporary Mixed Commission further consider that, even if such an appeal were made, it would not achieve the object aimed at by the Assembly i.e. to minimise the likelihood of their being used in any future war."

Lord Robert Cecil pointed out that there was another step which might usefully be taken, and he has described it in the following words:—

"It is very much to be hoped that the use of gas in future warfare may not be resorted to. But it is at least possible that this may happen and if so it is certain that the gases which would be used in any future warfare will be far more deadly in effect than those hitherto known.

"Nor is poison gas the only example of the future development of chemical warfare; explosives grow yearly in strength and destructive effect; bombs which in the late war were regarded as formidable are already of insignificant power compared to those which will be used in future wars and there is the whole department of bacteriological attack which may be developed as science progresses.

"It is of great importance that the peoples of the world should realise before it is too late what those new methods of warfare will mean in future, not only to the armies in the field, but to the civil population at home. Partial statements have been made in technical works by individuals. But no authoritative exposition of the whole subject is available.

"It is thought that a small committee could collect, partly from existing publications and partly by enquiries from experts, the facts necessary for such an exposition without treading upon any secrets or giving information which might be utilised in undesirable ways. What is wanted is not information as to the technical methods by which these things can be made or employed, but as to what will be the result of their manufacture and use."

The Temporary Mixed Commission therefore decided to appoint a small committee to investigate and report upon this subject.

2. PROPOSALS AIMING AT EXTENDING TO NON-SIGNATORY STATES THE PRINCIPLES OF THE WASHINGTON TREATY RELATING TO POISON GAS.

At its meeting in Paris on July 3rd to 7th, 1922, the Temporary Mixed Commission considered a proposal that the Members of the League should be urged to adhere to the Washington Treaty concerning the use of poison gas in war.

The provisions of this Treaty relating to the employment of gas in war are as follows:—

"Article V. The use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices, having been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilised world and a prohibition of such use having been declared in treaties to which a majority of the civilised powers are parties.

"The Signatory Powers to the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part of international law binding alike the conscience and practice of nations, declare their assent to such prohibition, agree to be bound thereby as between themselves and invite all other civilised nations to adhere thereto."
Article VI. The present Treaty shall be ratified as soon as possible in accordance with the constitutional methods of the deposit of all the ratifications, which shall take place at Washington.

The Government of the United States will transmit to all the Signatory Powers a certified copy of the procès-verbal of the deposit of ratifications.

The present Treaty, of which the French and English texts are both authentic, shall remain deposited in the Archives of the Government of the United States, and duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that Government to each of the Signatory Powers.

Article VII. The Government of the United States will further transmit to each of the non-Signatory Powers a duly certified copy of the present Treaty and invite its adherence thereto.

Any non-Signatory Power may adhere to the present Treaty by communicating an Instrument of Adherence to the Government of the United States, which will thereupon transmit to each of the Signatory and Adhering Powers a certified copy of each Instrument of Adherence.

The Commission adopted the following resolution:

The Temporary Mixed Commission considered a proposal that the Members of the League should be urged to adhere to the Washington Treaty concerning the employment of asphyxiating and poisonous gases in war.

The Commission decided that no action should be taken until information has been received that the Washington Treaty has been forwarded to the non-Signatory States for adhesion, after ratification by the Signatory Powers.

Since the adoption of this resolution the Secretariat has not been informed that the Washington Treaty has been forwarded to the non-Signatory States for adhesion. In fact, the treaty has not yet been ratified by all the Signatory Powers, and the question remains open until this ratification takes place.

VII. PRIVATE MANUFACTURE OF ARMS.

By a resolution adopted on October 1st, 1921, the Temporary Mixed Commission was requested by the Second Assembly "to continue the examination of the question of the private manufacture of armaments and the trade in arms".

In this connection also the Second Assembly adopted the following resolution:

That the Council be requested to invite all the Members of the League and interested States which are not Members of the League to take part in an International Conference on the private manufacture of arms and the trade in arms, which should meet as soon as possible at a date to be fixed under the responsibility of the Council. It is considered highly desirable that this date should be prior to the next session of the Assembly.

The Temporary Mixed Commission should be entrusted with the task of preparing the programme of the Conference and of submitting to it a draft Convention.

On July 13th, 1922, the Temporary Mixed Commission submitted a memorandum to the Council of the League describing the progress made in the investigations undertaken by the Commission and in its preparation for an eventual Conference to deal with private manufacture. In this memorandum the work of the Commission already accomplished or in progress was outlined as follows:

1. A preliminary legal study of the problems which arise in connection with the application of Article 8 of the Covenant has been made by the Legal Section of the Secretariat, at the request of the Temporary Mixed Commission.
2. Technical studies of the administrative, industrial and military problems which arise in connection with the application of Article 8 have been prepared by General Marietti, Admiral Segrave and Colonel Carnegie, members of the Temporary Mixed Commission.
3. The definition of the technical terms, such as "arms and munitions", "private manufacture", and similar terms, have been studied by the Permanent Advisory Commission, which has prepared a report on them. The Temporary Mixed Commission has accepted these definitions.
4. Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith has submitted to the Commission a draft Convention proposed by Lord Esher which would have the effect of requiring licences for the private manufacture of munitions; restricting the ownership of newspapers by persons engaged in private manufacture; and restricting the ownership of shares or interests in munition
factories by foreigners. This draft Convention is now being studied by the Temporary Mixed Commission.

(5) A collection of the laws and administrative regulations now in force in various countries is being made by the Secretariat of the League of Nations, and a survey of this legislation is to be submitted to the Temporary Mixed Commission in September.

(6) Lord Robert Cecil has proposed that an enquiry be conducted to determine to what extent the evil effects of private manufacture exist. The Temporary Mixed Commission has postponed any final action on this proposal until its work has further progressed.

(7) The Temporary Mixed Commission has been furnished with information and statistics concerning the manufacture of arms and ammunition in the United States of America, which has been collected by statisticians collaborating with the International Union of Machinists.

The Council considered that there was no occasion for immediate action on its part as a result of this Memorandum, and decided that when it had before it, at its September session, the results of the various preparatory work, it would be in a better position than it was then to judge whether the moment had come to call forth an international conference.

Since the above report was made to the Council in July, further progress has been made in the consideration of the draft Convention proposed by Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith, and on September 2, 1922, the Commission adopted the following resolution:

"The Commission, having previously approved the principle of national licences for private manufacture, adopts Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith's project as a basis of consideration at the Conference which may consider both private manufacture and trade in arms."

The text of this project is given below:

I. For the purposes of the present draft agreement, the term "munitions and implements of war" will be understood as meaning:— war vessels, tanks, artillery of all kinds, apparatus for the discharge of all kinds of projectiles explosives or gas, flame throwers, bombs, grenades, machine guns and rifled small-bore breech-loading weapons of all kinds.

It includes parts exclusively used for armaments but (except as aforesaid) does not include materials or tools for their manufacture.

II. No company may engage in the manufacture or sale of armaments without a licence from the Government of the country in which such manufacture or sale is carried on. Such licence shall be conditional on an undertaking:

(a) That neither the company nor any director or other person occupying a responsible position in its management, or holding a controlling interest in the undertaking, shall own or hold any controlling interest in any newspaper or other periodical publication (whether published in the country or abroad).

(b) That the company shall keep the Government from which it holds the licence fully and promptly informed of any orders which it accepts for the supply of armaments to any foreign Government or person, and that neither the company nor its agents shall employ any disloyal means to obtain such orders.

(c) That (except as provided hereunder) the company is not subject to any foreign control or influence, and that while the licence is in force, the company shall not, without the previous consent of the Government, become subject to any such foreign control or influence. Any such consent shall be registered with a competent authority.

(d) No company holding a licence shall issue any shares "to bearer" which carry any voting power, and any such shares previously issued shall lose their voting power.

III. Every licensee shall furnish the Government annually with a sworn declaration in the prescribed form that all the conditions of the licence have been fully complied with during the year to which the Declaration refers. A false Declaration shall be punishable by severe penalties and shall also involve liability to have the licence cancelled.

IV. If the Government is satisfied that there has been a breach of any of the conditions of a licence it may, after giving the licencee an opportunity of furnishing an explanation, cancel or suspend the licence, or attach conditions to its continuance, provided that the licencee shall be entitled to appeal to the Court on the question whether there has been a breach of the conditions of the licence.

V. The above provisions shall apply to persons and firms as well as companies so far as applicable thereto.

In adopting the resolution quoted above, the Committee was of the opinion that the subject of private manufacture could not be divorced from the subject of traffic in arms, and as the consideration of the Convention of St.-Germain would have to be resumed in another memorandum, it seems possible that the same International Conference might be called upon to deal with both subjects.
Further progress has been made also in the survey of national legislation in various countries relating to the private manufacture of arms. A memorandum on this legislation has been prepared by the Secretariat, and the Commission has decided that it should be distributed among the Members of the League for criticisms and suggestions.

VIII. ARMS TRAFFIC CONVENTION OF ST.-GERMAIN.

At both its sessions the Assembly of the League of Nations adopted Resolutions insisting on the importance of the ratification of the Arms Traffic Convention of St.-Germain.

In pursuance of the Resolution adopted at its first session, the Secretary-General addressed, on March 8th, 1921, a letter to all States Members of the League transmitting this Resolution and requesting them to ratify the Convention and, if they thought necessary, to accompany this ratification with a reservation that the Convention should not be put into effect until the other Signatory Powers had also ratified it. A similar letter was addressed to the States which had not signed the Convention, requesting their adhesion.

Twenty-five States only replied to this letter and the Second Assembly accordingly adopted a fresh Resolution emphasising the importance of the ratification of the Convention of St.-Germain and expressing the earnest hope that the Washington Conference would take similar action.

In pursuance of this Resolution the Secretary-General addressed a new letter, dated November 21st, 1921, to all the States which had not stated their intentions regarding the ratification of the Convention or regarding their adhesion to it. At present, nine States have replied to this letter, so that total number of Governments which have so far expressed their views on the question is now 34.

To this figure must be added Germany and her ex-allies who, by virtue of the Peace Treaties, have taken the obligation to adopt the Convention as soon as the latter enters into force.

As the situation stands at present, the following States have ratified or adhered to the Convention:

Brazil, Greece, Siam,
Chile, Guatemala, Venezuela,
China, Haiti, Peru,
Finland,

Great Britain, as well as Spain, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa, are prepared to ratify the Convention as soon as all the other principal Powers are willing to do so.

France has announced that the President of the Republic has been authorised by the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate to ratify the Convention and that ratification will be carried out as soon as the principal Signatory Powers shall themselves have taken steps to ratify the Convention.

Italy has expressed her readiness to ratify the Convention as soon as it has been approved by Parliament, and Japan has promised to ratify it with as little delay as possible after its ratification by the other Powers.

A certain number of States, such as Denmark, India, Sweden, and Norway, make their ratification conditional on that of all the Signatory Powers, whereas Roumania, Luxemburg, Colombia, Uruguay, and Persia declare their willingness to adhere to the Convention.

It will be seen from this statement that the principal Powers which have replied to the enquiry make their ratification depend on that of the other principal Signatory Powers. This reservation would seem to refer especially to the United States of America, which are signatory to the Convention and which had not, up to the present, replied to the invitation addressed to them.

In addition, the Secretary-General sent two letters on February 17th, 1921, and on March 6th, 1922, to certain States Members of the League, represented at the Washington Conference — China, British Empire, France, Italy and Japan — asking them to take steps in the matter at Washington. Three of these Governments, the British Empire, France and Japan, informed the

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1 States which have replied to the letter of March 8th:

Belgium  France  Italy  Salvador
Brazil  France  Japan  Siam
Chile  Greece  Liberia  Spain
China  Guatemala  Netherlands  Sweden
Czechoslovakia  Haiti  New Zealand  Switzerland
Denmark  India  Poland  Venezuela
Finland  Greece  Roumania

States which have replied to the letter of November 21st, and to the reminders:

Canada  Lithuania  Norway
Estonia  Luxemburg  Panama
Esthonia  Mexico  South Africa
Liberia  Monaco

---
Secretariat that no opportunity had occurred at Washington for an official discussion of the question of the ratification of the Convention. No progress was therefore made in this matter at the Washington Conference.

The Commission at its Fourth Session had, moreover, adopted the following Resolutions:

(a) The Commission is of the opinion that the Convention of St.-Germain concerning the Traffic in Arms, which is of such importance to the peace of the world, remains and will remain a dead letter unless and until the Powers signatory to the Convention, whether Members of the League or not, including the United States of America, see their way to ratify it.

(b) The Commission is of opinion that the Council of the League of Nations should be asked to communicate with the Members of the League of Nations which have not ratified the St. Germain Convention urging them to make the necessary preparations for the ratification of the Convention in order that formal ratifications can be deposited as soon as all of the principal Signatory Powers are ready to deposit their ratifications.

(c) The Commission decided that the substance of the Secretariat's Memorandum on the Convention of St. Germain should be published.

The Council, on the basis of the above decisions, adopted on July 20th last the following Resolution:—

“The Council would once more urge upon the Members of the League of Nations the importance, for the cause of universal peace, of the Convention of St. Germain. It urgently requests all the Members of the League who have not yet ratified the Convention of St. Germain to make all the necessary preparations for the ratification of the Convention in order that the formal ratification can be deposited as soon as the principal Signatory Powers, including the United States of America, are ready to deposit theirs.”

In pursuance of this resolution of the Council, the Secretary-General addressed another letter to the States which had not ratified the Convention, drawing their attention to the following points:—

(1) The importance of the international control of the traffic in arms is heightened by a study of the various aspects presented by the problem of disarmament as defined in various resolutions of the Assembly.

For instance, in connection with the surplus stocks of war material, the destruction of which was recommended by the Assembly, the Permanent Advisory Committee expressed the opinion that:—

“In fact, it is not the existence of ‘surplus’ stocks of munitions in the control of a competent Government, even if such stocks did exist, which would be open to objection, but the fact that they may be distributed all over the world to persons and States which are not fitted to possess them.

“This is one more urgent reason for the ratification of the Arms Traffic Convention, part of which was drawn up in the first place to deal with this very question.”

(2) In considering another aspect of disarmament, namely, the question of the private manufacture of arms, which is mentioned in Article 8 of the Covenant, the Temporary Mixed Commission reached a similar conclusion, for, in February 1922, it expressed the opinion that the best method of gaining control of this manufacture appeared to be the ratification of the Convention on the Traffic in Arms.

(3) At its fourth session, the Commission recognised the difficulties which might be entailed, for certain Powers which produce arms and munitions, by the ratification of a Convention which imposes on the arms traffic and industry restrictions indispensable to any form of control, but at the same time tends to modify the general economy of production and exchange to the advantage of producing countries which have not ratified.

(4) Such considerations, though legitimate, should not, in the opinion of the Commission, be allowed to postpone indefinitely the application of a Convention likely to produce such valuable results. Accordingly, the Commission suggested that the Council should adopt the resolution quoted above, the effect of which would be to obviate any delay in the application of the Convention as soon as it was certain that all the necessary ratifications could be obtained.

Since this communication was despatched by the Secretary-General, a note, dated July 28th, has been received from the Department of State of the United States Government:—

“The communication which the Secretary-General of the League of Nations addressed to the Secretary of State of the United States of America on November 21st, 1921, has had careful consideration.

“In that communication the Secretary-General was so good as to bring to the knowledge of the Secretary of State a resolution adopted on October 1st, 1921, by the Assembly of the League of Nations, suggesting that the importance of ratifying the Arms Traffic Convention of St. Germain should be strongly impressed on all the States signatories thereto, whether Members of the League of Nations or not, as well as the decision of the Council of the League that the Assembly's resolution should be brought to the notice of all States which had not notified the League of their intentions on the subject.”
"In reply to the inquiry made by the Secretary-General in pursuance of this action, whether the Government of the United States of America is prepared to ratify the Convention of St. Germain, the Secretary of State begs to state that the terms of the proposed Convention have been carefully examined and that, while the Government of the United States is in cordial sympathy with efforts to restrict traffic in arms and munitions of war, it finds itself unable to approve the provisions of the Convention and to give any assurance of its ratification.

"The Secretary of State also desires to call attention to the fact that the Government of the United States is desirous to co-operate for the purpose of suitably controlling traffic in arms and munitions, and to this end the Congress of the United States has already enacted legislation providing that, ' whenever the President finds that in any American country, or in any country in which the United States exercises extra-territorial jurisdiction, conditions of domestic violence exist, which are or may be promoted by the use of arms or munitions of war procured from the United States and makes proclamation thereof, it shall thereafter be unlawful to export, except under such limitations and exceptions as the President prescribes, any arms or munitions of war from any place in the United States to such country until otherwise ordered by the President or by Congress.'"

In view of this situation, the Temporary Mixed Commission, on September 1st, 1922, adopted the following resolution:

"The Commission takes note of the communication of the Department of State stating that the Government of the United States is not able to ratify the Convention of St.-Germain. The Sub-Commission considers that this constitutes a fait nouveau. The Commission is of opinion that the question of a Convention on Arms Traffic must be re-examined in its entirety in the light of the existing situation and with a view to finding the basis of a possible collaboration with the United States."

The communication from the Government of the United States has cleared the situation. It is now apparent that the Convention of St. Germain in its present form cannot be ratified by all of the Principal Powers. The new examination of the question in its entirety called for by the resolution of the Temporary Mixed Commission will now be undertaken without delay, and must include a study of the changes which have occurred since the Convention of St. Germain was drawn up three years ago and since Sir Cecil Hurst drew up his report for the First Assembly.

If a basis for collaboration can be found, it will then remain for the Temporary Mixed Commission, with the approval of the Council, to take steps which may lead to the drawing up of a new Convention or to the necessary modifications in the present Convention.

CONCLUSION.

Such, summarised as faithfully and briefly as possible, is the work of the Temporary Mixed Commission for the Reduction of Armaments since the second Assembly.

As stated by M. Viviani, its Chairman, at the opening of the 4th session of the Temporary Mixed Commission: "the duties with which we have been entrusted by the Council are singularly important and complex. They are important in view of the fact that we have to deal with disarmament and that we are not free to handle the question of disarmament as we please, since we are the slaves of facts, the prisoners of circumstances and events."

The object to be aimed at is, perhaps, not so much the immediate framing of hasty resolutions—which might clash with, and be contradicted by, the facts—as the pursuit, with faith and perseverance, of the study of one of the most difficult problems with which humanity has ever been faced. This is the faith with which the members of the Temporary Mixed Commission are inspired.

Should humanity deliberately enter to-morrow on the true path of peace, the general lines of a plan which would lead the nations simultaneously to reduce their armaments could not fail to take definite shape in their minds and under their pens on the basis of the preliminary investigations which have already been carried out.

So far, the members are not discouraged, since—again to quote M. Viviani—"in the past, humanity achieved nothing without toil and time, and, as we are but men, we are heirs of those who left us such a heritage of woe."
ANNEX I.

SUMMARY OF ANSWERS RECEIVED ON THE SUBJECT OF THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE ASSEMBLY RELATIVE TO THE REDUCTION OF NATIONAL EXPENDITURE ON ARMAMENTS FOR THE TWO FINANCIAL YEARS ENVISAGED BY THE SECOND ASSEMBLY.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Africa.</td>
<td>20th April, 1921</td>
<td>Owing to the exceptional conditions mentioned in the first part of its memorandum, and the geographical situation and circumstances enumerated therein, the Union Governments, while they are in general agreement with the policy of the League of Nations, do not feel at present justified in giving the definite assurances which the recommendation of the Assembly suggests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa.</td>
<td>21st April, 1922</td>
<td>The South African Government has thought it necessary to reduce by 33(\frac{1}{3}) % the expenditure on national defence for the financial year 1922-23 as compared with the expenditure in the budget of the preceding year. It is improbable that the estimates for the 12 months ending March 31st, 1924, will surpass these figures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia.</td>
<td>14th June, 1921</td>
<td>Entirely in harmony with the spirit of the recommendation adopted at the League Assembly subject to the reservations in that recommendation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria.</td>
<td></td>
<td>The military, naval and air situation of Austria is settled by the Treaty of St. Germain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium.</td>
<td>21st April, 1921</td>
<td>Will conform to the recommendation adopted by the Assembly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia.</td>
<td>June 1921</td>
<td>Has reduced its annual military expenditure by 30 %.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil.</td>
<td>19th April, 1921</td>
<td>Declares itself unable to adopt the Assembly's recommendations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Effectives settled by the Treaty of Peace, but expenditure for 1922-23 shows an increase of 500 million levas as compared with 1912, owing to the voluntary system imposed by the Treaty.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Albania.

Argentine.

Australia.

Bolivia.

Brazil.

Belgium.

June 1921.

Has reduced its annual military expenditure by 30 %.

Declares itself unable to adopt the Assembly's recommendations.

Belgium.

21st January, 1922.

Previous reply confirmed.
ANNEXES.
Canada. 27th May, 1921.
In entire accord with the spirit of the recommendation. Has affected substantial reduction on military, naval and air expenditure. Looks forward to further possibility of reduction, though subject to reservations embodied in Assembly recommendations.

Chile. 10th June, 1921.
Does not contemplate any increase in its military and naval expenditure during the two coming years, it being understood that this statement does not constitute a formal engagement.

China. 11th May, 1921.
In entire accord with the spirit of the recommendation. Has decided to give effect thereto.

Czechoslovakia. 28th August, 1921.
Accepts with pleasure the reduction on military, naval and air expenses during the two fiscal years which will follow the coming financial year.

Denmark. 4th May, 1921.
An increase in its military expenditure during the two coming years is unlikely.

Finland. 26th April, 1921.
Regrets that, owing to the special circumstances prevailing, it is unable to accept the engagements proposed, although the percentage of its military expenses to the total expenses of the State fell from 22% in 1919 to 15% in 1921.

France. 20th April, 1921.
The French Government finds it impossible to undertake to conform to the recommendation of the Assembly, for which its representatives in Geneva did not vote. But it will make every effort to reduce its armaments within the limits compatible with the requirements of its international obligations and its national security.

Great Britain. 2nd June, 1921
Entirely in harmony with the spirit of the recommendation; has already effected very substantial reduction and

Colombia. 21st June, 1922.
Its military expenditure has been reduced during one year by about £200,000 (about 20%).

Czechoslovakia. 13th June, 1922.
Explains the increase which has taken place in 1921-22 as due to the rise in market prices, and points out that the absolute sum spent is considerably below that of the preceding year.

Denmark.
Previous reply confirmed.

Finland.
10th July, 1922.
Previous reply confirmed.

France. 22nd March, 1922.
The total credits granted to the War Department are being successively reduced from 6 milliards (1920) to 5,400,000,000 in 1921, and 4,500,000,00 in 1922, i.e., one-fourth. In the same way the Naval budget has dropped from 952,000,000 in 1921 to 797,000,000 in 1922.

Great Britain. 21st March 1922.
The further economies foreshadowed in the previous reply have been realised.
looks forward to the possibility of further economies in the next two years, subject to the reservations in the recommendation. This policy is liable to reconsideration if the recommendations of the Assembly are not adopted by other Powers.

**Greece.** 27th June, 1921.
Finds it impossible to conform to the recommendation of the Assembly in view of present circumstances.

**Guatemala.** 21st April, 1921.
Is ready to accept the recommendation.

**Italy.** 23rd May, 1921.
Adheres to the recommendation of the Assembly on condition that similar engagements are entered into by the other Members of the League and under certain reservations as to naval expenses.

**Japan.** 26th April, 1921.
Thinks that it is not advisable to take any action on the recommendation of the Assembly until the general plans for disarmament which the Council of the League is considering have been laid down.

**India.** 17th June, 1922.
Owing mainly to abnormal expenditure on frontier operations in the 1921-22 budget outlay, amounting to Rs. 6,50,100,000, the budget estimate for 1922-23 is Rs. 6,21,800,000, and the Government of India is considering the possibility of effecting reductions in their expenditure generally, including the military grants.

**Italy.** 22nd June, 1922.
Previous reply confirmed.

**Japan.** 10th July, 1922.
The total military, naval, and air budget for 1922 shows a decrease over that of 1921.

**Latvia.** 29th April, 1922.
Entirely in agreement with the spirit of the recommendation of the Assembly. The military outlay was in 1920 27% of the general expenditure; in 1921, 16%, in 1922, 14.4%.

**Netherlands.** 17th May, 1921.
Is ready to take into consideration the recommendation of the Assembly provided that the other Members of the League make similar declarations, that the increases owing to higher costs, etc., are not considered as breaking the pledge taken, and that due consideration is given to certain exceptional circumstances.

**Netherlands.** 25th July, 1922.
The military and naval expenses for 1922 show a diminution over those of 1921 of about 6¼ million and 1½ million florins respectively.
New Zealand. 20th June, 1921.
Associates itself with the views expressed in the letter from the British Government of June 2nd on this question.

Norway. 12th May, 1921.
Owing to the present value of the Norwegian money, the budget for the coming year is, in reality, smaller than those voted before the war. The Government finds it difficult to give a formal assurance not to surpass, during the two coming years, the figures for 1921-22 for the total military, naval and air expenses, owing to present conditions.

Norway. 26th July, 1922.
The army budget for 1922-23 has been reduced by 829,640 kronen over that of 1921-22. The naval budget has been reduced by 787,945. The expenses of the aerial units for the army and the navy are included in their respective budgets.

Peru. 1st July, 1922.
The war budget for 1922 is 900,000 Peruvian £ as against 1 million for 1921.

Poland. 11th July, 1921.
Owing to the present international situation and to the immediate neighbourhood of States which are not Members of the League of Nations, whose adhesion to the ideas and aims of the League is far from assured, does not see its way to accept the recommendation.

Poland. 26th June, 1922.
It endeavours in every way to limit its military budget. The military expenses for 1920 were estimated at 122,400,000 zł. In 1921, they were 60,327,696, showing a reduction of 43%; in 1922, 60,000,000, with the reduction of only 15% (on account of the exchange) for the budget estimates calculated at 50%.

Roumania. 11th July, 1922.
During recent years has made constant efforts to reduce its effectives and its military expenses. The increase in the estimates is merely due to the growing cost of living and the depreciation of Roumanian money.

Serb-Croat-Slovene State. 30th April, 1921.
Regrets to be unable to give an answer owing to the international situation.

Serb-Croat-Slovene State. 31st July, 1922.
Is anxious to respond to the recommendation of the Assembly, and makes every endeavour to reduce its military, naval and air expenses, despite unfavourable political, technical and financial conditions.

Spain. 30th May, 1921.
Does not believe that the procedure suggested is the best for the aim in view. The budget is not an exact index of the military power of a country.

Siam. 19th August, 1922.
Subject to the exceptional conditions mentioned in the letter, His Majesty’s Government is quite willing to conform to the recommendation referred to, and, in order to give a proof of its pacific intention and inclination, would use every endeavour to limit the budget for those two financial years as recommended.

Nicaragua.
Panama.
Paraguay.
Persia.
Portugal.
Salvador.
Sweden. August 19th, 1921.

In so far as the national defence of Sweden is concerned, the question of its future organisation forms at present the subject of a complete and detailed examination, the result of which cannot yet be foreseen, and will only be made known in a few months' time. In these circumstances, the Swedish Government regrets that it is at present unable to make a definite statement regarding the action which it is likely to take in compliance with the recommendation of the Assembly.

Switzerland. 14th Sept., 1921.

The budget for 1921 was an exception and it is therefore impossible for the Federal Government to establish its figures for 1922-1923 on it.

Sweden. March 20th, 1922.

The enquiry into the future organisation of national defence referred to in the Swedish Government's letter of August 19th, 1921, has not yet been completed. It will, however, result in a proposal for a reduction of military expenditure. Moreover, the military expenditure of Sweden has been very largely reduced. This expenditure amounted in 1921 to 229,738,000 cr.; it was estimated at 165,164,700 in the budget for 1922, while the budget at present before the Rikstag — which only includes expenditure for the first six months of 1923 — allows 73,285,000 crowns for this purpose.

Switzerland. 18th July, 1922.

Unless unexpected political events occur and on condition that the other Members of the League pledge themselves in the same manner, it believes it to be possible to undertake the engagement not to surpass during the years 1923-1924 the total military expenses of 1922.

Uruguay.

Venezuela.
ANNEX II

STATEMENTS BY VARIOUS COUNTRIES ON THE CONSIDERATIONS RELATIVE TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THEIR NATIONAL SAFETY, INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS, GEOGRAPHICAL SITUATION AND SPECIAL CONDITIONS.

1

REPLY OF SOUTH AFRICA

CAPE TOWN, April 20th, 1921.

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of March 8th, No. 21/31/27, conveying the recommendation of the Assembly of the League of Nations that Governments should undertake, for the years 1922-23 and 1923-24, not to exceed the sum total of expenditure on the military, naval and air services provided for in the Budget for 1921-22.

While my Government is in cordial agreement with the aim of the Assembly, in thus making a practical suggestion to carry out Article 8 of the Covenant, they desire me to notify the Council of the League, in terms of the second reservation contained in your letter, of the following “exceptional conditions” which make it at present uncertain to what extent they will be able to adopt the recommendations in the immediate future:

1. The Union has never possessed a standing naval, military or air force. It has not yet had time to develop its citizen force, the organisation devised for that purpose by the Union Parliament in 1912 having never been brought into effective being owing to the interruption caused by the Great War and a period of total inactivity since the cessation of that war.

2. Before the Great War:

(a) The Imperial Government maintained considerable forces stationed in the Union for defence purposes.
(b) There was no Air Force, Imperial or Union, in South Africa.
(c) The Imperial and not the Union Government assumed responsibility for naval defence of South African ports, waters and trade sea-routes.

3. The circumstances of the present day are that the Imperial Government has withdrawn practically the whole of the Regular Garrison stationed in the Union before the War, and it is likely that the Union will have to assume the military obligations which before the Great War were assumed by the Imperial Government for purposes of local defence. The Union’s share in the Naval Defence of South Africa has also still to be determined in consultation with the Imperial Government. These matters will be discussed at a Conference which it is proposed to hold in London at an early date; and any declarations as to the expenditure of the Union on military, naval and air defence in the immediate future would therefore be premature at present.

Finally, I desire to emphasise, for the consideration of the Council, “the geographical situation and circumstances” generally of the Union:

1. The territory of the Union covers 473,000 square miles and contains a native population in the process of emerging from barbarism, which outnumbers the European population by 4 to 1.

2. There are, moreover, in South Africa territories surrounding the Union but within the Union’s economic and political sphere, wherein the native population outnumbers the European population in far greater proportion. Seeing that the Union is far and away the strongest civilised

1 In a letter dated June 7th, 1922, the Government of South Africa sent a statement regarding the military and police forces considered indispensable by the Union of South Africa for the preservation of domestic order and the expenditure entailed thereby. This statement provides full information of a numerical order. Further, in the course of correspondence with regard to the limitation of military expenditure, the Government of South Africa wrote the above letter, dated April 20th, 1921, containing useful data on the considerations of national safety, international obligations, geographical situation and special conditions which determine its policy with regard to armaments. This letter was duly communicated at the time to the various bodies concerned.
State in Central and Southern Africa, the peaceful and orderly development of other States and territories, and the welfare and good government of the indigenous native races of Africa and the African Continent in the Southern Hemisphere, are matters of vital concern to the Union.

3. Only recently has the Union acquired international status, with its concomitant obligations in the way of national defence, and while other States have for years past made adequate provision for this purpose, the Union has had as yet no opportunity to lay down a basis for future guidance.

Besides, by accepting the Mandate for South-West African Territory, she has not only largely increased her seaboard, but has rendered herself liable for the peace, order and defence of a large territory, containing large numbers of natives, hardly developed from the stage of barbarism.

Owing to the exceptional conditions mentioned in the first part of this memorandum, and the geographical situation and circumstances enumerated herein, the Union Government, while they are in general agreement with the policy of the League of Nations, do not feel at present justified in giving the definite assurances which the recommendation of the Assembly suggests.

It is needless to add that the military and naval organisation contemplated for the Union has reference entirely to the defence of South Africa and the maintenance of internal order and peace, and would be useless from the point of view of foreign aggression or operations to be conducted outside of South Africa. It is therefore in complete conformity with the peaceful ideals which the League has at heart.

I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient servant,

(Signed) J. SMUTS,
Prime Minister.

The Secretary-General,
League of Nations,
Geneva.

EXTRACT FROM A LETTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA DATED MARCH 21ST, 1922.

"Owing to the transfer of the Cape Military Defence from the Imperial Government to the Government of the Union of South Africa, it may be expedient later on to make certain additions to the Defence Vote, to provide for services that have heretofore been performed gratis by the Imperial Government; but I am advised that this increase, if any, is not likely to reach large proportions."

REPLY OF ALBANIA

(Translation.)

ALBANIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

TIRANA, June 4th, 1922.

Your Excellency,

In reply to your letter dated April 13th last, relating to the Resolution adopted by the Second Assembly of the League of Nations with regard to the reduction of national armaments, I have the honour to enclose herewith a translation of a letter from the Albanian General Staff concerning the enquiries which were made in this connection.

Albania has no international obligations of a military character.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) DIAFER UPI,
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

His Excellency Monsieur Paul HYMANS,
Acting President of the League of Nations,
Geneva.
MINISTRY OF WAR.
TIRANA, May 23rd, 1922.

Reply to the letter No. 663, dated April 27th, 1922, forwarded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

We have the honour to reply to the questions asked by the Secretariat of the League of Nations.

From 1913 till 1920 Albania was occupied by various foreign Powers and did not, in consequence, possess any military organisation.

The work of organisation was commenced in 1921 and is still proceeding.

The Albanian State never possessed any naval organisation and has none at the present time.

The acquisition of some aeroplanes is contemplated but they have not yet been purchased.

The Albanian State possesses armed forces of soldiers and gendarmerie numbering 10,772 men; their function is to preserve peace in the interior and to defend the frontiers, which have an extent of 700 kilometres. The Albanian Government is contemplating an increase of this force, with a view to facilitating the attainment of the objects mentioned above, without adding to its expenditure.

The Albanian people have been for long periods without any government; they have thus been compelled, for their own preservation, to live perpetually under arms. Moreover, the events of the last ten years since the Balkan War, and the various policies pursued, had aggravated the situation. Many Albanians fled to the mountains and adopted the manner of life of highland peoples. The result is that the administration, which has been established on the model of modern governments, is in need of a well-organised, well-disciplined and adequate military force; hence the necessity of increasing the army and in particular of expanding the regular troops which have also to perform the duties of gendarmerie — up to a total of 12,000 of all ranks. Nevertheless, once normal conditions are restored, this force will be reduced, and will be organised on the “Swiss Militia” system. This force has not yet been fully equipped with modern armament.

As regards aeroplanes, as we have just observed, we do not possess any at present, but the Albanian Government desires to possess a small squadron, which would also be available for other public services, e.g., for the Postal Service.

The average budget for the maintenance of this force does not exceed 10,000,000 gold francs, and an additional 10 millions is all that will be needed to complete its armament in accordance with modern requirements.

The number of officers in the gendarmerie is 367, Cavalry N.C.O.s 8, gendarmes 2,098 and mounted gendarmes 79.

The military forces comprise the following units:

- 3 regiments of infantry;
- 3 battalions of rifles;
- 3 heavy machine-gun companies, with four machine-guns per company.
- 3 4-gun mountain batteries armed with guns of 75 calibre;
- 1 howitzer battalion of artillery, consisting of two 4-gun batteries;
- 1 company of engineers, consisting of two sections (engineering and bridging);
- 1 communication company, equipped with heliostats and telephones;
- 4 aeroplanes, of which two are fighting machines and two are used for communications.

The military organisation is based on the same principles as in all other countries; every Albanian citizen without exception is obliged to perform military service. The articles of the law governing the Army organisation are based on, and are in exact conformity with, Article 4, viz:

1. Every Albanian is obliged to perform military service by virtue of this law.
2. Liability to military service commences in all cases in the month of January after the man’s 18th birthday.
3. Military service is divided into two periods:
   (a) Active Service.
   (b) Reserve Service.

4. According to the requirements of the country, a portion or the whole of the young men who have reached the age of 19 will be called to the Colours by the War Minister each January.

(Signed) I. TATZATI,
Minister of War.

To the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Tirana.
3

REPLY OF AUSTRIA

[Translation.]

REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE AUSTRIAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC
ACCRREDITED TO THE SECRETARIAT
OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.
No. 290.

GENEVA, July 10th, 1922.

Sir,

In reply to the circular letter, C. L. 54. 1922. IX, dated June 12th last and signed by the President of the Council of the League, which you were good enough to send to my Government, I am instructed to request you to bring to the notice of those concerned the reasons for which the Federal Government has not thought fit to submit to the Temporary Mixed Commission for the Reduction of Armaments a statement such as is asked for in the above-mentioned circular letter.

The military, naval, and air forces of the Republic of Austria are the subject of special clauses in the Treaty of St. Germain. They could not be included in the draft treaty which the Commission is considering with a view to reducing the armaments of States which possess freedom of action as regards their military and other forces. In these circumstances, the Federal Government considers that there is no occasion to prepare a statement on the subject of disarmament in relation to the geographical situation and special conditions of Austria.

I beg to bring the foregoing to your notice, and have the honour to be, etc.,

(Signed) E. PFLÜGL.

To the Hon. Sir Eric DRUMMOND, K.C.M.G., C.B.,
Secretary-General of the League of Nations,
Geneva.

4

REPLY OF BELGIUM

[Translation.]

MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

BRUSSELS, July 17th, 1922.

Sir,

In his letter of June 12th last (C. L. 54, 1922. IX) the Acting President of the Council of the League of Nations requested me to furnish a statement on the considerations which the Belgian Government feels bound to submit, with regard to the requirements of its international obligations, its geographical situation, its special circumstances and with regard to the police and military forces indispensable for the internal security of the country.

I have the honour to transmit you herewith the statement in question.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) Henri JASPAR.

The Hon. Sir Eric DRUMMOND,
Secretary-General of the League of Nations,
Geneva.
STATEMENT.

I.

The Treaties of April 19th, 1839, imposed upon Belgium a regime of guaranteed neutrality to which the Treaty of Versailles put an end. Relying on the engagements undertaken by the Signatory Powers of the Treaties of 1839, the Belgian Government formerly considered that it was only bound to develop the military forces of the country to a very limited extent. The new international status of Belgium, by freeing her sovereignty from every restriction and by rendering her mistress of her destiny, has done away with the protection afforded by her guarantors. She therefore has to protect herself against the dangers which may menace her frontiers; and concern for her security makes it her duty to maintain the military forces for which she has made provision in the current year. It must not be forgotten that she was the first to experience the shock and invasion of the German armies, that almost the whole of her territory was invaded and held to ransom, and that she must, in consequence, take the necessary precautions to avoid a repetition of such a calamity. The sincere desire of the Belgian people to live in peace and to reduce their armaments to a minimum cannot be questioned. The letter of April 21st, 1921, in which the Belgian Government undertook to conform to the recommendation of the Assembly of the League of Nations with regard to the reduction of military expenditure, is a definite proof of this. But the accumulation of suffering, of ruin and of affliction in Belgium, during the course of the war brought on by the bellicose spirit of Germany, and the systematic destruction of her industrial wealth carried out during the occupation, keep alive in the country an unconquerable mistrust of the sentiments of the German people. This mistrust is only too well justified by the struggle which is, at this very moment, proceeding in the German Republic, between the forces favourable to peace and the forces of Pangermanism.

The issue of this struggle cannot be foreseen, but so long as the possibility of conflict exists, so long as there exist no guarantees of peace and real tranquillity for Germany's neighbours, these latter would be guilty of criminal folly towards themselves and towards those peoples who are exposed to the same dangers as themselves, if they did not maintain an army of defence, sufficient — though reduced to a minimum. Belgium has attempted to reconcile her international obligations with her desire to conform to a general limitation of armaments, and her future military system has been defined within the limits of Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which, indeed, only requires that armaments shall be reduced to the lowest point consistent with national safety and taking account of geographical situation.

II.

As regards the geographical situation and special circumstances of the country, which are next to be taken into consideration, attention must be drawn to the fact that the dangers of invasion for Belgium are increased to a remarkable extent by the length of the exposed frontier and the narrowness of her territory. The barrier of the Rhine, partly re-established between France and Germany, the fortifications which protect the new frontier between these two countries, the dense railway system on the right bank of the Rhine north of Cologne, the absence of any important geographical obstacles between the Rhine and the Flanders coast, and the development of the Belgian system of roads, would most probably, in the event of a new conflict, render Belgium the principal line of advance for the German armies. A country so narrow as ours must seek to protect itself against the unavoidable disadvantages of its geographical situation, which expose its plains to the danger of being overrun by enemy armies.

Situated as she is at the meeting-place of two races and two different civilisations, at the junction of many economic and commercial currents, Belgium has been the battlefield of Western Europe ever since the formation of the great Monarchies.

Recent experiences have proved that these conditions have not changed; she is therefore forced to maintain an army sufficiently strong to counterbalance to a certain extent the disadvantages of her geographical situation.

The Bill which the Government is shortly proposing to introduce is based on universal service and a ten months' period of service for the infantry. This will allow the organisation, on a peace footing, of nine divisions, and the creation, in case of mobilisation, of reserve divisions, varying in number, according to the danger menacing our security.

III.

Finally, as regards the military and police forces necessary for the security of the country, it should be pointed out that the gendarmerie has generally been sufficient to deal with passing disturbances and to maintain order. Belgium, like all other countries, is suffering from a social crisis out of which internal disorders may arise; but the moderate and commonsense character of the Belgian people makes disorders of this kind very unlikely.

The part that the Belgian army may be called upon to play in maintaining internal order cannot, therefore, be regarded as one of the chief points for consideration in fixing its strength.
REPLY OF BULGARIA

SOFIA, June 16th, 1922.

Your Excellency,

In reply to your letter of April 13th, I have the honour to lay before Your Excellency the following statement:

Bulgaria signed the Treaty of Peace with the sincere intention of loyally carrying out the whole of its clauses. In spite of the economic and social reasons which the Bulgarian Delegation urged on the Peace Conference in support of its request that certain of the military clauses should be modified, the Conference, while recognising the soundness and accuracy of these arguments, felt compelled nevertheless to maintain its original proposal, and to refuse to make any alteration in the clauses in question. Bulgaria has therefore endeavoured, during more than three years, to carry out the conditions which were imposed upon her.

The internal situation of Bulgaria presents great difficulties as a result of the reduction effected in her army. In spite of financial sacrifices beyond her strength, in spite of the energetic propaganda which has been carried on, and in spite of the efforts made to attract a large number of volunteers into the Army, she is to-day unable to take effective measures against the ever-increasing brigandage and the disorders of all kinds in the interior of the country, which prevent her from regaining her pre-war economic position. It is obvious that so limited a number of soldiers cannot be relied upon for the defence of the frontiers of the Kingdom, and for the maintenance of order and of the authority of the administration. The Government is therefore faced with the greatest difficulties in ensuring order and safety in the country.

The present strength of the Bulgarian armed forces is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Regular Army</th>
<th>Frontier Guards</th>
<th>Gendarmerie</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldiers</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

that is to say, a total of 10,157 soldiers and 1,511 officers instead of the 33,000 soldiers and 1,650 officers provided for in the Treaty of Neuilly.

In view of the unsettled situation in the interior of the country after the three successive wars which Bulgaria has been compelled to wage since 1912; in view of the daily increasing brigandage which extends even to the most populous districts and threatens the main routes of communication; in view of the heavy financial obligations assumed by Bulgaria, and in view of the fact that the frontiers are largely unprotected against smuggling, it is obvious that there is a danger that the position of the country, which is already very insecure, may be irretrievably compromised.

Bulgaria is fully conscious of the obligations incumbent on her, viz:—

1. To re-establish her internal situation;
2. To organise all the productive forces of the country so that economic life may be restored; to establish normal conditions of life as far as possible, and to begin to fulfil her obligations towards her former enemies;
3. To protect her frontiers against inroads by brigands and smugglers, and against contingencies of all kinds.

Unfortunately, it must be admitted that at present none of the conditions essential to any well-ordered country exist in Bulgaria. The abolition of the old military organisation and the substitution for it of a voluntary army renders the organisation and existence of a trustworthy and solid army problematical, if not impossible.

As experience has shown in other countries, the system of voluntary recruiting does not present any difficulty in the case of the great industrial States of Europe. The large numbers of poor and unemployed, together with the considerable financial resources at the disposal of those States, greatly facilitate the recruiting of an army of volunteers. In Bulgaria, however, this system of recruiting has met with insurmountable difficulties in consequence of the special economic and social conditions of our country.
The immense majority of the Bulgarian people are agriculturists. The peasants constitute 80 per cent. of the total population. Every peasant owns a small piece of land to which he is greatly attached. He feels a religious respect for his country and his family, and he objects to any occupation which would keep him for a prolonged period away from the home where he was born. It is no exaggeration to attribute to this special trait of the Bulgarian, character the disastrous result of the recent wars. During a period of many years, Bulgarian Governments had been compelled, in consideration of these conditions, gradually to reduce the period of compulsory military service to 15 months — a unique occurrence among Continental States. For example, the period of service for non-commissioned officers of the army was originally fixed at a minimum of three years. As a sufficient number of candidates did not come forward to enrol themselves in the Army, the period of service was reduced to one year, while other advantages and privileges were granted to soldiers.

In these circumstances it will be understood that the volunteers who come forward to-day for enlistment in the new army belong mostly to a class which could not earn a living in other employments. They are persons of very doubtful moral value, upon whom the State could not rely in a crisis. In view, moreover, of the insufficient number of volunteers, it is impossible for the Government to make any selection among those who offer themselves for enlistment in the Army; on the contrary, it is compelled by the circumstances to accept gladly any candidates.

The system of military service as provided for in the Peace Treaty, constitutes a great danger for the country, and this fact cannot be too strongly emphasised. A wave of communist ideas, which found in the difficult economic situation favourable conditions for development, is at present sweeping over Bulgaria Bolshevik propaganda finds favour and encouragement owing to the nearness of Russia, and constitutes to-day a most pressing danger. Bulgarian extremists are sparing no efforts to impose upon the country the dictatorship of the proletariat. Their attempts to win the army to their side were in vain. They are now determined to enter the army in large numbers by taking advantage of the system of voluntary enlistment. The control of the State, however vigilant it may be, is powerless to ward off this danger. In these circumstances there can be no doubt that the Bulgarian communists will gradually but surely work their way into the army and will become its only organised force and the masters of the situation.

The Bulgarian Government has adopted energetic measures against the communists in the country. The foreign representatives in Bulgaria can give evidence on this point. Thanks to her army, which was recruited under the compulsory system, Bulgaria was able to keep under the extremist elements, which became active on several occasions. At those critical moments the army did its duty to the full, especially during the general strike in 1919. If it had not been so, it is quite probable that the communists would have succeeded in accomplishing their aims by force.

To-day, on the other hand, when the old army has disappeared and has given place to an army of volunteers, the latter would undoubtedly, if an opportunity had arisen, have become the docile instrument of the communist leaders.

A few examples will afford striking proof of the impossibility for Bulgaria of bringing her army up to strength under the voluntary system.

The Bulgarian police has hitherto not been fully qualified for its work, and is not succeeding in filling its ranks with capable and thoroughly trustworthy men, in spite of the efforts which the Government has devoted to its organisation. Notwithstanding the very favourable terms offered, difficulties are encountered in recruiting, and the total of 4,000 men which was contemplated has not been reached. How much greater will be the difficulties to be overcome in filling the army to the extent of 20,000 for the army and 13,000 for the gendarmerie and the frontier guards!

Apart from these difficulties in the recruiting of a voluntary army, Bulgaria will soon be unable to find the money to pay this new army. The maintenance of an army of 20,000 men and a gendarmerie of 13,000 involves at present the expenditure of the enormous sum of approximately 500 million levas for the pay of soldiers and officers alone. Add to this amount other expenses amounting to 400 million levas, and it will be seen that the army costs Bulgaria more than 900 million levas — a burden which the budget of the State cannot bear indefinitely. In view of the present situation of the country, these expenses greatly exceed the resources of Bulgaria, which has never at any time in her existence spent more than 50 million levas on the maintenance of her armed forces.

In these circumstances, is it not justifiable to declare categorically that the system of voluntary recruiting is quite unsuited to Bulgaria, and consequently that the maintenance of an army recruited under the compulsory system is an absolute necessity and a condition sine qua non for the very existence of the country? With her new army Bulgaria runs the risk of falling a prey to internal conflicts which will certainly result in the disappearance of the country as a free and sovereign State.

The Bulgarian Government, which is fully conscious of its responsibilities, will continue, as in the past and with the same energy, to defend the independence of the country and to maintain the authority of the administration. It will, however, never cease openly to make the following declarations — the truth of which has been admitted by the members of the Inter-Allied Commission and of the Military Control Commission, as well as by all foreigners who have visited the country since the armistice:

1. The armed forces, as laid down in the Treaty of Neuilly, are insufficient;
2. The recruiting of the Army by means of the voluntary system is a crushing economic burden on the country, and prevents it from recovering and from meeting the
financial obligations imposed on it by the Treaty of Neuilly. Moreover, with this method of recruiting, Bulgaria cannot organise a well-disciplined army.

3. In spite of the active publicity campaign which has been carried out, and in spite of all the efforts made to obtain a sufficient number of voluntary recruits for the army, Bulgaria has at present only 10,000 men available. The generous rates of pay offered, which are immensely higher than the average of those paid to officials, and which impose a heavy burden on the Budget — and all the privileges granted to volunteers (volunteers receive, in addition to pay, their food, quarters and clothing: on completion of their terms of service the State guarantees them employment of some sort, a piece of land, pension, etc., and four months leave per year), and the propaganda which the deputies themselves have carried out in the towns and country districts — all these endeavours have produced only trifling results. The Bulgarian peasant declines to leave his land.

The Bulgarian Government is under no illusion as to the dangers to which it would be exposed in case of a fresh outbreak of the extremists. It therefore feels sure that the League of Nations will not refuse to recognise the gravity of the situation in which the country is placed. It is firmly convinced that when the question has been reconsidered, Bulgaria will be authorised to recruit her armed forces by compulsory enlistment on a scale which could be strictly defined and could be far below that of the pre-war establishment. In this way the Allied Powers would have a guarantee that the Bulgarian army would not be increased beyond the indispensable minimum; on the other hand, Bulgaria would be enabled to organise an army which, though small, would be disciplined and reliable, and in which the authorities could always place confidence.

In view of these considerations, the Bulgarian Government ventures to submit, for the consideration of the Assembly, the following suggestions regarding the numbers and organisation of its army:

I. Regular army, 30,000 men.
   Frontier guards, 5,000
   Gendarmerie, 10,000

The recruiting of the army, the frontier guards and the gendarmerie should be effected on the system of compulsory military service, with a term of service of two to three years. The annual levy called to the colours should not exceed 8,000 to 10,000 men.

As regards the frontier guards, it is particularly desirable that they should be recruited under the compulsory system. In fact, recent experience has proved that the control of the frontiers at present exercised by the frontier guards is illusory. This force is at present recruited from the poorest citizens, who, in many cases, accept the hardship and dangers of this employment with the object of working in league with the smugglers. Regular soldiers are really indispensable to enable us to guard our extended frontiers in an effective manner, since they will always be inspired by a sense of patriotic duty, whereas mercenaries will never risk their lives to protect the integrity of our territory against the incursion of armed bands.

If Bulgaria is allowed to maintain a small regular army, the present situation in the Balkans would be in no way thereby modified in her favour. How could this small armed force constitute a danger to our neighbours, who are far stronger than ourselves, particularly when it is remembered that modern conditions render any army powerless unless it has the support of highly developed war industries?

Another circumstance which should be taken into account in deciding on our system of recruiting is the fact that, under the voluntary system, the State budget has to support, as is mentioned above, an additional burden of 500 million leva. If the country were relieved of this excessive expenditure, it would be able to carry out the financial obligations imposed on it by the Treaty of Neuilly.

II. Another question which Bulgaria cannot too strongly urge upon the attention of the League of Nations is the present situation of the corps of officers. In compliance with the military clauses of the Peace Treaty, the Government was obliged to discharge a great number of officers of the old army. Bulgaria was only authorised to retain her officers in a proportion of 1:20 of the total of her armed forces; as this proportion was insufficient, it became necessary to fill a large number of purely military appointments by civil employees who were entirely unfamiliar with military affairs and lacked the special knowledge required for their duties. These officials have, to a large extent, become the agents of extremist propaganda in the army and have materially assisted in undermining the discipline and loyalty of all ranks.

The Bulgarian Government asks to be authorised to increase the number of officers to a proportion of 1:15 of the total strength.

III. The Peace Treaty allows only one military school for the military education of the officers and N.C.O.s. This school is adequate for the training of the officers, but it is necessary to establish a special school for N.C.O.s.

IV. Naval Clauses. The naval forces allowed to Bulgaria by the Peace Treaty for the policing and inspection of fisheries consist, as a maximum, of 4 torpedo boats and 6 motor-boats, with a displacement of not more than 100 tons each. These are insufficient to fulfil the requirements of naval police; the vessels are of old design and will be confined to their naval base for a great part of the year by the storms which prevail in the Black Sea.