Commission”. In other words, the initiative will come from a contracting Government, but will have no effect unless it is favourably received by the Permanent Commission.

The United States delegation, while entirely approving the intention of Article 58, thinks that it might be possible to secure the aim in view by a better method, and calls the attention of Governments to the desirability of investigating this question before the Conference.

Article 59.

The final article of the draft deals with the right of denunciation.

This is always a delicate question in multilateral treaties, and it is particularly delicate here, where the system implies a balance of mutual engagements which is in danger of being disturbed if one of the parties withdraws.

The Commission nevertheless considered it impossible to refuse the parties the right to denounced the Convention. It was careful, however, to make this right dependent on various conditions which, to some extent, correct its disadvantages.

In this connection, Article 59 provides, in the first place, that the right of denunciation can only be exercised in the course of one of the Conferences held in virtue of the preceding articles to re-examine, and possibly revise, the Agreement. It further lays down that denunciation, when thus notified, shall not take effect until two years after its date, and in no case before the expiration of the normal period of duration of the Convention, as to be fixed by Article 56.

If any State avails itself of this right, awkward questions will arise. At the present juncture, they can only be settled by formulae which would be both highly complicated and highly theoretical. It seems better not to settle them at all, but to defer consideration to the problematical day when an actual case arises.

The Preparatory Commission could only establish a draft Convention, or it would perhaps be more accurate to say a collection of rules, to form the framework of the future Convention.

In the reservations which have been reproduced in this report, certain delegates expressed the view that, even within those limits, the results were disappointing. The great majority of the Commission, however, so far from sharing this attitude, regards what has been done as marking an important advance on the path of disarmament.

Be that as it may, it will be for the Conference not only to decide as to the final adoption of the draft that will be laid before it, but also to define its practical scope by fixing in figures the extent of the undertakings it involves.

This delicate and complicated task can only be successfully discharged on certain conditions, first and foremost among which we must place the thorough and systematic preparation of the Conference itself. The German delegation proposed that the Preparatory Commission should ask the various Governments, with this object in view, to furnish detailed particulars of the present position of their armaments. The Commission welcomed the spirit in which this suggestion was made, but felt that certain correctives must be supplied. In the first place, it held that, as the preparation of the Conference was a matter for the Council of the League, it was for the Council to take the necessary steps to that end. It also regarded the German proposal as too restricted. Indeed, the preliminary work of study and investigation which will have to be done cannot be limited to scheduling existing armaments. It will have to cover every factor, technical or otherwise, which may help to inform the Conference, and to justify such concrete proposals as the Governments may lay before it.

The Commission further decided to ask the Council of the League to fix the date of the Conference at its next session. The German delegation had proposed that a definite date (Thursday, November 5th) should be recommended. The Commission felt that it would be exceeding its sphere by doing this. It is, of course, anxious that the utmost despatch compatible with practical necessities should be employed; but it took the view that the Council, with which it rests to fix the date, was the only authority qualified to weigh the various factors that must be taken into consideration.

While the final result depends in part on the preparatory work that has still to be done, it also depends in large measure on the atmosphere that will prevail during the subsequent proceedings. In such a matter, mutual confidence among peoples is an essential condition of progress. It is our hope that that mutual confidence will be strengthened, and will enable the aim to which our efforts have been directed to be completely attained.
ANNEX 19.

REPORT BY THE COMMISSION

I. HISTORICAL ................................................................. 562

II. COMMENTARY ON THE DRAFT CONVENTION.

Article I ................................................................. 567

Part I. — Personnel:
  Chapter A. — Effectives ........................................ 568
  Chapter B. — Period of Service .............................. 571

Part II. — Material:
  Chapter A. — Land Armaments ................................ 571
  Chapter B. — Naval Armaments ................................ 573
  Chapter C. — Air Armaments .................................... 577

Part III. — Budgetary Expenditure ............................... 580

Part IV. — Exchange of Information .............................. 581

Part V. — Chemical Arms ............................................. 583

Part VI. — Miscellaneous Provisions:
  Chapter A. — Permanent Disarmament Commission .......... 585
  Chapter B. — Derogations ......................................... 587
  Chapter C. — Complaints ......................................... 588
  Chapter D. — Final Provisions .................................. 589

III. Appendix. — REPORT TO THE COUNCIL ON THE WORK OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION FOR THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE ........ 593

I. HISTORICAL.

1. The origin of the draft Convention is found in the following resolution adopted on September 25th, 1925, by the Sixth Assembly of the League of Nations:

   "The Assembly,
   "Taking note of the declarations submitted to the Council and the Assembly of the League of Nations in respect of the Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes and of the fact that the said Protocol has not, up to the present, received the ratifications necessary for putting it into operation immediately;
   "Convinced that the most urgent need of the present time is the re-establishment of mutual confidence between nations;
   "Declaring afresh that a war of aggression should be regarded as an international crime:
   "Regards favourably the effort made by certain nations to attain those objects by concluding arbitration conventions and treaties of mutual security conceived in the spirit of the Covenant of the League of Nations and in harmony with the principles of the Protocol (Arbitration, Security, Disarmament);
   "Records the fact that such agreements need not be restricted to a limited area but may be applied to the whole world;
   "Recommends that, after these conventions and treaties have been deposited with the League of Nations, the Council should examine them in order to report to the Seventh Assembly on the progress in general security brought about by such agreements;
   "Undertakes again to work for the establishment of peace by the sure method of arbitration, security and disarmament;
   "And, in conformity with the spirit of Article 8 of the Covenant, requests the Council to make a preparatory study with a view to a Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, in order that, as soon as satisfactory conditions have been assured from the..."
point of view of general security as provided for in Resolution XIV of the Third Assembly, the said Conference may be convened and a general reduction and limitation of armaments may be realised."

2. In pursuance of this decision, the Council requested a Committee of Enquiry, under the chairmanship of M. Paul-Boncour, to submit to it proposals for setting up an organ entrusted to prepare for a conference for the reduction and limitation of armaments. This Committee's conclusions were adopted almost in their entirety by the Council on the report made to it by M. Beneš. This was the origin of the "Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference".

3. The Council naturally felt called upon, not only to draw up regulations for the composition and working of this new organ, but also to determine to some extent the direction of its work. For this purpose, the Council submitted to it the questionnaire—see below—which was based upon suggestions made to the Committee of Enquiry by the representatives of Great Britain, France and Spain.

4. This questionnaire was as follows:

**Question I.**
What is to be understood by the expression "armaments"?

(a) Definition of the various factors—military, economic, geographical, etc.—upon which the power of a country in time of war depends.

(b) Definition and special characteristics of the various factors which constitute the armaments of a country in time of peace; the different categories of armaments—military, naval and air—the methods of recruiting, training, organisations capable of immediate military employment, etc.

**Question II (a).**
Is it practicable to limit the ultimate war strength of a country, or must any measures of disarmament be confined to the peace strength?

**Question II (b).**
What is to be understood by the expression "reduction and limitation of armaments"?
The various forms which reduction or limitation may take in the case of land, sea and air forces; the relative advantages or disadvantages of each of the different forms or methods—for example, the reduction of the larger peace-time units or of their establishment and their equipment, or of any immediately mobilisable forces; the reduction of the length of active service, the reduction of the quantity of military equipment, the reduction of expenditure on national defence, etc.

**Question III.**
By what standards is it possible to measure the armaments of one country against the armaments of another—e.g., numbers, period of service, equipment, expenditure, etc.?

**Question IV.**
Can there be said to be "offensive" and "defensive" armaments?

Is there any method of ascertaining whether a certain force is organised for purely defensive purposes (no matter what use may be made of it in time of war), or whether, on the contrary, it is established in a spirit of aggression?

**Question V (a).**
On what principle will it be possible to draw up a scale of armaments permissible to the various countries, taking into account particularly:

1. Population;
2. Resources;
3. Geographical situation;
4. Length and nature of maritime communications;
5. Density and character of the railways;
6. Vulnerability of the frontiers and of the important vital centres near the frontiers;
7. The time required, varying with different States, to transform peace armaments into war armaments?

**Question VI.**

(a) Is there any device by which civil and military aircraft can be distinguished for purposes of disarmament?

If this is not practicable, how can the value of civil aircraft be computed in estimating the air strength of any country?
(b) Is it possible or desirable to apply the conclusions arrived at in (a) above to parts of aircraft and aircraft engines?

(c) Is it possible to attach military value to commercial fleets in estimating the naval armaments of a country?

Question VII.

Admitting that disarmament depends on security, to what extent is regional disarmament possible in return for regional security? Or is any scheme of disarmament impracticable unless it is general? If regional disarmament is practicable, would it promote or lead up to general disarmament?

5. According to the Council resolution, the Preparatory Commission was to consist of delegates of all States Members of the Council of the League, and invitations to send representatives were also to be addressed to the Governments of Germany, the United States of America, the U.S.S.R., Bulgaria, Finland, the Netherlands, Poland, Roumania, and Yugoslavia. Finally, the Secretary-General of the League of Nations was requested to bring to the notice of all other Powers, together with the questionnaire which was to be placed before the Preparatory Commission, the means placed at their disposal for stating their points of view.

6. The Preparatory Commission met for the first time on May 13th, 1926, and elected as President His Excellency Jonkheer Loudon (Netherlands), and as Vice-Presidents M. Cobbán (Spain) and M. Buero (Uruguay). In consequence of resignations, certain changes had subsequently to be made in the composition of the Bureau. During the sixth and last session, the places of the two Vice-Presidents were filled respectively by M. Politis (Greece) and M. Cobbán (Spain).

7. To provide for the preliminary study of the questions on which it had to give its opinion, the Preparatory Commission decided to appoint two Sub-Commissions, each under the chairmanship of one of its Vice-Presidents.

8. The first—known as Sub-Commission A—was entrusted with the technical examination of military, naval and air questions, and for this purpose split up into sub-committees. It was composed of experts appointed by all the States then represented on the Preparatory Commission; it met three times in 1926, under the chairmanship, first of M. Cobbán, and then of M. Buero, M. de Brouckère, and General de Ceminick. The voluminous report it subsequently submitted to the Commission contained extremely valuable technical observations and detailed replies to the questions referred to it.

9. The second Sub-Commission—known as Sub-Commission B—under the chairmanship of M. Buero, and subsequently of M. Veverka, and with the assistance of the Joint Commission set up by the Council for this purpose, studied the other aspects of this problem.

10. This Commission's deliberations, as did those of Sub-Commission A, furnished valuable material for the Preparatory Commission's work.
from the draft adopted at first reading and aimed at complete and universal disarmament in the immediate future.

14. This draft, referred to the fifth session, was rejected. A further Soviet proposal was, however, then submitted to the Commission providing for partial disarmament on the basis of a fixed percentage of reduction. It was decided to postpone the consideration of this proposal to the next session. This session opened in Geneva on April 15th, 1929.

15. The Commission decided to continue its work on the basis of the 1927 draft, while signifying its readiness, should the Soviet delegation so desire, to annex to the final report the draft Convention submitted by the latter.

16. This decision having been adopted, the Preparatory Commission began to consider at second reading the text framed as a result of the preceding discussions. It had to interrupt this session, however, after having reached agreement on a certain number of points. At that time the naval problem still gave rise to considerable difficulties. Wholly divergent proposals had been put forward in regard to the methods of limitation. The statements of certain Powers more directly concerned in the question, however, gave reason to hope that negotiations would be entered into very shortly with a view to removing these divergencies and to reaching an agreement upon a concerted formula. This hope proved to be justified. Negotiations took place and resulted in the convocation of the London Naval Conference on January 31st, 1930.

17. In these circumstances, the Preparatory Commission considered it wiser to postpone to a later date the completion of its work. Before it adjourned, the German representative, considering the resolutions adopted during the first part of the sixth session, unsatisfactory and likely to impair the value of the draft, declared that he "found himself obliged to dissociate himself definitely from the programme which the majority of the Commission had drawn up and to leave to it henceforth—seeing how its course was being shaped at that moment—the sole responsibility for the preparation of the Conference".

18. As soon as the London Conference had completed its work, it communicated the results to the Preparatory Commission through its President. Subject to a general reservation, an agreement had been reached between the Naval Powers which were the most immediately concerned on a method of limitation; the formula adopted established the principle of limitation by classes, but gave it greater elasticity by allowing, in certain cases, transfers from one class to another.

19. The obstacle which had temporarily brought the work of the Preparatory Commission to a standstill in 1929 having been removed, the President of the Preparatory Commission decided to resume the work of the sixth session. The Eleventh Assembly adopted, with regard to this matter, the following resolution proposed by the Third Committee:

"The Assembly,

"Has noted with satisfaction the results obtained at the London Conference and communicated to it by a letter from the President of that Conference dated April 21st, 1930.

"It considers that these results are of a nature to facilitate a general agreement on the occasion of the next meeting of the Preparatory Commission regarding the methods to be applied in the matter of the reduction and limitation of naval armaments.

"It trusts that negotiations, pursued in a spirit of conciliation and mutual confidence and with the determination to arrive at practical solutions, will make it possible to complete and extend the work of the Naval Conference.

"The Assembly accordingly expresses the conviction that, during its session next November, the Preparatory Commission will be able to finish the drawing up of a preliminary draft Convention and will thus enable the Council to convene, as soon as possible, a Conference on the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments.

"The Assembly decides that the proceedings and the report of the Assembly regarding disarmament shall be forwarded to the Preparatory Commission."

20. The Preparatory Commission therefore met again on November 6th last and was able to conclude the task assigned to it with the co-operation of twenty-seven 1 countries, including Norway and the Irish Free State, who were represented for the first time.

21. The present report is intended to give a concise survey of the results the Commission has achieved. Before analysing them, however, the Commission must outline briefly the results obtained by the Committee on Arbitration and Security, whose terms of reference were merged in those of the Commission.

22. As soon as it set to work, the Preparatory Commission was faced by the problem of international security. This was inevitable, for the connection between this problem and that

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1 Belgium, British Empire, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Irish Free State, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Persia, Poland, Roumania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United States of America, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

The following countries were not represented at the second half of the sixth session of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference: the Argentine, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Uruguay.
of disarmament is obvious. Traces of it are, moreover, to be found in Article 8 of the Covenant, and it became increasingly evident as the work of the League of Nations proceeded.

23. There is no need to recall here the many resolutions in which the Assembly and the Council have emphasised the interdependence of these two factors. It may, however, be appropriate to point out that, at the very time when it invited the Council to set up this Commission, the Sixth Assembly affirmed "the fidelity and unanimity with which the Members of the League" remained attached to the triple object which had always inspired their efforts—namely, arbitration, security and disarmament. The attempts previously made to organise a complete system of mutual assistance had encountered insurmountable obstacles. It was now proposed, not in any sense to abandon the undertaking, but to prepare for its accomplishment on another system of mutual assistance had encountered insurmountable obstacles. It was now proposed, not in any sense to abandon the undertaking, but to prepare for its accomplishment on another plane and "to indicate methods or measures by which an approach might be made to this object, pending the achievement of a general settlement which many consider indispensable ".

24. Two years later, pursuing the same course, the Eighth Assembly requested the Council to give the Preparatory Commission the necessary instructions for the creation of the "Committee on Arbitration and Security". This Committee, which was to consist of representatives of "all the States which have seats on the Commission and are Members of the League of Nations, other States represented on the Commission being invited to sit on it if they so desire ", "... would be placed at the Commission's disposal and its duty would be to consider, on the lines indicated by the Commission, the measures capable of giving all States the guarantees of arbitration and security necessary to enable them to fix the level of their armaments at the lowest possible figures in an international disarmament agreement ".

25. The Eighth Assembly further directed that these measures should be sought at the same time:

"In action by the League of Nations with a view to promoting, generalising and co-ordinating special or collective agreements on arbitration and security;"

"In the systematic preparation of the machinery to be employed by the organs of the League of Nations with a view to enabling the Members of the League to perform their obligations under the various articles of the Covenant;"

"In agreements which the States Members of the League may conclude among themselves, irrespective of their obligations under the Covenant, with a view to making their commitments proportionate to the degree of solidarity of a geographical or other nature existing between them and other States;"

"And, further, in an invitation from the Council to the several States to inform it of the measures which they would be prepared to take, irrespective of their obligations under the Covenant, to support the Council's decisions or recommendations in the event of a conflict breaking out in a given region, each State indicating that, in a particular case, either its whole forces, or a certain part of its military, naval or air forces, could forthwith intervene in the conflict to support the Council's decisions or recommendations."

26. Thus, from the outset, a vast programme of enquiry was outlined for the Committee on Arbitration and Security.

27. The following year (1928), when the Committee had started its work, the Ninth Assembly adopted a new resolution. After recalling that "a close connection exists between international security and the reduction and limitation of armaments" and that "the present conditions of security set up by the Covenant of the League of Nations, by the Treaties of Peace, and in particular by the reductions in the armaments of certain countries under these Treaties, and also by the Locarno Agreements, would allow of the conclusion at the present time of a first General Conventions for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments", it declared that the time had come to conclude a first General Convention for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, which Convention would, moreover, of itself tend to increase international security. It took that opportunity to declare that, after the conclusion of such a Convention, the work relating both to disarmament and to arbitration and security should be pursued "so that, by further steps, armaments may be progressively reduced as the increase of security allows".

28. The Committee on Arbitration and Security, which was set up on November 30th, 1927, under the chairmanship of His Excellence M. Ed. Beneš, Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs, has so far held four sessions. In the present report, no attempt can be made to analyse, even in summary fashion, the enquiries this Committee has undertaken or the practical effect given to them by the Council, the Assembly, and by States Members of the League. A simple reference to the results achieved—to be appreciated by the Conference—is all that can be undertaken here.

29. These results are, first, in the field of the pacific settlement of international disputes, the three model general conventions which the 1928 Assembly decided to combine in a single Act, this being the origin of the "General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes", to which, up to the present, eight States have acceded, thus ensuring its entry into force.

30. In the same connection, come the three model bilateral conventions which the Assembly proposed for the consideration of States, and which have already served as a basis for the drafting of a large number of treaties.
31. Next, there are the “Collective Treaty of Mutual Assistance” and the collective treaty and bilateral treaty of “non-aggression”, the models for which were recommended by the same Assembly.

32. There is the resolution of September 26th, 1928, in which the Assembly recommends that States should accede to the Optional Clause of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, and draws their attention to the elasticity of that clause and to the facilities it offers them. There is the model treaty “to strengthen the means for preventing war” which the Assembly, in a resolution adopted on September 20th, 1928, recommended for consideration by States and the “preliminary draft General Convention” of which the Eleventh Assembly decided to continue the study.

33. There are the studies on Articles 10, 11 and 16 of the Covenant which, on the recommendation of the Assembly, the Council adopted as “a useful piece of work”, providing valuable indications as to the possibilities offered, in time of emergency, by the different articles of the Covenant.

34. There are the resolutions adopted by the Assembly on September 30th, 1930, with a view to ensuring, also at times of emergency, the normal working of the communications of the League of Nations.

35. Finally, there is the Convention on Financial Assistance, which was approved by the same Assembly, and has already been signed by twenty-eight States, its entry into force being dependent on that of the Convention for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments.

II. COMMENTARY ON THE DRAFT CONVENTION.

36. The draft Convention adopted by the Commission preserves the structure of the French and British proposals considered at the third session. It is in six parts, some of which are subdivided into chapters. The numbering of the articles is, however, continuous.

Article I.

37. A first Article of a general character governs the whole Convention and defines its scope:

“The High Contracting Parties undertake to limit and, so far as possible, to reduce their respective armaments as provided in the present Convention.”

38. The form of this article is due to a suggestion of the Drafting Committee, made after the discussion by the Commission of the various sections of the Convention, particularly that relating to naval material.

39. The Commission has therefore recognised the principle laid down by Article 8 of the Covenant, which provides for the reduction of armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety, and the enforcement of international obligations.

40. The representatives of a number of Governments, while accepting the principle of limitation and reduction in the spirit of this article of the Covenant, desired to state that the reduction of all or some of the categories of armaments was not possible for them, their present armaments being far from sufficient to guarantee national safety. This reservation was made in precise form, particularly in relation to naval and air armaments, the latter being scarcely developed in the majority of States.

41. The Turkish delegation reserved its Government’s right to submit to the future Disarmament Conference the proposal it made with regard to standards for the reduction and limitation of armaments, and to require any modification of the text which might be rendered necessary in the event of the adoption of this proposal.¹

42. The German delegation reserved its Government’s right to submit to the future Disarmament Conference any proposals regarding the standards of reduction and limitation of armaments which it might consider likely to promote these aims.²

43. Norway not having taken part in the earlier work of the Commission, in particular the first part of the second reading of the draft Convention, the Norwegian delegate made a general reservation concerning the attitude his Government might adopt at the Conference. The delegate of the Irish Free State made a similar statement.

¹ See Minutes of the Sixth Session (first part), pages 206-208.
² See Minutes of the Sixth Session (first part), pages 203-206.
Chapter A. — Effectives.

Articles 2 and 3.

44. Chapter A of Part I of the draft deals with effectives, which it defines in the following manner in Article 2:

"The average daily effectives in the land, sea and air armed forces and formations organised on a military basis of each of the High Contracting Parties shall not exceed, in each of the categories of effectives defined in the tables annexed to this Chapter, the figure laid down for such Party in the corresponding column of the said tables."

45. This definition of peace-time effectives did not give rise to lengthy discussion, and the interpretation it should receive is made the clearer by the fact that the articles which follow define the scope of the two conceptions which might be open to question.

46. Article 3 lays down that "the average daily effectives are reckoned by dividing the total number of days' duty performed in each year by the number of days in such year". It is thus laid down, clearly and beyond question, that the limitation and reduction of effectives applies only to effectives in service. The Minutes of the meetings contain a number of interesting observations on this fundamental point, which was discussed at each session in greater or lesser detail.

47. At the third session, after simultaneous consideration of the initial proposals of the French and British delegations, the Commission adopted, by a majority, the solution which appears in the text of the draft. The representative of the British Empire, however, reserved his Government's opinion as to the limitation of trained reserves, while the representative of the United States formulated a general reservation in regard to the inclusion of formations organised on a military basis and the exclusion of trained reserves. The German representative made a general reservation with regard to the whole of the chapter, as making no provision for limitation of trained reserves, registered and compelled by law to render military service in case of war, although such trained reserves in countries with the system of conscription represent (in his view) the main body of the personnel in time of war.

48. Some delegations on the other hand, maintained at the first reading that, in view of the great military value attaching to trained reserves, a disarmament convention without limitation or reduction of these reserves would present a serious defect.

49. On the second reading (during the first part of the sixth session) the representatives of Great Britain and the United States withdrew their opposition on the subject of trained reserves for reasons which were expressed then and on subsequent occasions.

50. As regards the effectives of armed forces or formations organised on a military basis at sea, the representatives of the British Empire and the United States stated at the first reading that they only accepted limitation of naval effectives on the conditions of general adoption of this limitation and of a satisfactory agreement being reached in regard to the limitation of vessels of war; these reservations, however, were not maintained at the second reading.

51. It is understood that the armed forces, in the sense of Article 2, include all effectives receiving military training (other than preliminary training) wherever and however given. It is also understood that the effectives in reserve undergoing a period of training are to be included in the calculation of the effectives in service during this period.

52. The Polish delegation expressed some doubt as to the practical results of this method of calculation, but agreed to it on the understanding that there would be an opportunity at the Conference of comparing the various systems of military organisation and arriving at practical conclusions.

Article 4.

53. Article 4 contains the following definitions:

"By formations organised on a military basis shall be understood police forces of all kinds, gendarmerie, Customs officials, forest guards, which, whatever their legal purpose, are, in time of peace, by reason of their staff of officers, establishment, training, armament, equipment, capable of being employed for military purposes without measures of mobilisation, as well as any other organisation complying with the above condition."

54. "By mobilisation, within the meaning of the present article, shall be understood all the measures for the purpose of providing the whole or part of the various corps, services and units with the personnel and material required to pass from a peace-time footing to a war-time footing."
55. The above text takes into account the different views expressed in the course of the discussion.

56. It is understood that the Conference itself will be called upon to decide the condition or conditions to be taken into account in determining whether a particular case comes under the category of "formations organised on a military basis".

57. The definition of mobilisation is so clear and precise that it gave rise to no discussion and requires no comment.

58. The Commission had adopted a text, provisionally designated as Article H, with all the necessary particulars for drawing up the tables provided for in Article 2. The Drafting Committee, while taking account of the rules laid down in Article H for the preparation of these tables, thought it simpler to omit Article H as such. This change of form in no way affects the Commission's previous decisions, and the table should be interpreted in the light of these decisions.

59. The Commission considered that, in order to prevent the number of officers exceeding the legitimate requirements of the several armies, it would be desirable to lay down a special limitation for this category of effectives. There were differences of opinion as to the form of such limitation, certain delegations proposing to lay down a fixed proportion between the number of officers and the total effectives, while others proposed to specify the absolute maximum figures of the average daily effectives for these categories. The Commission adopted the latter standpoint. It also decided, on the proposal of the Italian delegation, that it was desirable to limit the number of professional soldiers of other ranks.

60. When the question arose of practical measures for the application of these principles, certain difficulties became apparent, as a result partly of the differences between the system of voluntary armies and conscript armies, and partly of the differences between the periods of service in the conscript armies.

61. The compromise solution, which the Commission accepted, provides in the case of land forces for the limitation (a) of officers and (b) of other effectives whose effective service exceeds the longest legal period of service in force in the conscript army of any contracting Power at the time of the signature of the Convention. A system of tables of publicity has been drawn up in the case of conscript armies to show the number of men whose service exceeds the legal period fixed in their respective countries, while remaining lower than the maxima period specified under (b).

62. The German delegation proposed that the standard of limitation should be the period of service fixed by the prevailing legislation in each country.

63. As regards naval armaments, limitation will apply to the aggregate figure of effectives (officers, petty officers and men), while the publicity tables will show separately the number of officers and men who have completed more than 5 months of effective active service.

64. As regards air forces, it was not thought possible or desirable to make a distinction between the officers and men, the functions of the two not being as clearly distinguished in air forces as in land and sea forces.

65. The French delegation stated that it could not accept specific limitation of professional soldiers in land or air forces unless provision was made for similar limitation in the case of sea forces.

66. The Commission, after a discussion, in the course of which divergent views were expressed as to the necessity of limiting separately the forces stationed in the home country and the forces stationed overseas, adopted a compromise under which the contracting parties are to limit, in the case of their land forces, the maximum armed forces stationed in the home country and the maximum total of their armed forces. The table showing the maximum of armed forces stationed overseas is to be optional. Similarly, in the case of air armaments, the table showing the maximum of armed forces stationed in the home country is to be optional.

67. In the light of the above explanations, the effect of the tables attached to Chapter A of Part I appears readily comprehensible.

68. Table I is to fix the maximum total daily effectives in peace-time service in the land armed forces stationed in the home country in the case of each contracting party. This table will also show separately the officers and other effectives who have completed a number of months of service to be determined by the Conference, on the basis of the longest period of service in force in the conscript army of any contracting party at the time of the signature of the Convention.

* * *

1 The question was considered whether it would not be well to add to the expression "service" some qualifying adjective such as "active", "actual" or "with the colours". But as the rules of limitation were based on the idea of average daily effectives, which in its turn was based on the idea of the number of actual "days' duty" on military service, it was finally decided that such a qualifying adjective was unnecessary.
Convention. Table II, which is "optional", gives the same particulars in the case of the maximum land armed forces stationed overseas. Table III, on the same lines as Tables I and II, will fix the total maximum land armed forces.

69. Tables IV and V are to give in the same way particulars of formations organised on a military basis stationed respectively in the home country and overseas.

70. In the case of sea forces, the Commission proposes two tables, numbered VI and VII, which are to fix in the case of each contracting party the figures of the total maximum effectives of the sea armed forces (Table VI) and the total effectives of the sea formations organised on a military basis (Table VII). These figures are to include officers, petty officers and men.

71. Tables VIII to XII inclusive are concerned with the limitation of the effectives of air forces. Tables VIII and IX are optional: they are to contain, Table VIII, the figures of the air armed forces stationed in the home country, and Table IX the air armed forces stationed overseas. Table X, which is obligatory, is to fix, like the two preceding tables, first the total effectives of the air forces of each contracting party, and, secondly, the effectives who have completed more than 2 months of service. Tables XI and XII are to fix similar figures for formations organised on a military basis. The arrangement of these tables is similar at all points to that of Tables VIII, IX and X.

72. A number of reservations were made in regard to the tables attached to Part I, Chapter A.

73. In regard to Tables I, II and III, the German and Italian delegations made the following statement:

"In connection with the distinction between the effectives and armaments of the home country and those stationed overseas, the German and Italian delegations formulated a general reservation to the effect that, for the purposes of the reduction and limitation of armaments, the importance of the forces and materials which one contracting party assigns to its overseas territories may vary, in relation to another contracting party, by reason of the geographical situation of its territory in relation to the home territories of the two contracting parties. Consequently, one contracting party will have every reason to regard the overseas forces of another contracting party as forming part of the latter's home forces, if the proximity of the overseas territories in relation to the home territories of the two parties justifies such an assumption."

74. The German delegation again draws attention to this reservation in connection with Tables V, IX and XII.

75. As regards Tables I, II and III, the Italian delegation considers that there should be added to the three columns (b), the words "or officials assimilated to officers", and to the three columns (c), after the words "other soldiers" the words: "or officials, employees or agents assimilated to soldiers".

76. As regards Tables VIII, IX and X, the Italian delegation is of opinion that no distinction should be made between armed air forces stationed in the home country and armed air forces stationed overseas.

77. The Turkish delegation has made reservations regarding the tables annexed to Chapter A of Part I, both as regards the optional indication of land and air forces stationed overseas (Tables II and IX) and as regards the non-indication of the maximum forces stationed in each of the overseas territories (Tables II, V and IX).

78. As regards this last point, the majority of the Commission was of opinion that it was not possible in practice to prescribe a separate limitation of this kind in an international convention.

79. The German delegation has made the following general reservation on the whole of Part I and the annexed table:

"The stipulations do not provide—either directly or by a reduction in the number of the annual contingent, or by a strict determination of the period of active service—for a reduction or limitation of trained reserves who, after having completed their service with the colours, continue to be registered and liable by law for military service, notwithstanding the fact that these reserves, though they do not exist in professional armies in the strict sense of the term, constitute the main body of the personnel in countries possessing conscript armies. Moreover, the stipulations do not provide for any method whereby the effectives of conscript armies serving with the colours in reserve, and professional effectives, whose military value is naturally not capable of comparison, could be reduced to comparable units of calculation."
CHAPTER B. — PERIOD OF SERVICE.

80. Chapter B of Part I relates to the limitation of the period of service. Its provisions apply—as is specifically stated in Article 5—only to effectives recruited by conscription.

81. Two different systems were proposed for this purpose: under one of them each contracting party would accept a special figure; under the other the Conference would fix a single maximum limit. The Commission was of opinion that the first system should be taken as a basis, whilst, at the same time, a general maximum should be prescribed. Several delegations pointed out that this general maximum would not be satisfactory unless it were fixed at a very moderate figure. It is understood that the contracting parties will have the option to accept, in respect of special limitations affecting them individually, different figures, not only for land, sea and air effectives, but also for the different services (infantry, artillery, etc.) of their armed forces. Since the contracting parties undertake not to exceed the figures accepted by each of them, they will always be at liberty to reduce this period, which must be regarded as a maximum.

82. These principles are set forth in Articles 6 and 7; but, on the proposal of the Belgian delegation, an important exception was provided for in Article 8. This exception is intended to obviate the disadvantage that would ensure, in the case of certain countries which have the conscript system, from a falling-off in the number of births as a consequence of the last war. This exception, which was unanimously agreed to, will allow the limits for the period of service under Article 6 to be exceeded “in so far as, owing to a falling-off in the number of births, such an increase may be necessary to enable the maximum total number of effectives fixed by the tables annexed to Chapter A of this Part” to be reached. Any contracting parties availing themselves of this option should immediately notify the measures they feel bound to take, together with reasons in support thereof, to the other contracting parties, and to the Permanent Disarmament Commission, to be set up under Chapter VI of the Convention.

83. Article 9 provides that “in any case the total period of service shall not exceed . . . months”. As regards this limitation, which is applicable to all contracting parties and represents a maximum that may not be exceeded, the Spanish delegation pointed out (and this view was accepted by the Commission) that the maximum fixed in accordance with this article cannot in any way effect, even indirectly, the figures given in the table provided for in Article 2, which are allowed to each contracting party without any restriction or reservation whatever.

84. During the discussion of the period of service, the German delegation submitted a proposal to the effect that the annual contingent should be limited, as well as the period of service. The Commission rejected this amendment by twelve votes to six with certain abstentions.

PART II. — MATERIAL.

85. On this point, as already mentioned, the Commission encountered difficulties which it was unable to surmount either at its third session or even after the second reading of the preliminary draft Convention during the first part of the sixth and last session.

CHAPTER A. — LAND ARMAMENTS.

86. As regards land armaments, the original position was as follows:

A proposal was made by the German delegation for the limitation of material in service and in reserve, in accordance with a table fixing under separate headings the maximum number of arms and the quantity of ammunition for the various arms. The French preliminary draft provided only for the limitation of the total expenditure on the upkeep, purchase and manufacture of war material in the strict sense of the term, with the option of carrying forward sums not expended during one year.

87. The Japanese and Italian representatives formally opposed the first method, while the United States delegation made a general reservation on account of the omission of any provisions regarding the limitation of material of the land and air forces, whether in service or in reserve. Despite the fact that this reservation was withdrawn at the second reading, opinion was divided as to the method of limiting material for land forces.

1 As regards this chapter, see the German delegation’s general reservation concerning Part I.
2 The Chinese delegation has, on many occasions, proposed the abolition of the conscription system. It has reserved the right to raise this question again at the Conference.
3 In order to take into account the frequent cases in which “service” is performed in several separate periods often of short duration, the word “months” was substituted for the word “years” of service.
4 See reservation by the German delegation, paragraph 79.
88. The following methods were considered:

1. Application of the fullest possible publicity to expenditure on land material;
2. Limitation of expenditure on material;
3. Direct limitation of material by categories;
4. Simultaneous application of the two last-named limitations, either separately or in combination;
5. Application of any one of these methods at the choice of the Contracting parties.

89. The Commission unanimously approved the principle that there should be the fullest possible interchange of information respecting armaments between the parties to the proposed Convention. It also recorded the unanimous desire of the members of the Commission to find some method which would provide for the limitation of war material in a more precise manner than can be achieved by publicity alone.

90. The result of the vote taken on the principle of direct limitation as proposed by the German delegation was as follows: nine votes for, nine votes against, and seven abstentions.

91. On a vote being taken on the principle of the simultaneous employment of the two methods proposed by the Italian delegation, nine members of the Commission declared themselves in favour of the system, eleven against, and five abstained from voting.

92. The principle of indirect limitation as set forth in Article 10 was adopted by sixteen votes to three, with six abstentions.

93. As regards the application of this principle the Commission passed the following resolution:

"I. With a view to limiting land material by limiting expenditure on its purchase, manufacture and upkeep, the Preparatory Commission requests its President to instruct the Committee of Experts on Budgetary questions to enquire into the means by which such limitation could be carried out, paying special attention to:

(a) The necessity of limiting all the expenditure in question;
(b) The variety of ways in which budgets are presented and discussed in different countries;
(c) The adjustment of the proposed method of limitation to possible fluctuations in the purchasing power of different currencies, especially with regard to the cost of war material.
(d) The conditions in which credits for one financial year might be carried over to the following year or years.

II. In order that the Governments may be able, before the Conference meets, to come to a decision on this point, the experts' report should be transmitted to them in good time by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations."

94. The American delegation stated that, whereas they were unable to accept budgetary limitation in any form as far as the United States was concerned (see American reservations, paragraphs Nos. 171 and 181), they did not wish their attitude to constitute an obstacle to agreement on the part of other Powers. They therefore stated that they were prepared to apply, as far as they were themselves concerned, direct limitation instead of indirect limitation, provided that some practical budgetary method were generally agreed upon, which would be sufficiently detailed and precise to constitute an effective means of limitation.

95. The Spanish delegation associated itself with this point of view, but observed that the direct limitation would have to be confined to material in service.

96. The Japanese delegation, while supporting the method of indirect limitation, nevertheless expressed the view that the adoption of this method did not necessarily exclude recourse to direct limitation in the case of a certain number of countries which cannot accept indirect limitation. But the number of such countries in this case should be strictly limited.

97. Several delegations stated that, in the application of the system of indirect limitation, account must be taken of the circumstances peculiar to each State. They urged that preferential treatment should be granted to non-industrial countries or countries whose budgets were below a figure to be fixed by the Conference.

98. The first of these arguments was put with particular clearness by the Greek delegate, who spoke as follows:

"It seems essential, in order to determine the budgetary limit for each country, to take into account the particular circumstances of each country, its economic circumstances, its standard of living, the cost of labour there, and, above all, its position as regards material at the time of signing the Convention. Obviously, if the material a country possessed at that time were worn out or incomplete; if, consequently, it were in a clear position of inferiority as compared with the other signatory States, that would constitute a factor to be taken into account in fixing the budgetary limit binding upon that country."
Apart from the reservation in the footnote to the article, the Turkish delegation made its acceptance of any budgetary limitation of material and armaments expressly conditional upon account being taken—as also with any other method of limitation—of the special position of countries in which industry is not adequately developed.

The Norwegian delegation observed that the possibility of some combination of direct and indirect methods by budgetary means had not been precluded.

The British delegation were ready to admit that direct limitation may, in theory, be the most effective and the most obvious system, but feared that this method of limitation would, in practice, prove unsatisfactory. Even if adequate definitions and categories could be established, it would be impossible to impose on all countries such a system of verification and control as to give the assurance that the limitation would be properly observed. The British delegation had hoped that it might be possible to limit directly the larger weapons such as big guns and tanks, but here again similar difficulties would be encountered. They would be prepared to accept any practical scheme for direct limitation of the more important weapons that would offer any prospect of general acceptance and reasonable effectiveness. It may be that the Governments at the Disarmament Conference will be able to find such a scheme. In the circumstances, the British delegation advocated the adoption of the indirect method of budgetary limitation. The British delegation recognise that such a method is not so complete; but, so far as it goes, it is, they feel, more effective and more reliable. Budgetary expenditure, in all the more important countries, is subject to a number of checks and controls, and cannot to any serious extent be evaded. Moreover, it has the additional advantage that it may serve to arrest competition in the development and perfection of weapons.”

CHAPTER B. NAVAL ARMS.

At the third session of the Preparatory Commission, two opposite schemes for the limitation of naval armaments were submitted: the British draft provided for the limitation of the tonnage, and of the number of vessels to be allowed to each of the High Contracting Parties; in each of the categories to be specified; the Italian delegation could only agree to the limitation of total (global) tonnage which each High Contracting Party would undertake not to exceed and which it might allocate and arrange in the way best suited to its national interests, provided it communicated to the Secretariat of the League of Nations, at least six months before the laying down of the keel, the characteristics of each warship it intended to construct.

The French delegation, whose views were much nearer to those of the Italian delegation than to those of the British delegation after having first submitted a two-column table indicating in Column I the tonnage required for the security and defence of its national interests, and in column II the tonnage which should be reached before the expiration of the Convention, later, in an attempt at conciliation, proposed a three-column table, the figures in the columns indicating for each High Contracting Party: (a) the total (global) tonnage it considered indispensable for its security and the defence of its national interests; (b) the total (global) tonnage it considered itself obliged to attain before the expiration of the Convention; (c) the manner in which it proposed to distribute, in total (global) tonnages for each category, the whole total (global) tonnage indicated by it in the previous column.

Four categories were provided: capital ships, aircraft-carryers, surface vessels of less than 10,000 tons, and submarines, with the power of transfer between categories when the High Contracting Party concerned considered this to be indispensable, provided that High Contracting Party informed the Secretariat of the League of Nations of the changes made in its allocation of its total (global) tonnage one year at least before laying down the keels of the tonnage to be transferred.

In spite of a reassuring statement made by the United States representative to the Preparatory Commission at the beginning of its sixth session in April 1929, the discussion of the naval problem was deferred. In view of the agreement reached at the London Naval Conference, the discussion was resumed in the second part of the same session, on the basis of a proposal submitted by the delegations of seven countries (United States, Great Britain, Canada, France, Irish Free State, Japan and Italy) which submitted a new text for almost all the articles in this
section. By adopting this text in its main outline, the Commission was able to overcome the
difficulties which had previously arisen, owing chiefly to the presence of two conflicting systems of
limitation—i.e., limitation of total (global) tonnage and limitation by categories.

108. The Italian delegation made a general reservation to the effect that the Italian Govern-
ment could not finally agree to any specific method before all the Powers had agreed on the
proportions and the levels of maximum tonnage.

109. The German delegation made a reservation in view of the great value of non-floating
material, on the ground that the latter—unlike floating material—would not be subject to any
direct limitation by specific articles and by numbers, and would only be affected indirectly by
limitation by expenditure. With regard to the latter, the German delegation reserved its opinion
until it had studied the report of the Committee of Budgetary Experts.

110. In conformity with the general principles it has followed, the Commission has not
proposed to the Conference any figures for tonnage, etc., in the articles and annexes of the Draft
Convention. The figures set out therein have been inserted merely as an illustration; they are
similar to those given in the Washington and London Treaties. It should be observed here
that, in several cases, delegations proposed other figures to the Commission or reserved the right
to do so when the Conference meets.

Articles II, 12 and 13.

111. These three articles must be regarded as a single whole, embodying the following
system of limitation:

(I) Limitation of the total (global) tonnage of each High Contracting Party (Article II),
with the exception of the tonnage of certain vessels referred to in Annexes I and II.
(2) Distribution of total (global) tonnage (Article 12);
(3) Power of transferring tonnage from one category to another (Article 13).

112. The Italian delegation proposed that Articles 11 and 12 should be replaced by a single
Article worded as follows:

“The limitation of naval armaments, accepted by each of the High Contracting Parties, is indicated in the following table . . .”

in the form of Table II of the text, Table I being omitted.

Article II.

113. The Chinese, Spanish, Persian, Roumanian and Yugoslav delegations observed that
it should be understood that the particulars of total (global) tonnage inserted by the High
Contracting Parties in Table I would not be in any way binding on their countries even as a
precedent after the expiration of the Convention.

114. The possibility was considered of providing two tables in the Convention, one to
indicate the total (global) tonnage which each High Contracting Party regarded as indispensable
for guaranteeing its safety and national interests, the other to show the figures of the total (global)
tonnage to be completed before the expiration of the Convention. In order to give prominence
to this idea, the Commission agreed, at the request of the Spanish delegate, to alter the wording
of the first article proposed by the Powers signatory to the London Naval Treaty. This explains
the meaning of the sentence: “Throughout the duration of the present Convention . . .”

115. Similarly, the Spanish delegation opposed a Soviet proposal to the effect that the
limitation of naval forces should involve a reduction for all countries. The Commission finally
adopted the principle of such a reduction, but with the addition of the words “so far as possible”.
Since the same idea had been accepted in respect of the other armaments, it was thought preferable
to embody it in a single clause which should govern the whole Convention. This—as has been
pointed out—is the object of the first article of the present Draft Convention.

116. The Yugoslav delegate emphasised the difference between recently created countries
at present engaged in preparing a minimum naval programme compatible with their national
security, and countries having a maritime history and tradition and possessing a complete
fleet. The figure of the total (global) tonnage to be inserted in Table I would, for the former
countries, represent only the first stage in the execution of their minimum programme,
whereas for the latter, the figure will really indicate their maximum naval forces in the present
state of international relations. In view of this essential difference, the Yugoslav delegation
reserved the right to request at the Conference that recently created countries, which are obliged to
distribute their expenditure for the construction of a minimum tonnage compatible with their
national security over a number of years exceeding the duration of the Convention, should be
accorded the right to mention separately, within the limits of the agreed total (global) tonnage,
what portion of their programme they intended to carry out during the period of the Convention.
Similarly, if, under Article 57 of the draft Convention, the Convention remained in force for a
further period, such prolongation should not debar the above-mentioned countries from continuing the execution of their naval programme within the limits of the agreed tonnage.

The Finnish delegate associated himself with this reservation.

Articles 12 and 13.

117. The Preparatory Commission’s discussions on these articles were directed mainly towards rendering the proposed system of limitation applicable to navies of a small tonnage. With this object the Commission unanimously adopted the rules below, which appear as the introduction to Table III:

1. Account must be taken of the special circumstances of each Power, and of the classes of ships involved in the transfer.
2. Powers whose total tonnage does not exceed 100,000 tons ¹ will have full freedom of transfer as regards surface ships.
3. As regards the other Powers, the amount of the transfer should vary in inverse ratio to the amount of the total (global) tonnage of each of them.

This Table will be prepared or filled in at the Conference; but the Commission desires to state that it regards the application of the rules proposed as an integral part of the system on which Articles 11-13 are based.

On this subject the following statements should be noted:

118. The representative of the British Empire stated:

"I am glad to be able to inform the Commission that I am now authorised to accept the three proposed rules in Table III of the Naval Clauses. In doing so, I should like to make it clear that I regard the first rule as governing the other two—I understand that was why it was put first—that is to say, that though rules 2 and 3 establish certain important principles, yet their application must in the last report depend to some extent upon the considerations set out in Rule 1. It is, of course, understood that in saying this I am dealing solely with the question of transfer and not suggesting that any limit can be put on the right of any Power to ask the Disarmament Conference for any class of ship as part of its navy."

119. The Swedish delegate spoke in the following terms:

"The Swedish delegation is glad to learn from Viscount Cecil’s statement that the British Government approves the text of Table III. "I wish to take this opportunity of saying that the Swedish delegation cannot accept any interpretation which might weaken the guarantees obtained by the Powers possessing fleets of small tonnage through the inclusion of the three principles in Table III as compensation for their acceptance of a large number of rules derived from the Treaties of Washington and London."

120. The representatives of Yugoslavia, Greece, Roumania, Turkey and Poland gave this statement their unqualified approval.

121. The Norwegian representative spoke to the same effect, adding that his country would certainly claim the utmost freedom of transfer at the Conference. The Chinese representative agreed with this view.

122. The Finnish delegate stated that he would like the three rules to be interpreted on a footing of equality; none of them should be regarded as taking precedence over the others.

123. The United States representative explained that, in accepting the three rules, which were drawn up as a compromise text, his delegation assumed that the application of Rule 3, Table III, was not intended to apply to Powers which are signatories of the Washington and London Treaties.

124. The Italian delegate spoke as follows.

"Like the British delegation, we consider that the basic criterion for the application of transfers should be that which was enunciated in principle No. 1. When this principle has to be applied in practice, we should make no difficulty in according complete liberty of transfer from the class of submarines to that of light surface vessels—e.g. destroyers and small cruisers.

"On the other hand, I desire to state now that we should oppose transfers in the opposite direction—that is to say, from the class of light surface vessels to that of submarines."

125. This statement was formally opposed by the Spanish delegate, who pointed out that the text in question represented a compromise and had been adopted without any reservation other than that of the British delegation.

126. The Netherlands delegate also pointed out that, if they made the second rule adopted subordinate to the first, they would modify the scope of the system and in that connection he made a formal reservation.

¹ This figure is given as an illustration.
Article 14.

127. The Soviet delegation proposed that the tonnage limit for capital ships should be fixed at 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons), and the limit for gun calibres at 12 inches (304.8 mm.).

128. Several delegations recommended that the Conference should either abolish capital ships altogether or should reduce the maximum tonnage of their standard displacement.

129. The Commission confined itself, however, to inserting—but by way of illustration only—the figures given in the text proposed by the signatory Powers of the Washington Treaty, fixing the tonnage limit for capital ships at 35,000 tons (35,560 metric tons) and the limit for the calibre of their guns at 16 inches (406 mm.).

130. The other articles of the draft submitted by the Powers which took part in the London Naval Conference, practically were adopted by the Preparatory Commission without discussion, it being understood that the figures contained in these articles were only given by way of illustration, and that the adoption of these articles in no way involved the adoption of the numerical data, which might be replaced by other figures.

Article 15.

131. The Spanish delegation, however, made a reservation regarding the second paragraph of Article 15, which provides for the limitation of the calibre of guns carried by aircraft-carriers whose tonnage does not exceed 10,000 tons. The Spanish delegation considered that certain navies which, for reasons of economy, were compelled to build ships not corresponding exactly to any of the classes specified in Annex III Definitions to Chapter B, Part II, could hardly be expected not to arm aircraft-carriers of a lower tonnage with guns of the calibre authorised for aircraft-carriers of the heavier tonnage mentioned in the first paragraph of Article 15.

Articles 16 and 17.

132. Articles 16 and 17 lay down that the standard displacement and the guns of submarines shall be limited and that no vessel of war exceeding the limits as to displacement or armament prescribed by the Convention shall be acquired by, or constructed by, for, or within the jurisdiction of any of the High Contracting Parties.

Article 18.

133. Article 18 contains a reference to Annex IV of Chapter B, Part II, regarding the rules with which the High Contracting Parties must comply in the matter of the replacement of vessels of war. Annexes IV (Rules for Replacement) and V (Rules for Disposal), mentioned in Article 22, reproduce the corresponding provisions of the London Naval Treaty.

Article 19.

134. Article 19 gave rise to a short discussion. This Article, which provides that no preparation shall be made in merchant ships for the installation of warlike armaments for the purpose of converting such ships into vessels of war, nevertheless authorises the stiffening of decks for the mounting of guns not exceeding 6.1 inches (155 millimetres) in calibre. This exception to the rule as stated was finally adopted. The Japanese delegation, however, reserved the right to raise the question of the limitation of aircraft equipment on merchant vessels, possibly at the Conference itself. The Soviet delegation emphasised the importance of laying down that no preparations shall be made in merchant ships with a view to converting such ships in wartime into fighting units.

135. The following Articles of the draft were adopted without discussion:

(1) Article 20, prohibiting any High Contracting Party engaged in war from using as a vessel of war any vessel of war which may be under construction within its jurisdiction for any other Power or which may have been constructed within its jurisdiction for another Power and not delivered.

(2) Article 21, prohibiting any High Contracting Party from disposing of any vessel of war in such a manner that such vessel may become a vessel of war in the navy of any foreign Power.

(3) Article 22, disposal of vessels of war surplus to the tonnage figures allowed by the present Convention.

(4) Article 23, authorising the retention of existing ships used as stationary training establishments or hulks.

Article 24.

136. On the proposal of the British delegation, the Commission adopted Article 24, providing for the limitation of the annual expenditure on the war material of naval armaments on lines similar to the limitation of material for land armaments prescribed in Article 10. The forms of this limitation are to be studied by the Committee of Budgetary Experts.
137. Certain delegations objected to the introduction of indirect limitation of naval material in addition to its direct limitation as provided for in the other articles of this Chapter.

138. The American delegation repeated its general reservation on the subject of budgetary limitation.

139. The French delegation does not see its way to accept the special limitation of expenditure on upkeep, purchase and manufacture of war material for naval armaments. Apart from the technical difficulties, it observes that the limitation of naval material under satisfactory conditions is assured by the direct limitation of floating material, as well as indirectly by the limitation of the aggregate expenditure on armaments.

140. The Japanese delegation also made a reservation in the same sense.

141. The German delegation reserves its opinion until it has studied the report of the Committee of Budgetary Experts.

142. The British and Italian delegations explained that their acceptance of this article depended on the attitude finally adopted by other maritime Powers.

143. A note inserted in the Draft Convention (after Article 24) quotes two Articles of the London Naval Treaty as examples of supplementary restrictions which certain High Contracting Parties might be prepared to accept. It is understood that these articles, which are binding solely upon the signatories of Part III of the London Treaty, are only quoted by way of example, the Commission not having expressed any view in regard to them. The representatives of Greece and Spain, however, have made a formal reservation in regard to the possibility of these supplementary restrictions being applied.

144. The Commission attached several Tables to Chapter B. Table I will have the figures of global tonnage allocated to each High Contracting Party. Table II will serve to show the distribution of such tonnage between the categories defined in Annex III in accordance with the scheme fixed in London. A special subdivision has, however, been admitted in the class of capital ships for those High Contracting Parties which have no capital ship of a standard displacement exceeding 8,000 tons. The tables referred to in these two articles will contain the figures allocated to each contracting party. As regards the aeroplanes of the armed forces (Table I) and those of the formations organised on a military basis (Table II) and dirigibles (Table III—Dirigibles of the armed forces, and Table IV—Dirigibles of the formations organised on a military basis), there are certain differences in the make-up of the tables. The two tables

1 As regards Table II, it should be noted that the High Contracting Parties non-signatories of Part III of the Treaty of London have the option of including cruisers of subdivision (ii) and destroyers in a single category.
relating to the armed forces (Tables I and III) contain an obligatory column for the total of the aeroplanes and dirigibles respectively, and three optional columns for the aeroplanes or dirigibles stationed in the home country, overseas or in aircraft-carriers. In the case of aeroplanes and dirigibles respectively, and three optional columns for the aeroplanes or dirigibles stationed in the home country, overseas or in aircraft-carriers. In the case of dirigibles, the figures will show first the number and secondly the total horse-power. In the case of dirigibles, there will be additional figures showing the total volume. The tables with regard to the formations organised on a military basis (Table II—Aeroplanes, and Table IV—Dirigibles) have the same columns and the same particulars as the others, without column (d) (Tables I and III), which is irrelevant in the case of formations organised on a military basis.

Article 27.

151. It should be noted in the case of this article that the British and Canadian delegations consider that it is impracticable to find any standard of horse-power measurement that would afford a satisfactory basis of limitation.

152. The French delegation had proposed at the first reading to measure horse-power according to the rules laid down by the International Air Navigation Commission. These rules are as follows:

“The power of an engine is the average power that the engine generates during two trials of one hour each during which it runs without stopping at a pressure of 760 millimetres of mercury in dry air and at a temperature of 15°C. The engine power will be measured in horse-power of 75 kilogramme-metres a second and will be expressed to the nearest lower horse-power for engines not exceeding 50 horse-power within 5 horse-power for engines between 50 and 200 horse-power and within 10 horse-power for engines exceeding 200 horse-power.”

153. The delegation of the United States expressed the view that, in the case of a subject on which technical methods change with great rapidity, it was not desirable to adopt a method at the present time which might not be acceptable by the time the Conference meets.

154. The Commission accepted this standpoint, and decided not to propose particular rules. The Commission is, however, of opinion that it is desirable for the Council to entrust to experts the preparatory studies required for the laying down of such rules, and that such rules should be communicated to the Governments, which might be invited to accept them as a preliminary basis for calculating the figures to be inserted in the table.

155. The German delegation makes a reservation of a general character in regard to Tables Ic, IIc, IIIc, IVc, attached to Chapter C of Part II. This reservation is to the following effect: for the purposes of reduction of armaments, the material which a contracting party may assign to its oversea territories may be of varying importance in relation to another contracting party by reason of the geographical situation of its territories in relation to the home country territories of the two parties. One contracting party will therefore have every reason to regard the oversea material of another contracting party as forming part of the home country material of the latter, when such an assumption is justified by the proximity of the oversea territories in relation to the home territories of the two parties.

156. The Turkish delegation repeated in regard to the tables attached to Chapter C the reservation it had made before (see paragraph 77 above) in regard to the tables in Part I (Chapter A).

Article 28.

157. Article 28 deals with the interesting problem of the relation between civil and military aviation. It makes provision for prohibitions and obligations to be imposed on the contracting parties, with a view to avoiding the danger involved in prescribing the embodiment of military features in the construction of civil aeroplanes, and with a view to encouraging the independent development of purely civil aviation. It is not superfluous to reproduce the somewhat complicated text of Article 28:

“1. The High Contracting Parties shall refrain from prescribing the embodiment of military features in the construction of civil aviation material, so that this material may be constructed for purely civil purposes, more particularly with a view to providing the greatest possible measure of security and the most economic return. No preparations shall be made in civil aircraft in time of peace for the installation of warlike armaments for the purpose of converting such aircraft into military aircraft.

1 The Italian delegation called attention to the reservation presented by it with reference to the tables annexed to Part I, Chapter A (see paragraph 73 above).

2 The Commission, in the course of its proceedings, examined on several occasions the problem of the relations between civil and military aviation.

The draft Convention submitted on first reading contained the following article:

“The limitations laid down are accepted by each High Contracting Party in the light of the present development of civil aviation in other countries.”

On the second reading, the Commission was of opinion that as this article simply noted a de facto situation it was not necessary to retain it in the draft Convention, and decided that it would be sufficient to mention in the report that various delegations reserved the right to bring the whole question of civil aviation before the Conference.
2. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to require civil aviation enterprises
to employ personnel specially trained for military purposes. They undertake to authorise
only as a provisional and temporary measure the seconding of personnel to, and the
employment of military aviation material in, civil aviation undertakings. Any such
personnel or military material which may thus be employed in civil aviation of whatever
nature shall be included in the limitation applicable to the High Contracting Party con-
cerned in virtue of Part I, or Articles 25 and 26 of the present Convention, as the case
may be.

3. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to subsidise, directly or indirectly,
air lines principally established for military purposes instead of being established for
economic, administrative or social purposes.

4. The High Contracting Parties undertake to encourage as far as possible the
conclusion of economic agreements between civil aviation undertakings in the different
countries and to confer together to this end.”

158. This article was drafted after the work of the Special Committee of Experts on
Civil Aviation. The Preparatory Commission agreed with the Committee of Experts that the
Convention should avoid any provision capable of obstructing the development of civil
aviation; but it was of opinion that all efforts should be directed towards differentiating
more and more definitely between civil and military aviation, and that Governments should
be prevented from interfering in civil aviation undertakings in order to divert them from
purely civil objects.

159. The Soviet delegation submitted the following amendment in the course of the
discussion:

“Any adaptation of civil aviation material to the establishment of armaments or
to military uses is prohibited.”

Under the terms of this amendment, the Governments would be bound to take steps to
prevent the construction for military purposes, or the adaptation to military purposes, of
aircraft, whether constructed by, or belonging to, private companies or private persons.

160. It should be noted that the text of the article approved by the Commission does
not bind the Governments to impose restrictions on the private manufacture or adaptation
of civil aircraft to purposes of war, but only prohibits them from encouraging such adaptation.

161. An amendment was submitted to the Commission by the Canadian delegation
to delete paragraph 2 of Article 28 and to substitute the following:

“Personnel seconded to, and military material employed in, civil aviation, whether
Government or commercial, shall be counted in the agreed quota.”

The effects of this amendment would have been to set out clearly that all seconded
personnel and machines would be counted in the quota allotted to each State, and also to
eliminate the temporary and provisional character of seconding.

162. The Commission, while appreciating the special circumstances of Canada, was not
prepared to recede from the general rule to which it had given its approval—namely, that
seconding should be only of a provisional and temporary character. It was thought that a
solution of the difficulty might be found in the establishment of an exceptional arrangement,
the form of which would have to be settled by the Conference. The Commission, while
disallowing the deletion of the second sentence of paragraph 2 of Article 28, accepted
unanimously the insertion of the Canadian amendment by which all seconded personnel and
material should be included in the quota allotted to each State.

163. The Canadian delegation subsequently submitted a reservation in regard to the
“temporary and provisional” character of the seconding of personnel to, and the employment
of military aviation material in, civil aviation undertakings. Canada, because of its special
needs and problems, requires, for the reasons given in the Minutes of December 2nd 1930,
the unrestricted right of seconding, in order to develop its country of vast distances and to
protect its citizens and natural resources.

164. In the course of the discussion on paragraph 3 the British delegation stated that
it must be clearly understood that the proposal did not imply that the Governments
committed themselves to complete internationalisation of aviation, and that on this point
the British Government reserved its entire freedom of action.

* * *

165. The British delegation proposed the insertion of a new article worded as follows:

“Each of the High Contracting Parties agrees to limit its annual expenditure on the
maintenance, purchase and manufacture of war material, for air armaments, to the figures
and under the conditions defined in the Annex to the present Convention.”
The voting on this article was as follows: 5 for; 6 against; 13 abstentions.

166. The British delegation expressed particular regret at the failure of the Commission to adopt a system of budgetary limitation of air material. They felt that the science of aeronautics is still in so early a stage that very great developments in size, cost and destructiveness of military machines are to be apprehended. These developments will in no way be affected by the limitation of the total number of machines, and they fear it is impossible to rely on the limitation of horse-power as a practically effective check. Without budgetary limitation, therefore, they believe that the air arm, potentially the most destructive to civilisation, will be the most free for competitive international development.

167. During the first part of the sixth session the German delegation submitted a proposal to prohibit the launching of weapons of offence of any kind from the air, as also the employment of un piloted aircraft controlled by wireless or otherwise, carrying explosive or incendiary gaseous substances.

168. After a very interesting discussion, this proposal was rejected, five delegations voting in its favour. In the discussion, the German delegate explained that he regarded these methods as essentially offensive, their destructive effects threatening the civilian population. The delegations which did not accept the German proposal stated that they did not thereby imply the authorisation of bombardment from the air of civil populations.

Part III. — Budgetary Expenditure.

Article 29.

169. Upon the proposal of the French delegation the Commission considered at its third session the limitation of the total annual expenditure by budgetary years for the forces stationed in the home country, and the formations organised on a military basis in the home country, as well as the overseas forces, their reinforcements and overseas formations organised on a military basis.

170. On this occasion the delegations of the British Empire, Italy and Japan stated that in their opinion budgetary limitation should be effected solely by means of publicity.

171. The delegations of the United States and Germany made a general reservation regarding the inclusion in the draft Convention of stipulations concerning the limitation of budgetary expenditure.

172. At the sixth session the Commission accepted the principle of the limitation of the total expenditure on land, sea and air forces. In adopting this principle the Commission desired to emphasise that such limitation should be used for checking the growth of the armaments of each country, and not as a method of comparison between one country and another, since the cost and conditions of manufacture vary very much in different countries.

The Preparatory Commission, however, is not submitting any final proposal to the Conference regarding the method of such limitation.

173. Valuable studies have already been made in this field, in particular by the Committee of Budgetary Experts set up by the Preparatory Commission; this Committee held several meetings in 1927. The results of its work—to the value of which the Preparatory Commission desires to pay tribute—are embodied in documents C.P.D. 40 (Provisional Report) and C.P.D. 90. Some delegations thought that it would be desirable to convene this Committee once more so as to enable it to complete its report in the light of the experience acquired during recent years, and taking into account, in particular, the observations made on this subject during the second part of the sixth session of the Preparatory Commission.

174. For this purpose the Commission requested its President to reconstitute the Committee of Budgetary Experts, and to convene it in good time to ensure that its report should reach the Governments as soon as possible so as to enable the latter to take it into consideration when preparing for the Conference. The next session of the Committee of Experts will open on December 11th, 1930.

175. The Commission requested the Committee to study, in particular, the following points:

(a) The necessity of limiting the total expenditure in question;
(b) To take into account the diversity of methods of presentation and discussion of the budgets customary in the various countries;
(c) To adapt the method of limitation contemplated to the possible differences in the purchasing power of the various currencies, with particular reference to the cost of war material;
(d) To determine the conditions under which the carrying forward of credits from one budgetary year to the next year or following years might be effected.

1 See Minutes of the Sixth Session (First Part), pages 85-93.
The Committee of Experts will have to bear these points in mind when it studies the methods of special limitation of land and naval material (Articles 10 and 24).

They will also, in accordance with the resolution adopted on December 6th, have to examine the possibility of a separate limitation of expenditure on land, naval and air forces.

The Soviet delegation proposed the insertion of a new article worded as follows:

"Secret funds intended in a disguised form for extraordinary expenditure on special preparations for war or an increase in armaments shall be excluded from the national budgets."

"In conformity with the above provision, all expenditure for the upkeep of the armed forces of each State shall be shown in a single chapter of the national budget; their full publicity shall be ensured."

Since the Commission agreed as to the desirability of asking the Budgetary Experts to examine the whole problem of the methods of limitation, including that raised by the Soviet delegation, the latter did not press its proposal.

While agreeing to the limitation of budgetary expenditure, several delegations, including the Roumanian delegation, declared that it was essential in this connection to take into account the conditions peculiar to each country—that is to say, economic conditions, the purchasing power of each currency, the industrial development of each country, and in particular its position with regard to war material at the time of the signature of the future Convention. If at that date a country had not yet been able to carry out its minimum defensive programme in regard to certain categories of armaments, and if it possessed only obsolete, worn or incomplete war material, obviously such a State would be in an inferior position in relation to other signatory States more fortunately situated in this respect. These are the factors which will have to be taken into account when the budgetary limit imposed upon the contracting States comes to be laid down.

The American delegation made a general reservation on the subject of budgetary limitation and drew attention to its declaration of November 11th, 1930.

The German delegation made a general reservation regarding this chapter pending the Committee of Budgetary Experts' report.

Part IV. — Exchange of Information.

Part IV of the draft Convention contains nine articles, providing for the drawing up of sixteen tables with a number of columns.

Article 30.

Article 30 provides for the exchange of information each year in regard to the average daily number of effectives reached during the preceding year in the land, sea and air armed forces and formations organised on a military basis of each of the contracting parties. It also specifies the conditions under which the information, details of which appear in the tables, is to be supplied. The tables are largely similar to those of Chapter I (limitation of effectives), but are more detailed.

It is to be noted that the Commission, which did not see its way to propose limitation by territories of the armed forces and formations organised on a military basis stationed in the various overseas territories, nevertheless accepted the principle of publicity with regard to their distribution (by 5 votes to 4 with a certain number of abstentions). As Tables II and V show, this publicity is limited to land forces.

The Commission recognised that the method of calculating on the basis of the average daily effectives does not give adequate information in all cases. In the case of certain forms of military organisations the real effectives may be considerably higher than the average effectives. The explanatory note, for which provision is made in the second sentence of the second paragraph, is intended to give publicity to this special feature of certain military systems. It is understood that the words in brackets "recruits, militiamen, reservists, territorials, etc.," are only given by way of example. Each State will have to arrange the enumeration of the categories of effectives to which Article 30 relates, having regard to its special methods of organisation.

The following reservations were made in connection with Article 30:

(a) The German delegation made a reservation to the article on the ground that the tables mentioned therein do not provide for publicity regarding trained reserves and the figure of the annual contingent.

The general reservation of the German delegation in regard to Chapter A, Part I (Table I'), applies to the following Tables of Part IV—Table II, Table V and the Annex to Tables II and V, Table IX and Table XII.

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1 Minutes of the Sixth Session, Second Part (Fifth Meeting).
2 See paragraph 73 above.
The German delegation also made a reservation in regard to the option allowed to States to show, if they desire, for purposes of information, in a special column of the Tables annexed to Part IV (Table Ve) the number of recruits not trained as defined in the national legislation.

The German delegation considers that this option should not be allowed, unless the Contracting Parties are under obligation to publish at the same time and in the same tables similar information with regard to the number of their trained reserves. Failing such publicity, the German delegation considers it impossible to judge of the real military situation of the States.

The Turkish delegation repeated in regard to the Tables annexed to Article 29 the reservations made by it in regard to the Tables in Chapter A. Part I.

The French delegation does not accept publicity for the effectives stationed in each overseas territory, as not being called for to any greater extent in the case of overseas territories than in the case of the various districts of the home country. The French delegation also desires to point out that detailed publicity in the case of each overseas territory, with a multitude of distinctions between the different categories of soldiers according to their rank and length of service, is even less acceptable, being materially impossible owing to the constant transfers from one territory to the other and the special conditions of the territories in question. An army of accountants would be required for the purpose. The inclusion in the Convention of such minute rules is calculated to multiply involuntary errors in the information supplied by the Contracting Parties, and further threatens to lead to unnecessary and provocative discussion, which no one can desire, and which cannot be the object the Commission has in view.

The British delegation concurred in the substance of this reservation.

The Japanese delegation also made a reservation as to the desirability of separate publication of the average daily effectives in each oversea territory.

Article 31.

In adopting Article 31 the Commission considered it important to know the number of youths compulsorily receiving preparatory military training. No provision is made for information on this point in Article 30, since Article 30 does not cover training which precedes active service.

On these grounds the Commission considered it desirable that the Contracting Parties, who have systems of compulsory pre-regimental military training, should state the number of youths who have received such training. The Commission held that the Governments were not in a position to supply statistical information in regard to voluntary pre-regimental military training.

The German and Italian delegations consider that particulars should be given, not only of the youths who have been subjected to compulsory preparatory military training, but of all who have received preparatory military training, whether voluntary or otherwise.

Article 32.

Article 32 imposes on the Contracting Parties the obligation to inform the Secretary-General of the League of Nations each year of the total number of days comprised in the first period of service, and the total duration in days of the ensuing periods: this provision applies only to the effectives recruited by conscription.

The limitation of the period of service laid down in Articles 6 to 9 (former Articles I and XB) did not provide for a separate limitation of the total number of days of the first period of service on the one hand, and the total duration of the periods of training not included in the first period of service, on the other.

The Commission considered, however, that, in order to give a clearer idea of the military organisation of the various countries, tables should be drawn up for purposes of publicity, giving these figures separately.

Article 33.

The Commission accepted (by 9 votes to 7) the principle of publicity in respect of land material by means of the budget. The Contracting Parties will state the amount actually expended for the upkeep, purchase and manufacture of land and naval war material. The methods of application of this principle will be determined on the basis of the report requested from the Committee of Budgetary Experts.

The Netherlands delegation, supported by several other delegations, had proposed that each of the Contracting Parties should, each year, prepare a statement giving the numbers (and for certain categories and for ammunition also the weight) of material in service and reserve of the land, sea and air forces under twelve specific headings.

1 See paragraph 77 above.
200. A Committee of Military Experts, which the Preparatory Commission had requested to study the method of application of this principle, if agreed to, adopted by a majority vote a simplified table applicable to land armaments. But the Commission, without discussing the principle involved on the table in question, adopted the French proposal and as a consequence the text of the article. Some delegations which were ready to accept publicity on the basis of this table in respect of material in service, did not see their way to accepting it in respect of material in reserve.

201. The German delegation made a general reservation in regard to Article 33. It considered that, in order to be effective, publicity should be given to the total of the land and air material and of non-floating material of the navies, and that this information should be published by categories and numbers.

As regards publicity in respect of expenditure, it reserved its opinion until it had had an opportunity to study the Committee of Budgetary Experts' report.

Article 34.

202. Article 34 specifies the information to be furnished by each Contracting Party regarding every vessel of war laid down or completed by or for such Party, or within its jurisdiction, after the coming into force of the Convention, except such vessels as are exempt from limitation under the terms of Annex I to Chapter B of Part II.

Article 35.

203. Article 35 lays down that the name and tonnage of any vessel whose decks have been stiffened as authorised in Article 19 shall be communicated to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations.

204. The Delegation of the United States pointed out that the obligation of this Article might be difficult to carry out in practice, and suggested that the Governments study the question between now and the General Conference in order to be in a position to devise a workable text.

Article 36.

205. Article 36 provides for publicity corresponding to the limitation of air material in service stipulated in Articles 25 and 26.

* * *

206. The German delegation made a reservation concerning this article. It considers that publicity should apply to the total Air material, including material in reserve.¹

207. The Turkish delegation repeated, in regard to the tables annexed to Article 36, the reservations it had made concerning the tables in Chapter A, Part I.²

Article 37.

208. Certain members of the Preparatory Commission urged the importance, from the point of view of armaments, which the development of the civil aviation of a country might assume. The Commission considered that the regular and official publication of information regarding civil aviation in the various countries would be extremely useful.

209. While accepting this principle, and approving the text of Article 5 as it stands at present, certain delegations were doubtful whether the provision contained in this Article would not be more suitably included in an international convention other than the Disarmament Convention.

A desire was expressed during the discussion that attention should be drawn to this point.

210. Upon the British delegation's proposal, the Commission adopted at second reading an addition to Part IV providing that the Contracting Parties shall be bound to furnish information regarding expenditure incurred on civil aviation by the Governments and local authorities. The delegation of the United States points out that it was doubtful whether its Government would be in a position to furnish data on the expenditure incurred for this purpose by local authorities.

211. On the proposal of the Polish delegation the Commission adopted an amendment providing that the returns furnished by the Governments should show not only the number but also the total horse-power of registered aircraft and dirigibles. The American delegation stated that its Government would probably not be in a position to furnish information of this kind.

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¹ See also, in regard to Tables Ic, IIc, IIIc, IVc, the German delegation's general reservation concerning the tables annexed to Chapter C of Part II (Paragraph 155 above).
² See paragraph 77 above.
212. The German delegation made a reservation in regard to Article 37. It considered that rules concerning publicity in regard to peace-time means of communication could not properly be included in a purely military convention, and that for this reason they should be dealt with in a special convention.

Article 38.

213. In adopting Article 38, the Commission approved the principles of publicity in regard to the total expenditure on the land, sea and air forces. Each of the Contracting Parties will undertake to furnish annually a statement of its expenditure in accordance with a standard model.

214. The standard model in question will be drawn up by the Conference on the basis of the studies made or to be made of this subject by the Committee of Budgetary Experts.

215. The German delegation reserved its opinion on the publication of expenditure until it had studied the report of the Committee of Budgetary Experts; it considered, however, that the standard model should not be used for purposes of comparison and limitation.

Part V. — Chemical Arms.

Article 39.

216. This part consists of only one article—Article 39—by which the contracting parties undertake, subject to reciprocity, to abstain from the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or similar gases and of all analogous liquids, substances or processes and undertake unreservedly to abstain from the use of all bacteriological methods of warfare.

217. The insertion in the draft Convention of provisions concerning chemical warfare was proposed by the delegates of Belgium, Poland, Yugoslavia, Roumania and Czechoslovakia.

218. There was a certain amount of discussion as to whether provisions of this nature were in their right place in a Disarmament Convention which aimed, not at codifying the rules applicable in wartime or at prohibiting the use of certain arms, but rather at regulating armaments in peace time, and whether it would not be preferable to insert these provisions in some other document.

219. The Commission's attention was also drawn to the existence of other international undertakings on the same question—in particular, the Protocol prepared by the 1925 Conference on the Trade in Arms. As was pointed out, however, the Governments which had acceded to the Protocol and those which would accede to the Convention might not in every case be the same, and thus the Convention would not produce its full effect.

220. Finally, the Commission adopted this article in the above-mentioned form, by a majority vote. Nevertheless, several delegations expressed the desire to reserve their right to submit to the Conference proposals concerning the chemical and bacteriological weapons, with a view to supplementing the provisions of the 1925 Protocol and amplifying their scope.

221. The Commission noted that certain Governments had signed and ratified the 1925 Protocol with reservations concerning, in particular, reciprocity. Though recognising that the undertaking to abstain from the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or similar gases (paragraph 1 of the draft article) could normally be observed only subject to reciprocity, the Commission thought that the undertaking to abstain from the use of bacteriological methods should be absolute. The use of such methods would, in any case, constitute a crime against international law, in that this arm necessarily strikes the whole population, and no civilised Government could possibly wish to be guilty of such a crime even against the armies of a criminal Government which had itself resorted to such methods.

222. The Soviet delegation drew the attention of the Commission to the following article of the draft Convention submitted by it:

"All methods of and appliances for chemical aggression (all asphyxiating gases used for warlike purposes, as well as all appliances for their discharge, such as gas-projectors, pulverisers, balloons, flame-throwers and other devices) and bacteriological warfare, either available for the use of troops or in reserve or in process of manufacture, shall be destroyed within three months of the date of the entry into force of the present Convention."

223. The Polish delegation, though in no way opposed to this proposal, expressed the opinion that the limitation or even destruction of any given appliance used for chemical aggression would merely create an illusion of action without in fact solving the problem of chemical warfare.

224. In the second part of the sixth session, the British delegation submitted a memorandum concerning the interpretation of certain terms used in the chapter, particularly whether the use of tear-gas was to be regarded as contrary to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the provisions of Part V of the Draft Convention or not.

1 See Annexes to the Minutes of the Sixth Session (Second Part).
225. The French delegation submitted certain observations on this memorandum. The Commission felt itself unable to express a definite opinion on this question of interpretation. Very many delegations, however, stated that they were prepared to approve the interpretation suggested in the British Government’s memorandum.

226. The Preparatory Commission thinks that it would be very useful if all the Governments which intend to send representatives to the Disarmament Conference were to devote very careful study to this question—the extreme importance of which the Commission recognises—so that the problem may be settled in all its aspects by the Conference.

227. The Polish delegation made the following declaration:

“Though recognising the moral value of international instruments forbidding the use of chemical and bacteriological methods in war, we nevertheless feel that it is necessary to make provision, in addition to these instruments, for practical preventive and executory measures. These measures should be such as to render chemical or bacteriological attack, if not impossible, at any rate difficult, and should limit the chances of success and efficacy of such attack. They should also constitute a fresh guarantee that no violation of the undertakings solemnly signed could be committed without involving very unpleasant consequences for the guilty State.

“In this connection, therefore, it would be desirable to consider the possibility of concluding a Convention for affording international aid on as liberal a scale as possible to any country chemically or bacteriologically attacked. As such aid would be essentially of a humanitarian nature (sanitary, scientific, etc.), it should meet with general approval.

“This problem might be studied in due course by the League of Nations.”

228. The delegations of Finland, Roumania, Yugoslavia, associated themselves with this statement.

229. With regard to Article 39, the German delegation is of opinion that the effect of prohibiting the use of chemical weapons would be incomplete unless it referred also to preparations for the use of those weapons (instruction of troops, etc.).

230. The same delegation stated that a scheme for the reduction and limitation of armaments should, in the first place, prohibit weapons of an essentially offensive character, the destructive efforts of which menaced not only armies but also the civilian population—i.e., bombs from the air, large calibre guns and tanks of every kind.

231. The German delegation’s proposals regarding the prohibition of bombing from the air (see paragraph 230 above), the suppression and destruction of all large guns and tanks, were rejected by the Commission.


Chapter A. — Permanent Disarmament Commission.

Article 40.

232. This article, together with the other provisions of Part VI of the draft, underwent a thorough preliminary examination at the last session, having been entrusted to a Sub-Committee presided over by His Excellency M. Politis. The Sub-Committee’s conclusions, having been stated and discussed in plenary meeting, were approved by the Preparatory Commission. The latter unanimously recognised the necessity of setting up at the seat of the League of Nations a Permanent Disarmament Commission to follow the execution of the Convention.

233. The object of Article 40 is both to provide for the creation of this organ and to determine its composition.

234. As regards the latter, several systems were suggested in the course of the debates. Differences of opinion were expressed with regard to the number of members composing the Permanent Commission, and with regard to the capacity in which these members should sit and the conditions in which they would perform their duties.

235. The text adopted lays down that the members of the Permanent Commission will be appointed by the Governments. But which will be the Governments that will appoint them? Some delegations expressed the opinion that this right should be given to all the contracting parties. The Commission did not accept this view. It thought that an institution of this kind could not satisfactorily perform its task unless it were of comparatively small size. The rule of universality thus being rejected, it remained to decide how many States should have the right to appoint members, and how these States should be selected.

236. After careful consideration, the Commission came to the conclusion that any decision on this subject, which is a definitely political question, should be left to the Conference itself. It thought it desirable, however, to bring to the notice of the latter the three systems which had

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1 See Annexes to the Minutes of the Sixth Session (Second Part).
been proposed to it: (1) that of the British delegation, consisting in reserving the right of appointment to the States Members of the Council of the League of Nations and to two or three States not Members of the League; (2) that of the French delegation, consisting in conferring this right on the States Members of the Council, on certain States not Members of the League of Nations to be designated by the Conference, and further on certain States Members of the League of Nations but not represented on the Council, which would also be determined by the Conference; (3) lastly that of the Chinese delegation, which recommended that the Conference should elect all the countries which should be entitled to nominate members, it being understood, however, that those countries should fulfil certain special conditions to be determined.

In any case, whatever system the Conference may agree upon, the selected Governments will only be required to appoint one member each to the Permanent Commission.

237. The second question on which the Preparatory Commission was called upon to decide was that of the conditions under which members of the Permanent Commission will serve. It pronounced in favour of the solution formulated in the second paragraph of Article 40, which lays down the following principles: (a) Members of the Permanent Commission will not represent the Governments which appointed them; (b) they will hold office for a fixed period to be determined by the Conference, but will be re-eligible; (c) during their term of office they may be replaced only on death or in the case of voluntary resignation or serious and permanent illness.

238. The third paragraph provides that members of the Commission may be "assisted by technical experts". The French delegation was in favour of a clause providing that members of the Commission must themselves be technical experts, giving purely technical opinions and not prejudging any political conclusions that the Governments might draw from those opinions. The French delegation stated that it still preferred this system, although the majority of the Commission did not accept it.

239. The question of payment for members of the Permanent Commission was also raised. It was thought better to come to no decision for the time being, especially as the question will readily settle itself in due course.

Article 41.

240. Article 41 and those which follow lay down rules for the procedure of the Permanent Commission. The first paragraph of Article 41 calls for no comment. Paragraphs 2 and 3 provide that the Permanent Commission shall meet annually in ordinary session on the date fixed in its Rules of Procedure, and that, in addition to this compulsory session, extraordinary sessions may be convened by its President (1) in the cases provided for in the Convention and (2) whenever an application to that effect is made by a contracting party.

Article 42.

241. This is an important article, for it leaves the Permanent Commission full power to lay down, and consequently to revise, its own Rules of Procedure. The only restriction placed on its power of decision is that it must be guided by the provisions of the Convention: this restriction is so logical that there is no need to lay stress upon it.

242. In leaving the Permanent Commission such wide latitude in regard to its Rules of Procedure, the Preparatory Commission intended to enable it to change its methods of work and its various forms of action in accordance with the lessons taught by its own experience. Had definite rules on this point been embodied in the Convention, there might have been some danger of the establishment of a rigid theoretical system, to which it might have been difficult to accommodate practical needs.

Articles 43, 44 and 45.

243. These three articles must be read together. They specify certain conditions which the Permanent Commission must observe in the conduct of its business.

(1) Two-thirds of the members must be present before the Commission can transact business (Article 43).
(2) In order to be adopted, a decision must be passed by a majority of the votes of the members present at the meeting (Article 45, paragraph 2).
(3) Each member of the Commission shall have only one vote (Article 45, paragraph 1).
(4) When a question brought before the Commission specially affects a contracting party not having a member of its nationality on the Commission, that party shall be entitled to send a member appointed for that purpose to sit on the Commission, and he will accordingly be regarded, so far as concerns the matter in question, as on the same footing as other members of the Commission, and may vote equally with them (Article 44).
(5) In two specified cases, however—those provided for in Article 50 (on "derogations") and in Article 52 (on "complaints")—the votes of members appointed by the parties concerned in the discussion shall not be counted in determining the majority (Article 45, 1 It should be noted that the Chinese delegation had primarily supported the system of universality.
paragraph 3). This rule applies, of course, not merely to members specially appointed under Article 44, but also to ordinary members of the Commission.

(6) Lastly, the final paragraph of Article 45 provides that the minority may state its views in a report.

**Article 46.**

244. The Permanent Commission will obtain such information as it requires under the conditions laid down in Article 49. Apart, however, from these regular sources of information, Article 46 entitles any member of the Commission to have any person "heard" or "consulted" who is in a position to throw any light on any question which is being examined by the Commission. At the same time, in establishing this right, the text carefully emphasises that any member availing himself of it does so "on his own responsibility". Indeed, in such delicate questions as those with which the Commission will have to deal, great circumspection must be exercised in selecting sources of information.

**Articles 47, 48 and 49.**

245. These articles have this common feature—that they specify the conditions under which the Permanent Commission is to draw up, communicate and publish its reports.

246. Article 47 deals with a special point, but one which could not be neglected. It entitles every member of the Commission to require that, in the Commission's reports, account shall be taken of the opinions or suggestions put forward by him personally, if necessary in the form of a separate report. This provision is analogous to that in the last paragraph of Article 45. Its intention is the same—to ensure that all shades of opinion may be made public.

247. Article 48 provides that all reports by the Commission shall be communicated (a) to the contracting parties and (b) to the Council of the League. It also requires that they shall be published. The conditions for this communication and publication will be laid down in the Commission's Rules of Procedure, so far as they are not already fixed in the Convention itself.

248. Article 49 deals with the reports to be drawn up by the Permanent Commission on the information it receives with regard to the application of the Convention.

249. To examine and judge this information is looked upon as the Permanent Commission's normal function. It is in fulfilling this function that the Commission will become an essential factor in the system of the Convention, being responsible for watching its application, regularly reporting on the situation, and calling attention, where necessary, to any errors and omissions which experience may have revealed in the text in force.

250. In investing the Commission with this function, Article 49 lays down certain rules which it may not be out of place to consider more fully:

(1) In principle the information in the Permanent Commission's possession will be sent to it through the Secretary-General of the League by the contracting parties in pursuance of their international obligations. It was thought advisable, however, that the Commission should be able to supplement these statements by information drawn from other sources. Here, however, a difficulty arose. It would be unwise to make this power so elastic as to be indefinite. There must be a certain weeding-out of the reports that might come before the Commission. Who is to do it? It was impossible to settle the matter in detail in the actual text of the Convention, which accordingly leaves the application of the principle to the Commission's own judgment and merely emphasises the fact that this power of discrimination should be exercised with caution. That is the effect of Article 49, which lays down that the "other information" in question is that which "may reach it from a responsible source" and which "it may consider worthy of attention". The Rules of Procedure will give a definition of what should be understood by such sources. It will also be remembered that Article 46, which is dealt with above, entitled every member of the Commission, on his own responsibility, to have any person "heard or consulted" who is in a position to enlighten the Commission.

(2) The report to be drawn up by the Commission under Article 49 must be produced at least once a year. It is to be communicated to the High Contracting Parties and to the Council of the League "forthwith". Its publication will take place on a date to be fixed by the Commission's Rules of Procedure.

**Chapter B. — Derogations.**

251. Despite the Preparatory Commission's desire to give the provisions of the Convention the maximum degree of stability, it felt obliged to provide for the possibility of certain derogations. In a matter such as this, which affects the vital interests of national defence, grave circumstances may arise which would justify the application of exceptional measures.
252. But while recognising this truth and taking it duly into account, the Commission has endeavoured to take every precaution to avoid the abuses to which a system of derogations might possibly open the door.

253. The drafts submitted in 1927 by the French and British delegations contained certain provisions in the matter—but the system laid down in both of them gave rise to criticisms, the foundation for which their authors were the first to recognise. Finally, a simpler and more elastic proposal submitted by the United States delegation, which was the subject of certain amendments, met with the approval first of the Sub-Committee and then of the Preparatory Commission, and resulted in the text of Article 50.

254. Under the terms of this article, any contracting Power will have, on certain conditions, the right to suspend any provision of the Convention if a change of circumstances constitutes a menace to its national security.

255. An analysis of the text reveals the following features:

(I) The hypotheses in which the right of suspension shall apply are not enumerated, as so rigid a method was not to be recommended. Although, however, Article 50 does not enumerate the circumstances which would justify any suspension, it does lay down that these circumstances must constitute a menace to the national security of the State in question, so that its field of action is considerably restricted thereby. It is only in quite exceptional and really serious cases that any suspension will be possible, cases so serious and so exceptional that one may hope that they will not occur.

(2) The suspension may effect certain articles of the Convention or all its provisions as a whole, with the exception, however, of those designed to apply in the event of war.

(3) The suspension will in any case be purely temporary, and, when the reasons for it have ceased to exist, the armaments which have been temporarily increased must be reduced to the level agreed upon in the Convention.

(4) It seemed impossible to make the entry into force of measures implying suspension conditional on previous authorisation, as the menace which justifies it may be so urgent as to call for immediate precautions. The Commission noted this fact with regret but was obliged to acknowledge the impossibility. Each of the contracting parties may therefore take officially such measures as are necessitated by the circumstances in which it is placed, and will have the right for such purposes to appreciate the gravity of those circumstances. That is what is meant in the text by the words: "a change of circumstances constitutes, in the opinion of any High Contracting Party . . . ." (5) Article 50, however, after recognising this right, subjects its exercise to a series of precautions which constitute a powerful check against any attempted abuse.

256. It provides first that any contracting party which suspends any provision of the Convention shall immediately notify such suspension and the extent thereof not only to the other contracting parties but also, through the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, to the Permanent Disarmament Commission.

257. Further, it makes it incumbent upon the said contracting party to accompany the notification by “a full explanation of the change of circumstances” determining its action.

258. It provides lastly that the other contracting parties shall promptly advise as to the situation thus presented.

259. In addition to these guarantees there is the guarantee under Article 54, the effect of which, as will be noted later, is to establish the principle of compulsory arbitration for all disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention. In this way there is built up a system of precautions to obviate all risk of abuse.

260. In providing for this system the Commission, it need hardly be said, had no intention of restricting in any way the rights and obligations of States Members of the League of Nations under the provisions of the Covenant. Those provisions naturally retain their full force, and will help in their particular sphere of application to reinforce the guarantees laid down in the Convention.

Chapter C. — Complaints.

Articles 51 and 52.

261. Article 51 embodies an important principle in that it lays down that any violation of the Convention is a matter of concern to all the contracting parties. Should such a violation occur, any one of them, therefore, would have the right to act and set in motion the procedure in the matter of complaints provided for in Article 52.

262. This article provides that a complaint may be lodged, not only when one of the contracting States violates the Convention (for example—this is the most typical case, though there may be others—by maintaining armaments in excess of the figures agreed upon), but also when it endeavours to violate it.
263. The complaint must be brought, through the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, before the Permanent Commission, which, after hearing the contracting party whose action is questioned, and any other party which may be specially concerned and which asks to be heard, will draw up a report. This report, like all others framed by the Permanent Commission, must be presented to the contracting parties and to the Council of the League of Nations and published, together with any proceedings.

264. The Permanent Commission, being only a consultative body, cannot itself decide on the action to be taken on its report. But the High Contracting Parties will advise on the situation, and the Council of the League of Nations will take action, within the limit of its powers under the Covenant. It is understood, moreover, in this connection, that the various pacific procedures provided for by the existing international agreements would, if necessary, be employed. The procedure laid down in Article 54 of the draft Convention is naturally included among the various solutions that might be employed.

CHAPTER D. — FINAL PROVISIONS.

265. Certain formal provisions (such, for instance, as those relating to the signature of the Convention) do not figure in the present draft. It seemed preferable to leave it to the Conference to add them.

266. Further, the text makes no mention of a clause which generally figures in multilateral conventions and which provides for the possible accession of third Powers. The reason is that the present situation is somewhat peculiar. The Convention is intended, not only to lay down rules for collective application, but is to embody individual figures fixing the limit of the armaments for each State. Naturally, if a Power which is not an original Party to the Convention wished subsequently to accede to it, it would have to submit concrete and detailed proposals, which would form the subject of difficult and complicated negotiations. Such being the case, the Commission decided that it was preferable not to establish formal rules of procedure for this somewhat theoretical hypothesis.

Article 53.

267. The first paragraph of this article is based on a proposal by the British delegation. The second is the outcome of an amendment submitted by the French delegation.

268. The article first of all embodies the principle that the present Convention does not affect the provisions of previous treaties under which certain of the contracting parties have agreed to limit their land, sea, or air armaments.

269. It also contains a provision enabling the contracting parties which so desire, to declare, when signing the Convention, that the limits fixed under the latter for their armaments are accepted by them in relation to the provisions referred to in the preceding paragraph and that the maintenance of such provisions constitutes for them an essential condition for the observance of the present Convention.

270. Article 53 is designed in the interests of greater clearness. It seemed necessary to a large number of delegations, in view of disputes that might arise concerning the interpretation of the Convention—disputes which, under the terms of Article 54, would come within the competence of the Permanent Court of International Justice—that there should be no possible doubt as to the conditions under which the Convention had been concluded.

271. Moreover, in the matter of disarmament, every attempt should be made to avoid anything in the nature of a retrograde measure; accordingly, the provisions of the Convention must not restrict the scope of previous treaties on the same subject.

272. Further, certain Governments will estimate the position of their armaments according to the situation resulting from such treaties. The maintenance in force of these treaties is thus an essential condition for the Governments for their contractual undertaking under the Convention. It will be for the Conference if necessary to define this principle in order to prevent any abusive interpretation, in the event of any temporary and unimportant breach or suspension of the provisions of the said Treaties.

273. The German delegation stated, in connection with Article 53, that, in so far as it does not refer to the Washington and London Treaties, the German delegation would vote against the draft Convention as a whole. The draft, as drawn up by the majority of the Preparatory Commission, excludes essential elements from the limitation and reduction of land armaments. Instead of leading to real disarmament, this draft would serve only to conceal the real state of world armaments or would even allow armaments to be increased. To accept it would at the same time be tantamount to a renewal of the German signature to the disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles.

Article 54.

274. This article, which owes its origin to the Belgian delegation, lays down the principle of compulsory arbitration for all disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the provisions of the present Convention, when such disputes have not been settled by direct
negotiations or by some other method of friendly settlement. It provides that, in such cases, the dispute shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice or to an arbitral tribunal chosen by the parties to the dispute.

275. The principle underlying Article 54 met at once with the unanimous approval of the Commission. Certain delegations had, however, wondered on first examination whether the proposed text might not lead to a conflict of powers between the Permanent Disarmament Commission and the tribunals to which disputes concerning the application of the Convention might be referred. It was pointed out to them that this risk need not be considered, as the Permanent Commission is not a tribunal competent to settle disputes, but an examining body responsible simply for drawing up reports and giving opinions. The provisions of Article 54, which was finally adopted without opposition, thus leave the powers conferred on the Permanent Commission intact.

Article 55.

276. The first paragraph of this article concerns the ratification of the Convention and does not call for any comment.

277. Paragraphs 2 and 3 concern the entry into force of the Treaty. The Conference will have to establish the list of ratifications required to ensure its entry into force. If, however, by a date to be fixed in the Convention itself, the necessary instruments have not been deposited with the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, the latter would invite the signatory Powers to meet and decide whether it is possible, notwithstanding, to put the Convention into force. This special procedure, the purpose of which is so clear as to require no emphasis, was suggested by the British delegation. It is based on the resolution concerning ratifications adopted by the eleventh Assembly of the League of Nations.

278. The last sentence of Article 55 provides that the contracting parties undertake to participate in this consultation, which will take place within a period to be fixed by the Conference. The Commission decided that it would be better to leave it to the Conference to decide whether it might not be better to insert such an undertaking in the Final Act or in a Protocol to be annexed.

279. The text adopted at the first reading contained an Article EC 1 by which Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Poland and Roumania set out certain conditions on which their acceptance of the Convention would depend.

280. The Commission decided that the study of this question should be left for the Conference. This decision was dictated by two reasons. The first was that the text raised an essentially political question, and the second that it brings up a very complex problem: the effect of the reservations which the contracting powers will be allowed to formulate at the time of signature.

Article 56.

281. This article could, if necessary, have been omitted from the draft. Naturally, directly the Convention comes into force, each of the contracting parties must, in so far as concerns itself, take the measures necessary to ensure its execution. The insertion of an express provision to this effect is designed simply to direct the special attention of the contracting parties to their duty of exhibiting the greatest diligence in the performance of their obligations. It will be for the Conference to decide whether this text is to be kept in the body of the Convention or whether it should be placed either in the Final Act or in a Protocol to be annexed.

Article 57.

282. Article 57 provides for the period of validity of the Convention. The Commission could not itself suggest how long it should remain in force, as this will depend on the circumstances at the time of the conclusion of the Convention, and the Conference alone can judge of such circumstances. It is important, however, to note that, as regards the States Members of the League of Nations, Article 8 of the Covenant provides for a maximum limit, in that it lays down that the “ plans ” for the reduction of armaments “ shall be subject to reconsideration and revision at least every ten years ”. The period laid down in Article 57 cannot therefore exceed ten years. It might be less, but the general feeling of the Commission is that it should not be too short.

283. The British delegation directed attention to the desirability of establishing some agreement between the period of validity of the Convention and that of other agreements concerning the limitation of armaments, such as the Treaties of Washington and London.

284. Moreover, even when fixed, the period of validity of the Convention will not be at all rigid. Two categories of provisions will have the effect of rendering it more elastic—namely, Articles 57 and 58 which will be examined below and the effect of which may be to shorten it, and further the rule laid down in the last sentence of Article 57, the effect of which may be to extend it. In virtue of this rule, the Convention will not be extinguished by the expiry of the period laid down. It will remain in force except in so far as it may be amended, suspended or denounced.

1 See Minutes of the Third Session, page 416.
The Commission's purpose in instituting this system was to prevent the work of the coming Disarmament Conference, which will constitute a first stage, from coming suddenly to an end without there being anything else ready to replace it. In an undertaking such as this, continuity is essential if the results already achieved are to be consolidated.

Article 58.

286. This article provides that the contracting parties shall re-examine the Convention before the expiration of the period fixed in Article 57. The Conference must, however, see that such examination is not premature and the text accordingly provides for the fixing of a minimum date. The re-examination of the Convention must take place within these two limits. There will be a certain elasticity which will make it possible to select the most suitable moment. In order to ensure successful results, the new Conference, which will be responsible for the re-examination, will have to be convened at the moment when the circumstances are most favourable to the accomplishment of its work. To fix the date of the meeting in advance would be imprudent. The Commission thought it preferable to leave the proper organs to decide on the most suitable moment, while restricting their freedom of choice by means of maximum and minimum dates.

287. Who are these proper organs? The Council of the League of Nations, which will have been responsible for convening the first Disarmament Conference, seems eminently fitted to convene the others. Accordingly, the draft Convention entrusts this duty to it, adding, however, that, before passing the necessary resolution, the Council shall consult the Permanent Disarmament Commission and also the contracting parties, non-Members of the League of Nations.

288. This Conference will examine the position and will, if it thinks fit, revise the Convention wholly or in part. Should its proceedings lead to the establishment of a new Convention, it will itself fix the duration of that Convention and determine the conditions in which it will again be examined and possibly revised.

Article 59.

289. The procedure instituted by the previous article cannot, therefore, in principle, be set in motion before a certain date. Article 59, however, makes an exception to the principle.

290. It covers the case in which the conditions under which the engagements stipulated in the Convention were contracted have undergone, as the result of technical transformations or special circumstances, changes justifying a fresh examination and possibly the revision of such engagements. It may be that, before the date fixed by Article 58 as the starting-point of the period during which the Convention normally must be re-examined, the conditions under which it was drawn up may undergo such radical changes that it would be difficult, or even impossible, to await the prescribed date before reconsidering the situation and making any alterations it may entail. In such a case—but in such a case only—it is allowable under Article 59 for the procedure to be set in motion before the normal date. The Commission felt that it was advisable to authorise the immediate re-examination of the Convention, and that after its entry into force a certain period ought to elapse during which the option provided for in Article 59 could not be made use of.

291. Thus, three periods are contemplated by Articles 57, 58 and 59 of the draft. The first (x years) determines the normal duration of the Convention; the second (y years) is the period during which, in principle, the Conference to re-examine the Convention cannot be called; and the third (z years) is that during which the Convention can, in no case, be re-examined, even in the exceptional circumstances contemplated in Article 59.

292. These circumstances might include, for example, an unforeseen development of civil aviation. Indeed, the British, French, Japanese and Polish delegations definitely stated that they had this case, in particular, in mind.

293. The text of the draft adopted at first reading included, in Section III of Chapter II (material, air armaments), an Article AD, which read as follows:

"The limitations laid down are accepted by each High Contracting Party in the light of the present development of civil aviation in other countries."

294. In view of Article 59, and subject to the statements which they made, the above-mentioned delegations agreed that the old Article AD should be omitted from the draft, but pointed out that its omission did not imply any change in their attitude, and that when they submitted to the Conference figures for the limitation of military aviation they would take into consideration the development of civil aviation in other countries up to that time.

295. On the other hand, the German delegation submitted the following reservation:

"The German delegation is of opinion that the development of a peaceful means of communication must in no case be made a basis for armaments, especially as no account has been taken of the essential and purely military factors of material in reserve or in stock,
trained reserves, etc., and other important means of communication, such as the mercantile marine, on which, indeed, preliminary warlike fittings have been authorised.

296. The exceptional procedure provided for in Article 59 may be followed, says the text, "at the request of a High Contracting Party, with the concurrence of the Permanent Disarmament Commission". In other words, the initiative will come from a contracting Government, but will have no effect unless it is favourably received by the Permanent Commission.

Article 60.

297. The final article of the draft deals with the right of denunciation. This is always a delicate question in multilateral treaties, and it is particularly delicate here, where the system implies a balance of mutual engagements which is in danger of being disturbed if one of the parties withdraw.

298. The Commission nevertheless considered it impossible to refuse the parties the right to denounce the Convention. It was careful, however, to make this right dependent on various conditions, which to some extent correct its disadvantages.

299. In this connection, Article 60 provides, in the first place, that the right of denunciation can only be exercised in the course of one of the Conferences held in virtue of the preceding articles to re-examine, and possibly revise, the Agreement. It further lays down that denunciation, when thus notified, shall not take effect until two years after its date, and in no case before the expiration of the normal period of duration of the Convention, as fixed under Article 57.

300. The Preparatory Commission could only establish a draft Convention, or it would perhaps be more accurate to say the framework of the future Convention.

301. In the reservations which have been reproduced in this report, certain delegates expressed the view that, even within those limits, the results were disappointing. The great majority of the Commission, however, so far from sharing this attitude, regards what has been done as marking an important advance on the path of disarmament.

302. Be that as it may, it will be for the Conference not only to decide as to the final adoption of the draft that will be laid before it, but also to define its practical scope by fixing in figures the extent of the undertakings it involves.

303. This delicate and complicated task can only be successfully discharged on certain conditions, first and foremost among which we place the thorough and systematic preparation of the Conference itself. The German delegation proposed—and this proposal was seconded by the Italian delegation—that the Preparatory Commission should ask the various Governments, with this object in view, to furnish detailed particulars of the present position of their armaments. The Commission welcomed the spirit in which this suggestion was made, but felt that certain correctives must be supplied. In the first place, it held that, as the preparation of the Conference was a matter for the Council of the League, it was for the Council to take the necessary steps to that end. It also regarded the German proposal as too restricted. Indeed, the preliminary work of study and investigation which will have to be done cannot be limited to scheduling existing armaments. It will have to cover every factor, technical or otherwise, which may help to inform the Conference, and to justify such concrete proposals as the Governments may lay before it.

304. The Commission further decided to ask the Council of the League to fix the date of the Conference at its next session. The German delegation, with reference to the resolution adopted by the Council on December 8th, 1926, had proposed that a definite date (Thursday, November 5th, 1931) should be recommended. The Commission felt that it would be exceeding its sphere by doing this. It is, of course, anxious that the utmost despatch compatible with practical necessities should be employed, but it took the view that the Council, with which it rests to fix the date, was the only authority qualified to weigh the various factors that must be taken into consideration.

305. While the final result depends in part on the preparatory work that has still to be done, it also depends, in large measure, on the atmosphere that will prevail during the subsequent proceedings. In such a matter, mutual confidence among peoples is an essential condition of progress. It is our hope that that mutual confidence will be strengthened, and will enable the aim to which our efforts have been directed to be completely attained.
III. APPENDIX.

REPORT TO THE COUNCIL ON THE WORK OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION FOR THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE.

Held at Geneva from May 18th to 26th, 1926.

The Preparatory Commission convened by resolution of the Council dated March 18th, 1926, met at Geneva from May 18th-26th, 1926. It elected as Chairman H. E. Jonkheer J. Loudon and, as Vice-Chairmen, M. Cobian and M. Buero, delegates of Spain and Uruguay respectively.

From the outset the Preparatory Commission realised that the study of the questions submitted to it by the Council would be facilitated by the constitution of two special Sub-Commissions composed of persons directly attached to the delegations forming part of the Preparatory Commission and consequently representing the opinion of their respective Governments. The Preparatory Commission intended to entrust one of these Sub-Commissions with the study of the military, naval and air aspects of the questions under consideration, while the other would devote its attention to the non-military aspect of these questions.

Presided over by the two Vice-Chairmen of the Commission itself, these two Sub-Commissions, which would thus be in close touch with the Commission, would be in a position to observe faithfully the principles laid down for their guidance by the latter.

The Sub-Commission entrusted with the study of non-military questions has been authorised by the Preparatory Commission to ascertain the opinion of the organisations or persons it may judge advisable to consult on these questions, and particularly that of the Joint Commission set up by resolution of the Council. The Military, Naval and Air Sub-Commission has identically the same composition as the Permanent Advisory Commission as enlarged by the decision of the Council. The system thus set up by the Preparatory Commission therefore follows the main outlines of the organisation established by the Council.

The Preparatory Commission does not doubt that the Council will see fit to endorse its decisions, in which it has been guided by its desire to do all in its power to ensure the success of the task entrusted to it.

1.

On the proposal of the French delegation, the Preparatory Commission considers that the task entrusted to it by the Council should be undertaken on the understanding that every Government should have in view for the proposed Conference for the preparation of a disarmament agreement, definite and quantitative proposals accompanied by reasons in support calculated with reference to the degree of security existing at the date when the Conference meets.

2.

A. The Commission refers to its Technical Sub-Commissions the points stated below in order that it may be informed on the technical aspect of the questions submitted to it by the Council. The Commission is alone competent to deal with the political aspects of these questions in the same way that it has sole responsibility for the final answers to be given to the questions.

The Chairman and the Vice-Chairmen may take the necessary steps to co-ordinate the work of the two Sub-Commissions and to enable each to consult the other on any particular point.

Question I.

What is to be understood by the expression "armaments"?

(a) Definition of the various factors — military, economic, geographical, etc. — upon which the power of a country in time of war depends.

(b) Definition and special characteristics of the various factors which constitute the armaments of a country in time of peace: the different categories of armaments — military, naval and air — the methods of recruiting, training, organisations capable of immediate military employment, etc.

The Commission refers Question No. I to Sub-Commission A.

Question II (a).

Is it practicable to limit the ultimate war strength of a country, or must any measures of disarmament be confined to the peace strength?

With regard to Question II (a), the Commission is of opinion that it would not be practicable at the present time to limit the ultimate war strength of a country. On the other hand, it affirms that it is possible to limit the land, sea and air forces permanently maintained in peace-time by
the various countries or capable of immediate use without preliminary mobilisation measures. This principle is in any case without prejudice to the conditions of such limitation as determined by an examination of the remaining questions, notably Question V.

The Commission refers to Sub-Commission A the definition of the forces mentioned in the preceding paragraph and the study of the possibility of a wider limitation than that referred to above.

**Question II (b).**

What is to be understood by the expression “reduction and limitation of armaments”? The various forms which reduction or limitation may take in the case of land, sea and air forces; the relative advantages or disadvantages of each of the different forms or methods: for example, the reduction of the larger peace-time units or of their establishment and their equipment, or of any immediately mobilisable forces; the reduction of the length of active service, the reduction of the quantity of military equipment, the reduction of expenditure on national defence, etc.

**Question III.**

By what standards is it possible to measure the armaments of one country against the armaments of another—e.g., numbers, period of service, equipment, expenditure, etc.? The Commission refers to Sub-Commission A the two following questions for its opinion:

(a) What are the standards by which it is possible to measure the (a) military, (b) naval, (c) air armaments of one country against the corresponding armaments of another country?

(b) What are the methods by which the reduction and limitation of (a) land, (b) naval, (c) air armaments can be effected, and what are the comparative advantages and disadvantages of each?

*Note.* — The following methods, amongst others, have been suggested: the reduction of the larger peace-time units or of their establishment and their equipment, or of any immediately mobilisable forces; the reduction of the length of active service; the reduction of munitions of war.

It has also been suggested that a limitation of armed forces might be effected by the reduction or limitation of expenditure on national defence.

The Commission wishes to have the opinion of the two Sub-Commissions on this last subject and on the conditions in which the above method might be applied, should they consider that it is practicable.

**Question IV.**

Can there be said to be “offensive” and “defensive” armaments? Is there any method of ascertaining whether a certain force is organised for purely defensive purposes (no matter what use may be made of it in time of war), or whether, on the contrary, it is established for the purposes in a spirit of aggression?

The Commission refers to Sub-Commission A the following questions:

Are there any armaments (and, if so, what) which are only capable of being used for the defence of a State’s territory?

Is there any method of ascertaining whether a certain force is organised for purely defensive purposes (no matter what use may be made of it in time of war), or whether, on the contrary, it is established in a spirit of aggression?

**Question V (a).**

On what principle will it be possible to draw up a scale of armaments permissible to the various countries, taking into account particularly:

1. Population;
2. Resources;
3. Geographical situation;
4. Length and nature of maritime communications;
5. Density and character of the railways;
6. Vulnerability of the frontiers and of the important vital centres near the frontiers;
7. The time required, varying with different States, to transform peace armaments into war armaments?
As the armaments to be maintained in each country cannot be determined on the basis of mathematical considerations alone, the Commission, in order to allow of a profitable examination of the basis on which the reduction and limitation of armaments is possible, requests the two Sub-Commissions to investigate how far armaments in general are affected by factors 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7 enumerated in Question V (a) and refers factor 6 to Sub-Commission A.

Question VI.

(a) Is there any device by which civil and military aircraft can be distinguished for purposes of disarmament? If this is not practicable, how can the value of civil aircraft be computed in estimating the air strength of any country?

(b) Is it possible or desirable to apply the conclusions arrived at in (a) above to parts of aircraft and aircraft engines?

(c) Is it possible to attach military value to commercial fleets in estimating the naval armaments of a country?

The Commission refers Question VI to Sub-Commission A for its opinion.

Question VII.

Admitting that disarmament depends on security, to what extent is regional disarmament possible in return for regional security? Or is any scheme of disarmament impracticable unless it is general? If regional disarmament is practicable, would it promote or lead up to general disarmament?

The Commission asks Technical Sub-Commissions A and B to consider whether regional military, naval and air disarmament can be regarded as an important step towards general disarmament, and should general disarmament not prove immediately practicable, what regions could be considered separately, from the point of view of the limitation of armaments.

Sub-Commissions A and B are requested to consider what factors the term "region" should connote from the point of view of security and from the point of view of disarmament.

B. The Commission has examined the attached proposal submitted by the Belgian delegate. Without expressing a definite opinion regarding the measures suggested in this proposal concerning which certain delegations have reserved their decision, the Commission has decided to refer this matter to the Technical Sub-Commissions, on the understanding that such reference does not prejudice the question in any way, either as regards the practicability of these measures or as regards any subsequent decision which the Preparatory Commission itself may take when it comes to examine the question from the general and political point of view.

The delegate of Italy reiterated his opinion that supervision would be ineffective and was inadmissible, and asked to have his view placed on record.

Proposal.

"The last paragraph of Article 8 of the Covenant of the League stipulates that "the Members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval and air programmes and the condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to warlike purposes"."

"With a view to organising this exchange of information, Sub-Commission A has been requested to consider the advantages and disadvantages from the military point of view of the various methods which might be employed and in particular:

"(a) The organisation at Geneva of a permanent service for the collection of information received from the different Governments;"

"(b) The conclusion of an international convention making it compulsory to publish all inventions which can be used in chemical or bacteriological warfare and in general all forms of warfare which are condemned by the opinion of the civilised world."

"Sub-Commission A is requested to investigate what would be the consequences from the military point of view of inserting in the Convention relative to disarmament, or in that regarding the prohibition of certain forms of warfare, of provisions similar to those contained in the statute of the International Labour Office (Articles 411 to 420 of the Treaty of Versailles)."

"Sub-Commission B is requested to ascertain the consequences of such insertion from the economic point of view."

"Sub-Commission A is requested to consider to what extent the experience acquired regarding the supervision of disarmament points to the possibility from the military point of view of general supervision."
Sub-Commission B is requested to state if such supervision offers any difficulties from the economic point of view and, if so, what difficulties.

C. On the proposal of the delegate of the British Empire, the Commission decided to refer to the competent Sub-Commissions the questions defined below without prejudice to any Convention or Rule of International Law on the subject:

To Sub-Commissions A and B.
1. (a) Can factories normally and legitimately employed for chemical purposes, including dyeworks, be quickly adapted to manufacture poison gases?
   (b) If the answer to the above is in the affirmative, how long would it take to effect the change?
   (c) Can any proposals be made to prevent or hinder chemical factories from being used for the production of poisonous gases?

To Sub-Commission A.
2. (a) What are the means which would probably be employed for spreading gas and what would be the apparatus required?
   (b) How long would it take to manufacture this apparatus, and how long would it take to superimpose this apparatus on the normal equipment of an aeroplane?
   (c) Would the length of time referred to immediately above vary in the case of military or civilian aircraft?
3. (a) What is the information in existence as to the effect of the distribution of poisonous gas over closely populated districts?
   (b) Have any experiments been carried out on this subject?
   (c) Apart from the difficulty of equipping the entire population of a city with gas masks, are there any gases known against which a gas mask affords no protection?

Sub-Commission A is invited to consider what effective sanctions can be proposed for the enforcement of the international undertaking not to employ poison gas or bacteria in warfare.

A. Questions V (a) and V (b).
8. The degree of security which, in the event of aggression, a State could receive under the provisions of the Covenant or of separate engagements contracted towards that State?
   (b) Can the reduction of armaments be promoted by examining possible means for ensuring that the mutual assistance, economic and military, contemplated in Article 16 of the Covenant shall be brought quickly into operation as soon as an act of aggression has been committed?

The following very important proposal has been laid before the Commission by the French delegation:

Proposal.

"With reference to Question V (a) 8 and V (b), the Commission considers that in order that a State should be able to calculate to what extent it can consent to the reduction or limitation of its armaments, it is essential to determine what method and what machinery are best calculated to give help to that State when attacked.

"The Commission therefore proposes to suggest to the Council:

1. That methods or regulations should be investigated which would:
   (a) Facilitate the meeting of the Council at very brief notice in case of war or threat of war;
   (b) Enable the Council to take such decisions as may be necessary to enforce the obligations of the Covenant as expeditiously as possible.

2. That the Permanent Advisory Commission should be instructed:
   (a) To define the measures necessary to comply with paragraph (a), No. 8;
   (b) To investigate the procedure which would allow of the rapid drafting of recommendations regarding the military assistance provided for in the second paragraph of Article 16 of the Covenant, when the Council shall have decided to make such recommendations;
   (c) To investigate what measures should be taken in case of a conflict of which the Council shall have been notified, and when the latter shall have taken a decision, in order to prevent the development or preparation of hostilities, according to the precedent of the Greco-Bulgarian dispute.

3. That the Joint Commission should be instructed:
   (a) To investigate the question of the improvement of the telegraphic and the telephonic communications of the different countries with the Secretariat of the League;
   (b) To study what measures would be most appropriate, when the Council shall have so decided, to give most rapidly such economic and financial help as may be necessary to a State which has been attacked;
   (c) To determine the composition and procedure of the Committees for the supply and allocation of resources which the League might set up for that purpose."
It has been objected that the aim of the proposal was to define and elaborate the machinery for carrying into effect the decisions taken by the Council of the League of Nations in virtue of Article 16 of the Covenant, and that constructive proposals of this nature belonged rather to the competence of the organs of the League of Nations than to that of the present Commission.

Without pronouncing any opinion on the validity of this objection, the Commission feels that there are obvious inconveniences in asking a body comprising representatives of countries not members of the League of Nations to discuss new means of carrying out the provisions of an instrument which they have not signed.

The Commission has accordingly decided to forward the French delegation's proposal to the Council with a request that it should be immediately taken into consideration.

B. The Commission also decided to forward to the Council the following proposal of the Polish delegation, which is closely related to that of the French delegation:

Proposal.

"The Commission suggests to the Council that it would be well to consider whether a special organisation of regional assistance within the scope of the Covenant of the League would be likely to give the organs of the League effective help in supplying the assistance required and would thereby render the execution of the relevant articles of the Covenant easier and more expeditious (study of the machinery, form and procedure of regional assistance)."

C. The Commission has decided also to send to the Council the following proposal by the delegation of Finland:

Proposal.

"The Commission proposes that the Council should undertake the examination of special arrangements whereby a reduction of armaments agreed to by States unfavourably placed, owing to geographical or other exceptional circumstances, might be compensated in order to meet their requirements for security."

* * *

The United States delegation stated that it was anxious to favour every effort made with a view to disarmament, and that it therefore had no objection to certain proposals being discussed in connection with the obligations entered into by the Members of the League of Nations; but it naturally could not be bound in any way by such discussions in which it could not properly take part. This observation refers, in particular, to certain phases of the proposals reproduced in Nos. 1, 2 B and 3 above.

* * *

The German delegation stated that its exceptional position did not at present allow of its being heard before the Council, and therefore desired to be in a position to submit an opinion to the Council on the proposals which were referred to it in regard to Questions V (a) 8, V (b).

The suggested examination of the methods likely to bring rapid assistance to a country attacked should not, in the opinion of the delegation, be based on the present position of armaments, which is only temporary. This examination should have as a starting-point a state of disarmament resulting from the Conference such that no country would be powerful enough to be in a position to assert its strength against that of the League of Nations. The examination of Questions V (a) 8 and V (b) could only give provisional results if it took as a starting-point the present position of armaments (see Minutes of the Seventh Meeting of the Drafting Committee).

C.687.M.288.1930.IX.
[C.P.D.292(2).]

Geneva, December 9th, 1930.

ANNEX 20.

DRAFT CONVENTION 1.

Article 1.

The High Contracting Parties agree to limit and, so far as possible, to reduce their respective armaments as provided in the present Convention.

1 See general reservations by the Turkish Delegation, paragraph No. 41 of the Report.

German
Norwegian
Irish Free State

"  "  " No. 42  
"  "  " No. 43  
"  "  " No. 43  

"  "  " No. 43  
"  "  " No. 43  
"  "  " No. 43  

* * *
PART I. — PERSONNEL. 1

CHAPTER A. — EFFECTIVES.

Article 2.

The average daily effectives in the land, sea and air armed forces and formations organised on a military basis of each of the High Contracting Parties shall not exceed, in each of the categories of effectives defined in the tables annexed to this Chapter, the figure laid down for such party in the corresponding column of the said tables.

Article 3.

The average daily effectives are reckoned by dividing the total number of days’ duty performed in each year by the number of days in such year.

Article 4.

By formations organised on a military basis shall be understood police forces of all kinds, gendarmerie, Customs officials, forest guards, which, whatever their legal purpose, are, in time of peace, by reason of their staff of officers, establishment, training, armament, equipment, capable of being employed for military purposes without measures of mobilisation, as well as any other organisation complying with the above condition.

By mobilisation, within the meaning of the present article, shall be understood all the measures for the purpose of providing the whole or part of the various corps, services and units with the personnel and material required to pass from a peace-time footing to a war-time footing.

Tables annexed to Chapter A of Part I. 2

TABLES OF THE AVERAGE DAILY EFFECTIVES WHICH ARE NOT TO BE EXCEEDED IN THE LAND ARMED FORCES.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High Contracting Parties</th>
<th>Table I. — Maximum Land Armed Forces stationed in the Home Country.</th>
<th>Table II (optional). — Maximum Land Armed Forces stationed Overseas.</th>
<th>Table III. — Maximum of the total Land Armed Forces.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total effectives, including the effectives specified in columns b and c</td>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>Other effectives who have completed at least x months of service</td>
<td>Other effectives who have completed at least x months of service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>a</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total effectives, including the effectives specified in columns b and c</td>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>Other effectives who have completed at least x months of service</td>
<td>Other effectives who have completed at least x months of service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>a</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total effectives, including the effectives specified in columns b and c</td>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>Other effectives who have completed at least x months of service</td>
<td>Other effectives who have completed at least x months of service</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A. BB. CC. DD. ...

1 See reservation by the German Delegation, paragraph No. 79 of the Report.

2 On certain tables annexed to Chapter A of Part I, see reservations by the French Delegation, paragraph No. 65 of the Report.

German " " No. 73, 74 " "
Italian " " No. 73, 75, 76 " 
Turkish " " No. 77 " "

3 Note. — This figure will be determined by the duration of the longest period of service which is in force in the conscript land army of any High Contracting Party at the time of the signature of the Convention.
## Tables of the Average Daily Effectives which are not to be exceeded in the Land Formations organised on a Military Basis.

### Table IV. — Maximum Formations organised on a Military Basis stationed in the Home Country.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High Contracting Parties</th>
<th>Total effectives, including the effectives specified in columns b and c</th>
<th>Officers or officials ranking as officers</th>
<th>Other effectives or officials who have completed at least ( x ) months of service</th>
<th>Total effectives, including the effectives specified in columns b and c</th>
<th>Officers or officials ranking as officers</th>
<th>Other effectives or officials who have completed at least ( x ) months of service</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>A</td>
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<td>D</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Table V. — Maximum Formations organised on a Military Basis stationed Overseas.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High Contracting Parties</th>
<th>Total effectives, including the effectives specified in columns b and c</th>
<th>Officers or officials ranking as officers</th>
<th>Other effectives or officials who have completed at least ( x ) months of service</th>
<th>Total effectives, including the effectives specified in columns b and c</th>
<th>Officers or officials ranking as officers</th>
<th>Other effectives or officials who have completed at least ( x ) months of service</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>A</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

## Tables of the Average Daily Effectives which are not to be exceeded in the Sea Armed Forces.

### Table VI. — Maximum Sea Armed Forces.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total effectives (officers, petty officers and men)</th>
<th>Total effectives (officers, petty officers and men and officials of every grade)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
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<td>B</td>
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<tr>
<td>C</td>
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<td>D</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Table VII. — Maximum Sea Formations organised on a Military Basis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total effectives (officers, petty officers and men)</th>
<th>Total effectives (officers, petty officers and men and officials of every grade)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
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<td>B</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

## Tables of the Average Daily Effectives which are not to be exceeded in the Air Armed Forces.

### Table VIII (Optional). — Maximum Air Armed Forces stationed in the Home Country.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total effectives, including the effectives specified in column b</th>
<th>Effectives who have completed at least ( x ) months of service (officers, non-commissioned officers and men)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table IX (optional). — Maximum Air Armed Forces stationed Overseas.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total effectives, including the effectives specified in column b</th>
<th>Effectives who have completed at least ( x ) months of service (officers, non-commissioned officers and men)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
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<tr>
<td>B</td>
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<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>D</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table X. — Maximum of the Total Air Armed Forces.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total effectives, including the effectives specified in column b</th>
<th>Effectives who have completed at least ( x ) months of service (officers, non-commissioned officers and men)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
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<tr>
<td>B</td>
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<td>C</td>
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<td>D</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

1 Note. — This figure will be determined by the duration of the longest period of service which is in force in the conscript land army of any High Contracting Party at the time of the signature of the Convention.

2 Note. — This figure will be determined by the duration of the longest period of service which is in force in the conscript air army of any High Contracting Party at the time of the signature of the Convention.
**CHAPTER B. — PERIOD OF SERVICE.**

_Article 5._

The provisions of this Chapter apply only to effectives recruited by conscription.

_Article 6._

For each of the High Contracting Parties concerned, the maximum total periods of service to which the effectives recruited by conscription are liable in the land, sea or air armed forces or formations organised on a military basis respectively, shall not exceed the figures laid down for such party in the table annexed to this Chapter.

_Article 7._

For each man, the total period of service is the total number of days comprised in the different periods of service which he is liable under the national law to perform.

_Article 8._

As an exception, each of the High Contracting Parties concerned may exceed the limits which he has accepted by the table annexed to this Chapter in so far as, owing to a falling-off in the number of births, such an increase may be necessary to enable the maximum total number of effectives fixed in his case by the tables annexed to Chapter A of this part to be attained.

It is understood that any High Contracting Party which avails itself of this option will immediately notify the measures taken and the reasons justifying them to the other High Contracting Parties and to the Permanent Disarmament Commission referred to in Part VI of the present Convention.

_Article 9._

In any case, the total period of service shall not exceed . . . months.

**Table annexed to Chapter B of Part I.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High Contracting Parties</th>
<th>Maximum total period of service to which the effectives recruited by conscription are liable in the armed forces or formations organised on a military basis</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Land</td>
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<td>Sea</td>
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<td>Air</td>
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<tr>
<td>A.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

1 _Note._ — This figure will be determined by the duration of the longest period of service which is in force in the conscript air army of any High Contracting Party at the time of the signature of the Convention.