In its resolution of April 19th, 1929, the Commission rejected the three principles recommended by the Soviet delegation thus giving proof of its unwillingness to engage upon any real and effective reduction of armaments.

VI.

The successive rejection by the Preparatory Commission of two Soviet proposals, one for complete disarmament and the other for the reduction of armaments, would have given the Soviet delegation sufficient grounds for deciding to withdraw from participation in the work of the Commission. Desirous, however, of persevering to the last in its attempt to obtain from the Preparatory Commission some sort of tangible result, and unwilling as it was to afford anyone a pretext for attributing the manifest lack of success of the Commission's work to the non-participation of the representatives of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Soviet delegation continued its collaboration.

VII.

In taking part in the discussion on the draft framed by the Commission itself, the Soviet delegation endeavoured, by means of amendments and concrete additions, to do something towards bringing this draft nearer to the conception which must underlie any draft convention for the reduction of armaments.

During the course of the discussions, the Soviet delegation not only declared itself in favour of this or that principle, but itself submitted proposals and did its best to win acceptance for them, voting for them and against proposals which were equivalent to a refusal to disarm, and declaring itself adverse to any system which might tend to justify or pass over such a refusal.

Unhappily, the overwhelming majority of the Preparatory Commission, by systematically rejecting the Soviet motions and following the line of least resistance, deprived the Commission's draft, from which all figures had already been omitted, of all real meaning, using the draft to mask and justify the maintenance and increase of existing armaments.

VIII.

The Soviet delegation thinks it necessary to formulate, in concrete shape, its principal and most general objections to the draft Convention in the form in which it has emerged from the Preparatory Commission's last session. They are as follows:

1. The Soviet delegation has vigorously urged the necessity of effecting an appreciable reduction of armaments, but this principle was not accepted by the Commission in 1929. This year, in view of the Soviet delegation's insistent pressure, it has introduced the principle into its draft, but in an entirely inadequate form.

The Soviet delegation objects to the ambiguous formula of "limitation and, so far as possible, reduction", which has been employed instead of a clear and definite statement that existing armaments absolutely must be appreciably reduced. It wishes to point out that the formula adopted allows full latitude for the maintenance and even expansion of armaments.

2. The Preparatory Commission's decision concerning the limitation of the effectives of armed forces in time of peace is essentially a fictitious measure, because modern general staffs themselves display no tendency to increase the numerical strength of the armies. On the contrary, the structure of armies and the quality of their effectives are undergoing important changes in the direction of a strengthening of military requirements in time of mobilisation and in time of war. Consequently, as regards effectives, the Preparatory Commission is only following the most up-to-date tendencies of contemporary militarism.

The Soviet delegation is opposed to the Commission's decision regarding effectives for the following reasons:

(a) Because the Commission has refused to reduce reserves having military training, which constitute one of the main elements in the armed forces accumulated in time of peace with the object of creating enormous armies of the modern type in case of war;

(b) Because the Commission has refused to introduce for each arm separately a reduction in the number of professional soldiers, officers, non-commissioned officers and pilots, who form such a high percentage as to ensure the rapid expansion of great armies;

(c) Because the mere limitation of the period of military service is in itself inadequate, being, for certain countries, merely a device to increase the reserves having military training.

3. The Soviet delegation is opposed to the Commission's refusal:

(a) To effect a direct reduction of the material of land armaments in service, in reserve and in stock, which material, in view of the mechanisation of modern armies, affords a means of compensating for the reduction in effectives;

(b) To abolish tanks and very long range artillery, which are among the most aggressive and dangerous armaments from the point of view of the civil population, and to prohibit the introduction of newly invented military devices, as stimulating competition in armaments.
4. The Soviet delegation objects to the Commission's refusal to establish the maximum limits proposed by the Soviet delegation for the various component parts of warships and their guns, with the object of reducing the aggressive and destructive power of contemporary fleets; it objects to the excessive standards given by way of illustration, and to the complete exemption of a considerable number of warships from reduction.

The Soviet delegation likewise objects to the fact that the future convention will confirm the Washington and London Naval Treaties, which have legalised the maintenance of the total tonnage of fleets at its present high level and a considerable increase in various classes of warship.

The Soviet delegation further objects to the Commission's refusal to prohibit the fitting of merchant vessels with a view to their use as fighting units in time of war.

5. The Soviet delegation wishes to point out that the maximum limits for the various classes of fighting units, mentioned by the Commission by way of illustration, differ considerably from the maximum limits proposed by the Soviet delegation.

Ships of the line:
- Figures given by the Commission: 35,000 tons maximum.
- Soviet proposal: 10,000 tons maximum.

Submarines:
- Figures given by the Commission: 2,000 tons maximum.
- Soviet proposal: 600 tons maximum.

It should be noted that the standard displacement, if calculated by the method selected by the Commission, gives an artificial reduction of total tonnage amounting to as much as 40 per cent.

6. The Soviet delegation objects to the Commission's refusal to prohibit aerial bombardment, which is a particularly serious threat to the civil population, who take no part in military operations.

The Soviet delegation likewise objects to the Commission's refusal to reduce all military air material in stock.

The Soviet delegation also objects to the Commission's refusal to make it compulsory to reduce armaments in the home country and in each overseas territory separately; although, failing such a reduction, Colonial Powers may, by concentrating their armed forces in one of these territories, create a threat to neighbouring countries or to the native population. The same objection applies to the effectives of all armed forces.

7. The Soviet delegation objects to the Commission's refusal to prohibit the manufacture in time of peace of chemical and bacteriological weapons and their maintenance in armies and depots, as this compromises the prohibition of their employment in time of war.

8. The Soviet delegation cannot take any final decision on the chapter dealing with budgetary reduction, as the Commission, by referring the question to the Committee of Budgetary Experts, has avoided taking any definite resolution on the subject, and has not decided to reduce military expenditure under each heading separately.

The Soviet delegation desires to lay special stress on the fact that budgetary reduction alone is only an inadequate means of reduction, and must be combined with a direct reduction of material.

9. The Soviet delegation offers no opinion on Chapters IV and VI of the draft Convention, inasmuch as the question of the publicity and supervision of armaments depends entirely on the manner in which, and the extent to which, they are reduced. The Soviet delegation must make it perfectly clear that publicity for armaments which are neither reduced nor limited cannot take the place of a reduction, or even of a limitation, of those armaments, and it is opposed to any attempt to employ publicity as a cloak for a refusal to limit or reduce armaments.

The Soviet delegation must point out that it is in favour of equality among all the signatories to the Convention as regards their representation on the Permanent Commission, and that it objects to the execution of the Convention being entrusted to an organ of the League of Nations.

Furthermore, the Soviet delegation objects to any system which might leave every country free to exceed the established standards of armaments, thereby depriving the Convention of all meaning.

10. The Soviet delegation vehemently protests against the Commission's refusal to pronounce any final judgment on the article according exemptions to the western neighbours of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the event of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics not acceding to the Convention. This article, which is directly aimed at the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, "reflects the intention of several countries to represent the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as an obstacle to peace and disarmament. This allegation, which the delegation will refrain from characterising as it deserves, is not, of course, worth the trouble of refuting. As the Polish delegate has rightly pointed out, the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is the sole case of a State which, in its foreign policy, has never departed, in the thirteen years of its existence, from its pacific programme, notwithstanding the repeated attempts which have been made to provoke it to armed resistance to the various attacks that have many times been directed against it."

The delegation protests against the decision to submit this article to the Conference by referring to it in the Report.

IX.

In view of what has been said, it is impossible for the Soviet delegation to accept the draft Convention, and the delegation is confirmed in its determination to pursue its indefatigable struggle for peace and to uphold its own disarmament proposals before the future conference.

X.

Referring to the Preparatory Commission's resolution of April 19th, 1929,1 in which it is stated that the Commission decides, "if the Soviet delegation so desires to append the Soviet draft Convention to the report to be submitted by the Commission on the conclusion of its proceedings and to be subsequently laid before the Disarmament Conference ", the Soviet delegation feels sure that the Commission will carry out this decision by communicating the Soviet draft Convention to the Conference simultaneously with its own. The Soviet delegation requests the Commission to append to its report the present declaration, which is intended to supersede the reservations and remarks relating to the position taken up by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as these have been to a large extent struck out of the Commission's report.


The President. — I should like to reply to M. Lounatcharsky at once.

It is perfectly true that, according to a decision reached on April 19th, 1929, the Soviet draft Convention was to be appended to the report to be submitted by the Commission on the conclusion of its proceedings, and to be subsequently laid before the Disarmament Conference. The decision added: "...without prejudice to the right, shared by the Soviet delegation with all the other delegations, to bring forward amendments to the articles of the 1927 Draft in the course of the discussion in the Preparatory Commission ".

The Soviet delegation has never objected to its proposals, statements or reservations in the report. M. Lounatcharsky now wishes an exception to be made, for the benefit of his delegation, to the procedure adopted by the Bureau and the Commission,

The Bureau does not see why any delegation, whether representing a Government Member of the League or not, should ask for an exception to be made in its favour. Unless the Commission decides otherwise — and I am willing to take its opinion again if the Soviet delegation so desires — we are bound to follow the procedure we have agreed to. I cannot therefore accede to M. Lounatcharsky's desire that the statement he has just made should be appended as an annex to our report.

M. Lounatcharsky (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — I should very much like to throw a little more light on the present position.

At the meeting on December 6th, 1930, the Soviet delegation made a statement to the effect that it would not associate itself with the Commission's report for reasons that I have repeated in my statement to-day. I understood that, inasmuch as the Soviet delegation was not sharing in the preparation of the report, it would be entitled to make a statement after the report had been adopted, and that that statement would appear in the report. You now tell me that I am mistaken, and that our statement will go no further than the Minutes, or at all events will not be officially appended to the report.

The Soviet delegation has never objected to its proposals, statements or reservations appearing in the report wherever the Rapporteurs might care to place them. The Bureau, however, and probably the majority of the Commission, have thought fit to expurgate a good many passages in which M. Bourquin and M. Cobian (Rapporteurs) alluded to the Soviet delegation. Lord Cecil took part in this ventilation of your proceedings. That being so, we wondered what would come of the repeated assertions that the report was to be an exact photograph of the historical reality. We wondered where in the report there would be any reflection of the collaboration of the Soviet delegation in the Commission's work during these three years. It seems to me that such a method as this is apt to make the photograph considerably different from the reality, although that may be preferable from the point of view of several delegations. We thought, however, that we might prevent the report from ending in, as the Japanese delegate put it, an unbalanced state, if its centre of gravity were restored to the proper place by appending to it our own statement.

1 Note by the Secretariat: See document C.195.M.14.1929.IX. Minutes of the Sixth Session (first part) page 38.

2 Note by the Secretariat: This draft Convention was printed as annex to the Minutes of the Fifth Session of the Preparatory Commission which were circulated to the Council and the States Members of the League in 1928 (see document C.165.M.50.1928.IX, page 347-353).
Not content, however, with thus distorting the report, the Commission now shows a disposition to refuse our request that our separate report should be communicated to the Governments which have not been represented in the Commission, and also to the Conference. You can do what you like, of course; but I think that, if you do this, your report will not be a true photograph of our work.

Should the Commission refuse our request, the Soviet delegation will publish its own report and send it to the Conference through its President. I think, however, that it would be better that you should embody our report in yours, appending it as a document, without assuming responsibility for its contents. That would be more impartial, and on that basis I repeat my request to the Commission.

The President. — I must correct an error which has crept into M. Lounatcharsky’s remarks. It was neither the Bureau nor the Commission that expressed the desire to delete from our report those passages that concerned Soviet statements; it was M. Lounatcharsky himself. I must point out that the Rapporteurs were not in favour of this procedure, but it was agreed to at M. Lounatcharsky’s own desire.

As a matter of fact, I have before me the Minutes of the meeting of Saturday, December 6th, 1930 and I see that that is exactly what I said in reply to M. Lounatcharsky. I said:

“I understand that he wishes all his reservations to be withdrawn from the report, and that, after the discussion on the report, he will make a statement similar in form to that which he has sent in in writing to the President.”

Consequently, I cannot but uphold the decision we reached at the meeting of December 6th, I further added:

“It is, of course, impossible to insert such a statement and to annex it to our report; I have not the right to accept such a procedure. The Soviet delegation, however, will be able to make a verbal statement after the discussion of the Report and I think the Commission will agree with me in accepting this procedure. I must repeat that it is not possible to insert a statement in the report.

If M. Lounatcharsky wishes the Commission to take a formal vote, we can proceed to take it.

M. Lounatcharsky (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — The Soviet delegation has never asked for its reservations or the statement of its attitude to be deleted; it has never urged any such thing.

What we said was: We will not take any share in the preparation of the Commission’s report; the majority will draw it up as it thinks fit. Our idea was that the report was to be a true photograph; and we added that, although we were not taking part in that work, we wished to be given an opportunity of making a statement to be appended to the report.

It is quite true that the President told me that that was impossible, for one reason or another. I promptly asked why, and I recalled to the Commission’s notice what M. Politis told us, in the earlier part of this session. He then promised that there would be a third part of the report which would embody the statements of all the delegations. No one replied to me but I was merely asked whether I wished to throw any light on the situation at that juncture. I replied in the negative, and added that it would be time to raise that question after I had made my statement.

And so the question was not settled. The Commission made a very radical alteration in this objective photograph by deleting from the report our proposals and the various reflections of our attitude here; it deleted them from the first part, but kept them in the second. It seems to me that the Rapporteurs ought to say in their report that, in these circumstances, the document is not an accurate report. I do not see how they could do otherwise.

In short, we simply ask that our statement should be joined to your report, without however forming part of the Commission’s report. As you see we do not ask very much.

Count Bernstorff (Germany). — If there is to be a vote I should like to explain in a few words the position that I should take up. In my view, this is simply a question of form, for if the Soviet Government desires to send this declaration to all the Governments it will do so, with or without our approval. Our decision, therefore, will not affect the position in the slightest.

As regards the substance of the question, I feel some doubt as to the wisdom of the Bureau’s decision. I have had some experience during the past few years of committee work in general. I have never known a committee refuse a minority report when the minority felt that it could not accept the majority report.

M. Massigli (France). — I support the Bureau’s proposal.

The Soviet delegation’s attitude appears to me somewhat contradictory. On December 6th we were told: “You are preparing a report for a body of which I know nothing, and of which I do not wish to know anything, the Council of the League of Nations. You will frame this document as you think fit; the matter does not concern me”. Any allusions to the attitude of the Soviet delegation were subsequently omitted from the document, in accord with M. Lounatcharsky’s request.
Now M. Lounatcharsky tells us: "I wish to add something to this paper which you are sending to that body that must not be acknowledged."

I do not understand.

In 1929, it is perfectly true, we took a formal vote on a particular point. But the position was quite different. The Council of the League of Nations — for that is the body in question — had invited the Soviet delegation to participate in our work, and the Soviet delegation accepted, which we were glad of. When one receives an invitation from someone and accepts it, that is proof, if not that one knows that person, at all events that one is not entirely averse to knowing him. It was quite natural, then, that in 1929 we should say: "The report which we are submitting to the Council will contain special reference to a draft put forward by the Soviet delegation."

But we were solemnly told on December 6th last that they refused utterly to know this body, that they took no interest whatsoever in the report intended for it, and that we could say what we liked in the report. Little interest was thus shown in the "photograph" of our discussions and that is very logical. Now unreasonableness is shown. I do not understand at all.

As to Count Bernstorff's observations, I may say that the position is somewhat different from what he supposed. If our report had contained only the majority opinion, every delegation forming part of the minority could have appended all its criticisms. But we adopted a different method. We invited each delegation to insert its observations in the report article by article. We have blended the report of the minority in that of the majority.

One delegation said to us: "I do not wish to submit my observations in this way. I wish to express them in the form which responds best to my reservations and to address them to whom I wish; leave me free to arrange matters as I like." The President warned that delegation of the consequences of its attitude.

If we comply with the Soviet delegation's requirements, each one of us might withdraw his reservations and present them as an annex to the report.

For these various reasons I support the Bureau's proposal.

M. Lounatcharsky (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — The question is perfectly clear. I ask that a vote be taken on the Soviet delegation's request that its statement be adjointed to the report.

M. Sato (Japan). — We have before us a request from the Soviet delegation that its reservations be appended to the report in the form of a statement. This request is opposed by the Bureau, which is supported by M. Massigli.

It seems to me that the report ought to be as faithful as possible a reflection of the entire discussion. Consequently, if we were dealing with individual reservations presented on behalf of the Soviet delegation, I should be the first to agree to their being included in an annex to the report; but it seems to me that that is not the case.

Moderate as M. Lounatcharsky's statement was, it was at the same time very vehement. The Soviet representative finds scarcely a single one of the sixty articles of our draft that he can accept. He attaches all sorts of reservations to them, which is practically equivalent to rejecting the whole of our draft. It is perfectly natural that the majority should find difficulty in accepting this long series of reservations to the report. At the same time in a spirit of compromise — a spirit by which the Commission should always be animated — it might perhaps be possible to add to the report a paragraph to the effect that the Soviet delegation adheres to the spirit of the draft Convention it presented two years ago (which the Commission agreed to submit to the Disarmament Conference) and cannot accept the present draft Convention. In that case we should give a reference to the Minutes. Everything M. Lounatcharsky has said this afternoon appears in the Minutes, and there is therefore no need to repeat it in the report. In some respects this procedure seems to me satisfactory. The Minutes will be printed and sent to all Governments as quickly as possible.

I do not know whether M. Lounatcharsky can accept this suggestion. For the moment I will not make any formal proposal unless I have the support of other delegates.

M. Cobian (Rapporteur). — I feel that there is a misunderstanding somewhere, for which all of us are responsible and from which all of us are suffering.

In my view, if the Soviet delegation had not scorned the report we have submitted to the Commission, it could have referred, in the historical section, to the Preparatory Commission's decisions regarding the Soviet draft. Anyhow, such is the position. I do not see how we can go back and amend the report. Three or four times I have said that the Rapporteurs thought that all the Soviet delegation's reservations ought to be embodied in the report; but the Soviet delegation did not agree.

M. Lounatcharsky said that his Government would not give its approval to any document addressed to the Council of the League of Nations, but that it felt that was most important that the Governments should be acquainted with the Soviet delegation's views.

I hope that, during this final meeting, not only the Soviet delegation, but other delegations will make statements.

The wisest method I think, and one which would satisfy everybody, would be to send the Governments, by way of information as to the proceedings which are coming to a close this afternoon, the Minutes of this present meeting, which will embody the various statements made this afternoon, including M. Lounatcharsky's.
It was decided to take action as proposed by M. Cobián.

130. Declarations by the Delegations.

Declaration by the Delegation of Greece.

M. Politis (Greece). — Now that we are coming to the end of our work in this Commission, I should like to tell you briefly how I feel about it.

We have written a great page in history by completing the official preparations for a Conference which is to mark the progress of humanity towards a new form of international peace—a true peace, a disarmed peace.

In point of fact, our task was a very modest one: it consisted in surveying the ground on which the great edifice is to be erected, and in tracing the outlines of the plan according to which it might be built.

It will be for the Governments, in the exchanges of views which will surely take place between them, and for their plenipotentiaries at the Conference, to amplify that plan, to introduce the necessary detail, and to take steps for putting it into effect.

Working here as we have, however, for more than four years, we have, it seems to me, come to realise the enormous difficulties of the task at the same time as the possibilities of embarking upon it with any real chance of success.

We have realised more particularly that the task in view is bold in the extreme, that it cannot be avoided, and that it is an urgent necessity.

It is bold because what we are asking is that States should by contract renounce part of their own guarantees of security, although the international community has not yet given them the fullest measure of collective guarantees in replacement thereof.

The boldness of the plan is manifest to anyone prepared to realise that, in any social community, men ceased to arm only when there was a public force sufficiently well organised and strong enough to render individual forces superfluous. When that time came, individual forces were willingly relinquished, as it were automatically, without compulsion and without previous contract of any kind.

The method which we recommend is an entirely different one. We want States to disarm without awaiting the creation of a well-organised international force. We want them to begin to reduce their armaments on the strength of the collective guarantees already furnished by the international community, because we believe that the effect of this first reduction will be to add to those guarantees by strengthening mutual trust, and thus a further step in the same direction may be taken, which in its turn will prepare the way for further progress in the parallel and interdependent domains of disarmament and security.

We have had to accept a sort of postulate which provides an interesting application of the theory of communicating vessels.

Experience will show whether this postulate is correct.

However, we are bound to recognise, at this stage, that there is a certain doubt which makes caution necessary, and, on the other hand, that the condition of the world is such that caution must not be carried so far as to prevent our attempting the experiment.

This experiment is an imperative necessity to-day. It is essential both for reasons of morality and law, because a solemn promise was given to the peoples immediately after the war, and also for political reasons. If nothing is attempted in this direction to check the natural tendency of States to seek to supplement, by their own means, the imperfections furnished by international organisation, there is bound to be a repetition of the competition in armaments which took place at the beginning of this century, and another war, which would destroy civilisation for ever.

If this work, which needs a certain amount of temerity, but is none the less necessary, appears to be possible to-day, it is not only because it responds to the imperative will of the peoples, but also because that will has found, in the last ten years, throughout the world convinced interpreters whose voices have reached the innermost recesses of the consciences.

In saying this, I am thinking, in paying a tribute to them, in the first place, of those who have been our collaborators here, whose departure we all regret, although we have among us some very worthy and esteemed successors—of M. de Brouckère and of my friend Paul-Boncour, whose clearness of mind and eloquence have left an imperishable memory.

I am also thinking of some of our colleagues who are present who have taken a very large part in our work. I will not name them, with the one exception of Lord Cecil, the great architect of the work we have completed; but I should like to express what we owe to him. Both here and outside no one has done more during the last ten years than Lord Cecil to uphold the postulate to which I referred just now, and to spread the doctrine that disarmament must begin without delay. His action has not only been that of a statesman of noble heart and lofty inspiration; it has been—if he will allow me to say so—rather that of an apostle; the sanctity of his cause has almost made a prophet of him. His contagious faith has already received the reward promised in the Scriptures—it has moved mountains. He has overcome numerous obstacles and prejudices. His prophecies have begun to materialise, since the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference has completed its work and the long-anticipated Conference is at last in sight.
we propose.

...and I think reasonably effective, extending rather beyond all the actual limitations that well-known problem of supervision and control. In addition, we have proposed a system of difficulties attendant upon any limitation of material, difficulties which centre round the there is in any other way. I believe that in that way only can you get over the enormous and, indeed, as I think, of all material by limiting the amount of money spent upon it than...it was quite out of the question to hope for an agreement reasonable person must concede, that it was quite out of the question to hope for an agreement...and would undoubtedly have been considered; but our function is a much more modest one. Our function—and the only function of this Commission—is to draw up the framework of a treaty, in which can be inserted afterwards, effective proposals for disarmament; and I venture to beg him and other critics—my German colleague, for instance—to consider carefully what we have done and to ask themselves this question, because it is the only relevant question: “Can there be fitted into the framework of this Convention a really effective step towards that great ideal, which we all have before us, of the complete disarmament of the nations”? That is the only question we have to ask. I venture to reply to it: “Why not? What is there in our provisions which is inconsistent with an advance towards that ideal, and a really serious advance—as large an advance as anything that can be reasonably hoped for?”

...I need not make a speech about the contents of our Convention except in the most summary way; but what have we done? We have provided for the limitation of the numbers of the personnel; we have not said how much that limitation is to be—that is for the Conference—but we have created the possibility of that limitation in all three arms, land, sea and air. As regards land armaments, we have added that there must be a separate limitation of the total effectives, of the conscript soldiers, and of officers and professional soldiers. Further than that, we have made provision by which a limitation of the period of service, to any extent, can be agreed upon. There is no limit; it might come down to three months, it might come down to any period that may be imagined. We have also provided that it shall be a limitation affecting each country, and that, in any case, there shall be a limitation beyond which no country shall go.

It is quite true that conscription remains. The British Government has always hoped, for reasons into which I need not go now, but which have always seemed to them sufficient, that some day or another the nations of the world would agree to abolish the system of conscription. It is true it remains, and I regret it; but if you once concede, as I think every reasonable person must concede, that it was quite out of the question to hope for an agreement for the abolition of conscription altogether, then the only thing that mattered was to limit the numbers and period of training of the conscript soldiers. We have done both. I know a great deal is said about trained reserves, but people forget that the number of trained reserves depends entirely upon the number of soldiers who are taken into the army. If you limit the number of soldiers taken into the army you limit in the only possible way—there is no other way in which you can do it—you limit automatically and as a consequence the trained reserves as well. So much for personnel.

What about material? No one doubts that we have limited, or made provision for limiting, directly, the material in navies and air forces. True we have not been able, for reasons which have often been explained and which I will not repeat, to accept proposals for the direct limitation of the material of land forces, though my delegation and I have no doubt others, would have been very glad to consider any proposals to that effect, if there had been practical and workable proposals submitted to them. But we have limited, or propose by a great majority— not, I regret to say, unanimously—to limit the cost of those materials. I can only express my own opinion, and I have given attention to this subject for some years past. My own judgment is that there is much more hope of a really effective limitation of land material and, indeed, as I think, of all material—by limiting the amount of money spent upon it than there is in any other way. I believe that in that way only can you get over the enormous difficulties attendant upon any limitation of material, difficulties which centre round the well-known problem of supervision and control. In addition, we have proposed a system of publicity, I think reasonably effective, extending rather beyond all the actual limitations that we propose.
I venture to say that within these principles, the power of limitation we have provided for personnel and for material, the Conference will be able to carry out any degree of limitation whatever. Take the Soviet delegation's proposal to limit, I think it was by 25 per cent, the armaments of the world. There is no reason why that proposal should not be carried out within the framework of our Convention, if the Conference should so decide. Or take the proposal adumbrated by my friend Count Bernstorff, which, is, roughly speaking, to apply the disarmament provisions of the Treaty of Versailles to all the world. In my judgment, that can be done, although not exactly in the same method but with the same effect, in the framework we have provided.

Do not let me mislead anyone. I do not think myself that it is at all probable that so extensive a step will be taken by the first Disarmament Conference, either in the direction of the Russian proposal or of the German proposal. I think it most probable that we shall have to be content with a much smaller advance than that. Still, one never knows and one must never give up hope. The one thing I want to impress, not only upon my colleagues, who are well aware of it, but upon anyone else who may hear or read what I have said, is that one of the most valuable features in our scheme is that it expressly contemplates that there is to be no finality; that the first Conference and the first advance is only to be the prelude to greater advances later on; that we are to have a revision every five or ten years of everything that we do, so that, even if our first advance should be disappointing—and I have not given up hope that it will be the very reverse—then five or ten years afterwards we can advance still further.

We have created, or proposed to create, in the Permanent Disarmament Commission a piece of machinery which I believe to be of the most enormous value to the cause of disarmament. For the first time we are going to bring into existence, if our proposals adopted, an international organ of disarmament whose duty it will be to watch over the gradual, or let us hope the rapid, progress of disarmament; because I believe, once we have started on this line, the pressure to go on, and to proceed with vigour, will become enormous. I say, whether our advance be slow or rapid, we have created that international organ whose duty it will be to watch over what we have done, to press forward continually to further advances. That is, I believe, broadly, and without any exaggeration—I hope I have not exaggerated a single fact that I have stated—the scheme we have agreed upon.

To tell me that our results might have been better is merely to tell me that our efforts are human. Of course they might have been better; everything might be better; but I do say with absolute conviction that within the framework of this Convention we can make not only a material but an immense advance towards disarmament, and it entirely depends on what the Conference does whether what we have done here is going to be effective or the reverse.

The next word is with the Council. They will have to meet and determine the date of the Conference, which I hope will not be far removed; they will have to take whatever other measures are necessary to see that the Conference meets under the conditions most favourable to success; but though the next word is with the Council the last word is with the peoples of the world. We have given them in this Convention a great opportunity. They have the opportunity to carry forward the disarmament of the world. What will they do with it? The world can be disarmed if the peoples wish. The question we have to solve in the next few months—and it will be the duty of everyone of us to assist in that solution—is "do the peoples wish for disarmament?" Only they can give an answer to that question.

Declaration by the Delegation of the United States of America.

The Hon. Hugh Gibson (United States of America).—Mr. President, I confess that I should arise with considerable trepidation, after listening to the two eloquent speakers who have preceded me, if it were not for the opportunity it affords me to associate myself with the tribute M. Politis so justly paid to the great part Lord Cecil has played in the work of disarmament. Opposite M. Politis' remarks on this subject there can be no reservation—nor can there be any reservation to our agreement with the clear and really moving speech which Lord Cecil has played in the work of disarmament. Lord Cecil has just made.

I had occasion, Mr. President, during the London Naval Conference, to stress the contribution of M. Paul-Boncour to the success of our work, and I welcome the opportunity to join in what M. Politis has said about the rôle played by M. Paul-Boncour. And I cannot refrain from adding an expression of admiration for the way in which his successor has upheld the best traditions of French diplomacy.

In fact, I have reason to be deeply grateful to all our colleagues for their unfailing helpfulness and kindness.

In the course of our debates, we have heard numerous estimates as to the value of our work. But it is only now that our deliberations are coming to an end that we can effectively judge to what degree we have succeeded in our task.

For four years we have been endeavouring to reach agreement. There have been long and direct conflicts of opinion; views have been maintained with vigour, and yet our friendship with those who have differed from us has grown as steadily and as surely as our friendship with those who have shared our views. I take this as a good omen for the spirit in which all
the nations will enter the General Disarmament Conference and try to convert our text from a theory to a reality.

I have throughout been sensible of the very real difficulties under which many members of this Commission have laboured. Overshadowing our discussions, though seldom spoken of, have been the anxieties and worries that have arisen from the special preoccupations felt by numerous Governments for their national security.

We have now completed a draft Convention which, after study by the Governments' will go forward to the General Conference. I should not be frank, Mr. President, if I did not say that this draft falls short of our hopes and expectations. It fails to contain many factors in which we have always believed, and which, in our opinion, would lead to a real reduction of armaments. What we have achieved does not hold out the promise of bringing about that immediate reduction of armaments we would like to see. Make no mistake, it is not my purpose to belittle what we have done. Although our hopes may thus be disappointed, we can find comfort in the measure of agreement which has been reached in this Commission. We can, at least, foresee a stabilisation of armaments, the setting up of machinery to receive and disseminate information on armaments, to educate public opinion and to prepare systematically for the work of future conferences, as successive milestones in the continuing process of disarmament. If these things can be achieved by the coming Conference, and from present indications I think we are justified in assuming that they can be achieved, we shall have a situation obviously better than we have at present, and, while we cannot claim to have built the edifice, as M. Politis said, we shall at least have laid the foundation upon which it can be erected.

It is possible that the coming Conference will accomplish more than this; but, if so, it will be because our labours have been improved upon and because, after mature study of the problems involved and after weighing the consequences of failure, all the Governments come to the Conference resolved on greater measures of concession than the delegates here have been authorised to make.

I feel, Mr. President, that we should be rendering a poor service to the cause of reduction of armaments if we were to lead our peoples to believe that this work carried the movement further than it does. We have been repeatedly told during the past four years of the rôle of public opinion in connection with disarmament. It has been repeatedly said that real achievement by the Conference can be reached only by an aroused public opinion. This is profoundly true, but it is not enough that public opinion be aroused. It is first of all necessary that it should be informed, for an aroused and uninformed public opinion may do infinitely more harm than good. Public opinion will not be informed in such a way as to exercise an intelligent influence, if, through a desire to create confidence, we adopt too optimistic a tone as to what we have done and what can be accomplished on the basis of our present draft. Such exaggeration can really tend only to lull public opinion into a false sense of confidence, render it incapable of exercising its salutary influence, and prepare it for inevitable disillusionment.

We are all in agreement that an immense amount of preparatory work remains to be done before the meeting of the General Conference. The technical preparation for that Conference is in all conscience great enough, but a more difficult and more responsible task lies ahead of all our Governments in informing public opinion as to the facts, as to the difficulties, and as to the possible measures which may, with mutual concession, help us toward the goal we all desire to reach. This end can be served only by stating our achievements and our difficulties with moderation.

I hope that, in separating at the conclusion of our labours, we shall not yield to the temptation to indulge in mutual congratulations; that we may separate with becoming modesty, and, on reporting to our various Governments, that we do so with a full and frank recognition of the shortcomings of our present draft, and of the duties and responsibilities still before our Governments to lead the General Disarmament Conference to the success which our peoples so earnestly desire.

Declaration by the Delegation of Germany.

Count Bernstorff (Germany). — I have listened to Mr. Gibson's speech with the greatest interest, and, as regards essentials, I fully agree with him.

I have accepted the report because it contains all my reservations, and I have no present intention of reverting to matters that are now past. The reservations I have had to make have shown why I must maintain my criticism of the draft Convention. They also show that—in accordance with that criticism—the German Government must reject the draft, which, in its opinion, is full of the most serious and fundamental defects and omissions. The peoples have a sure instinct for realities, and mere words, however fine, cannot change their feeling. On the contrary, they will be quick to see that this so complex instrument lacks that which is essential—namely, a firm determination to disarm.
The Commission having completed its work, the peoples are now turning their gaze towards the future Conference. For the Conference will afford the very last opportunity of achieving the final goal of disarmament, for which the German Government will work ceaselessly and with all its strength, as it has done hitherto. It is on this point in particular that I find myself in agreement with Mr. Gibson. The Conference will be faced with an historic task; it will have to approach the problem in an entirely different way from that chosen hitherto, and so achieve the ideal—the true security of peace. It cannot succeed, however, unless it feels itself supported and urged on by public opinion throughout the world. On that point I am also quite in agreement with what Lord Cecil has just said.

It is, therefore, to the peoples that I now address a last and most urgent appeal. I ask them to do their utmost to get their Governments to realise the magnitude of their task and to see that they do not shrink from it. The peoples must not for a moment lose sight of the grave dangers which might arise if, in the end, the work of disarmament failed.

M. Sato (Japan). — It is purely by accident that my name appears on the list of speakers immediately after that of Count Bernstorff, and not because I have any intention of criticising what he has said. I simply wish to voice what is felt by my Government, and I leave it to other delegations—if they wish to do so—to express their views on the German representative's remarks.

Compared with those who have done their share in the work for disarmament since the beginning of the League of Nations ten years ago, I am really a mere novice. I have only been dealing with this question for four years; yet, in that time, I have acquired an experience greater than I had ever hoped.

When I attended the third session of our Commission—exactly three and a half years ago—the Commission, and my delegation in particular, experienced a very great surprise. As you will remember, Lord Cecil had arrived from London with a big draft Disarmament Convention in his pocket, while M. Paul-Boncour had submitted a French counter-project.

The draft Convention we have just adopted in its final form is based on the two texts to which I have just referred, and which constitute, as it were, the prelude to all our work, and I take this occasion to pay a respectful tribute to Lord Cecil and to M. Paul-Boncour, the two statesmen who were the authors of the first two drafts.

This is an historic moment for us. We have just adopted a draft Convention, the outcome of the joint efforts of more than thirty delegations, after collaborating for a number of years; and here I cannot omit a reference to the help the American delegation has given us.

We were all fully aware of the American view on various important questions with which this Commission has dealt. On the question of trained reserves, on that of material in reserve, and on that of direct limitation, Mr. Gibson had, at the outset, as we all know, very definite ideas. In May of last year, he made a most important statement. He has, to a certain extent, abandoned his views on several of these important questions, and he has modified his attitude while, at the same time, pressing his arguments. He did so, however, in order to enable a positive result to be achieved; in order to promote the progress of our work he has made a sacrifice. On the naval question, we all knew what the American representative's statement meant. At that time, he spoke of his famous "yard-stick" scheme. That idea was not wholly realised; yet it was the actual origin of the negotiations between the maritime Powers, and its results were reached at the London Naval Conference. My country was a party to the London Naval Treaty, and therefore I must not sound its praises too much; but I must say that, if it has enabled the Commission to continue the work of disarmament. I am sure we shall all agree that, but for that Treaty, the Commission would have been in a very difficult, if not impossible, position.

Speaking wholly impartially, I do not think the draft Convention adopted to-day can be called ideal. To be so, it would have to be drawn up differently. But we cannot hope to reach an ideal settlement of the problem by simple or easy means. Indeed, I have never heard it said that man can attain his ideal. Much time will therefore be required for the League to achieve disarmament. What we have done up to the present, however, will enable the first stage of disarmament to be carried out.

I have more than once had occasion to voice my Government's feelings on this subject, and I shall not dwell on the point. I cannot refrain from saying, however, that this first stage of disarmament will probably be a modest one. No great work can be carried out at one step. If we tried to do so, we should encounter immense difficulties, and might even risk causing the failure of the Conference. My Government, therefore, has always favoured moderate courses and steady but gradual progress. This is an opinion which, I think, may be shared by the Commission even if it does not wholly share all my Government's views.

We are parting to-day after having accomplished the task entrusted to us by the Council and Assembly. We are parting with a feeling of comfort, because the work we have done has prepared the way for disarmament.
It is now for the Council to fix the date when the Conference is to be convened. I earnestly hope that the representatives whom the Governments send to the Conference will all be armed with full powers to sign the future Convention; otherwise, public opinion would be deeply disappointed, and that would be most regrettable. We must therefore do our utmost to bring about this result. I hope that the Conference may be convened very shortly. In any case my Government will come to it in a broad spirit of conciliation. It will do all in its power to enable all the representatives to collaborate fruitfully in order that the Convention may be signed.

DECLARATION BY THE DELEGATION OF FRANCE.

M. Massigli (France).—In putting the finishing touches to the draft Convention, which has been on the loom, so to speak, for three years, our Commission has completed its task, and that of the Governments will now begin.

Doubtless, the proposals we have made to settle the problem may be considered timid, and, from an absolute point of view it might not be difficult to conceive of better ones. No one can say, however, that this Commission has not produced a solid piece of work. No one can maintain that, after having unflinchingly faced realities, we are submitting a draft which does not respond to present possibilities. We were faced with a grave problem which had been probed for many years and yet in some respects was new. At every step unexpected difficulties arose, and our duty, therefore, was not to recommend to the Governments one of those futile manifestations which leave behind them nothing but a memory of disappointment in the minds of the peoples—our duty (and we have fulfilled it) was to state the bases on which, after conscientious and laborious enquiry, we consider it possible at the present time to establish a general treaty for the limitation of armaments. That is what Lord Cecil has told us, and, in associating myself with what he has said, allow me to associate myself also with the tribute paid to him.

It is for the Governments to utilise the materials with which we have provided them, even though they do not find them all they were entitled to expect after the questions they had put to us; even though we give them no final opinion on the criteria on which the proportions between the armaments of the various countries might be based; even though we have not determined how far careful adjustment of the methods of applying Article 16 of the Covenant would facilitate the reduction of armaments; even though, lastly, we have not considered systems of regional disarmament.

None the less, Article 8 of the Covenant fixes in very definite terms the goal to be reached by the Governments of the Members of the League, and in this respect the unanimous decisions of successive Assemblies have surely framed a League doctrine.

The First Assembly established respect for existing treaties as the basis of the edifice to be constructed.

The Third Assembly, in the famous Resolution 14, emphasised the connection which would necessarily be formed between the proportion in which armaments were to be reduced and the organisation of a system of mutual assistance within the framework of the Covenant.

After the great Assembly of 1924, the Assembly of 1926, while recommending that a Conference for the limitation and reduction of armaments should be called as rapidly as possible, pointed out that the results of the Conference would depend upon the conditions of regional and general security at the time when the Conference met, and the Preparatory Commission embodied this declaration in its report to the Council after its first session.

In the same spirit the subsequent Assemblies, seeing that it would be useless to try to forestall events, to push forward disarmament faster than the general political situation allowed, at the same time proclaiming the necessity of proceeding pari passu with the organisation of security, emphasised strongly the view that the first Conference would only succeed in taking a first step.

It is this first step that the Governments are now asked to take. When they come to the Conference they will bring with them facts, proposals, justifications.

By facts I mean that they will bring documents that will irrefutably demonstrate the success of the steps which a number of them have already spontaneously taken, since signing the Covenant, on the lines laid down in Article 8 of the Covenant.

By proposals I mean that they will state within what limits they consider themselves able to contract international obligations in a field which has hitherto been the close preserve of national sovereignty.

Lastly, when I speak of justifications I mean that they will state the grounds—based on hope or on foresight—on which their proposals are founded.

On this point the Governments must ask themselves—and, if they were likely to forget, public opinion in the different countries would remind them—what progress has been made in the organisation of security since the work of our Commission was started; or, if you prefer the phrase used by our Rapporteurs, who regard things from the psychological point of view, let us say the progress made in the growth of confidence since our Commission started its work.

What has been done with the drafts prepared by the Arbitration and Security Committee? What has been done to promote the conclusion of regional agreements, whether for the purpose of preventing or of penalising war? What has been done in the field of arbitration? What is the position as regards accessions to the General Act?

All these are questions which the Governments will have to ponder before the Conference is held, and the solutions which have been found for them, or which will be found for them, in the coming months will determine how great the first step to be taken will be.
I cannot do better here than to read you the words spoken by M. Politis last year:

"Whatever may be the scope of this first stage, it will assuredly constitute a very important advance. For the first time in the history of the world, the problem of national armaments will have changed its character. It has hitherto been, and still is, an essentially domestic concern—a matter coming exclusively under the sovereign rights of each State. Henceforth it will become an international question, governed by laws which the States will have freely accepted."

That is the essential truth which Governments imbued with the will to peace, or, to speak more simply, Governments animated by good will—it amounts to the same thing—must have the courage to proclaim, even though—to do so they have to withstand the pressure of public opinion; and assuredly it may prove far from easy to bring public opinion back to the right path when once it has been allowed to stray from it. Yet, if there is a firm resolve, public opinion can easily be enlightened while there is still time.

Since this Commission entered upon its task it has, I venture to say, received loyal assistance from the French Government, fully conscious as that Government is of its obligations under the Covenant. I was happy to find that fact acknowledged in the tribute paid to my predecessor here by M. Politis, M. Sato and the Hon. Hugh Gibson, and I thank them for it, though I trust the Hon. Hugh Gibson will forgive me if I prefer not to have heard what he kindly added. Nor will French help be withheld in the months to come or at the Conference itself, when we come to give final form to, and to define the final scope of, the solemn undertakings which we propose the countries should contract. My country will bring to this work the unreserved good will which should be felt by all countries that are truly bent on peace. For France, though conscious of the limits which elementary prudence forbids her to pass at present, however impatient she may be and whatever interest may have to be sacrificed, is firmly determined to do, within these limits, all that is reasonably possible.

Declaration by the Delegation of Bulgaria.

M. Morfoff (Bulgaria).—Gentlemen, I recognise that we have done very useful work and have made a first step towards preventing war. I am bound to say, however, that our work leaves my country in a state of flagrant insecurity. Owing to the obligations which have been imposed upon us, we are still deprived of all necessary means of legitimate defence.

Article 11 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and all that we have done in the domain of security, only applies to normal circumstances, and will not give us the requisite security in abnormal times and in periods of general political complication, when the great Powers which control the situation are unable to help us.

Bulgaria remains open to all comers by land, by sea, and by air, for her reduced army, although it is very expensive and is a heavy charge upon her financial situation, is hardly sufficient for local duties.

We hope that the experts and the future Permanent Disarmament Commission will be given a chance of finding a practical solution which, while creating no dangers for any party concerned, will put an end to our state of insecurity. In saying this, I base myself on the following precedents. In 1922, during the Lausanne Conference, when demilitarised zones were created, the experts recognised that these zones were not sufficiently protected and allowed Bulgaria to increase her effectives and to arm them with automatic rifles, although this was not provided for in the Treaty. Similarly, in 1923, during the disturbances which occurred in Bulgaria, the Conference of Ambassadors, to which one of the delegates here to-day belonged (and I desire to pay a tribute to his sense of justice), also allowed us to increase our effectives. This measure considerably assisted the internal pacification of the country, but it must be admitted that the evils which were then in evidence would not have been so great if Bulgaria had not had to undergo so many restrictions as regards armaments.

It is not necessary to quote to you examples to demonstrate the utility of putting an end, as soon as possible, to the state of insecurity in which my country is placed, and this cannot fail to be in the interests of general peace. I will confine myself to expressing our hope that the forthcoming Disarmament Conference will itself examine, or instruct the future Permanent Commission to examine, the situation of Bulgaria, and will permit her to take the measures which are essential to her legitimate defence.

Declaration by the Delegation of Roumania.

M. Antoniade (Roumania).—Now that we are reaching the end of our labours, the Roumanian delegation, which represents a Government firmly attached to the idea of peace, has great satisfaction, when giving its approval to the draft Convention which has just been drawn up and to the report, in recording the fact that an important step has been made in dealing with a question which has occupied our attention for so many years. It does not share the pessimism of certain fretful spirits who always ask for absolute perfection and who, in pursuit of the most radical solutions, underestimate achievements which have only the merit of answering to the possibilities of the moment. We consider that our Commission, in entering upon a line of action which is entirely new in the history of international co-operation, has done all that was reasonably possible in the present situation.
It is true, as pointed out by several of the previous speakers and also in the report, that only the framework or canvas of a disarmament convention has been prepared—which, indeed, was all that our Commission was asked to do—and that this framework will have to be filled in with definite figures. It is then that the most delicate and difficult task will begin. But, in carrying out this task, the importance and difficulty of which no one will deny, neither the Governments, nor the Committee, nor the assiduous work done by the Commissions which have sat and by the successive Assemblies, we have rallying-points and principles to which we shall always have to come back. As has already been pointed out, there is a League doctrine in this connection, which is solidly established and has been repeatedly stated. There is, first of all, the spirit and structure of the Covenant, which as a whole, and particularly in Articles 8, 10, 11 and 16, aims at setting up an organisation for peace. Thus, we find in Article 8 of the Covenant the principle that the reduction of national armaments is bound up with each country's security, its geographical situation and its special circumstances. Then we have the whole series of unanimous resolutions of the Assembly which have never faltered in their principles. I may mention that of the third Assembly, which, after stating the necessity of a general reduction of armaments, looked to the conclusion of a treaty of mutual guarantee within the framework of the Covenant as a means of bringing this about, and stated that this reduction must be proportional to the security provided by the Treaty of Guarantee. Then there was the resolution of the 1926 Assembly, which, dealing with the programme of a conference for the limitation and reduction of armaments, viewed this limitation and reduction “in relation with the present conditions of regional and general security”. The 1927 Assembly, in approving the creation of the Committee on the Reduction of Armaments and Security, was “convinced that the principal condition of success is that every State should be sure of not having to provide unaided for its security by means of its own armaments, and should be able to rely also on the organised collective action of the League of Nations”. And the following Assembly, after recalling the close relation between international security and the reduction and limitation of armaments, contemplated the progressive reduction of armaments by further steps as the increase of security allowed.

The doctrine is therefore a stable and consistent one—indissoluble connection, interdependence between disarmament and security, the former a function of the latter. When the time comes to fill in the framework we have prepared, the state of general and regional security will determine the limitations which can be agreed to. In the direction of theoretical and practical security, the League of Nations has had no lack of studies, labours and international acts carried out either by itself or within its framework. There are general and/or regional pacts and model treaties which have been carefully prepared and approved by the Assembly, and there is a General Act. Far be it from me to throw doubt on the value of these studies, models or pacts. But the fact remains that, when the future Conference enters upon its first stage, the actual disarmament problem will be faced with the greatest care what have been the positive results of these acts in the sphere of general and regional security. On this will depend the distance which countries will be prepared to go in the limitation of armaments.

The Roumanian delegation, which has collaborated wholeheartedly in the labours of this Commission in the hope that they would reach a successful issue, will attend the Conference in the same spirit, and will agree to any limitation compatible with its security. It hopes that, between now and the meeting of the forthcoming Conference, certain facts, tendencies and manifestations liable to diminish security will have disappeared, and that general and regional security will have made sufficient progress to permit of an important first step being taken.

Declaration by the Delegation of Sweden.

M. Westman (Sweden).—I had not intended to take part in this final debate, but the rather disturbing discussion which took place the other night in connection with the request submitted by one of our colleagues in a very important case the report should make an express reference to the attitude of certain delegations not belonging to the majority, showed me that it may be useful, in order to avoid misunderstandings in future, to define briefly my Government's attitude with regard to the work done by the Commission, and with regard to its future consequences.

The Swedish delegation is among those which have made no express reservations to the provisions voted by the majority. It did not feel called upon to make reservations, although the proposals which it put forward or which it supported with regard to certain vital points in the Convention did not meet with the approval of the majority. In this connection I need only recall the decisions taken by the Commission with regard to trained reserves, with regard to the limitation of land war material, and with regard to publicity concerning this material, decisions by which the Commission, evidently guided by political considerations, thought fit to lay the foundations, which we regard as technically unsatisfactory, of the future work of the Disarmament Conference. If, however, the Swedish delegation refrained from making reservations, it is in order that the differences of opinion which have been manifest in our Commission should not be still further accentuated; and it made a point of refraining from any action which might exercise an unfavourable influence on the heavy and difficult work of disarmament undertaken by the League of Nations. This course is in full conformity with the attitude always observed by the Swedish delegation, which has pursued its task in our Commission with the firm determination to do all in its power to promote positive results, however limited, on each point.
This attitude has not involved, and cannot involve, any renunciation on the part of the Swedish Government of the opinions which it has stated since the outset of our work, through the members of its delegation and in the best interests of disarmament. My Government therefore emphasises its right in the course of the subsequent proceedings to take any action and to support any proposal likely to make the international Disarmament Convention as effective and as just as possible.

DECLARATION BY THE DELEGATION OF YUGOSLAVIA.

Dr. Markovitch (Yugoslavia). — The Preparatory Commission has concluded its work and it only remains for us to accept as a whole the conclusions embodied in the draft Convention and in the accompanying report. What is the real value of our draft and of the documents annexed? This is a question which can well be answered now, because there can be no doubt that this draft affords a well-defined and well-considered framework for the international Convention which will be called upon to settle, in future, the question of armaments on the basis of the solidarity of peoples and of their common interests.

But if, from the technical point of view, we give our full approval to the draft in question, because it answers to all the technical factors of the problem, and has succeeded to a large extent in reconciling the ideal with the practical, we cannot unreservedly accept the same conclusions if we consider the draft from the political aspect. In this connection we desire to emphasise certain elementary truths which lie at the very root of our work and of all measures of disarmament.

We note, first of all, that the work of disarmament is carried out, and must be carried out, within the framework of the international organisation created by the Covenant of the League of Nations. Article 8 of the Covenant, which governs the problem of disarmament, forms part of a whole system, the different factors of which are interdependent. If the States Members of the League of Nations recognise that the maintenance of peace necessitates the reduction of national armaments, this recognition is based on the observance and validity of all the other articles of the Covenant, with which Article 8 forms an indivisible whole. The execution and application of Article 8 of the Covenant are certainly a guarantee of peace, and nobody can dispute this fact. But they are not the sole guarantee. It cannot even be proved that they are the first and main guarantee.

Any attempt to base the organisation of peace on a single article of the Covenant is mistaken, and contrary to the spirit and letter of the Covenant. The provisions of the Preamble, of Article 10 and of Article 16 of the Covenant, and of other articles also, constitute part of the same unit as Article 8, and they cannot be dealt with separately. We think it well to emphasise this position as regards principle which dominates the whole subject of disarmament.

In emphasising this essential aspect of the problem, we are in complete harmony with the attitude and the line of conduct followed, in this connection, by the League of Nations during the eight years of its activities from 1922 to 1930. I will refrain from quoting facts which are well known, and which, indeed, are mentioned in the report, with regard to the period from 1925 to 1930. When, in 1925, the Council of the League of Nations decided to appoint a special Commission to seek the methods and establish a programme of disarmament, it saw very clearly the problem as a whole, its complex nature and its connection with the whole international organisation of peace as reflected in the League of Nations. From the outset, the Council had contemplated the formation of a Commission consisting of the delegates of the responsible Governments, and having full freedom to deal with the problem as a whole without any limitation or restriction with regard to the different and varied elements of the problem. The questionnaire prepared by the Council and recommended to the Preparatory Commission as a basis for its work leaves no room for doubt on this point. Apart from questions of a technical and military nature, this questionnaire covers other problems of a political nature in relation with the general system of the Covenant. I would particularly recall Questions V and VII, which relate to questions of capital importance. In Question V, paragraph (a), the Preparatory Commission is asked to determine:

"On what principle will it be possible to draw up a scale of armaments permissible to the various countries, taking into account particularly:

1. Population;
2. Resources;
3. Geographical situation;
4. Length and nature of maritime communications;
5. Density and character of the railways;
6. Vulnerability of the frontiers and of the important vital centres near the frontiers;
7. The time required, varying with different States, to transform peace armaments into war armaments;
8. The degree of security which, in the event of aggression, a State could receive under the provisions of the Covenant, or of separate engagements contracted towards that State?"
In paragraph (b) the question is raised:

"Can the reduction of armaments be procured by examining possible means for ensuring that the mutual assistance, economic and military, contemplated in Article 16 of the Covenant shall be brought quickly into operation as soon as an act of aggression has been committed?"

I will further quote Question VII, which raises the following problem:

"Admitting that disarmament depends on security, to what extent is regional disarmament possible in return for regional security? Or is any scheme of disarmament impracticable unless it is general? If regional disarmament is practicable, would it promote or lead up to general disarmament?"

I quote these questions, which I regard as essential. What are the Commission's replies to these general problems, whose importance will be evident to all? As regards Question V, paragraph (b), in so far as it concerns economic assistance, the problem is partly solved by the adoption of the Convention on Financial Assistance. This Convention owes its importance mainly to the fact that it consecrates the principle of assistance in the case of aggression than to the actual assistance which it offers to the countries attacked, but it certainly marks a material step forward. As regards the other problems indicated in the questionnaire, the Commission has not thought it necessary to reply. There is not even a reply stating a principle. The Yugoslav delegation considers, however, that, in view of the capital importance of the problems raised, and in view of the example given by the formal resolutions of the Assembly, this correlation between the methods for reduction and limitation of armaments and the political factors of the problem, the absolute observance of the Covenant and the faithful execution of all the obligations contained therein—in short, the degree of national and international security—should have found a place in the draft Convention. It should have been placed at the beginning of the Convention side by side with Article 1. This was not done, and the Yugoslav delegation regrets it.

The Commission has endeavoured to make good this deficiency by recalling in the report the decisions of the Council and the resolutions of the Assembly with regard to security and the interdependence between the level of armaments and national security. We should have preferred to see this principle embodied in the draft Convention itself; but, in view of the spirit of conciliation which has attended our labours, we accepted this indirect method, which seemed to be preferred by a number of delegations. We wish, however, to emphasise that the omission, from the Convention itself, of any special rule regarding the interdependence between disarmament and security in no way modifies the actual problem, and does not imply any weakening of the value of the Assembly's formal resolutions or any relinquishment on our part of the principles on which disarmament must be based. We regard this as a solidly established doctrine, and it is on the basis of this doctrine that the Yugoslav delegation has given and gives its consent to the draft Convention and to the report. It is in conformity with this doctrine, and after having carefully considered and appreciated all its military and political elements, that the Yugoslav delegation will lay before the General Disarmament Conference the minimum figures for its national armament compatible with its national security in the present state of general and regional international relations.

**DECLARATION BY THE DELEGATION OF POLAND.**

General Kasprzyeki (Poland).—At the end of our discussions, I should like to draw the Commission's attention to certain difficulties and dangers which overcloud future prospects. In doing this, I speak as an optimist, and in order to note the fact that it will be both necessary and possible, between now and the Conference, to counteract all the tendencies which may make the success of that Conference more difficult.

All those who have come here for the sole purpose of genuinely preparing the First Disarmament Conference agreed at the outset that a full and complete solution of the problem could not be contemplated under the present conditions of general security. In the League a doctrine has, moreover, established itself, which is that, in the matter of disarmament, you must proceed by stages. This doctrine was recognised by a unanimous resolution of the 1928 Assembly. I believe that, now more than ever, we must bear this highly important point in mind, in order to cope with a form of propaganda which seeks to detract from the value of our work and possibly to render success difficult to achieve in the first stage of disarmament. We must take action against this propaganda, which will deny all the facts of the position and remain in the clouds.

We hope, however, that these negative tendencies will not gain the upper hand, and that those who, on many occasions, instead of helping us, have loaded us with bitter criticism, will ultimately realise that, in attempting too much, you defeat your own object. It is only by joining forces and by a common effort of goodwill that we shall be able, at the Conference, to achieve positive results.

On behalf of the Polish delegation, I desire to state that the provisions of our draft Convention, which have been carefully studied from a technical standpoint and at the same time are fairly complete, provide a sound basis and framework for the future Convention. As I have already had occasion to emphasise, the draft prepared by our Commission provides for very valuable undertakings in the various fields of national defence, and that the first
stage in the reduction and limitation of armaments will consequently be recognised as of unquestionable value by all unbiased minds.

In agreement with several of my honourable colleagues who have already spoken, I consider it indispensable, at the present moment, to bring forward one or two fundamental ideas on security, ideas upon which success in disarmament must hinge.

Before going into details, I wish to express concurrence in the general ideas on security which have been expounded by the honourable delegates of France and of Roumania and others. In particular, I entirely share the views of the honourable delegate of Yugoslavia regarding the interdependence of the articles of the League Covenant. Only by elaborating and translating into practice all the essential articles of the Covenant and not one or two isolated clauses, shall we, in fact, be able to reach a logical and harmonious solution of all the problems under consideration. So long as a general agreement is not possible, this can be done regionally or by agreement between particular parties. It can also be done by instalments, by stages, as in the case of the Convention on Financial Assistance.

In using the general term "security", we were concerned mainly with the three following aspects of the problem — guarantees of mutual assistance, respect for treaties, and the securing of a general détente.

In our opinion, mutual assistance is the very basis of security — no security without assistance, no assistance without definite practical and precise undertakings.

In this connection, I need only refer to Resolution XIV of the Assembly, which considers that a real guarantee can be obtained by effective and immediate assistance afforded according to a prearranged plan, and which even contemplates that "in cases where, for historical, geographical or other reasons, a country is in special danger of attack, detailed arrangements should be made for its defence.”

The conception of security is, moreover, based upon absolute respect for international undertakings. The Preamble to the Covenant says in this connection:

"... In order to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security by ... a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with one another."

Moreover, we should bear in mind the resolution of the first Assembly, which has been rightly referred to by M. Massigli, and which makes a general limitation of armaments contingent upon the full execution of the draft treaties; and in this I would point out that the Assembly recognises the logic of the position and the plain evidence of the political facts to which I referred this morning. This resolution further states that the general limitation of armaments depends upon "the collaboration of the other great military Powers which have hitherto remained outside the League."

Finally, an essential factor in security is the achievement of general moral disarmament. Now we are bound to note that in this field there appears, at the moment, to be a tendency in the opposite direction.

The "cries of death and hatred", so aptly referred to by M. Briand two months ago, are spreading, are becoming more numerous, and are making themselves heard more and more frequently in the world without let or hindrance.

These struggles, which are growing more embittered; this propaganda, which causes friction between one nation and another — all this engenders a state of mind highly unfavourable to the reduction of armaments. Conducted by persons with no sense of responsibility, based for the most part on tendentious information, a propaganda is developing which is not only likely to render success more difficult in the first stage of disarmament, but is also a danger to peace and goodwill among nations.

Moral disarmament has been talked about for a long time in the League. I regret to say, however, that, hitherto, nothing practical has been done along these lines, and this is the essential point to which I would draw your attention. There is a whole series of practical measures which might be taken by States and by the League of Nations with a view to promoting moral disarmament. It would certainly be possible, by mutual undertaking, to arrest the hate-inspired propaganda; it would certainly be possible to compel States to rectify false information about other countries which is current in public opinion or appears in the Press or in literature; it would certainly be possible to have war propaganda recognised as a crime by the law of all countries. Many other measures could also be contemplated.

The problem of moral disarmament is an urgent problem, which is closely bound up with that of material disarmament.

You cannot expect to enhance, or even to preserve, the feeling of security in an atmosphere of growing disquiet.

The flagrant contradiction between demands for an appreciable reduction of armaments, demands for total disarmament, and an increasingly violent propaganda tending to promote disorder or even war, must be brought home to the general public.

World public opinion must be convinced of the absolute necessity of practical results in moral disarmament. A study of the practical means to that end is becoming more and more essential. It is one of the most indispensable conditions of the success of the future Conference.
DECLARATION BY THE DELEGATION OF CHINA.

Dr. Woo Kaiseng (China). — The Chinese delegation is happy to congratulate the Preparatory Commission and its Rapporteurs on the successful conclusion of its work, and to extend its thanks to the President and Vice-Presidents for their skilful conduct of the business, which has ensured the success of the draft Convention.

The Chinese delegation regards the present draft as a well-formed infant brought forth after prolonged labour. Five years of preparatory work, six sessions, all very carefully followed, thirty-two delegations bringing their national ideals to the work, extend a promise of happy days to our democracies.

World public opinion expected Geneva to bring forth this wholly practicable scheme. The first stage has been passed. We now have a text before us, but the draft which the Governments will vote to-morrow will still raise many difficulties. To-morrow, however, we mean to fight our way through to final success.

Unquestionably, this is the first time that a convention on the limitation and reduction of armaments has been drawn up. It is a great event in world history.

If, during the lengthy discussions of this session, the Chinese delegation has sometimes refrained from voting, this did not imply that it adopted a negative attitude, but that it needed time to reflect on these very grave matters.

China is a true democracy; it is consequently peaceful. It has its "declaration of the rights of man"; the San Mintshui — that is to say, the Three Principles of the People. It knows how to fight against war by practising justice. It must succour the weak and raise the fallen.

After many years of internal strife, my country has quite recently achieved national unity and political stability.

The Chinese delegation holds definite opinions on peace and disarmament, and we can assure the Commission that we shall state these opinions at the General Conference.

What I wish to do to-day is to explain the views of the Chinese delegation on peace. All our practical work in the field of disarmament will certainly have the technical value of statements by Governments; it may have considerable moral effect. We must hope that its moral effects will be genuinely felt, and that we shall thus get at the real causes of war. The limitation and reduction of land, naval and air armaments is a positive means of arresting preparation for war. The work of abolition must be carried into other fields as well. We must deal with the deep-lying causes, the moral causes.

More than anything else, mutual understanding, a clear comprehension of the issues which divide nations, will contribute towards the abolition of war among States. We must get to know each other better and better.

If men speak to each other clearly, and if their interests and their needs are identical, we shall have peace. If they allow themselves to be dragged into ignorance and hatred, and if their interests and their needs clash, we shall have war. China is following with sympathy the schemes for the federal organisation of States which economic circumstances, unemployment and interests are impelling to fratricidal strife. It is to our interest to make ourselves useful to others, to endeavour to weaken those who are harmful to society. Allow me to quote our philosopher, the old sage Me Tseu, who was born more than 500 years before the Christian era, and who said:

"Wise men must concern themselves with the improvement of the human universe. If they know where trouble originates, they can intervene effectively. If, on the other hand, they do not know, they will be helpless. They will be like doctors whose task is to cure the sick; but whose knowledge does not extend to the root of the evil."

Where, then, does trouble originate in the human universe? It has its source in the fact that nations do not know and do not love each other. Thus brigades love their families but not their fellow-men; that is why they plunder the houses of others, in order to serve the interest of their own kin. Nations love their own country and do not love other nations. That is why they conquer neighbouring countries in order to extend their own.

But why all this? Because we do not know each other. If peoples looked upon neighbouring countries as their own, wars would disappear.

Such, Mr. President, are our fundamental views, views that the Chinese delegation is proud to be able to expound here.

If we frequently stress these ideas, we shall be promoting the work of disarmament, and thereby the happiness of our peoples.

DECLARATION BY THE DELEGATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

M. Fierlinger (Czechoslovakia). — As we have now come to the end of the series of statements by delegates I will be brief. I can, indeed, be briefer than I anticipated, for what I had in mind has already been said by others with added clearness and precision. I entirely share their views — views which in most cases reflect moderate optimism based on a sense of realities.

I should like, however, to add to their statements the main point of what I intended to say.
My purpose is to draw attention once more to certain facts which have been constantly present in our minds throughout the work of the Commission, facts which must come up again before the Conference and determine its line of conduct. To explain my point I need only refer to various resolutions unanimously adopted by the Assembly and already mentioned by certain of my colleagues.

These resolutions, which formed the basis of our work, laid stress on the interdependence between the problem of disarmament and that of security.

The great majority of the Commission has taken this view of its work, and what I have just said might therefore appear superfluous. We desire, however, to point out once more the most practical and reliable means of reaching the goal we have in view.

The idea of peace has doubtless gained ground and valuable guarantees of security have been provided, which must not be under-estimated. These guarantees and the successful results of the League's efforts have made it possible for our Commission to complete its work, which, notwithstanding its theoretical nature, will perhaps, as was rightly said by M. Politis, constitute a great page of history.

We hope that, when the Conference meets, we shall be in a position to record fresh progress calculated still further to facilitate the Conference's work, but we must not close our eyes to the distance we still have to travel before the Covenant is carried into full effect; there is still a long road ahead of us. We must not forget that we shall have to exert ourselves very considerably, sometimes in one direction, sometimes in another, in order to achieve our purpose. At the same time, if we make this our chief concern, I do not doubt but that we shall fulfill the highest aspirations of mankind, the aspirations embodied in Article 8 of the Covenant.

DECLARATION BY THE DELEGATION OF ITALY.

General de Marinis (Italy). - The Italian delegation has on many occasions expressed its point of view with regard to the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, and it is unnecessary to recapitulate its views on the methods and stipulations provided for in the draft Convention. It is sufficient to refer you to the Minutes.

Now that the Preparatory Commission has completed its lengthy task, in which the Italian Government has all along participated with the keenest interest, I wish to state that my Government is inspired by the policy of peace which has actuated it in all its international activities. It is a policy of peace, but one which is governed by the necessity of safeguarding its vital interests, and my country will participate in the Disarmament Conference with an earnest desire to achieve results in the form of the equitable regulation of armaments. While taking into account the requirements of each country from the point of view of defence, it should be the object of such regulation to abolish the very great discrepancies which at present exist; these are the chief cause of the competition in armaments and are highly detrimental to international security. I am firmly convinced that the absence of a just proportion between armaments and the real requirements of each country for defence, which exists at present, is the chief obstacle to the framing of an effective scheme for the reduction of armaments.

I am convinced that, if we succeed in modifying this state of affairs, we shall have made great progress in the direction of disarmament and shall greatly facilitate the next stage of our work.

131. Close of the Session.

The President. — Our Commission met for the first time on May 18th, 1926. After four years and seven months it has to-day completed its task.

We were instructed to prepare for a First General Conference for the Limitation and Reduction of Armaments, and it was our duty to lay down guiding principles for that Conference's work. With the approval of the League Assembly, we considered that the best means of laying down such principles was to draw up a draft Convention specifying the method and principles to be adopted for the limitation and reduction of armaments and to prepare the many tables to be filled in by the Conference in application of those principles.

Does the preliminary draft which we have just adopted show that we have accomplished what we set out to do?

To those who expected us to settle all divergences of principle among the different Powers with regard to disarmament I would frankly reply, No! Even before we began our work all the Governments knew that this would be impossible.

On the other hand, to those who realise that, in the present state of the world, an initial effort, however incomplete, in the direction of limitation — and, as far as possible, the reduction — of armed forces is of capital importance, I do not hesitate to reply, Yes!

What we have prepared is, as it were, a well-thought-out framework in which the figures will be filled in by the General Conference. Only then will our draft Convention be signed and become the first Convention for the Limitation and Reduction of Armaments. It will no doubt be revised and amended many times, as mutual trust between the nations increases, showing what has been termed moral disarmament.
If the provisions which we have framed appear to be incomplete, it is none the less true that never before in the history of the world have the nations, which are so jealous of their sovereign rights, contemplated the international regulation of their means of national defence.

Does not this fact alone give to our work, however imperfect it may be at this initial stage, a profound significance?

The work done by the Committee on Arbitration and Security, set up by the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, is deserving of the highest praise.

To that Committee, presided over with such competence by M. Beneš, we owe a series of agreements for the pacific settlement of international disputes, financial assistance, etc., which cannot fail to facilitate the limitation and progressive reduction of armaments by the various Governments.

Our draft Convention will now be submitted to the Governments. It is for them to do their utmost to facilitate the convening at the earliest possible date of the world Conference which public opinion in all parts of the world is demanding with such insistence.

We cannot say that the present situation is unfavourable to the limitation and reduction of armaments. Even if there were no Locarno Treaties and no Paris Pact, it is obvious that the economic interests of the nations make the pacific settlement of their disputes more than ever necessary. It is more than ever necessary that military budgets should be reduced; never before have responsible statesmen and enlightened public opinion realised so clearly that war — "that horrible thing", as one of the greatest contemporary military chiefs has called it — is a crime unworthy of mankind, and that no victory is worth the sacrifice of human lives which it entails.

You have worked tirelessly in the cause of peace, and, as President, I would praise particularly your determination to achieve results. In this connection I call to mind certain members of our Commission who played such a prominent part in its first sessions and of whose work we have an imperishable memory, men such as M. de Brouckère and M. Paul-Boncour, to name only two.

I should also like to pay a special tribute to Lord Cecil, and to express to him on your behalf our profound gratitude and admiration for all that he has done for so many years past to help forward our work.

Despite what were frequently divergent points of view, our discussions have taken place in an atmosphere which never verged on the sombre, an atmosphere from which humour and laughter were by no means absent. I wish to thank you for having realised that the responsibility for the successful conduct of meetings such as ours does not depend upon the President alone. Our sometimes lengthy debates might easily have become unduly protracted if you had not understood that success demanded brevity, concision and that degree of discipline which your President constantly demanded of you. Moreover, you have spoken frankly, as is the custom in the League of Nations, where anything can be said provided that the conventions are observed.

When an international meeting has the privilege of counting among its members a Nicholas Politis, it can be sure of always finding a clear and accurate formula which, but for him, it might perhaps have to seek in vain. You have given us so many proofs of this, Mr. Vice-President, you have repeatedly directed and summed up the discussions of our Sub-Committees in so admirable a fashion that I am, I feel sure, interpreting the feelings of the whole Commission in expressing our profound gratitude to you.

Beside you sits a proud Castilian, whose delightful ardour and laborious diligence are deserving of our warmest thanks. M. Cobian, our enthusiastic Rapporteur, had an unparalleled opportunity of expressing his views in the person of our young colleague, M. Bourquin, "a trained reserve" as he described himself—a reserve whose training is the more admirable in that his period of service within our ranks is even now quite short. I wish to thank you, M. Bourquin, on behalf of everyone. I would thank you more particularly to-day, and for the added reason that only two or three hours ago I learned that up to October 20th last you knew nothing about the question of disarmament.

While I am concerned with the expression of our gratitude, may I extend our thanks not only to the first delegates, but also to all the experts present, who from the outset of our work have given such signal proof of their knowledge and zeal?

What a wealth of learning the General Conference will derive from the reports of your Sub-Commissions A and B and from the many technical statements due to our experts!

I have already had occasion to laud the merits of our Drafting Committee, composed of M. Westman, M. Paul-Boncour and Sir William Malkin. It is a pleasure to me to reiterate our profound gratitude and admiration for all that he has done for so many years past to help forward our work.

When one speaks of zeal, unwearying zeal, it is to the whole staff of the Secretariat that a large part of our debt of gratitude is due. First and foremost to M. Aghnides, that youthful, dauntless and energetic Director of the Disarmament Section, who, in the space of a few months, has become completely conversant with a task which he must have found all the more difficult in that he had as his illustrious predecessors M. de Madariaga and M. Colban, whose talent, activity and devotion to our cause I shall never forget.

M. Aghnides has behind him a first-class staff and a number of Amazons — women warriors of whom I cannot refrain from mentioning by name, for I know that all of you who have seen her at work since this Commission came into being, and who know how hard she works, and how she works night and day with her untiring fellow-Amazons, will agree that Mlle Gabrielle Boisseau is the personification of active, intelligent and smiling grace, without which the Disarmament Section would lack its characteristic sunny atmosphere.
Lastly, I desire to extend our very grateful thanks to our two faithful interpreters, who make what is really so difficult a task appear so easy.

In conclusion, gentlemen, I, who have had the honour to preside over your sessions for over four years and a half, would venture to voice one last hope. It is that, when you return home, you may succeed in persuading your Governments that there is no more time to lose, that nothing must be neglected to facilitate the speedy reunion of the General Conference, and above all to ensure its success; for the nations are looking to us, and failure would spell disaster.

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — Your diction was so admirable in French, Sir, that I think every delegate understood every word you said, and therefore, unless the Commission desires it, I do not think it necessary that we should have a translation.

I desire to add one name to those you so very properly enumerated as being among those to whom the Commission owes its sincere thanks. I only wish it were possible that you, with your masterly and graceful phrasing, should have been the person to make the observations I am now about to make; but, owing to circumstances which will appear in a moment, that is unfortunately impossible.

What I desire to bring before the Commission is, that our thanks are due very heartily and sincerely to you for your admirable conduct of our proceedings throughout these four and a half years. Many of us know how difficult your task has been, how provoking some of us must have been to you, how irritating we have been to one another, and how difficult it must have been to preserve that atmosphere of serenity which has almost always characterised our debates. If you have succeeded in doing so it is partly owing to the close and great attention, but still more to the marvellous gifts of good temper, of tact, of courtesy, and above all perhaps of patience, you have displayed with such remarkable regularity in all circumstances. I can assure you, Mr. President, that one thing is certain: you have acquired the personal esteem and affection of every member of the Commission. That is, perhaps, some compensation for the immense trouble that you have taken. You have undoubtedly, as you have said, been assisted by one Vice-President with an extraordinary gift of eloquent lucidity, and by another with that unfailing geniality which endears him to us all; and you have had the assistance, latterly, of two Rapporteurs who could scarcely be improved upon. But still we come back to our personal feelings towards you, and it is on that account that I tender to you on behalf of the whole Commission our very warmest thanks.

M. Politis (Greece). — I desire to associate myself most warmly with what Lord Cecil has just said with reference to our President. As his lieutenant and closest neighbour, I have had an opportunity each day of realising how conscientiously and patiently he has followed our discussions. Those discussions might have been shorter had he not insisted on respecting the opinion of each one of us, and only intervening as seldom as possible. That is proof of his magnanimity and the real good humour with which he has presided over our discussions. I noted, further, that at difficult moments, when some conciliatory effort was required, he never failed to step into the breach with a view to hastening a solution. We shall all carry away with us a lasting memory of this particular period of our lives, and our President's name will remain an imperishable part of that memory.

The President. — It only remains for me to express my most grateful thanks to Lord Cecil and M. Politis for their extremely kind words with reference to myself. I myself shall never forget these four years, especially when I think of all of you, gentlemen, who have collaborated with me and honoured me with your confidence.

I thank you, and now may I take up this hammer for the last time and declare the sixth and last session of the Preparatory Commission closed.
ANNEXES.
ANNEX 1.

Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference.

TEXTS OF THE DRAFT CONVENTION DRAWN UP AT FIRST READING.

TEXTS OF THE DRAFT CONVENTION DRAWN UP AT SECOND READING.

1. This document contains:

(a) The Report of the Third Session of the Preparatory Commission.

(b) The Texts of the Draft Convention drawn up at First Reading in the course of the Third Session.

(c) The Texts of the Draft Convention drawn up at Second Reading in the course of the Sixth Session, First Part.

2. The First- and Second-Reading Texts are placed in parallel. Where no Second-Reading Text has been adopted, a blank space is left.
THIRD SESSION.

_Held at Geneva from March 21st to April 26th, 1927._

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REPORT.

The Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference examined, in the course of its third session, the reports submitted to it by technical Sub-Commissions with regard to the questionnaire it had been instructed to study. The Commission was of the opinion that these preliminary investigations were such as to permit it to undertake forthwith the study of a Draft Convention. Its task was facilitated by the fact that preliminary drafts had been submitted to it by the British and French delegations.

The Commission has endeavoured, during the present session, to draw up a text which could serve as a basis for discussion at the second reading. It has not succeeded in establishing a single text for all the points discussed. The present document shows separately for each of the parts the points on which unanimity was obtained, as well as the reservations submitted by the various delegations on certain specific points. Where it has not been possible to establish a unanimous text, this document gives the different proposals submitted. It has been generally understood that the acceptance of each delegation at first reading does not prejudice the attitude it might adopt at the second reading and does not bind it in any way.

In the course of the discussion, several suggestions and proposals were put forward, either in order to meet exceptional situations, or with a view to inserting into the Convention limitations or general clauses other than those which had been unanimously adopted at the first reading by the Commission or which had been put down as alternative texts. These proposals and suggestions are reproduced in the minutes of the Commission. It is understood that each delegation retains full freedom to reconsider at the second reading such suggestions or proposals and to put forward fresh ones.

The discussion seems to suggest that it might be advisable to classify the matter into five parts, which might constitute the five Chapters of the Draft Convention as a basis for the second reading:

- Chapter I. — Effectives.
- Chapter II. — Material.
- Chapter III. — Budgetary Expenditure.
- Chapter IV. — Chemical Warfare.
- Chapter V. — Miscellaneous Provisions.

This division is, of course, liable to alteration at the second reading.

The Commission annexes to the present report a table of the texts.

When a text has encountered no opposition from any delegation, it has been printed right across the page. The reservations which delegations have asked to have inserted have been placed in the margin.

When only a single text was submitted and one or more delegations formally opposed its adoption, it has been printed on the left-hand side of the page, the right-hand column being left blank. The delegation or delegations under whose authority this text was submitted have been indicated. No attempt has been made to define the position of the others, and only the observations and declarations which delegations have formally requested to have inserted have been placed in the margin.

When, at the end of the discussion at the first reading, several texts have remained in being, they have been inserted in parallel columns, the delegation or delegations under whose authority the text was submitted being indicated at the head of each column. As in the previous case, no attempt has been made to define the position of the delegations which did not formally submit a text, and here too only the formal observations or declarations have been inserted.
Texts drawn up at First Reading.

PREAMBLE.

(British Draft.)

[Names of the High Contracting Parties.]

Persuaded that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations;

Considering that all Members of the League of Nations are already pledged by Article 8 of the Covenant of the League to the acceptance of the principle enunciated above;

Realising that the purpose of the limitation of armaments by international agreement is to diminish the risk of aggressive action by one State against another and that all agreements for limitation of armaments should be construed in the light of that purpose;

Believing that, in order to obtain the greatest possible advantage from a reduction and limitation of armaments, such reduction and limitation must cover military, naval and air armaments and must embrace as many nations as possible;

Determined to alleviate to the greatest possible extent the heavy burden which expenditure on armaments is imposing upon the economic life of the world and thus lowering its standard of living:

Have resolved to conclude a Convention with a view to accomplishing these purposes and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

The President

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

(French Draft.)

[List of High Contracting Parties.]

In view of Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations;

Whereas the reduction of armaments must be in accordance with general conditions of security and the special conditions of each State;

And whereas the Treaty of Mutual Assistance and the Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, which were intended to define more precisely the operation of Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, have not been applied;

And whereas the general guarantees resulting from the Covenant still exist;

And whereas regional agreements based upon the principles of the Covenant and arranging for mutual assistance between the signatory States in the event of attack have been successively concluded and have resulted in improved conditions of security for a number of States:

Consider that it is now possible to contemplate a first step towards the limitation and reduction of armaments laid down in Article 8 of the Covenant,

And, having decided to conclude a Convention for this purpose, have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

Who, having deposited their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following provisions:

(German Draft.)

Whereas heavy armaments constitute the most serious menace to the peace of the world;

And whereas Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations provides for a general reduction of armaments:

The High Contracting Parties have resolved to conclude a Convention as a first step towards the accomplishment of this purpose, to be followed by successive measures with a view to further disarmament, and have appointed
Texts drawn up at Second Reading

PREAMBLE.
CHAPTER I. — EFFECTIVES.

Observations and Reservations.

The German delegation makes a general reservation in regard to Chapter I as a whole, which, contrary to its view, does not contain any limitation of reserves given military training, registered, and compelled by law to serve in case of war, although in its opinion these reserves, while non-existent in professional armies, form the decisive factor as regards personnel in war, in countries having a conscript system.

The British delegation reserves the opinion of its Government as to the limitation of trained reserves.

The delegation of the United States of America makes a general reservation on the following provisions of Chapter I as regards the inclusion of formations organised on a military basis and the exclusion of trained reserves.

Article A.

The High Contracting Parties agree to limit the effectives in service in their armed forces, or land, sea and air formations organised on a military basis, and who may for that reason be immediately employed without having to be mobilised, to the effectives determined in the tables enumerated below and annexed to the present Convention.

1. Land Armaments:

Table I. — Maximum home forces.
Table II. — Maximum overseas forces stationed in the home country.
Table III. — Maximum of total forces stationed in the home country.
Table V. — Maximum of the total forces of the High Contracting Parties.
Table VI. — Maximum of the forces belonging to formations organised on a military basis stationed in the home country.
Table VII. — Maximum of the forces belonging to formations organised on a military basis stationed in overseas territories.

2. Naval Armaments:

Table VIII. — Maximum armed forces.
Table IX. — Maximum forces belonging to formations organised on a military basis.

The delegations of the British Empire and the United States of America only accept the limitation of naval effectives provided such limitation is generally accepted and provided also that a satisfactory agreement is reached respecting the limitation of warships.

The delegation of the British Empire considers Table IX unnecessary.
CHAPTER I. — EFFECTIVES.

Article A.

The High Contracting Parties agree to limit the effectives in service in their armed forces, or land, sea and air formations organised on a military basis, to the effectives determined in the tables enumerated below and annexed to the present Convention.

1. Land Armaments:

Table I. — Maximum armed forces stationed in the home country.

Table II. — Maximum armed forces stationed overseas.

Table III. — Maximum of the total armed forces of the High Contracting Parties.

Table IV. — Maximum of the forces belonging to formations organised on a military basis stationed in the home country.

Table V. — Maximum of the forces belonging to formations organised on a military basis stationed overseas.

2. Naval Armaments:

(Discussion of text of first reading, and the reservations relating thereto, adjourned.)
3. Air Armaments:

Table X. — Maximum armed forces.

Table XI. — Maximum forces belonging to formations organised on a military basis.

Article H.

In order to prevent the number of officers, warrant officers and sergeants from exceeding the legitimate requirements of each army, the tables relating to land armaments mentioned in Article A above shall indicate a maximum number of officers, warrant officers and sergeants which each High Contracting Party shall undertake not to exceed.

Similarly, for the same reasons as those given above, the said tables shall show the maximum figure which each High Contracting Party undertakes not to exceed in respect of other ranks whose period of service is longer than the longest period at present in force in the conscript armies of the High Contracting Parties.

The provisions contained in the first paragraph of this Article equally apply, mutatis mutandis, to the tables in Article A relating to naval and air armaments.

Article C.

By “formations organised on a military basis” shall be understood Police forces of all kinds, gendarmerie, Customs officials, forest guards, which, whatever their legal purpose, can be used without mobilisation, by reason of their staff of officers, establishment, training, armament or equipment, as well as any organisation complying with the above condition.

Article D.

By “mobilisation” within the meaning of the present Convention shall be understood all the measures for the purpose of providing the whole or part of the various corps, services and units with the personnel and material required to pass from a peace-time footing to a war-time footing.

Article F.

Each of the High Contracting Parties may, within the limits fixed by the tables relating to land armaments in Article A, and should the conditions affecting its security so require, modify the distribution of the said forces between its home territories and overseas territories.

Any modifications in this distribution shall be shown in the annual statements of particulars, the preparation of which is provided for in Article IA of Chapter V below.

Article E.

When drawing up the tables mentioned in Articles A (Chapter I) and IA (Chapter V):

(a) By “effectives in service in the armed forces” shall be understood the average daily effectives reckoned by dividing the total number of days duty by the number of days in the budgetary year;

(b) By “effectives in service in the formations organised on a military basis” shall be understood the actual effectives, e.g., the actual number of men shown up to the time of their discharge from active service or during their periods of training, in the statement of effectives which determines grants of every kind for these effectives, including men who, for any reason whatever, are absent from the units to which they are allocated.
Second Reading.

3. Air Armaments:

Table I. — Maximum armed forces stationed in the home country.

Table II. — Maximum armed forces stationed overseas.

Table III. — Maximum of the total armed forces of the High Contracting Parties.

Table IV. — Maximum of the forces belonging to formations organised on a military basis stationed in the home country.

Table V. — Maximum of the forces belonging to formations organised on a military basis stationed overseas.

Article H.

The tables relating to land armaments mentioned in Article A above, shall indicate a maximum number of officers which each High Contracting Party shall undertake not to exceed.

The said tables shall further fix the maximum number of soldiers, other than officers, who may have completed more than \(x^1\) years of actual service with the colours.

In conscript armies, the number of men whose service exceeds the legal period in force in their respective countries but is less than \(x^1\) years, shall be shown for each High Contracting Party in the annual statements for which provision is made in Article IA of Chapter V.

The number of men of the class mentioned in the second and fourth paragraphs of the present article who are actually with the colours shall be shown every year for each High Contracting Party in the statements for the preparation of which provision is made in Article IA of Chapter V.

Each country may, if it so desires, show for purposes of information, in a special column in publicity table IA of Chapter V, the proportion of recruits not trained as defined in the national legislation who are embodied in the effectives of its armed forces.

(To be discussed later as far as Naval Effectives are concerned.)

Article C.

By "formations organised on a military basis" shall be understood Police forces of all kinds, gendarmerie, Customs officials, forest guards, which, whatever their legal purpose, can be used without mobilisation, by reason of their staff of officers, establishment, training, armament, equipment, as well as any organisation complying with the above condition.

Article D.

By "mobilisation" within the meaning of the present Convention shall be understood all the measures for the purpose of providing the whole or part of the various corps, services and units with the personnel and material required to pass from a peace-time footing to a war-time footing.

Article E.

(This Article was deleted. See Minutes of Sixth Session (First Part), page 153.)

Article F.

When drawing up the tables mentioned in Articles A (Chapter I) and IA (Chapter V): by "effectives in service in the armed forces" and by "effectives in service in the formations organised on a military basis" shall be understood the average daily effectives reckoned by dividing the total number of days duty by the number of days in the budgetary year.

(The discussion of this Article as far as Naval and Air Effectives are concerned has been reserved.)

\(^1\) Note: This figure will be determined by the duration of the longest period of actual service with the colours which is in force in the conscript armies of the High Contracting Party at the time of the signature of the Convention.
First Reading.

Article I.

In each Contracting State having the conscription system, the total period of service which the annual contingent is compelled to serve shall not exceed the figure accepted by each of the High Contracting Parties.

For each man the total period of service shall be the total number of days of active service and of days of service during the periods of instruction which he undergoes.

CHAPTER II. — MATERIAL.

SECTION I. — LAND ARMAMENTS.

Article TA.

(The German Draft.)

The High Contracting Parties agree to limit the maximum material of their land forces in service and in reserve to the figures fixed in Table annexed to the present Convention.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material in service and in reserve</th>
<th>Maximum number of arms</th>
<th>Quantity of ammunition for the various arms (rifles, machine-guns, etc.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Rifles or carbines</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Machine-guns and automatic rifles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Guns, long and short, and howitzers of a calibre below 15 cm...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Guns, long and short, and howitzers of a calibre of 15 cm. or above</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Mortars of all kinds</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Tanks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Armoured cars</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(The French Draft.)

In each of the Contracting States, the total expenditure on the upkeep, purchase and manufacture of war material in the strict sense of the term, for the duration of the present Convention shall be limited for the land, naval and air armaments to the respective sums fixed in Columns X, Y and Z of Tables...

(Home forces and formations of the home country organised on a military basis) and ... (Overseas forces and their reinforcements and overseas formations organised on a military basis) annexed to the present Convention.

The said sums shall be divided by the number of years for which the present Convention is to remain in force, and, in each of the Contracting States, the annual expenditure on the upkeep, purchase and manufacture of war material in the strict sense of the term shall not exceed the figure laid down for each year; nevertheless, sums not expended during one year may be carried forward to the following year and added to the sums fixed for that year.

1 The tables referred to correspond to the model statements provided for in the report of the budgetary experts. Their definitive form depends on the final conclusions of these experts.
Second Reading.

Article I.

(Discussion of the text adopted at first reading and of German proposal document C.P.D.174(1)—adjourned.)

CHAPTER II — MATERIAL.

SECTION I. — LAND ARMAMENTS.
First Reading.

SECTION II. — NAVAL ARMAMENTS.

Observations and Reservations.

The German delegation declares that it is necessary to limit naval material in reserve in addition to floating material.

The French delegation points out that the accompanying French text constitutes the draft for reaching a compromise, which, after discussion and with a view to finding a formula for agreement, it has substituted for its original draft, which included only the first three paragraphs of this text.

(British Draft.)

The High Contracting Parties agree to limit to the figures laid down the number and tonnage of all the ships in each of the classes specified in Annex I.

(French Transactional Draft.)

The limitation of naval armaments agreed to by each of the High Contracting Parties is shown in the annexed Table X.

Each of the High Contracting Parties, within the limits of the total tonnage which it undertakes not to exceed, may distribute and arrange its tonnage to the best advantage for its national interests, subject to communicating to the Secretariat of the League of Nations, at least six months before laying down the keel, the characteristics of each vessel of war which it intends to construct, in conformity, for example, with Article XVI of the Treaty of Washington.

(Illustrations of this text.)

The figures in column I of this table represent the total tonnage that each of the High Contracting Parties considers it essential to attain for the purposes of security and the defence of its national interests.

The figures in column II represent the total tonnage that each of the High Contracting Parties considers it necessary to complete before the expiry of the Convention.

The figures in column III represent, for each of the High Contracting Parties, the division of the total tonnage stated by it in column II into total tonnage by groups.

These total tonnage groups apply to all ships of a similar nature in the following manner: (a) capital ships; (b) aircraft-carriers; (c) surface ships of less than 10,000 tons; (d) submarines.

Each of the High Contracting Parties, while keeping within the limits of total tonnage stated in column II, can alter such division as it deems necessary for its security, subject to informing the Secretariat of the League of Nations of the changes brought to the division of its total tonnage, at least one year before laying down
Second Reading.

SECTION II. — NAVAL ARMAMENTS.
First Reading.

Observations and Reservations.

the portion of the tonnage which is to be transferred.

Note: Each of the High Contracting Parties states in column III the division of its total tonnage, either into the four groups of vessels as stated in paragraph 4, or only into those groups which it considers necessary for its needs of security.

The delegations of the United States of America and Italy make a general reservation concerning this Table.

TABLE X. — ANNEX TO ARTICLE NA OF FRENCH DRAFT.

Table of Tonnage of Warships.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I. Tonnage essential for the purposes of security and the defence of national interests</th>
<th>II. Tonnage to be completed before the expiry of the Convention</th>
<th>III. Division into total tonnage by groups of the total tonnage stated in column II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total tonnage of</td>
<td>Capital ships</td>
<td>Armoured cruisers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a.</td>
<td>b.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Article NB.

(British Draft.)

The High Contracting Parties agree to limit to the figures laid down in Annex ... for each class of ship the maximum tonnage of any one ship and the calibre of the largest gun that may be mounted thereon.

(French and Italian Draft.)

The High Contracting Parties agree to limit to the figures laid down in Annex ... the tonnage of the largest vessel of war and the calibre of the largest gun mounted in any vessel of war.

Article NC.

(British Draft.)

The High Contracting Parties agree to limit to the figures laid down in Annex ... the maximum diameter of the largest torpedo tube carried by any ship.

(French Draft.)

In assessing total tonnage, a fraction only equal to ... per cent of the real tonnage shall be calculated in the case of vessels of war which have exceeded the age-limit indicated in Table ... of the Annex.
Second Reading.
First Reading.

Article ND.

The standard displacement of a ship is the displacement of the ship complete, fully manned, engined and equipped ready for sea, including all armament and ammunition, equipment, outfit, provisions and fresh water for crew, miscellaneous stores and implements of every description that are intended to be carried in war, but without fuel or reserve feed water on board. This assessment shall be in metric tons.

Article NF.

The High Contracting Parties undertake that, except in case of loss, no vessel of war shall be replaced before having reached the age-limit indicated in Table .... of the Annex. The age of units shall be counted as from the date of their completion.

Article NG.

With the exception of those ships which, in order to effect economy and specially mentioned in the Convention as being allowed to be converted into a type of warship other than that for which it was originally designed, no ship which has been replaced may be reconverted into a vessel of war.

Article NH.

No preparations shall be made in merchant ships in time of peace for the installation of warlike armaments for the purpose of converting such ships into vessels of war, other than the necessary stiffening of decks for the mounting of guns not exceeding 6 inches (152 millimetres) calibre.

Article NI.

No vessel of war constructed within the jurisdiction of any one of the Contracting Parties for a non-contracting Power shall exceed the limitations as to displacement and armament prescribed by the present Convention for vessels of a similar type which may be constructed by or for any of the Contracting Powers; provided, however, that the displacement for aircraft-carriers constructed for a non-contracting Power shall in no case exceed 27,000 tons (27,432 metric tons) standard displacement.

Article NJ.

In the event of a Contracting Power being engaged in a war, such Power shall not use as a vessel of war any vessel of war which may be under construction within its jurisdiction for any other Power, or which may have been constructed within its jurisdiction for another Power and not delivered.

Article NK.

Each of the Contracting Powers undertakes not to dispose—by gift, sale or any mode of transfer—of any vessel of war in such a manner that such vessel may become a vessel of war in the navy of any foreign Power.
Second Reading.
First Reading.

SECTION III. — AIR ARMAMENTS.

Article AA.

Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to limit the air material in service in accordance with the figures laid down in the following tables.

Table A. — The maximum number and total horse-power of aeroplanes and maximum number, total horse-power and total volume of dirigibles in service in their armed forces.

Table B. — The maximum number and total horse-power of aeroplanes and maximum number, total horse-power and total volume of dirigibles in their formations organised on a military basis.

The limitation shall apply to aeroplanes and dirigibles capable of use in war employed in commission in the land, sea and air forces, or in the formations organised on a military basis.

Article AC.

Horse-power shall be measured according to the rules. . . . . . . . (to be established by the Conference).

The volume of dirigibles to be expressed in cubic metres.

Article AD.

The limitations laid down are accepted by each High Contracting Party in the light of the present development of civil aviation in other countries.

Article AE.

1. If the High Contracting Parties intervene in any capacity, whether directly or indirectly, wholly or partially, in civil aviation undertakings, they agree that the State organs dealing with the matter shall be quite separate from the organs dealing with military aviation. It is agreed that this undertaking does not prevent the union of civil and military aviation under a single Ministry provided that the two subjects are dealt with separately and independently.

2. The High Contracting Parties shall refrain from prescribing the embodiment of military features in the build of civil aviation material so that this material may be constructed for purely civil purposes, more particularly with a view to providing the greatest possible measure of security and the most economical return.