Lord Cecil (British Empire).—Other people, no doubt, less charitably disposed, would think that that was the reason why he wanted 200,000 tons. But whether he wishes it—of course, I accept what he says as to his intentions—it does raise these difficulties immediately, and I find myself in sympathy with Mr. Gibson and M. Massigli, and wonder whether some device could not be worked out to give practical satisfaction to M. Westman and others who spoke on behalf of the small Powers, without so rigid and iron-clad a system as fixing a definite tonnage, and which will, in particular, provide the same restriction we made with regard to submarines. I am not pledging my Government to the acceptance of such a system, but they would be prepared to consider a system based on some such principles.

M. Massigli (France).—As I stated yesterday, I should like to express my sympathy with M. Westman’s amendment, but I desire, at the same time, to show him the disadvantages this amendment seems to offer in its present form.

Since we agree on the principle that, in the case of small navies, transfers shall be on a much larger scale than in the case of others, it would be advisable not to insert any figures for the tonnage limit. As specific cases, I will take the example of three navies that are not represented here—namely, those of the Argentine, Brazil and Chile. Sooner or later these countries will certainly be led to adopt a common system. The Argentine navy is of over 100,000 tons, the Brazilian of nearly 80,000, whilst the Chilian navy is rather less than 70,000 tons. The amendment proposed would, perhaps, make it much more difficult for these three countries to reach an agreement.

Consequently, I ask that, whilst asserting in the report the principle that the rules concerning tonnage will be much more elastic for smaller navies, we should nevertheless not state any definite limit in the text.

As to the Soviet amendment, I shall not give M. Litvinoff the satisfaction of developing the incident he seemed to be seeking just now. I shall make no reply on that subject. I will merely tell him that we cannot, in this particular case, fix any limit and that it is, at all events, certain that Russia did not contemplate this figure of 200,000 tons for herself. There is indeed a public document with which we are all acquainted and in which a Soviet delegation formerly stated its Government’s intentions. I refer to the report of the 1924 Rome Conference (document C.76. 1924. IX). At that Conference, the Soviet delegation had asked for 400,000 tons of capital ships for its country, though agreeing, it is true, to reduce its tonnage to 280,000 on condition that the Council of the League of Nations was abolished. That condition has not been realised and I do not think M. Litvinoff intends to revive it. The Commission will decide and I shall not prolong the discussion on this point.

M. Westman (Sweden).—I should like, in the first place, to thank the various speakers for the sympathy they have kindly expressed for the Swedish delegation’s proposal.

I desire to stress once more the ideas underlying our proposal. What are the small Powers asked to do? We are asked to cast a vote here and now in support of the method of categories; but we are not, at the same time, given any such guarantee as would be provided by definite proposals accepted by all, or by a considerable majority of the Sub-Committee concerning the rules for ensuring elasticity and freedom. In our opinion, such rules are an indispensable condition if small fleets are to abandon the principle of global tonnage.

To remedy this situation, we proposed that Article C should include a reference to fleets of 100,000 tons, which would thus be exempted from over-rigid rules concerning transfers.

We think it is very desirable that the Commission should fix a figure. Naturally, such a figure would not be final but, as it would constitute a proposal from the Commission to the Conference, we should consider it a valuable guarantee.

In this connection, I should like to tell M. Massigli that I find it somewhat difficult to understand how the result could work out as he suggested. Our system is sound, as I shall prove.

Various criticisms have been directed against our system. It has been said that the insertion of this figure of 100,000 tons would lay down too rigid a line of demarcation between two types of fleet. On this subject—and I am addressing myself particularly to M. Massigli—I should like to point out that we did not propose only that figure. We also proposed, as our document shows, a system of transfers which supplements our original suggestion.

We can easily agree on a starting point for the discussion of these questions. We have, on one side, a certain number of Powers for whom limitation does not seem possible unless the system of categories is applied—those are the great Powers. On the other side, we have a considerable number of countries to whom such a system cannot be applied in its entirety. I think we shall all agree that it would be absurd to divide into different categories the total tonnage of a fleet of 10,000 tons. The great majority of the countries represented in this Commission find their place somewhere between the two extreme points of this great scale. As regards the methods of limitation we are now discussing, it seems essential to cut that group in two. In other words, there must be some total tonnage figure below which complete freedom of transfer may be allowed and may be accepted by everyone. Above that figure, however, the system of categories must be applied more or less strictly.
I admit at once that we shall find great difficulty in fixing that figure. I admit that, as Lord Cecil said, such a figure will always be more or less arbitrary, but that is no reason for saying that we should not try to ascertain that figure. I even think that if, in this Commission, we wish to find a solution for the problems before us, it will be very helpful, perhaps essential, to ascertain it.

We proposed the figure of 100,000 tons. I am inclined to think it represents a happy mean. It is an appropriate figure at which to fix the line of demarcation between the different types of navies.

I am particularly anxious to reply to Lord Cecil’s criticism of the suggestion that this figure should be fixed. Yesterday, as an illustration, he argued, if I am not mistaken, that a navy of 99,999 tons would have complete freedom of transfer, whereas a navy of 100,001 tons would come under the rule of categories.

We anticipated this criticism in our proposal, and we suggested a system of transfers according to which the amount of the transfer should vary in inverse ratio to the amount of the total tonnage of a navy. That is equivalent to saying, the smaller the navy the greater will be the amount of transfer allowed. Clearly, if this system be adopted, a navy of 100,000 tons will not by any means lose all freedom of transfer. It will not be put on the same footing as the navy of a Great Power. On the contrary, its right of transfer will be almost equal to that granted to a navy in the free class. Under our system, the two navies mentioned by Lord Cecil would, in reality, be treated almost on a footing of equality.

In conclusion, I should like to refer to the question of submarines. We are prepared to discuss this question with a view to laying down a rule which would, to some extent, limit the use of these vessels, even in the case of so-called “free” fleets. In that way, we should overcome the difficulties that will arise if certain countries are allowed to use for submarines the total tonnage granted them.

M. Sato (Japan). — I have listened to the very interesting speeches on the question of transfers (Article C). M. Westman’s last speech showed me the importance of this question, particularly for his country.

In a general way, I share the views concerning the Swedish proposal expressed by Lord Cecil, M. Massigli and Mr. Gibson. To some extent, this proposal resembles the Soviet amendment. It is very difficult to trace a rigid line of demarcation between two classes of navies. Particular cases must be examined, and we must see what rule for transfers the Conference desires to lay down. I took part in the drafting of the text of the amendment submitted by the seven delegations. The delegations who co-operated with me in that work will allow me to say that we left Table III blank (that is, the transfers table), in order to give the different navies freedom of transfer. We thought this procedure would meet the wishes of countries with small navies. We had no intention of fixing a rule that would be too rigid in their case.

Like M. Massigli, I was going to propose that this Commission’s report should include a reference to the matter. In that way, account would be taken of the wishes expressed by M. Westman and other delegations. As, in his last speech, M. Westman did not seem to be satisfied with this course, I shall raise no objection to Table III being accompanied by general rules for determining the percentage of transfers. Other delegations who assisted in drafting the amendment submitted by the seven delegations may find a solution for the problems before us, it will be very helpful, perhaps essential, to ascertain it.

M. Westman’s amendment provides for a certain proportion in the matter of transfers. Perhaps new proposals will be submitted by other delegations. We might be divided into two classes. In the naval problem, as in almost all problems connected with the limitation and reduction of armaments, the particular case of each country has to be considered, but I do not propose any method for tracing a line clearly dividing Powers or fleets into two distinct classes.
We have before us:

(a) The system proposed by the seven Powers, the authors of document C.P.D.230, which is the basis for our discussion, and

(b) Three amendments, the Soviet amendment to Article B, and the Swedish and Spanish amendments to Article C.

The Soviet amendment lays down a limit of 200,000 tons as regards the limitation of naval armaments.

As to Article C, I think that the Swedish and Spanish amendments, although not identical, are not incompatible. They deal with solutions, and even problems, that are quite different.

Lord Cecil rightly pointed out that the Swedish amendment, with its limit of 100,000 tons, does not cover the case of Spain. I make no complaint since, as a compromise, we accepted this method, on which the London Naval Treaty is based, but we desire it to be elastic. I have no objection to supporting the Swedish amendment, even if the other delegations ask that it should be supplemented by figures.

I fully realise the difficulty of introducing figures in our work, and it would perhaps be preferable to leave that matter to the Conference.

I support the Swedish amendment all the more readily because it does not cover the case of Spain — since it leaves full liberty for the distribution of the global tonnage granted to Powers whose tonnage is less than 100,000.

I quite understand the apprehensions aroused concerning submarines. M. Westman, too, stated that he was quite prepared to discuss this question with a view to reaching a solution.

The Spanish delegation’s proposal does not deal particularly with cases in which Spain is interested. We placed this suggestion before the Sub-Committee because we thought it would be preferable to frame rules regarding transfers. The same idea has, moreover, been expressed by M. Sato.

We ask that one sentence in Article C should be changed, and that the words: “shall in no case be the object of increase beyond the figures” shall be replaced by the words: “shall in no case exceed the figures”.

At first sight, this difference seems to be very subtle, but I must explain it. In this sentence, the seven Powers’ text contemplates percentages for transfers. That is to say, a Power could not be granted a percentage greater than a certain figure $x$. Now, I think this wording would not be sufficient to allow a very small navy—for instance, one of from 10,000 to 15,000 tons—the possibility of a percentage increase, because, in that case, its needs would not be covered. Accordingly, I leave aside percentages, and I say that such a navy of 15,000 tons may not in any case transfer more than 12,000 or even 15,000 tons.

Having explained this small amendment, I come to the rules in Table III. We are agreed that the figures given in Table III should be fixed by the Conference. But in its statement (last paragraph) the Swedish delegation, like the Spanish delegation—for the two amendments are very similar—considers that some executive rules should be determined for transfers. As M. Sato said, the object is that Powers whose global tonnage does not exceed $x$ tons should have complete freedom of transfer.

In the case of big navies, the figures will be determined without any proportional rule. The particular case of each country must, naturally, be considered. It would be very difficult, and even unjust, to bring them all under a fixed proportional rule. I realise that this introduces a complication, but we often have to face complications if we wish to ensure justice and fairness.

These special needs must be taken into account in defining the total tonnage. We should lay down a rule for the Conference to follow in determining the figures of Table III. The greatest possible freedom would be allowed as regards the transfer of vessels from the cruiser and submarine categories to the destroyer category.

In the last resort it is for the Sub-Committee proposed by M. Sato to examine these suggestions, and I do not think I need insist for the moment. I felt bound to give these explanations to the Conference.

(a) The system proposed by the seven Powers, the authors of document C.P.D.230, which is the basis for our discussion, and

(b) Three amendments, the Soviet amendment to Article B, and the Swedish and Spanish amendments to Article C.

The Chairman. — There are still two delegates who wish to speak.

We propose that, in view of the discussion we have just had and in accordance with the suggestion made by M. Sato and supported by M. Cobian, those who are particularly interested in this question should meet this afternoon and discuss it among themselves, so as to be able to inform the Commission to-morrow of the results.

M. Westman (Sweden). — I support M. Sato’s proposal to set up a sub-Committee.

Admiral von Schoultz (Finland). — I must say that, in all the speeches made this morning, I have not heard any very serious objections to a certain tonnage limit. Let me take Lord Cecil’s
example of two navies of 99,000 tons and 101,000 tons respectively. In such a case, if it is to the interest of the Power which has 101,000 tons to come within the class of Powers with less than 100,000 tons, no one will object to its doing so. It can easily bring its figure down to 99,000 tons. Many arguments have been advanced to prove the difficulty of regulating small differences but, personally, I do not think that is any objection.

I should like once more to support the Swedish proposal, for I think it is not enough merely to express sympathy with this proposal. I am, therefore, very grateful to M. Sato for not conforming himself to sympathy. I think that, if we keep too rigidly to a plan drawn up solely for the great Powers, and if we do not make concessions to the small Powers, the latter will find it impossible to accept this plan. We shall be in a very difficult position if no exemption is admitted in our case. I therefore hope we shall be given this facility. I am very grateful to M. Cobián for suggesting another solution, and I think many others might easily be suggested. It is merely a question of willingness to do so.

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — I quite agree with M. Sato and M. Cobián that it would be a very desirable thing to have a really small committee to draft a proposal for the consideration of this Sub-Committee. But I admit I was a little frightened at your suggestion, Sir, which was simply that we should go round and round in a circle and practically have this Sub-Committee meeting again under another form as a sub-committee. That is of no use at all, and I propose the appointment of a sub-committee in the ordinary sense, presided over by our Vice-Chairman and consisting of five, or seven members, to be selected by the Bureau.

M. Colban (Norway). — If we accept the proposal to appoint a sub-committee and if the other delegates cannot be present, I would propose that the sub-committee should consist of the representatives of all the great Naval Powers. This sub-committee's duty is to prepare a text and nothing else, as the political decision must be left entirely to the Commission.

The Hon. Hugh Gibson (United States of America). — If you are going to have a very small committee, I would like to ask that I may not have a seat on that very small committee.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — Lord Cecil has asked for a select committee. Would it not be more practicable to have all those who have introduced certain amendments and shown interest in this special question.

APPOINTMENT OF A SUB-COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF THE AMENDMENTS TO ARTICLES B AND C AND TO TABLES II AND III.

The Chairman. — I was just about to make a similar proposal, and suggest that the sub-committee should consist of M. Sato, M. Cobián, M. Litvinoff, and M. Westman.

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — I think M. Massigli ought to be added to it because he is the person who moved, or practically moved, the whole of this discussion.

M. Sato (Japan). — I assume it is understood that we shall have the assistance of members of the Bureau.

The Chairman. — M. Politis is willing to be present.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — I suppose the delegates may be assisted by the naval experts?

The Chairman. — Yes.

The Chairman's proposal for the composition of this sub-committee was adopted.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.

FOURTH MEETING OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE.

Held on Wednesday, November 19th, 1930, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: M. Loudon (Netherlands).


TEXT PROPOSED FOR TABLE III, ARTICLE C.

The Chairman. — At yesterday's meeting, after discussing Articles A, B and C of the joint proposal by the seven delegations and the amendments relating thereto, the Sub-Committee was able to adopt the new wording proposed by M. Politis for Article A. That does not exclude discussion of the addition to Article A proposed by M. Markovitch.
As regards Articles B and C, the Sub-Committee, on M. Sato's proposal, decided to appoint a very small Sub-Committee to draw up a formula to be submitted to the main Sub-Committee. This formula was to bring into line the text of the joint proposal by the seven delegations and the Spanish, Soviet and Swedish amendments. That small Sub-Committee met yesterday afternoon with M. Politis as President, and we know already that the meeting led to a very satisfactory result. I would ask M. Politis to be good enough to inform the Sub-Committee of the small Sub-Committee's work.

TEXT UNANIMOUSLY PROPOSED BY THE SUB-COMMITTEE, THE ADOPTION OF WHICH IS A CONDITION FOR ITS ACCEPTANCE OF ARTICLE C WITHOUT MODIFICATION.

"Table III. -- Rules for Transfer.

The figures to be entered in this table will be calculated on the following principles:

1. Powers whose total tonnage does not exceed 100,000 tons (or \(x\) tons) will have full freedom of transfer.

2. As regards the other Powers, the amount of the transfer will vary in inverse ratio to the amount of the total (global) tonnage of each of them.

3. Account must also be taken of the special circumstances of each Power, and of the category of ships involved in the transfer."

M. Politis (Greece). -- The Sub-Committee you appointed yesterday to consider the various amendments submitted in connection with Articles B and C and with Table II and III met yesterday afternoon and was fortunately able to agree unanimously on a certain number of conclusions which, on its behalf, I have the honour to submit for your approval.

First, as regards Article B, the Sub-Committee thought this might be accepted without any change. The Soviet delegation stated that it is prepared to withdraw its amendment if the Commission accepts the principles which we propose to include in Table III and, in particular, the principle given under No. 2.

The Sub-Committee also proposes that Article C should be accepted without change, provided that the principles stated in the document which has just been circulated, are included in Table III.

I shall comment very briefly on these principles so that their meaning may be clear.

The Sub-Committee considers that these principles should be taken as illustrations to enable the Conference to fix the figures in Table III. These will be different for each country, and account will be taken of each country's special situation and of its special circumstances, in accordance with the rule laid down in Article 8, paragraph 2, of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Principle No. 1 states that, in the case of countries whose navies are small—and to make this idea clear we say "Powers whose total tonnage does not exceed 100,000 tons (or \(x\) tons)" in order to leave the Conference the fullest latitude in this respect—there shall be complete freedom to transfer vessels from one category to another.

The Sub-Committee attaches special importance to principle No. 2, in view of the Soviet delegation's statement that, if this principle be adopted, it will withdraw its amendment to Article B. This principle No. 2 states that as regards the other Powers—that is to say, those whose global tonnage exceeds 100,000 tons, for instance—the possibility of effecting transfers from one category of vessels to another will be greater in proportion as their tonnage is less by comparison with the tonnage of other Powers.

Finally, principle No. 3 is intended as a statement of the fact that, in determining the figures, account must be taken of the special circumstances of each country from the geographical and political point of view and also of the category of ships involved in the transfer. This means that, other things being equal, the possibilities of effecting transfers will be less for certain categories for instance, submarines—than for other categories, such as small surface vessels.

As regards Table II, the Sub-Committee agreed to adopt the Swedish proposal to sub-divide Class (a), Capital Ships, subject to a reservation concerning the Soviet amendment which refers to capital ships.

In conclusion, the Sub-Committee proposes that you should first take a decision on the three principles in Table III. If these principles be approved, Articles B and C will be adopted without change and without discussion.

A decision will then have to be taken concerning Table II, so that we may know whether the Sub-Committee accepts the Select-Committee's proposal to adopt the Swedish amendment. In this connection, however, a decision must first be taken on the Soviet amendment, according to which large naval units would be abolished.

These, very briefly, are the proposals which the Sub-Committee has the honour to submit to you. It hopes that you will adopt them and that, after the agreement so happily reached, no discussion on Articles B and C will be necessary.

The Chairman. — I am sure that, after hearing M. Politis, the Commission will agree to consider at once the three principles proposed.

Lord Cecil informs me that he does not agree. I will ask him to speak.

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — I feel that I am in a slight difficulty in regard to this matter. I thought I had made it quite clear, so far as the British delegation is concerned, that we could not
agree to freedom of transfer unless there was a definite restriction on submarines. So far as my instructions go, that is a sine qua non. I do not want to promote a long discussion, or to put the Commission in any difficulty. Therefore, under the circumstances, I venture to suggest that this matter should be adjourned to enable me to consult my Government further; but I think it is only right to say that I see no prospect of their assenting to an arrangement which does not provide for a definite limitation of submarines, and, in view of my Government's interest in this question, I am surprised that, in M. Politis's account of the work of the Sub-Committee, there is not even a reference to this matter.

M. Politis (Greece). — Evidently my explanation was not clear enough. I thought that, in my very brief summary of the Sub-Committee's work, I had met even Lord Cecil's point of view. The first principle adopted applies to small navies. As an illustration, we mentioned 100,000 tons. The second principle applies to the navies of other Powers. The third principle is common to all navies. It is intended to show that, for certain classes of vessels, account must be taken of the kind of vessels for which a certain part of the tonnage may be transferred, thus abridging the freedom mentioned in No. 3. It is in that sense that No. 3 was accepted.

I repeat, moreover, that these principles are only indicative. Acting on these very general indications, the Conference will have to fix the figures for each country in Table III. As regards submarines in particular, the Conference may be as severe as it pleases.

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — The first principle shows that, under 100,000 tons, there is to be complete liberty of transfer, and then you go on to say that a variety of other considerations have to be taken into account. That does not mean complete liberty in fact, but it is going to be settled as originally proposed under Article C. What it means is that, under 100,000 tons, there must be complete liberty; but, beyond that figure, principles 2 and 3 are to be observed. If you give complete liberty to 100,000 tons, it would mean that any navy consisting of 100,000 tons might, in theory, consist of submarines, which would be nearly double the tonnage of submarines permitted to the British navy under the London Naval Treaty. I am sure the Commission will see that this is a wholly unreasonable proposal, and one which it would be impossible for any of the great naval Powers to accept. Submarines stand in a special category and they must be limited for all navies. I do not want to argue this point at length now, but I do not think I shall be entitled to go beyond my instructions, which are precise at present. The British Government says that it does not see any reason for making any change. I could not recommend my Government to make a change which would enable any Power to have 100,000 tons of submarines and no other ships. I feel that, under the circumstances, it would be better to adjourn the consideration of this question for the moment, because, if we discuss it now, I shall have to vote against the proposal, which would be very unfortunate in view of the circumstances under which we have met here. May I ask the President to put the question that this discussion be adjourned?

M. Sato (Japan). — If Lord Cecil presses his request for an adjournment, I shall agree. Nevertheless, I should not like this question of submarines to be passed over in silence. I was myself a member of the Sub-Committee. I raised the question of submarines, and proposed that this category should be excluded from the possibility of transfer. The Sub-Committee did not agree, and, in view of the lateness of the hour, I could not insist. I was compelled to content myself with the text submitted. It provides in paragraph 3 for the possibility of limiting transfers to the submarine category to some extent. The present wording, however, is somewhat vague.

I venture to recall the fact that, at the London Naval Conference, my country's attitude on the submarine question differed from that of the other participating Powers. For the submarine category, we desired to complete freedom for the countries concerned. This point of view was not accepted by the other Governments represented in London, and, in order not to compromise the success of the Naval Conference, we abandoned our claim to a certain extent. We contented ourselves with fixing a figure for the submarine category, and, in addition, we accepted the prohibition of transfers to this category.

The Japanese delegation is therefore fully prepared to accept a greater restriction as regards transfers to the submarine category. I should like at once to reassure the British and American delegations, and the other delegations which took part in the London Naval Conference, and tell them that we by no means intend to take advantage of the text which the Sub-Committee submits this morning in order to evade the obligation we accepted in London. On the contrary, I tried to secure a strict limitation of transfers to the submarine category. Such, then, are the circumstances under which I was led to support the Sub-Committee's text.

If Lord Cecil is unable to accept this text, I am quite prepared to ask for stricter limitation, or even for the prohibition of transfers to the submarine category. We might, perhaps, agree here and now on that point, without any adjournment of the discussion being necessary. If not, I am prepared to agree to the adjournment of the discussion in accordance with Lord Cecil's request.
The Chairman. — M. Westman has just made a very wise suggestion. As one who took part in yesterday afternoon's conversations, he believes that agreement could very easily be reached if we suspended the meeting for a short time to enable the delegates concerned to confer.

The proposal was adopted.

The meeting was suspended at 10.40 a.m. and resumed at 11.5 a.m.

**REVISED TEXT PROPOSED FOR TABLE III, ARTICLE C.**

M. Politis (Greece). — In concert with Lord Cecil, the Sub-Committee has agreed on the following text:

"**TABLE III. — RULES FOR TRANSFER.**"

1. Account must be taken of the special circumstances of each Power, and of the classes of ships involved in the transfer.

2. Powers whose total tonnage does not exceed 100,000 tons¹ will have full freedom of transfer as regards surface ships.

3. As regards the other Powers, the amount of the transfer should vary in inverse ratio to the amount of the total (global) tonnage of each of them.”

**VOTE ON THE REVISED TEXT PROPOSED FOR TABLE III, ARTICLE C.**

The Chairman. — I do not think any discussion is necessary. We might vote at once.

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — It is understood that in voting for this I will be voting only to submit it to my Government. I cannot pledge my Government.

M. Politis (Greece). — Lord Cecil's reservation entails a similar reservation by Powers which would have liked to go a little farther in this direction.

The Chairman. — As there is no objection, we will take the vote.

The revised text proposed by the Select Committee was unanimously adopted by nineteen votes, with some abstentions.

**VOTE ON ARTICLES B AND C.**

The Chairman. — I put to the vote Articles B and C together.

Articles B and C were unanimously adopted by nineteen votes, with some abstentions.


"**Article D.** — No capital ship shall exceed 35,000 tons (35,560 metric tons) standard displacement or carry a gun exceeding 16 inches (406 millimetres) in calibre.”

**AMENDMENT PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION.**

The Chairman. — We will now vote on the Soviet amendment (document C.P.D.239)² to Article D. This amendment reads as follows:

"**Article D.** — No capital ship shall exceed 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons) standard displacement or carry a gun exceeding 12 inches (304.8 millimetres) in calibre.”

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — I think the meaning of our proposal is clear to everyone. Our idea is to do away as much as possible with arms of an offensive nature. In this instance we are moving the diminution of the size of capital ships in the hope that this will find support from the big naval Powers, and I am basing my remarks on statements made by them at the London Naval Conference. At that Conference the British Government said:

"In the opinion of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, the battleship, in view of its tremendous size and cost, is of doubtful utility, and the Government would wish to see an agreement by which the battleship would in due time disappear altogether from the fleets of the world."

¹ This figure is given as an illustration.
² Note by the Secretariat. — See Annex 3.
That was supported by the Italian declaration which reads as follows:

"Moreover, should the other Powers concur, Italy is prepared to examine favourably the abolition of capital ships."

The Versailles Treaty, moreover, found the establishment of the limit of 10,000 tons displacement and 11-inch guns for surface vessels sufficient for purposes of defence, and that is the substance of the Soviet proposal.

**DISCUSSION ON THE QUESTION OF THE INSERTION, OR NOT, OF FIGURES IN ARTICLE D.**

**Lord Cecil (British Empire).** — I feel I could not support this amendment, and I think figures ought not to be given. If the figures are left in, they should be left in on the same terms as the figure of 100,000 tons—that is to say, merely as an illustration. If it is proposed to include these figures, they should appear in brackets, or a note should be added indicating what is in our minds. It seems to me that it is impossible for us to decide the question of the size of vessels, which is a political question and not a disarmament question.

**M. Colban (Norway).** — I support Lord Cecil's proposal to omit figures from the text. The objective of this Commission is the reduction of armaments, and I think it is quite impossible for us, even as an illustration, to give figures as high as 35,000 tons for the maximum displacement of capital ships. In view of the "naval holiday" agreed to in London in respect of these vessels, such figures would, moreover, be quite useless. Certainly, if this Commission had to decide on figures it should adopt the lowest possible figures, but the best course would be to accept Lord Cecil's proposal.

**M. Massigli (France).** — The French delegation definitely favours a reduction in the displacement of capital ships. On the other hand, I recognise, with Lord Cecil, that it would perhaps be difficult for us to embark on a discussion of this subject here, although in other articles we have precisely defined classes of vessels. In the case of aircraft-carriers, for instance, we go into minute details. If the Sub-Committee thinks it inopportune at present to engage in a full discussion of this question—and I fully agree with that view—I would at least ask that the report should state that the Commission is in favour (I hope that is the case) of a reduction in the displacement of capital ships.

**M. Sato (Japan).** — My Government, too, strongly favours a reduction in the tonnage of capital ships, and it put forward this view at the London Naval Conference. I do not think, however, that in our Convention we can give any maximum figure at all. I recognise the great importance of this question, and I hope that one day an agreement may be reached to reduce the tonnage of capital ships. But, until such an agreement has been reached between the nations who possess these big vessels, it will be impossible for us to give any figure in our text. We should, therefore, do well to omit it, as Lord Cecil proposes, and wait until we see whether those who possess big vessels can agree on such a reduction in their tonnage.

As to M. Massigli's suggestion that our report should express a desire for the tonnage of capital ships to be reduced, my delegation entirely agrees, and I associate myself with that proposal. Nevertheless, I think that, before deciding to put such a passage in the report, we should ascertain that it is the unanimous view of the Commission; otherwise, we should be in a very delicate position, if there were any opposition.

**M. Rosso (Italy).** — We have just been reminded that in London, the Italian delegation declared for the abolition of capital ships. We still maintain that view, and could therefore agree with the suggestion made by the Soviet delegation in its amendment to Article D. If we had to discuss figures, we should perhaps have to suggest some changes—as regards, for instance, the calibre of guns. In our view, the figure of 12 inches in the Soviet amendment should be changed to 11 inches, so as to conform with the basic figure of the Treaty of Versailles.

It has been suggested that we should not discuss figures, but leave the Conference to decide on any possible reduction in maximum displacement. We consider that a reduction in the displacement of capital ships would give rise to several complications. It would imply, *inter alia*, the creation of a new type of rapid battleship, and this might lead to a new competition in armaments. We are, therefore, in favour of abolition, but feel we must make a reservation concerning reduction of displacement.

I desire now to explain my attitude in case a vote is taken on this point. I abstained from the two previous votes because that seemed the logical consequence of our general reservation. Having declared that we support the principle of the abolition of capital ships, I shall therefore abstain from voting on this subject also.

**The Hon. Hugh Gibson (United States of America).** — If the proposal made by M. Massigli is put to the vote, I confess that I am rather at a loss as to how I shall vote in order to give an accurate impression of the attitude of my Government on this subject. I shall therefore take the convenient course of abstaining.
I should like to explain the reason for this decision. The question of reducing the maximum unit size of capital ships arose between the three Powers who concluded their agreement in London. It was decided that, inasmuch as we had made practical provision for the next six years so far as our three navies are concerned, and inasmuch as it was quite impossible to foresee the trend of naval development, construction and design, the best course we could agree upon was to defer this question until it was presented in a more definite form. My Government has not taken up a position in opposition to the reduction of the maximum unit size; but it seems to us that it is impossible for us to foresee how far we would be justified in going, or whether, in view of the other developments in construction or design, we would be justified in making any step, in that direction. Inasmuch as my Government is not able to make a definite pronouncement at this time, I shall abstain, while not wishing to obstruct any recommendation that may come forward.

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — I hope we shall proceed regularly in this matter, and not, from a general desire to show how keen we are for disarmament, do something which will interfere with the regularity of our proceedings.

We have laid it down from the very outset that we are, in this Commission, not dealing with quantities but with methods. I hope we shall stick to that. When you formulate that a battleship is not to exceed—I do not care whether you say fifty thousand or five thousand tons—you are dealing then with the size of a unit of combat. You are dealing with matters of quantity entirely. That is entirely outside our function, and we should have to enter into a very long, abstruse and technical discussion if we were to enter upon a matter of that kind.

My Government—as M. Litvinoff has pointed out—has already declared itself in favour of a reduction, if it can be arranged. I am not trying to quote the actual words, which are not before me, but my Government has generally expressed the view that it is in favour of the reduction of the size of capital ships. As far as my personal opinion counts for anything, I most heartily agree with that proposition. I have always thought these monsters, which only exist to fight one another, are quite outside the conception of a disarmament policy. But this is a matter which will have to be decided, if at all, at the Conference. It is not a matter for us.

Therefore, with the greatest respect to M. Massigli, I rather hope he will not even insist on putting that indication into our report. I think if he desires to give satisfaction to his view and to mine also, the proper form is to say certain members of the Commission expressed the view that capital ships ought to be reduced in size, but the Commission felt that any decision on that point was outside its province, and therefore it did not come to any decision on the point. I think that is the right way for us to deal with a matter of this kind. Otherwise, we shall really be launching ourselves into a sea which is absolutely boundless.

I hope we may take this decision on this particular article in the sense that we express no opinion on the size, and that in succeeding articles similar alterations will be made, striking out any numbers which indicate an attempt to settle the size of these ships, which is not really part of our functions. Personally, I hope the matter will be considered very carefully by the Conference when it comes to meet.

M. Massigli (France). — My proposal was chiefly intended to draw the attention of the Governments to the fact that the question must be settled at the 1932 Conference, and that we cannot continue the present system with its two overlapping series of naval agreements, differing both in scope and duration. At Washington, certain Powers reached an agreement concerning certain classes of vessels. At Rome, in 1924, an attempt was made to generalise this agreement, but it did not succeed. The same Powers have just tried to reach a further partial agreement in London. The 1932 Conference seems to mark the opportune moment for at last reaching a general solution. If Lord Cecil agrees with me that the question can be settled at the 1932 Conference I shall, for my part, support the views he has just expressed.

M. Rutgers (Netherlands). — I have heard no arguments in favour of either of the figures proposed. Personally, I should favour the figure of 10,000, just as I favour anything which is likely to lead to a result. Nevertheless, although this very low figure seems to be widely supported, I am still in uncertainty.

The Hon. Hugh Gibson (United States of America). — I confess I do not attach any great importance to having this particular figure in, but in drafting the document we all felt that it was a figure in an existing treaty, and when you gave the various figures embodied in treaties, you gave a coherent picture. It was very carefully stated that this was not meant to represent a definite proposal, and we might put a footnote to the effect that the figure of 35,000 tons is added only for the purpose of illustration—as we did with the figure of 100,000 tons in Table III. It is very difficult to treat figures on different bases, and if we can treat one set of figures in that way, why not another set?
should be quite content to accept Mr. Gibson’s suggestion of a note; but I really think, as a matter of order, that it would be better to leave out all these figures which deal with quantities absolutely, and I move formally, as an amendment to the Soviet amendment, that the figures of 35,000 tons and 16 inches, and the corresponding figures which translate these into metric tons and centimetres, should be omitted. If that is carried, I hope it will not be necessary to move a similar motion with regard to the succeeding articles, but that this may be taken as an indication of the views of the Commission.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — Throughout the work of the Preparatory Commission, the Soviet delegation has been in favour of the Commission settling, not only the algebraic formulae, but also the figures—which is the most important part of our work, in our opinion—since, unless we come to an agreement on figures, nothing much will have been accomplished by the Commission. We shall only have a draft Convention in which all the questions of real value that arose will have been left to the Conference to decide. If the Commission decides not to deal with figures, that is a matter for them; but I think we must admit that, if we introduce this amendment with regard to capital ships, it is because the proposal of the seven delegations, which we have taken as the basis for discussion, also contains figures. If we accept the proposal which has just been made that we take figures as a certain indication, then again there must be a discussion as to which figure should be taken into consideration, and we say that our figure should be taken into consideration. If Article D and other articles dealing with figures are withdrawn, then all our corresponding amendments must also be withdrawn, and it will only remain for us to discuss Article M and Standard Displacement, and we shall finish the question of naval armaments very shortly.

The Chairman. — As M. Litvinoff will withdraw his amendment if Lord Cecil’s proposal is adopted, we shall vote on the latter.

M. Cobbán (Spain). — Everyone agrees that the tonnage of capital ships should be reduced. If, however, we give no figure, there is just as much likelihood of 10,000 being adopted as 50,000.

An agreement has been reached between the great naval Powers, who mutually undertook not to exceed a given figure. In the case of the other Powers, if no figure is given, the result may be a fantastic figure. I quite fail to understand this anomaly. This discussion has been very interesting; it has brought out our interest in the reduction of the tonnage of capital ships. I think, however, that we have reached a point where reflection is necessary before any decision is taken.

M. Sato (Japan). — As regards the displacement of capital ships, which is mentioned in Article D, I see no difficulty in omitting the figure both for the tonnage and for the calibre of guns. If we left a blank, that would be an even better application of the principle we have to follow. Some delegations, however, have said that the figure of 35,000 tons should be given as an illustration referring to capital ships which are at present in existence and of which the tonnage is limited by the Washington Agreements. The two ideas might be combined. We might leave a blank in Article D, as Lord Cecil proposes, and add a note to that article mentioning, by way of illustration, that the displacement was fixed by the Washington Treaty at 35,000 tons and the calibre of the guns at 16 inches. In that way we should satisfy all parties.

I think Lord Cecil’s proposal goes farther. If I understood him aright, he proposed to omit all figures, even those in the other categories.

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — Perhaps I might interrupt and answer at once what M. Sato has just said. I do not want to raise any further question than this particular article, because I think the great thing is to settle each question as we come to it. But, in point of fact, if we do decide to leave out these figures, there are certain other figures which, as a matter of course, we can also leave out. However, we can deal with those as we come to them.

I do not want to lay down a principle, because it is evident there may be special circumstances in regard to particular figures in which it would be improper to leave them out; but the general theory in my mind is simply this: where the figures tend to a limitation of the force of the country, they ought to be left out. That is a question of quantity. Where they are put in in order to define what is meant by a category, that is not a limitation of force; it is merely to explain what the provisions of the Convention are to apply to. Therefore, I have no objection in principle to the insertion of the 100,000 tons in connection with the matter we have been discussing this morning, because there it is a question of defining what fleets are not to be subject to transfer. That is merely to make a definition of transfer—of what fleets you propose to omit. It is not limiting the force of any particular country in any way.

I do not want to lay down principles. My motion is only to strike out the figures in this particular article. When we come to other figures, I shall be very ready personally to consider whether they ought or ought not to be left in.

A suggestion was made to me just now which is worth mentioning in order to make the thing clear. It might be desirable to add a footnote, explaining what these figures were in the Treaties of London and Washington, in order to show what we had in our minds; but, of course, not in any way to bind the Conference to accept these figures for a general reduction of armaments all over the world.
M. Sato (Japan). — I thank Lord Cecil for his explanation. I entirely agree with him.

Personally, I think that, without exceeding our powers, we might give the figure of 35,000 tons in Article D. There we are only seeking to limit the displacement of a naval unit. The question of quantities—that is to say, the tonnage allowed to each country—will naturally be settled by the Conference itself.

On the other hand, some delegations expressed a wish that the maximum limit for the displacement of capital ships should be still further reduced.

In these circumstances, it would be better not to give any figure in Article D; but, naturally, we cannot omit all the figures concerning the other categories. We shall soon come to page rI, where there are definitions of the various categories. We should be really paralysed if we had no figure either for the displacement of units or for the calibre of guns. How, in such circumstances, could we give any exact definition of the cruiser category, for instance?

The Hon. Hugh Gibson (United States of America). — I honestly feel, with regard to this question of figures, that, as we put them in for illustration, either all ought to stay or all ought to come out, and I find difficulty in picking and choosing between the different articles before us. I feel that it will lead to an endless debate if we reopen the general discussion on principle whenever we come to a fresh article, amendment or series of amendments, and it gives opportunity, to all those who wish to do so, to reopen the question. We have to put it clearly whether we can adopt a principle of illustrations, and, if so, the sensible course is to take the figures laid down in existing treaties, which present cohesion as far as the texts before us are concerned.

The Chairman. — I shall put to the vote the retention of the provision under discussion—that is to say, Article D as submitted by the seven delegations.

Dr. Markovitch (Yugoslavia). — Article r of Part I of the London Treaty provides for a truce in the construction of capital ships. This truce now applies to Powers which have capital ships. Before the vote is taken on Article D, I should like to raise this preliminary question: Does the adoption of such an Article imply any change in the obligations of those Powers not to lay down the keels of capital ships in general, or might the adoption of this Article encourage Powers not bound by the London Treaty to lay down the keels of capital ships not exceeding the tonnage fixed—that is, 35,000 tons?

The Chairman. — I think we might now take the vote.

I ask those in favour of retaining Article D of the draft submitted by the seven Powers to signify their wishes. You understand that, by voting for the retention of Article D, you are opposing Lord Cecil's amendment. Those who support Lord Cecil's amendment should, therefore, vote against this retention.

M. Sato (Japan). — I shall vote for the retention of Article D if the figures are given as an illustration. Moreover, that is the idea underlying the text submitted by the delegations of the seven Powers.

The Chairman. — That is a new amendment.

The Hon. Hugh Gibson (United States of America). — I shall vote on the same condition as M. Sato.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — I understand we are voting now on the question of whether any figures are to be inserted or not, and then on the figures themselves. I think we should vote first of all on the retention of the figures, and then on the figures themselves.

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — May I remind the Commission that I have moved a definite motion to delete these figures. That may be right or wrong, but that is the motion. I ask the President to put that motion. Does the Commission favour that proposal or not? M. Litvinoff wants to put it round the other way, but that will cause confusion.

The Chairman. — The question is whether or not the figures should be retained.

I ask those in favour of retaining the figures to raise their hands.

The retention of the figures in Article D was rejected by ten to one, with a certain number of abstentions.

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — May I make a suggestion? I agree with Mr. Gibson that it will be an endless business if we have the discussion renewed on each of these amendments, and this is an occasion for the Bureau or a small committee to present a definite scheme as to what we should do with regard to the other figures, otherwise we shall have a long discussion as each article comes up as to whether or not we ought to have figures.
The Chairman. — Naturally, the Soviet amendment to Article D falls to the ground.


The Chairman. — We shall now discuss Table II of the draft submitted by the seven Powers, which is as follows:

Table II.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories (defined in Annex III)</th>
<th>High Contracting Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Capital ships.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Aircraft-carriers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(cd) Light surface vessels (i)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) Guns of more than 6.1 inches</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) Guns of 6.1 inches and less</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Destroyers.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) Submarines.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AMENDMENT PROPOSED BY THE SWEDISH DELEGATION.

The Chairman. — There is the Swedish amendment to this Table, which is as follows:

"Table II.

"Replace Table II of draft C.P.D.230 by the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class A</th>
<th>Class B</th>
<th>Class C</th>
<th>Class D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vessels exceeding 10,000 tons displacement</td>
<td>Vessels not exceeding 203 mm. (8 inches)</td>
<td>Aircraft-carriers</td>
<td>Submarines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A 1</td>
<td>A 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Exceeds 155 mm. (6.1 inches) but does not exceed 203 mm. (8 inches)</td>
<td>C 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Does not exceed 155 mm. (6.1 inches)</td>
<td>C 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"Reasons. — In view of the fact that the names by which warships (‘capital ships’, ‘cruisers’, etc.) are known in the various fleets are not identical but vary appreciably (the same type of vessel being regarded in one fleet as a torpedo-boat, in another as a cruiser, etc.), the introduction of these names in the text of a general Disarmament Convention does not appear to be advisable. It would be preferable, for the purposes of the future Convention, to use the terms employed in Table II of the present document. If this suggestion is accepted by the Commission, formal modifications would naturally have to be made in certain other parts of the text proposed in document C.P.D.230.

"The proposed system would facilitate the sub-division into two parts of the class termed in document C.P.D.230 "capital ships”. The disadvantage of the adoption of this latter definition would be that the same provisions would apply to very different vessels—for instance, to the British capital ship Nelson with a displacement of 35,000 tons, mounting nine 40 cm. guns, and to the Swedish coast defence vessel Aran, with a displacement of 3,360 tons, mounting two 21 cm. guns."

M. Westman (Sweden). — The Swedish delegation proposes a table for Table II. Our reasons for proposing this table are given in the same document; there are two of them. We think that it would be difficult to include in a general disarmament Convention such names as “capital ships”, “cruisers”, etc., since these terms are differently used in different navies.
Thus, it would probably be better to use the descriptions we have proposed, and say merely "Class A, Class B," etc., indicating the characteristic features of the types in question.

Naturally, this question is not very important from our point of view, but we attach more importance to the second reason which prompted our counter-proposal.

If you examine the table proposed in the document submitted by the seven Powers, you will see that the coast-defence vessels of the Swedish fleet would fall into the first class, which would thus include vessels of very different types. There would, on the one hand, be vessels like the British capital ship Nelson, with a displacement of 35,000 tons and mounting nine 40 cm. guns, and, on the other hand, the Swedish coast-defence vessel Aran, with a displacement of 3,360 tons and mounting two 21 cm. guns.

We should prefer the first class to be sub-divided into two columns. This division could be made either by means of our Table II or by drawing a line in the first class, called "capital ships", in the document submitted by the seven Powers (document C.P.D.230).

M. Politis (Greece). — I should like to offer a brief observation to show that the path we are following is edged by precipices. You have just decided to leave blank the maximum displacement allowed for capital ships. Now you are proposing to divide capital ships into two classes—namely, those above and those below 10,000 tons. We do not know whether the States which sign the Convention will be allowed to have capital ships of over 10,000 tons.

If you wish to be more or less logical and to conform to what you have just decided under Article D, you must say:

"Class A. Should the Conference decide to fix . . . in Article D for capital ships, this class would be divided into the following two sub-classes."

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — I fully support the proposal of M. Politis, which is quite logical. On the other hand, I should not be able to vote for the Swedish delegation's proposal, though I sympathise with its desire. If I voted for that proposal it would mean that I voted for capital ships of more than 10,000 tons.

M. Sato (Japan). — I regret to find myself in complete disagreement with M. Politis. In my opinion, Article D applies only to capital ships that are to be constructed in the future, and not to those already existing. If the Conference wishes to abolish all the capital ships that exist already, there will be great difficulties in the way of accepting the Convention. Together with several other Governments, we signed the Washington Treaty, which authorises us to retain our capital ships. If, by adopting Article D, the Conference intends to abolish all capital ships, the Governments which have such ships and which are Parties to the Washington Treaty will be compelled to scrap all these vessels, such as the Rodney and the Nelson, the big American units and ours also. No Government could assume such an obligation. Accordingly, I urge that we should subsequently discuss and adopt an article stating that our draft does not affect the provisions of other treaties for the limitation of armaments. Moreover, this is indicated on page 19 of our draft Convention (first reading) (document C.P.D.211): Article EA of that draft provides that:

"The present Convention shall not affect the terms of previous treaties, under which certain of the High Contracting Parties have agreed to limit their military, naval or air armaments . . ."

According to this article, the Washington and London Treaties will remain in force. That was, I repeat, the spirit in which I accepted Article D without any figures. But I cannot assume any obligation to scrap all existing capital ships forthwith.

M. Colban (Norway). — I support the Swedish proposal that capital ships should be sub-divided. My country is in the same position as Sweden. That is to say, we have vessels for the defence of our coasts which mount guns of slightly greater calibre than the maximum given in the seven Powers' proposal for light surface vessels. We should be surprised if we suddenly found ourselves credited with the possession of four capital ships as the four vessels in question were built at the end of last century or the beginning of this century and are of about 4,000 tons each.

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — I understand there are two questions now, a question of form and a question of substance. The question of form is whether the Swedish table in which you seek to define and say exactly the vessels you mean is better than the seven-Power system of having a list of certain ships and then defining them later on. Personally, I think we had much better adhere to the seven-Power system, because it is much easier to have an adequate definition without trying to insert in a few words a definition which will certainly lead to trouble. I am therefore against the Swedish proposal on the question of form.

The question of substance is quite a different matter. The question is whether we ought not to have sub-division of capital ships, because there are some ships which are technically, according to the definition proposed on page 11 of document C.P.D.230, capital ships, but which nobody would really regard as ships of the line.

See Annex I of the Minutes.
M. Colban has given an illustration. I do not desire to express any final opinion, because I cannot deal with so technical a matter. Personally, I see no objection to splitting up capital ships into two different classes and having in one class ships of the line in the way we have understood it, and, in the other class, such ships as the Scandinavian and others—I believe the Finnish Government also have ships of that kind. We ought to have in Table II, if that view be accepted, capital ships of the first class and capital ships of the second class, and then a proper definition, when we come to page ii, explaining exactly what we mean by first- and second-class capital ships.

I suggest that all that is necessary at the moment is to have a sub-division of capital ships in this Table, leaving it otherwise as it is, and that we deal with the matter of the Swedish amendment when we come to the definitions.

The Hon. Hugh Gibson (United States of America).—I associate myself fully with the last remarks of the honourable delegate of Japan.

M. Westman (Sweden).—If the Commission does not wish to change the heading altogether, I am prepared to withdraw my proposal concerning Table II and to support Lord Cecil's suggestion for the sub-division of "capital ships".

**Setting up of a Sub-Committee to consider Table II.**

M. Massigli (France).—I think that our discussion would be clearer and that this question would be easily settled if we appointed a small committee to put this table in order.

M. Westman's table had the great advantage of being clearly set out and easy to understand, but it was incomplete as it did not mention destroyers; it therefore needs revision. I think that if a committee of technical experts were set up, it could take account of Lord Cecil's and M. Westman's observations and easily draw up a table that would satisfy us all.

Lord Cecil (British Empire).—I quite agree.

The Chairman.—I think you will all agree that that would be the quickest way. We must therefore request the Scandinavian (that is, the Swedish and Norwegian) experts to be good enough to come to an agreement with the British, French and American naval experts. We do not wish this sub-committee to be too numerous, but M. Sato would perhaps like the Japanese delegation to be included.

M. Sato (Japan).—Naturally, for we are greatly interested in this question.

The Chairman.—In that case the Japanese delegation will also be included.

Admiral von Schoultz (Finland).—I would ask that the Powers most concerned in this question—that is, the small Powers—should not find themselves in a minority in this sub-committee.

Lord Cecil (British Empire).—I hope this is not a question of a majority or a minority.

M. Sato (Japan).—This sub-committee has been set up as the result of an amendment to the text proposed by seven delegations. Accordingly, I think that all the delegations which took part in the preparation of the text proposed should be members of this sub-committee, together with the Scandinavian delegations which are particularly interested in the question.

The Chairman.—In reply to M. Sato, I would point out that his suggestion exactly corresponds to the proposal I made to the Commission. This sub-committee will therefore consist of the experts of Great Britain, France, the United States, Italy, Japan, Sweden, Norway and Finland.

I think we might ask M. Cobian to act as Chairman of this sub-committee.

The proposal was adopted.

41. Discussion on Article A: Amendment proposed by the Yugoslav delegation.

The Chairman.—We have now before us the following amendment to Article A proposed by the Yugoslav delegation. I would ask M. Markovitch whether, after to-day's discussion, he maintains his proposal.

**Amendment proposed by the Yugoslav Delegation.**

"Article A.

"Add a third paragraph to Article A:

"States which, for reasons due to their recent creation or as a result of their special situation, are obliged to spread over a number of years exceeding the duration
of the Convention, the expenditure on the construction of the minimum of their respective tonnages compatible with their national security, shall be allowed to indicate, within the limits of the total tonnage agreed upon, what portion they intend to construct within the period of duration of the Convention.”

Dr. Markovitch (Yugoslavia). — I have not heard any opinion at all concerning our amendment. My position is therefore somewhat difficult. I suggest that the report should mention our amendment, not only to give our delegation a personal satisfaction, but also on account of the principle itself. As I have already explained, it refers to the exact position of certain Powers when called upon to submit their minimum programme for the period of the Convention.

If that programme is to provide the minimum compatible with the national security of those Powers, in conformity with Article 8 of the Covenant, they will be bound to submit a larger programme than they think they can, in fact, carry out during the term of the Convention.

But if, in one form or other, you make it possible for them to give two figures, you will then have an exact picture of the naval position of those countries.

I make this suggestion so that the work of the future Disarmament Conference may be genuine, and I leave it to the Commission to decide how far they can take these observations into account.

M. Cobian (Spain). — I support the suggestion just made by the Yugoslav delegate all the more warmly because it also covers the case of Spain and reinforces the observations I made three or four days ago, at the beginning of the naval discussion.

The Chairman. — We agree with M. Markovitch that this question should be mentioned in the report.

42. Statement by the Persian Delegate regarding the Persian Government’s Intentions and Desires concerning the Organisation of its Fleet.

Colonel Ali Khan Riazi (Persia). — My country’s position resembles that of Yugoslavia, with this difference: that we cannot for the moment supply figures for our global tonnage, as we are engaged in organising our navy. In this connection, I shall venture to read a statement which I should like to appear in extenso in the Minutes:

“For the reasons given in our general statements concerning land armaments, we desire to acquaint the Commission with our Government’s intentions and desires concerning the organisation of its fleet.

“Owing to the length of the Persian Empire’s sea frontier, the problem of proportionate naval strength is of the greatest importance to the security of our country.

“In the north, the Caspian Sea has been, and always will be, the most direct route for our communications with Russia and Europe. Its importance has been increased by recent treaties with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has just become greater through the construction of the Bender-Shah-Teheran railway, on which the Persian Government is at present engaged.

“In the south, the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman are our only means of access to the open sea, and are also the routes most favoured for our international communications.

“Developments in the working of our mines and the construction of the new Trans-Persian railway compel us to be more vigilant than ever.

“The Persian Government is, therefore, unable to content itself with a few old warships now being disrated in the Persian Gulf and has just drawn up a ten-years’ programme of naval construction.

“This programme, which is still a modest one, will leave us, even when it has been fully carried out, far below the figure of 100,000 tons which was advanced by other countries with small navies, and, notwithstanding the length of our coast-line, the funds available will not allow us, for the moment, either to go farther or to undertake costly building.

“The figures we shall submit to the Conference will, therefore, be proportional to our budgetary possibilities, but will in no way prejudice our maximum global tonnage, as we are unable to determine that until our defensive programmes have been carried out.”

M. Massigli (France). — The Yugoslav proposal is tantamount to a revival of the whole of the French compromise proposal of 1927. Accordingly, if the majority of the Commission adopts this view the French delegation will, as a matter of course, also support it.

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — I thought we had settled that question. I thought we had agreed that it was to be mentioned in the report.

The Chairman. — Yes, we agreed that it should be mentioned.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — I only wish to say there can be no doubt that any facilities which may be demanded by the Persian Government will be in the nature of defence, in order to guarantee the security of their country. I can assure the Persian delegate that the Soviet delegation will fully support their demands.
43. **Sub-Committee to consider Table II: Extension of the Mandate of the Sub-Committee (Consideration of the Question of the Insertion of the Figures in the Draft Convention).**

The Hon. Hugh Gibson (United States of America). — May I make a suggestion about the Sub-Committee that is going to meet this afternoon? It seems to me that we might make a display of executive ability—which consists usually of getting other people to do one’s work—if we were to ask them to come to-morrow with a suggestion as to how we are to deal with figures, possibly in the form of a resolution that we can vote on. This would obviate any necessity for discussion to-morrow morning.

M. Cobian (Spain). — That would certainly be very helpful.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). The work and nature of the Sub-Committee have been changed, and I suggest that all delegates who have made amendments be included in it.

The Chairman. — In that case, the Sub-Committee would be too large. I ask you to be satisfied with what we have already decided and to give the Sub-Committee your confidence. To-morrow, we shall discuss its report.

44. **Postponement of Vote on Articles E, F and G.**

The Chairman. — As there are no amendments to Articles E, F and G, we might take the vote at once. It must be clearly understood that, in accordance with the decision taken concerning Article D, the figures in these articles will be left blank, as this question of figures has been referred to the Sub-Committee. We shall not be able to take any decision on the figures until to-morrow, when we shall have the Sub-Committee’s report before us.

Is there any objection to our saving time by taking the vote at once?

M. Sato (Japan). — Since this question of figures has been referred to the Sub-Committee which is to meet this afternoon, I think it would be more logical to postpone the vote on Article E and the following articles until to-morrow morning. If the Sub-Committee decides to mention no figures, I shall perhaps have a proposal to put forward as an alternative.

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — Let me point out that Articles F and G are not part of our Convention at all. It is only a question of Article E, and surely we can adopt Article E subject to the question of figures, and I should have hoped that we could adopt a good many other articles, too, subject to the question of figures.

M. Cobian (Spain). — There is a question of principle. Paragraph 2 of Article E says that “no aircraft-carrier of 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons) standard displacement shall carry a gun exceeding 6.1 inches (155 mm.) in calibre.” This concerns the great Powers and is very appropriate from their point of view. For others, however, it would not be just, and this question of principle must be considered before a conclusion is reached.

The Chairman. — I should have liked to obviate any further delay, but, after that observation, I see that the vote must be postponed until to-morrow.

Dr. Woo Kaiseng (China). — The Chinese delegation shares the view of the Yugoslav and Persian delegations and asks that this should be mentioned in the report.

The Sub-Committee rose at 1 p.m.

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**FIFTH MEETING OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE.**

*Held on Thursday, November 20th, 1930, at 10 a.m.*

Chairman: M. Loudon (Netherlands).

45. **Discussion on Chapter II. — Material: Section II, Naval Armaments (continuation): Discussion on Table II, Article B (document C.P.D.230) (continuation): Report of the Sub-Committee set up to consider Table II, and how Figures should be dealt with in the Draft Convention.**

The Chairman. — On M. Massigli’s proposal, the Sub-Commission decided to set up a Sub-Committee of Experts to complete Table II, bearing in mind the Swedish amendment. At Mr. Gibson’s suggestion the Sub-Committee was also requested to submit a draft resolution to the Sub-Commission as to whether the figures in the draft Convention should be maintained or not.
The Sub-Committee's proposals in regard to Table II are as follows:

**Proposals of the Sub-Committee Concerning Table II.**

"Table II.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories (defined in Annex III)</th>
<th>High Contracting Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Capital Ships:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Aircraft-carriers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(cd)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) Submarines</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 For Powers which possess only vessels of a displacement which does not exceed 8,000 tons.

"Annex III.

"Modify Annex III (page ii of document C.P.D.230) as follows:

"For the purposes of the present Treaty the following expressions are to be understood in the sense defined in this part.

"(a) Capital Ships.

"(i) A capital ship, except in the case of the existing ships specified in Annex II, is defined as a vessel of war, not an aircraft-carrier whose displacement exceeds 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons) standard displacement, or which carries a gun with a calibre exceeding 203 mm. (8 inches).

"(ii) Vessels not exceeding 8,000 tons displacement and the calibre of whose guns exceeds 203 mm. (8 inches).

"(b) Aircraft-carriers:

The Sub-Committee considered that it would be out of place to insert the definition of these two classes of vessels in Table II. It decided to establish two sub-divisions, the asterisk (the meaning of which I have just explained) being placed against the latter sub-division. These two definitions will, of course, be given in the Annex.

As regards the insertion of figures, the Sub-Committee unanimously agreed that it was preferable to insert these in the draft Convention. Opinions differed as to what figures should be inserted. The majority of the delegations thought that those in existing agreements or treaties should be taken, with a note stating that they do not imply a recommendation, but are simply an illustration. Other delegations thought that figures should be discussed and adopted as a recommendation from the Preparatory Commission to the Conference, the latter being, of course, free to change them.

I accordingly submit to the Sub-Committee Table II with its references to the definitions in Annex III, and propose that a resolution should be adopted to the effect that figures should be..."
inserted in the draft Convention. The Sub-Commission should then decide whether the figures in document C.P.D.230, which have been taken from existing treaties should be given as an illustration, or whether each figure should be discussed. In the latter case, it will be necessary to decide on what basis they are to be calculated.

**Vote on Table II as proposed by the Sub-Committee.**

The Chairman. — After yesterday's discussion and after hearing M. Cobián's explanations we can proceed to vote. A vote will now be taken on Table II as proposed by the Sub-Committee.

Table II was adopted by nineteen votes.

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — I would like to explain that, although I voted for it, my vote is subject to the reservation I made yesterday. I am awaiting further instructions.

**Vote on the Maintenance of the Figures given in Document C.P.D. 230 on the Understanding that They are Given as an Illustration.**

The Chairman. — We now come to the question of the figures. Do you agree to maintain the figures taken from existing treaties in the draft of the seven delegations, it being understood that they are given as an illustration?

The maintenance of the figures was adopted by sixteen votes for to two against.

**Annulment of Previous Decision to Omit Figures in Article D.**

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — I understand that the decision we took yesterday to leave out the figures in Article D will, of course, be annulled now, and we shall put in those figures?

The Chairman. — That is agreed.


"Article E.

1. No aircraft-carrier shall exceed 27,000 tons (27,432 metric tons) standard displacement or carry a gun with a calibre in excess of 8 inches (203 mm.).

2. No aircraft-carrier of 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons) or less standard displacement shall carry a gun exceeding 6.1 inches (155 mm.) in calibre.

3. If the armament carried includes guns exceeding 6.1 inches (155 mm.) in calibre, the total number of guns carried, except anti-aircraft guns and guns not exceeding 5.1 inches (130 mm.) shall not exceed ten. If, alternatively, the armament contains no guns exceeding 6.1 inches (155 mm.) in calibre the number of guns is not limited. In either case the number of anti-aircraft guns and of guns not exceeding 5.1 inches (130 mm.) in calibre is not limited."

The Chairman. — In regard to Article E, it is understood that the figure of 27,000 tons is given as an illustration.

M. Cobián (Spain). — At the end of yesterday's meeting I stated that my delegation was obliged to vote against the second paragraph of Article E, which provides that no aircraft-carrier of at least 10,000 tons may mount guns exceeding 6.1 inches in calibre.

I said that this limitation and this prohibition were very well suited to Powers which possess aircraft-carriers exceeding 10,000 tons, but that Powers which have perhaps only one aircraft-carrier of 10,000 tons or under, ought to have the right to arm their aircraft-carriers with any guns they please.

If this principle be maintained without any restriction, it will place countries which have no aircraft-carriers exceeding 10,000 tons at a serious disadvantage. For this reason I propose, either that this prohibition should be abolished, or that the clause should be applicable solely to countries which have aircraft-carriers of over 10,000 tons.

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — I think we should be making a mistake in entering on this discussion. Having already resolved that these figures are only put in by way of illustration, surely we cannot take one particular set of figures and discuss them.

M. Cobián (Spain). — It is not the figures that I am objecting to, but the principle. I would agree to the insertion of figures as an illustration, on condition that they apply to Powers with some units exceeding this tonnage, whether the Conference fixes it at 10,000 tons or at 8,000 or 12,000 tons. What I cannot accept is a rule without exception.
Powers which do not possess large navies are obliged to distribute their tonnage in a special manner, and even to construct vessels which are not exactly similar to those of other fleets which must be capable of use as aircraft-carriers and at the same time must be sufficiently armed.

The Hon. Hugh Gibson (United States of America). — I can reassure M. Cobián about this text. The figures, as I have already pointed out, are inserted purely as an illustration and not as a recommendation. I think that every one of the authors of the project feels that some of the figures are unacceptable. We realise that they may be modified; but, in order to present a coherent picture, it was thought necessary to give an illustration of the situation as it now exists in the only definite quantitative treaties in force. Obviously, this matter will require a certain amount of adjustment, and there is nothing in this that precludes any delegation from entering reservations, or footnotes, making their position clear, and these will go forward with the text to the Conference. I hope what I have just said will reassure anyone who thinks that it is our desire to impose figures. That is not our wish at all.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — During the discussion on this draft Convention the Soviet delegation has invariably expressed itself for the total abolition of aircraft-carriers, regarding them as the most aggressive form of sea forces, adding, as they do, to the destructive might of navies the further destructive qualities of aviation over a vast field of action practically embracing the whole world. These vessels, which are, moreover, the most costly of all—the Lexington and Saratoga costing upwards of 9 million pounds—are the most advantageous for powerful navies, ensuring their undivided sway over smaller countries and colonies. For this reason the Soviet delegation abstains from voting, and at the proper moment they will either bring in a corresponding proposal, or suggest that zero be put in the tables against the aircraft-carrier figures.

M. Cobían (Spain). — I do not agree with Mr. Gibson, and I still maintain that this is not a question of figures but of principle. I will accept his proposal that mention should be made in the report of the Spanish delegation’s reservation on this matter.

VOTE ON ARTICLE E.

The Chairman. — Note will be taken of M. Cobían’s reservation. We will now proceed to vote. Will those who are in favour of Article E kindly raise their hands?

Article E was adopted by thirteen votes, with some abstentions.

47. Discussion on Articles F and G (document C.P.D.230).

The two following articles appear in Part III of the London Naval Treaty, and are quoted as examples of supplementary restrictions which certain High Contracting Parties may be prepared to assume:

“ARTICLE F.

Not more than 25 per cent of the allowed total tonnage in the cruiser category may be fitted with a landing-on platform or deck for aircraft.

“ARTICLE G.

In the destroyer category, not more than 16 per cent of the allowed total tonnage shall be employed in vessels of over 1,500 tons (1,524 metric tons) standard displacement.”

M. Politis (Greece). — In regard to these articles, I should like to point out that, even if they are merely illustrative, they can only apply to large navies and are not applicable to small navies. Examples are unnecessary. Article F shows us that countries which have only three cruisers would not be entitled, according to this text, to any cruisers fitted with a landing-on platform.

Even if these articles are only maintained as illustrations, we should adopt a wording which does not place Powers with small navies at an unfair disadvantage.

The Chairman. — Account will be taken of M. Politis’s observation.

M. Massigli (France). — I think that the Greek representative’s remark is very well founded, and I propose that these two articles should be inserted in the draft in the form of notes.

The Chairman. — M. Massigli’s suggestion is a very good one, and note will also be taken of it when the final text of the draft Convention is drawn up.

M. Cobían (Spain). — I could not accept these two articles without reservations, even if they are given purely and simply as an indication.

[Note by Secretariat. — These two articles, and the paragraph preceding them, are inserted as a note in the draft Convention.]

"**ARTICLE H.**

"No submarine shall exceed 2,000 tons (2,032 metric tons) standard displacement or carry a gun exceeding 5.1 inches (130 mm.) in calibre."

**Amendment proposed by the Soviet Delegation.**

**The Chairman.** — The Soviet delegation proposes that this article should be worded as follows:

"No submarine shall exceed 600 tons (610 metric tons) standard displacement or carry a gun exceeding 4 inches (101.6 mm.) in calibre."

**M. Litvinoff** (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — I wish to draw the attention of the Commission to the fact that this proposal, as it stands in the draft of the seven States, will have a very restricted meaning and scope because, of the 333 submarines which are enumerated in the documents of the London Naval Conference, only five are of over 2,000 tons, and I may remark by the way that these five are all allowed by way of exception. If you accept this draft, it will have no meaning at all, because there are few submarines of over 2,000 tons and those which exist are already exempted. Therefore I urge the utmost reduction of displacement and of the military equipment of submarines. We want to bring about the limitation of possibilities of aggression and therefore we should not accept the limitation proposed by the seven States, the more so that both the British and Italian delegations in London were in favour of the diminution of the tonnage of submarines. I should like to hear confirmation of this point of view, officially stated in the Blue Book circulated by the Chairman. We see no reason why the Preparatory Commission for Disarmament should not follow up the suggestion made in London, and we therefore propose a displacement of 600 tons, with four-inch guns, for submarines. I am convinced that such limitation would deprive submarines of a great degree of their aggressive power.

**Lord Cecil** (British Empire). — I thought we had resolved—and I have called attention to it once—that these figures are only to be regarded as indicative and not as laying down any rule, and therefore it seems to me foolish to bother about 2,000, or 6,000 or 50,000 tons.

**The Chairman.** — I was going to make that remark myself. We have taken a decision and we must abide by it.

**M. Colban** (Norway). — I do not see how it is possible for us to vote on the Soviet amendment, which deals with figures, when we decided just now that all figures were simply to be regarded as illustrative. I have no objection to a vote being taken on the Soviet amendment, provided we first of all agree to go back on the decision which we took a few minutes ago.

**The Chairman.** — M. Colban is quite right. The simplest thing, I think, would be not to vote on the Soviet amendment but to vote simply on the text of the draft submitted by the seven Powers.

**M. Litvinoff** (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — If figures are given as an indication, then some importance must be attached to them. I propose that my figures should be given in the nature of an indication. I submit that I am quite in order in proposing this.

**Lord Cecil** (British Empire). — We have decided, not only that these figures shall only be illustrative, but that we shall take the figures from existing treaties, because that is the principle of illustration. Having decided that once, I do not see that we can always be going back on it.

**Vote on Article H.**

**The Chairman.** — We must maintain that ruling, and I will therefore put to the vote Article H of the draft submitted by the seven Powers (document C.P.D.230).

*Article H was adopted by fourteen votes, with some abstentions.*


"**ARTICLE J.**

"No vessel of war exceeding the limitations as to displacement or armament prescribed by the present Convention shall be acquired by, or constructed by, or for or within the jurisdiction of, any of the High Contracting Parties."
In regard to vessels of war limited by the present Treaty, the High Contracting Parties agree to be bound by the rules for replacement set out in Annex IV.

Within one month after the date of laying down and the date of completion respectively of each vessel of war, other than the vessels exempt from limitation as defined in Annex I, laid down or completed by or for them or within their jurisdiction after the coming into force of the present treaty, the High Contracting Parties shall communicate to each of the other High Contracting Parties the information detailed below:

(a) The date of laying down the keel and the following particulars:
    - Classification of the vessel and for whom built (if not for the High Contracting Party), standard displacement in tons and metric tons. Principal dimensions—namely, length of water-line, extreme beam at or below water-line. Mean draught at standard displacement. Calibre of the largest gun.

(b) The date of completion, together with the foregoing particulars relating to the vessel at that date.

Articles J, K and L were adopted without discussion.


No preparation shall be made in merchant ships in time of peace for the installation of warlike armaments for the purpose of converting such ships into vessels of war, other than the necessary stiffening of decks for the mounting of guns not exceeding 6.1 inches (155 mm.) calibre.

Amendment proposed by the Soviet Delegation.

The Chairman. — The Soviet delegation has submitted an amendment that this article should read as follows:

No preparation shall be made in merchant ships in time of peace for the installation of warlike armaments for the purpose of converting such ships into vessels of war.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — I should like my naval expert to say a few words in favour of my amendment.

M. Antzipo-Tchekounsky (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — The Soviet delegation is entirely in agreement with the first part of Article M of the draft submitted by the seven Powers. Nevertheless, it fails to understand why it was necessary to weaken this article by giving leave to stiffen the decks for the mounting of six-inch guns. It cannot be denied that this stiffening of the decks is a preparation of the same kind as the special adaptation of the hold to store shells or arrangements for the installation of fire-control apparatus. It is true that the former is easier than the latter, but that is no reason for departing from the principle.

Rules providing for warfare against enemy commerce are laid down in the "Treaty for the Protection of the Lives of Neutrals and Non-combatants at Sea in Time of War" (Washington, February 6th, 1922).

The essential argument for the arming of merchant ships with large guns is that they require them in order to fight submarines. Section (2) of Article I of the above-mentioned Treaty provides that:

Belligerent submarines are not under any circumstances exempt from the universal rules above stated; and if a submarine cannot capture a merchant vessel in conformity with these rules the existing law of nations requires it to desist from attack and from seizure and to permit the merchant vessel to proceed unmolested.

Article 22 of the London Treaty states that, in their action with regard to merchant ships, submarines must conform to the rules of international law. If the representatives of the principal naval Powers who signed this Treaty consider that its articles are capable of execution, it is unnecessary to provide in a disarmament Convention for the arming of merchant ships with six-inch guns. By so doing you make it possible to create a large class of auxiliary cruisers which would strengthen the destructive power of navies.

The Soviet delegation accordingly desires to maintain its wording for Article M.

M. Colban (Norway). — I have no definite instructions from my Government on this point, but I feel very strongly that a clear distinction should be made between merchant ships and war
vessels. We are endeavouring to establish this distinction in the case of aircraft, and it has already been inserted in our draft Convention. In principle, therefore, I am opposed to anything which might make the distinction between warships and merchant ships less clear, and I accordingly accept the Soviet delegation’s proposal.

M. Sato (Japan). — I am quite prepared to accept the article in its present form, especially as there is a corresponding provision in the Treaties of Washington and London.

Nevertheless, my Government has a suggestion to make. It considers it inadvisable that merchant ships should be allowed to make preparations in time of peace which would allow aircraft-to start from or alight on them, because, if too much liberty be allowed in regard to aircraft installations, at a time of crisis these merchant ships could easily be converted into aircraft-carriers and would thus constitute an aggressive arm.

My Government is also very anxious not to hamper the expansion of civil aviation; but, as I said just now, it wishes some limit to be laid down to prevent merchant vessels from being converted in times of emergency into aircraft-carriers.

My Government therefore maintains its suggestion; but, in view of present circumstances, and in order not to obstruct the progress of the Commission’s work, it merely desires to place this suggestion before you and reserves the right to raise the question at the Conference.

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — I only wish to say this in answer to what M. Litvinoff and M. Colban have said—that, after all, you must allow merchant vessels to defend themselves against submarine attack, and for that purpose they must carry some kind of gun, and this, from one point of view, is merely recognising that. More than that, this has been a matter of considerable discussion and the subject of a compromise arrived at at two international conferences—those of Washington and London. I think that, without very strong grounds, it would be unwise for this Commission to try and go against this compromise.

M. Rutgers (Netherlands). — I should like to explain that this article does not deal with the question of armed merchant ships, but only with the question of preparations for arming merchant ships, so as to convert them into vessels of war. Merchant ships converted into vessels of war are not armed merchant ships but warships—that is to say, auxiliary cruisers.

VOTE ON THE SOVIET AMENDMENT.

The Chairman. — We will now vote on the Soviet amendment.

The Soviet amendment was rejected by nine votes against and five for, with some abstentions.

ADOPTION OF ARTICLE M.

Article M was adopted.


"ARTICLE N.

“In the event of a High Contracting Party being engaged in war, such Power shall not use as a vessel of war any vessel of war which may be under construction within its jurisdiction for any other Power, or which may have been constructed within its jurisdiction for another Power and not delivered.

"ARTICLE O.

“Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes not to dispose—by gift, sale or any mode of transfer—of any vessel of war in such a manner that such vessel may become a vessel of war in the navy of any foreign Power.

“Any vessels of war which have to be disposed of as being surplus to the tonnage figures allowed by this convention shall be disposed of in accordance with the rules given in Annex V.

"ARTICLE P.

“Existing ships of various types which, prior to April 1st, 1930, have been used as stationary training establishments or hulks, may be retained in a non-seagoing condition”.

The Chairman. — We now come to Articles N, O and P. No amendments having been submitted, we will regard them as adopted.

Agreed.
52. Adoption of Tables I, II and III (Document C.P.D.230).

The Chairman. — After the discussions we have had in regard to them, we will consider these tables—as amended in consequence of these discussions—adopted.

Agreed.


"ANNEX I. — EXEMPT VESSELS.

"The following vessels are exempt from limitation:

"(a) Naval surface combatant vessels of 600 tons (610 metric tons) standard displacement and under;
"(b) Naval surface combatant vessels exceeding 600 tons (610 metric tons), but not exceeding 2,000 tons (2,032 metric tons) standard displacement, provided they have none of the following characteristics:

"(1) Mount a gun above 6.1-inch (155 mm) calibre;
"(2) Mount more than four guns above 3-inch (76 mm) calibre;
"(3) Are designed or fitted to launch torpedoes;
"(4) Are designed for a speed greater than twenty knots;

"(c) Naval surface vessels not specifically built as fighting ships which are employed on fleet duties or as troop transports or in some other way than as fighting ships, provided they have none of the following characteristics:

"(1) Mount a gun above 6.1-inch (155 mm) calibre;
"(2) Mount more than four guns above 3-inch (76 mm) calibre;
"(3) Are designed or fitted to launch torpedoes;
"(4) Are designed for a speed greater than twenty knots;
"(5) Are protected by armour-plate;
"(6) Are designed or fitted to launch mines;
"(7) Are fitted to receive aircraft on board from the air;
"(8) Mount more than one aircraft-launching apparatus on the centre line; or two, one on each broadside;
"(9) If fitted with any means of launching aircraft into the air, are designed or adapted to operate at sea more than three aircraft."

AMENDMENT PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION.

The Chairman. — To Annex I there is a Soviet amendment, which is as follows. As this refers to figures the question has been decided.

"ANNEX I. — EXEMPT VESSELS.

"The following vessels are exempt from limitation:

"(a) Naval surface combatant vessels of 100 tons (101.7 metric tons) standard displacement and under, the calibre of whose guns does not exceed 3 inches;
"(b) Naval surface vessels not specifically built as fighting ships which are employed on fleet duties or as troop transports or in some other way than as fighting ships, provided that they have none of the following characteristics:

"(1) Mount a gun above 3 inches (76.2 mm) calibre;
"(2) Mount more than four guns of this calibre;
"(3) Are designed or fitted to launch torpedoes;
"(4) Are designed for a speed greater than 15 knots;
"(5) Are protected by armour-plate;
"(6) Are fitted to receive aircraft on board from the air;
"(7) Are fitted with any means of launching aircraft into the air."

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).—This is a very important question. We are here speaking of reduction and we must draw a line of demarcation between those vessels which are to be reduced and those which are to be left untouched. It is not merely a matter
of figures by way of indication. We must accept some definite figure. The draft before us
proposes that vessels with a displacement not exceeding 2,000 tons with guns not above 6.1-inch
calibre, or with a speed of not greater than 20 knots, should not be included in global tonnage.
There can be no manner of doubt that these vessels have considerable fighting power, and
constitute, in particular, a substitute for small cruisers in operations against mercantile vessels
and in remote theatres of war. We maintain that to leave unlimited such an important group
of fighting tonnage runs counter to the principles which should inspire the Disarmament Conference.
Such vessels should certainly be included in global limitations, under the category of light cruisers
—light forces. For this reason I would propose that only vessels of 100 tons with three-inch
guns should not be subjected to limitation. Indeed, 100 tons was spoken of as a desirable
figure by the Italian representative in the Committee of Experts during the London Naval
Conference.

M. Rosso (Italy). — It is true that in London we maintained the view that 600 tons was
not a satisfactory figure and we proposed 100 tons as the maximum limit. In view of the
decision which has been taken, I do not think it necessary to expound the Italian views at
length, since all discussion of the figures has been postponed. We therefore propose to raise
the question at the Conference.

M. Westman (Sweden). — I am in favour of a reduction in the figure of 600 tons and support
the Soviet delegation's proposal in this connection.

M. Colban (Norway). — I wish to support M. Westman's observation. Nevertheless, this
is a figure which will have to be adopted by the Conference, and it must be the same for all States
without any exception for particular groups, unless they come to an agreement among themselves.

Admiral von Schoultz (Finland). — I wish to support the remarks of M. Colban.

AMENDMENT PROPOSED BY THE FRENCH DELEGATION.

M. Massigli (France). — After what M. Rosso has said, I do not think we need discuss
this question at the moment. However, I think it would be desirable to take M. Colban's
observations into account and to insert at the beginning of Annex I the following words: "Subject
to stricter conditions resulting from special agreements, the following vessels . . . ". We
should thus be opening the door for special agreements which might facilitate the work of the
Conference.

M. Rosso (Italy). — I desire to associate myself with M. Massigli's proposal, the more so
as we made a similar proposal at the London Naval Conference.

The Chairman. — I propose that we should now vote on the Soviet amendment.

The Hon. Hugh Gibson (United States of America). — We are asked to vote on this, but
how can we do that after what the Chairman has said?

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — I venture to think it would be a great mistake if we voted on
M. Litvinoff's amendment. I have no kind of objection personally to a note being inserted,
but I should think that it was a very great mistake to divide on any particular suggestion of
this sort, for it will give a false impression. If we reject M. Litvinoff's amendment, it will look
as if we are in favour of this particular standard. At any rate, I think that we should stick
to our rule. I do not think this amendment is in order, and therefore it should not be put to
the vote.

M. Politis (Greece). — I do not agree, because this is not merely a question of figures but
of method. The draft drawn up by the seven delegations provides for two categories of vessels
which are exempt, unless fulfilling certain conditions. The Soviet proposal is to abolish one
of these categories; and, with regard to the other category, the conditions which it enumerates
are not absolutely the same as those in the draft of the seven delegations. I consider, therefore,
that a vote should be taken on the Soviet amendment.

VOTE ON THE SOVIET AMENDMENT.

The Chairman. — The arguments of M. Politis appear to be justified, and I accordingly
propose that a vote should be taken on the Soviet amendment.

The Soviet amendment was rejected by eleven votes against to three votes for, with some abstentions.

The Chairman. — We must now vote on the amendment proposed by M. Massigli, to insert
at the beginning of Annex I the following words: "Subject to stricter conditions resulting from
special agreements, the following vessels . . . ",
M. Rosso (Italy). — I should like to ask M. Massigli if he does not think it would be better to adopt the same formula as we used in London—namely: "Subject to any special agreements which may submit them to limitation, the following vessels . . . "

M. Massigli (France). — I support M. Rosso’s proposal.

M. Sato (Japan). — If we say ‘‘stricter conditions’’, what is to be done if an agreement is concluded the conditions of which are less strict? I think it would be better to retain the London wording.

**VOTE ON THE FRENCH AMENDMENT.**

The Chairman. — I will therefore put this formula to the vote: “Subject to any special agreements which may submit them to limitation, the following vessels . . . ”

This formula was adopted by fifteen votes, with some abstentions.

Annex I thus amended was adopted.

54. **Discussion on Annex II (document C.P.D.230).**

The Chairman. — The Soviet delegation proposed the deletion of Annex II.

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — We have voted on that already.

Annex II was adopted.

55. **Discussion on Annex III (document C.P.D.230).**

"ANNEX III. — Definitions.

For the purpose of the present Treaty, the following expressions are to be understood in the sense defined in this part:

“(a) Capital Ships.

A capital ship, except in the case of the existing ships specified in Annex II, is defined as a vessel of war, not an aircraft-carrier whose displacement exceeds 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons) standard displacement, or which carries a gun with a calibre exceeding 8 inches (203 mm.).

“(b) Aircraft-Carrier.

The expression ‘aircraft-carrier’ includes any surface vessel of war, whatever its displacement, designed for the specific and exclusive purpose of carrying aircraft and so constructed that aircraft can be launched therefrom and landed thereon.

“(c) Cruisers.

A cruiser is a surface vessel of war, other than a capital ship or aircraft-carrier, the standard displacement of which exceeds 1,850 tons (1,880 metric tons) or with a gun above 5.1 inches (130 mm.) calibre.

The cruiser category is divided into two sub-categories, as follows:

“(i) Cruisers carrying a gun above 6.1 inches (155 mm.) calibre;

“(ii) Cruisers carrying a gun not above 6.1 inches (155 mm.) calibre.

“(d) Destroyers.

Surface vessels of war the standard displacement of which does not exceed 1,850 tons (1,880 metric tons) and with a gun not above 5.1 inches (130 mm.) calibre.

“(cd) Light Surface vessels of war, the standard displacement of which does not exceed 10,000 tons, and with guns not exceeding 8 inches calibre. These are divided into two sub-categories as follows:

“(i) Vessels carrying a gun above 6.1 inches (155 mm.) calibre;

“(ii) Vessels carrying a gun not above 6.1 inches (155 mm.) calibre.

"Standard Displacement.

1. The standard displacement of a surface vessel is the displacement of the vessel complete, fully manned, engined and equipped ready for sea, including all armament and equipment."

1 Note by Secretariat. — London Naval Treaty, Article 8.
ammunition, equipment, outfit, provisions and fresh water for crew, miscellaneous stores and implements of every description that are intended to be carried in war, but without fuel or reserve feed water on board.

"2. The standard displacement of a submarine is the surface displacement of the vessel complete (exclusive of the water in non-watertight structure), fully manned, engine and equipped ready for sea, including all armament and ammunition, equipment, outfit, provisions for crew, miscellaneous stores and implements of every description that are intended to be carried in war, but without fuel, lubricating oil, fresh water or ballast water of any kind on board.

"3. Each naval combatant vessel shall be rated at its displacement tonnage when in the standard condition.

"The word 'ton', except in the expression 'metric tons', shall be understood to be the ton of 2,240 lb. (1,016 kgs.)."

AMENDMENT PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION.

"ANNEX III. — DEFINITION.

"For the purpose of the present Treaty, the following expressions are to be understood in the sense defined in this part:

"(a) Capital Ship.

"A capital ship is defined as a vessel of war, not an aircraft-carrier, which carries a gun with a calibre exceeding 8 inches (203 mm.)."

"Standard Displacement.

"1. The standard displacement of a surface vessel is the displacement of the vessel complete, fully manned, engine and equipped ready for sea, including all armament and ammunition, equipment, outfit, provisions and fresh water for crew, miscellaneous stores and implements of every description that are intended to be carried in war, and including fuel and reserve feed water.

"2. The standard displacement of a submarine is the surface displacement of the vessel complete (exclusive of the water in non-watertight structure), fully manned, engine and equipped ready for sea, including all armament and ammunition, equipment, outfit, provisions for crew, miscellaneous stores and implements of every description that are intended to be carried in war, and including fuel, lubricating oil and fresh water, but without ballast water of any kind on board.

"3. Each naval combatant vessel shall be rated at its displacement tonnage when in the standard condition.

"The word 'ton', except in the expression 'metric tons', shall be understood to be the ton of 2,240 lb. (1,016 kgs.)."

The Chairman. — The Soviet delegation has proposed a new text which differs considerably from that of the seven delegations.

M. Massigli (France). — The drafting of this text will have to be revised.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — We have left out the consideration, in Annex III, of standard displacement. This question has not been discussed. There is a Soviet amendment to the proposal of the seven Powers, and, with your permission, I will ask my naval expert to say a few words.

M. Antzipo-Tchekounsky (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — The method of standard rating is not simply a technical question or a matter of convenience. The Soviet amendment proposes that, in calculating the displacement, fuel and reserve feed water should be included, thus modifying what was agreed on at Washington and London.

Everyone may not be aware of the fact that, according to the normal displacement adopted for all fleet statistics prior to the Washington Treaty, capital ships were about 5,000 tons larger than under the new method. Most of the Washington cruisers rated at 10,000 tons are really vessels of 14,000 tons. Part of the Washington Treaty provides that “vessels now completed shall retain their present ratings of displacement tonnage in accordance with their national system of measurement.”

This means that, if you try to establish any comparison between the tonnage of new and older vessels, you are really being misled. The difference between the new and old vessels, in the class of 10,000-ton vessels, amounts to more than 40 per cent—that is, taking into consideration displacement alone and leaving other factors affecting the fighting capacity out of account.
It is obvious that, if cruisers of the time of the world war are compared with the Washington cruisers, the same figure actually represents an increase of 40 per cent. That is the result of the system of standard displacement. Moreover, the radius of action of vessels is chiefly determined by the factors excluded from the calculation. I am still speaking only of cruisers. The British vessel, the *London*, which is really a ship of 14,000 tons and the French *Tourville*, which is a vessel of 11,700 tons, are both regarded as 10,000-ton cruisers. This shows that, in the case of cruisers which are similar, the method of standard displacement conceals the difference in this essential factor. The Soviet proposal reverts to the older method of rating as being fairer. It may be objected that this would cause all navies to show a sudden large increase. That is perfectly true, but you would be going back to the true index, which has been considerably reduced by the new method. These observations in regard to surface vessels naturally apply to submarines as well. The French *Surcouf* of 3,257 tons is, according to the London Treaty, only a vessel of 2,880 tons. The British submarine, *Pandora*, really a vessel of 1,600 tons, is shown as 1,475. It is obvious that, if the tonnage calculated in this way is compared with the figures for 1919 and even for 1928, there is apparently a great reduction in the same units. Our proposal suggests a method of correcting the defects which I have just mentioned.

**VOTE ON THE SOVIET AMENDMENT.**

*The Chairman.* — This is not merely a question of figures but of system as well. I will accordingly put the Soviet amendment to Annex III, to the vote.

*The Soviet amendment was rejected,*

*Annex III was adopted.*

56. **Adoption of Annex IV** (document C.P.D.230).

"**ANNEX IV. — RULES FOR REPLACEMENT.**"

"1. Except as provided in paragraph 4 of this annex, no vessel limited by this treaty shall be replaced until it becomes ‘over-age’.

"2. A vessel shall be deemed to be ‘over-age’ when the following number of years have elapsed since the date of its completion:

(a) Capital ships: 20 years, subject to special provision as may be necessary for the replacement of existing ships;

(b) Aircraft-carriers: 20 years, subject to special provision as may be necessary for existing ships;

(c) Surface vessels exceeding 3,000 tons (3,048 metric tons) but not exceeding 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons) standard displacement:

(i) If laid down before January 1st, 1920, 16 years.

(ii) If laid down after December 31st, 1919, 20 years.

(d) Surface vessels not exceeding 3,000 tons (3,048 metric tons) standard displacement:

(i) If laid down before January 1st, 1921, 12 years.

(ii) If laid down after December 31st, 1920, 16 years.

(e) Submarines: 13 years.

3. The keels of replacement tonnage shall not be laid down more than three years before the year in which the vessel to be replaced becomes ‘over-age’; but this period is reduced to two years in the case of any replacement surface vessel not exceeding 3,000 tons (3,048 metric tons) standard displacement.

4. The right of replacement is not lost by delay in laying down replacement tonnage. The bar of replacement is not lost by delay in laying down replacement tonnage. *The right of replacement is not lost by delay in laying down replacement tonnage. A vessel may be replaced immediately, but such replacement tonnage shall be subject to the limits of displacement and other provisions of this treaty."

**AMENDMENT PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION.**

"**ANNEX IV. — RULES FOR REPLACEMENT.**"

"I. Except as provided in paragraph 4 of this Annex, no vessel limited by this Treaty shall be replaced until it becomes ‘over-age’.

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1 Under the London Treaty, certain Powers agreed not to exercise their rights to lay down the keels of capital ship replacement tonnage during the years 1931 to 1936 inclusive, as provided in the Washington Treaty.
2. A vessel shall be deemed to be 'over-age' when the following number of years has elapsed since the date of its completion:

(a) Capital ships: 25 years, subject to special provision as may be necessary for the replacement of existing ships;

(b) Surface vessels exceeding 3,000 tons (3,048 metric tons) but not exceeding 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons) standard displacement:

(i) If laid down before January 1st, 1920, 20 years;
(ii) If laid down after December 31st, 1919, 25 years;

(c) Surface vessels not exceeding 3,000 tons (3,048 metric tons) standard displacement:

(i) If laid down before January 1st, 1921, 16 years.
(ii) If laid down after December 31st, 1920, 20 years.

(d) Submarines: 15 years.

3. The keels of replacement tonnage shall not be laid down more than three years before the three in which the vessel to be replaced becomes 'over-age'; but this period is reduced to two years in the case of any replacement surface vessel not exceeding 3,000 tons (3,048 metric tons) standard displacement.

"The right of replacement is not lost by delay in laying down replacement tonnage.


"ANNEX V. — Rules for Disposal of Vessels of War.

The present Treaty provides for the disposal of vessels of war in the following ways:

(i) By scrapping (sinking or breaking up);
(ii) By converting the vessel to a hulk;
(iii) By converting the vessel to target use exclusively;
(iv) By retaining the vessel exclusively for experimental purposes;
(v) By retaining the vessel exclusively for training purposes.

Any vessel of war to be disposed of, may either be scrapped or converted to a hulk at the option of the High Contracting Party concerned.

Vessels which have been retained for target, experimental or training purposes, shall finally be scrapped or converted to hulls.

"Section I. — Vessels to be scrapped.

(a) A vessel to be disposed of by scrapping, by reason of its replacement, must be rendered incapable of warlike service within six months of the date of the completion of its successor, or of the first of its successors if there are more than one. If, however, the completion of the new vessel or vessels be delayed, the work of rendering the old vessel incapable of warlike service shall, nevertheless, be completed within four and a-half years from the date of laying the keel of the new vessel, or of the first of the new vessels; but should the new vessel, or any of the new vessels, be a surface vessel not exceeding 3,000 tons (3,048 metric tons) standard displacement, this period is reduced to three and a half years.

(b) A vessel to be scrapped shall be considered incapable of warlike service when there shall have been removed and landed or else destroyed in the ship:

(1) All guns and essential parts of guns, fire-control tops and revolving parts of all barbettes and turrets;
(2) All hydraulic or electric machinery for operating turrets;
(3) All fire-control instruments and range-finders;
(4) All ammunition, explosives, mines and mine rails;
(5) All torpedoes, war-heads, torpedo-tubes and training-racks;
(6) All wireless telegraphy installations;
(7) All main propelling machinery, or alternatively the armoured conning-tower and all side armour-plate;
(8) All aircraft-craneS, derricks, lifts and launching-apparatus. All landing-on or flying-off platforms and decks, or, alternatively, all main propelling machinery;
(9) In addition, in the case of submarines, all main storage-batteries, air-compressor plants and ballast pumps.

" (c) Scrapping shall be finally effected in either of the following ways within twelve months of the date on which the work of rendering the vessel incapable of warlike service is due for completion:

(1) Permanent sinking of the vessel;
(2) Breaking the vessel up; this shall always include the destruction or removal of all machinery, boilers and armour, and all deck, side and bottom-plating.

"Section II. — Vessels to be converted to Hulks.

A vessel to be disposed of by conversion to a hulk shall be considered finally disposed of when the conditions prescribed in Section I, paragraph (b), have been complied with, omitting sub-paragraphs (6), (7) and (8), and when the following have been effected:

(1) Mutilation beyond repair of all propeller-shafts, thrust-blocks, turbine-gearing or main propelling motors, and turbines or cylinders of main engines;
(2) Removal of propeller-brackets;
(3) Removal and breaking up of all aircraft-lifts, and the removal of all aircraft-craneS, derricks and launching-apparatus.

The vessel must be put in the above condition within the same limits of time as provided in Section I for rendering a vessel incapable of warlike service.

"Section III. — Vessels to be converted to Target use.

(a) A vessel to be disposed of by conversion to target use exclusively shall be considered incapable of warlike service when there have been removed and landed, or rendered unserviceable on board, the following:

(1) All guns;
(2) All fire-control tops and instruments and main fire-control communication wiring;
(3) All machinery for operating gun-mountings or turrets;
(4) All ammunition, explosives, mines, torpedoes and torpedo-tubes;
(5) All aviation facilities and accessories.

The vessel must be put into the above condition within the same limits of time as provided in Section I for rendering a vessel incapable of warlike service.

(b) In addition to the rights already possessed by each High Contracting Party under the Washington Treaty, each High Contracting Party is permitted to retain, for target use exclusively, at any one time:

(1) Not more than three vessels (cruisers or destroyers), but of these three vessels only one may exceed 3,000 tons (3,048 metric tons) standard displacement;
(2) One submarine.

(c) On retaining a vessel for target use, the High Contracting Party concerned undertakes not to recondition it for warlike service.

"Section IV. — Vessels retained for Experimental Purposes.

(a) A vessel to be disposed of by conversion to experimental purposes exclusively shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Section III (a) of this annex.

(b) Without prejudice to the general rules, and provided that due notice be given to the other High Contracting Parties, reasonable variation from the conditions prescribed in Section III (a) of this Annex, in so far as may be necessary for the purposes of a special experiment, may be permitted as a temporary measure.

Any High Contracting Party taking advantage of this provision is required to furnish full details of any such variation and the period for which they will be required.

(c) Each High Contracting Party is permitted to retain, for experimental purposes exclusively, at any one time:

(1) Not more than two vessels (cruisers or destroyers), but of these two vessels only one may exceed 3,000 tons (3,048 metric tons) standard displacement;
(2) One submarine.
"(d) On retaining a vessel for experimental purposes, the High Contracting Party concerned undertakes not to recondition it for warlike service.

"Section V. — Vessels retained for Training Purposes

"(a) Each High Contracting Party is permitted to retain, for training purposes exclusively, the following vessels:

"(b) Vessels retained for training purposes under the provisions of paragraph (a) shall, within six months of the date on which they are required to be disposed of, be dealt with as follows:

1. Capital ships.
   "The following is to be carried out:
   "(1) Removal of main-armament guns, revolving parts of all barbettes and turrets; machinery for operating turrets; but three turrets with their armament may be retained in each ship;
   "(2) Removal of all ammunition and explosives in excess of the quantity required for target practice training for the guns remaining on board;
   "(3) Removal of conning-tower and the side armour belt between the foremost and aftermost barbettes;
   "(4) Removal or mutilation of all torpedo-tubes;
   "(5) Removal or mutilation on board of all boilers in excess of the number required for a maximum speed of eighteen knots.

2. Other surface vessels.
   "The following is to be carried out:
   "(1) Removal of one-half of the guns, but four guns of main calibre may be retained on each vessel;
   "(2) Removal of all torpedo-tubes;
   "(3) Removal of all aviation facilities and accessories;
   "(4) Removal of one-half of the boilers.

"(c) The High Contracting Party concerned undertakes that vessels retained in accordance with the provisions of this Section shall not be used for any combatant purpose."

The Chairman. — I now put to the vote Annex V, in regard to which no amendment has been submitted.

Annex V was adopted.

58. Insertion of New Article: Proposal by the British Delegation in regard to Limitation of Annual Expenditure on War Material for Naval Armaments.

The Chairman. — We will now consider the British proposal to insert a new article, to read as follows:

"Each of the High Contracting Parties agrees to limit its actual expenditure on the maintenance, purchase and manufacture of war material for naval armaments to the figures and under the conditions defined in Annex No. . . . to the present Convention."

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — This is a perfectly simple amendment. Its object is to apply the method of budgetary limitation to navies as well as to armies. I do not really think that I should be treating the Sub-Committee with respect if I were again to elaborate the arguments in favour of that course. It is in accordance with that interesting report which Count Bernstorff called to our notice at an earlier stage, and it is, as I think, in accordance with general principles. It is quite true that, in navies, you have a much closer specific limitation than, so far, we have been able to apply to armies; but, none the less, there is a considerable possibility of latitude even in the case of navies. You might have great improvements in speed, in guns and in armour-plating, all of which would be possible under the specific limitations provided for navies, but which would be controlled, more or less, by budgetary limitation — indeed, I think it would be controlled very accurately.

For these reasons, I hope the Sub-Committee will agree to apply in principle the same system of budgetary limitation for navies. Of course, in that case, we would have to enlarge the reference to what I may call M. Massigli's committee, to deal with it and to take the proposals in the same way as we have provided for in the case of the practical details in respect of armies.

The Hon. Hugh Gibson (United States of America). — I have, on a number of occasions made very clear the position of my Government in respect of all forms of budgetary limitation.
I do not, therefore, feel justified in taking up the time of the Sub-Committee by re-stating our position. I merely refer then to the statements to be found in the Minutes.

M. Sato (Japan). — A few days ago when we were discussing the question of budgetary limitation, I explained that my Government was not prepared to accept this in respect of naval forces. If Lord Cecil's new proposal be put to the vote I shall be obliged to vote against it.

M. Cobián (Spain). — The only object of the British amendment is to extend the principle accepted in regard to land armaments to naval armaments. In view of the explanations given in regard to land armaments I can accept this amendment on the basis which has just been specified.

AMENDMENT PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — The Soviet delegation is prepared to vote for the British amendment but would like to insert after the word “limit” the following words: ”. . . and to reduce”. This is the more important in this case because it has just been decided to reduce naval armaments. If we reduce armaments and not the budget, there will be a certain surplus at the disposal of Governments which is unlikely to be diverted to educational or similar purposes but may be spent on other kinds of armaments, so that we shall not gain anything in the way of disarmament. I hope that no objections will be made, from a formal point of view, to this amendment not having been sent in in writing; it is so simple that anyone can grasp its meaning even without the text. Of course if for formal reasons this amendment be rejected, we shall have to propose it another day when we come to the general chapter on “Budgetary Expenditure”.

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — I would like to say a word about M. Litvinoff's proposal. I hope he will not press it, for I think it proceeds on a wrong conception of budgetary limitation, which is essentially an auxiliary form, and not a direct form, of limitation. We will arrive at the limitation of armies so far only by a limitation of effectives. If we could have found some way of adding a limitation of material I personally should have been very glad, but we could not think of a practical way, so it depends on effectives. Effectives would require equipment, and that would require a certain expenditure. That expenditure would be the expenditure permitted and it would be limited.

If the effectives were reduced, the expenditure would be automatically reduced, and the limitation would apply in that way. It is to be an auxiliary and not a direct form of limitation.

The same thing would apply even more in the case of the navy, where the main limitation must be a limitation of the ships and the guns. You will have the auxiliary limitation of the budgetary limitation, the purpose of which is to ensure that countries which have accepted the direct form of limitation are not indirectly, in some way or other, exceeding that limitation.

We want a limitation—not so much a reduction as a limitation. That is the reason why I cannot accept M. Litvinoff's amendment.

With regard to what has been said by Mr. Gibson and M. Sato, I fully recognise their position, and can only say that if, unfortunately, no means are arrived at, at the time of the Conference, for getting over that difficulty, then, of course, the British Government would have to reconsider their position with regard to budgetary limitation also.

SUGGESTION BY THE FRENCH DELEGATION.

M. Massigli (France). — I think that the Sub-Commission should consider very carefully what it is going to vote on. We are not here to manifest opinions but to give the Governments a draft to show them the existing situation and whether an agreement is possible on the given bases.

We have just heard two very important declarations from the representatives of two of the principal naval Powers, the United States of America and Japan. Lord Cecil has also clearly explained to us his proposal, which deals with some sort of additional limitation. I doubt whether it is advisable to accumulate difficulties and to propose combined methods when we see that two delegations are clearly opposed to such a course. Could we not try to find an intermediate solution, and limit indirectly, by budgetary expenditure, this part of the material—since it actually exists and is of considerable importance—which we cannot limit directly?

Moreover, if the real object is to provide some flexible form of additional limitation, it seems to me that from the naval standpoint, since floating material, which is the essential part of naval material, is already limited directly, Lord Cecil's proposal has, to a large extent, been met, because budgetary limitation of the total naval expenditure is provided for in Chapter III.
I hope, therefore, that if Lord Cecil thinks it necessary to maintain his proposal for the indirect limitation of material, he will consider the possibility of confining it to material which is not already directly limited under Section II of Chapter II. Perhaps this suggestion might lead to a compromise between the different proposals which have been put before us.

M. Rutgers (Netherlands).—I do not wish to re-open the discussion on direct and indirect limitation. I should merely like to know whether Lord Cecil’s proposal also includes expenditure on material in reserve—that is to say, guns kept in reserve in the arsenals for arming auxiliary cruisers, etc.; whether it includes expenditure on merchant ships in the form of subsidies granted to steamship companies, which are not shown in the naval budget which appear in other budgets, and, finally, whether the amendment also includes expenditure on naval bases.

In conclusion, is it proposed to refer the whole question to the Committee of Experts, as was done in the case of the limitation of land armaments?

M. Antoniade (Roumania).—I am quite prepared to accept the British delegation’s amendment if the observations of my delegation in regard to the budgetary limitation of land armaments—which are, moreover, approved by the Greek and Spanish delegations among others—are taken into account.

Lord Cecil (British Empire).—So far as M. Antoniade’s question is concerned, I quite agree. My object is to put the same conditions in regard to land and sea.

In regard to the questions which M. Rutgers has put to me, I would say that, broadly, I accept all of them—that is to say, I certainly contemplate that all expenditure on merchant vessels or on maritime bases or anything else which can properly be called expenditure on material for naval purposes, and all war material, would be included. I certainly do contemplate that we should ask the Committee of Experts to advise the delegates on this matter, in exactly the same way as we have asked them to advise on the details of land expenditure. I hope my answer is sufficiently precise.

With regard to M. Massigli’s very interesting suggestion, I am afraid I do not quite see what we gain by it. The difficulty with regard to the United States and the Japanese delegations is one of principle. The United States delegation quite definitely objects to budgetary limitation, and I also understand that, with regard to navies, the Japanese delegation objects to budgetary limitation. It does not appear to me therefore that we can meet either of those delegations by confining our budgetary limitation to only one part of naval material. I am sure M. Massigli will see how extremely complicated his system would be, if we were to say that only the material which was not limited by direct limitation was to be limited. What would that include? Evidently we should not have things definitely affecting the calibre of guns. Suppose there were expenditure on an existing eight-inch gun, for example, which made it far more powerful than it is at present. We know in practice how very much arms have improved in that way. The classical instance, the change from the small bore of a hundred years ago to the modern rifle, is of course the best example. Similar changes may take place, and I fancy have taken place, even in the manufacture of the big cannon on board these ships. It would need a very careful definition to say how much of that expenditure was to be included. If the improvement of an existing gun were included, would that be something which was already limited or not? I doubt whether it would. I think the complication would be extreme in trying to divide things up in that way.

The same thing would apply even more clearly in the case of armoured ships. With a ship of 10,000 tons you limit the tonnage: do you limit or not the rearrangement of armour, which may make a very great difference in the fighting capacity of the ship? I think if we are to have this at all it must apply to all forms of naval material, otherwise we shall introduce a complication.

Then M. Massigli had an alternative, or an additional, proposal, that we should not actually limit naval material, but should be content to limit the total expenditure on navies under Chapter III. I do not think that quite meets the case. The question that has been oppressing me right through these discussions is the fact that material has become, and is becoming, so much more important than personnel—I will not say more important, but increasing in importance in proportion to personnel, in all three arms—and unless you have some way of limiting material, as well as personnel, it is doubtful whether you will really accomplish your object. You certainly will not accomplish your object on land, and I doubt whether you will really accomplish it effectively in any of the three arms. That is why I hope we shall put in a general limitation. Therefore I hope M. Massigli will accept this.

I quite agree that, in view of the United States and Japanese delegations’ attitudes, it must be in a sense provisional. It is only a suggestion of this Commission, as indeed is everything we are doing. If, unfortunately, we are unable to find some means of accommodation with those two delegations, it is quite evident it will be impossible for us to go on with the proposal ultimately; but if the majority of those who are present here agree that some such limitation would, if practicable, be desirable, let us say so. Let us put it into our draft Convention, and, with all respect to those two delegations, hope that some means of accommodation may be found between now and the Conference. Therefore I hope M. Massigli will not persist in his amendment at this stage. It can be well understood that it is all to be left to the Committee of Experts for the adjustment of details.
Count Bernstorff (Germany). — Document C.P.D.211 contains a general reservation by the German delegation. I should like to know if I may speak about this reservation in the present Sub-Committee, or whether there will be a further discussion of this matter in the Commission? The Chairman. — There is no objection to your making a declaration now.

Count Bernstorff (Germany). — The general reservation to which I have just referred is similar to that expressed by M. Massigli. It reads as follows:

"The German delegation declares that it is necessary to limit naval material in reserve, in addition to floating material."

As the majority of the Commission did not accept the limitation of material in reserve in the case of land forces, I cannot hope that my country's reservation will be accepted as a proposal. I simply wished to point out that unless naval material in reserve is limited, it would be a very easy matter to transfer it and use it in time of war for land forces. Since, in my opinion, the idea of the limitation of land material has already been sacrificed by the majority of the Commission to an agreement regarding naval material, I wished to make this observation and shall return to this question at the 1931 Conference.

M. Rosso (Italy). — I should like to make a statement before we vote on Lord Cecil's amendment. Lord Cecil regards the limitation of annual expenditure on the purchase and manufacture of naval war material and armaments as an additional limitation; this is precisely in accordance with the views advanced by General de Marinis in the general discussion on the method of limitation. In these circumstances, if a vote be taken on Lord Cecil's proposal, the Italian delegation will support it, subject, of course, to our general reservation. I would add that, when the time comes to take a final decision, we shall have to take into account the attitude of the other naval Powers, because we can only accept the proposed method provided it is adopted by all the naval Powers.

Dr. Riddell (Canada). — When the limitation of land material was under consideration, the Canadian delegation supported a combination of direct and indirect limitation. Lord Cecil's proposal would apply both direct and indirect methods of limitation to naval material, and in view of that the Canadian delegation will have pleasure in supporting it.

M. Sato (Japan). — I desire to thank Lord Cecil for what he said just now. He has spoken not only for his delegation, but also for my own. As Lord Cecil was good enough to explain, our chief objection to a proposal for the budgetary limitation of naval expenditure is one of principle. If the French compromise proposal eliminates that objection, we shall naturally be very pleased to support it, although there is still one part of the proposal which we cannot accept. M. Massigli explained to us that, in questions of naval armaments, floating material is the predominant factor. That is true, but if you exempt the principal part of this material from budgetary limitation, why subject the small remaining part to that limitation? If floating material is not to be so limited, the rest of the material should be excluded also.

The question of expediency must also be borne in mind: it is very difficult, in my opinion, to distinguish between floating material and other naval material. I think that Lord Cecil has clearly explained this difficulty and I fully agree with what he said. Consequently, our objection of principle makes us oppose budgetary limitation in naval questions; moreover the considerations of expediency which I have just mentioned must also be taken into consideration.

If there is to be budgetary limitation of naval material, I should personally prefer the British proposal, which covers material as a whole and all expenditure on naval forces. This would make the question clearer for us, and we should know what our Government could approve and what it would have to oppose. I should therefore prefer the British proposal to be left as it stands so that we can vote on it.

M. Massigli (France). — In making my proposal I had a threefold object: first, if possible, to find a compromise, and in this I see that I have not been successful. Secondly, I wished to meet Count Bernstorff's point as far as this seemed possible. Finally, I wished to be consistent. When land material was discussed, like the majority of the Commission, I was opposed to a combination of the two methods. For the moment, I can only maintain this attitude: I very much regret that I cannot vote for Lord Cecil's amendment.

1 Note by Secretariat. — See document C.P.D.211 (Annex I).
because it implies a combination of methods, which I rejected in the case of land material and which I shall also have to reject in the case of air material, for reasons which I will explain when the time comes.

The Chairman. — We will now vote on the British delegation's proposal.

VOTE ON THE BRITISH DELEGATION’S PROPOSAL.

The British delegation's proposal was adopted by eleven votes for to three against, with some abstentions.

59. Completion of the Sub-Committee's Work.

The Chairman. — I am glad to state that the Sub-Committee has now completed its work, and I wish to thank the members for their co-operation. I think I may say that this result is due to the speedier methods which I have endeavoured to introduce, with your help.

The correct procedure would now be to appoint a Rapporteur; but you will agree with me that this is an unnecessary formality, because those who were not present during the proceedings of the Sub-Committee can see what was done from the Minutes; those who took part in the work can inform the others of what happened at our meetings. I accordingly declare the work of the Sub-Committee closed; it will now be possible for us to resume the discussions of the plenary Commission, which will, moreover, be asked to approve the Sub-Committee's work.

M. Cobin (Spain). — Since we are so often accused of dilatoriness, may I be allowed on this occasion at least to lay stress on what we have accomplished and the considerable efforts we have made? Nine days ago, the seven Powers which signed the Treaty of London distributed a lengthy document to us. We have examined it, and by holding two meetings a day—which was not done in the case of the other questions—we have settled the whole of this naval question in three or four days. It should not be forgotten that the question of naval armaments is of vital importance for the security of a large number of countries, and that it consequently interests many delegations. I should like to emphasise the value of the work done, and the speed with which it has been carried out.

The Sub-Committee rose at 12.20 p.m.

ELEVENTH MEETING OF THE PLENARY COMMISSION.

Held on Thursday, November 20th, 1930, at 12.30 p.m.

President: M. Loudon (Netherlands).


The President. — We will now continue, sitting as a plenary Commission.

We have already examined all the articles of Section III relating to air armaments. Article AA was adopted in second reading in the first part of this session. On this article we have an amendment by the British delegation and also one by the Canadian delegation.

In accordance with our Rules of Procedure, these amendments will be considered after the conclusion of the second reading.

In regard to Article AC, which was also discussed during the second reading, we have decided to leave the rules for measuring the horse-power of airship and aeroplane motors to be fixed by the Conference.

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — I want to be quite clear about air armaments. My amendments to air armaments are the same as those we have just been discussing with regard to naval armaments, but I think it would be more convenient to take them on the third reading, since the whole question of material will come up on the third reading. I think it is impossible to move amendments on this subject until we come to the third reading.

Dr. Riddell (Canada). — I bow to your ruling, but I understand that the Commission has definitely decided that the Canadian amendments will be considered at the third reading.
The President. — Naturally; that is a matter of course.

As regards Article AD, we have already decided to discuss that together with Article ZD.

In the case of Article AE, which was also adopted at second reading, in the first part of our session, we shall have to consider the British and Canadian amendments when we have concluded the second reading. Furthermore, the British delegation has proposed a new article, which would provide for limiting expenditure on air armaments. We are all agreed that that should be deferred to the conclusion of the second reading.

61. Discussion on Chapter III. — Budgetary Expenditure: Article DA.

The British, Italian and Japanese delegations consider that budgetary limitation should be effected solely by publicity.

The delegations of the United States and Germany make a general reservation on the inclusion in the present Draft Convention of any limitation of budgetary expenditure.

The President. — Chapter III, concerning budgetary expenditure, has been taken from the French delegation’s preliminary draft for the reduction of armaments, where it appeared as Article 19. It was discussed at length in the third session of the Preparatory Commission. It did not receive the unanimous support of the Commission during the first reading.

During the first part of our sixth session and again during the last few days, the question of limiting budgetary expenditure was discussed in relation to material for land armaments. On the other hand, the general question of limitation by budgetary methods has so far been adjourned. In regard to Article DA, the Commission will have to take into consideration the British and Soviet delegations’ proposals which follow. The Commission will also have to discuss the reports in document C.P.D.90 (Report, etc., of the Committee of Experts on Budgetary Questions).

PROPOSALS BY THE BRITISH DELEGATION.

"CHAPTER III. — BUDGETARY EXPENDITURE.

" Insert the following articles for the blanks left as a result of the second reading:

" Article DA.

Each of the High Contracting Parties agrees that its total annual expenditure on land, sea, and air forces, in any budgetary year, shall not exceed the figures given for them in Tables ...

" Article DB.

Each of the High Contracting Parties agrees that its total annual expenditure, in any budgetary year, on the upkeep, purchase, and manufacture of war material, shall not exceed the figures indicated in Tables ...

" Chapter V. — Miscellaneous Provisions.

"Substitute the following article for Articles DA* and DB*:

Each of the High Contracting Parties shall communicate to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, in a model form, a statement showing the actual total amount expended on land, sea and air forces, during the preceding financial year.

" It shall, at the same time, communicate to the Secretary-General a statement showing the amount actually expended during the preceding financial year on the upkeep, purchase, and manufacture of war material as defined in Article DB of Chapter III of the present Convention.

"This communication shall be made not later than ... months after the close of the financial year.”

1 Note by Secretariat. — See document C.310.M.109.1927.IX (Minutes of the Third Session), page 364.

2 War material to be defined in a special annex.
Proposal by the Soviet Delegation.

"Article DA to be replaced by the following articles:

"Article DA.

The total annual expenditure counted per budgetary year and allocated according to Tables . . . (home forces and formations of the home country organised on a military basis) and . . . (overseas forces and their reinforcements and overseas formations organised on a military basis), shall not exceed the figures approved by the several Contracting States in the present Convention, the military budgets current at the time of the signature of the present Convention being reduced by an equal percentage; an exception being allowed, however, in favour of the States which are weakest from a military point of view and are specially mentioned in the present Convention, and of such States as have reduced their armaments in virtue of international agreements other than the present Convention.

"The reduction of military budgets shall also extend to the expenditure specified in the table attached to the present article."

"Article DB.

"Secret funds intended in a disguised form for extraordinary expenditure on special preparations for war or an increase in armaments shall be excluded from the national budgets.

"In conformity with the above provision, all expenditure for the upkeep of the armed forces of each State shall be shown in a single chapter of the national budget; their full publicity shall be ensured."

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — I really ought to move this amendment arrayed in a white sheet because it is a case where I have stolen the thunder of the French delegation. The French delegation had this amendment, in substance, in first reading, and as you, Sir, have pointed out, it was carried by a majority. In that case the British delegation had some doubts about it and they made a reservation. Since then their doubt has been cleared away and they are now prepared to support the amendment. They have put it in a form of their own, but I do not suppose it is superior to the form the French delegation had. In fact, it appears to me there is one word that ought to be inserted in the British amendment to make it quite clear—that is the word "respectively". Article DA ought to read:

"Each of the High Contracting Parties agrees that its total annual expenditure on land, sea, and air forces respectively, in any budgetary year, shall not exceed the figures given for them in Tables . . ."

Our suggestion is for a separate figure of limitation for each of the three arms, not a general figure for the three arms taken together. No doubt, if you add together the budgets for each of the three arms that makes the total budget, but the idea is to limit each of the three arms separately so as to present transfers from one arm to another, and to avoid a certain amount of uncertainty as to what is being done.

The argument is much the same as the argument which has been developed in favour of limitation of material only. It is, however, a little different, because the object, in this case, is not only to add this additional limitation to the direct limitation we are providing for in our Convention, but also to provide for a general limitation of expenditure—a matter which certainly excites a great deal of interest amongst those who have to pay taxes in the various countries. Therefore, it is a matter which I certainly think we should deal with in our Convention.

But that is not our main point. Our main point is to limit armaments, not to limit expenditure. Limiting expenditure is only of value in so far as it contributes to the limitation of armaments—at least that is our point of view.

I do not think that I have anything further to say about our amendment at this stage. It is a very simple one. The machinery of it will be made clear by reading the amendment to Chapter V, which appears on the same paper, and which provides for the return which each of the contracting parties is to make with reference to its expenditure on armaments. There it provides that:

"Each of the High Contracting Parties shall communicate to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, in a model form, a statement showing the actual total amount expended on land, sea and air forces, during the preceding financial year.

"It shall at the same time communicate to the Secretary-General a statement showing the amount actually expended during the preceding financial year on the upkeep, purchase, and manufacture of war material as defined in Article DB of Chapter III of the present Convention.

"This communication shall be made not later than . . . months after the close of the financial year."

1 See tables on pages 12 and 13 of document C.P.D.90, of July 1st, 1927.
That is the conception, and that is based on the report of the Committee of Experts on budgetary questions made to this Commission in the spring or early summer of 1927. As the Soviet delegation points out, there is an actual form set out in that report which the British delegation thinks satisfactory and sufficient. But they have assented to further discussion of the actual form by the Committee of Experts, in accordance with the French resolution which had been passed.

The machinery, therefore, will be quite clear to the members of the Commission, and it has the great merit, I think, of being extremely simple. You will first have the provision for the return in a prescribed form as nearly as possible. The details, so far as it is necessary to examine them, are all set out in the Committee of Experts' report of 1927. It is unnecessary, as I have pointed out, to have an absolutely identical form for each country, provided the form covers substantially the same ground. It may be more convenient for one country to vary a little from another but, provided the broad principles are on the same lines, that return will be sufficient. When that return has been made, everybody will know what the expenditure is, in the first place, on the three arms generally, and, in the second place on the three arms with respect to material.

It will be on the basis of these figures, which limit to a certain figure the general and specific expenditure on material, that you will be able to see whether the Convention has been complied with.

All I have to do is to move this motion explaining that it is an auxiliary method of controlling expenditure on the three arms, as part of the general system for limitation of expenditure.

The President. — The Bureau has received a further proposal relating to Chapter III from the Soviet delegation reading as follows. It has not yet been circulated, but this will be done as soon as possible.

As we have made pretty good progress this morning I propose to adjourn the meeting.

Proposals by the Soviet Delegation.

"(1) First amendment to Article DA of the British delegation's draft:

After the words ‘each of the High Contracting Parties agrees that its total annual expenditure on land, sea and air forces in any budgetary year’ add the words: ‘shall be reduced and . . .’

"(2) Second amendment to Article DA of the British delegation's draft:

At the end of Article DA, add in the case of the following categories: (1) Staff, (2) Movements, (3) Buildings, (4) War material.

"(3) Article DA proposed by the Soviet delegation is withdrawn.

"(4) Article DB proposed by the Soviet delegation is maintained."

The Hon. Hugh Gibson (United States of America). — I would like to express the gratification of the American delegation at the very speedy despatch of our work this morning, and to thank the President for keeping us so strictly "on the rails". I should like to preface what else I have to say by the statement that there is nobody in this room who more cordially dislikes the idea of two daily sittings than I, but I feel we have now got the best momentum yet attained and that it is doubtful whether we should not be justified in having afternoon sittings. We have all come here anxious to finish up the work at this session and I think nearly all of us are convinced that this is feasible if we can get through a substantial amount of productive work. There is no escaping the fact that we have lost a good deal of time in the two weeks we have been here through the prolonged general debates, but if we can keep going for a few days at anything resembling the pace maintained to-day, we can catch that up, and I would suggest that we adopt the idea of two daily sessions until the Bureau either tells us it is desirable to slow down, or until we have covered enough ground for them to foresee an orderly end of the work remaining to be done and the prospect of the final presentation of our report.

Dr. Markovitch (Yugoslavia). — The difficulty does not consist in holding one or two meetings a day, but in the length of the speeches. It is only by improving our methods of work that we can hope to reach an early conclusion of our labours, and I think it desirable that delegates should be given time to reflect, and to study all the aspects of the problems before them. I therefore propose that we continue to hold one meeting only each day.

The Hon. Hugh Gibson (United States of America). — Since speaking, I have heard from a number of delegations that the procedure I suggested would not be convenient for them. I would like, therefore, to withdraw my suggestion, but with the reservation that we shall have two sessions a day whenever the work of the Conference can be best expedited by so doing.
Count Bernstorff (Germany). — I think Mr. Gibson's object was to induce the Commission to proceed more rapidly, and I entirely agree with him. For my part, I would observe that I have never made any long speeches.

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — I entirely agree with Mr. Gibson that we must contemplate, at a future date, the possibility of two sessions a day, but I do think, having some knowledge of the subjects we have to discuss, that, just for the moment, it would be better not to have more than one session a day. I think we should probably advance quicker in that way. I certainly agree with him that we may eventually need two sessions a day, but that depends entirely upon the rate of progress during the rest of this week.

The President. — I infer from this discussion that the Commission considers that, as a rule, we should only have one meeting a day; provided always that the Bureau will be free to propose two meetings a day if it think necessary.

The Commission rose at 12.50 p.m.

TWELFTH MEETING.

Held on Friday, November 21st, 1930, at 10 a.m.

President: M. Loudon (Netherlands).

62. Discussion on Chapter III. — Budgetary Expenditure (continuation).

The President. — We will now continue the discussion of Article DA of Chapter III—Budgetary Expenditure.

I would remind you that the proposals before the Commission are:

First, the text submitted by the French delegation at the third session.

Secondly, the new text proposed by the British delegation, to which that delegation desires to add the word "respectively";

Thirdly, the amendments submitted by the Soviet delegation to add to Article DA of the British delegation's draft, after the words "each of the High Contracting Parties agrees that its total annual expenditure on land, sea and air forces in any budgetary year", the words: "shall be reduced and..."; and to add, at the end of the same article "in the case of the following categories: (1) Staff, (2) Movements, (3) Buildings, (4) War material."

M. Lounatcharsky (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — The Soviet delegation has modified its proposal because it contained the principle of proportionality, which has been definitely rejected by the Commission. We have seen the British amendment, and it is quite acceptable, with the two changes mentioned.

We desire to maintain Article DB, which provides that all military expenditure under Chapter A shall be shown in a single chapter of the budget. I believe that M. Massigli has already stated that he is in favour of such a measure.

General de Marinis (Italy). — We have before us a text submitted by the British delegation. This consists of three Articles, DA, DB and Chapter V—Miscellaneous Provisions. I should like to know whether we are going to discuss this proposal article by article or all together.

The President. — Article by article.

General de Marinis (Italy). — I should like to say a few words in regard to Article DA, which reads as follows:

"Each of the High Contracting Parties agrees that its total annual expenditure on land, sea and air forces in any budgetary year shall not exceed the figures given for them in Tables..."

The Italian delegation is prepared to accept this article, but will not be able to do so if the words "in any budgetary year" are retained, for the reasons which I explained some days ago. I would ask Lord Cecil to admit the justice of my objections. It would be impossible for certain Governments, including my own, to bind themselves not to transfer credits unexpended in one budgetary year to the following year. The unforeseen contingencies which I have already

1 Note by the Secretariat. — See page 185.
M. Sato (Japan). — I wish to make a short statement in regard to budgetary limitation, and to deal with this question as a whole, including the original French proposal and the British and Soviet amendments.

As regards the limitation of land material, my delegation has accepted the budgetary method as a compromise, but, as I have already pointed out, this does not imply acceptance of the general principle of this method of limitation. I gave you many arguments against it at the third session of our Commission and need not repeat them now. I shall merely say that I still think that, in principle, budgetary limitation is undesirable, and that limitation should be applied solely by means of publicity. I particularly object to the application of this method to naval and air armaments. In regard to these two categories of armaments, the Commission has already accepted the system of direct limitation, which goes further and is, I think, more effective. It has also recognised that the limitation of expenditure has to be individual, and that it cannot form a basis of comparison between the budgets of one country and another, but is simply a means of comparing the budgets of any given country from one year to another. If we adopt the principle of publicity of expenditure, this would make it possible indirectly to attain the object which those who advocate budgetary limitation have in view.

According to my present instruction, I am not in a position to accept the principle of budgetary limitation, except as regards land armaments; consequently, if the general principle be put to the vote, I shall be obliged to vote against it.

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — I should like to make a few remarks on each of the three speeches made. In the first place, with regard to the amendments proposed by the Soviet delegation; they are two-fold, and perhaps it would be more convenient if I only dealt with the first at this moment, because nothing has been said about the second.

The first amendment is to insert, after the words " budgetary year ", the words: " shall be reduced and ". I am in agreement with the purpose of this amendment—that is, I think we ought to lay down in this Convention the general principle that we aim not only at limitation but also at reduction—but I am also of opinion that it would not be proper to insert it here. As I see our project of the Convention, it is this. We are going to establish a specific limitation of each of the three arms as far as we can, we are going to do it directly with regard to the navies and the air forces, and as far as the land forces are concerned by limiting the effectives, which, so far as I have been able to hear, seems to be the only effective way that has yet been proposed.

In respect to each of the clauses dealing with that direct limitation, I should be entirely in favour of the insertion of the word " reduce ", in some form or another, as we have done in regard to the navies. I should be in favour of inserting it also in regard to the land and air forces.

When you come to budgetary limitation, I have always seen that, not as the principal limitation, but as a very important and an absolutely essential check on the principal limitation. That is why I was in favour of applying it to the navies, though there is a very complete limitation there—as far as you can make any method of limitation complete—and I should be in favour of applying it to the air forces and even more strongly in favour of applying it to the land forces. But this is a complementary limitation and not the direct and principal limitation, and, in my judgment, the figure that is to be inserted for the purpose of budgetary limitation directly results from the figure that is inserted with respect to direct limitation. Therefore, it is not logical to say you are going to reduce the budgetary limitation. Budgetary limitation will follow automatically—or quasi-automatically—on the figures that you have inserted in the direct limitation. I do not myself see any purpose in putting in the word " reduce " here, and I think it leads to a little misapprehension as to what you are aiming at with regard to budgetary limitation. I hope that will not be insisted upon.

With regard to the point made by General de Marinis, I do not feel able to resist his suggestion, because we have agreed to appoint a Committee of Experts to enquire into this question, as to how it can be done, and I think it very difficult for us now, before the report of that Committee, to insist on these words here. But I accept the point of view with the greatest reluctance and only on the strict understanding that the position of the British Government remains unchanged. They are confident that you will not get a really satisfactory limitation of armaments unless it be strictly confined year by year. If you have a system by which a country may save up its expenditure during the first three or four years, with the power of suddenly having a very elaborate and complete expenditure in the fifth year, then that will not be a satisfactory guarantee. The whole purpose of budgetary limitation will, in my judgment, and there will not be a satisfactory guarantee that the general standard of limitation is being observed. Therefore General de Marinis will forgive me for saying that I assent to his proposal with reluctance, because of the appointment of the Committee of Experts, but I remain strongly of opinion that, in some form or another, and subject to whatever modification may prove to be necessary, you must have an annual limitation and not a limitation spread over a number of years. That is my answer to him.

As to my friend M. Sato, he will not be surprised to hear that I deeply regret the statement he has been instructed to make. I do beg him and his Government to consider very carefully mentioned must be provided for. If the British delegation is prepared to delete the words " in any budgetary year ", I can accept Article DA and Article DB.
whether really specific limitation is enough. I do not want to enlarge the debate, and I will not therefore go into the case of the air forces. When we come to consider the air forces, I do beg him to consider whether any specific limitation can possibly be satisfactory. I will not say more than that, but would ask him to consider that point before we get to it. I am afraid I must beg the Commission to accept this general principle.

Let me say just a word in conclusion. Undoubtedly, we have got to take account, in all these matters, of public opinion. I remember years ago when I was younger and more impulsive, I once ventured to go as far as to say that I did not think the Governments would ever impose disarmament upon the peoples, but I thought it quite possible that the peoples would impose disarmament upon the Governments. I would not put it quite so crudely as that now, but I believe that to be profoundly true. I believe there is a tremendous sentiment throughout the world, amongst all the peoples of the world, in favour of disarmament, and I believe that we have got to take account of that in everything that we do in our Commission. Undoubtedly one of the great reasons why the peoples of the world desire disarmament is because they are shocked and outraged by the expense to which all the countries of the world are put in this matter. It is the burden of taxation which perhaps comes most closely and most immediately home to the peoples in this matter; they, of course, desire disarmament on other grounds but they do strongly desire it on that ground.

I think it very important that we should take account of that feeling, and that we should recognise in our Convention that, quite apart from the main reason for our putting in budgetary limitation, we do wish to give satisfaction to those who desire some check on this reckless and wicked waste of the efforts and savings of the peoples of the world. Therefore, I hope that we shall adhere to this resolution as it stands, except that, in order to conform to what we have already done, I will accept the omission of the words, "in any budgetary year".

General van Tuinen (Netherlands). — Before the vote is taken on the article now under discussion, I should like to ask for a few explanations.

I would remind you that the Netherlands delegation attaches much greater importance to complete publicity than to budgetary limitation; it is of opinion that publicity is a more effective method of attaining the object which we all have in view. However, as we have already shown, our delegation is not opposed to all ideas of budgetary limitation.

When the British proposal for the budgetary limitation of naval armaments, was under discussion, our first delegate asked Lord Cecil certain questions. M. Rutgers asked him whether the limitation would also apply to certain annual expenditure—for instance, on the establishment and upkeep of naval bases, material in reserve, subsidies to navigation companies, etc.—and Lord Cecil replied in the affirmative.

Now that we are discussing the British proposal with reference to Article DA of Chapter III, I am encouraged by that reply to ask its author some further questions. Does his proposal also apply to expenditure which may perhaps not be included in the military or naval budgets—for instance, expenditure on the construction of strategical railways, subsidies to rifle and gymnastic clubs for land and naval forces and to organisations of a military character?

In this connection, I would draw your attention to page 5 of the Report of the Committee of Experts on Budgetary Questions (document C.P.D.90), where it is stated that the experts decided not to devote a chapter to expenditure of this kind.

It seems to me desirable to avoid any possibility of doubt as to the effects of the British amendment.

I should add that our only object is to obtain information on these points; but I would point out that this information will be of great value to the Committee of Experts referred to in the French delegation’s proposal, especially as regards Point III of that proposal in respect of which our decision has been postponed.

Indeed, it might perhaps be useful to mention this discussion in the report, so that the experts may be informed of the Commission’s discussions in regard to this article.

Count Bernstorff (Germany). — I only rise to explain the reasons for my vote. I understand that there are other speeches to come, but I should like to be allowed to state my views immediately.

We have discussed the budgetary question at length; and I think the Commission agreed, almost unanimously, that the budgetary method should be regarded as an accessory method.

Personally, I share the unanimous opinion of the Mixed Commission—namely, that budgetary limitation can only be an accessory method, and that it is unacceptable as the principal method. I shall therefore abstain from voting, because I think it would be wrong to regard budgetary limitation as the principal method in the case of land armaments, in view of the fact that in regard to air and naval armaments, it was accepted as a subsidiary method. This injustice appears to me so flagrant that I shall abstain from voting.

1 Note by Secretariat. — See page 150.