Lord Cecil (British Empire).—I should like to propose an amendment to the French proposal. I am a little afraid of the rather vague character of the first phrase:

"... la fabrication des matériels de guerre des armements terrestres dans les conditions définies ..."

I should greatly prefer it if some words could be put in to make it more clear that what we are leaving to the experts is the consideration of the technical details; that we definitely accept the principle and leave only the figures and so on to be settled after discussion with the experts.

If M. Massigli would be good enough to agree to the insertion of the words "au chiffre fixé et", as follows:

"... la fabrication des matériels de guerre des armements terrestres au chiffre fixé et dans les conditions définies ..."

I think it would be an improvement. I still do not like its vagueness; but, as long as it is quite clearly understood that we are not postponing the decision on this question but are really taking a decision, I do not mind.

General de Marinis (Italy).—I have before me the proposal submitted by the French delegation, and, in principle, I should have no difficulty in accepting it, provided, of course, that it were additional to the principle of direct limitation. As I said yesterday, my Government thinks it could not accept any budgetary limitation which was not additional to direct limitation.

I should be prepared to accept that part of the French proposal which relates to indirect limitation. I must say, however, that I cannot accept the word "annual" in the phrase: "Each of the High Contracting Parties agrees to limit its annual expenditure."

I note that the French delegation has abandoned its original standpoint as, in its first draft, it allowed expenditure to be carried over from one budgetary year to another, whereas that is no longer the case.

It was, moreover, under another chapter that the French delegation expressed its view concerning the possibility of carrying over from one year to another whatever it had been possible to save. Now it is definitely stated that the expenditure must be annual—that is to say, a country will not be able to carry over to the following year part of its budgetary credits which it has not really expended within the limits of its budget.

I strongly oppose this provision, and I venture to say that I do so on humanitarian grounds. If, in a given year, a country is overtaken by great public calamities, such as earthquakes or other catastrophes, it is compelled to economise on certain budgets—for instance, on its armament budgets—in order to meet great unforeseen difficulties. It would be the height of injustice if such a country were to be further handicapped by being told that it could not carry over from one year to another expenditure on its military defence.

The President.—Is there not a misunderstanding? If I understood M. Massigli aright his draft text covers the point you mention.

General de Marinis (Italy).—I am glad to agree with M. Massigli: but what I said applies to the British proposal, and I desire to state quite definitely that my Government could not accept that.

If M. Massigli's text is to be adopted, I would ask him to be good enough to make an addition to the last paragraph, where abstentions have been overlooked.

As I said, I could not accept budgetary limitation alone as a method of limitation. As Count Bernstorff pointed out, we are in a curious situation. A committee of competent experts stated that limitation by budgetary means alone could not be an effective method of disarmament. After this unanimous decision by the experts of Sub-Commission B, we are entirely disregarding their reply.

Is it worth while to convene experts and to set them to work for a long time and then disregard their reply?

May I now put one consideration before you? What have we to do? We have to submit to the Conference a plan for the reduction and limitation of armaments. This plan, must, if it is to have any value for the guidance of the Conference, in each of its articles give an exact indication of the unanimous opinion of this Commission, or at least the opinion of the great majority of this Commission.

Should it happen that, on any one of these articles, we are not in a position to give the Conference such an indication, such guidance, then it would be better not to try to frame a text at all costs.

I think the note in the French proposal clearly reflects the situation. The same is true of the proposal submitted yesterday by the British delegation. I think that anyone reading the British proposal or the French note would be struck by the fact that, after stating that votes were equally divided on the question of direct limitation, and that there were many abstentions, and after recording the various votes that were taken, this Commission finally adopted an article. That article could not represent the opinion of the great majority of the Commission.

We should find it very difficult to draft that article; but, even supposing we succeeded in doing so, many reservations would certainly be stated. Moreover, even if they were not expressed, they would nevertheless be apparent from our discussion. Accordingly, I think we should do
the Conference better service by merely stating the position as regards land armaments. The discussion would subsequently be opened at the Conference.

I do not think we should be doing anything to help the Conference if we prolonged our discussion in order to frame an article which would be weakened by the reservations that are apparent from the Minutes of recent meetings.

To portray the situation as it is, I should be satisfied with the proposal made yesterday by Lord Cecil and with the note submitted by the French delegation.

If we merely portray the situation, the discussion begun here will be continued at the Conference, but we shall at least have saved time here.

How can we agree on a single text after all the reservations that have been made and after all these somewhat doubtful votes? We could only gain for ourselves the satisfaction of having apparently prepared a draft. But, note, it would be merely apparent; for, in reality, as other speakers have pointed out, the situation is so uncertain that we ought to submit a table showing the differences of opinion that have become evident.

M. Massigli (France). — I should like to give General de Marinis a word of explanation. I used the expression “annual expenditure” instead of “budgetary expenditure” with a view to covering all expenditure, whether included in budgets or not. I therefore think my text meets even M. Litvinoff’s anxiety concerning secret expenditure. By “annual expenditure” I cover the whole of the expenditure on material in any year.

Moreover, in using the word “annual”, I had no intention of excluding the possibility of credits being carried over from one year to another. In the explanations I previously gave the Commission on this subject, I pointed out that, in this respect, there were certain differences between the French proposal and the original British proposal. Hence, in my resolution I mentioned in paragraph (d) that credits for one financial year might be carried over to the following year or years under conditions to be determined. This question will have to be discussed later. I think Lord Cecil will propose certain amendments to this paragraph, but it seems to me that General de Marinis’s anxiety may thus be removed. Moreover, I myself gave the example of a country which was overtaken by a calamity in the course of one year and which would therefore have to effect unforeseen economies in its military budgets, and I added that such a country would be obliged to carry certain expenditure over to the following financial period.

There remains the question whether we should adopt the text of an article. I tried to take account of real possibilities, and my very reason for drafting a proposal was that I thought the text proposed by Lord Cecil was somewhat too optimistic. I venture to state that I think my proposal accurately reflects the situation. Yesterday, sixteen delegations supported the principle of limitation by budgetary means. What we ask is that those sixteen delegations should vote for this text. The notes which follow show how the other votes were divided and accurately describe the situation. I think that, under these circumstances, the text might be accepted without any supplementary reservations being necessary.

General de Marinis (Italy). — The Committees of Experts are doing their duty, and we have no right to disregard their work. May I be allowed to supply the Commission with a new fact which will enable it to judge the situation better? The report of the Committee of Experts on Budgetary Questions, published on July 1st, 1927 (document C.P.D.9o), says on page 9:

“...In its report, the Joint Commission makes the following remarks concerning the limitation of expenditure:

“Limitation by expenditure only would be inadequate as the basis of a convention. If, however, the contracting parties agreed upon specific maximum figures for effectives and material, it would, in the opinion of the Commission, be useful to supplement that method of limitation by limiting certain main categories as well as the total of budget expenditure on national defence.

“The Commission assumes that the Disarmament Conference, in preparation for which this work is being undertaken, will, in the first place, proceed to limit the number of effectives and material...”

I would emphasise that this is the opinion of the Joint Commission. I had the honour to be a member of that Commission, as was Lord Cecil. We appoint commissions every year; but if, the following year, we forget what those commissions did the previous year, it is not worth while appointing them.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — I understand that the proposal of the Italian delegate really amounts to interrupting our discussion of this question altogether, and simply stating that the Commission cannot come to an agreement on any text for the reduction of armaments and, therefore, passes the question on to the Conference. That is a very radical proposal. I think that we should not embark on a discussion of this particular proposal, but simply take a vote at once. If it is decided in the affirmative, then there is an end to the discussion; and, if it is rejected, the discussion will go on.

With regard to the proposal made by the President that we should limit our discussion to Article TA, I should like to quote an English proverb which says: “One should never change horses in mid-stream.” I think that, as we have begun the discussion we should finish it on all the questions.

1 Note by the Secretariat. — See Seventh Meeting.
that are relevant. My contention is that the French proposal, although it has the heading “Chapter II. — Material: Article TA”, etc., does not come within Article TA but belongs of right to Chapter III, and it would be proper to include it in that Chapter. But, as I mentioned before, having begun the discussion, it is, perhaps, better to continue it, and, that being so, I maintain that my proposal comes within the same heading. We cannot discuss two proposals on the same subject, one under Chapter II and the other under Chapter III. I think they should both be taken together, and, even if my proposal be not discussed, I ask that it should be voted upon, together with the French and the British proposals.

M. Rutgers (Netherlands). — In its first form, the Netherlands proposal said:

“The Commission adopts the two texts of Article TA.”

The French delegation withdrew its proposal on Article TA. Consequently, I had to change my wording; but, as the French delegation has reversed its decision, I have had to go back to my first wording.

I was greatly flattered by the compliments paid to the Netherlands proposal. It was said to be very ingenious, and, if that were not a compliment that is sometimes addressed to offenders when they appear before their judges, I should be tempted to return it to the new French proposal, for I think it is very ingenious to refer in a note to the vote taken yesterday on Lord Cecil’s proposal. For my part, I believe it would be better to say nothing on that point, for I think there are many ways of using figures, however accurate they may be, so that they do not give an adequate impression of the situation.

When we voted on Lord Cecil’s proposal, several of us thought that budgetary limitation should, in one way or other, be alternative to, or combined with, direct limitation. Others said that direct limitation was the better. Still others asserted that a convention without direct limitation would not be acceptable. Some speakers said that they could not wholeheartedly support the principle of indirect limitation, but they were voting for it in order to reach some conclusion. The proposal has been modified so as to prevent members of the Commission from voting against it.

The first wording was that the majority prefers indirect limitation. The present wording is that the majority accepts the principle. That was a more innocent statement, and some members were caught by it. They said that they were not opposed to direct limitation being included, and they voted for this wording. Others voted against it. Still others abstained. If we merely read what is stated, we do not obtain a correct idea of what occurred.

Accordingly, I think it would be better not to mention that vote.

In regard to the Netherlands proposal, Lord Cecil told me that the United States of America were well able to take care of themselves, and that it was not my duty to plead their cause.

I have not pleaded the cause of any country. What I am pleading is the cause of the preparation for the Disarmament Conference, and, though I recognise that I have a very agreeable position next to the United States delegate, I must add that the Netherlands proposal was not inspired by the fact that that delegate is a very pleasant colleague.

It is not a question of the United States. It is a question of preparing for the Disarmament Conference and I still think that, to prepare it well, we must place both texts before it.

M. Sato raised the question whether, if the Netherlands proposal were accepted, the figures to be inserted in the Convention would be fixed by the Conference or by the members of the Conference. I do not think that question can arise, since the decisions of the Conference must be unanimous. The inclusion by any country of a figure in this or that table will have to be decided by the Conference. The country cannot be said to have freedom of choice. As to the table in which the figures will be entered, the countries may truly be said to decide, since the decision of the Conference is identical with the decision of its members.

M. Sato feared that, by placing both texts before the Conference, we might cause its failure. I think that nothing is gained by shutting the skeleton up in the cupboard. Danger lies, not in the fact that the two texts are placed before the Conference, but in the fact that there are two opinions. To submit both texts to the Conference may, on the contrary, enable the Conference not to fail, or to be “torpedoed” as M. Sato said, but to get under way, and that is a very different matter. M. Sato himself recognised that there might be exceptions. If the Conference had only a single text, the question would arise all the same. By eliminating political questions from our draft, we do not necessarily eliminate them from the discussions of the Conference.

Lord Cecil feared that we might give the impression of being irresolute. The Netherlands delegation has, however, been to some extent satisfied by the French proposal. I would merely like the note to be drafted rather differently. We should be satisfied if, for instance, it mentioned the fact that the Commission had before it a proposal concerning the limitation of material—the text of this proposal being reproduced in the note—and added that this text was not voted upon.

That would satisfy us, because, in this way, the essential part of the Netherlands proposal, which I continue to recommend to the Commission, would be adopted.

The President. — I should have liked to pass to the vote on the question of procedure raised by M. Litvinoff. As, however, it is already 1.5 p.m., and as this question is so important, I propose that, as an exception, we should meet this afternoon at 5 p.m.
Lord Cecil (British Empire). — I hope we can avoid a five o'clock sitting by sitting a little longer now and getting a solution. I see no reason why we should not reach a decision on the French proposition almost immediately. It is a perfectly definite proposition. It merely sets out that this Commission recommends, as one means of limiting armaments, the limiting of expenses. It does not confine itself to that, of course. We are going to limit effectives, ships of war and aeroplanes; but we do say that, in addition to all those methods, we do think there ought to be the limitation of expenses.

I just want to refer to what Count Bernstorff and General de Marinis have read from document C.P.D.90. 1 In my view, we are going on almost exactly the recommendation of that Committee. That Committee said: “It is perfectly true that you cannot limit armaments merely by limiting expenses”; but they were considering, as is quite clear from the text—I have read it all—all armaments. They said: “Of course you will have to limit effectives; of course you will have to limit ships of war”; and, in addition to that, they thought you ought to limit, if possible, big guns and tanks. Beyond that, they did not expect you could limit in detail all the armaments. They go on to say that, whatever decisions you come to in regard to direct limitation, they do think a limitation of expenses would be useful as a controlling agency to see that the other limitation is carried out. It seems to me that statement is entirely in support of what we are hoping to do, and I am surprised that it should have been read in the opposite sense. General de Marinis merely read a quotation from that document which appears in a later document. If he would be good enough to read the whole of the passage I think he would agree with me that the financial experts by no means said there was no advantage in a limitation of expenses as a controlling agency. On the contrary, they said it was mainly a political question and not a question for experts. They explained some of the conditions which would have to be accepted in such a limitation. Therefore, there is nothing in those previous documents which gives any reason against our deciding, here and now, that one method of limiting armaments ought to be budgetary limitation. By deciding that, we do not decide that it is the only method. Indeed, it is clear that it cannot be the only method.

I very much regret that, instead of these resistances to this proposal, we have not had definite, precise proposals, saying: “If you cannot have limitation of all material, why not (as I think the Swedish delegation suggested) limit some of the material directly?” I think this is a matter that certainly ought to be considered and is important.

I would ask the Commission here and now to vote on the question whether, in addition to all other methods of limitation, we do accept the principle that there ought to be a limitation of expenses. I think we ought to arrive at a decision now on that point.

The President. — Since an objection has been raised to a meeting being held this afternoon, I am glad to see that Lord Cecil shares my original opinion that we should proceed to vote on the question whether the article under discussion shall remain blank and whether we shall adjourn the question.

We will, therefore, proceed to vote.

Count Bernstorff (Germany). — When I asked to speak, I merely intended proposing that we should adjourn at once and not meet this afternoon. I think that would be agreeable to everyone. But, as a contrary decision has been taken, I shall say a few words. I have never spoken against budgetary limitation as a supplement, but I have spoken against budgetary limitation as a supplement to a limitation of air and naval material only, whilst an exception is made in the case of land material. I ask myself why this exception should be made in favour of land material. If the reason is explained, the position will be different; but, up to the present, no one has explained the reason for this exception.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — What is happening to the Soviet proposal?

VOTE ON WHETHER THE DRAFTING OF A TEXT OF ARTICLE TA SHOULD BE REFERRED TO THE CONFERENCE.

The President. — I propose to take a vote on the preliminary question—namely: Should the drafting of the text of Article TA be referred to the Conference?

I invite the Commission to vote.

A vote was taken by a show of hands.

One delegation voted for this proposal.

The proposal was rejected.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — I was going to support the Italian proposal, but as I see the Italian delegate did not vote for it himself, there seems to be nothing for me to support.

General de Marinis (Italy). — I merely gave my personal opinion. I made no proposal; but, obviously, I maintain what I said.

1 Note by the Secretariat. — Report of the Committee of Experts on Budgetary Questions.
VOTE ON THE FRENCH PROPOSAL OF A TEXT FOR ARTICLE TA.

The President. — This vote shows that the Commission desires a text. The text before us is M. Massigli’s, with a slight amendment. After the words “land armaments” the words in accordance with the figures and the conditions laid down in Annex No. ... to the present Convention must be added. I put M. Massigli’s proposal, thus amended, to the vote.

A vote was taken by a show of hands.

Fifteen delegations voted for this proposal and one delegation against it.

The Hon. Hugh Gibson (United States of America). — I assume this is voting on the text of the French proposal and not on the note, which is separate.

M. Westman (Sweden). — Yesterday I abstained from voting for the British proposal so that it should not appear that I wished to increase the majority against direct limitation. To-day, my vote cannot admit of that interpretation, and I therefore voted for the French proposal.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — I cannot vote for the French proposal until my proposal is disposed of.

General de Marinis (Italy). — I desire to explain my abstention so that my statement may be included in the Minutes. I am not opposed to budgetary limitation. I desire, however, that it should not be adopted alone, but that it should be associated with direct limitation. I think it my duty to explain my view on this subject, for I should not like any misunderstanding to remain. The present text of our draft gives the impression that the Commission decides solely in favour of budgetary limitation. That does not at all correspond with the unanimous opinion of the Commission, of which several delegations, I think, accept budgetary limitation on condition that it is associated with another form of limitation.

The Hon. Hugh Gibson (United States of America). — There is one point arising out of General de Marinis’s remarks. If any reservations are brought forward relating to a single text, the note which I suggested this morning loses its virtue. From the moment that any delegation feels it must offer a definite reservation, much the best course would be to drop the footnote and leave it to the various delegations to make such reservations as they deem essential.

M. Rutgers (Netherlands). — I desire to state that I did not vote, and that I shall abstain from voting on the French note for the same reasons as General de Marinis.

Count Bernstorff (Germany). — Since all the minority have done so, I wish to explain the reasons for my abstention. I made a general reservation and stated that a convention which did not cover trained reserves and land material would not be acceptable to me. Like Mr. Gibson, I abstained because I did not wish to cause any obstruction. I hope the majority will bring us to the Disarmament Conference as quickly as possible and we shall meet again there.

The President. — We shall now proceed to vote, and I invite delegations who desire to vote in favour of the inclusion of the note without reservation to raise their hands.

The inclusion of the note without reservation was adopted by sixteen votes.

The President. — We still have M. Litvinoff’s amendment. Does M. Litvinoff desire a vote to be taken forthwith on his proposal, or would he like it to be postponed until we come to discuss Chapter III, for the Commission has not yet discussed this proposal?

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — If we have disposed of everything in Chapter III and there will be no further discussion, then, of course, I should wish my amendment to be put to the vote now; but, if we are going to discuss Chapter III, then I do not mind putting it off till then.

The President. — The discussion will be resumed when we consider Chapter III, subject to a reservation as to the texts adopted at the end of our session. At the beginning of the next meeting we shall start the discussion of the draft resolution submitted by the French delegation.

The Commission rose at 1.35 p.m.
TENTH MEETING.

Held on Monday, November 17th, 1930, at 10 a.m.


President: M. LOUDON (Netherlands).

30. Discussion on Chapter II: Material. — Section I: Land Armaments (continuation).

Discussion on Draft Resolution submitted by the French Delegation¹ (Enquiry by the Committee of Budgetary Experts).

The President. — After agreeing by a majority vote on the principle of budgetary limitation, the Commission, at its meeting the day before yesterday, embodied that principle in an article, with which you are now familiar, followed by a note, also adopted, by two successive votes.

To-day, therefore, the Commission will discuss the draft resolution submitted by the French delegation.

To this resolution there is an amendment to paragraph I (c) proposed by the Spanish delegation. The proposal is to add to that paragraph, which reads as follows:

"(c) the adjustment of the proposed method of limitation to possible fluctuations in the purchasing power of different countries;
the words: "... and to the special circumstances of each country with regard to the cost of production of war material."

The discussion on the French proposal is now open.

M. Massigli (France). — After what has already been said on the subject, I shall confine myself to a few very brief remarks defining the resolution submitted by the French delegation. As I said at a previous meeting, its purpose is to enable the Governments, before the Conference, to determine the conditions for the application of budgetary limitation.

The four points enumerated in paragraph I of the resolution are not limitative, and the experts can of course examine and point out any other questions that they consider important.

Paragraph (a) indicates the necessity of limiting the aggregate expenditure under every head.

Paragraph (b) emphasises the importance of studying the budgets and taking into account, in any solution, the variety of ways in which budgets are presented in different countries.

Paragraph (c) reverts to a point the importance of which has long been clear: the purchasing power of the different currencies.

To this paragraph the Spanish delegation proposes an addition which in itself appears to me quite reasonable, but I wonder, since for the moment we are discussing the experts’ programme of work, whether the question really comes within their competence; it appears to me to be rather a question of figures, to be raised at the General Conference, when we come to limit the expenditure on material; the Conference will realise that in every country the cost price has to be taken into consideration, so that the figures are not absolutely comparable.

Such being the case, unless there are any other arguments, and though I agree that the idea is in itself perfectly sound, I wonder whether we might not be complicating the experts’ work if we introduced this amendment.

Lastly, paragraph (d) concerns the question of carrying credits for one financial year over to the following year or years; as I have already said, I consider this principle essential, while readily admitting that it is important to prevent abuse and the disastrous consequences that might ensue.

Paragraph III, I may say at once, concerns Chapter III of the Draft Convention, though it can be taken separately; but if we are already agreed on the principle of studying the limitation of the aggregate budgetary expenditure, there is no real objection to approving it now.

M. Cobíán (Spain). — Since the Commission first met, the Spanish delegation has maintained the same attitude towards the grave problem of the reduction and limitation of armaments.

On May 3rd, 1929, I put before the Commission my doubts as to the wisdom of accepting the method of budgetary limitation, owing to my country’s special situation as regards manufacturing costs. Still with the same conciliatory purpose in view, I may say, therefore, as regards budgetary

¹ Note by the Secretariat. — See Seventh Meeting, page 86.
I understand that the chief point is the question of figures, but if figures were the only point at issue the Preparatory Commission would have nothing at all to do, as it rests with the Conference to decide them.

We are meeting now to establish methods and agree on principles. In this amendment submitted by the Spanish delegation, what I ask for is the recognition of a principle.

I do not quite agree with M. Massigli when he says that the question exceeds the scope of his amendment. I think that if the experts are to study the question of whether the method of limitation agreed upon can be adapted to the fluctuations in the purchasing power of the different currencies (paragraph (c) of the French draft) it will be quite possible for them also to study the principle embodied in my proposal. You all appreciate my conciliatory attitude. My country will be satisfied if the Commission decides on that principle. I see no objection to deciding not to fix the figures, but months will elapse between now and the Conference and there will be changes. In the interests of my country, therefore, I should ask you to accept my proposal or another, framed in different terms, but embodying the same principle. I do not think that my country can agree to limitation, as proposed, unless that principle is adopted.

M. Westman (Sweden). — The first point in the French proposal refers to an enquiry by the experts into land material only, whereas point III proposes a similar method for the limitation of the aggregate annual expenditure of every country on its land, naval and air forces.

I shall have a few words to say on the subject of the experts' enquiry with reference to the forces to be maintained and I should like to know if this is the moment to raise the point or if there will be a discussion later, on the instructions to be given to the experts for the questions mentioned in point III.

M. Massigli (France). — I am prepared for the moment to withdraw point III.

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — I do not rise to make any objection to this French proposal, though personally I am not quite sure that it is actually necessary. I believe that the enquiries which have already been made by the experts will be sufficient; but if anyone desires to have a further reference to them I have no objection. The only thing is, I hope they will be called together at the earliest possible moment. I do not know whether it will be possible for them to meet while we are sitting here, that would be best, but, if that be impracticable, then as soon as possible after that. Perhaps the President will be good enough to consider that matter and see what can be done if my colleagues agree that the earlier the experts meet the better.

As I understand that paragraph III is for the moment withdrawn, I will reserve any criticism on that; I had a little doubt as to whether the wording was correct.

As regards the Spanish proposal, I entirely agree that it would be quite wrong to make any comparison between one country and another as to the cost of their armaments. Take my own country for example—and the United States, supposing we ultimately find some means of arranging the matter so far as they are concerned—the cost is enormously greater in both these countries than in any other country owing to a variety of circumstances. Any comparison, therefore, between my country and other countries in which production is much cheaper would obviously be quite unfair and unjust, and would not help. That is not the idea of budgetary limitation at all. It is not to furnish a comparison between countries, but to see that one country, having accepted a standard of limitation, is not exceeding that standard in some manner—without any intention but in fact.

It is really as a check on that very useful report to which Count Bernstorff called attention on Saturday. It is not useful as a primary method of limitation, but it is very useful as a check. That being so, it seems to me that all that ought to be pointed out in our report; it ought to be made quite clear that there is a great difference in the cost of production in different countries, and that, therefore, there can be no comparison as between one country and another but only as between one year in each country and the next year—or the previous year. I do not know whether an insertion of that kind in the report would meet M. Cobian's apprehension, but only as between one year in each country and the next year—or the previous year. I do not quite agree with M. Massigli when he says that the question exceeds the scope of his amendment. I believe that the enquiries which have already been made by the experts will be sufficient; but if anyone desires to have a further reference to them I have no objection. The only thing is, I hope they will be called together at the earliest possible moment. I do not know whether it will be possible for them to meet while we are sitting here, that would be best, but, if that be impracticable, then as soon as possible after that. Perhaps the President will be good enough to consider that matter and see what can be done if my colleagues agree that the earlier the experts meet the better.

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As far as I am concerned, if it would add to M. Cobian's satisfaction—I do not know what M. Massigli thinks—I should see no objection to adding at the end of paragraph (c), "especially with regard to the cost of war material ". That is to say, that any question of variation in the cost is particularly important when you come to deal with war material. It obviously is.

I fully understand from M. Massigli that it is not intended to ask the experts to report on the principle of disarmament in any way. Their business is to point out the technical methods in which this disarmament can be carried out, and the technical difficulties, if any, and the way in which these technical difficulties can be overcome. As long as that is quite clear I have no objection.
I mention that because I am not quite satisfied, with the wording of paragraph (d), whether that is quite clear. But I do not want to propose any amendment so long as it is entered in the proces verbal that it is quite clear that the experts are not advisers as to whether it should or should not be done, but only as to the way in which it should be done if it be decided to do it.

M. Cobián (Spain). — I am very grateful to Lord Cecil for his proposal. If the cost of manufacture of material is taken into account, I have no observation to offer: the proposed addition entirely meets my requirements.

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — The words are "especially with regard to the cost of war material".

The President. — M. Massigli accepts the proposal to add to paragraph (c) the words "especially with regard to the cost of war material".

M. Politis (Greece). — I wish to make one remark in connection with the Spanish amendment, though not by way of objection to it. I am not quite clear whether this is the proper place for the amendment. I agree with M. Massigli's remarks, but I should not object to the French proposal being amended as the Spanish delegation suggests. I simply wish to point out that budgetary limitation must be individual, for every country. The special conditions in the different countries would have to be taken into account, not only the cost of the goods, the cost of raw materials and labour, but all the other economic and military conditions. The general economic conditions of the country and the state of its armaments would have to be considered. A country may at present have reserves of armament that are incomplete or unfit for use. It would not be fair to put it on the same footing as the others, and to have one rule for all of them. The Spanish delegation's suggestion, therefore, even if it were embodied in the French proposal, does not exhaust the question, and I should like the report to note, either in this connection or in connection with the general discussion on the indirect limitation of armaments, that budgetary limitation implies individual limitation, and that it would be fixed for each country with due reference to the particular conditions of that country.

M. Colban (Norway). — I wish to direct the President's attention to the somewhat peculiar position of the Committee of Experts. This Committee has been to all intents and purposes non-existent for the last three and a half years. I do not know if the members would be prepared to meet again. I should like it to be understood, therefore, that the Bureau has the right to reorganise the Committee. Since it was originally constituted by the Bureau, it would be in conformity with a principle adopted by the Commission to leave the Bureau absolute discretion as regards its composition.

Moreover, it is quite clear from M. Massigli's proposal that the Committee is not intended to give an opinion on the expediency of budgetary limitation, but only on the means of applying a principle already adopted by the majority of the Commission. I should like this point to be made quite clearly. Members of the Committee will not have to discuss the arguments for or against budgetary limitation. Budgetary limitation, it must be remembered, is simply one of the methods of limitation under the Draft Convention, which will also provide for the limitation of effective, publicity, etc. The experts will not have to give an opinion on the value of budgetary limitation, for they will not have before them all the factors which the Commission alone can appreciate. I wish to point this out, to emphasise the great importance of Lord Cecil's observations on the subject.

M. Antoniade (Roumania). — The Roumanian delegation accepts the French delegation's proposal and entirely agrees with M. Politis' judicious observations. We feel, as he does, that any budgetary limitation accepted by the States will have to be peculiar to each country, taking into account all the economic, financial and other factors, and we wish this to be definitely stated in the report which will be submitted by the Commission to the Conference.

Dr. Markovitch (Yugoslavia). — I entirely agree with M. Politis' suggestions, which should, in my opinion, figure in the report not as the personal suggestions of the delegate of Greece but as illustrating our resolution concerning the method for the limitation of land material, that is, as a decision of the whole Commission.

Munir Bey (Turkey). — The Turkish delegation entirely agrees with M. Politis' observations.

Adoption of the Draft Resolution submitted by the French delegation, with an amendment to paragraph (c) and the holding over of Paragraph III for further discussion.

The President. — Due mention will be made in the report of the observations which have just been submitted, and the Commission will, I think, approve M. Markovitch's proposal that M. Politis' proposal should be regarded as representing the views of the whole Commission.

As regards the Committee of Experts, I can reassure M. Colban. The Bureau, realising the importance of its task, will do its best to reconstitute that Committee. I do not know if we can still call upon the different members, as I cannot say what the present position is, but I will certainly go thoroughly into the question.
In reply to Lord Cecil, I may say that his proposals will also receive full consideration. The discussion being closed, I think I may consider the draft resolution submitted by the French delegation as adopted by the Commission, with the proposed amendment to paragraph (c), and that paragraph III will be held over for further discussion.

Agreed.

Convening of, and Constitution of, the Committee of Budgetary Experts.

The President. — I may add, in order to avoid any possible confusion, that Lord Cecil's proposal was that we should try to convene the Committee of Experts as soon as possible, perhaps even before the close of this session, if it goes on for a few days longer.

Count Bernstorff (Germany). — It is, of course, understood that this question of the Committee of Experts will not mean any delay in the convening of the Conference. I should object to any delay in the convening of the Conference, which is for us the essential matter. May I ask if it is the last point of the chapter on Land Material that we are discussing at present?

The President. — Yes.

Proposal by the German delegation regarding prohibition of the more offensive engines of land warfare. Discussion deferred to Chapter IV.

Count Bernstorff (Germany). — In order to conclude the discussion on this point, I may say that I have drawn up a proposal which will be circulated in a few minutes. In this proposal I have endeavoured to make up for the decision passed the other day by the Commission in the matter of land material, by demanding the prohibition of the more offensive engines of land warfare. We have included it under Chapter IV, relating to chemical warfare.

The reason that I am submitting my proposal now is to avoid all difficulty later as regards procedure, and so that the question may be discussed in connection with Chapter IV. If you think that the proposal should be discussed under the chapter on land material, may I ask you to decide the question now? Personally I should be quite prepared to discuss it when Chapter IV is being examined.

The President. — In reply to Count Bernstorff, I may say that as the proposal has not yet been circulated it cannot be discussed now.

Count Bernstorff (Germany). — That is so.

The President. — I think, as Count Bernstorff suggests that the proposal might be held over for Chapter IV. According to the rule that we have adopted, it should only be discussed at the last reading.

Munir Bey (Turkey). — The Turkish delegation is of opinion that the Committee of Budgetary Experts should also include experts of States which have since taken part in the work of the Commission. Turkey was not represented on the Committee of Experts and would certainly feel entitled to ask that her expert should sit on the Committee.

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — With regard to Munir Bey's remarks, I hope that we are not going to introduce the national aspect of the question. The essential thing is to get together the most qualified people, irrespective of nationality.

The President. — I quite agree with Lord Cecil, especially as you have asked the Bureau to see to the constitution or reconstitution of the Committee of Experts. The Bureau, I can assure you, will do its best to find the most competent experts to sit on that Committee, but it is impossible for every State to be represented.

Count Bernstorff (Germany). — I shall be very willing to accept the President's suggestion (for the discussion of the German proposal under Chapter IV).

Our proposal will be circulated in a few minutes. We were unable, owing to the Sunday interval, to have it ready earlier. I may add that I do not mind when the vote is taken, provided that it is voted upon.

All that matters, so far as I am concerned, is that the proposal should be submitted to the Commission, and that the latter may consider it.

The President. — I think that the Commission agrees with Count Bernstorff. Is it understood that the draft resolution submitted by the French delegation is adopted?

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — I would remark that I abstain on this question. I declared on Saturday that as long as the Soviet delegation's amendment has not been discussed and voted upon, I am unable to express any opinions on other amendments on the same question.
General de Marinis (Italy). — May I ask the President to say exactly what the Bureau is required to do as regards the composition of the Committee of Experts? The Committee consists of delegates from certain countries, of which I have a list. You agreed to the proposal to constitute the Committee; but it already exists. You said that the Bureau would proceed to constitute the Committee and would call upon first class experts; but I do not quite grasp exactly what the Bureau proposes to do.

The President. — In reply to General de Marinis, I have before me a list of the experts who sat on the Committee.

It is clear, referring to what M. Colban said, that we must try to reconstitute the Committee as it was, but I do not know if all the members are still available. The Bureau will do its best to convene the former members, but we would ask to be allowed a certain latitude, if necessary, that we may call upon other experts to sit on the Committee. General de Marinis said just now that certain countries had been appointed to serve on the Committee; but if an expert of any one of those countries were prevented for some reason from attending, he would have to be replaced by another expert from the same country. This seems the best solution, but I would ask the Commission to allow me a certain discretion in the matter. The Bureau will do its best, but will naturally have regard to the original constitution of the Committee.

General de Marinis (Italy). — It is understood that the composition of the Committee of Experts will be the same as it was originally. Delegates will simply be appointed to replace those who cannot attend; but it is clearly understood that no country can be added to the list or left out.

The President. — No country will be omitted, but I would ask you to allow me some latitude as regards adding other countries. I hope you will trust to the discretion of the Bureau.

Dr. Woo Kaiseng (China). — The Committee of Experts will have a very important duty. May I ask the President to inform us as soon as possible of the composition of that Committee, so that we may know how matters stand and say if we are in agreement?

Munir Bey (Turkey). — The Turkish delegation has perfect confidence in the Bureau, but as there was some question of replacing absent members of the former Committee who could not attend, by representatives of the same countries, we wish to direct the Commission’s attention to this small point.

The President. — I propose that the Commission should leave the matter to the Bureau, which will do its best to reconstitute the Committee as it was originally. If any changes are found necessary, I will inform the Commission.

Agreed.

31. Statements by the delegates of Greece and Turkey regarding the Treaty of Friendship and the Agreement between the Greek and Turkish Governments for the Limitation of Their Naval Armaments, signed at Ankara on October 30th, 1930.

The President. — I call upon the representatives of Turkey and Greece, who have statements to make.

Tevfik Rüştü Bey (Turkey). — I have the honour to inform the Commission that we have concluded an agreement with the Greek Government. This agreement, which was signed at the same time as the Treaty of Friendship between Turkey and Greece, is designed to put a stop to the competition in naval armaments and the unnecessary expenditure which that involves. It will undoubtedly have the effect of consolidating peace in the Eastern Mediterranean. We congratulate ourselves on being among the first nations in Europe to contribute by means of special agreements towards the creation of an atmosphere favourable to the work of the Disarmament Commission.

M. Politis (Greece). — My distinguished friend the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs and I both thought that the Commission might be interested, when it is about to begin its study of the limitation of naval armaments, to receive from the delegations concerned official confirmation of the signing at Ankara, on October 30th last, of an agreement between the Greek and Turkish Governments for the limitation of their naval armaments.

This agreement provides as follows: “The High Contracting Parties, desirous of preventing any unnecessary increase in the expenditure on naval armaments and of proceeding simultaneously to limit their respective forces with due reference to the particular conditions of their respective States, undertake not to place orders for, or to purchase or construct any warship or armaments without previously informing the other Contracting Party, six months in advance, in order that the two Governments may thus have an opportunity of preventing any competition in naval armaments, by means of a friendly exchange of views and of explanations between the two Parties in a spirit of perfect sincerity.”

The agreement is embodied in a Protocol annexed to the Treaty of Friendship, signed the same day, and it marks the opening of a new era of collaboration, understanding and friendship in the relations between the two countries.

When you think, gentlemen, what struggles and rivalry those countries have known for centuries, you will realise with what joy the two nations received the news of their reconciliation.
The real value of this agreement lies in the fact that it was concluded only after the two nations, having realised their common interests, decided to accept their territorial status as definitive. Henceforth, on neither side will there be any question of mental reservations, ulterior motives or further claims. This being the case, both countries have realised that since there is now nothing to divide them, they can cease to arm against one another and proceed with full confidence to co-operate, looking as they do to such co-operation to increase their prosperity and consolidate peace in the Near East.

I am happy and proud, gentlemen, that my country should have given so signal an example and pledge of its pacific attitude. I trust most sincerely that the consecration of this friendship between the Republics of Greece and of Turkey will constitute a powerful factor for peace in the Balkans and in Europe as a whole.

The President. — I shall, I am sure, be interpreting the feelings of the whole Commission in expressing to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs and to our colleague and Vice-President M. Politis our satisfaction at the news which they have just announced.

The conclusion of this Treaty between two peoples who for centuries were enemies is a matter for general rejoicing.

The Protocol which M. Politis has just read and which was appended to that Treaty, constitutes an example which we can and ought to follow. I congratulate those two countries and their eminent representatives in particular. I feel that the agreements were concluded—and you, I am sure, will agree with me—as the result of the efforts of two statesmen of outstanding capacity, vision and nobility of character.

32. Discussion on Chapter II: Material. — Section II: Naval Armaments.

The President. — Our draft Convention provided for a series of articles relating to naval armaments. The results obtained at the London Naval Conference—results which, as Mr. MacDonald himself noted in his letter to the Secretary-General, indicate a real advance in the matter of the reduction and limitation of armaments—necessitate some adaptation of our text adopted at first reading. This work could not be done better than by the representatives of the countries which took so active a part in the London Naval Conference.

Those delegates forwarded to us the results of their combined effort over a week ago, and these results, as document C.P.D.230 indicates, are intended as a basis of discussion. To the draft submitted by the seven delegations we already have amendments, presented by the Soviet, Spanish and Swedish delegations. The Soviet and Spanish delegations have also submitted amendments to the text of our draft adopted at first reading.

The position is therefore as follows: we have before us our text adopted at first reading, and to this is now appended the draft submitted by the seven delegations. This last-named draft constitutes an amendment to the draft adopted at first reading and in its turn is the subject of further amendments.

The Commission is free to choose between these texts. Should it decide to take the draft framed by the seven delegations as a basis of discussion there would be nothing to prevent it later, in connection with the examination of the relevant articles, from considering not only the amendments to that text but also, if necessary, the amendments to our text adopted at first reading.

If the Commission agree on this procedure, I shall propose that the draft of the seven delegations be taken as a basis of discussion.

Agreed.

General reservation by the Italian delegation.

General de Marinis (Italy). — In document C.P.D.230, dated November 10th, 1930, which has been circulated, you will find a footnote on the first page concerning the general reservation made by the Italian delegation at the London Naval Conference; this reservation, regarding methods of naval limitation, I now desire to repeat.

I have the honour to state, therefore, that the Italian Government is unable to accept any specific method for the limitation of naval armaments until ratios of strength and maximum levels of tonnage have been fixed by the different Powers.

This reservation, of course, will not prevent us from collaborating in the technical examination of the provisions of the draft which we are now examining.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — I want to say a few words in favour of the Soviet delegation’s Amendment, but perhaps as it is based upon the text of the proposal of the seven States, the latter’s representatives may like to say a few words first, and in that case I am prepared to wait.

1 Note by the Secretariat. — See Annex 3.
2 Note by the Secretariat. — These amendments are given in the text, where they are taken into discussion.
33. Setting-up of a Naval Sub-Committee.

M. Politis (Greece). — The Commission has before it various amendments to the text, submitted by a number of delegations representing the principal naval Powers, and I would venture at this juncture to submit a proposal in regard to procedure.

I think it would facilitate our work if we decided now to set up a Sub-Committee on which any delegations which so desire might be represented by their naval experts, the duty of this Sub-Committee being to examine the various amendments, to see which can be retained, which should be rejected, and which should be further amended.

Once agreement has been arrived at in the Sub-Committee the discussions in the plenary Commission will be much shorter, and this will mean added clearness and saving of time.

My proposal, therefore, is that we should decide to set up a Sub-Committee on which any delegations that so desire might be represented by their naval experts. The Sub-Committee would sit when the plenary Commission is not sitting.

The President. — May I express my personal view? I propose that we should first hold a very brief general discussion. We might then proceed, if necessary, to appoint a Sub-Committee.

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — I am far from opposing the idea of a Sub-Committee; I think that very likely it would be a good plan, and the Sub-Committee could discuss in the afternoons when this Commission is not sitting. But I do hope that no naval expert will misunderstand me if I say that I trust the representatives of the delegations will be those who have the responsibility for decisions in these matters, and that delegates will not try and shift the burden on to the shoulders of their naval experts. I feel very strongly that that would be a mistake and put the naval and other experts into a wrong position. Of course they must be consulted, and continually consulted, on the technical aspects, but the political delegates of the various countries must take the decisions, and therefore I trust M. Politis will be kind enough to move his motion allowing for that to be done, and I should then be in full accord with his suggestion.

I am afraid I do not like the idea of another general discussion. I do not see what we are to discuss in general terms. We have to put something in about naval limitation—that was decided three years and more ago—and it was decided that it should be based on these proposals before us. What more is there to discuss generally? I cannot conceive such a discussion being useful or saving time, if we have to proceed through a Sub-Committee. M. Litvinoff courteously suggested that some of those responsible for the proposal of the seven delegations should explain it in general. I am very much obliged to him for his suggestion, but I do not think there is anything to explain in general. The proposals seemed quite clear to me, and if there is any doubt or difficulty when we come to it some of those responsible can explain. A general discussion would mean long explanations in detail of each paragraph, or it would have to be a mere statement of platitudes which would not help us, and I hope Mr. Litvinoff will forgive me if I do not respond.

The Hon. Hugh Gibson (United States of America). — The American delegation would like warmly to support the proposal of M. Politis for a Naval Sub-Committee to sit concurrently with this Commission. The great advantage of that procedure is that, while we are going ahead with such matters on our agenda as we have decided to take up, the Naval Sub-Committee can take the various amendments to the text submitted by the seven delegations, and deal with them, and so bring us the problem reduced to its simplest form with the minimum of problems left for discussion. Otherwise we may follow a large number of red herrings.

If we leave to the Naval Sub-Committee the reduction of the problem to its simplest form, we may find that the discussion in this Commission will be limited, to the benefit of all concerned.

As to the composition of that Sub-Committee, I feel that Lord Cecil has the most practical idea in saying we should be represented by members of our delegations who are competent to take decisions, because the whole purpose of this Sub-Committee is to do some preliminary work and to do away with problems which otherwise will take up the time of this Commission.

The American delegation would like to be represented by a political member, and other delegations may wish the same; perhaps the President would say that each delegation is at liberty to choose its representatives as it deems best.

Now, Mr. President, there is one step we might take before referring this question to a Naval Sub-Committee—that is, to decide one question of principle at any rate. One thing that makes it simpler to refer this problem to the Naval Sub-Committee is that so far no amendments to our draft have been brought forward regarding its form.

There are briefly three types of amendments now before us: the first class provides for drafting changes which can obviously be dealt with by the Naval Sub-Committee. The second class provides for adjustments. It remains to be seen whether or not those can be dealt with. They are
proper amendments. There is the third category which, to my mind, involves quantitative proposals. It will be observed that in our draft there are a number of figures, and it is explained that these are inserted as being the figures of the existing Treaties—Washington and London—and that they are given for purposes of illustration and in some cases in order to make the text intelligible. We, the Powers submitting the draft, have no intention of seeking to impose the acceptance of those figures. They are there for clarity and simplicity. It seems, therefore, that there is no reason to substitute other figures, and that the substitution of figures not in existing Treaties would mean exactly nothing so far as this body is concerned, because we have decided that we cannot entertain quantitative proposals.

I think it is within the power of the Chairman to instruct the Naval Sub-Committee of the decision we have taken in the past—namely, that proposals involving quantitative suggestions are out of order.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).—I am in full agreement with the remarks of Lord Cecil as to the prematurity of forming a Sub-Committee at the present time. It would certainly give the impression that the delegates are shifting their responsibilities and trying to hide the question from the public. The question of naval armaments has held the attention of this Commission, and of the whole world, for over three years. We have been wandering in the wilderness all this time and have been told that the naval negotiations going on somewhere or other would bring us to the Promised Land. Now that this promised land has been reached it is proposed that it should be shown only to a Sub-Committee. As to Lord Cecil’s proposal I think it must be left to everyone to explain his point of view in the form he thinks best. Each of the proposals before us is inspired by definite ideas, and the authors should be allowed to explain the ideas which are the basis of their proposals. I would therefore like to insist that some general discussion should take place here before the setting up of a Sub-Committee of experts.

M. Westman (Sweden).—Before making up our minds about this question of procedure, we ought to know whether the meetings of the Sub-Committee are to be public or not, and whether Minutes will be kept.

M. Cobian (Spain).—I understand that the representatives of the principal naval Powers, which discussed the questions at such length in London, regard it as quite superfluous to have a discussion before we set up this Sub-Committee as M. Politis suggests. Nor do I myself wish for a discussion if that means loss of time, but I think all the same that we might formulate certain principles; the Sub-Committee would give an opinion on them, and would then submit to the Commission a text on which we can take a decision. M. Westman has just made a most useful observation. If the constitution of this Sub-Committee and the machinery at its disposal make it, to all intents and purposes, the same as the Commission itself, we can proceed at once to appoint it. But if it is to work on the usual lines, then we ought to consider whether it would not be better to formulate certain observations before appointing it. I personally should have no observation to offer if, in connection with Article A, and in conformity with the procedure proposed by Lord Cecil, which I support, each delegate could bring up any questions of principle which interest him.

The Hon. Hugh Gibson (United States of America).—I am in entire accord with M. Cobian’s views, which seem reasonable. In accepting the proposal of M. Politis, nothing was further from my mind than that we should have secret meetings or should do anything to suppress discussion. Our sole object is to press forward with the work of the Commission, and we welcome the fullest discussion. It would be helpful if we had Minutes of our meetings, and my support is based on that understanding.

Dr. Riddell (Canada).—The Canadian delegation fully approves the setting-up of a Sub-Committee, which it believes should be helpful in considering the difficulties that may arise when we examine, article by article, the texts which we have taken as a basis for discussion. Some of the articles we shall have no difficulty in agreeing upon, but when we find that we have difficulties with certain articles or the amendments to them, these might be referred to the Sub-Committee; I cannot see any reason for the Sub-Committee taking over any other work from the Commission. The problems which do not offer great difficulties might better be settled in the full Commission.

M. Massigli (France).—I am quite prepared to accept any proposal that secures the support of the majority of the Commission. I think, as the Mr. Gibson pointed out, that it is essential, if the naval question is referred to a Sub-Committee, that the latter should have full publicity. We are of course all agreed on this point.

In practice, moreover, the Sub-Committee will be the same as the Commission itself, except that certain members not being interested in naval questions will not attend it. If the proposal be adopted, the position will be as follows: In the morning we shall hold plenary meetings to examine all the other questions on the agenda, and in the afternoon we shall sit as a Sub-Committee to discuss naval questions. Very good; there is, however, one drawback. As Lord Cecil very rightly pointed out, either the Sub-Committee will be a body of experts and the Commission will have to take a decision on the various questions afterwards, else the Sub-Committee will itself
take what are practically final decisions, which the Commission will simply have to ratify. If that be the case, the responsible representatives of the delegations must continually be present at the proceedings of the Sub-Committee, and one objection occurs to me. If we decide to sit morning and afternoon to discuss the naval question, I see no objection to the procedure that has been proposed, but if in the morning we discuss non-naval questions—and there are very important questions not yet settled, which will require also a good deal of discussion between delegations outside meetings—and if in the afternoon we deal with naval questions, I am afraid that we shall not have more than we can cope with.

The naval question has, however, been prepared to some extent, and the various problems clearly defined, while the amendments are specific in character, so that it might be better to discuss the naval clauses both morning and afternoon. If we examine all the various questions at the same time, I am afraid that we might encounter difficulties.

Dr. Woo Kaiseng (China).—I support M. Massigli's proposals and Dr. Riddell's observations. Serious difficulties will obviously ensue if we sit both morning and afternoon, and even from the standpoint of the public and of the journalists following our discussions, our proceedings might appear somewhat obscure and less easy to comprehend. I desire, therefore, to support Dr. Riddell's proposal that we should discuss the articles one by one, and only refer to a Sub-Committee those on which we fail to agree.

M. Westman (Sweden).—I support M. Massigli's proposal, provided that the Sub-Committee's meetings are public, that Minutes are kept and that the delegations can be represented by their political members.

The President.—I feel that M. Massigli's proposal is really very sound. It is impossible to discuss certain questions—very important questions—in the morning, and quite different questions in the afternoon. It would be much better to continue the discussion in the Commission. My suggestion is that we should meet to discuss naval questions both morning and afternoon. It is understood that there would be no general discussion.

M. Massigli (France).—I did not intend to propose that the Commission should meet morning and afternoon, but that the Sub-Committee should do so.

The President.—This Sub-Committee would then be exactly on the lines of the plenary Commission, and Minutes of its proceedings would be kept.

M. Massigli (France).—The technical delegates would simply be present.

The President.—We must be quite clear. Does the Commission desire to continue the discussions under the conditions which have governed the general discussion, or does it wish a Sub-Committee to deal with the matter?

Lord Cecil (British Empire).—I hope the Commission will not think me terribly pedantic, but I have a great fondness for seeing any proposition that is submitted to the Commission decided by the Commission before we proceed to any other proposition. I understood M. Politis had moved a definite motion that this matter should be referred to a Sub-Committee. I hope that we shall decide that question now. Then we can decide when that Sub-Committee is, or is not, to sit, whether mornings or afternoons, or only in the afternoons. That is a separate matter. I hope we shall now decide whether we agree with M. Politis or do not agree with him, that this being a matter of great detail is more suitable to a Sub-Committee than to the whole Commission. I personally hope we shall accept M. Politis' motion. In any case, I hope the President will be good enough to put it to the Commission.

M. Colban (Norway).—Before we can decide on M. Politis' proposal, the Commission ought to know whether the Sub-Committee is to sit simultaneously with the Commission. If it is not to do so, I shall vote in favour of the proposal, but I cannot do so otherwise.

M. Politis (Greece).—I feel that the question raised by M. Colban is quite a subsidiary one. The real point is the question of method. The idea in suggesting a Sub-Committee was that for a large number of delegations—unless I am mistaken—these questions are of no interest at all, or only of secondary interest. I felt, therefore, that the Commission could get on better with its examination of this question if its numbers were limited, as it would be able to arrive more quickly at results.

Should you endorse this view, you will decide first to set up a Sub-Committee. Then will come the question of when it is to sit, and whether it is to sit at a different time from the Commission or simultaneously.

M. Massigli's objection would have the result that the plenary Commission would not sit until the Sub-Committee has concluded its work, but I repeat—and I think I am no more pedantic than Lord Cecil—that the questions will have to be thoroughly dealt with. You will have to decide, first of all, on the principle of setting up a Sub-Committee. If you decide in the affirmative, you will next have to decide whether the Sub-Committee is to sit simultaneously with the Commission or not.
Dr. Markovitch (Yugoslavia). — I agree entirely with M. Colban’s view, and my vote will depend on whether the Sub-Committee is or is not to sit simultaneously with the plenary Commission. Our delegation desires, for very special reasons, that all its members should take part in the proceedings both of the Sub-Committee and of the Commission.

The President. — I can answer M. Markovitch at once: it is impossible for the Plenary Commission and the Sub-Committee to sit simultaneously, since we adopted the principle—Lord Cecil, if I remember rightly, brought it up at the beginning—that the responsible delegates should themselves sit on the Sub-Committee.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — I am in favour of the proposal of M. Politis as to the procedure of voting on this question. I understand this proposal is that we are going to vote, whether there should be a Sub-Committee or not, and that if we vote against it, it does not mean that we may not decide to form a Sub-Committee at a later date. We are voting only on the question: Is the sub-committee to be formed immediately or not?

The President. — I put to the vote M. Politis’ proposal for the immediate setting up of a Sub-Committee. It is understood that it would be on the lines just suggested by the Mr. Gibson—that is, Minutes would be kept and there would be the necessary publicity.

The proposal was adopted.

The President. — The principle of the constitution of this Sub-Committee having been adopted, we now have to decide when it will sit, and it is understood that it will not be at the same time as the plenary Commission. I propose that we should adjourn the plenary Session and meet morning and afternoon, but not before 4.30 in the afternoon. The meeting would be adjourned at 6.30. We want two hours, but not a minute longer.

It is understood, then, that we are to set up a Sub-Committee for naval questions and that that Sub-Committee will meet morning and afternoon until the subject has been thoroughly discussed.

M. Bourquin (Belgium). — Now that we have agreed to set up this Sub-Committee we might decide, as it is understood that all the delegates can take part in its proceedings, simply to do away with the word “Sub-Committee”. Actually, the Commission is continuing its work.

M. Politis (Greece). — I have no objection in principle to this suggestion. Still, there is a difference. The Commission has decided to resolve itself into a smaller Committee, but the work of this Committee will have to be approved by the plenary Commission. Delegations which do not desire to take part in the work of this smaller Committee will have to vote on the final decision to be taken on the conclusions of this body.

The President. — In that case I adjourn the meeting of the Commission, but we continue to sit as a Sub-Committee, and any delegates who do not wish to sit on the Sub-Committee may retire if they so desire.

The meeting was adjourned at 12.20 p.m.
FIRST MEETING OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE.

Held on Monday, November 17th, 1930, at 12.25 p.m.

President: M. LOUDON (Netherlands).

34. **Discussion on Chapter II: Material. — Section II: Naval Armaments** (document C.P.D.211, Annex 1).

   (Basis of discussion: Document C.P.D.230 (Annex 3 to the Minutes).

**DISCUSSION ON ARTICLES A, B, C.**

**Article A.**

The High Contracting Parties agree to limit the total (global) tonnage of their vessels of war, other than exempt vessels (as specified in Annex I) and Special Vessels mentioned in Annex II, to the figures laid down in Table I.

These figures give the tonnage which shall not be exceeded during the term of the present treaty.

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<tr>
<th>High Contracting Party</th>
<th>Total (Global) Tonnage</th>
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**Article B.**

Table II shows, by tonnage per category, the way in which each High Contracting Party intends to distribute, during the period of application of the Convention, the total (global) tonnage which it has limited to the figure indicated, as far as it is concerned, in Table I.

The maximum displacement and gun calibre limits of the several categories shall be as laid down in this Treaty. ¹

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¹ With reference to Articles A and B, the Italian Delegation expressed the opinion that they should be replaced by a single article stating:

"The Limitation of naval armament accepted by each of the High Contracting Parties is indicated in the annexed Table ",

"Which might be the Table II attached to this document. Consequently the Italian Delegation is in favour of suppressing Table I."

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<th>High Contracting Parties</th>
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Article C.

Within the limits of the total (global) tonnage shown for each High Contracting Party in Table I, and in the absence of more strict conditions resulting from special conventions to which it is or may become a party, each of the High Contracting Parties may effect a transfer of the tonnage indicated for it in the different categories in Table II, subject to the two following conditions:

1. The tonnages by category shown for each High Contracting Party in Table II shall in no case be the object of increase beyond the figures shown for it in Table III.

2. Before the laying-down of the ship or ships for the construction of which the transferred tonnage has been assigned, due notice must be given to all of the other High Contracting Parties of the amount of tonnage transferred, the length of such notice being that laid down for each of the High Contracting Parties in Table III.

Table III: Rules for Transfer.

AMENDMENTS BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO ARTICLES A, B AND C.

The President. — There are amendments to Articles A, B and C by the Soviet delegation, which are as follows:

Article A.

The High Contracting Parties agree to reduce the existing tonnage by . . . %, by limiting to the figures fixed in Table I the total (global) tonnage of their vessels of war other than exempt vessels (as specified in Annex I). These figures give the tonnage which shall not be exceeded during the term of the present Treaty.

Article B.

The High Contracting Parties whose navy exceeds 200,000 tons agree to limit their total tonnage in conformity with the classes and figures fixed in Table II.

Article C to be deleted.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — I shall have some difficulty in limiting myself only to Article A, as Articles A, B and C together, in my opinion, form one method of restricting naval armaments. You cannot treat of one article in our proposal without dealing with the other two also, so I must speak on the three Articles together. Together they constitute the idea which pervades the Soviet proposal. In this connection I would like to remind the Commission that the discussion on Naval Armaments has been delayed for over three years in the expectation that the naval negotiations going on in certain States would help us to overcome the difficulties that have been met with in this Commission. We have now got the outcome of those naval negotiations and we are, of course, entitled to ask ourselves whether the proposals put forward in document C.P.D.230 really afford a solution and remove the difficulties which have prevented the Commission so far from coming to an agreement on Naval Armaments. I can see no solution in the proposals which are put forward by the seven States, because, after all, the point at issue was whether to choose the global method for the limitation of tonnage or the method of limitation by categories. And what is the situation now? Article A proposes global limitation compulsory for all the contracting parties. Article B merely stipulates that each country should itself classify, according to category, the tonnage allowed to it. It is obvious that it is publicity, and not the limitation of categories, that is meant here. Article C allows any country to make transfers, with supplementary publicity throughout the term of the Convention. This alteration, however, is subject to certain limits which cannot be exceeded.

The percentage allowed for transfers from one category to another will depend upon whether we adopt the global or the category method. Should, for instance, a 100% transfer be allowed, there will be no limitation except global limitation, whereas with strict tonnage figures and only a trifling percentage of transfer we shall have limitation by categories. A scheme which places no limits on transfers practically shifts from the Commission to the Conference the problem of choosing the method itself as well as settling on the figures. The blank space in Table III shows that no practical agreement as to a uniform method has been arrived at by the Seven States themselves.

The Soviet delegation considers that the partial reduction of armaments cannot be based on the individual method of establishing rates acceptable for all. That method is bound to come up against enormous, if not insurmountable, difficulties. It therefore proposes proportional reduction, with certain exceptions in favour of weaker countries. This proposal is embodied in the Soviet draft of Article A and Table I. At the same time they consider it would be fair for big sea Powers, with uniformly organised navies, to limit them by categories in accordance with Table II, while States with smaller navies, with, let us say, a total tonnage of less than 200,000,
would be subject to global limitation only. This principle will be found in Article B, and in the proposed removal of Article C. That is the essence of the Soviet proposal on Articles A, B and C.

I wish to repeat that one cannot accept one Article of the proposal without accepting at the same time the other Articles. I would therefore propose that members of the delegations who speak after me should give their opinions on the proposal as a whole—not only Article A, but all three Articles—as on a single method of dealing with Naval Armaments. We propose that the big sea Powers should accept the method of reduction by categories, and that the smaller countries should accept the method of reduction by global tonnage. We shall then have to draw a line between the big sea Powers and the smaller countries. For the smaller countries we suggest a figure not exceeding 200,000 tons. Perhaps the Commission will propose another figure, and the Conference yet another figure. We suggest not only limitation but also a proportional reduction of the existing navies. I can foresee that some delegates who do not agree with the principle of proportional reduction may propose some other methods—for instance, some progressive proportional reduction—the bigger the sea Power the greater the decrease in its armaments, to which I should have no objection to offer.

May I add a few words more? I wish only to say that Article A in the proposal of the seven delegations (Document C.P.D. 230) differs in another point from the corresponding Article in the Soviet amendment. That is where mention is made that “the High Contracting Parties agree to limit the total (global) tonnage of their vessels of war, other than exempt vessels (as specified in Annex I) . . .”. These exemptions do not exist in our proposal. We do not know exactly what vessels will be included in the list of exemptions, but some idea may be found if we refer to the London Naval Treaty. Therein is a list already drawn up, and if you look at it you will be struck by the dimensions of the exempted vessels. For instance, the total tonnage of the special vessels of the five Powers exempted by the Treaty of London was equivalent to 87% of the Italian Navy. We regard it in this way: If States build such ships or want to maintain them, they should be included in the global tonnage at their disposal.

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — I will do my best to say a few words in answer to M. Litvinoff. It is rather difficult to deal with the number of proposals in the Soviet amendment, Articles A and B. I will take them one by one.

The first change is that instead of limiting the total tonnage of the vessels of war as stated in the Table, M. Litvinoff proposes to reduce that tonnage by percentage. Well, I do not think that would do at this stage, because you do not know the existing tonnages, and, apart from that, it would mean the existing proportional strengths of navies would continue as it is at present, and that, for many reasons, is not a practical solution.

I want to guard myself by saying that once you have a General Treaty on Disarmament you have the levels of every one’s armament fixed, and then the system of reducing by percentage might be usefully employed, and perhaps you will have to reduce in that way. But first you have to fix the armaments at a figure the various States agree to accept at the present time.

The second proposal in Article A is to get rid of the special vessels, and I think there is a misunderstanding here. As I understand it, what was proposed in London—and indicated in this Article—was that there should be a list of certain vessels difficult to classify in any existing or proposed category, and that they should be allowed to go on until they came to a natural termination by age, and after that tonnage which replaces them should be included in the total tonnage of the vessels limited by the Treaty. So that special vessels are only a temporary exception to the general principle of limiting the tonnage of the various fleets. I think that is not an unreasonable proposal in order to bring the Treaty into force.

The next proposal is to get rid of the system of limitation by categories, modified by a power of transfer from one category to another, to forbid all transfers under all circumstances, and to draw a sharp line at 200,000 tons and say that all fleets above that line should be limited by categories and all fleets below it should be limited by total tonnage. I do not think that is a practical proposal, and I can say so the more freely because I remember that, in 1927, I ventured to make a proposal on these lines, and it was rejected and has never been revived by those who are considering these problems. There are a number of other objections which I will not elaborate. One seems fatal. If you fix a hard and fast level like 200,000 tons, you will have a fleet with 200,001 tons limited in one way, and a fleet of 199,999 tons limited in another way, and that is impracticable. You need something more elastic and supple, and in the circumstances I ask the Sub-Committee to reject the amendment of the Soviet delegation.

M. Westman (Sweden). — I should like to commence with a quotation. During the discussions in our Commission in 1929 Mr. Gibson, the representative of the United States, made a declaration
from which I would venture to quote. The passage is a short but highly significant one.

Mr. Gibson's words were: "Aside from the signatories of the Washington Treaty there is no conceivable combination of naval power which could threaten the safety of any of the principal naval Powers."

To my mind, this declaration puts the question which we are discussing on its proper plane. I will make a few preliminary observations in order to clear up the situation, before expressing an opinion on the various proposals before us.

Under the terms of Article A of the proposals of the seven Powers, fleets would be limited globally—the method consistently advocated by the Swedish delegation. Under Article B, however, the category method is advanced as a second principle and we are invited to maintain the definitions of the various categories of vessels as laid down at Washington and London. Naturally, these categories are conceived from the standpoint of the requirements of large navies, and it is obvious that the unmodified application of such categories to small navies will not be an easy matter.

As a concrete instance of the difficulties afforded by such application, I should like to put some figures relating to one of the great navies, say with a tonnage of 1,000,000 tons, alongside those of a small navy of about 100,000 tons.

If we take the classification given in document C.P.D.230, (Annex 2) we shall have five different categories. When we come to distribute the total (global) tonnage of one of the great navies over these five categories, very large tonnage figures (frequently several hundred thousand tons) have to be inserted in each category. In other words, you will have in each category a tonnage figure equal to the total (global) tonnage of three or four small fleets.

On the other hand, to show you what would be the effect of applying the five-category system to a smaller navy the manner in which the tonnage would be split up by such an operation —some 10,000 tons per category—I would point out that, if navies of a great Power like Great Britain or the United States of America had their tonnage similarly distributed, we should have to provide, not five but fifty or sixty categories.

My sole object in making these remarks is to stress the tremendous difference between large navies and the small navies for which we are at present trying to find the best and most equitable methods of limitation.

The proposals before us clearly prove also that their advocates realise the impossibility of imposing the London category system unchanged on small navies and the need of modifying that system so as to give it the flexibility necessary for the needs of such navies.

Table III of Article C, showing within what limits transfers may be made, has been left blank, so that it is at present impossible to give an opinion on the real effect of the proposals.

It will clearly be our duty to discuss this problem; but I would like to say, here and now, that it is very difficult to commit oneself to a course, or to adopt a principle or a solution without knowing whither they lead.

To ensure the necessary flexibility in the navies referred to, other methods than those contemplated in the document might certainly be conceived. For example, navies below a certain limit should not be entirely exempt from regulation (except, of course, publicity). A provision might be made determining the categories specially adapted to the types of ships and to the requirements of small navies. I will not at the moment go into further details of the various possibilities which offer themselves. The Swedish delegation has just handed to the Bureau a concrete proposal which we shall have to discuss.

To know which solution to choose, it would clearly be very helpful to have some explanations of the intentions of the authors of the proposal in document C.P.D.230. For this purpose, I would like to put two questions.

I. Article A lays down the so-called total (global) tonnage principle, and Article B refers to a Table which will show the tonnage per category and the way in which each High Contracting Party intends to distribute the total (global) tonnage.

Will this distribution by category be made by the Disarmament Conference; or simply at the Conference by each State, after any necessary discussion, with the countries specially interested?

II. Article C provides that States may effect a transfer of tonnage in the different categories; but it states at the same time that the tonnage by category shall in no case be the object of increase beyond the figures shown for it in Table III. As Table III does not exist for the moment this is tantamount to saying that the document in question provides for the right of transfer but makes no regulations on the subject. Do the authors of the proposals intend that these regulations should be made by the Preparatory Commission or only by the Disarmament Conference?

The President.—I did not want to interrupt M. Westman but I would remind him that we are at present discussing Article A, and not Article C. I would therefore suggest that M. Westman should continue his speech later. We must now vote on the Soviet amendment.

M. Westman (Sweden).—Unless I am mistaken, M. Litvinoff urged that the Articles could not be dealt with separately. As no one raised any objection, I take it this is the view of the Commission.

1 Note by the Secretariat. — See Minutes of the Sixth Session (First Part), page 58.
As far as I am concerned, I cannot vote before receiving a reply to the questions I have raised. If the Soviet amendment is put to the vote now, I shall have to abstain.

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — Other delegates and I myself are anxious to satisfy M. Westman, but it was impossible to prevent M. Litvinoff presenting his case on Articles A, B and C. Article A is separate from Articles B and C, and we can vote on Article A without interfering with Article C. The amendments on that point will have to be carefully considered, because it is one of the most contentious articles in the Draft. I hope we shall vote now on Article A, reserving the discussion for Article C.

M. Westman (Sweden). — I can only say that I regard these three articles as closely connected.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — I wish to answer the criticisms made by Lord Cecil, in the first place as regards special vessels outside of existing categories. Lord Cecil's arguments are not convincing, and I cannot see why such vessels should not be limited under the general category of light vessels. We have, for instance, in the list of special vessels attached to the London Naval Treaty vessels built as recently as 1924—surely these should be limited in one way or another. Then I understood Lord Cecil to say that it was impossible to draw any distinction between the naval Powers because it was difficult to agree as to figures. And that, if we take the figure of the Soviet proposal of 200,000 tons, States with 200,000 tons would have to be treated differently from States which have 199,999 tons.

This seems to me almost as metaphysical as the problem of when baldness may be said to begin: after the loss of the two-thousandth or of the two-thousand-and-first hair. Naturally if we want to draw a distinction between naval Powers, we must insert some figure as to their tonnage. The Swedish delegation also gives figures, namely, 100,000 tons; so Lord Cecil's objection ought to apply to their proposal too, and to the Spanish amendment which put an "x" to be replaced by a definite figure. If we follow up the argument of Lord Cecil we shall have to treat small and great Powers alike, which is exactly what the Soviet delegation is opposed to.

Lord Cecil has said we cannot reduce armaments until we know what existing armaments amount to. But surely we can get more or less precise information as to existing armaments from the figures given in the Armaments Year Book of the League of Nations.

What will be the position if the Soviet proposal for the reduction of naval armaments is rejected and we keep strictly to the limitation of armaments? What would be the tonnage of the various navies? Some idea may be formed from a study of the London Naval Treaty, which is offered to us as the prototype of any future Convention on naval armaments, and has been commended to us in the letter referred to by the President and by the President himself. The outstanding fact is that the total figures for the displacement of the navies of the three Parties to the Agreement came, on March 1st, 1930, to 2,979,000 tons, and by 1936 these figures for the same three Powers are to be 2,989,000 tons. Thus the Treaty gives no reduction in naval armaments for the next six years, but at the best stabilisation at the present level of naval forces. If this Treaty is to become a prototype of a common agreement with regard to general, and not merely naval, disarmament, then, indeed, not merely disarmament, but the very reduction of armaments is decided in advance in the negative.

If we consider that the total displacement for cruisers and aircraft carriers (newer than twenty years) built by March 1st, 1930, comes to 89,480,000 tons, and that for the same categories the London Naval Treaty allows for a total tonnage of 1,222,000—i.e. an increase of 407,200 tons, or 50 per cent—with the disposal by the three Powers of only nine battleships, and precisely those which are oldest, weakest, and perhaps obsolete, we shall have an actual increase in the destructive powers of those navies.

That gives an idea of the result of a disarmament conference conducted only on the method proposed by the seven States. It is for that reason the Soviet delegation must earnestly insist that something be done for reduction and not only for limitation.

The figures given by me are taken from official American documents which can be put at the disposal of the Commission if desired.

The President. — It is past one o'clock and there are still two delegates to speak. I would ask them to be good enough to refrain.

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.

¹ Note by the Secretariat. — See page 157 of the minutes.
SECOND MEETING OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE.

Held on Monday, November 17th, at 4.30 p.m.

President: M. Loudon (Netherlands).


Amendments by the Soviet Delegation (continuation).

The Hon. Hugh Gibson (United States of America). — I assume we are dealing with the amendment to Article A, submitted by the Soviet Delegation (document C.P.D.239).1

The President. — Yes.

The Hon. Hugh Gibson (United States of America). — In connection with that I would like to draw the attention of the Commission to something which happened in the first part of the sixth session. At the meeting on April 19th, 1929, reported on page 37 of the Minutes of the Sixth Session (document C.195.74.1929.IX), the President began by reading a document prepared by the Bureau, of which paragraph 2 reads as follows:

“The Commission has not seen its way to adhere to the method of reduction based on the proportional principle. At the same time, there is nothing to prevent the Government representatives assembled at the Conference, when they finally come to draw up the Disarmament Convention, from taking account of this principle or of any other similar objective criterion in addition to those indicated in Article 8 of the Covenant.”

This document was adopted by the Commission, as shown on page 41 of the same Minutes. It seems clear that, unless the Commission decides to re-examine the question of principle and to reverse its former finding, the Soviet amendment is out of order, in that it clearly provides a method of reduction based on the proportional principle.

M. Massigli (France). — I asked to speak this morning in order to dispel what seemed to me to be a misunderstanding between the Swedish and British delegation. M. Westman pointed out, perfectly justly, that Articles A, B and C were inter-connected: my own opinion is that we cannot take these articles separately, as they form an indivisible whole.

The question at present under discussion does not, in my opinion, refer to Article A, together with Articles B and C; it is rather whether we shall take into consideration the principle of proportional reduction embodied in the Soviet amendment: when that is disposed of, we shall have to decide on Articles A, B, and C in conjunction as M. Westman has pointed out.

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — M. Litvinoff seems to think my attitude is against reduction. My attitude is that you must begin by finding some means of settling the amount of tonnage each country is going to have and then you can proceed with reduction. Personally, I very much hope that when we come to the actual Conference we shall be able to agree to a considerable reduction.

M. Cobian (Spain). — I want to explain why I cannot support the amendment defended this morning by M. Litvinoff. The Soviet delegation has always demanded the reduction, as well as the limitation, of armaments. In the case of land armaments, I had no objection to this criterion of M. Litvinoff’s, from my own country’s standpoint; but as regards the limitation of naval armaments our situation is quite different, and that is why I shall be quite unable to support this proposal, which provides for proportional reduction, and only contemplates limitation on the basis of an all-round reduction of navies.

Spain occupies quite a special situation in this respect, as we have at present a very small navy. In all our proceedings, however, at the Conference or at the Preparatory Commission, there is one common denominator—namely, the attainment of the object mentioned in Article 8 of the Covenant. According to this article, the reduction and limitation of armaments should be carried out to the lowest point consistent with each country’s safety and national defence.

As regards the problem of naval armaments, from the Spanish point of view, the question is absolutely vital to us. We have, as you know, a very extensive coast line, as well as islands, which compel us to keep a navy sufficient, from an exclusively defensive standpoint, to enable us, in the event of a conflict, to defend our neutrality and contribute to the maintenance of world peace. That is why we cannot give unqualified support to the principle of naval reduction. Now, M. Litvinoff’s proposal does not provide for any exception and we cannot therefore adopt

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1 Note by the Secretariat. — See Annex 4.
it for the reasons I have just given, and for those already expressed by the United States representative.

I have some remarks to make on Article A, but I leave it to the President whether I do so immediately or later.

The President. — Preferably later. Mr. Gibson has pointed out that there is a question of procedure involved. The Soviet delegation's amendment opens the question decided in the first part of our session regarding the principle of proportional reduction. We must therefore decide whether we want to reopen this question, which has already been decided; the Commission is free to do so, but I am bound to point out that the question was decided in the first part of the session. In such circumstances the simplest way is to put the principle of the Soviet amendment to the vote.

M. Westman (Sweden). — As M. Massigli maintains that the three articles A, B and C form an indivisible whole, I agree with the procedure proposed.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — I am glad to hear from Lord Cecil that he is not against reduction, and that he admits that the Disarmament Conference should take some decisions favouring reduction. That being so, it is for this Commission, which is to propose some definite scheme. What Commission, if not this, will have to prepare what the Conference will have to deal with?

With regard to the remarks of the Spanish delegate that he cannot vote for proportional reduction because he is in favour of certain exceptions on behalf of small countries, I should like to remind him that on every occasion when I have advocated proportional reduction, I always made a proviso for exceptions for smaller countries, and that holds good for naval armaments too. I am not against the Spanish or any other delegate introducing an amendment to this effect, and if such an amendment is submitted I shall support it.

Now a few words on the question of procedure. The delegate who spoke against the Soviet amendment to Article A pointed out that this amendment was out of order because the Commission had taken a decision against proportional reduction. That is quite true, but at the beginning of this session it was decided that the Commission could go back on certain decisions which had been taken previously, and the Commission must decide whether the present question is sufficiently important to allow of reversing the previous decision. We have had no discussion so far on second reading in regard to naval disarmament, so the question should be discussed now, and not at the third reading, and if the Sub-Committee is against proportional reduction, even in respect of naval armaments, they can vote on it.

I would only say a few words more. It is precisely on the question of naval armaments that certain Powers have tried to come to an agreement with regard both to methods and figures, and they failed in those negotiations. They failed in all their efforts. I had hoped this would have been a lesson to them and that they would have drawn the conclusion that the only way to obtain reduction is not to prejudice the interests of any country, but by adopting a 'universal' method.

If they have not learned this lesson, then the case is hopeless. Eighteen months have passed since the resolution was adopted and I thought perhaps views might have changed in that time. We have seen many instances of opinions changing, but if the Commission decides against proportional reduction, that does not necessarily mean the rejection of the Soviet amendment, because this amendment contains the principle, not only of proportional reduction, but of reduction as such.

Another characteristic of the amendment is in regard to the list of special vessels, and I think this should be taken separately; I would ask the Sub-Committee to vote on these three points separately.

General de Marinis (Italy). — I think it my duty to explain the Italian delegation's attitude to the amendment submitted by the Soviet delegation. In doing so I shall, perhaps, have to go beyond the limits of Article A. This is inevitable, however, because in discussing Article A we must also necessarily refer to Articles B and C, since they all deal with the same problem. M. Westman made the same remark this morning, quite justifiably, as I think.

I shall first explain, as shortly and clearly as possible, the Italian delegation's attitude on the method of naval limitation. This attitude is based on the reservation appearing on the first page of the draft (document C.P.D.230), and it signifies that we cannot—and I believe none of us can—decide on the fairness or the practicability of any method of limitation from a merely theoretical standpoint.

Such a method must be considered with regard to the basic factor of limitation. This basic factor is represented by the proportions and maximum levels of tonnage fixed for each navy. You may reply: "But even if these proportions and maximum levels are only to be fixed at the Conference, is that a reason why we should abstain from discussing questions of method here?" I do not go so far as that. Just as we co-operated in the Technical Committees in the London Naval Conference, so we intend to co-operate in this Sub-Committee, provided it is understood that our general reservation will none the less be fully maintained.

This declaration is perhaps superfluous, but it explains the Italian delegation's attitude towards M. Litvinoff's amendment.
The central idea of M. Litvinoff’s proposal seems to me to be a reduction of existing tonnage; and there we agree with him, for we, too, advocate not merely limitation, but reduction.

Where we cannot follow the Soviet delegation is when it asks for existing tonnage to be reduced by a percentage that is to be fixed; this, I understand, is a reduction percentage applicable indiscriminately and automatically to all navies. On this point we cannot agree, because the Soviet proposal overlooks what we believe should be the prerequisite condition, the basis, so to speak, of all reduction—namely, agreement on the levels of the various navies.

In this connection let me make a short digression, which must come at this point because it refers to a statement M. Litvinoff made this morning.

Speaking of the large tonnage of the special vessels specified by the London Naval Treaty, M. Litvinoff mentioned a figure which impressed the Sub-Committee as well as the public, the more so as it appeared that the figure referred to Italy only.

M. Litvinoff has kindly explained to me that the figure of 87 per cent which he gave should be understood to mean that the total tonnage of the special vessels of the five Powers which signed the London Naval Treaty amounted to 87 per cent of the Italian navy.

On that point, I would observe that, at the London Naval Conference, the Italian delegation tried to limit the exempted tonnage as far as possible.

I now come to another aspect of the question, one which has already been presented in the discussion in the form of a dilemma: global tonnage, or limitation by categories?

You have read our note at the foot of the draft (document C.P.D.230), worded as follows:

“With reference to Articles A and B the Italian delegation expressed the opinion that they should be replaced by a single article stating:

“‘The limitation of naval armament accepted by each of the High Contracting Parties is indicated in the annexed Table . . .’ which might be the Table II attached to this document.

“Consequently, the Italian delegation is in favour of suppressing Table I.”

This note has been taken to mean that the Italian delegation, which had formerly maintained the principle of global tonnage has now gone over, bag and baggage, to the opposite party which advocates strict limitation of all navies by the system of categories. Such an interpretation is far too ingenious to be exact. It is quite incorrect that we have changed our views, or that we now propose to combat what we yesterday advocated. It is still our conviction that the global tonnage method is more equitable for all countries who do not wish to spend too much money on building up a navy, and that this method is therefore more suitable than that of reduction by categories.

We supported this principle for years without convincing its opponents, until we were begged to leave principles on one side and work for a solution on practical grounds.

In compliance with this request we went to London and there endeavoured, with the other Powers, to find a solution. The solution has not yet been found so far as we are concerned, and that is why we maintain our reservation.

But Articles A and B of the draft (document C.P.D.230) raise quite a different question. They refer to a Table No. I and a Table No. II, the first being a table of global tonnage and the second showing how this global tonnage will be allocated. If I am not mistaken, Table No. II is not optional but obligatory, and I believe I am also right in thinking that the phrase “the way in which each High Contracting Party intends to distribute”, etc., means that such distribution will not be left to the option (ad libitum) of each Power; that, I think, implies that the system proposed in the draft is the system of limitation by categories.

What is the use, then, of Table No. I?

It seems to me that this Table has no significance, serves no purpose and may more likely lead to difficulty and confusion. In the first place, it would contain figures which would not be comparable as between the various navies, since they would be merely the result of totalling the figures in Table No. II, which may not have the same significance in every country. Secondly, the table seems to exclude the possibility of any special agreement, between two or more Powers who might succeed in making a preliminary arrangement based on a different method of limitation.

On the other hand, I do not ignore the argument which has been used this morning and will no doubt be frequently repeated in this Sub-Committee, that, as regards the method of limitation, the situation of a country with a large navy differs from that of a country with a very small navy. I fully realise the force of this argument, and it is precisely on that account that we have admitted, in principle, the possibility of transferring naval vessels from one category to another. Naturally, we shall have to discuss—more particularly, I think, at the future Conference—how this system of transfers is to be applied to the various naval Powers. I can even imagine that the percentage of transfer may be very high, as much as 100 per cent, which would allow a given Power, where it appears justified, complete freedom of transfer between certain categories.
That question, as I said, will have to be discussed in the light of particular circumstances and special needs; but I think that our draft would gain considerably in clearness and frankness if we deleted Table No. 1.

The President. — M. Litvinoff proposes to re-word his amendment as follows:

“The High Contracting Parties agree to limit and to reduce the existing tonnage by . . . per cent by limiting to the figures fixed in Table I . . .”

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — May I venture to ask that we take the amendment as it has been distributed. Afterwards, if M. Litvinoff, or some other member, wishes to bring some further amendment, I shall not raise any objection. If he says this does not cover everything he wanted it to cover, I shall raise no objection. If we have amendments which are read out from the Chair and which none of us have seen—I am not quite sure whether the Chair can fully understand what they mean—it makes it impossible for us to follow what is going on. We must have some regularity in our proceedings.

The President. — I was reading what we have to put before the Sub-Committee.

The Hon. Hugh Gibson (United States of America). — I raised a point of order as to whether we could entertain a proposal which was in violation of a decision already taken by this Commission. That point of order takes precedence of everything else, and I should like to ask that it be decided. Whichever way it is decided, we shall at least know what we want to talk about.

The President. — We agreed to proceed thus, even before the last proposal was submitted, and before M. Litvinoff’s amendment was read.

Mr. Gibson is perfectly right. We agreed to vote on the proportional principle, as embodied in M. Litvinoff’s amendment, and I shall ask the Sub-Committee to vote on this principle.

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — If I might say so very respectfully, that is exactly what I object to. Here is a definite proposition that we should insert in the draft Convention here and now this principle of proportional reduction. I am against that, because I think this is not the right place. I think it is for the Conference to consider it. But I cannot vote against the principle of proportional reduction. On the contrary, I think it is extremely likely that ultimately that would be a very useful principle to adopt in the reduction of armaments, and when the Conference comes we shall very likely, all of us, wish to adopt some such principle. Personally I hope M. Litvinoff, or someone else, will press that upon the Conference. Now I vote against it, because it is not the right place to put it in. We have expressly declared, over and over again, that we have nothing to do with questions of quantity, and that all these kinds of questions are to be left to the Conference. I do not see how you can settle the principle of proportional reduction until you have a datum line from which to make your reduction. All I ask is that this amendment be put in its original form. If there is a slight verbal change, that is a different matter, but it should be put substantially as it is now; then we can vote on it. If it be rejected, if M. Litvinoff thinks there are still some points that have not been covered, let him bring in a fresh amendment and we can vote on that.

The President. — We can, of course, vote on the principle, but we can also vote on the amendment, since it embodies the principle. I even believe that is what the Sub-Committee prefers and that Mr. Gibson will probably not object.

I therefore propose that we vote on Article A of M. Litvinoff’s amendment.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — It has been decided that we should take as the basis of our discussion the proposals made by seven Powers (document C.P.D.230). The Commission agreed that the Soviet proposals and all other proposals should be regarded as amendments to the proposals of the seven Powers. I think I am entitled to ask that the principles embodied in our proposal should be voted on separately. One can be in favour of one principle and not in favour of another, and I ask that all the principles be voted on separately, as they are of a different nature.

In the text of Article A in the proposal of the seven States, the words are “The High Contracting Parties agree to limit . . .” I did not mention in my proposal the word “proportion” at all. I said: “The High Contracting Parties agree to reduce the existing tonnage”, by a certain percentage, leaving it for the Commission to say, in due time, what the proportion was to be. Whatever the reduction is, it would be a percentage of the tonnage that exists at the present time.

The second suggestion is to strike out in the proposal of the seven States the words in the first paragraph “and special vessels mentioned in Annex II”. That is quite a different principle; it has nothing to do with the proposal for reduction, and you cannot vote at the same time on two different principles. I hope Lord Cecil will withdraw his objection to our voting separately on each of these two principles.

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — I do not object at all. It is not for me to direct the proceedings of the Sub-Committee. All I want is to have it perfectly clear what I am voting for, and not to be asked to vote for or against a principle which may be quite right in one case and quite wrong in another. I am quite prepared to vote on any definite amendment that the Soviet delegation puts forward, and then to vote on their next amendment. Let us dispose of the first amendment first and then go on to the next one.
M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — That is what I am suggesting.

M. Massigli (France). — We cannot keep on interminably discussing this question. As I see it, there are really only two points to bear in mind:

First, the Soviet amendment re-introduces into this discussion in one form or another the question of the limitation figures, and that, as we have already said, is anticipating the decisions of the Conference.

Secondly, it is, of course, quite impossible to settle now the question of special vessels which were, so to speak, created in London by the five Powers, the latter having realised that they each had certain types of vessels which did not come under any definite category. They therefore decided to classify them separately.

Clearly, when the question comes up before the Conference, not merely for five navies, but for ten, twelve or fifteen, it will perhaps be formed either that new categories can be created, or, it may be, that certain vessels of some other navy, or of all navies, will also have to be classified separately among “special vessels”.

I therefore believe that it would be wasting time to try and settle the question to-day; and I accordingly ask for the Soviet delegation’s second amendment to be rejected as prejudging a question which, like the first one, can only be dealt with at the Conference.

The President. — There are thus two questions which we have to vote upon, the first, that of figures, and the second, that of the special vessels mentioned in Annex II.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — I am not proposing any figures. I am proposing that we should add the words “and reduce”.

The President. — Figures are not mentioned, but you are raising the question of the proportional principle. Does the Sub-Committee agree to add the two words “and reduce” to M. Litvinoff’s amendment?

M. Colban (Norway). — I do not understand how we can vote on the addition of two words to a text which has not yet been adopted. If I am correct, the Soviet amendment to Article A should be put to the vote.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — It is my amendment to the proposal of the seven Powers.

M. Massigli (France). — I don’t think we can proceed thus. We have two amendments before us, the Soviet text (document C.P.D.239) and the seven delegations’ proposal. I think we should first vote on the amendment to the proposed text, that is, on the Soviet amendment. If this amendment be rejected, we shall have to vote on the text in document C.P.D.230.

M. Sato (Japan). — I entirely agree with M. Massigli’s proposal. So far, we have been discussing the Soviet amendment, and now we are suddenly asked to vote on the original amendment. I think the procedure is wrong. We should stick to the amendment and see what the result of the voting will be. I would like to make it clear that I am referring to the original Soviet amendment. I propose that the article should be voted on as an indivisible whole, because the question is so clear that it is not worth while to divide it into two or three paragraphs.

The President. — May I ask M. Litvinoff if he wishes to keep his Article A as it originally stood?

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — There is no original Soviet proposal, nor a second or third proposal; there is only one Soviet proposal. If M. Massigli and M. Sato will take the document of the seven Powers they will see that our amendment is, as the Chairman has just explained, an amendment to add the words “and reduce” in Article A of document C.P.D.230 and to strike out the words “special vessels”. They are two separate amendments, and I maintain that they should be voted on separately. You can accept one and reject the other, and I think it is my right to ask that they be voted on separately. May I remind the members of the Sub-Committee that only the other day we had a proposal by the British delegation consisting of three clauses, and we agreed to vote on each clause separately? I ask that the same procedure be adopted in regard to the Soviet delegation’s amendments here. For it seems to me that what was right a few days ago for a British proposal must be right to-day for a Soviet proposal.

M. Sato (Japan). — May I have an explanation? What has happened in the document C.P.D.239 of the Soviet delegation to Article A? I have no recollection of M. Litvinoff having withdrawn the amendment embodied in this document, which must be still in existence. We should, therefore, vote on what I call the “original” amendment, because we have had it before us for some time past. I do not understand why M. Litvinoff contends that there was no original amendment.

VOTE ON THE SOVIET AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE A.

The President. — The normal procedure is to vote on Article A of the Soviet delegation’s proposal as originally submitted.

1 Note by the Secretariat. — See Annex 4.
PIT (A vote was taken on the Soviet amendment to Article A as submitted in the original document (C.P.D.).)

The Soviet amendment was rejected.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — I did not vote myself, because that is not what I proposed.

DISCUSSION ON ARTICLE A (document C.P.D.230, Annex 3 of the Minutes).

The President. — We now come to the discussion of Article A as submitted by seven delegations (document C.P.D.230, Annex 2).

General Kasprzycki (Poland). — I should like to give my views on the principle of the limitation of naval armaments as set forth in document C.P.D.230, more particularly as regards the method of its application.

M. Politis has very clearly and very forcibly laid down the principle of special situations, which must be taken into account when applying the various methods of limitation of armaments.

The Sub-Committee made no objection this morning to M. Markovitch’s request for an acceptance of this principle. It is clear that it applies to all categories of armaments, both land and naval. M. Cobian pointed that out this afternoon.

The special situation of Poland is clearly shown in the sphere of naval armaments also. The free access to the sea restored to Poland is a vital factor in my country’s existence. Poland has no heritage of naval armaments and must organise the defence of its maritime interests from the beginning. It is her duty to do so, and she will do it.

I want to stress this fact, as it will explain our attitude at the Disarmament Conference, just as it does our extreme interest in the present discussion.

I come now to Article A of the proposal made by the seven delegations. Generally speaking, I endorse the remarks made by the Swedish representative. Unless I am mistaken, the same idea is expressed in the Spanish delegation’s amendment. Clearly, the principle of global tonnage, or of free transfer among the vessels of the various classes, is vitally important to smaller navies. It has, moreover, been shown to leave the interests of the great naval Powers unaffected. An acceptance of this principle for second-class navies would facilitate the accession of the maritime Powers and, ipso facto, the work of disarmament.

M. Antoniade (Roumania). — In connection with the discussion of Article A of the joint draft contained in document C.P.D.230, the Roumanian delegation wishes to submit the following observations on the method of limitation of naval armaments.

For historical, economic, financial or other reasons there are certain small naval Powers which still do not possess the navy strictly necessary for the defence of their coasts and their maritime interests, and which cannot therefore consider reducing their present naval armaments, but only limiting the global tonnage of their future naval programme.

The method most acceptable to such countries, including Roumania, is that of limitation by global tonnage only.

In Sub-Committee A, the naval experts fully demonstrated the arguments in favour of this method. It should be remembered that the very small tonnage required by us will not need to be inserted in all the columns of Table II. Roumania, for example, will have no entry to make in some of the columns of this Table.

Moreover, as Roumania’s very modest naval programme is still in the stage of realisation—to the extent that the country’s finances permit—we cannot at present determine very closely all the details of the programme, more particularly as scientific progress may make necessary certain modifications, which will have to be taken into account.

Our delegation therefore asks that the global tonnage method of limitation, by published categories, should be applied to countries which will have less than 100,000 tons global tonnage, but with full freedom for the transfer of tonnage from one category to another.

For the above reasons, I support the Swedish proposal and my delegation is very sympathetic to the Spanish proposal. We are prepared to adopt the scheme set forth in document C.P.D.230, provided that, in Table III, this rule regarding the transfer of tonnage from one category to another is admitted in the case of Powers agreeing to accept a tonnage of less than 100,000 tons.

M. Cobian (Spain). — The Spanish delegation associated itself with the Italian and French delegations in advocating the advantages of global limitation. We shall not change our minds to-day. We still hold the same view—for the same reasons that we have frequently explained. On the first reading, the French delegation made a concession by submitting a compromise text, and we supported this compromise. This is a further proof of the accommodating spirit shown by that delegation, which we must all commend. As General de Marinis very well said, his views have not changed either, but, in a spirit of accommodation, he, too, has abandoned the method of global limitation for naval armaments.
The Polish and Roumanian delegates have just explained their countries' views on the problem. I fully support, and will vote in favour of, the wish expressed by these delegations that the amount of global tonnage should be laid down for all countries which will not have more than 100,000 tons global tonnage.

In the case of Spain, however, I would have preferred that the Convention should specify in the first column of the French compromise proposal the tonnage which Spain will need in accordance with the spirit and the letter of Article 8 of the Covenant.

If we are contemplating a Convention of very short duration, it may seem inexpedient to lay down tonnage figures which cannot be reached during the period of the Convention. At the same time, I think it very important that the principle should be recognised, so that, whenever, on the expiry of the Convention, it may be desired to prolong it or draw up a new one, it should not be possible to quote as a precedent the figure already adopted by certain countries merely for the period of the validity of the Convention.

I therefore venture to suggest a slight amendment to the authors of the proposal in document C.P.D.230. Article A contains a second paragraph which reads:

"These figures give the tonnage which shall not be exceeded during the term of the present Convention."

In order to emphasise the principle to which I have just alluded, I would ask the Commission to have this clause of the second paragraph inserted in the first paragraph, which would read as follows:

"The High Contracting Parties agree to limit to the figures laid down in Table I, and during the term of the present Convention, the total (global) tonnage of their vessels of war."

The object of inserting the subordinate phrase "and during the term of the present Convention", is to show that it is solely on account of the comparatively brief term that certain countries can accept the figures laid down, without thereby implying that they forgo any of their rights under Article 8 of the Covenant.

M. Massigli (France). — The interesting remarks we have heard this morning and this afternoon from our Swedish colleague, as well as from our Roumanian and Spanish colleagues, and the opposing observations of General de Marinis, largely justify the proposal which the five Powers represented at London have submitted, subject to the reservation mentioned by the Italian delegate.

The fact must not be overlooked that the object of the Conference is to frame a general Convention, and it was thus essential to find a flexible formula. The most flexible is obviously the global tonnage formula pure and simple—but you know what difficulties it has met. I think, therefore, that the formula adopted at London and applied in Part III of the Treaty (in Articles 17 and 18) affords smaller navies the satisfaction they require.

In reply to M. Westman's questions this morning, I would point to the machinery which the Convention provides. Article A defines global tonnage. It may be thought that in certain cases it is unnecessary to mention global tonnage; but, as we are drafting a general Convention, it seems to me that it should be realised that such cases form the exception and not the rule. The global tonnage principle should, therefore, be inserted in column I.

This global tonnage is distributed in categories. In Article B we read:

"Table II shows, by tonnage per category, the way in which each High Contracting Party intends to distribute, during the period of application of the Convention, the total (global) tonnage which it has limited to the figure indicated, as far as it is concerned, in Table I."

M. Westman enquired this morning when and how this distribution would be carried out—before, after or during the Conference.

Clearly, distribution will be effected during the Conference itself, as a result of the discussions at its sessions, so that, when the Conference closes, it will be possible to sign a document which—subject to the provisions of Article C—will definitely settle the size of world navies during the term of the Convention. It cannot be otherwise. Reference was made a moment ago to small navies of 100,000 tons. If a country with such a navy proposed to have a global tonnage, pure and simple, assigned to it and then announced that such tonnage would be, wholly or to the extent of 80 per cent, applied to the class of submarines, it would certainly meet determined opposition. It is perfectly clear that there must be distribution of tonnage among the categories.

I now come to Article C, which is an integral part of the general mechanism. The drafting of each of these articles will, of course, have to be revised.

Article C provides the transfer machinery regarding which certain doubts appear to exist. M. Westman enquired when Table III regarding transfers would be drawn up. Obviously, this will also be done at the Conference.

The machinery is as follows: the second paragraph of Article C (1) reads as follows:

"The tonnages by category shown for each High Contracting Party in Table II shall be limited in no case [clearly 'by means of transfer' must be understood here] by the object of increase beyond the figures shown for it in Table III."

In other words, Table III will show the maximum which a navy can reach in a given class by means of transfers, within the limits of global tonnage.
What will this maximum be? It will vary very considerably. This is where regional agreements in particular will play a large part. It is quite possible that, in a navy of 30,000 tons, up to 95 per cent may be transferred, whereas in a navy of 100,000 tons, transfers will certainly be much less.

The formula proposed is, therefore, extremely flexible and, if everyone displays the necessary goodwill, should dispose of all the difficulties.

One word more on M. Cobian’s suggestion, emphasising a fact which, I think, we all admit. M. Cobian said “it is quite clear that the figures which will be inserted in the Convention will only bind the parties for the term of the Convention”. Of course. It is certain that, generally speaking, the figures will be fixed in proportion to the general security prevailing in the world and the particular situation of each country, and that any modification in the situation would lead to the figures themselves being modified at the next conference.

I wonder whether the transposition of the second paragraph, as suggested by M. Cobian, and its insertion in the second line of the first paragraph would make any real difference in the text. In my opinion, it would not; it has, the disadvantage of making the phrase longer and more ambiguous.

Let me add that the principle that the figures inserted are not to form a precedent, for a later Convention appears in Article 23 of the Treaty of London, where it is expressly stated: “it being understood that none of the provisions of the present Treaty shall prejudice the attitude of any of the High Contracting Parties at the Conference agreed to”.

M. Cobian (Spain). — Probably I was not quite clear. Texts are texts, but, in interpreting them, precedents must be followed. In Article A, I find the following paragraph:

“These figures give the tonnage which shall not be exceeded during the term of the present Convention.”

I conclude that that is not a self-evident truth, as M. Massigli has just said, otherwise these last words would not have been inserted.

Why was this second paragraph inserted? Because, at the first reading, the French delegation, abandoning the global limitation method, accepted, as a compromise, limitation by categories, a table being employed to show for each of the contracting parties the total (global) tonnage which it thought requisite for the defence of its safety and its national interests.

If this table existed in the draft under discussion I should have nothing to say. To the French proposal was added:

“The figures in column II represent the total tonnage that each of the High Contracting Parties considers it necessary to complete before the expiry of the Convention.”

This gives us the text proposed, which reads:

“The High Contracting Parties agree to limit the total (global) tonnage of their vessels of war. These figures give the tonnage which shall not be exceeded during the term of the present Convention.”

Article B reads:

“Table II shows, by tonnage per category, the way in which each High Contracting Party intends to distribute, during the period of application of the Convention, the total (global) tonnage which it has limited to the figure indicated, as far as it is concerned, in Table I.”

That is to say, the only figures are those which will be reached during the term of the Convention and these figures may be distributed in accordance with Table II.

The figures which specify the needs of each of the contracting parties have been deleted, and that is exactly what I drew attention to. In such circumstances, my proposal was that, accepting the idea at the basis of Table I, the Sub-Committee should change the wording of Article A so as to make it clear that this Table does not cover all the requirements of each country, but merely the tonnage it thinks it can achieve while the Convention is in force.

I am very sorry that I did not express myself as clearly as I would have liked, but I trust that M. Massigli’s keen comprehension will apply the precision which my words lack.

The President. — I apologise for having called on M. Cobian before M. Colban. I only did so to make the debates clearer. I now ask M. Colban to allow me to call upon M. Massigli who is anxious to supplement the explanation he has just given.

M. Massigli (France). — I apologise for not having immediately understood M. Cobian’s idea. I grasp it now and think he will be satisfied if, as he suggests, we omit paragraph 2 and say:

“For the period of the present Convention the High Contracting Parties…”

M. Cobian (Spain). — I accept M. Massigli’s wording, as it embodies the principle which I stated was so important to my country.

M. Colban (Norway). — The Norwegian delegation considers that small navies should be entirely free to dispose of all their tonnage. I agree therefore with what has been said in the
Swedish delegation’s memorandum that the amount of tonnage transferred should vary in inverse ratio with the total tonnage of the various navies. I therefore welcome M. Massigli’s declaration. There is no one better fitted to explain what occurred in London, and what is set forth in document C.P.D.230.

Admiral G. von Schoultz (Finland). — I am not going to explain the position of my country. I think everyone in this room knows that we have a very long coast, and are exposed to all kinds of dangers on all sides. I support the Swedish proposition put forward this morning. I do not insist on the number, which may be one hundred thousand tons or other number, it would be, as I understand it, for the Conference to put the number in. I hope nobody would expect Finland—during those six years, or perhaps double that period, which the Convention may cover—to build a large navy, not even one hundred thousand tons, perhaps not half that amount. But we ought to have the liberty to dispose of the little tonnage which we are going to build as it suits our condition. I do not think anybody in this Commission would be prepared to say that the conditions are the same as those for the Great Powers. I am objecting to categories as they are put down in the project of the five or seven Powers. I think it would be ridiculous to call a gunboat of three or four thousand tons a ship of the line.

I repeat I am supporting wholeheartedly the proposition made by M. Westman, and I hope that the conditions of the small navies and small Powers, which may sometimes be in a more dangerous position than the large Powers, will be taken into consideration by this Commission.

The President. — The meeting is adjourned.

The Commission rose at 6.30 p.m.

THIRD MEETING OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE.

Held on Tuesday, November 18th, 1930, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: M. LOUDON (Netherlands).


The Chairman. — As President, I found yesterday afternoon’s discussion particularly instructive. It showed me that it is absolutely essential to lay down very strict rules in order to avoid confusion. With that object, I would ask that: (1) Except when a general discussion has been declared open, the discussion should be limited to one definite question. I say this very clearly, because there is a tendency to disregard this rule, although it was established at the outset. (2) No proposal or amendment whatsoever should be discussed before it has been submitted to me in writing. I will acquaint the Commission with any such proposal or amendment and, if the Sub-Committee decides to discuss it, the discussion will take place and will bear exclusively on the proposal or amendment in question.

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — I only want to express for myself the warmest thanks for the announcement just made, and ask whether you will be good enough to complete it by stating what the question is we are now discussing. I assume it is that Article A be adopted, and if that motion be put then it will be for anybody to move amendments to the article. Or you may prefer that Articles A, B, and C should be adopted together—whichever you think right—but I wish to move one or other of these motions.

The Chairman. — We have had a general discussion on Articles A, B and C. We are now entering upon the discussion of the various articles of the draft, starting with Article A.

M. Westman (Sweden). — I formally propose that the discussion should bear on the three articles A, B and C together.

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — I understood that we would now have the discussion confined to Article A and then take Articles B and C together, because they cannot be discussed separately.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — I should like to be quite clear also as to the two amendments put forward by my delegation. I want to know when we are going to discuss them and to vote on them.
Dr. Markovitch (Yugoslavia). — Yesterday’s discussion showed very clearly that in this question, which concerns both great Powers and those States that are usually said to have “limited interests”, we must seek a solution covering both classes of Powers. Yugoslavia is one of those States whose interests in naval matters are limited. Nevertheless, she considers that, for her national security, she needs a fleet, solely for defensive purposes.

We are now considering Article A, which lays down the global tonnage that no contracting party may exceed during the term of the Convention. The London discussions showed that this rule means that each country must indicate the global figure which corresponds to the minimum compatible with its national security. The figures in question are not purely technical. They correspond to certain conditions of a political character. Now, as the Roumanian, Polish and Finnish delegates said yesterday, some countries are in a special position. At the General Conference, those countries will be invited to submit figures corresponding to that minimum but, at the same time, they will be confronted by the limit which may not be exceeded during the term of the Convention.

The Spanish delegate noted an essential difference between, on the one hand, those countries which have a complete fleet, the countries with a maritime history, the countries which, through their favourable economic and financial situation, have been in a position to realise either the minimum or something approaching that minimum, and, on the other hand, those recently created countries which have new maritime needs and which, notwithstanding their keen desire, have not yet provided for their defence to the minimum extent necessary.

The Spanish delegate asked that this special—but real—situation should be taken into account when all the Powers represented at the Disarmament Conference are called upon to announce the minimum that must be granted to them during the term of the Convention.

Although approving M. Cobian’s point of view in principle, M. Massigli thought that it might be met by changing the order of the words in Article A. Finding that this solution was not entirely satisfactory, M. Massigli mentioned Article 23 of the London Naval Treaty, of which the last paragraph, referring to the forthcoming Naval Conference of 1935, says:

“... It being understood that none of the provisions of the present Treaty shall prejudice the attitude of any of the High Contracting Parties at the conference agreed to.”

M. Massigli apparently suggested that a similar provision should be inserted in our draft Convention, but I do not think such a provision covers the case M. Cobian had in mind. I have ventured to draft a text. I do not put it forward as a formal amendment but as a suggestion, so as to give other delegations an opportunity to state their views on this point. To meet the apprehensions and desires of the Spanish delegate and of the delegates of many small countries, I would propose to add to Article A a third paragraph as follows:

“States which, for reasons due to their recent creation or as a result of their special situation, are obliged to spread over a number of years exceeding the duration of the Convention the expenditure on the construction of the minimum of their respective tonnages compatible with their national security, shall be allowed to indicate, within the limits of the total tonnage agreed upon, what portion they intend to construct within the period of duration of the Convention”.

The Chairman. — Will you kindly submit that amendment in writing, so that the Commission may consider and discuss it?

Dr. Markovitch (Yugoslavia). — I submitted this amendment solely as an accurate expression of the view taken by our delegations and of our real need to ask that mention should be made of the global tonnage necessary to our countries. I have ventured to draft a text. I do not put it forward as a formal amendment but as a suggestion, so as to give other delegations an opportunity to state their views on this point. To meet the apprehensions and desires of the Spanish delegate and of the delegates of many small countries, I would propose to add to Article A a third paragraph as follows:

“States which, for reasons due to their recent creation or as a result of their special situation, are obliged to spread over a number of years exceeding the duration of the Convention the expenditure on the construction of the minimum of their respective tonnages compatible with their national security, shall be allowed to indicate, within the limits of the total tonnage agreed upon, what portion they intend to construct within the period of duration of the Convention”.

The Chairman. — If I understand you aright, this is not really a proposed amendment but merely an idea expressed during your speech. Naturally, it will be noted both in the Minutes and in the report.

Dr. Markovitch (Yugoslavia). — I will have this amendment circulated presently, but I shall not press it if I see that the Commission is not prepared to adopt it.
M. Cóbián (Spain). — I thank M. Markovitch for the way he has just supported the observation I submitted to the Sub-Committee at yesterday afternoon’s meeting. Naturally, I am quite prepared to approve of any formula framed in that sense. Nevertheless, I think that the simplest means—a means to which no one could object—would be to reinstate column No. 1 of the table provided for in the French compromise proposal at the first reading—that is to say, a table of which the first column would give, for each of the contracting parties, the global tonnage that party considers essential for the purposes of its security and the defence of national interests. Then, the second column of this table would give the global tonnage that each of those countries thinks it necessary to reach before the expiry of the Convention. All these suggestions can, of course, be noted in the report and the Conference will in due course be able to consider them. In any case, I think it is most important to emphasise them all, for they are based on very definite principles.

Personally, I accepted limitation by categories in connection with global limitation as a compromise and I am very anxious to emphasise the need for this reservation.

The Hon. Hugh Gibson (United States of America). — I should like to express my satisfaction at the adoption of definite rules of debate. It seems to the American delegation that it is only through the strict enforcement of such rules that we can hope for the orderly and expeditious disposal of our work. When I asked to speak yesterday, the general discussion was on Articles A, B and C, and what I intended to say was addressed to that general subject. The discussion has now reverted to Article A only and I will reserve what I have to say until we come to the latter articles.

M. Rutgers (Netherlands). — The Netherlands delegation accepts Article A, which relates to the global limitation we have always supported in this Sub-Committee. I will not add to this statement an expression of our sympathy with the Swedish amendment, for I shall speak of it in connection with Articles B and C.

The Chairman. — I am very grateful to the last two speakers for the excellent example they have given the Sub-Committee.

FIRST AMENDMENT PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION.

The Chairman. — As the discussion on Article A has now been completed, we will pass to the amendments proposed to that article. First, we shall consider the Soviet amendment, which is as follows:

"After the words ‘agree to limit’, introduce the words ‘and to reduce’.”

M. Colban (Norway). — Before the vote is taken, I should like to express my opinion on this amendment. My country ardently desires the reduction of armaments, but it does not follow that this desire must be expressed in similar terms as regards the fleet of each country. The reduction of armaments is the object of our work; it must be the obvious result of the First Disarmament Convention. But I am afraid the somewhat rigid form given to this addition makes it very difficult to vote for it. By voting against this amendment, or by abstaining, I do not in any way imply that I am not a supporter—and a keen supporter—of the reduction of armaments.

AMENDMENT TO THE SOVIET AMENDMENT, PROPOSED BY THE FRENCH DELEGATION.

M. Massigli (France). — The statements just made and the explanations given yesterday by M. Litvinoff himself make it easily possible, I think, to frame a text on which we can all agree. Instead of adding the words “and to reduce”, it would be sufficient to say “and if possible to reduce.”

Thus, according to the circumstances, there would be a reduction, stabilisation or increase of fleets, and that might satisfy everybody.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — I think the question is a simple one, which requires a straight and unequivocal answer. The question was raised by me during the first half of the session when we discussed this point. I then explained fully and exhaustively the importance of this amendment, which of course, in my opinion, should refer not only to naval armaments but to all kinds of armaments. I mentioned then that even the Covenant of the League of Nations speaks in Article 8 of reduction of armaments, not of limitation. If the Sub-Committee has substituted for the word "reduction" the word "limitation", it has practically infringed the rules of the League of Nations. It is not for me to defend the Covenant of the League of Nations, I only mention this in order that delegates should not be able to take refuge in this Covenant of the League of Nations, as has so often been done here. In any case, we think this question is of the

Note by the Secretariat. — See document C.P.D.211 (Annex 4 of the Minutes), page 8).
utmost importance and that the world should know what the Preparatory Commission is preparing for. Is it preparing for limitation, augmentation or a decrease of armaments?

We cannot have too clear an answer to this question. There are no rules which do not admit of exceptions. I can imagine, if we accept a quite rigid form on this point with regard to reduction, that some countries may come before the Conference and demand some exemptions in their favour, but it is not necessary to weaken the meaning of this word “reduction” by introducing such words as “if possible”. This would mean that the Preparatory Commission itself is not sure that any reduction is possible. I therefore object to this new amendment.

According to the rules laid down by the Chairman this morning, a new amendment should be put in writing, but I am no stickler for formalities. After my original proposal has been voted on, and if it be rejected, then the President can put to the vote the wording “and reduce” with the addition of the words “if possible”, a quite different proposal.

I attach so much importance to this question that I would ask the President to have a roll-call on this point, without any addition and in the original form that I proposed it this morning. If it be rejected, M. Massigli or some other delegation can propose a new amendment.

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — I quite feel the force of what M. Massigli and M. Colban have said. I think, on the whole, it is better to put in the words “and to reduce” quite simply. It may well be when the Conference meets that it will find that ideal is incapable of being carried out, but I think on the whole that we shall more accurately convey the general feeling of this Sub-Committee if we insert the words “and to reduce” than if we insert them subject to any modification.

The Hon. Hugh Gibson (United States of America). — I propose to vote in favour of the amendment to insert the words “and to reduce”, and I should like to explain my vote. It seems to me that these words are really superfluous, but I see no objection to adding them. I am not troubled by the analysis as to the possible inferences to be drawn from the insertion of these words, because I think, to almost anybody they merely mean that is the goal towards which we are striving. I question very much the value of adding these words. I might illustrate the value to be attached to such a proposal by a story of a very eminent American who was noted for his extreme parsimony in the use of words. One Sunday morning he returned from church and his wife enquired from him the subject of the sermon. He replied: “The subject was Sin”. His wife said, “What did the parson say about it?”, to which our eminent statesman replied, “He was against it”. I shall vote for the amendment.

M. Cobiañ (Spain). — I am unable to vote for M. Litvinoff’s amendment since it does not provide for the exception of which, in principle, he himself approved. I would vote for a reduction affecting fleets of over $x$ tons, but the amendment is so rigid in form that I shall abstain, pending a more elastic wording.

VOTE ON THE AMENDMENT PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

The following eleven delegations voted for:

British Empire, Canada, China, Finland, Irish Free State, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United States of America.

The following delegation voted against:

Poland.

The following twelve delegations abstained:

Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Greece, Norway, Persia, Roumania, Spain, Turkey, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

The amendment was adopted by eleven votes to one with twelve abstentions.

On voting, the under-named delegations made the following declarations:

Count Bernstorff (Germany). — In conformity with my general declaration, I abstain.

M. Massigli (France). — I abstain on the understanding that a vote will be taken afterwards on the addition of the words “and if possible to reduce”.

M. Politis (Greece). — The Greek delegation abstains for the same reasons as the Spanish delegation.

General de Marinis (Italy). — I am voting for this amendment, but I have to inform the Commission that I shall vote for M. Massigli’s proposal also.
M. Antoniade (Roumania). — I abstain for the reasons given yesterday and repeated to-day by the Spanish delegation.

Dr. Tevfik Rüstü Bey (Turkey). — I abstain for the reasons given by the Spanish delegation.

Dr. Markovitch (Yugoslavia). — I, too, abstain for the reasons given by the Spanish delegation.

The Chairman. — I invite you to vote on the French delegation's amendment.

M. Massigli (France). — As I have already stated, I consider the Soviet amendment to be merely an idle manifestation, for, as we know after the statements made here, it does not at all correspond to the real situation in this Sub-Committee. Personally, I do not like idle manifestations. In passing, however, I should like to thank M. Litvinoff for his defence of the Covenant of the League of Nations. I hope that, on other occasions, he will adopt the same principle.

I should like to refer briefly to my amendment. I ask that the words " and as far as possible to reduce " should be added, in a parenthesis, after the words " agree to limit ". In that way, we should be taking account of the situation as it really is, and of the statements made here. By adopting the Soviet text as it stands we should be transmitting to the Governments a misleading document giving no idea of the real situation.

M. Rutgers (Netherlands). — I am not at all clear as to the effect of the French amendment. Two possibilities are contemplated. But when will a choice have to be made between them? At the Conference? The Convention we are drawing up will not come into force until after the Conference. How, then, can the Conference introduce the words " if possible " into the text? Accordingly, I think it would be better if the French delegation withdrew its amendment. Some delegations have already stated that they supported M. Massigli's view. The decision as to whether it is possible to adopt it will be taken at the Conference, but the amendment now proposed would not in any way change the state of affairs.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — Only a few words in regard to this new amendment. However optimistic we may be with regard to the future Conference, I do not think that anybody can believe that the Conference will achieve what is impossible. If it be impossible it will, of course, do nothing. This amendment really seems to me to be quite superfluous. In other clauses of the draft Convention, when we spoke of limitation we did not say " if possible ", although limitation also may prove to be impossible at the Disarmament Conference. Is M. Massigli so sure that limitation will be possible and easy to realise at the Conference? We know of difficulties in negotiations in London, Washington and Geneva dealing with limitation only, and it would therefore seem logical to add the words " if possible " wherever the word " limitation " is used, and even to call the Commission itself " Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament-if-possible Conference."

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — I want to be quite clear, as usual, what exactly we are voting on. I did not understand M. Massigli to move " si possible ", but " autant que possible ". To reduce " if possible " suggests that you will not reduce at all, but to reduce " as far as possible " suggests that you certainly will reduce and go as far in that direction as it is possible to go. It seems to me to be a very fortunate form of words, and a form which I think protects everybody's susceptibilities, and I hope we can all agree on that form, because, on this matter of importance—which is a question of principle—it is better to have a unanimous decision of the Sub-Committee rather than a majority one. Personally, I can vote for " autant que possible " but not for " si possible ".

Withdrawal of the French Delegation's Amendment.

M. Massigli (France). — The remark just made by M. Rutgers is indeed accurate, but I must say that its very accuracy tells against the Soviet amendment for which he first voted. Indeed, although it is true that we are framing a draft Convention for the Conference, it is none the less true that the real situation will become evident at the Conference itself. In the case of certain countries there will perhaps be a reduction. For others there will be stabilisation and for others, perhaps, an increase. But, in any case, there will be limitation for all. The Soviet proposal, therefore, added absolutely nothing and was, I repeat, an idle manifestation.

Having said that, I should like to add that I proposed this amendment with a desire to give the draft we are preparing for the Conference a form which more adequately reflects the real situation. I recognise the force of M. Rutgers' remark and I realise that, at the present stage of the discussion, my amendment is inappropriate and perhaps even quite useless. Accordingly, I withdraw it. I would, however, ask that what has taken place at this meeting should be very clearly set out in the report, with the names of the delegations which accepted this addition of the words " and to reduce ", which is a mere manifestation and nothing more.
The Chairman. — M. Massigli's wish will be gratified. The report will give full details of the discussion that has taken place.

RE-SUBMISSION OF THE WITHDRAWN FRENCH AMENDMENT BY THE SPANISH DELEGATION.

M. Cobían (Spain). — This is a question of fairness and sincerity. Of the twelve abstentions from the vote on the Soviet proposal, at least eleven were based on the assumption that the exceptions which by M. Litvinoff himself was prepared to admit would be taken into account. That was the meaning of the amendment which M. Massigli proposed and which, unfortunately, he has just withdrawn.

I do not think this is the time to discuss the literal or grammatical meaning of words. This amendment represented a compromise which we all accepted a few moments ago. These words "as far as possible", or "if possible", cannot be said to prejudice the general principle of the reduction of naval armaments. To say they do so, would be incorrect and illogical. These words merely represent the recognition of a principle in the minds of at least eleven of the twelve delegations who abstained and, if the number of abstentions had been added to the number of votes in the negative, M. Litvinoff's proposal would have been rejected.

I urge that, through some formula or other, the Sub-Committee's real opinion should be expressed. M. Massigli's formula did not entirely satisfy me; I should have preferred a statement to the effect that the reduction would apply to fleets exceeding a certain tonnage.

In any case, in order to remain faithful to the principle we supported, I now take up M. Massigli's proposal myself, and I ask the Sub-Committee to adopt it.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — We have now before us two new amendments.

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — Only one.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — We have Lord Cecil's amendment and M. Cobían's amendment. I maintain that Lord Cecil's amendment is different from M. Massigli's amendment, that is if my linguistic knowledge of French is right. I would translate "autant que possible" by "as much as possible", and if Lord Cecil puts this construction on the words I will vote for his amendment.

And now there is M. Cobían's amendment relating to certain countries. That is a new amendment, and if it is his intention that it should favour smaller countries I am prepared to agree to it.

M. Politis (Greece). — I apologise for taking part in this debate, but I should like to point out that we are at present engaged in a discussion which is really barren. With a large number of abstentions, you have accepted, by a small majority, the rule that there may be a reduction and that, in principle, there will be a reduction, side by side with the limitations. You also accepted the principle that, in a great many cases—that is to say, for secondary naval Powers—an exception will be allowed. In other words, there will be no reduction for them.

You are asked to express this idea, and M. Cobían re-submits the amendment withdrawn by M. Massigli, adding, before the verb "to reduce", the phrase: "as far as possible", or: "to the greatest extent possible". Be careful! Read the text and you will see that, if you add these expressions, the text becomes absolutely incomprehensible. What are you saying? "The High Contracting Parties agree to limit and, as far as possible, to reduce . . ."—What?—". . . to the figures laid down in Table I".

This text is now quite meaningless. Obviously, you will only draw up Table I after taking into account both the present conditions for securing limitation and the possibilities of reduction on which agreement might be reached in the Conference. In drawing up this table, it is understood that, as regards secondary naval Powers, their situation will be taken into account and no reduction of their present armaments will be imposed on them. Under these circumstances, I think that, if you wish the text before you to retain any meaning, you must either not add "as far as possible" or else you must find some other wording to replace the words "to the figures laid down in Table I".

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — The criticism of M. Politis is right grammatically, but there is no difficulty about that. Instead of saying "et réduire" say "en réduisant autant que possible", and I am sure M. Litvinoff will not contest the grammar of this amendment.

I venture to hope we may now decide this question, because we have debated it from every point of view.

M. Cobían (Spain). — I think that, if M. Politis had made his remark half an hour ago, the voting on M. Litvinoff's amendment might have been different. When you are fixing the figures in a table, you cannot speak of limiting or reducing the figures given; they cannot be changed. If they imply reduction for some, they must equally imply reduction for others, and, on the contrary, if they do not imply it for some, they must not imply it for others. If we admit the principle of reduction we must take account of the exceptions. Accordingly, notwithstanding all the objections to this wording, I shall support Lord Cecil's suggestion, and I beg that my amendment should be put to the vote. Thus, the principle will be established and the
Drafting Committee will subsequently be able to put the text in order. If this suggestion is not accepted, I shall, on behalf of my delegation, make a reservation concerning Article A.

The Chairman. — I think we fully understand the proposal. I would ask you to trust the Bureau to find a suitable formula. At the third reading we shall be able to reach complete agreement.

This suggestion was adopted.

VOTE ON THE AMENDMENT PROPOSED BY THE SPANISH DELEGATION.

The Chairman. — We now pass to the vote on M. Massigli's amendment, as re-submitted by M. Cobian. The proposal is that the words "as far as possible" should be inserted in Article A.

This amendment was adopted by fourteen votes to two, with some abstentions.

SECOND AMENDMENT PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION.

The Chairman. — We now pass to the second amendment proposed by the Soviet delegation as follows:

"After the words 'as specified in Annex I' omit the words 'and special vessels mentioned in Annex II'."

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — I have already spoken on this subject at yesterday's meeting and I am not going to develop my argument again; I merely want to make it clearer to the Sub-Committee by repeating what special vessels I have in view. These vessels are to be inserted in a table at present blank, but the London Naval Treaty gives us some idea as to what vessels are proposed. I shall not enumerate them, but will merely say that the vessels to be exempted in accordance with a list attached to the London Naval Treaty amount to a total of nearly 250,000 tons. The United States of America alone have presented for exemption a total tonnage of 91,496 tons, which approaches the 100,000 tons which, in Mr. Cobian's view, is the demarcation line for smaller countries, and this total amount represents 87 per cent of the entire fleet of Italy, although Italy herself shares in this list with a figure of 11,960 tons. In this list, you will further find the French vessel Commandant Teste, built in 1929, and having a displacement of 10,000 tons, and also the British vessel Adventure, built in 1924 with a displacement of 6,740 tons. I think there can be no limitation or reduction if we allow exemptions of these dimensions. I understand the force of M. Massigli's and Lord Cecil's arguments, put forward yesterday, to the effect that some countries have to build or maintain these vessels, but I do not see why they should not be reduced under any category they choose. At present they belong to no class, but Great Britain, the United States of America and France may decide themselves how they will reduce their tonnage — i.e., under which category. That would present no difficulty and we should then be clear that we were reducing all round.

VOTE ON THE SECOND AMENDMENT PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION.

This Amendment was rejected by ten votes to one with some abstentions.

REVISED TEXT FOR ARTICLE A PROPOSED BY M. POLITIS.

The Chairman. — M. Politis desires to propose a form of words which is clearer than that of the present Article A and on which we shall vote.

M. Politis (Greece). — In order to take account of the various votes just taken and of the observations M. Massigli made yesterday with a view to meeting the wishes of the Spanish delegation, I have prepared a text which, I think, expresses our idea and which everyone would be able to understand.

I shall venture to read this text. If you think it should be circulated before the vote is taken, we might postpone our final decision to a later meeting.

This Article A would read as follows:

"The High Contracting Parties agree to limit and, so far as possible, to reduce their naval armaments. In consequence they undertake not to exceed throughout the duration of the Convention as regards the global tonnage of their vessels of war, other than the exempt vessels specified in Annex I and the special vessels mentioned in Annex II, the figures laid down in Table I."

The Chairman. — In accordance with the rule laid down, this text must be circulated before it is discussed.

The Hon. Hugh Gibson (United States of America). — In order to assist us in coming to an early decision, would it not be preferable to dictate the text slowly so that we can discuss it now?
The Chairman. — I see no objection, if the Sub-Committee agrees. The suggestion was adopted.

Dr. Markovitch (Yugoslavia). — I have no objection to a vote being taken on the new wording, which is very clear. I do not think there is any need to have it circulated, but I would like to ask for a preliminary explanation. Does the adoption of this text imply that the suggestion I submitted at the beginning of this morning’s meeting will be neglected? I proposed that a third paragraph should be added to Article A. If the adoption of the new wording entirely disposes of my suggestion, I should like to speak before the vote is taken.

If, on the other hand, you allow me to speak after the vote, I shall support the wording proposed, for my suggestion is in no way opposed to this wording.

VOTE ON M. POLITIS’ PROPOSED TEXT.

The Chairman. — It will be quite in order for you to develop your proposal after the vote. Before passing to the vote, I desire, on behalf of the Sub-Committee, to thank M. Politis. He has, as usual, given us a clear wording which enables us to bring out what was hitherto more or less obscure.

I therefore put M. Politis’ text to the vote. The proposed text was adopted by twenty votes. There were some abstentions.

Dr. Markovitch (Yugoslavia). — Would it not be better to postpone my observations until the amendment I proposed has been circulated, for it is not opposed to the Article we have already adopted?

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — I hope that can be done.

The suggestion was adopted.

37. Discussion on Articles B and C (Document C.P.D.230) (Annex 2 of the Minutes) and on the Amendments proposed by the Swedish, Soviet and Spanish Delegations.

"ARTICLE B.

"Table II shows, by tonnage per category, the way in which each High Contracting Party intends to distribute, during the period of application of the Convention, the total (global) tonnage which it has limited to the figure indicated, as far as it is concerned, in Table I.

"The maximum displacement and gun calibre limits of the several categories shall be as laid down in this treaty."

"Table II.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories (defined in Annex III)</th>
<th>High Contracting Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Capital ships</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Aircraft-carriers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(cd) Light surface vessels</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) Guns of more than 6.1”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) Guns of 6.1” and less</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Destroyers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) Submarines</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"ARTICLE C.

"Within the limits of the total (global) tonnage shown for each High Contracting Party in Table I, and in the absence of more strict conditions resulting from special conventions to which it is or may become a party, each of the High Contracting Parties may effect a transfer of the tonnage indicated for it in the different categories in Table II, subject to the two following conditions:

"(1) The tonnage by category shown for each High Contracting Party in Table II shall in no case be the object of increase beyond the figures shown for it in Table III;"

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1 With reference to Articles A and B, the Italian delegation expressed the opinion that they should be replaced by a single article stating:

"The limitation of naval armaments accepted by each of the High Contracting Parties is indicated in the annexed Table which might be the Table II attached to this document. Consequently the Italian delegation is in favour of suppressing Table I."
(2) Before the laying down of the ship or ships for the construction of which the transferred tonnage has been assigned, due notice must be given to all of the other High Contracting Parties of the amount of tonnage transferred, the length of such notice being that laid down for each of the High Contracting Parties in Table III.

“Table III. — Rules for Transfer.

AMENDMENTS PROPOSED BY THE SWEDISH DELEGATION.

“ARTICLE B.

“Table II.

“Replace Table II of document C.P.D.230 by the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class A</th>
<th>Class B</th>
<th>Class C</th>
<th>Class D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vessels exceeding 10,000 tons displacement</td>
<td>Vessels not exceeding 10,000 tons displacement and the calibre of whose guns exceeds 203 mm. (8”)</td>
<td>Aircraft-carriers</td>
<td>Surface vessels whose displacement does not exceed 10,000 tons and the calibre of whose guns exceeds 155 mm. (6.1”) but does not exceed 203 mm. (5”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A 1</td>
<td>A 2</td>
<td></td>
<td>C 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“Reasons. — In view of the fact that the names by which warships (‘capital ships’, ‘cruisers’, etc.) are known in the various fleets are not identical but vary appreciably (the same type of vessel being regarded in one fleet as a torpedo-boat, in another as a cruiser, etc.), the introduction of these names in the text of a general Disarmament Convention does not appear to be advisable. It would be preferable for the purposes of the future Convention to use the terms employed in Table II of the present document. If this suggestion is accepted by the Sub-Committee, formal modifications would naturally have to be made in certain other parts of the text proposed in document C.P.D.230.

The proposed system would facilitate the subdivision into two parts of the class termed in document C.P.D.230 ‘capital ships’. The disadvantage of the adoption of this latter definition would be that the same provisions would apply to very different vessels—for instance to the British capital ship Nelson with a displacement of 35,000 tons, mounting nine 40-cm. guns, and to the Swedish coast-defence vessel Aran with a displacement of 3,360 tons, mounting two 21-cm. guns.”

“ARTICLE C.

“Within the limits . . . conditions:

“(1) The tonnages by category shown for each high contracting Party whose total tonnage exceeds 100,000 tons in Table II shall in no case be the object of increase beyond the figures shown for it in Table III.

“(2) Before . . . in Table III.

“Table III of Document C.P.D.230.

Observations in regard to Table III.

“The Preparatory Commission should draw up definite proposals concerning the rules for transfer to be inserted in Table III. To ignore this problem would be to renounce any effective preparation in regard to one of the most important parts of the future Convention. The Preparatory Commission should therefore examine the various possible systems (transfer either by percentage figures or by maximum tonnage figures to be transferred in each class, etc.) and decide between them. The Swedish delegation is of opinion that the percentage system is the most appropriate and that, if this system were applied, the amount of the transfer should vary in inverse ratio to the amount of the total tonnage of the various navies.”
AMENDMENTS SUBMITTED BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION.

"ARTICLE B.

"The High Contracting Parties whose navy exceeds 200,000 tons agree to limit their total tonnage in conformity with the classes and figures fixed in Table II.

"ARTICLE C.

"To be deleted.

AMENDMENTS PROPOSED BY THE SPANISH DELEGATION.

"ARTICLE C.

"Substitute for the words: 'shall in no case be the object of increase beyond the figures', the words: 'shall in no case exceed the figures'.

"ARTICLE NA. — RULES FOR TRANSFER.

"Table III.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Limit attainable in case of transfer by each of the High Contracting Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital ships</td>
<td>. . . .</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period of notification</td>
<td>. . . .</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"Note. — The figures to be entered in Table III will be calculated on the following principles:

"(1) The Powers whose total tonnage figure does not exceed x tons will have full freedom of transfer.

"(2) As regards the other Powers, the figures will be determined irrespective of proportionality on the basis of the total tonnage and special needs of each.

"(3) The greatest possible freedom shall be allowed for the transfer of tonnage from the capital ship to the cruiser category, and from the cruiser and submarine categories to the destroyer category."

M. Rutgers (Netherlands). — I would point out that there is a Swedish amendment referring to Table II of Article B. Would it not be better to discuss the Swedish amendment separately?

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — I have no objection to that suggestion. So far as I am concerned, I include the necessary tables, and any amendment is quite in order. I think some delegations want to make some observations on Articles B and C taken together. I think Mr. Gibson is one. That was why I moved that they should be taken together.

The Hon. Hugh Gibson (United States of America). — I am rising on the assumption that the discussion on Articles B and C together is in order. There seems to be a very logical connection between them.

After the admirably lucid statement made by the honourable delegate for France yesterday, I shall not venture to go over any of the ground covered by him, but I should like to offer some observations on the remarks made by the honourable delegate for Sweden yesterday morning.

As I understand it, his purpose in his amendment to Article C is to devise a method which will give greater liberty and elasticity to the smaller navies in the distribution of their tonnage. With this fundamental purpose, the American delegation has always expressed its concurrence. We have repeatedly stated our readiness to recognise the need of the smaller Powers for less rigid limitation than we have applied to ourselves. Therefore I am confident that the Swedish delegate will not take it amiss if I say that any attempt by us to fix, here and now, an arbitrary, total tonnage-limit at which a given system shall begin or end is not really practicable. We can only determine what level should be fixed when, in the course of the final Conference, we have examined the figures put forward by the various countries and set aside the figures for ships which can be agreed upon as belonging to an exempt class, as well as special vessels not subject to limitation.
It is necessary, not only that we have a clear idea of exactly what ships a country puts forward for measurement, but that this be expressed in some common standard of tonnage measurement. Until we have achieved this, we have no clear, workable idea of the extent of the naval forces to which our limitation is to be applied, and until we have this statement in clear and comparable terms, we obviously cannot have a comprehensive idea of which navies would fall under the limitations described by M. Westman, and which would come into another category. Until then we cannot decide what level is best.

For the purposes of this Sub-Committee would it not be sufficient if we agree upon an elastic method for the limitation of smaller navies, and that we refrain from seeking to establish any arbitrary, quantitative limits for the application of that plan? While I confess I do not find it easy to accept the form of the Swedish amendment to Article C, I have no hesitation in saying I am in complete sympathy with the essential purpose of that amendment. In fact it is my impression that, in Table III proposed with our draft, we had met exactly this difficulty, that we had provided for the possibility, not only of one elastic method, but of as many different adjustments as might be necessary by agreement in regard to different groups of Powers and different conditions. As a matter of fact, it seems to me that Article C of our draft is more elastic than the scheme put forward by the honourable delegate for Sweden, for there is nothing in it inconsistent with any measure of transfer within the global tonnage.

So far as my Government is concerned I can see only one qualification that would be of interest to us, and that is on general grounds. The London Naval Conference adopted certain rules governing the use of submarines. We feel that this is in the general interest, and that, in future agreements, there will be a tendency to press for the reduction of submarines, or at least, as a first step, for their stabilisation at the present level, and that in any Conference this tendency should be taken into account in fixing general tonnage levels. It further seems to me that, if we are prepared to leave the door open for agreement on such a broad basis as I have outlined, it would not be in the interests of the smaller navies to close that door part way by the adoption of intermediate arrangements.

M. Rutgers (Netherlands). — Just now, I said that I was postponing any expression of my sympathy for the Swedish amendment until Articles B and C were discussed. The Netherlands delegation fully agrees with the Swedish amendment to Table III, by which liberty of transfer would be left to small naval Powers.

It is true that this liberty may be given to them through Table III. That is the object of the Spanish amendment. That is the system to which M. Cobian referred just now when he said that Table III is very elastic, since figures may be given under it which leave complete liberty of transfer.

Nevertheless, I wonder whether the Swedish amendment has not an advantage over this system. The object of Table III is to limit freedom of transfer. If we wish to have complete freedom of transfer we must not enter in Table III figures limiting this freedom, otherwise the table will have no value for the States concerned. It would be better to say it expressly as the Swedish amendment does, and apply the limitation of the right of transfer found in Article C only to the larger fleets.

I should like to submit another observation as to the extent of the liberty requested for small fleets. I think we should not exaggerate this extent. We must not imagine that, if we put different figures for different categories in Table II, and leave small fleets full freedom of transfer, they will have ships of one category only the following year. Small naval Powers usually retain their ships in service longer than great Powers. Freedom of transfer has practical value when a vessel is withdrawn from active service and replaced. But the ships of very small naval Powers can be replaced only as and when the fleet is renewed. The possibility of transfer in the case of such Powers is very slight. Each year it can affect only a small fraction of the figures given for the different categories.

The danger referred to by M. Massigli—namely, that we might one day find a small Power with 80 per cent of its tonnage in the form of submarines—does not arise, as that would mean withdrawing from service a large proportion of the existing vessels. There is one great obstacle to that. It is the de facto budgetary limitation. In other words, it is impossible on financial grounds.

That is true of small Powers which already possess a navy. It might be argued that it does not apply to small Powers who are expecting to construct a navy. But in that case, too, the same argument applies. A Power which has hardly any ships and which anticipates having a navy of, say, 100,000 tons one day, will not construct it in a year or two. The same reason which has prevented it from having such a fleet hitherto will prevent it from building one during the term of the Convention.

We must realise the true meaning of freedom of transfer; in other words, we must understand what transfers are really possible during the few years that the Convention will remain in force.

If that is true, we may wonder whether the method suggested in the Swedish amendment (according to which no figures at all are entered under Table III) is not preferable to the method by which figures would be calculated for each small Power to show the freedom of transfer which, in reality, will not be of great importance to the small countries, since they have only very limited possibilities in that direction. This impossibility of making transfers to any considerable extent,
in the case of small Powers, is certainly as effective as the limitation of freedom of transfer contained in Article C. Accordingly, I think the Swedish amendment is to be recommended. If we are to consider the possibilities of transfer during the term of the Convention, and if we are to be certain on that point, we must have before us a statement of the different fleets. A final decision can be reached only by the Conference. Any decision that we take concerning freedom of transfer in the case of the small Powers will come up again before the Conference, which will make the final decision. For that very reason, I think we might meet Mr. Gibson's wishes without thereby being prevented, for the moment, from accepting the Swedish amendment.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — I wish to make it clear that we are now discussing three amendments to the proposal of the seven States. All through the Swedish and Spanish amendments runs the principle of a distinction being made between the bigger naval Powers and the smaller ones. One difference between the Soviet proposal and that of the Swedish and Spanish delegations is this: while the Soviet proposal contemplates that the big naval Powers can afford to limit and reduce their fleets by categories, the Swedish and Spanish proposals admit of some allowance for transfers also in the case of the big Powers. If I may say so, they are more liberal with regard to the big Powers than is the Soviet delegation.

Another difference is with regard to the line of demarcation between the big naval Powers and the smaller ones. We place this line at 200,000. The Swedish amendment places it at 100,000 tons, while the Spanish proposal leaves the figure at \( x \), the exact figure to be decided by the future Disarmament Conference.

The Soviet delegation has been asked by some delegates here why they have chosen this particular figure of 200,000 tons, implying that I had in view the special interests of my country in putting forward a figure which would allow the Soviet Union to come under the category of bigger countries. I must confess that I have been unable to answer that question because, strange to say, the Soviet Government has never been able to decide under which category its navy is to come. In spite of our enjoyment of over ten years of a state of peace, a part of the Soviet fleet is still kept in captivity by one of the big naval Powers and by what right? Only by the right of force, so that the answer to the question under which category the Soviet fleet would come is dependent on the return of that part of their fleet.

The Chairman. — I must ask M. Litvinoff to refrain from observations of the kind he has just made.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — I shall not allude any more to it because I have said what I had to say on that point.

If part of our fleet is returned to us, then we shall not be among the privileged countries; we shall not be allowed greater freedom of transfers—but in any case, it is not considerations such as those which have inspired the Soviet delegation in putting forward this or any other figure. If the Sub-Committee decides to take a lower figure we shall not offer any objection; but, as the Sub-Committee is not going to deal with figures at all, we can leave it to the Conference, as proposed by the Spanish delegation, which has put, instead of any figure, an \( x \). The Soviet delegation will support any proposal which will place the weaker naval Powers in a more privileged position with regard to the transfer of ships from one category to another.

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — I do not desire to say very much on this question, but I do think that the attempt to fix a definite figure of 100,000 tons is one of very great difficulty. I have just been looking at the tables and I find that 100,000 tons would probably exclude Spain; it would certainly exclude the Argentine, and it would exclude Russia and Germany. In view of the great resources of those last two countries, that is not perhaps so objectionable, but with regard to the other two it seems more difficult, and, wherever you draw the line, you will find a similar anomaly.

Where I find great difficulty with the Swedish amendment is that it lays down a hard and fast rule. I agree with the general proposition that the small Powers ought to have greater facilities of transfer than the large Powers. I am disposed to agree with that proposition, but to fix a general figure seems to me very difficult. That is my first proposition.

My second proposition is this: I do feel that the submarine question, as stated by Mr. Gibson, does raise a very great difficulty. There is no doubt that if any of the so-called small Powers were suddenly to choose to concentrate on building nothing but submarines, that would make a very great difference in the naval balance of the fleets of the world, and I think that, whatever is done in regard to transfers, some restriction in regard to submarines will be absolutely essential. Beyond that, I am quite in agreement with M. Massigli and Mr. Gibson that, granted Table III is properly and reasonably applied, it gives all the liberty that ought to be given. It gives, indeed, complete liberty, and I am rather disposed to think that it would be better to leave it until we have got the Naval figures actually before us, so that we can judge exactly what ought to be done in the case of each Power.

I doubt very much whether a hard and fast rule applying to all Powers is judicious. The speech of M. Litvinoff shows the difficulty we are in. He, quite frankly, says that he wants to fix the figure at 200,000 tons because that will include Soviet Russia.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — No; I said exactly the opposite.