The President has told us that the discussion covers not only Article 1A (Limitation of Land Armaments), but also the principle of the limitation of budgetary expenditure as a whole, and, finally, the problem of publicity.

I need not tell you that any genuine and sincere system of publicity will be accepted by the Norwegian Government, both as regards budgets and existing material.

As regards Article 1D (Limitation of Total Budgetary Expenditure), in principle, I am entirely in favour of the French proposal inserted in this article. We will deal with the details later.

The discussion yesterday and to-day has turned chiefly on Article 1A (Limitation of Land Armaments). There are two currents of opinion, one in favour of direct limitation and the other of indirect limitation by the limitation of budgets. My delegation considers that this latter method would probably give the best results, but we should not object to a combination of the two systems if this should prove acceptable to many delegations.

Nevertheless, we believe that budgetary limitation will be the best way of controlling the stocks of war material in years to come. The full results of this method will not be visible on the first day after the Convention comes into force. It is only as you examine successive budgets that you will see, after a few years, what is happening, and you will thus gain a sense of security because you will know exactly what is going on.

It may be argued that the figures inserted in the first Convention will probably be very high. That is possible. But I think that the deplorable financial situation of the majority of countries will exert sufficient pressure at the Conference to prevent the insertion of excessively high figures. If countries are protected from the risk of a further catastrophe, their position will improve, and figures which at first appeared somewhat high will subsequently represent a real restriction.

In favouring budgetary limitation, I am not excluding direct limitation, if it is found possible to graft this method on to budgetary limitation.

I would add that, as regards the observations made by the representative of the United States of America as to the inability of his country to accept budgetary limitation, I do not see why, if the great majority of the Commission are in favour of budgetary limitation with full publicity, the United States should not adopt a system of direct limitation with full publicity. I do not think it is possible in the League of Nations to establish absolutely identical and uniform rules for all Governments. The special circumstances of each country must be taken into account.

We are now at a turning-point of the discussion. Eighteen months ago you agreed that it was essential to limit war material, but you reached the conclusion that this could not be done. It is certainly possible to limit this material if you agree. After the speeches to which I have listened yesterday and to-day, it seems to me that the general opinion of the Commission is in favour of budgetary limitation.

M. Bourquin (Belgium). — My task has been very much simplified by the excellent speech which we heard yesterday from Lord Cecil. I agree with everything he said—not only with his conclusions, but also with the arguments on which they were based. The Belgian delegation’s attitude to all these matters is very simple. We desire, as far as possible, to leave defensive forces intact and to restrict offensive forces. I am aware that the distinction between the two is sometimes very subtle and is not always easy to draw; but that is our attitude, and that is why we have given very strong support to the principle of the limitation of the period of service. For the same reason we are firmly convinced of the necessity of limiting land armaments.

I think I am right in saying that, as regards material, the Commission is no longer going to confine itself to the system of publicity alone. We are strongly in favour of publicity; we are anxious that it should be as complete as possible, and will support any measures with that end. But, although publicity is a good thing, it is inadequate by itself and must be supplemented by limitation.

Two ways of limitation have been suggested: direct limitation and budgetary limitation. We are not, and have never been, opposed in principle to direct limitation. Our objection to this system is not based on selfish reasons, because direct limitation would not be more disadvantageous to Belgium than to any other country; it would have no greater drawbacks for us than for others. Consequently, our attitude is not dictated by personal or particularist reasons. We regard this matter, I will not say from an objective, but from an entirely disinterested standpoint.

At the 1927 session, M. de Brouckère said that, if it could be shown that direct limitation was a good method, we were open to conviction. I should like to endorse those words, although I would add that we are still waiting to be convinced. I still consider, possibly more strongly than ever, that, of the two methods proposed, budgetary limitation is the better one.
I quite agree that it is not perfect. We have not yet come upon the perfect method. All systems have their advantages and disadvantages and we must see which is the most advantageous.

I do not wish to repeat all the arguments which have been advanced in favour of budgetary limitation and against direct limitation. I should, however, like to reply to an argument submitted by M. Rutgers. I have the impression that our colleague meant—and I think he told us so—that it is not a question of the method but of the object of limitation; you must know what you are going to limit. In the case of budgetary limitation, you will only limit future material—new material—because it is new material which involves the expenditure which you desire to limit.

May I say that I do not think that is quite a correct statement, because existing material must be kept in repair, and upkeep costs money? Consequently, budgetary limitation does not merely cover new material but also the upkeep of existing material. It is true that everything is not covered and that there are gaps and omissions. But I do not think that direct limitation covers all material either; it can only cover a part.

This question gives rise to many difficulties. What are you going to limit? Only material in service or, as proposed by the German delegation, material in stock as well? If material in stock is to be covered, it seems to me that this would be contrary to a decision which was taken at the second reading in regard to air material, when it was decided that we could not limit material in stock. Moreover, if this is to be limited, how are you going to deal with spare parts? If a gun is dismantled into two or three pieces, it is no longer a gun—these are merely spare parts. How are you going to cover spare parts by direct limitation? I think that is impossible. If material in stock is to be included, why should you not include material which can be requisitioned at the second reading in regard to air material, when it was decided that we could not limit material in stock? It seems to me that this would be contrary to a decision which was taken in service or, as proposed by the German delegation, material in stock as well?

Lastly, in this same connection, I should like to draw your attention to a point which I consider of great importance.

On examining the table submitted by the German delegation, I find that it contains seven categories of material to which limitation would extend and that one of those categories refers to tanks. Supposing that, instead of drawing up this Convention in 1930, we had drawn it up in 1913. At that time tanks would not have been included in the Convention, because they were not invented until later. We are now going to draw up a draft Convention which will determine the categories of material to be directly limited. We know what those categories are, but how are we to know that during the period our Convention is in force someone will not invent new implements which may be very powerful and highly destructive and may thus be of great importance from the point of view of war material, but which will escape direct limitation because we can only tabulate the implements with which we are familiar?

Consequently, we must not conclude that direct limitation will cover all material and that budgetary limitation would be much less effective. With budgetary limitation, the new inventions to which I have referred can be covered, whereas with direct limitation this is impossible.

Although I do not wish to repeat all the arguments in favour of budgetary limitation, I should like to insist on the importance of the question of supervision. In comparing the two systems of direct limitation and budgetary limitation, there is one very important point to be considered—namely, the facility of supervision.

It has been said that supervision is of secondary importance because we must trust in each other’s good faith. I quite agree. Our Anglo-Saxon friends lay special stress on this point, and I think they are right in saying that, without good faith, no international convention and no international policy are possible. But we must remember that public opinion in the various countries is extremely emotional and passionate, and a Press campaign at a given moment is sufficient to alarm a nation and to incite public opinion to accuse another country of departing from its obligations.

I need not tell you that these emotional outbursts on the part of public opinion may be very dangerous to friendly international relations. How are you going to allay these fears and to prove that the accusation is unfounded if there are no means of supervision? Supervision is necessary to prevent these dangerous outbreaks and reveal the true state of affairs.

Since supervision is essential for this reason, the system of direct limitation would thus have to be supplemented by a supervision which might have serious consequences. Very close supervision would be necessary and it would have to be carried out on the spot. At the present time there are a large number of States which would never agree to this. It may be possible at some future time, but in drawing up the Convention we must take into account the existing state of affairs.

The system of budgetary limitation, on the other hand, has the immense advantage of simplicity as regards supervision. Take, for example, the question of a tax. There are taxes which at first sight appear to be very sound and just, but which have to be abandoned because their application would involve inquisitorial methods of enquiry irksome to the taxpayer. On
the other hand, there are taxes which at first sight appear to be less satisfactory and less just, but which have the immense practical advantage of being easy to collect without any annoyance to the taxpayer.

Our position is very similar. We have two methods, one of which can easily be supervised while the other cannot. In my view, this is an additional argument in favour of budgetary limitation.

In conclusion, I should like to refer to something which happened at yesterday's meeting. We have come to expect from Mr. Gibson statements which clear the atmosphere, and whenever he rises to speak I always wonder what good news he is going to give us. Yesterday he gave us another piece of good news. As regards budgetary limitation, one of the chief obstacles hitherto, apart from certain general arguments, has been the opposition of the United States. Yesterday Mr. Gibson told us that, while the convictions of his delegation were in no wise modified, they were unwilling to let this constitute an obstacle to general agreement, and he made a proposal, which I should like to have time to consider more carefully, but which appears to offer a possible solution and a way out of the difficulty. I need hardly say that this gives me great satisfaction.

Dr. Markovitch (Yugoslavia). - After the very clear and logical statement which the Belgian delegate has just given us, it is hardly necessary for me to say anything, because I fully agree with all the arguments which he has advanced and which produced an impression even on delegations which defended the opposite view.

It is now my duty to define the attitude of the Yugoslav delegation. I need only say that this has not changed. We are still in favour of the limitation of war material, and consider that the French proposal is the best and most acceptable for the purpose.

I have carefully followed the discussion in regard to direct limitation yesterday and this morning, and have noticed that speakers who supported this method preferred to quote general arguments in favour of the limitation of material. We do not wish to dispute those arguments, with which we also agree, although we prefer the other method—indirect limitation by means of budgets. We have not heard one new argument in favour of direct limitation. The honourable delegate for Italy referred to certain increases in war material during the last eighteen months; but such an increase, if it has really taken place, would not have been, and would not be, possible with a system of budgetary limitation of military credits.

General de Marinis' apprehensions will be completely eliminated if we succeed in limiting military credits by limiting budgetary expenditure.

In conclusion, I would emphasise the fact that budgetary limitation represents a genuine limitation of material and is not merely a symptom, as M. Rutgers said, because it restricts the possibilities of procuring war material.

I should also like to say that I feel certain misgivings with regard to the suggestion to combine the two methods. If I may say so, this seems to me a somewhat strange proceeding. I am not in favour of such complicated methods, and think that a system of disarmament, based on the limitation of effectives, the limitation of the period of military service and the limitation of budgetary expenditure, would allow of a genuine reduction of armaments if it were put into practice by the forthcoming Disarmament Conference.

M. Massigli (France). - After this lengthy discussion, it is unnecessary for me to say that we are debating an essential question.

The French delegation, which, in 1927, asked for budgetary limitation and reluctantly agreed last year to another solution, still maintains its former point of view. I would add, however, that, while this is an essential question, it is not the only essential question, and I cannot agree with the view which has been expressed here that, if we cannot obtain a positive result in this matter, our work will have been fruitless. If so, why did we have a long discussion a few days ago on the question of effectives? I do not think any military authority would maintain that material is everything in war-time.

I should like to be allowed to make a short digression here. Reference has been made on several occasions—I believe by Lord Cecil—to the opinion on these questions of a military authority whose views have frequently been quoted. I think it is desirable, for the purposes of our discussion, to state that the opinion of this military authority has not always been summarised very correctly.

When the expert in question speaks of small armies having ample equipment, he is referring to small, well-equipped professional armies which are intended to strike the first blow in an offensive war. But afterwards—and this is an essential part of his system—the main forces, consisting of young men who are to be given intensive military training and for whom equipment will be obtained thanks to a carefully prepared industrial mobilisation, are to be brought into action.

I would add that the military authority in question states that, in the present position of the world and of our technical knowledge, the accumulation of large stocks of material is an anti-economic measure, while even its military value is doubtful. This is the end of my digression and I will now return to the point at issue.
I hope it will not be thought that I am lacking in respect or consideration for previous speakers if I say that no new arguments have been put forward during this discussion. That was only to be expected. Nevertheless, new facts have been brought to our notice, and one aspect of this technical question, which we, as a semi-technical organ, are bound to discuss in order that we may submit a report and technical proposals to our Governments, is that, as a result of political considerations outside the scope of our work, the significance of certain arguments has changed. This is an interesting point. We shall take note of it and we shall even welcome the change, in so far as we have thus obtained further converts to the idea which has encountered so much opposition—the idea of supervision.

I will confine myself to the technical aspect of the question and will endeavour to be very brief. In regard to direct limitation, I think that everything has been said, and M. Bourquin, following other speakers, has given us a masterly summary of the question. It is clear that, without effective supervision, the method of direct limitation would not afford the necessary guarantees, or at least—and I should like to stress this, because it is important—the method of direct limitation, without effective supervision, is of no value except in the case of countries where questions of national defence are fully discussed, where there is a large measure of parliamentary control, where— if I am using the plural I shall not be offending anyone—in discretion, if I may say so, is the rule, and where, finally, it is not regarded as high treason to reveal the breach of an international convention by one’s own country. Moreover, the experiment has been tried and it has been found that direct limitation does not permit of any accurate estimate being formed of a country’s military position.

Another argument in favour of the system of direct limitation has been put forward by the German delegate—namely, that symmetry should be established between the clauses of the Peace Treaty and the provisions of the future Convention. We shall have to go into this question before the close of the Commission’s work, but for the moment I merely desire to say that I cannot accept this argument.

There remains the question of indirect limitation. My friend Mr. Gibson was, I think, rather too severe yesterday in his criticism of this method when he said that it was easier to conceal the application of a dollar than the existence of a rifle. This may be true in the case of a dollar, but I doubt whether the argument holds good when it is a question of thousands of dollars. In any case, if you do not know how the thousands of dollars have been employed, you know that they have been spent, and that is a very important point.

I agree that the method of budgetary limitation is not perfect and that it needs to be improved. M. Sato, in particular, has already drawn the attention of our Commission to various points. I should also like to deal with certain aspects of the question.

Lord Cecil said yesterday, and other speakers repeated, that the method of indirect limitation is of no value as a basis of comparison. Its sole object is to ensure that, during the term of the Convention, the military preparations of a country are maintained at the authorised level. This is an important and even essential result. However, if this method is to be of value, it must be employed in a manner satisfactory to all the States which sign the Convention. I am obliged to say that, in this respect, the preparatory studies are inadequate.

The question of the limitation of expenditure was dealt with by a Committee of Budgetary Experts, but those experts considered the matter chiefly from the point of view of publicity and not from the point of view of limitation. Although they touched on this latter question, they did not go into it very fully. This must, however, be done if two essential results are to be obtained. On the one hand, the method must be as watertight as possible, and all expenditure on material—and this also applies to budgetary limitation in general—must be included in the limitation. Consequently, it must also comprise expenditure incurred outside the budget. In countries where there is strict control of budgetary expenditure, the danger from that source is not very great, because any expenditure outside the budget is automatically inserted in the budget for the following year, so that the exact situation is eventually known. But this may not be the case in other countries, and precautions and precise indications are therefore necessary. Then it is essential to provide, as far as possible, for all forms of indirect subsidies—for instance, if countries agree to limit their expenditure on material they must not be allowed to organise “spontaneous” subscriptions in their territory for the purpose of providing the army with some special material. That is an important point which needs to be studied.

Some degree of elasticity is also indispensable. M. Sato has already drawn our attention to the fluctuations in the purchasing power of currencies. That is another point which should be examined. A further point which has not yet been mentioned and which is, I think, of some importance is this: the French proposal provided for the possibility of carrying over credits from one year to the next. On the other hand, the British proposal does not mention this possibility, and I think I know the reason. Lord Cecil will correct me if I am wrong. The British delegation fears, for instance, that a country which is on the point of making a discovery capable of bringing about a complete transformation of military technique might save a certain proportion of its authorised credits for one, two, or even three years, and then, when the discovery had been perfected, it would suddenly construct new material, which in many cases would upset the equilibrium of the forces.

This argument is not without weight, but there is an contrary argument which must be taken into consideration. It is quite possible that, as a result of economic calamities or a temporary financial crisis, a country might not be in a position in a given year to expend the whole of the credits authorised for military expenditure; it is only right that this country should be allowed
to employ these credits during the following year. We shall have to find some solution midway between these two extreme cases, and the experts should be asked for their opinion on this point.

M. Westman has proposed that the two systems of limitation should be combined. I very much doubt the possibility of this combination, in the first place, because a given material might be limited and this material, a year or two later, might no longer be essential. Moreover, the result of this combined method might be felt chiefly in countries in which natural means of control—control by public opinion—are most effective. In such a case we should be combining the disadvantages of both systems.

This leads me to conclude that the indirect method is the only one possible at the present time, and that this is the only principle which is acceptable. I quite agree that it needs to be improved and that the methods of application require further study. I should like the Commission to decide that this examination will be carried out not by it or for it, but by budgetary experts, who will be asked to submit their report to the Governments in order to provide the latter with further data. Until the Governments have pronounced on the matter—that is to say, until the Conference assembles—they have the right to change their minds.

My proposal possibly has another advantage, in that it may make it easier for certain delegations to withdraw from their present non possumus attitude with regard to the indirect method. Our friend Mr. Gibson, whose conciliatory spirit is worthy of the highest praise, has suggested a new way out of the difficulty. He proposes that it should be possible for certain countries to assume different obligations from those undertaken by the majority of the States which sign the Convention. I do not wish to exclude this solution a priori, but I rather fear that it would give rise to serious difficulties; and, moreover, several delegates, including, I think, M. Sato, would possibly find it difficult to accept this proposal. But if, as I suggest, we content ourselves to-day with adopting a principle, in regard to which abstention is possible, and if we decide that, before the Conference is held, a report shall be drawn up by experts for the purpose of submitting further data to Governments, there would still be some chance of weakening the resistance. I know our colleague's gift of persuasion. Could he not endeavour to convince those who are still incredulous? That, in any case, is my earnest hope.

The President. — This very valuable discussion cannot be closed to-day. There are still four names on the list of speakers. I therefore propose to adjourn the meeting.

The Commission rose at 1.10 p.m.

SEVENTH MEETING

Held on Thursday, November 13th, 1930, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: M. Loudon (Netherlands).


The President. — This morning we will continue the very important discussion on the limitation of the material of land armaments.

If I might briefly sum up yesterday's discussion, I would say that five methods of solving the problem were clearly suggested:

First, publicity alone, then direct limitation alone; a choice between direct limitation and indirect budgetary limitation, a combination of the two foregoing methods of limitation, and, finally, budgetary limitation alone.

Concerning the last-named method, M. Massigli proposed that the principle of budgetary limitation should be adopted and that the consideration of details should be referred to a Committee of Experts. According to M. Massigli, this investigation would take place during the interval between the meeting of this Commission and that of the general Conference. I understand that this Committee of Experts would send a report to the Governments through the Secretary-General.

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — With one or two other members of the delegations, notably the French and that of the United States of America, we have been considering how we would in a resolution sum up what you have been good enough to say, and this is the resolution I propose to move at the end of the general debate:

"The Commission

I. Approves the principle that there should be the fullest possible interchange of information respecting armaments between the parties to the proposed Convention;"
"2. Records the unanimous desire of the members of the Commission to find some method which will provide for the limitation of war material in a more precise manner than can be achieved by publicity alone;

"3. Recognises that the majority of the Commission are of opinion that, as to land war material, the most practical method of securing this more precise limitation is by budgetary limitation, that other members of the Commission are of opinion that the most practical method is by direct limitation, by specific enumeration, and that a certain number would desire to see some combination of the two methods."

That is the resolution, and we should have to see how we could transmit this into the body of the Convention.

This text has been sent in to the Secretariat for translation and distribution so that you may all have it before you. Paragraph 3 states that certain delegates were of opinion, in regard to land armament material, that direct limitation was the best, others preferred budgetary limitation and yet others a combination of the two methods.

M. Massigli (France). — With reference to the proposal I outlined yesterday, I should like to read a draft resolution which would supplement that which Lord Cecil has just proposed. This resolution, too, will be placed before the Commission in due course. It is as follows:

"1. With a view to limiting Land War Material by limiting expenditure on its purchase, manufacture, and upkeep, the Preparatory Commission requests its President to instruct the Committee of Budgetary Experts to enquire into the means by which such limitation could be carried out, paying special attention to:

(a) The necessity of limiting all the expenditure in question.

(b) The variety of ways in which budgets are presented and discussed in different countries.

(c) The adjustment of the proposed method of limitation to possible fluctuations in the purchasing power of different countries.

(d) The conditions in which credits for one financial year might be carried over to the following year or years.

2. In order that the Governments may be able, before the Conference meets, to come to a decision on this point, the Expert's report should be transmitted to them in good time by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations.

3. The Committee of Experts should be asked to make a similar enquiry in connection with the limitation of the aggregate annual expenditure of every country on its land, naval and air Forces, and to make a report which will also be transmitted to Governments."

General de Marinis (Italy). — I assume that M. Massigli's resolution will be circulated.

Count Bernstorff (Germany). — I intended to speak later, and I desire now merely to raise a preliminary question. The resolution proposed assumes that there is a majority in one sense and a minority in another. I think we should first ascertain whether that is really the case and, accordingly, I should like a vote to be taken by roll-call so that we may know what Governments are on one side and what Governments are on the other. In this way, we shall discover what the Commission thinks about direct limitation, which goes much further than the other systems. For that reason, the vote on direct limitation should come first—before the vote on any resolutions.

The President. — We are now continuing the general discussion. Naturally, a vote will be taken after this discussion.

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — May I suggest that it will be very convenient to the members of the Commission if Count Bernstorff will kindly do as I have tried to do, put down definitely in writing what he desires to see adopted?

I do object to these general consultations of the Committee, when nobody knows exactly what they are voting about, and I suggest, therefore, that Count Bernstorff should put down in writing what he wishes to obtain the views of the Commission upon. I have no objection to that being done now or at any other time.

Count Bernstorff (Germany). — I agree.

The President. — We will therefore continue the general discussion.

Munir Bey (Turkey). — On the important question of the limitation of war material the Turkish delegation continues to hold the views that it has stated from the outset in the Preparatory Commission.

The discussion which has gone on for three days has brought out all the points of the problem. There is no need to refer again to the arguments advanced in favour of each of the systems proposed. I shall therefore confine myself to stating that, realising the need for including the limitation of war material in any plan for the reduction of armaments, the Turkish delegation could support
any one of the three systems so far suggested—the direct system, the indirect system or the combined system.

I must, however, add at once that this general approval is subject to the condition that large exceptions should be made in favour of non-industrial countries. This adjustment is necessary because, if it be not made, the idea of the reduction and limitation of armaments would meet with insurmountable obstacles. Similarly, in the case of indirect limitation, specially favourable treatment must be reserved for countries whose budgets fall below a figure to be settled by the Conference. Should circumstances arise in consequence of which, according to the provisions of the Convention, the engagements undertaken would be suspended, that would be the only way to avoid placing such countries in an unfavourable position in comparison with industrial countries or countries with large budgetary resources.

I would make an urgent appeal to all my colleagues and ask them to be good enough to consider the serious consequences that would follow from any system of limitation for which the necessary correctives were not, at the same time, set out in our draft Convention.

In conclusion, I desire to put forward a suggestion concerning the statement made by the representative of the United States of America two days ago. I gladly associate myself with previous speakers who welcomed the American proposal. This proposal, although made only on behalf of the United States of America, makes it possible for this Commission to contemplate another solution of the problem, by which the draft Convention would contain a provision to the effect that the Contracting Parties would be entitled, as suited them best, to adopt either of the two equivalent systems of limitation. This procedure might perhaps facilitate agreement on the question of war material.

M. Cobian (Spain).—Gentlemen, I desire to reply to M. Fierlinger's appeal that we should all give our opinion on the important problem of the limitation of war material.

When he spoke, there was no written proposal before us on which we might clearly express our views. To-day, however, several proposals have already been outlined, and we have to decide, and probably to vote, on these proposals.

As to my delegation's opinion on the problem that the Commission has discussed for the last three days, I must remind you that, at the meeting on May 3rd, 1929, I had the honour to acquaint the Commission with my personal standpoint, and with the special position of my country concerning this question. I shall not repeat to-day what I said then, but I note with great satisfaction that, in their speeches yesterday, M. Litvinoff, M. Rutgers and Dr. Riddell showed that I was fully justified in the remarks I made in 1929 from the standpoint of my own country concerning limitation by budgetary means.

I do not know whether, by the method suggested by M. Massigli, it would be possible to arrive at a formula which, whilst adopting the principle of limitation by budgetary means, would avoid, in the case of my own country, the disadvantages to which I have just referred. In any case, we might find full satisfaction in the American delegate's happy and ingenious proposal.

I emphasise the fact that this concerns only material in service, for Spain could not admit limitation of material in stock. We think, indeed, that such a limitation of material in stock would constitute a premium for countries with highly developed military industries, of which Spain is not one. Spain could not agree to any limitation of material in stock. On the other hand, as regards material in service, she is quite prepared to adopt the principle of direct limitation for herself, without wishing to impose it on other countries.

In this problem of the reduction of armaments we consider that the principle of supervision is an essential premise. We think that nothing can be done without supervision. I quite understand certain apprehensions regarding supervision which have long been expressed. I agree that, when we are contemplating binding ourselves by a convention or a contract, we must have full confidence in all the parties. But, though that is true in every field—even the international field—I think that when national defence and national security are at stake, we should reflect more than once before showing undue confidence which will bind us for the future, and which may amount to a crime against our own country.

I must also say that, though we are all agreed on the need for publicity regarding armaments and material, and even regarding military credits, we are also agreed that the solution we adopted at our last session does not of itself imply any limitation, and that this limitation can be obtained only by methods other than the two methods contemplated. The objections that have been raised against these two methods show that neither is perfect, that both are attended with serious disadvantages. That is why the Commission is divided.

I also recognise the force of the arguments M. Sato advanced at yesterday's meeting when opposing the Hon. Hugh Gibson's proposal, with which I have just expressed my entire agreement.

A simple formula is always preferable but, when the problems to be solved are themselves complicated, it is somewhat difficult to find a simple formula which gives entire satisfaction. Accordingly, I venture to appeal to M. Sato's good will and spirit of conciliation and ask him not to persist in his opposition, particularly as his country will suffer no disadvantage. The United States, Spain, Turkey or any other State may accept direct limitation, but they do not impose it on others. If, therefore, as M. Sato said yesterday, Japan is prepared to accept limitation
by budgetary means, we are quite ready to agree to her doing so. It can be no disadvantage for Japan to allow other countries to adopt still stricter methods of limitation.

M. Politis (Greece). — Gentlemen, my remarks will be very brief. I desire to state that, in the interest of my own country, the Greek delegation prefers limitation by budgetary means. In this connection, I fully agree with the arguments so clearly advanced yesterday by M. Bourquin. Nevertheless, if the alternative system proposed by Mr. Gibson were shown to be practicable, the Greek delegation would not oppose that system. I desire, however, to note one point that was raised in the 1929 discussions and to which no reference has been made on this occasion. It is that when limitation by budgetary means is discussed account must be taken, as in the case of effective, of the special circumstances of each country.

In determining the budgetary limit for any State, regard must certainly be paid to that State’s special circumstances, its economic conditions, its standard of living, its labour costs and, above all, the condition of its material at the time the Convention is signed. Obviously, if the material at a country’s disposal at that time were worn out or defective and if, consequently, the country were in a position of manifest inferiority as compared with other signatories, that is a fact which would have to be taken into consideration in fixing the budgetary limit to be observed by that country.

Count Bernstorff (Germany). — I did not speak yesterday because—as I said at the beginning of our work—I desire above everything that we should soon reach the end of our discussions, so that the Conference may meet. I know of no better way to shorten discussions than to refrain from speaking oneself.

I had also another reason for not speaking. It is not my country which must disarm but others. Accordingly I have hitherto confined myself to listening to what speakers had to say regarding the means and methods to be employed for the purpose of disarming when the time comes.

I must say, to my great regret, that I have been greatly disappointed at what I have heard. I do not wish to re-state arguments that have already been developed, for I do not think arguments become more convincing when they are repeated.

I was particularly struck by the fact that almost all the arguments have been technical. I must say that, personally, I regard this question from the moral standpoint, the historical standpoint and the political standpoint. I am not at all impressed by the technical point of view, for the thing has been done, and what has been done once can be done again.

I have heard only one argument that is more or less political in character. It was said that, when the European situation improves, we shall be able to make a better Convention. The unfortunate fact is, that if the Convention is bad, the European situation will not improve. That situation will grow better only if we make a good Convention. A bad Convention can never improve the situation. The unfortunate situation of Europe at present is, indeed, largely the result of inequality in armaments.

I regard this question from the moral standpoint because, in my opinion, Governments have on this subject entered into a solemn undertaking in the eyes of the nations of the world. The nations will not be satisfied if the Convention framed is such that not a single tank and not a single big gun will be destroyed. No one would be able to understand such a result.

In a large city, it is sometimes necessary to disarm the civilian population. Suppose an individual who is asked to give up his pistol, instead of doing so, puts it in his pocket and promises that the next pistol he buys will be a cheaper one. That is just the position in which we shall find ourselves if we keep all the material in stock and merely promise to buy other less expensive weapons in future.

I have not been convinced by the objections raised, and I remain persuaded that there is only one way to disarm—direct limitation.

M. Massigli spoke of symmetry. I wish to say merely that during the five years I have been here I have always said that, in my opinion, the levelling of armaments was the essential aim to be pursued in the matter of disarmament. Without such levelling, disarmament has no real value for us.

In accordance with the desire expressed by Lord Cecil, we are ourselves preparing a proposal which we shall submit to the Commission.

As regards M. Massigli’s proposal, I see no objection to the experts studying this budgetary question once more, but on one condition which we regard as a sine qua non, namely, that the Conference shall not be postponed on account of this work, that in no case shall there be a further session of the Preparatory Commission, that in no case shall the experts’ report be submitted to the Preparatory Commission, and that in no case—I repeat—shall the Conference be postponed because of this work. To my mind, the essential thing—and I venture to stress this point—is that the Conference should be called as soon as possible, so that we may be clear as to whether the Powers intend to disarm or not to disarm.

The President. — I think I may assure Count Bernstorff that there are no grounds for uneasiness. I might almost say that we have sworn that this session shall be the last. I would, moreover, remind him of paragraph 4 of the Assembly Resolution: “The Assembly accordingly expresses the conviction that . . . the Preparatory Commission will be able to finish . . .”

Colonel Ali Khan Riazi (Persia). — For three days we have been following a very interesting discussion directed towards finding a practical solution for the problem of land disarmament —by the direct method through limiting war material, or by the indirect method through limiting budgetary expenditure, or by other mixed methods.
Our delegation might have supported the direct method if certain Powers had not expressed doubts as to the possibility of ensuring effective supervision. Without such supervision this direct method would have no real value except through reliance on the good faith of all the contracting parties.

Unhappily for our time, though good faith exists everywhere, faith in good faith is lacking. This increases suspicion in certain nations and the fear of isolation in others, and thus retards the solution of the problem of security. If this were not the case, the Pact of Paris, by outlawing war, might have led to a much greater measure of disarmament.

If supervision is not possible, then, like many other delegations, we think that the only practical method will be limitation by budgetary means. Nevertheless, as M. Politis rightly stated, public opinion throughout the world would think it advisable and necessary that this budgetary limitation should be supplemented by a thorough investigation of the war potential of different countries, showing clearly the means at the disposal of each country at the time the Convention is signed.

General Kasprzyczy (Poland). — After yesterday's long discussion on the limitation of material, I shall make only a short statement.

The Polish delegation does not approve of the direct method of limiting material since a majority of the members of the Commission would not support the system of supervision which is essential for that limitation. We accept the principle of indirect limitation through limitation of expenditure on armaments.

I must also refer to certain statements or suggestions made during the discussion yesterday and on previous days.

I agree with the opinion expressed by several delegations, amongst them the Roumanian delegation, to the effect that both methods entail the disadvantage that, by comparison with other countries, they put into an unfavourable position those countries which do not produce war material or do so only to a slight extent, and also those countries which have not inherited or maintained equipment for national defence or which are still engaged in organising themselves for that purpose.

That is a situation which cannot be overlooked and for which the Disarmament Conference will have to find an equitable solution, perhaps in connection with figures and with the political conditions of security.

I come now to the suggestion made yesterday by M. Massigli. I agree with him that the wording proposed in the Draft Convention is incomplete. Events have shown it to be so. It leaves outside the scope of limitation many important factors connected with the problem of war material, the constitution of stocks and, in general, expenditure on war preparations. The limitation of expenditure, like any other limitation, must admit of supervision. Now, as was pointed out yesterday, there are certain circumstances under which normal supervision by parliamentary means or by public opinion at home cannot be exercised in the same way in all countries. A solution must be found.

Whilst recognising the need for limitation of expenditure, the Polish delegation therefore thinks that this grave problem calls for special supplementary work of a technical and legal nature. We may wonder whether, under these circumstances, an Article in the Convention will be sufficient and whether it is indeed possible to refer the whole problem to the Disarmament Conference in this state.

Accordingly, I agree with the head of the French delegation that it would be advisable to ask the experts to facilitate the task before the Disarmament Conference by submitting to it the suggestions and opinions of specialists. I reserve the right to take a decision, on the texts submitted this morning, when I have had an opportunity to study them, which has not yet been the case.

To remove all doubts, I, too, desire to state that this work must in no way postpone the meeting of the Disarmament Conference. As was quite clearly stated yesterday, it must be done outside the Preparatory Commission.

Finally, there is one point to which reference has been made in this discussion. The political aspect of the problem has been emphasised. We may already anticipate that the Commission will, on the present occasion, decide in favour of the limitation of material—the first stage, closely connected with security, having been considered last year in the form of publicity concerning expenditure. The new decision we are about to take will add greatly to our disarmament obligations. Nevertheless, we are fully prepared to accept it, in spite of the undeniable fact that there is a political crisis at the present time. It has been said that the eighteen months which have elapsed since the previous meeting have brought changes—but in what sense? I put myself that question.

Has the tendency to peace been really consolidated? Has the feeling of security been strengthened? No. From day to day suspicions have revealed themselves. People talk of war and the best means of waging war. They talk of it even more than before 1914.

In the light of these facts, can we agree that we are making great strides towards peace? I merely emphasise the threatening contradiction that exists between, on the one hand, the Polish resolution adopted first by the Assembly at Geneva and later by the whole world in the form of the Pact for the renunciation of war, and, on the other hand, the spirit of hatred and of international social upheaval of which we see the evidence. This contradiction does exist; it is developing under our very eyes. These threatening activities must be stopped at the earliest possible moment. Political pacification must begin to assume practical form if we are not merely to progress towards disarmament but even to preserve the fruits of our present efforts.

In spite of these significant facts, in spite of this unfortunate political situation, we will not give way to nerves. We shall advance towards our goal without ignoring the obstacle and, if we ultimately decide to accept the limitation of material by the indirect method, we shall take this
first important step in conditions of security which correspond to the degree of disarmament realised.

This great step towards the consolidation of peace must be taken without compromising the existing equilibrium.

Mr. Sean Lester (Irish Free State).—At this stage of the debate I do not propose to add to the exhaustive arguments of the speakers who have preceded me, but I think I should state the views of the Irish delegation in a few words.

In the speeches made yesterday and to-day on the question of direct limitation, I have heard no arguments against direct limitation except on the ground that it would not be effective without a degree of control which appears to be impossible in the present circumstances.

But it seems to me, as to other delegates, that a combination of the two systems of budgetary limitation and of direct limitation is possible. I think that if the majority of the Commission, as appears to be the case at the present time, be in favour of the adoption of budgetary limitation, that limitation would be strengthened by the adoption of certain undertakings by the various States restricting the main items of the land armaments at present in use.

The Irish delegation feels that if a combination of the two systems on these lines is not generally acceptable to the Commission, the Irish delegation will support a proposal for budgetary limitation as being the more effective method.

M. Sato (Japan).—I apologise for speaking a second time in this great discussion.

In order to remove a misunderstanding I desire to make a correction. I did not say—as M. Cobian seemed to think—that I could not accept the Hon. Hugh Gibson's suggestion. I venture to repeat a few lines of the statement I made yesterday: "There seem to me to be only two solutions: either that we should adopt the principle of budgetary limitation and that countries unable to apply it should accept direct limitation, or, if that solution be impossible, that we should revert to the solution already adopted at the last session—namely, indirect limitation by means of publicity."

Since there is no longer any suggestion that we should content ourselves with publicity, the latter solution fails to the ground. Thus, only the former solution remains, namely, a combination of budgetary limitation, in the case of most countries, with the method of direct limitation in the case of certain countries which cannot accept the method of indirect limitation. In this connection I must, however, insist on the importance of homogeneity and uniformity in the system to be adopted.

I am not quite sure that most delegations really favour the system of budgetary limitation. Before that can be said, I should like to know the result of the voting, for there are many delegations which no less forcibly urge the adoption of direct limitation. If the majority of the Commission is in favour of the indirect method of budgetary limitation, that kind of limitation will have to be considered as the general rule, to which only a limited number of exceptions can be admitted. Amongst those exceptions, there will be the case of the United States of America and perhaps of Spain. I recognise the force of M. Cobian's argument, and I readily agree to the method he proposes for his own country. In my opinion, it is necessary and most important that we should determine the cases admitted as exceptions. I think it is important for the Commission to realise that the method of direct limitation without supervision is not as good as indirect limitation through budgetary means. If direct limitation is accompanied by supervision that method will be the strictest, but if it is not so accompanied—and it seems that this notion of supervision is not really accepted by anyone—we shall have a limitation that is less rigid than budgetary limitation.

I would further point out that, by limiting material through budgetary means, we are for the future indirectly limiting the material in stock, whereas if we adopt the direct limitation of material in service as proposed by M. Cobian, the material in stock will be excluded from the limitation. There will thus be no equality of treatment as regards limitation. These facts must be borne in mind, and if we agree, if the majority adopt indirect limitation through budgetary means, the exceptions to be admitted must remain as definite exceptions. The number of countries applying direct limitation without supervision must be strictly limited.

M. Morfoff (Bulgaria).—So far I have refrained from taking part in this discussion because I found that the proposals made were not compatible with the military system imposed on us by the Treaties. Certain recommendations that have been made, however, compel me to offer some observations before the vote is taken.

The Belgian delegate said that an arithmetic mean might be found by multiplying the number of units by the number of years' service. That is incorrect.

Although we may rightly say that the effect produced by a force of one kilogramme overcoming a resistance through one hundred metres is equivalent to the effect of a force of one hundred kilogrammes overcoming a resistance through one metre, we cannot assert that one man who serves in the army for twenty-five years is the equivalent of twenty-five men who serve for one year.

Thus, there is an incompatibility which results from the difference in military systems.

I was glad to hear the President say at the outset that our object was to reduce armaments gradually to the minimum compatible with national security. Again, M. Sato, the Japanese delegate, said yesterday that he was in favour of equality and that he would only accept a system that could be applied to all in the same way. Moreover, that is the policy prescribed in the Covenant of the League of Nations.

I do not mean to say that complete equality in armaments can be applied at present. I merely desire that the future Committee of Experts should be aware that, as a result of differing
The object of the resolutions is to keep out of a general discussion, and to get down to particular reserves I shall have to make in regard to the French resolution. I think it will come better feel to each particular proposal. I do not propose to ask the Commission to hear me on certain paragraphs, it will be time for us to hear Dr. Rutgers and others as to the objections they may have to these motions. When they are taken, each paragraph will refer to what we shall do subsequently.

M. Woo Kaiseng (China). — I wish to make a very short statement. The Chinese delegation approves of limitation of any kind but it desires to point out that countries fall into two classes—industrial and non-industrial countries. In accordance with the view put forward by M. Sato and by the Turkish delegate, we think that this distinction should be reflected in the Convention, for it is certain that a country with very highly developed industries can easily convert its factories, either by industrial mobilisation or by some other method, whereas countries in which industries are less developed have at their disposal only the material in stock.

I should like the Commission to note the need for making such a distinction. For my part, I fully agree with the Japanese and Turkish delegates. The Chinese delegation strongly favours budgetary limitation. At the present time, indeed war must, I think, depend on monetary considerations. That is the great danger, for money can procure all the means for organising war. To suppress armaments, we must adopt the system of budgetary limitation. As this question has been referred to by the Belgian delegate, I shall not deal further with it.

In conclusion, I desire to state that I agree with M. Massigli’s proposal for budgetary limitation. The Experts’ report must, however, be forwarded in good time to the different Governments, so that they may be able to study it before the general Disarmament Conference.

I think we should endeavour to frame a convention which will be acceptable to all and which will ensure the most complete equality. The question placed before us must be settled wholly in a spirit of conciliation.

M. Holsti (Finland). — In principle, the Finnish delegation preferred the direct method, but, with a view to reaching a compromise, it supports indirect limitation through budgetary means.

M. Rutgers (Netherlands). — In order not to prolong the discussion, I shall resist the temptation to deal with arguments that have already been put forward. I am sure M. Bourquin will understand my silence and not attribute it to any lack of respect.

I desire merely to make a short reference to the British and French proposals. As some delegations support one system whilst others support a different system, it would be difficult to achieve unanimity on either method. At the beginning of the sixth session we had almost reached unanimity by setting them both on one side. As we cannot achieve the unanimity we hoped to secure by means of a new discussion, we shall have to combine the two methods in some way.

There are two paragraphs in the British proposal on which I hope we shall be able to agree. But the third starts by recognising that “the majority of the Commission are of opinion that, as to land war material, the most practical method of securing this more precise limitation is by budgetary limitation, that other members of the Commission are of opinion that the most practical method is by direct limitation, by specific enumeration, and that a certain number would desire to see some combination of the two methods”.

I do not think any advantage will be gained by stating in the resolution that there is a majority for either of these methods.

The proposal goes on to say that a certain number would desire to see some combination of the two methods. I hope that is true of the great majority, or almost of all, since this procedure would enable us to overcome the deadlock in which we are at present. The French proposal differs from the British text by making an addition thereto. The French proposal refers to what we shall do subsequently.

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — Would you allow me to suggest that it would perhaps be more convenient to have the discussion on these proposals when they have been formally moved and put before the Commission? At present we have merely given notice of our intention to move them at the conclusion of the general discussion. I am a little afraid of a new general discussion developing on the terms of these motions. When they are taken, each paragraph by paragraph, it will be time for us to hear Dr. Rutgers and others as to the objections they feel to each particular proposal. I do not propose to ask the Commission to hear me on certain reserves I shall have to make in regard to the French resolution. I think it will come better when we have them before us as definite propositions.

I propose to move the resolutions paragraph by paragraph and then we can discuss each one. The object of the resolutions is to keep out of a general discussion, and to get down to particular...
details. When we come to the third paragraph of the British resolution, Dr. Rutgers will be able to explain why he thinks it should be modified in this or that way.

M. Rutgers (Netherlands). — I thought these two proposals were under discussion. It seems that is not the case. I shall therefore not insist, but I must repeat that I thought the proposals were under discussion and I saw in them a way of concluding the general discussion.

The President. — We are at present engaged in the general discussion. These proposals are not yet under discussion. That was what Lord Cecil meant.

**Draft Resolution Submitted by the Italian Delegation.**

General de Marinis (Italy). — I assume we are still engaged in the general discussion and that it is not yet closed. We shall ourselves place a proposal before the Commission. But at present I do not feel justified in giving our reasons for submitting this text, which somewhat resembles the British delegation’s proposal and which, moreover, will shortly be circulated.

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — I think it would be very convenient if General de Marinis would read his proposal, and reserve his observations in favour of it till the time when it actually comes before the Commission.

General de Marinis (Italy). — My proposal is in three parts. The first reproduces the whole of the first part of the British delegation’s proposal. The third part is as follows:

“Considers that the best method for limitation of land material would consist in a combination of the two systems of direct limitation and budgetary limitation.”

The President. — Let us not prolong this discussion unnecessarily. The simplest procedure would be to vote, not on the various proposals as they have been put forward by Lord Cecil, but on the different systems. Lord Cecil’s proposal can be discussed only after that.

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — If I may say so, with all respect to the President, I think that is madness. For one thing we shall get into the most hopeless morass unless we have some definite proposition before us. We cannot say we are generally in favour of this or that, we shall none of us know what we are really voting for. If anyone thinks either of these propositions is insufficiently clear and desires to make the thing more precise, by all means let them move amendments, or let them present alternative propositions, but if we are asked to vote generally in favour of this or that no one can say whether they approve it or not. Merely to give one single illustration. Take the question of direct limitation, I could not say Aye or No to the question: Are you in favour of direct limitation? What I should have to say would be: In principle I think direct limitation has very many merits, but in fact I do not see my way, under the particular circumstances, to approve it in this particular case. It would be impossible for me to vote.

I beg the President to insist on precise propositions being laid before the Commission, so that we know exactly what it is we are voting for and what we are not voting for. Until we do that, I am quite sure we shall get into the most awful mess.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — I am not quite sure whether I shall be in order to speak now. Some new method of procedure has been introduced quite alien to the Commission or to any international assembly. Lord Cecil has moved, at the very beginning of this meeting, certain resolutions which have been circulated. It seems to me the resolutions are before us. Why should we not discuss them?

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — I have not moved them. I have merely given notice that at the end of the general discussion I will move them.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — In any case I cannot see why we must speak on these resolutions separately, and on each paragraph. Why cannot we discuss the resolution as a whole? I may speak against the whole resolution and not against separate articles. I think this right should be given to me. I myself will move an amendment which will be in due time circulated, and I shall probably have to put off my statement until then.

Count Bernstorff (Germany). — Mr. President, I find myself in a position of considerable difficulty. This morning, Lord Cecil placed a proposal before us. I should have liked to submit another proposal in writing, but I noticed that there were at least half a dozen others in the air and I thought it inadvisable to increase the number still further, particularly as my suggestion or proposal practically reproduces yours.

The text says, in effect, merely that “the Commission decides that the principle of direct limitation should be adopted.”
M. Politis (Greece). — We must agree on this question of procedure before voting, for the meaning of the vote will not be clear unless we have first agreed as to what we are voting on.

I hope Lord Cecil will allow me to point out, with the greatest respect, that it is impossible to vote on the third paragraph of his proposal, as the text of that paragraph records decisions that would have to be taken beforehand. It is difficult for us to vote on such a sentence as this: “Does the Commission recognise that the majority of its members are of this or that opinion?” before knowing whether there is a majority at all and whether that majority is or is not of that opinion.

The only method that can be employed—and it has been adopted on many occasions, even in this gathering—after a long, complicated and important discussion like the present, is to discover the general ideas that emerge and to vote on them.

Now there are three general ideas which emerge from this discussion and, on this point, I think I cannot be mistaken.

The first general idea is that of the system of direct limitation. Lord Cecil says that if the question is put to him he will not be able to answer. I hope he will pardon me if I say that what we have to ascertain is whether the system is acceptable to the Commission as a general system. I understand that he would vote against a proposal put in that way.

The first question is therefore: “Does the Commission accept the direct method as the general method of limitation?”

The second question, which will arise if the reply to the first is in the negative, will be: “Does the Commission accept the method of budgetary limitation as the general system of limitation?”

Finally, the third question, which will arise whatever the Commission decides on the first two questions, is: “Should these two systems be combined—for instance, in the way suggested by the American delegation, that is to say, as alternatives so that some may accept the system of budgetary limitation whilst others may accept the system of direct limitation?”

Once the Commission has answered these three questions it will be a very simple matter to reproduce them in a text similar to that of the third paragraph of the British proposal.

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — I am afraid I have not made myself clear. I do not disagree with a single word that M. Politis has said. It is not that I want you to pass my resolution immediately. When I drew it up last night there was general agreement that a majority were in favour of budgetary limitation, but if this be disputed it can and must be cleared up. I only want something precise and definite, and I confidently believe I shall have the support of M. Politis in this, for having observed his conduct at meetings of this kind I know how highly he values having something that is precise and clear. I do not want my resolution taken first but I do think we should have something quite definite and clear before us so that we shall not have misunderstandings later on as to how the Commission has proceeded. The importance of it is this, that we have to translate our decisions on the general question into particular articles which we shall or shall not insert in the Convention, and I am very anxious that when we come to draw up these articles we should not have to review the whole thing again on the ground that it is not clear.

A perfectly definite proposition has been circulated, and I should think it could be decided. Others could do the same, and I should have thought the great abilities of the German delegation would have been sufficient to enable them to draft in a few words what Count Bernstorff wishes to be decided. I quite agree that some proposition such as I have drafted can only come finally when we have determined what is the view of the Commission. Let us proceed carefully and distinctly and clearly; that is all I am asking.

M. Fierlinger (Czechoslovakia). — May I add a few words to M. Politis’ statement, with which I entirely agree?

I think we must seek the simplest possible formula. So far, we do not know exactly on what the vote will be taken and we have, as it were, opened Pandora’s box by giving all countries a choice between the different systems. Hitherto we have discussed two systems—direct limitation and indirect limitation. But now a new factor has been introduced into the discussion, a factor that has not yet been exactly defined. To-day, at the opening of the meeting, the President informed us that we now have five possible solutions. During the meeting a new method has emerged—that mentioned by M. Cobian. Thus the number of possible solutions increases every day.

I think that, in this way, we are adding greatly to the difficulties of the future Conference—which I always have in mind, since it is to crown all our efforts—by placing before it so many different possibilities. It is important that we should make clear which possibility we ourselves favour. We should therefore vote on the two possible solutions that have now been discussed with all the clarity and precision desirable. The rest is confused and indefinite and we do not see exactly what we can vote on.

Hence, I think the discussion should be confined to these two systems. Obviously, there is a mass of floating opinion swaying between one and the other. Nevertheless, I think those who have a preference either for the direct method or for the indirect method should be given an opportunity
to express that preference quite clearly. In that way we shall have a formula that is infinitely simpler.

In regard to Count Bernstorff’s proposal, I am not yet quite sure which method goes farthest. After yesterday’s discussion, I think indirect limitation is more far-reaching. To me it seems much more effective than the other method. But, Mr. President, that is a matter which I leave to your appreciation.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — I must confess that to my mind the procedure is getting more and more obscure. I have mentioned already the official document of the Secretary-General of the League of Nations which is submitted by the British delegation. My understanding of the word “submitted” is that it refers to the past and not to the future. We have been told that we must not discuss this resolution because it does not exist yet; but, shortly afterwards, M. Politis spoke against one clause of precisely this resolution. Surely if he is entitled to speak on one clause of the resolution, we are entitled to speak on the rest of it? In any case I want to remind you that the question of land armaments has been before us in the first half of this session. At that time the Commission had proposals by the Soviet delegation and by the German delegation. Now we have decided to go back to this question and re-open the discussion and revert to the position taken up last year. It seems that we have gone back to the proposals, which were discussed then, of the Soviet and German delegations, and the British proposal appears to be an amendment to those proposals. I do not mind introducing new proposals of the same nature, but to avoid misunderstanding I would respectfully submit the British proposal appears to be an amendment to those proposals. I do not mind introducing new proposals of the same nature, but to avoid misunderstanding I would respectfully submit the Commission that we should ask Lord Cecil to move his resolution forthwith, and then we shall be able to discuss not only his resolution but all the amendments to it. I cannot put forward any proposal without officially knowing the contents of Lord Cecil’s amendment.

The President. — I think that is what Lord Cecil intends.

Count Bernstorff (Germany). — I have but little to say. M. Politis put the matter quite clearly. I agree entirely with what he said. If we vote as M. Politis proposed, there will be no need for the German delegation to draft its own text of a resolution.

M. Massigli (France). — Before the vote is taken, I must ask permission to make a brief statement on a question that is not related to procedure. Yesterday, in my anxiety not to import heat into this discussion and in my desire that the Commission should accomplish its task; as we all hope it will, in that spirit of conciliation and co-operation which is essential to the success of our work, I purposely refrained from taking up and discussing a statement made the day before by the German delegate. I merely alluded to it and I hoped that the reason for my attitude would have been understood. To-day, however, Count Bernstorff has felt it necessary to insist again on that point. His statement compels me to repeat that, before the end of this session, it will be absolutely necessary to have a thorough explanation on the question raised and on certain other questions. For my part, I shall ensure that the explanation is a full one.

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — I desire now to move the resolution which I have already read. I have nothing to say about the first two paragraphs, which I had hoped represented the unanimous view of the Commission.

In regard to the third paragraph, I observe that there is an alternative proposal by the Italian delegation, and I understand that Count Bernstorff also desires to vote, either against it or for some modification of it. I shall wait to hear what these two gentlemen have to say before I make any further observations. I ask you, Sir, to accept this as a motion of the whole of the resolution, because I understand M. Litvinoff wishes to speak against the whole thing; but I shall ask you to put the first two paragraphs to the vote separately.

M. Bourquin (Belgium). — Referring to the Italian proposal, Lord Cecil has just said that this is an alternative text. I think it is clearly understood that the Italian delegation proposes a combination and not an alternative.

The President. — Exactly.

General de Marinis (Italy). — I do not desire to go into the details of the different proposals. I think we must adopt the method proposed by M. Politis, that is to say, vote on one part of the text at a time. For instance, we might first vote on paragraph I of the British proposal. Explanations might be given with regard to this first paragraph.

When my proposal is put to the vote I shall state the reasons for it. In reply to the Belgian delegate’s remark, I may say immediately that I intend the two methods of limitation—direct and indirect budgetary limitation—to be co-existent. Perhaps I did not use the best word in my proposal and it might have been preferable to say “co-existent”. I reserve the right to give the necessary explanations at the proper time.

The President. — We agree. I ask you to vote on paragraph I:

“The Commission approves the principle that there should be the fullest possible interchange of information respecting armaments between the parties to the proposed Convention.”
M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — I should like to speak against the proposal as a whole—not only against the first paragraph.

The President. — You will be able to do so later. I should like to have this paragraph voted on first.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — It will be no use speaking after the vote has been taken. The three paragraphs are all inter-connected and I cannot speak on one without mentioning the other two.

The President. — I call on M. Litvinoff.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — The proposal submitted by the British delegation is indeed quite a new departure in the proceedings of this Commission. The Soviet delegation will certainly not be accused of being too fond of old traditions and old methods. They are quite willing to accept new ones so long as they lead to a clarification of certain points—which I am afraid I must say is not so in this case. We have been discussing the question of limitation of armaments and the discussion has turned around the methods to be adopted, either direct or indirect. To sum up this discussion: the Commission is expected to say which of these two methods they would commend to the future Disarmament Conference. I respectfully ask Lord Cecil: Do we find an answer to this question in the proposal submitted by him?

The first clause deals with Publicity. For the Soviet delegation to vote on this, it would require to know first of all what exactly has been decided as to the limitation and reduction of armaments. Publicity by itself has no meaning whatever. It is for this Commission to discuss limitation and the reduction of armaments, not any other question. “Publicity”, as I have pointed out many times, does not mean “Reduction” or “Limitation”. If we decide on certain methods of reduction of armaments it may automatically become necessary to give certain information, as a means of control and as a means of carrying out the decision as to reduction. I am afraid that when we come to the rest of this resolution, if we decide in the negative for reduction of armaments, the result would be mere interchange of information. The Soviet delegation, therefore, cannot accept the first paragraph at the present moment, although I have nothing to say against publicity as a corollary to the reduction of armaments.

I come to the next paragraph of the British proposal—namely, that it “records the unanimous desire of the Members of the Commission to find some method which will provide for the limitation of war material in a more precise manner than can be achieved by publicity alone”. What public opinion, and what our peoples who have sent us here wish to know, is not what the sentiments and desires of the Members of the Commission. They do not wish to know that all the Members of the Commission are inspired by the best sentiments, desires and ideals, and what our Governments are inspired by. They want to know what are we going to do in the way of disarmament. We have listened to many speeches which invariably begin with the words: “In principle I am in agreement with such a proposal”. In principle I am for the most radical limitation of armaments.” Then a speaker will go on to say: “I do not think that any people would be found, either here or outside, who would be in favour of Armaments as such, and who would in principle be against the reduction of Armaments. But the question is: Are we willing, are we able, to find the methods of reducing Armaments, or not?” It is therefore not sufficient to say we have got the “desire”—we must be able to say that we have found the method, and this resolution shows that we have not found any method. It is for that reason that the Soviet delegation must reject the second clause of this resolution.

Then I come to the third clause. I should not say that the discussion which has taken place has been quite conclusive. Many speakers stated yesterday that no arguments had been brought forward for the direct method of reducing armaments. By merely brushing aside the arguments which have been brought forward you cannot make them non-existent, for they do exist, whether they are ignored or not. It seems to me that I have made it quite clear that reduction of armaments by way of curtailment of budgets might place smaller and industrially-undeveloped countries in a very disadvantageous position. I think this argument should be convincing, although it has been ignored by all the speakers. Nobody could convince us that industrially-undeveloped countries can obtain, with the same resources, the same results as bigger countries. But the chief argument used (not so much this time as during the first half of the Session) was that by budgetary limitation we do not touch upon the existing stocks, the existing armaments, and I maintain that the armaments existing in many countries at present, even if they are not added to, can produce very great war and can bring about the killing of millions of men.

If we limit only the budget as to its future use and leave untouched all the armaments existing now, we are not achieving anything in the way of reducing the chances of war. This argument—the most important one—has also been brushed aside, but I think it will sound very convincing outside this hall.
The third clause says that “the majority of the Commission are of opinion that, as to land war material, the most practical method of securing this more precise limitation is by budgetary limitation.”

It may be true or not true: I have no means to gauge the opinions of the Commission. If we take a vote and the majority declare themselves against the method of direct limitation, then we shall know the result. Then, “other members of the Commission are of opinion that the most practical method is by direct limitation by specific enumeration, and that a certain number would desire to see some combination of the two methods.” I am not quite clear as to that. The Soviet delegation has proposed a simultaneous application of the two methods: direct limitation and reduction also of budgetary expenditure on the same armaments, because we regard each of these methods as in itself insufficient; therefore we want to supplement one method by the other. I am not sure that other delegations who have spoken of the two methods mean the same thing. To make the thing quite clear, therefore, we are wording our Resolution as follows:

**DRAFT RESOLUTION SUBMITTED BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION.**

“The Preparatory Commission decides that the only effective means of reducing and limiting war material is the direct reduction and limitation of all kinds of war material according to detailed tables, together with budgetary limitation, by categories. The two methods should be applied simultaneously by all countries.”

I think we have made our proposal quite clear.

With regard to the resolution put forward by the Italian delegation, I am prepared to support the third clause of their proposal, if General de Marinis will assure us that he means the same thing—the simultaneous application of both methods; that all countries should apply both methods. In this case I am prepared to vote for the third clause of the Italian Draft Resolution, at the same time declaring myself against the two clauses which coincide with the British proposal.

**Lord Cecil (British Empire).** — Out of courtesy to my colleagues on the Commission, I feel bound to reply to the discussion. I had hoped the first two paragraphs would have passed without any discussion at all as merely preliminary to what we desire.

The first paragraph merely sets out—without any statement of principle whatever—that it is desirable to have a complete interchange of information. I heard no argument from M. Litvinoff at all against that, except that he did not see the advantage of it unless there was going to be a restriction of armaments. That might be a proposition to put forward as an argument in favour of restriction of armaments, but it does not seem to me to be an argument in favour of, or against, the principle of publicity.

With regard to the second proposition, I should have thought that on his own showing it was in accordance with the opinion which he has reached—namely, that mere publication is not enough, and that you must have some specific restriction. He objects to that because it is a statement of principle. I quite agree that if my proposal were that the Commission should satisfy themselves with a mere statement of principle, there would have been some relevance in M. Litvinoff’s objection, but he knows perfectly well no such proposal has been put before the Commission. We have always said these proposals must be translated into articles in the Convention, which will carry out a definite policy. That being so, I do not see what his objection to the first two paragraphs is.

In regard to his objections to the third paragraph, I will deal with them when we come to the discussion on that paragraph, and I have heard what my Italian and German colleagues desire to say about those two points.

All I would venture to say very respectfully to M. Litvinoff is, it is not enough merely to object to every proposition that is put before this Commission, but it is essential, if we are to reach a direct result, to put forward definite and practical propositions which there is some chance of seeing adopted by the nations of the world.

**Vote on the Resolution proposed by the British Delegation.**

The President. — Before taking a vote on the first paragraph of the Draft Resolution put forward by the British delegation, I desire to say that the words “the fullest possible interchange of information respecting armaments” will in no way prejudice the full discussion of this question when we come to the chapter concerning the exchange of information.

*Paragraph 1 was adopted by 23 votes.*

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — After the declaration of M. Litvinoff we cannot say “unanimous” in paragraph 2. We must say “records the desire of almost all the members of the Commission”.

The President. — I shall therefore put paragraph 2 to the vote with that amendment.

*Paragraph 2 was adopted by 21 votes.*

The President. — We now come to paragraph 3.

Count Bernstorff (Germany). — I should like to be quite clear and to know exactly how we are going to vote. Personally, I accepted M. Politis’ proposal but I hoped both proposals would be voted on.
I shall ask for the vote on the third paragraph of the British proposal to be taken by roll-call.

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — I am entirely in the hands of the Commission. I have assured Count Bernstorff that my only anxiety is that every view shall be expressed in the clearest way. Perhaps the most fitting way of raising the particular point he wishes to raise would be to substitute the words "some members" for the word "majority." Then we shall know whether in point of fact there is a majority or not. If he does not think that is sufficient, I am quite content with any other system that he proposes. The only other thing I was going to suggest is that it is now about three minutes to one, and perhaps it would be a convenient course to adjourn. Then perhaps Count Bernstorff and I, with M. Politis, could discuss the matter and arrange some definite form of words which would express the idea in a precise and exact form. I am only anxious to facilitate the clear decision which I most earnestly hope we shall come to.

The suggestion was adopted.

The Commission rose at 1 p.m.

EIGHTH MEETING.

Held on Friday, November 14th, 1930, at 10 a.m.

President: M. Loudon (Netherlands).

24. Discussion on Chapter II: Material. — Section I: Land Armaments (continuation).

The President. — We will continue the discussion on the limitation of the material of land armaments. Yesterday you adopted the first and second paragraphs of the draft resolution submitted by the British delegation. We now come to the third paragraph.

There was some confusion yesterday, and it is desirable that we should be perfectly clear today. The simplest method appears to be to vote in succession on the various amendments to paragraph 3 of the British draft resolution. Three amendments have been submitted by the Soviet, German and Italian delegates respectively.

The German and Italian delegations' amendments are as follows:

AMENDMENT BY THE GERMAN DELEGATION TO THE DRAFT RESOLUTION SUBMITTED BY THE BRITISH DELEGATION.

"Paragraph 3 of the said draft to be replaced by the following text:

3. The Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference is of opinion that the principle of direct limitation should be applied to land war material."

DRAFT RESOLUTION SUBMITTED BY THE ITALIAN DELEGATION.

"The Commission,

1. approves the principle that there should be the fullest possible interchange of information respecting armaments between the parties to the proposed convention;
2. records the unanimous desire of the members of the Commission to find some method which will provide for the limitation of war material in a more precise manner than can be achieved by publicity alone;
3. considers that the best method for limitation of land material would consist in a combination of the two systems of direct limitation and budgetary limitation.

Direct limitation will be applied separately to material in stock and material in service. Two tables will indicate separately the armament categories of the material in stock and those of the material in service, together with the respective maximum figures fixed for each country. Budgetary limitation will be applied in accordance with the rules which are determined on the basis of the work of the Committee on Budgetary Questions."

Note by the Secretariat. — See page 96.
General de Marinis' amendment, with an addition explaining the third paragraph, has been circulated, and I will ask General de Marinis, who is first on the list, to address you.

General de Marinis (Italy). — As I have already stated, the purpose of my remarks in regard to the chapter on material is to make a further effort to avoid the grave disadvantage of submitting to the General Disarmament Conference a method for the limitation of material which does not take account of some of the essential elements of disarmament. One of those elements is the war material in stock. If the Disarmament Conference is not able to take that into consideration, it will not have a really solid basis for its work. It is because indirect limitation can only deal with future armaments, and not with existing armaments, that it is necessary to combine the two systems.

This was clearly explained by M. Rutgers when he said that my proposal referred to the object rather than to the method of limitation, and this object is, I repeat, the limitation of existing material. This was corroborated by the honourable delegate for Sweden in his very interesting speech.

It has been pointed out that both budgetary limitation and direct limitation have certain defects. That is why I think it is necessary to combine them, so that each may, as far as possible, supply what the other lacks. If both are adopted, we shall have done all that it was possible to do for the reduction of this very important element of armaments. Dr. Riddell, the honourable delegate for Canada, in concluding his important speech, also stated that, in the end a solution might perhaps be found by combining the direct and indirect methods of limitation. Moreover, M. Litvinoff pointed out that industrially undeveloped countries, whose interests must be protected in the same way as those of other countries, would be placed in a position of inferiority if the budgetary method were employed. If this method were combined with direct limitation, it would be justifiable to allow industrially undeveloped countries, or countries which lack raw materials, to have stocks of materials compatible with their special situation.

I will not reply to the objections which have been made to the method of direct limitation, because I do not wish to prolong the discussion. I quite admit that there are gaps in this method, and it is in order to fill those gaps that I propose we should limit expenditure in respect of the purchase and upkeep of material. We should thus have the co-existence of the two systems.

If both were adopted, I see no objection to taking into consideration the difficulties mentioned by Mr. Gibson in regard to the adoption of budgetary limitation by his country, and I am quite prepared to agree that the United States of America, for instance, should merely give the figures relating to material in service and in stock.

As regards the method of applying the combination of the two systems, I consider that each country should accept a limitation of its military expenditure according to the system adopted by the Conference, and, at the same time, each country would accept a maximum figure either for material in service or for material in stock.

The maximum for the material in service would be comparatively easy to fix as a result of the limitation of effective.

As regards the material in stock, I recognise the difficulty, not only of fixing a maximum figure for the different categories of material, but, above all, of finding a system which will ensure the loyal execution of the obligations assumed. That, of course, raises the difficult question of supervision. In this connection I would repeat what I said last Monday—namely, that we must not start from the assumption that countries which sign the Convention do not intend to carry it out in good faith. Moreover, we may perhaps agree upon the establishment of a Permanent Disarmament Commission.

Apart from these reasons, it seems to me that from a general standpoint we shall have made considerable progress towards disarmament if we also accept the principle of the limitation of material in stock. Once that principle is accepted, we must have confidence in the goodwill of all countries to apply it more and more effectively as time goes on.

In order to explain more precisely the views which I have just put before you, I have added the following paragraph to my original draft resolution:

"Direct limitation will be applied separately to material in stock and material in service. Two tables will indicate separately the armament categories of the material in stock and those of the material in service together with the respective maximum figures fixed for each country."

I think it would be best for these two tables to be drawn up by the Conference and for us to content ourselves with laying down the principle, which is the most important thing:

"Budgetary limitation will be applied in accordance with the rules which are determined on the basis of the work of the Committee on Budgetary Questions."

If we adopt the proposed text, I think we shall have done everything possible to show the Conference the importance which we attach to the existence and accumulation of stocks of war material which, whenever large supplies are immediately available, undoubtedly constitute the most dangerous means of aggression.
In order that we may progress as quickly as possible, I would request the President to put my proposal to the vote in two parts.

I propose that we should associate the method of budgetary limitation with the method of direct limitation—that is to say, with the limitation of material in service and in stock. Some delegations may perhaps be prepared to accept indirect limitation associated with direct limitation, but only as far as material in service is concerned.

I should be glad if you would first put to the vote the proposal to associate indirect limitation—i.e., budgetary limitation—with the direct limitation of material in service.

I presume that other delegations will be prepared to go further and to accept budgetary limitation combined with the direct limitation of material both in service and in stock. I accordingly suggest that a second vote shall be taken on the adoption of my system in its entirety.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).—I would bring up a point of procedure. I think no useful purpose will be served by prolonging the discussion, and that it is time we proceeded to vote. We ought to take first the proposal which goes furthest—the Soviet proposal—to apply simultaneously both methods, the direct method and the budgetary method. The Italian proposal amounts to the same thing with some modification at the end.

If this proposal falls through, I would suggest that a vote should be taken as to whether we should apply only one method, voting first on the direct and then on the budgetary method. I would propose to take a vote by roll-call on every one of these three points. Naturally, after this, the third clause of the British proposal would be quite superfluous.

Count Bernstorff (Germany).—Contrary to what I said before, I no longer desire the Commission to vote on my proposal before the others. After what General de Marinis has said, I am prepared to vote for the Italian proposal.

I should, however, like to make some reservations. I shall vote for this proposal if material in stock is included.

Secondly, I should prefer the tables to be submitted to our Commission and not to the Conference, and would be prepared to submit tables myself.

Lastly, I should like to reserve my final decision in regard to the budgetary question until we know exactly what the experts propose as a result of their investigations.

Lord Cecil (British Empire).—I find myself in a considerable amount of agreement with a good deal that was said by M. Litvinoff and Count Bernstorff. I agree with M. Litvinoff that, supposing we proceed to vote on these questions, or any of them, it is evident that my way of dealing with the matter is no longer applicable. I hoped that my resolution would have been accepted almost as a matter of course, and then we would have tried to elaborate it; but that plan has now gone by the board, and I do not attach any importance to the third paragraph. Also, I agree with Count Bernstorff that it is important that we should make as definite and clear a proposal as we can in our Convention. I do not agree with the idea put forward (if it is the idea) of General de Marinis or M. Litvinoff that it would be enough for us to pass a resolution and leave that to be worked out by the Conference.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).—That is not my proposal.

Lord Cecil (British Empire).—I am very glad to hear that, for I could not agree. But whether General de Marinis' resolution is passed or not, I shall still ask to be allowed to move the two articles of which I have given notice, and I hope that you will allow them to be taken immediately, since we have been discussing the subject and the matter is now entirely open in our minds. These are the two Articles DA* and DB* shown hereunder. But I propose that they shall be put together and made into one article in order to explain my whole idea.

PROPOSITIONS BY THE BRITISH DELEGATION.

CHAPTER III.—BUDGETARY EXPENDITURE.

Insert the following articles for the blanks left as a result of the second reading:

"Article DA*.

"Each of the High Contracting Parties agrees that its total annual expenditure on land, sea, and air forces, in any budgetary year, shall not exceed the figures given for them in Tables . . . ."

"Article DB*.

"Each of the High Contracting Parties agrees that its total annual expenditure, in any budgetary year, on the upkeep, purchase, and manufacture of war material, 1 shall not exceed the figures indicated in Tables . . . ."

1 War material to be defined in a special Annex.
CHAPTER V: MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS. — SECTION II: EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION.

Substitute the following article for Articles DA* and DB*:

"Each of the High Contracting Parties shall communicate to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, in a model form, a statement showing the actual total amount expended on land, sea and air forces during the preceding financial year.

"It shall at the same time communicate to the Secretary-General a statement showing the amount actually expended during the preceding financial year on the upkeep, purchase, and manufacture of war material as defined in Article DB of Chapter III of the present Convention.

"This communication shall be made not later than . . . months after the close of the financial year."

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — Finally, as far as General de Marinis' proposal is concerned, I should have great difficulty in voting for it in its present form, because I do not really know exactly how it is going to be worked out in the Convention. I abstain, therefore, from voting as far as his resolution is concerned in its present form, and, when he brings up the definite articles which he proposes to insert in the Convention, I shall be able to decide whether or not I can support them.

M. Massigli (France). — I agree with Lord Cecil that it is inadvisable at the present stage of our discussion to introduce new proposals, more particularly as these proposals are not clearly defined.

We have the Italian delegation's proposal to distinguish between material in stock and material in service.

But what we want to know is: What is meant by material in stock and by material in service?

This question has already been discussed at length, and it was found very difficult to give a definition. Consequently, we must first have this definition.

Then there is the question of tables. We have no idea what those tables are to contain.

This being the case, it is impossible for me to decide for or against the proposal, and I would urge that any new proposal should be elaborated and submitted in the form of articles. We shall then know where we stand.

General de Marinis (Italy). — Our discussion during the last three days has shown that we must first agree on a general criterion.

Do we desire limitation by publicity? Do we desire it by publicity alone?

Do we desire it by budgetary limitation or by direct limitation?

Is the limitation to be confined to material in service or to material in stock?

Should it apply to both?

We are not yet agreed as to these general principles, and the object of my proposal was to enable the Commission to state its views on these general principles. When agreement has been reached—that is to say, when the majority of the Commission has stated that it is in favour of publicity alone (as a matter of fact, a negative answer has already been given to this question), or of budgetary limitation alone, or else of budgetary limitation combined with direct limitation, complete or partial—we shall then be able to go into details and discuss the articles to which Lord Cecil has referred.

For the moment, you are only asked to vote on principles. I am prepared to draw up the tables immediately, but we must first know whether the Commission wishes to adopt them or not. This is not a question of the text we are going to insert in our draft, but simply a question of principle, and it is quite in conformity with the first two paragraphs of the British proposal.

I would repeat that the only object of my proposal is to enable us to decide on the principle.

M. Cobian (Spain). — When we are asked to vote on a question of this kind, especially when the vote is to be taken by roll-call, the vote must be based on clearly defined principles, or on a proposal for an article to be inserted in the Convention.

If the matter on which we are asked to vote is very complicated, a number of delegations will hesitate to vote one way or another because, while they find certain principles acceptable, there are others which they cannot accept. They would thus be obliged to abstain from voting, with the result that there would be an enormous number of abstentions and only a few votes for or against.

It seems to me that the question of principle has already been decided, because every delegation, without exception, has stated its views very clearly. We have only to refer to the Minutes to see what those views were. I am not opposed to a vote on the principles, provided they are clearly defined.

I should like to recapitulate the clear principles which have emerged from this discussion:

1. Direct limitation of material in service and in stock, proposed by Count Bernstorff;

2. Budgetary limitation, which has the support of several delegations;

3. A combination of the direct method and the budgetary method suggested, I think, by M. Litvinoff;
4. The system now proposed by General de Marinis,—namely, to combine the direct and the budgetary methods with the various gradations which he has clearly explained.

Finally, we have a proposal of principle by the United States delegation, with which I fully associated myself yesterday; this consists in an alternative between the direct method and the method of budgetary limitation.

We unanimously accepted publicity as the fundamental basis for the limitation of material, although we agreed that, by itself, publicity limits nothing. We could enumerate the five principles which I have just mentioned, and each delegation could say whether it is in favour of principle No. 1, principle No. 2, and so on. We should then know the number of delegations in favour of each system and could thus settle the question by a single vote.

In any case, I think that, if we vote on anything but principles, we shall never arrive at a definite result. We could afterwards appoint a sub-committee representing the chief exponents of the different systems to draw up a text for insertion in the Convention. I repeat that, if we do not first settle the question of principle, a vote will be useless.

M. Sato (Japan). — I should first like to explain my attitude to the Italian amendment and afterwards to touch on the question of procedure.

The Italian amendment recommends the simultaneous adoption of the two systems of limitation—direct and indirect—and thus provides for the co-existence of these two methods of limitation. We know already, however, that there are at least two very important delegations which will be unable to accept that combination.

In addition to direct limitation, the Italian amendment provides for budgetary limitation on the part of all countries. Mr. Gibson told us the other day that, for constitutional reasons, the United States would be unable to accept budgetary limitation. Consequently, the Italian amendment would not cover the case of Mr. Gibson, who would be unable to accept this combined system.

Moreover, M. Cobian has told us that his country would prefer direct limitation and could not agree at the same time to indirect budgetary limitation.

There are thus two delegations which could not accept the combined method suggested in the Italian amendment.

Personally, I also have a strong objection to this combination. I agree to budgetary limitation, but I cannot commit my Government to direct limitation as well. My Government takes the view that, without very strict supervision, direct limitation would be ineffective or would, at best, have the same value as publicity.

Moreover, if General de Marinis’ proposal for direct limitation were to be extended to material in stock, my Government would not be able to accept this either. The arguments against it have been explained at great length during the last four years. This question was first examined by Sub-Commission A, and at the third session we had an opportunity of explaining our views very fully. I have already stated the reasons why it is impossible for my Government to accept direct limitation of the material in stock. My Government’s views have not changed during the last four years, because Governments do not decide lightly on questions of such importance. My Government therefore adheres to its previous opinion.

You see, therefore, the difficulties in regard to the Italian proposal. On the one hand, the American and Spanish delegations could not accept it and, on the other hand, my Government could not accept direct limitation, more particularly if it is to include the direct limitation of material in stock. It would be impossible for my Government to sign a Convention containing this obligation.

In view of all these difficulties, I should like to suggest to the Commission another method of procedure. Generally speaking, I am in favour of the procedure suggested by M. Cobian. In my opinion, a separate vote should be taken on the two systems—direct limitation and indirect limitation.

I should like to add, however, that the adoption of either of these two methods should not preclude the possibility of allowing exceptions in the case of certain countries which cannot accept either system.

I do not know whether the Commission will adopt direct limitation or indirect limitation. The vote will show which system is favoured by the majority. We should therefore vote separately on the two systems, on the understanding that the adoption of either method of limitation will not preclude the possibility of exceptions being allowed in the case of countries which cannot adopt either method. This seems to me to be the only possible method of procedure and I believe it will give satisfaction.

The Hon. Hugh Gibson (United States of America). — I reach out for M. Cobian’s proposal somewhat as a drowning man reaches out for a large and substantial life-preserver. It seems to me that he has offered us a way of simplifying our procedure and getting on with the subject we are all anxious to get on with.

I confess that I find the present system very confusing with this avalanche of proposals and amendments, and I think it would be very difficult for anyone, without a card index, to have a very clear idea of them in their present form. I am glad M. Cobian has made a suggestion which will put all these views into the form of a tabulated statement, where we can see clearly where we stand.

I do not want this to be taken as criticism, because this general discussion has been extremely valuable; and, in addition, we have, in fact, performed a miracle—we have resurrected a text that
died on second reading. It was completely dead; we have raised it; discussed it and really got back to fundamentals. To put it another way, I think we might say we went back to Genesis. As we went back to Genesis, I felt obliged to bring the matter up to Exodus, that is our exodus on the subject of budgetary limitation. I think, if we act according to M. Cobian's system, we may trust that the Bureau, as it has often done before, may find a way out and bring us into the Promised Land, and perhaps lead us on to Revelation.

M. Bourquin (Belgium). — I agree with Mr. Gibson that M. Cobian's proposal has clarified the discussion to some extent. Up to the present we seemed to be groping our way in the dark and, personally, I felt very uneasy. I regret to say that I do not yet feel altogether reassured.

The question has been presented in a simple form. We have been told that there are certain main principles which have already been discussed and between which we must decide. I agree that there is a clear distinction between principles and technical methods of application, and that we must first take a decision on principles. I should like to say, however, that, from this point of view, the two alternative systems which have been defended during our discussions are not quite on the same footing. This is a point to which I should like to draw the Commission's attention before the vote is taken.

In the case of budgetary limitation, the principle is very clear, because we know the object. We know that what we want to limit is the total expenditure on war material of every category and description.

M. Massigli told us the other day that the question of the limitation of budgetary expenditure would require further study by experts, and I quite agree with him on this point. However, the purpose of this study would not be to define the object of the limitation, it would deal exclusively with the technical methods of achieving that object.

In the case of what is termed the principle of direct limitation, it is not merely a question of doubts as to the methods of application, but of doubts and confusion in regard to the actual object of the limitation. This was shown very clearly and simply by M. Massigli, and I need not repeat his explanation. In discussing the Italian proposal, he asked what was meant by material in service and material in stock. These expressions are misleading, and the previous discussions of the Commission have shown that it is necessary to define the meaning of those terms. In regard to air material in particular, there was very lengthy discussion regarding the definition of material in service and material in stock. The meaning of these two terms is not clear in our minds.

There are other questions which would have to be settled. The proposed tables are blank. What are they going to contain? This matter raises a number of queries and, as the honourable representative for Bulgaria, who has a highly mathematical mind, would say, there are a number of "unknown quantities" which relate to the actual object of limitation and not the methods of application.

If you ask me to vote on the principle of direct limitation or the combination of this with indirect limitation, it will be impossible for me to do so until I know exactly what direct limitation is to cover.

I should like to support an observation made by M. Sato. It is obvious that we shall not succeed in obtaining unanimity for either formula. One may obtain a very large majority, but it will not receive unanimous support. If we obtain a very large majority, we shall go away at one o'clock or thereabouts feeling extremely satisfied. But will the Disarmament Conference for which we are working be equally satisfied? When the time comes to apply the formula which we have adopted, the Conference will find that there is opposition; and it will not be possible, therefore, on the basis of this single formula, to arrive at a general Convention which will be adopted unanimously. It is essential for us to bear in mind, at this stage, that the minority will not give way to the majority. It will maintain its point of view; consequently, the formula which has obtained the support of the great majority will not be applicable to the general Convention, which requires unanimity. I regret this, but we have to face the facts, and in these circumstances I do not think we can be content with a single formula. We shall have to adopt at least two, if not three, formulae. The British proposal has this advantage—that it contemplates several formulae. It would, of course, be best to draw up a single formula, but this cannot be done.

If we are to have several formulae, I think that we should put them in order of preference. We ought to inform the Conference that the majority of our Commission was in favour of such and such a principle. We should thus simplify the work of the Disarmament Conference as far as possible. In view of the circumstances, we can only lighten the task of the future Conference by indicating an order of preference. I therefore concur entirely with the view expressed by M. Sato.

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — What is Mr. Cobian's proposal? It is that we should vote on five or six different principles. He has not defined them, he has only indicated them. I cannot believe we shall get very far by that method. We shall have a number of formulae which no one will know the meaning of. I feel that, if you depart from the regular method in these matters, you always get into confusion. What is the position under ordinary procedure? I have moved a motion, and General de Marinis and M. Litvinoff have proposed alternative
propositions—amendments really, but they are different propositions. I think the only thing to do is to vote on these propositions separately and immediately. We know exactly what they are, we know exactly what they propose. I personally think that they are not satisfactory, and I cannot vote for either of them; I can only vote for my original proposition, but, whatever happens to them, we have got to put something into the Convention. With great respect to M. Bourquin—it is the first time I have not agreed with him—I cannot agree with him in this. I cannot agree to the principle of having alternative schemes in the Convention. It will show us up as being quite incapable of producing a definite proposal for the consideration of the Conference. Therefore, I hope we shall stick to that principle and have something in our Convention of a perfectly definite character. Whatever happens to these motions of General de Marinis and M. Litvinoff, I shall continue to move my proposal, which I think is the only definite proposal, for insertion into the Convention. If, when that is moved, it is thought it ought to be expanded, by including direct limitation, by giving an alternative or by giving any other proposal you desire to include, anyone can move an alternative or an addition. I beg the bureau now to put the amendment of M. Litvinoff or the amendment of General de Marinis, whichever ought to come first, but to put one of them to the Commission, and, if it be carried, it, of course, takes the place of my paragraph 3; but, if not, I shall ask the Commission to vote for my paragraph 3.

The President. — Mr. Gibson will speak to clear up a small point.

The Hon. Hugh Gibson (United States of America). — I have asked to speak because I want to make clear to Lord Cecil that I have not intended to question that his proposal was the regular and orderly way of dealing with the subject, and I myself find no difficulty in voting for this proposal subject to possible changes of drafting. I favoured the other proposal, to which Lord Cecil has referred, only because there have been such a number of amendments and explanations, and I felt that, if there could be a tabulation of the views expressed, it might provide a way out. But, obviously, if we could have a regular vote it would clear the way. I think if, as suggested by Lord Cecil, we could proceed to an immediate vote on the resolutions that would solve our difficulty.

General de Marinis (Italy). — I regret to have to speak again. I quite recognise that it is necessary to close the discussion and to take a vote, and I therefore thank Lord Cecil for his suggestion. However, I must say a few words in view of the criticism of my proposal.

There are many things I could say in reply to the apprehensions which have been expressed concerning future inventions, but I will leave them unsaid because I do not wish to take up the Commission's time.

It was stated just now that it was not possible to distinguish between material in stock and material in service, and that this was a matter for the experts. If we are going into technical discussions, I think we may remain here for centuries.

What is the object of the limitation of material? It is to reduce the whole material of a country, whether in stock or in service. I quite realise that part of the material in stock—for instance material assigned to certain units which is taken into service for example, during manoeuvres)—changes its character, and that in this way a large quantity of material in stock becomes material in service.

It may be said, therefore, that this is not material in stock but material in service. It is the duty of a country in all good faith to reduce all its available material; that is the whole question. If at a given moment a certain country brings into service a much greater quantity of material than that allowed it, all the other States would have the right to say that it was partly material in stock, the total material remaining the same.

You will see, therefore, that, if we enter into questions of an exclusively technical nature, we shall never agree. The question is one of good faith. When we speak of limiting material we refer to war material as a whole.

Our distinguished colleague, the honourable delegate for Belgium, said just now that the great advantage of indirect limitation—i.e., budgetary limitation—is that the object of the limitation is clearly defined. I would point out, however, that, as a matter of fact, we have had the greatest difficulty in deciding to what things budgetary limitation was to apply.

A committee of experts sat for months and found it extremely difficult to determine the object of the limitation. They raised the question, for instance, whether the construction of a military road or railway, or a subsidy given by a certain Government to some industry which might be used for military purposes, were to be covered by budgetary limitation.

It was for that reason that we hesitated to accept budgetary limitation—because the object of that limitation was not clear.

I should not have spoken if a direct reference to the question of material in stock and in service had not been made. However, I hope that we shall soon be able to take a vote, which will end the matter.
M. Massigli (France). — I merely wish to say that the reason I referred to the difficulty of drawing a distinction between material in stock and in service was not only because I made the same remark last year and did not meet with any contradiction, but also because, if you open the report of Sub-Commission A at page 71, right-hand column, you will find a reference to that difficulty. Unless I am mistaken, the Italian expert associated himself with the drafting of the report.

General de Marinis (Italy). — This is not a technical question but a question of good faith. We desire to reduce the whole of the material at a country's disposal. Whether it is shown as in stock or in service that country will undertake to reduce the whole of its material to the figure fixed. That is the whole question: but, if we enter upon a technical discussion, difficulties will arise. Those difficulties will disappear if a country loyally undertakes to reduce the whole of its material and gives the assurance that its total material will not exceed the sum of its material in service and in stock. This is obviously a question of good faith.

The President. — I appreciate the attempts made by a large number of delegates to clear up the question in order to facilitate the work of the Conference. May I say, however, that, in my opinion, the only way to clear up the matter is to adopt my proposal that we should vote on the three amendments to Lord Cecil's text.

Perhaps in the circumstances M. Litvinoff and M. Sato would consent not to speak?

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — I would readily have responded to the appeal of the President if it had been made a few minutes earlier. It happens, however, to come just at the moment when it is my turn to speak, and I must, in this instance, regret that I am not able to fall in with his suggestion.

The President. — I addressed myself both to M. Sato and to yourself.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — I would have been quite happy to speak on procedure only if the Belgian delegate had not made a passionate appeal in favour of the method of reduction which he is advocating. I shall restrict myself to a very few words in answer. He based his argument mainly on the ground of simplicity, and prefers the method he advocates because of its simplicity. I would respectfully point out to the Commission that the question of disarmament is by no means a simple question—far from it. The simplest way of solving the question of disarmament would be to leave armaments alone. If the Commission agreed to the reduction, for example, of only the effective of land armies, that would be a bit less simple, but it would still be a simple enough method. The simplicity of the method is in inverse ratio to the extent of disarmament, and for that reason I cannot agree with the proposal that we should only strive after simplicity. Reduction by budgetary limitation of expenditure is not so simple as it appears to the Belgian delegate. He is against direct reduction because he does not know exactly what will be reduced in that way. I am against budgetary expenditure limitation because I know exactly what will not be reduced. I know that budgetary limitation will merely affect future armaments, if that, leaving existing armaments as they are. For that reason I am against budgetary limitation of expenditure only.

Now with regard to the remarks of M. Massigli, he complains that we have no tables before us, and that we cannot, therefore, deal with direct reduction. I would, with all respect, remind M. Massigli that this session began in April 1929, and during this session tables have been introduced which are before us. You will find in the Minutes of the first half of his session, pages 160 and 161, tables proposed by the German and the Soviet delegations. They may be lengthened or they may be shortened, but they exist, and, therefore, I think that that objection falls to the ground.

M. Sato (Japan). — I regret that I cannot respond to the President's appeal. Moreover, I am encouraged to speak by several of my colleagues.

I proposed a procedure similar to that suggested by M. Cobian, and several of my colleagues are in favour of it. If the Commission does not consider it advisable to take a vote on the Cobian-Sato proposal, I will not press the matter, unless M. Cobian desires to maintain his proposal.

I have thus no objection to a vote being taken on Lord Cecil's proposal; but, before this is done, I should like to ask him for certain explanations which might facilitate the adoption of his motion.

In paragraph 3 of his text, the British delegate proposes a parallel recommendation in favour of the three methods—the direct, the indirect and a combination of the two.

The third will naturally be capable of various sub-divisions.

The British proposal does not indicate a preference for any one of these three methods. If this proposal be adopted, what will be the position? The Commission will doubtless be obliged to discuss the matter article by article. This will bring us at once to Article TA in regard to which there is a German proposal for direct limitation.

What attitude is to be taken by those who are opposed to that method of limitation?

I am myself against the method of direct limitation and shall naturally have to combat the German proposal, and I hope that a large number of delegations will continue to combat this method and will endeavour to exclude it from the draft Convention.
Similarly, when we come to indirect limitation by means of budgets, those who consider that direct limitation is the only possible method will doubtless do their utmost to exclude indirect limitation.

Consequently, I do not quite see how we are to proceed in this discussion. It would be somewhat incongruous for me to accept a method of limitation which I should afterwards be obliged to combat.

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — When I presented my resolution—the third part of it—I meant it to be a summary of what, as I understood it, was the result of the debate on the first day, and I thought that we had agreed on the first two propositions, and yesterday's vote showed that we had. I thought that, with respect to the third part, there was a majority in favour of Budgetary Limitation, but that there was no majority (as far as I knew) in favour of the other methods, either the direct or the indirect. My resolution merely summarises that result. I do not think you can go further as a result of the general discussion, and any attempt to go further in general discussion will merely lead to endless debate and not to a definite result. Therefore I want to come back to the definite proposals for the Convention. I have already given notice that if my resolution be passed, I shall ask to move at this place, as part of the limitation of land material the two first paragraphs of which the British delegation gave notice. If these two paragraphs be accepted, it will be open to anybody—General de Marinis or M. Cobian—to add to them some combination of the direct limitation method, or it will be open to Count Bernstorff or anybody else to move an alternative in favour of direct limitation. We shall then vote on that precise proposition and know exactly what we are voting on, because we shall see the exact proposal made with the exact consequences. I hope now that the Commission will be good enough to adopt my proposal, which seems to me to be the best in view of getting a clear and businesslike determination of this question.

The President. — We will now proceed to vote on the first amendment to the third paragraph of the British proposal—i.e., the proposal submitted by the Soviet delegation.

Before the vote is taken, I have to communicate a letter which I have received from the Ambassador Munir Bey.

This letter reads as follows:

"Geneva, November 14th, 1930.

"As it had the honour to state yesterday in the Commission, the Turkish delegation will vote in favour of any system for the limitation of war material. In order to avoid having to ask to speak when the various proposals in regard to this matter are put to the vote, the Turkish delegation desires to confirm its statement that its acceptance in each case will be subject to the proviso which it has already formulated in regard to the necessity of making an exception in favour of non-industrial countries and of those whose budgets are smaller than a figure to be determined by the Conference. In order to avoid any misunderstanding, I would request you to be good enough to take note of this declaration before the Commission proceeds to vote.

(Signed) Mehmed Munir."

M. Fierlinger (Czechoslovakia). — I do not quite understand the purport of the Turkish delegate's letter, because it appears to me that, if a delegation cannot accept a certain system, it should abstain from voting.

Munir Bey (Turkey). — Each delegation has the right to make any reservation which it thinks fit. I do not consider that the Turkish delegation's reservation calls for any discussion. It is not a motion.

M. Fierlinger (Czechoslovakia). — Nevertheless, if a reservation be made in regard to a certain point, it is hardly possible to vote on that point.

The President. — Delegations can make any reservations they wish.

M. Fierlinger (Czechoslovakia). — Even so they cannot vote in favour of a system in regard to which they have made an express reservation.

The President. — With regard to the Soviet proposal, I was asked at the beginning of the meeting to have the vote taken by roll-call. I think that the most practical procedure would be for delegations to raise their hands, and I will call out the names of the delegations which are in favour and those which are against.

The vote was then taken.

The following five delegations voted for the Soviet proposal:

Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

1 Note by the Secretariat. — See page 99.
The following twelve delegations voted against it:

United States of America, Belgium, British Empire, Czechoslovakia, Finland, France, Greece, Japan, Persia, Poland, Roumania, Yugoslavia.

Colonel Ali Khan Riazi (Persia). — My reason for voting against this proposal is that we cannot accept direct limitation without supervision, because ours is a non-producing country and is consequently dependent on other countries.

M. Holsti (Finland). — I have to make the same declaration as the honourable delegate for Persia as regards the facts that the proposal did not include the principle of control and secondly that my country, generally speaking, does not produce war material.

The President. — The Soviet delegation's proposal has been rejected by twelve votes to five.

Count Bernstorff (Germany). - May I renew my request for a nominal roll-call for the next vote, because the procedure which has just been employed does not enable us to know which delegations abstained, and this may be of interest.

VOTE ON THE ITALIAN PROPOSAL.

The President. — This will be done. A vote will now be taken on the Italian proposal. I understand that General de Marinis wishes a vote to be taken first on the two points which he has mentioned. I will therefore ask the Commission the following question: Does the Commission accept the principle of indirect limitation by means of budgets combined with the direct limitation of material in service?

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — This is not the amendment we have been given notice of. The only amendment I have commences with "Considers that the best method..."

Dr. Markovitch (Yugoslavia). — I have already made the same observation as Lord Cecil.

General de Marinis (Italy). - I flattered myself that I had been understood. I said that we should endeavour to go as far as possible in the matter of the reduction of armaments, both as regards material in stock and material in service—that is to say, war material as a whole. In my desire to obtain as much as possible, and because I know that "striving to better, oft we mar what's well", I said that I would be content with a combination of budgetary limitation and the limitation of material in service. I therefore asked that a separate vote should be taken on my entire proposal and on the first part of it—that is to say, that members of the Commission should state whether they are prepared to accept indirect limitation together with the limitation of material in service, or whether they would accept budgetary limitation combined with the total limitation of material, whether in service or in stock.

Some speakers were concerned with the difficulty of distinguishing between material in service and material in stock. I admit that in some cases—during manoeuvres, for instance—material in store is used. It is then no longer material in stock. This raises the question of good faith. Material in service is the whole of the material distributed to the troops in normal times. Moreover, it would be a simple matter for the Commission to adopt a definition of material in service. Consequently, the objections raised in this connection do not affect the substance of my proposal.

First question: Is the Commission prepared to accept the principle of the combination of budgetary limitation with the limitation of material in service? If necessary, a sub-committee could be appointed to define what is meant by material in service.

Second question: Does the Commission accept budgetary limitation combined with the direct limitation of all material in service and in stock?

M. Bourquin (Belgium). — The text of the Italian draft before us states:

"The Commission considers that the best method for limitation of land material would consist in a combination of the two systems of direct limitation and budgetary limitation."

If I have rightly understood the text, which has not been circulated but which was read out to us just now and reread by General de Marinis, this appears to be different: it states that the Commission accepts the principle of a combined system, which is quite another thing.

I am not opposed in principle to the direct limitation of material, but, for reasons which I will not repeat, I should prefer budgetary limitation. If I were asked whether the combined method is the best, I should reply: "No!"

You see, therefore, that it is necessary to have a definite text before a vote is taken, and this small illustration shows that there would be a considerable difference in the result of the vote according to the formula adopted. My attitude would be quite different, according to the text. I repeat that, if I were told that the best solution is to combine the two systems, I should disagree.
Lord Cecil (British Empire).—I am sure General de Marinis will forgive me if I venture to make a suggestion to him. I quite understand the way the difficulty has arisen, but I think he will see there is a little difficulty because we have not got the definite text before us. Also, a little difficulty is caused by the vote we have just taken, because we have voted now for the time being against the proposition—at any rate till we see something more precise—of a complete limitation by direct and a complete limitation by indirect. Therefore there only remains really, as far as I understand it, the other proposition of General de Marinis—namely, limitation of the material in service. I should like to know a little more about exactly what is intended before giving a vote myself.

I make this suggestion. There is nothing in General de Marinis' proposition which is really in conflict with the proposition I have made. I have merely recited the three propositions, pointing out that there is a majority, as I believe there is, in favour of indirect limitation. He agrees with that, but he wants to add something to it. I suggest very respectfully for his consideration that he should withdraw his proposition now and bring up a definite amendment to the Convention, when he will be able to explain exactly what it is. He may have two alternative propositions to explain exactly what it is that he proposes to ask the Commission to adopt. I respectfully suggest to him that that would be of great assistance to us. We do not want to vote against any proposition of General de Marinis if we can possibly avoid it.

M. Westman (Sweden).—With all due deference to Lord Cecil, I would say that I do not think that the Italian proposal is affected by the vote which has been taken on the Soviet proposal. I was unable to accept the latter because it referred to detailed tables, and I have always maintained that, in the case of direct limitation, we should confine ourselves to a few broad categories of arms.

I should like to ask General de Marinis whether he does not think it would be best, first, to vote on the Italian text as it stands, and afterwards, if necessary, on the more limited Italian proposal covering the direct limitation of material in service alone.

Count Bernstorff (Germany).—I associate myself entirely with what M. Westman has just said.

General de Marinis (Italy).—The sole object of my suggestion was to facilitate the acceptance, at all events of part of my proposal, by delegations which might have found it difficult to accept it in its entirety; I also desired to avoid prolonging the discussion. I now see that this proposal has given rise to further discussion, and, while thanking Lord Cecil for his suggestion, I prefer to accept the proposal of the Swedish delegate and Count Bernstorff—that a vote should be taken on my proposal as it stands. If any delegation thinks that it is not clear, it can abstain from voting or can vote against it, but I desire to maintain it as it stands. This will save the Commission's time, and I think I have clearly explained the object of this proposal.

M. Cobión (Spain).—If a separate vote had been taken on the two sub-paragraphs of paragraph 3, I should have voted for the first and against the second. Since General de Marinis proposes to submit the whole of paragraph 3 to the vote, I can only vote against it.

The President.—We will now vote on General de Marinis' proposal as it stands.

The vote will be taken by roll-call.

The following nine delegations voted for the Italian proposal:

Canada, Germany, Irish Free State, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Turkey, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Venezuela.

The following eleven delegations voted against it:

Belgium, British Empire, Czechoslovakia, Finland, France, Japan, Persia, Poland, Roumania, Spain, Yugoslavia.

The following five delegations abstained:

United States of America, Bulgaria, China, Greece, Norway.

The Italian proposal was rejected by eleven votes to nine; with five abstentions.

VOTE ON THE GERMAN PROPOSAL.

The President.—We will now vote on the German proposal.

Colonel Ali Khan Riazi (Persia).—I desire to repeat the declaration which I made when the previous vote was taken.
M. Holsti (Finland). — My vote is subject to the same reservation as in the last vote.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — The Swedish delegate has misunderstood me. I have alluded to tables but not to specific tables. Tables are necessary, and we cannot reduce armaments without them. I think our amendment is the same as the Italian amendment, and I think M. Westman will be happy to know he has unconsciously voted for a Soviet amendment.

M. Westman (Sweden). — I desire to point out that the Soviet delegation’s proposal contains an explicit reference to “detailed” tables. It was for that reason that I preferred the Italian proposal.

The President. — We will now vote by roll-call on the German amendment, which reads as follows:

“(3) The Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference is of opinion that the principle of direct limitation should be applied to land war material.”

The vote will be taken by roll-call.

The following nine delegations voted for the German amendment:

United States of America, Canada, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Turkey, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Venezuela.

The following nine delegations voted against it:

Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Finland, France, Japan, Persia, Poland, Roumania, Yugoslavia.

The following seven delegations abstained:

British Empire, Bulgaria, China, Greece, Irish Free State, Norway, Spain.

The German amendment was not accepted.

VOTE ON THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF THE BRITISH PROPOSAL.

The President. — We now come to the third paragraph of the British delegation’s proposal.

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — I have said all I have to say on the proposition, but I would like to add that, in my view, the adoption of this resolution leaves the door open to anyone to propose definite and precise amendments to the Convention on the lines of this paragraph.

Count Bernstorff (Germany). — We are going to vote on a text which “recognises that the majority of the Commission are of opinion . . .”. I merely desire to point out there is not at present a majority.

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — That is quite true at the moment, but there will be a majority in a few minutes.

Count Bernstorff (Germany). — We are none the less going to vote on a statement which is not correct.

M. Massigli (France). — What Lord Cecil has said is true. The only way out is first of all to vote on the last principle, which has not yet been voted upon.

M. Politis (Greece). — I think before saying that there is a majority, it must be shown that there is one; and the simplest method—I desire to make a formal proposal—is first to vote on the first part so as to ascertain whether the majority of the Commission “are of opinion that, as to land war material, the most practical method of securing this more precise limitation is by budgetary limitation”.

General de Marinis (Italy). — Before we can vote we must have a text.

M. Politis (Greece). — We have one.

The President. — You have the text before you.
General de Marinis (Italy). — Before you can say “the majority” you must be sure that this majority exists.

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — I think General de Marinis is right: it is better to vote for the motion on the paper. It does seem to me it is a refinement of verbal criticism to say you cannot recognise that a majority exists without first saying there is a majority and then recognising the fact. But you can decide whether such a majority exists and then recognise that it does. Rather than pursue the point, I think it is better to vote for the motion on the paper.

The President. — M. Politis has made a definite proposal that the paragraph should be divided. I suggest voting first of all on the first sentence.

Dr. Riddell (Canada). — Yesterday I said I favoured direct limitation and should vote for it; but, if that did not receive a majority, I would vote for indirect or budgetary limitation. Now it is difficult for me to say that we consider this is the best method, which is what Lord Cecil’s resolution calls for. We are prepared to support it because the other proposals have not received a majority, and we would like to support it; but to make a definite declaration like this, which we should do if we voted for it, puts us in a difficult position. The other proposal makes it much easier for us. I want to vote for budgetary limitation, but I do not want to have it put on record that this is the best method. I think it is the method which may find acceptance with the Commission or may find a majority in favour of it, and that is why I am going to vote for it.

M. Westman (Sweden). — I entirely agree with what Dr. Riddell has just said. I shall only support the indirect method because it will be the only one left as the result of our discussion and not because it is the most practical.

M. Rutgers (Netherlands). — I, too, am in the same position as Dr. Riddell. If you ask me whether I consider indirect limitation to be the most practical method, I should say “No”; but that does not mean that I would not accept that method.

General de Marinis (Italy). — I desire to associate myself with what the last speakers have said. It is obvious, as I have already stated in my proposal, that the best solution is a combination of the two methods. I shall not be able to support a proposal which states that budgetary limitation is the most practical method. I shall therefore be obliged to vote against the proposal under discussion.

MODIFICATION OF THE TEXT OF THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF THE BRITISH PROPOSAL.

The President. — The meeting will be suspended for ten minutes to enable us to agree upon a text.

The meeting was adjourned at 12.40 and resumed at 12.50 p.m.

The President. — The Bureau has agreed with Lord Cecil and several other delegations on a slight modification of the existing text. As there was not time to have this typed or distributed, I will read it to you very slowly. The following alterations have been made. The first four lines are to be replaced by the following words:

“(3) Accepts the principle of budgetary limitation for land war material, while recognising that certain members prefer the method of direct limitation by specific enumeration and that certain other members would desire to see some combination of the two methods.”

The words “are of opinion” have been replaced by the word “prefer” and the words “other members” by “certain other members”.

This time we shall not vote by roll-call unless you so request.

The Hon. Hugh Gibson (United States of America). — I note that the new text does not mention the fact that there is a majority of the Commission in favour or what the actual majority is. I thought that we were to vote on a text which was founded on the existence of a majority in favour, in which case I should have had no difficulty in voting for the original text. I could have adopted such a text, but in the present circumstances, inasmuch as it is stated that the Commission accepts the principle of budgetary limitation, I regret it is impossible for me to vote for this text.

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — I should like to say to my friend Mr. Gibson that I hope he will not think it is my doing that the text has been changed. I was quite satisfied with the text as it originally stood, and it was only owing to the grammatical scruples of some better-educated people than myself that it was thought necessary to alter it.

The President. — I think there is a very easy way out. It has been suggested by the French delegation that we should simply add the words “by a majority”, and should thus say “the Commission by a majority accepts . . .”.

I think Mr. Gibson will agree to this.
M. Rutgers (Netherlands). — I notice that this text reads: "... recognising that certain members prefer ... and that certain other members would desire ..."

As I belong to both categories I could not accept this text. Moreover, the acceptance of the principle of budgetary limitation does not exclude other combinations; it does not exclude the possibility of inserting the direct method in the Convention.

The President. — I think that if we leave out the word "other" this will meet M. Rutgers’ point.

M. Cobian (Spain). — I merely desire to say that the vote I am about to record is based on all that I said yesterday, and that it is on the basis of those statements that I am voting in favour of this proposal.

The President. — The text upon which we are going to vote reads as follows:

“... The Commission accepts, so far as the majority is concerned, the principle of budgetary limitation for land war material, while recognising that certain members prefer the method of direct limitation by specific enumeration and that certain members would desire to see some combination of the two methods.”

General de Marinis (Italy). — All the observations which I have made were intended to show the necessity of limiting material in stock—that is to say, all existing material. As to-day’s discussion is confined exclusively to future material and has not touched on existing material, I am obliged to vote against this proposal, especially as this text states that the majority prefer indirect limitation, whereas in reality there were an equal number of votes for direct limitation and for indirect limitation.

The President. — We shall, of course, take note of General de Marinis’ observations.

M. Rutgers (Netherlands). — I should like to point out to General de Marinis that there is no question of preference in the text in its present form. Consequently, there is nothing to prevent those members who voted in favour of Count Bernstorff’s proposal from maintaining their former point of view. I might even say that the proposal before us does not really decide anything.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — I regret to have to disagree with M. Rutgers. My reading of this clause (which I confess is very “misty”) is very different from his. This clause presupposes a preference, because it mentions the existence of a majority. I do not regard the budgetary reduction method as preferable to other methods. It is understood that, if I vote against this clause, it is because I am not of the opinion that this method is preferable. That does not say that I am against this method. I cannot vote for this clause. If I vote against it, it must be taken as opposition not to reduction by the budgetary method, but to preference being given to the budgetary reduction over other methods.

The Hon. Hugh Gibson (United States of America). — I should like to give an explanation of my abstention from voting. I am in complete accord with the substance of the third paragraph, but I anticipated that we would have established whether or not there was a majority in favour of budgetary limitation, before voting. As an affirmative vote now might place me in the position of contributing to that majority, I shall abstain from doing so.

M. Massigli (France). — I shall vote for the proposed text on the understanding that the Commission will give its opinion later on the draft resolution submitted by the French delegation concerning the appointment of a committee of Budgetary Experts.

M. Westman (Sweden). — I shall abstain for the same reasons as Mr. Gibson.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

The following sixteen delegations voted for the British proposal as amended:

Belgium, British Empire, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Finland, France, Greece, Irish Free State, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Persia, Poland, Roumania, Spain, Yugoslavia.

The following three delegations voted against it:

Germany, Italy, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The following six delegations abstained:

United States of America, Bulgaria, China, Sweden, Turkey, Venezuela.

The proposal contained in the text read by the President was adopted by sixteen votes to three with six abstentions.
25. Expression of Sympathy with the Japanese Delegation in regard to the Attempt on the Life of the Prime Minister of Japan.

The President. — We have received this morning the news of an attempt on the life of the Prime Minister of Japan. I am sure that I shall be interpreting the feelings of all the members of the Commission in saying that we were deeply grieved at this news. I am very glad to say, however, that M. Sato has informed me that, according to the latest report, the Prime Minister is going on fairly well and that the crime has not had fatal consequences.

I am very gratified to hear this, and should like to express to M. Sato on behalf of the whole Commission our horror at this outrage.

M. Sato (Japan). — The Japanese people have heard with indignation the news of this dastardly outrage. However, as the President has just stated, the latest report is fairly satisfactory, I desire to express my sincerest thanks to the Commission for their expression of sympathy.

The Commission rose at 1.10 p.m.

NINTH MEETING.

Held on Saturday, November 15th, 1930, at 10 a.m.

President: M. Loudon (Netherlands).


The President. — The discussion during the last two days has enabled us to make some progress. The majority of the Commission, by its vote of yesterday, has accepted the principle of limiting material for land warfare by the budgetary method. The discussion has thrown light on the different aspects of the application of this method. We have now to embody this principle in an article and to regulate the details of its application. The drafts submitted by the British and French delegations fulfil that object. Moreover, the text of the draft Article TA, submitted by the French delegation at the first reading, is on the same general lines as the new articles proposed by the British delegation for Chapter III.

I would further remind you that the Soviet delegation has submitted proposals in regard to this question. An amendment by the Netherlands delegation has also been circulated. These are as follow:

CHAPTER III: BUDGETARY EXPENDITURE.

PROPOSAL BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION.

" Article DA to be replaced by the following articles:

" Article DA. — The total annual expenditure counted per budgetary year and allocated according to Tables ..... (home forces and formations of the home country organised on a military basis) and ..... (overseas forces and their reinforcements and overseas formations organised on a military basis), shall not exceed the figures approved by the several contracting States in the present Convention, the military budgets current at the time of the signature of the present Convention being reduced by an equal percentage; an exception being allowed, however, in favour of the States which are weakest from a military point of view and are specially mentioned in the present Convention, and of such States as have reduced their armaments in virtue of international agreements other than the present Convention. The reduction of military budgets shall also extend to the expenditure specified in the table attached to the present Article."¹

" Article DB. — Secret funds intended in a disguised form for extraordinary expenditure on special preparations for war or an increase in armaments shall be excluded from the national budgets. In conformity with the above provision, all expenditure for the upkeep of the armed forces of each State shall be shown in a single chapter of the national budget; their full publicity shall be ensured."

¹ See Tables on pages 12 and 13 of Document C.P.D. 90, of July 1st, 1927.
CHAPTER II: MATERIAL. — SECTION I: LAND ARMAMENTS.

AMENDMENT PROPOSED BY THE NETHERLANDS DELEGATION.

“The Commission adopts the two texts of Article TA. It leaves it to the Conference to decide whether it can agree, in the case of a particular State, to no figures being entered in one of the tables (budget table or table with regard to material). In that case, such table would not apply to that State.”

The President. — I now open the debate on this question.

PROPOSAL BY THE BRITISH DELEGATION.

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — I desire to move now the two articles which are headed DA and DB. The Commission will find them set out in the British proposal. Whether, when the drafting Committee comes to consider this matter, it will regard this as the right place for them in the Draft Convention is a matter which must be considered later on, but I propose to move them now because I think they come conveniently at the end of our discussion on this question. Just let me read them out; they are very short and very simple:

“Article DA. — Each of the High Contracting Parties agrees that its total annual expenditure on land, sea and air forces, in any budgetary year, shall not exceed the figures given for them in Tables ...”

I ought to explain that the tables we have in view are the tables prepared by the special Committee which sat on these subjects in 1927, and appear in document C.P.D.90. You will find a very short table there which they think would carry out the work. I understand that my French colleague thinks further technical enquiries are necessary and of course I shall not oppose any further enquiry, but it is necessary that I should refer the Commission to that table. Our proposal goes on:

“Article DB. — Each of the High Contracting Parties agrees that its total annual expenditure, in any budgetary year, on the upkeep, purchase, and manufacture of war materials shall not exceed the figures indicated in Tables ...”

The war material would have to be shown in a special annex, as has been done in other documents of this Commission. I do not burden my paper by putting it in here in detail. That is the principle which, I venture to suggest, carries out the decision at which we arrived—namely, to apply the system of budgetary limitation. I want to say one or two things in addition. In the first place, it is, of course, quite open to add to this some specific limitation. We were not able to accept that yesterday, but I shall raise no objection if somebody proposes a scheme for some further limitation of a specific kind. However, with the best will in the world I have not been able to satisfy myself that any such scheme is practicable. I want to say two other things and then I do not think I need keep the Commission any longer. Certain of the delegations represented here explained, with very commendable candour, if I may be allowed to say so, the difficulty they feel about this scheme of budgetary limitation. I think that it ought to be very clearly set out in our report that that difficulty, at any rate, exists and will be provided against in some way or another. It may be provided against in a number of ways. For instance, we might have a special exception for certain particular countries enabling them to adopt the system of specific enumeration in view of the very special difficulties that affect them. That would be a possible course, and that might be inserted in an annex. It is quite evident that a full reservation of their position will have to be made in the report—at least, I hope it will be made—and the whole difficulty that we have been in must also be set out in full in the report. I venture very respectfully to suggest to those delegations that feel a difficulty about this matter that that will be sufficient, and it will not be necessary to make any alternative proposals here. I think that such proposals produce an air of uncertainty and irresolution about our proceedings which I personally should regret. I think that we ought to recommend one particular text, pointing out that, owing to the circumstances of the case, it may turn out that that text will not be sufficient to deal with the whole of the difficulties. If it be so, then some such proposal as I have indicated will have to be adopted to meet those difficulties.

In absolute candour, I think that I ought just to add this: the British Government are in favour, as I have said more than once in this Commission, of a complete system of budgetary limitation. But it is quite evident that, if budgetary limitation be rejected, say for naval matters, by other great maritime Powers, it would be very difficult for the British Government to accept budgetary limitation for naval matters. There is a very complete specific limitation of fleets already existing and that would, of course, remain. I think everyone will agree that it would be a very difficult proposition for the British Government to say that they accepted, not only a specific limitation of their fleet, but a budgetary limitation also, whereas other Powers accepted a different standard. I only state that now so that there may be no misunderstanding on the

1 “War material to be defined in a special Annex.”
point when we come to the Conference. Personally, I do not propose to ask the Commission to put in anything of that kind, or even to make a formal reservation on that point at this stage. That is a matter which will fall to be dealt with when we come to the actual Conference settling the final terms of this treaty; but I thought it was only right and fair to mention that matter.

It would be an impertinence for me to talk again about the advantages of budgetary limitation as a system, because we have discussed that ad nauseam, but there is this other point I should like to touch upon. The Commission will see that in our articles the British Government provides first for a limitation of the total annual expenditure on each of the three forces—that is the total, including personnel and everything. Then it provides for a specific limitation of the material of each of the three forces. That is the scheme on which we proceed. I venture to move that now, although it goes a little beyond the particular article we have been discussing, for this reason: the British Government feel that, unless you have a total limitation first and then a specific limitation of material, it will be very difficult to be sure that there has not been some manipulation of the figures which enables a particular country, whilst greatly increasing its expenditure apparently on personnel, is, in reality, spending some of its money which is allotted to personnel on material. Therefore, if you are to have a complete scheme of limitation of material it seems necessary, to the British Government, that you should also have a limitation of the total expenditure, so that it would be impossible, by increasing other items of the war budget, in actual practice to increase the amount spent on material. Those are the broad principles of the proposal I submit to the Commission.

I ought to add that it is the intention to put, in a very general form, the broad principles, because the British Government believes that that is the only practical way in which you are going to deal with these problems. You have, at any rate at the start of a system of disarmament, to be content with broad, general principles of limitation and reduction. We quite agree that we aim, not only at limitation, but at reduction; but we feel that, if you try to go too much into detail, your difficulties will be enormously increased at the final Conference, where the figures have to be filled in, and it is extremely doubtful whether you will gain anything material in the way of certainty of reduction or limitation. We therefore ask the Commission to accept this very general system, leaving it, as we are bound to leave it, to the Conference to fill in the figures which will make that general system really effective as a system of limitation and reduction.

**The President.** — Lord Cecil's remarks refer to Chapter III: but what we now require is a text for Chapter II Section I, and I fear that there may be some confusion on this point. What exactly is intended by Lord Cecil?

**Lord Cecil (British Empire).** — I should be quite content to have this put in Chapter II.

The only thing is, that when the final draft comes to be arranged, it may be that the Drafting Committee will see a better way in which to deal with it; but that is a matter for them. This is to take the place of what is proposed in Chapter II, the chapter we are now dealing with.

**Suggestion by the American Delegation.**

**The Hon. Hugh Gibson (United States of America).** — I have to thank Lord Cecil for the friendly consideration he has shown in regard to this special problem. I am most anxious to respond to his appeal that we keep our text as simple as possible—free from alternative texts and, so far as possible, free from specific reservations.

I should like to go all the way to meet him, but I am sure he will agree that this whole subject is so fluid that we would hardly be contributing to our real purpose if we failed, in some way, to give a picture of the present state of opinion. However, I am quite ready to give up any idea of an alternative text, and I should like to avoid the necessity for adding a specific American reservation.

I should like to make a suggestion for the consideration of the Commission; I am not making a specific proposal. In seeking some way of translating our friendly desire to meet Lord Cecil in regard to terms for our text, one possible means has occurred to me—that is, of course, in the event that our text is confined strictly to budgetary limitation. I obviously cannot make a proposal until we know what our text is to be, but I should like to have the Commission consider whether we could not keep the text in a single column and avoid the necessity for reservations—or at least for an American reservation—by the insertion of a footnote after the text, saying something to this effect:

"In connection with the text of Article..., it should be borne in mind that, on the following resolution, the Commission was evenly divided as follows ..."

Then I suggest that you should give the text of the German amendment to the draft resolution submitted by the British delegation and the vote. I think that might give the picture and at the same time avoid the necessity for reservations.

**M. Massigli (France).** — I think that we are really discussing two questions, if not three, at the same time. There is the article on direct limitation, the article on budgetary limitation and, lastly, a French draft resolution which several delegations regard as an essential factor in the question. As regards Article TA, there is a French first reading draft. I now withdraw it,
because it no longer corresponds to the situation, for it assumes that certain questions, on which we are not agreed, have been settled—for instance, the circumstances in which credits may be carried forward.

We have now to decide what we are going to insert in place of that draft. Lord Cecil has proposed a very simple article—too simple, perhaps, since it implies the solution of certain problems which cannot be settled until the report of the experts, which is to be submitted to the Governments before the Conference, has been made known. Lord Cecil's draft makes mention of certain tables, but they have not yet been drawn up. Document C.P.D.90, to which the British delegation refers, provides, indeed, for a very detailed system of publicity, thirteen categories of expenditure including rates limitations; whereas here we are merely dealing with totals.

I do not understand Lord Cecil's desire to insert such an article in the draft, and I agree with him that it is essential that all this discussion in regard to material for land warfare, Chapter II, Section I, of the draft, should result, after so many arguments, in something more than a blank page. We must arrive at some positive conclusion; and, if I am not mistaken, that is the true object of the British proposal. It seeks to show that there was a majority—as, indeed, is stated in the resolution—in favour of the principle of budgetary limitation.

Our American colleague, who finds some difficulty in the proposal, has made a very interesting suggestion—namely, that we should append the resolutions we have adopted after the article which it is proposed to insert. This would show clearly that the decision only implies the recognition of a principle, and that all the details of its application have still to be elaborated. I think that is a very ingenious suggestion.

Our Dutch colleague made a substantially different proposal; for, if I have rightly understood, he proposes, not simply to adopt two alternative texts expressing the decisions we adopted yesterday, but, in fact, to efface one of them altogether. One of these decisions was of a very definite character, since the Commission, by eleven votes to nine, rejected the idea of combining the two systems; whereas M. Rutgers' text would lead one to conclude that the combination of the two methods was to be the rule, and that the Conference might then allow exceptions to that rule; that is very far from being the case.

After the vote we took yesterday on direct limitation, when the views of the Commission were seen to be divided, it might conceivably be contended that there were two evenly balanced opinions on the Commission, and that the question whether the countries would be free to choose, and the conditions of such a choice, would perhaps have to be dealt with by the Conference.

That was, indeed, the sense of Mr. Gibson's proposal; but I do not think that, at the present moment, it can be claimed that the principle of a combined system commended itself to the Commission.

The only question to consider is, therefore, whether we shall have two alternative texts or a single text representing a principle accompanied, in the form of a note, by a reference to the resolutions adopted, and to the French resolution which, as I have already said, is regarded by many delegations as an essential element in the question.

M. Rutgers (Netherlands).—We are now dealing with the text itself. If I rightly interpret the decision we took yesterday, we did not reject any system—unless it were the compulsory combination of the two systems under review. The Commission did not express its opinion concerning what has been termed the "alternative" system, since none of the resolutions referred to that system. The proposal of the Italian delegation, which was rejected by eleven votes to nine, aimed at a compulsory combination of the two methods of limitation—direct or budgetary. This is proved by the fact that, if I remember rightly, Mr. Gibson did not vote on the Italian proposal. If it had not involved a compulsory combination of the two systems, he would have voted in favour of it, instead of abstaining.

What is called the "alternative" system was not voted upon. The Commission was not asked to express its opinion on that system. I do not know who first used this term, "alternative" system. Perhaps it was myself; but it is not a correct term. It is not proposed to insert alternative provisions in the Convention, and to allow countries to choose between them. The Convention must contain an explicit obligation. The alternative would exist only for the Conference, whose hands we must leave perfectly free in regard to questions which are not technical but political. Our task here is to prepare the Conference, to deal with technical issues and take decisions upon them. But the political decisions must be left entirely to the Conference.

The Conference might have two series of tables before it—one series for budgetary limitation and one for direct limitation. How will they proceed? During the Conference, figures will be under discussion; I have no idea how they will be discussed, as I was not at the London Naval Conference, but it may well prove more difficult than in London. Each Government will produce its figures and announce that it is prepared to accept certain figures in some tables and others in other tables. The Conference will then have to say if it is prepared to allow one State to give its figures in one series of tables, other States in another series, and some States perhaps in both series of tables.

I would, therefore, prefer not to use the word "alternative". Several delegations have been willing to recognise the particular situation of the United States of America. Other speakers have made various reservations, but have inclined towards the notion that a given country might be willing to accept direct limitation but not indirect limitation; they were prepared to consider that suggestion, but solely as an exception. If I am right, it was not suggested that all the countries should be entitled to adopt one plan or the other.

If we accept the notion of an "exception", is there any way of giving it technical expression; or is this not a purely political question? My opinion is that it cannot be given any technical form, and that it is a political question.
Lord Cecil has suggested that it would be quite possible to give technical application to this method by making the draft Convention provide only for indirect limitation, and by giving a summary in our report of our political discussions concerning direct limitation.

If we do not adopt a single text, our report will give an impression of uncertainty and indecision: but, if we accept Lord Cecil’s proposal, there will be an appearance of decision and certainty which will not correspond with the facts. The uncertainty and indecision would therefore subsist.

Perhaps you will reply that, at any rate, there will be more certainty, in the sense that a draft Convention in the form proposed by Lord Cecil would certainly not be adopted; and, indeed, the speeches we have listened to show that a Convention drawn up as Lord Cecil proposes would not be acceptable to all the countries. Our resolution would not therefore, constitute an adequate preparation for the Conference, a preparation which we are appointed to provide. Our task is to prepare the Conference from a technical point of view. We must recognise that certain solutions cannot be adopted in the final Convention, and yet our task is to submit to the Conference, which we are preparing, a text which it will be able to adopt.

As regards the wording of the Netherlands proposal, I have one remark to make now that M. Massigli has withdrawn the French proposal. The Netherlands amendment provides for the adoption of both texts of Article TA. I have no wish to resuscitate the French text, since it has been withdrawn by its author; but, instead of saying “adopts the two texts of Article TA”, we could say “adopts Article TA and Article DB”. That is only a formal modification. The Netherlands proposal in no way excludes the French proposal, which is still acceptable.

To conclude, I feel some hesitation in discussing general budgetary limitation. It seems to me that we are now discussing Chapter II, Material; Section I, Land Armaments. We ought to observe a certain method in our proceedings.

It does not seem to me an orderly procedure, when we are dealing with land armaments, to make comparisons with naval expenditure—a question which has a very remote relationship with the subject now under discussion.

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — I should like to say a few words in answer to M. Rutgers and to express my great admiration for the extremely ingenious reasons which he has presented in favour of doing nothing; but, with every respect to him, it is not our function to present the Conference with all the difficulties that may exist in the way of reaching a conclusion. Our function is to make a recommendation to the Conference as to one way, at any rate, in which those difficulties can be surmounted; it is not to present alternatives but to make recommendations. Therefore, I am very much opposed to the general thesis of M. Rutgers’ proposal.

I should be altogether opposed to the substance of the proposal. Although it is clear that it may be necessary, in particular cases and for particular reasons which will have to be justified to the Conference, to make exceptions to whatever general rule is established, I think it would be an altogether disastrous thing to leave to countries complete liberty of choice as to what system of limitation of armaments they are going to adopt. In substance, therefore, I could not accept the suggestion and, in form, it seems to me to be equally objectionable.

M. Rutgers says that he objects to my articles because they give too much of an air of certitude as to what we are doing. That is not generally the charge that has been made against the proceedings of this Commission, but I think it is justifiable that we should state quite definitely that this system, whether it be completed or added to, is a totally different matter. This system of budgetary limitation did command the assent of a very large proportion of the Commission. I may remind M. Rutgers that, of the three delegates who voted against it, two of them, M. Litvinoff and General de Marinis, explained that they were not opposed to budgetary limitation in itself, but they thought that by itself it was insufficient. Therefore, they were not voting against the principle of budgetary limitation. I do not know whether I can say the same of Count Bernstorff, but I think he was not opposed to the principle of budgetary limitation. The net result, therefore, is that there was only one delegate—I may be misinterpreting even him—who was against this proposal on its merits. In that case, I do not think I am wrong in saying that it is a proposal we have a right to put into our Convention.

M. Rutgers was very anxious we should do nothing which would embarrass the United States delegation. I have the greatest possible admiration and respect for the delegation of the United States of America, and I am quite sure of their capability to look after themselves. Since they have not expressed any opposition to this proposal, provided their own position is made clear, I do not see why M. Rutgers should be more anxious about their interests than they are themselves.

M. Sato (Japan). — I shall start by stating some objections to M. Rutgers’ amendment. He explained that his proposal does not aim at the adoption of an obligatory system including the two methods of limitation—direct and indirect. Nevertheless, he clearly showed that no country will be free to choose one or other method of limitation. The duty of indicating the method to be applied to each country will fall on the Disarmament Conference itself.

I must say quite frankly that I cannot agree with this idea. M. Rutgers said that several countries might give figures in two columns. Now I do not think that is the case. If the
Conference admitted the claims of one or more countries which could not give figures in one column
—whether those for direct limitation or those for indirect limitation—it is very unlikely that
other countries would accept an obligation to give figures in both columns. The proposal could
not be carried out; it is even somewhat illusory.

If we contemplate such a possibility, why not call the system proposed by M. Rutgers "the
alternative system"? Under that system, every country will be entitled to choose one or other
method. That was the system recommended yesterday by M. Cobrian. I do not support that
system either, because it leaves all countries too free to choose one or other method. That would
lead to confusion and produce uncertainty.

When a country goes to the Conference, it must know under which system it comes and what
general rule will be applied to all countries. Just now, Lord Cecil showed the necessity for this
certainty, and I shall have very little to add to what he said. This certainty is absolutely
necessary to every country which goes to the Conference. It must not be possible for a country
to be unaware which method will be applied in its case. Now, according to M. Rutgers' proposal,
a country, though favouring the method of indirect limitation, might at the Conference suddenly
find itself compelled to accept the other method of limitation, since the Conference itself will decide
this matter on political grounds.

My country, for instance, favours the method of indirect limitation. I go to the Conference
and suddenly the Conference tells me that, in consequence of this or that consideration, I cannot
belong to the group of countries coming under the method of indirect limitation, but must accept
the other method. In that case I shall say: "I am very sorry, but my country cannot accept
such an obligation; I must belong to the group of countries coming under the method of indirect
limitation."

As Lord Cecil showed just now, M. Rutgers' idea is very ingenious; but, in my opinion, its
ingenuity is of the kind that is likely to torpedo the Conference.

With Lord Cecil, I said just now that a general rule applied to all was essential and should be
framed in this Commission, for a general rule, obligatory for each Government, must be laid down.
In that way, there would be certainty beforehand as to the purpose for which we are going to the
Conference. I readily agree, however, that it may not be possible to apply this general rule to all
countries and that we may have to accord certain derogations and exceptions.

Personally, I am quite prepared to accept them, to recognise the need for them, to admit the
possibility.

M. Rutgers told us that such derogations and exceptions could not be drafted in technical terms.
This morning, however, Mr. Gibson gave us an example. The example given by Mr. Gibson is,
perhaps, not perfect. The Commission will discuss the way in which the door may be opened for
certain exceptions. That is a question for discussion; but, in principle, I think Mr. Gibson's
idea is excellent. In my opinion, the general rule must be that of indirect limitation. Moreover,
after yesterday's vote, it seems that that would be the opinion of the majority of this Commission.

From these considerations I pass to the British delegation's specific proposal concerning
Article DA.

Lord Cecil proposes that we should limit the total annual expenditure on land, sea and air
forces. He says that the total in question will be the total for each class of armaments—that is
to say, there will be one total for land forces, one total for sea forces, and another for air forces.
Personally, I find it somewhat difficult to accept Lord Cecil's idea. He himself said just
now that he could not accept any limitation of naval expenditure if the other naval Powers could
not, for their part, accept such limitation.

I find myself in the same position. Further, it would be particularly difficult for my country
to accept the principle of the limitation of naval expenditure—not because other Powers are unable
to accept such an obligation, but there is another difficulty in our case. The reason for it is quite
simple. In naval matters, we have already adopted a strict and direct limitation of material.
Further, we have adopted an aggregate limitation of effectives. If we accept a third kind of
limitation—through budgetary means—we shall find ourselves in a position which entails various
disadvantages. Accordingly, we say that, as regards sea forces, we must be content with the direct
limitation of material and effectives.

With regard to air forces, we adopt the same view. Further, we would observe that, in the
case of air forces, there are several countries—of which mine is one—which cannot yet determine
their total for these forces. In Japan, for instance, the air force is now in course of formation.
It is not yet completely constituted and as yet we do not know what expenditure will have to
be allocated to it. It is very difficult for us to estimate that expenditure, and, therefore, it is
also very difficult for us to accept any limitation of it.

Under these circumstances, I propose to strike out from Article DA the reference to sea
and air forces.

In the same article there is another point on which I should like to be quite clear. The
British proposal says:

"Each of the High Contracting Parties agrees that its total annual expenditure on land,
sea and air forces, in any budgetary year, shall not exceed the figures given for them in
Tables . . . "

I am not quite clear as to the meaning of the words "in any budgetary year". Is this the
expenditure provided for in respect of a given year, or is it that provided for in respect of several
years?

If we are required to limit expenditure for several years—that is to say, for the period covered
by the Convention—we shall be confronted by many difficulties, for we do not know exactly how great that expenditure will be, as it is spread over a fairly lengthy period.

These questions are, naturally, rather technical, and I should like to go into them with the technical experts of the other nations. I do, however, feel anxious about them.

As to the French proposal, in principle I entirely agree with it.

I am quite prepared to accept the principle that a small committee of experts should be constituted to draw up the table of expenditure with a view to the limitation and determination of credits for national defence. I should, however, like to add one or two paragraphs to this French proposal; but, as it is not yet under discussion, I shall reserve until later the proposal or proposals which I shall venture to submit.

The President. — What we need is the text of an Article TA. I received a text a few moments ago and I will have it copied and circulated, but I should like first to read it to you.

I wish to shorten the discussion as much as possible; but, if the four speakers whose names are still on my list desire, nevertheless, to speak, I shall ask them to do so.

The text, which for the greater part corresponds to the Article DB proposed by Lord Cecil, is as follows:

"Each of the High Contracting Parties agrees to limit its annual expenditure on the upkeep, purchase and manufacture of war material for land armaments in accordance with the conditions laid down in Annex No. . . . to the present Convention.

"(Note. — In pronouncing on this article, the Governments will take into account at the Conference the report requested from the Committee of Budgetary Experts, which will have been forwarded to them in order of the drawing up of Annex No. . . . "The Preparatory Commission, by sixteen votes to three with six abstentions, adopted the principle of limitation by expenditure. It also discussed the following resolution:

"The Preparatory Commission is of opinion that the principle of direct limitation should be applied to land war material.'

"When this resolution was put to the vote, there were nine votes for and nine against with seven abstentions.

"Lastly, it examined the principle of a combination of the two methods, for which nine members of the Commission voted, while eleven voted against.)"

This Article TA corresponds almost entirely to the Article DB proposed by Lord Cecil. I think we might resume the discussion on this basis.

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — I am quite content that the discussion should go on, on the new text, but I must make two reservations. In the first place, I shall want—at some time or another, I do not care when I do it—to insert the navy and the air in that resolution. It may be found more convenient to do that when we discuss the navy and the air, and I am quite content to await my time for that purpose.

Also, I shall certainly ask the Commission to adopt my Article DA as well. I think, without that first article, the second article would be ineffective. But, there again, if it is more convenient to the Commission to take that at some other stage, I am quite content.

The President. — Could we not discuss Article DA under Chapter III ?

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — By all means—wherever you like to have it. But my assent to the present draft depends—or is at any rate in the hope—that it will be completed in the two ways I have indicated.

Dr. Riddell (Canada). — I am handicapped by not having before me a copy of what the Chairman has just read. I understood, however, that the proposed explanatory note to the Article stated that sixteen voted in favour of budgetary limitation, that three were opposed to it and that there were six abstentions. In my opinion, this is not what the Commission decided yesterday when it adopted the resolution on this matter. In that resolution the Commission stated that it accepted "so far as the majority were concerned, the principle of budgetary limitation for land war material"—in other words, that there was a majority in favour of the principle of budgetary limitation. If my memory is accurate, I believe that the actual text on which we voted yesterday said that the Commission "accepts by a majority the principle of limitation by budgetary methods of land war material". I even raised the question then of whether there was a majority in favour of budgetary limitation; however, I voted for this system because I was desirous of obtaining some type of limitation after direct limitation had failed to obtain a majority. I suggest, therefore, that, in the note which it is proposed to insert under the text of the article, it should be stated that sixteen recognised that there was a majority for the principle of budgetary limitation, but not that by a vote of sixteen to three with six abstentions the Commission accepted budgetary limitation.

M. Fierlinger (Czechoslovakia). — I wish to say a few words concerning the proposal which has just been read and which is still anonymous. I hope that the text will be circulated and that we shall be able to study it. The remarks of our Canadian colleague, in particular, must be borne in mind.

For the moment, we are discussing the principle. At bottom, the principle contained in the new proposal is practically the same as that of the British proposal. Yesterday, a majority of the Commission supported the principle of limitation by budgetary means. I think that the
which classes of expenditure would be affected by our articles. We shall have to try to prevent
consider the French proposal that the question should be thoroughly studied. We must see
ideal. We recognised that there are still many gaps in it. I think we should, therefore, attentively


guarantee that the international undertakings will be carried out. Certainly, this system is not
in a natural and semi-automatic way, we not only ensure publicity but also provide a certain


of material from the field of competence of the general staff to that of the legislative organs. Thus,


text of the resolution gives a very good summary of the situation as it was yesterday. By its


objection to the adoption of either the British proposal or the text which the President has just


read.


about the adoption of either the British proposal or the text which the President has just


history is somewhat mixed, but the ultimate author is M. Massigli. Please note that M. Massigli


agreed beforehand with certain other delegates, particularly with Lord Cecil, who is really the


original author.


M. Colban (Norway). — If I remember aright, one speaker said this morning that the
Commission, by its vote yesterday, rejected the combination of the two methods—direct and
indirect limitation. I do not entirely agree. In my opinion, by eleven votes to nine, with a
certain number of abstentions, the Commission rejected the very definite text of paragraph 3
of the Italian delegation's proposal.


I do not know whether this slight difference as to the interpretation of the vote will ultimately
be of any real importance; but I desire to emphasise the fact that, in my opinion, the question
of any kind of combination is still unsettled.


M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — May I venture to say a few words
on a point of procedure? It seems to me that, in order to save time and work, we ought to be
told at the beginning of each meeting what are the questions we are going to discuss—what are
the limits of this discussion; otherwise, we are apt to “ drift on the open sea ” without knowing
exactly what are the issues before us.


I think, if the Commission has decided that there should be only one method of reduction of
armaments, and that by way of limiting budgetary expenditure, then Chapter II, Section I:
Land Armaments, should be left a blank and all the questions relating to budgetary expenditure
should be referred to Chapter III, and then we could discuss the amendments of the British,
French and Soviet delegations, with one exception—the Netherlands’ amendment, dealing with
the question of tables for land armaments. That is for the Chair to decide; but, at any rate, all
the rest should be discussed at a later date, when we come to Chapter III.


I take it, however, that we are now discussing jointly Chapter II, Section I: Land
Armaments, and Chapter III, and that the discussion will be an exhaustive one and we shall
not refer again to Chapter III. Therefore we shall be in order in speaking, not only of curtailing
expenditure on land armaments, but also of naval and air Armaments. That seems to be the
most simple procedure.


I could not quite grasp the meaning of what Lord Cecil said this morning—that he had no
objection to adding some further methods for the reduction of armaments to the one adopted
by yesterday’s vote.


Lord Cecil (British Empire). — All I meant was that, as far as I was concerned, I would
raise no objection to an amendment of that kind being moved if the Chair thought it in order.
I was only dealing with the question of budgetary limitation.


M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). — We have decided that there should
be no other method of reduction of armaments but the budgetary method. If Lord Cecil thinks
it would be in order to bring in amendments with regard to the direct reduction of armaments, I can, of course, only express my satisfaction to be able to include Lord Cecil among those who voted for the combined method of reduction. Whatever their formal meaning, Lord Cecil's words, if I may be allowed perhaps to interpret his feelings, expressed a certain uneasiness and dissatisfaction with yesterday's vote. He admits that it was not quite conclusive, and that is what has been said to-day by the Canadian delegate and by M. Colban. Indeed, yesterday, we adopted quite an extraordinary means of registering the opinions of the Commission. Usually this is done by means of a vote; but in this case we have adopted a resolution in which not only the opinions of the majority but also the opinions of the minority are mentioned. That means that we have come to no definite conclusion, and the Commission itself is not clear as to whether there was a real majority for one method or another. That being so, we are bound to be, in some measure, in agreement with what the Netherlands delegation told us to-day. We have to consider the possibility of the Conference adopting the direct method of reduction or the combined method of reduction in spite of the decision of the Commission.

Moreover, there have been a great number of abstentions. I suppose that, at the Disarmament Conference, the delegates will have more responsibility and more authority, and that to each question coming before the Conference they will give a direct answer. It is therefore possible that those States who abstained from voting here will adhere, at the Conference, to the direct or combined method.

As far as our delegation is concerned, Lord Cecil stated quite truly that we are not opposed to the principle of reducing armaments by way of budgetary expenditure; but we are opposed to this principle taking the place of disarmament. We did not come here to discuss the question of budgets, but of disarmament, which means the direct reduction of armaments. The Soviet delegation will therefore not be satisfied with any Convention which does not contain some clauses for the direct reduction of armaments; and, if it nevertheless takes part in the discussion now with regard to budgetary expenditure, it does so in the belief that the Conference will do better on this point than the Commission has done.

I should like to remind the members of the Commission and the Chairman himself that, in addition to the amendments on budgetary expenditure from the British, French and Netherlands delegations, there was also an amendment brought some days ago by the Soviet delegation which is of quite a different nature to the other amendments, the principal difference being that, while the British and French and other amendments deal only with the limitation of budgetary expenditure, the Soviet amendment expresses quite clearly that "the total annual expenditure shall not exceed the figures approved by the various contracting States in the present Convention, the military budgets current at the time of the signature of the present Convention being reduced by an equal percentage. . . . This means, not limitation, but reduction."

We should take a vote on the cardinal point: Are we only going to limit expenditure, i.e., to place expenditure on the level existing now, or an even higher level, or to reduce expenditure?

The further characteristic of the Soviet amendment is the mentioning of secret funds. It is no secret that, in many States, there are some funds for military expenditure which are placed either at the disposal of General Staffs or are disguised under expenditure, not actually of War Ministries, but of other institutions. The Soviet amendment proposes that all these secret funds should be done away with, and the whole expenditure of the armed forces of each State shown in a single chapter in the national budget, and that thus full publicity shall be assured.

My proposal is that, when we come to the vote, the Soviet amendment, as the most radical one, should be voted on first.

The President. — I have not forgotten it. I mentioned it at the beginning of the meeting.

Count Bernstorff (Germany). — Every time I have to speak on arguments that we have been hearing for the last five years I feel that I am saying, as Aeneas did to Dido: "Inlandum regina jubes renovare dolorem."

The discussion seems to turn on the method that will be provided for in the Convention. It is clear that there was not a majority of this Commission against the direct limitation of land material. We have before us a proposal by Mr. Gibson and another by M. Rutgers, and now a third is put forward. Personally, I am not expressing any definite preference for one or other method, but I think it is absolutely essential that we should inform the Disarmament Conference that there was not a majority against the direct limitation of land material.

The other day I said that I considered our work, above all, from the historical standpoint. In this connection I should like to remind you of what occurred in the early days of this Commission. Five years ago we convened so-called sub-Commissions of Experts—I say "so-called" because now we are doing the opposite—whose duty it was to inform us on more or less technical questions. We had a Sub-Commission A and a Sub-Commission B; and these convened a Joint Commission. The last-named unanimously adopted the following decision: "For these reasons, limitation by expenditure only would be inadequate as the basis of a Convention."

Budgetary limitation alone is not acceptable to me because it does not cover a tremendous amount of material accumulated in anticipation of a war.

M. Cobian (Spain). — Yesterday, my friend Mr. Gibson abruptly parted company with me when we were marching together towards the Promised Land. This is the result. The Commission was unwilling to vote on principles, and now everyone interprets yesterday's vote quite differently. I agree with what M. Cobian has just said concerning the combination of the two methods, and I would point out that, when we were about to vote on the Italian proposal, I said that, if a distinction were made between the two parts of paragraph 3, the vote would be clearer, as we should have voted first on the combined system and then on the remainder of the Italian proposal.

As M. Sato referred to me just now, I should like to make clear when and how I spoke of the alternative. It was when delegations were each giving their opinion on the systems before us—that is to say, before a vote was taken on any proposal. But since we have adopted the British draft resolution, which clearly states that the majority of the Commission accepts the budgetary solution, I am not entitled to press for an alternative solution, which, in reality, has been rejected by the majority of the Commission. Only in those exceptional conditions emphasised by M. Sato is it possible, after yesterday's vote, to maintain this alternative for definite and well-defined exceptional cases. I therefore agree with M. Sato's proposal.

Count Bernstorff rightly said that there was not a majority against direct limitation, but it is none the less true that there was not a majority for direct limitation. Only a positive vote can justify the assertion that a proposal was accepted.

We have now to consider the last proposal with an explanatory note, referring to Section I of Chapter II, for we are still dealing with the limitation of land armaments. I fully approve of that text, as it reflects yesterday's vote. I think, however, the last paragraph of the note ought to be modified, since it does not exactly correspond with what occurred. I could not accept this proposal—that is to say, the system of budgetary limitation—unless, in fixing the figures, account were taken of the special conditions—of the cost of manufacture of land armaments—in my country. That is the spirit in which I submit the following slight amendment to the French proposal:

"CHAPTER II. — MATERIAL.

"Addition proposed by the Spanish Delegation to Paragraph I, Sub-paragraph (c), of the Draft Resolution submitted by the French Delegation.

"(c) . . . and to the special circumstances of each country with regard to the cost of production of war material."

The President. — Gentlemen, I would ask you to confine yourselves to the consideration of Chapter II, and endeavour to settle the object of our discussions to-day—namely, the text of Article TA. Lord Cecil has informed us that he is prepared to discuss the British proposal when we come to the discussion of Chapter III. Accordingly, I would ask M. Litvinoff to be good enough to allow the discussion of his draft amendment to be postponed until we come to consider Chapter III. Thus, we shall confine ourselves solely to the consideration of the text of Article TA under Chapter II: Material, Section I, Land Armaments. Thus the position will be clearer.

"CHAPTER II. — MATERIAL: ARTICLE TA.

"Proposal by the French Delegation.

"Each of the High Contracting Parties agrees to limit its annual expenditure on the upkeep, purchase and manufacture of war material for land armaments in accordance with the conditions laid down in Annex No. . . . to the present Convention.

"(Note.—In pronouncing on this article, the Governments will take into account at the Conference the report requested from the Committee of Budgetary Experts, which will have been forwarded to them in order to permit of the drawing up of Annex No. . . . The Preparatory Commission, by sixteen votes to three and six abstentions, adopted the principle of limitation by expenditure. It also discussed the following resolution:

"'The Preparatory Commission is of opinion that the principle of direct limitation should be applied to land war material.'"

"When this resolution was put to the vote there were nine votes in favour, nine against and seven abstentions."

"Lastly, it examined the principle of a combination of the two methods, in favour of which nine members of the Commission voted, while eleven voted against.)"

Lord Cecil (British Empire). — May we take it, then, that we are now discussing on the basis of the French proposal which has just been handed in.

The President. — Yes, I should have mentioned it at the end.