have received further confirmation from recent events; but it nevertheless feels entitled to
ascertain, for the purpose of informing its Government and public opinion in its country,
what prospects there are of productive work being done by the Commission in the future.
I consider, Sir, that the request which I am forwarding to you is also of interest to all
the delegations and to public opinion in all countries, and, for that reason, I venture to ask
you to be good enough to reply at an early date.
I am sending a copy of this letter to the Secretariat of the League of Nations.

(Signed) M. Litvinoff.

LETTER FROM M. LOUDON TO M. LITVINOFF.

September 4th, 1928.

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of August 20th, 1928, regarding
the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference.
In reply, I beg to inform you that my reason for not having summoned a new session
of the Commission is that I felt convinced that such a session could not have given the desired
results before the opening of the Assembly. For the present, I consider it desirable to watch
the course of events at the present Assembly, after which I shall be in a position to take a
decision.
I am forwarding a copy of your letter and my present reply to the other delegates on
the Preparatory Commission for their information.

(Signed) J. Loudon.

LETTER FROM M. LITVINOFF TO M. LOUDON.

December 6th, 1928.

In my letter of August 20th last (see above) referring to the resolution adopted by the
Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference at its fifth session, “ to convene
a new session . . . if possible before the next session of the Assembly ”, I asked you
why it had been impossible to convene a session within the stipulated period and on what
date it was proposed that the Commission should meet.
In your reply, dated September 4th, you briefly informed me that in your opinion the
holding of the sixth session of the Preparatory Commission before the Assembly of the League
would not produce the desired results. In reply to my question as to the prospects of the
Commission’s meeting, you stated that you were watching the course of events at the League
Assembly, after which you would be able to come to a decision.
I do not know whether the issue of the events referred to in your letter has given you
satisfaction and assisted you to reach a decision. I only know that the League Assembly
adopted an extremely vague resolution on the disarmament question, instructing the President
of the Preparatory Commission “ to keep in contact with the Governments concerned, so
that he may be apprised of the progress of their negotiations and may be able to convene
the Commission at the end of the present year, or in any case at the beginning of 1929 ”.
Thus, the opening of the next session of the Preparatory Commission is again made
dependent on the issue of diplomatic negotiations among certain countries, which negotiations
have already been responsible for the inopportune suspension of the fifth session of the
Preparatory Commission.
At the last session of the Commission, the Soviet delegation firmly opposed the idea that
the Preparatory Commission itself should abandon the frank and open discussion of disarmament
questions, and that the centre of gravity of this discussion should be transferred to private
diplomatic negotiations among a small group of countries.
The Soviet delegation there and then expressed doubt whether this method could lead
to the establishment of a universally satisfactory basis for an agreement on the subject of
disarmament. It was easy to foresee that the Powers taking part in such negotiations would
deadend to conclude an agreement which would not limit, or would scarcely limit at all,
the quantity and calibre of the armaments of importance to themselves, but would limit as
closely as possible the armaments of other countries — countries which were not taking part
in the negotiations or which entered into them at a later stage. Such an agreement may be
useful for all kinds of purposes, but not for that of disarmament. It would strengthen in the
Preparatory Commission or in the Disarmament Conference itself the position of the parties
to the negotiations and stiffen their resistance to reductions in any particular class of armaments
that might be of importance to them, and consequently it would inevitably place fresh
difficulties in the way of a general agreement for disarmament.
I am now obliged to point out that the Soviet delegation’s apprehensions on this subject
are unfortunately entirely justified. As far as we can judge from the official documents recently
published, the negotiations between Great Britain and France regarding the reduction of
armaments have failed, and have not in the least facilitated the Preparatory Commission’s work in the near future, but have, if anything, complicated it. The sole result of these negotiations so far is that the fifth session of the Preparatory Commission was a failure, the sixth session has not been convened, and that the Commission has been completely inactive for at least nine months.

At the present juncture when these negotiations, though sterile, can be regarded as at an end for a certain period, there do not seem to be any other events the issue of which must be awaited before any decision can be reached as to the convening of the Preparatory Commission. Depressing as the prospect is for the Commission’s work, and still more overclouded by the differences of opinion on certain points connected with disarmament which have been accentuated in the course of the negotiations between certain powers, the Soviet delegation is of opinion that the Preparatory Commission should meet without delay, if only to analyse the reasons for its lack of success, to draw the necessary conclusions from the present situation, and to seek new avenues towards the solution of the problems that confront it.

The deplorable results of the disarmament negotiations between certain Powers — results which we are forced to recognise to-day — are not wholly explained, in my view, by the fact that the negotiations were carried on behind closed doors and that the number of participants was reduced to a minimum; their failure was also due to the principle on which it is desired to base agreement — I refer to the principle of establishing individually the limit for the armaments of each country without reference to any fair and universally accepted general standard. Unfortunately, this principle is a corollary of the draft Convention on Disarmament to which the Preparatory Commission has already devoted several unfruitful sessions. Ever since it joined the Preparatory Commission, the Soviet delegation has constantly urged the necessity of applying a general standard to the reduction of armaments and it was from this point of view that we laid before the Commission at its sixth session our scheme for the reduction of armaments based on the general application of the principle of proportionate reduction (i.e., a reduction of 50 per cent), with a few exceptions for the benefit of the less powerful countries. I am profoundly convinced that, if the Preparatory Commission does not wish to continue marking time or to confess itself utterly impotent to stimulate disarmament, it must promptly and seriously begin its consideration of the Soviet scheme for the reduction of armaments. I would therefore beg you to propose to all the members of the Preparatory Commission that they should obtain the necessary instructions from their Governments in good time with a view to the placing of this scheme on the agenda of the next session of the Preparatory Commission.

My proposals therefore amount, in substance, to a request that the sixth session of the Preparatory Commission should be held as speedily as possible, and that the necessary steps should be taken to enable the Soviet draft Convention on the Reduction of Armaments to be discussed at that session.

I avail myself of this opportunity to offer you the renewed assurances of my highest consideration, and I have the honour to request you, Sir, to bring this letter to the notice of the members of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission.

(Signed) M. Litvinoff.

Letter from M. Loudon to M. Litvinoff.

December 29th, 1928.

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of December 6th, 1928. In conformity with the resolution adopted by the Ninth Assembly of the League of Nations, by which I was instructed to keep in contact with the Governments concerned so as to be able to convene the Preparatory Commission, in any case, at the beginning of 1929, I have come to the conclusion, after mature consideration, that, if the Commission is to continue with success the work it has undertaken and which it decided at its last session to pursue along the lines already laid down, the next session should not be held before next April. Accordingly, I am this day informing all the delegations that the Commission will meet on Monday, April 15th, 1929.

(Signed) J. Loudon.
ANNEX 2.

OBSERVATIONS OF COUNT BERNSTORFF, GERMAN DELEGATE,
ON THE DISARMAMENT PROBLEM.

C.P.D./138.

The German Government has always maintained that an international convention for the reduction and limitation of armaments should embrace all the factors composing armaments. Any convention which disregarded essential elements in armaments would provide not more than the semblance of a solution, since it would not only lead to false conclusions as to the military strength of the various countries, but would also enable the signatory Powers to make good the reduction in certain armaments factors by an increase in others.

Reduction and limitation can, however, only apply to armaments which exist in time of peace, and which have often been contrasted with the "war potential". It is desirable to remove any obscurity in the definition of these terms and to draw a sharp line of demarcation between forces held in readiness in time of peace for immediate employment in war, and forces which can only be created by a State, during the course of hostilities, for use during the war—forces which therefore are not available for military purposes on the outbreak of hostilities. Only the first-mentioned factors—i.e., armaments existing in time of peace—can be used for the purposes of that aggression which it is the essential object of any disarmament convention to render as difficult as possible. These factors alone can be subjected in a convention of the kind to reduction and limitation.

The factors held in readiness in peace-time for immediate military use cover, in the first place, as regards personnel, men with the colours and trained reserves, and, as regards material, the supplies in service and the stored material kept in readiness against an outbreak of war.

We indicate below certain points taken from the general scheme thus outlined for the disarmament convention, on which, in our opinion, it is both urgent and necessary that the Commission should throw further light during its sixth session. The following considerations, however, are solely intended to serve as a starting-point for a discussion of these questions; they are not to be regarded as exhausting the subject, nor are they intended to exclude other suggestions.

I. — THE FACTOR OF PERSONNEL.

(a) The effectives constituting the military strength of a country should be divided into effectives serving with the colours—among these the long-service personnel plays a particularly important part—and trained reserves. In both these groups, the number of officers is of great importance. In addition to these two classes of effectives, there are also in some countries effectives available for immediate service who can be called to the colours at any time without a special mobilisation order being required.

The effectives may be divided not only in the above way, but also into home and overseas troops. If it is intended that the convention should deal with these two categories separately, an effort must be made to ensure that only those troops which a State undertakes to employ solely for the defence and policing of its overseas territories should be regarded as overseas troops. Only if overseas troops are understood to mean troops that are not, in fact, to be employed for military purposes in the home country, will it be possible, in that proper adjustment of armaments which is the object of the disarmament convention, to regard them as a special factor distinct from the home troops without running the risk of under-estimating the military strength of certain countries.

(b) Sub-Commission A has already examined in detail the manner in which the limitation of effectives, including the limitation of the trained reserves, might be dealt with in a convention. In its report, the Sub-Commission gives seven methods by which trained reserves might be limited. These are:

(1) Abolition of compulsory military service;

In addition, reduction of:

(2) The annual contingent;

(3) Material;

(4) Period of service with the colours;

(5) Number of regulars;

(6) Registration of effectives;

(7) Total duration of military service.

It would be desirable for the Preparatory Disarmament Commission, on the basis of the preparatory work of Sub-Commission A, to decide upon the best method of achieving the object in view.

The first and most thoroughgoing method—i.e., the abolition of the system of compulsory military service in all countries where it obtains—would certainly be the most effective. An army built up on this system (we are not thinking here of the militia system with a very short
period of service, such as exists in a number of countries) and capable, thanks to the trained reserves, of being raised in a very short interval to a strength many times that of its peace-time establishment constitutes, by the mere fact of its huge numerical superiority in trained men, a war machine of the most dangerous character. Such a system is, moreover, especially suitable for carrying out large-scale plans of aggression, as it allows of a very rapid mobilisation of a large number of men. Unfortunately, owing to the opposition of certain countries to the abolition of compulsory military service, we are forced to recognise that there is small chance of this method being adopted. Having due regard to these difficulties, Germany would be prepared to investigate, in co-operation with the other States represented on the Preparatory Disarmament Commission, the methods of arriving at a proper adjustment of armaments in the disarmament convention, while retaining the various systems of military organisation existing at present.

Each of the other methods indicated by Sub-Commission A would, apart from the abolition of military service, be of practical value. The object in view would, however, not be achieved by applying only one of these methods, because in that case the factor of personnel would only be limited in one particular direction, and consequently a State could still develop this factor in other ways and thus defeat the proposed reduction of armaments. It would therefore be best to adopt a mixed system, involving the simultaneous reduction of the annual contingent, the period of service with the colours, the total duration of service, material, registration and the regular personnel.

In our opinion, special importance attaches here to the reduction in material, not only because such a reduction is an excellent method of reducing the military value of the effectives, but also, and more particularly, because it is the most effective means of reaching the trained reserves which will still be available at the moment of the coming-into-force of a disarmament convention. We shall not, however, deal at any greater length with the question of the reduction of material under this heading, as it properly comes under that of the “Factor of Material”. In the latter section, it will, however, be desirable to take specially into account the importance of a reduction in material in relation to a reduction in the factor of “personnel”.

The best way to apply the other methods of reduction indicated by Sub-Commission A would be to combine them as follows. The Convention would include a table for the factor of “personnel” which would cover the points mentioned by Sub-Commission A—i.e., annual contingent, period of service with the colours, regular personnel (in particular, officers) and the total duration of service. The maximum figures allowed in the case of each country would be entered in this table at the Conference. There would be no need to indicate in the table the reduction in registration, mentioned above under (6). The reduction in the total duration of service would automatically bring about a reduction in registration. It would, however, be desirable to stipulate in the text of the convention that there must be no registration of persons whose military duties have been discharged or who have not performed their military service.

The tables contained in the German proposals on the publicity of armaments might serve as a basis of discussion for the preparation of a suitable table for the reduction of personnel.

(c) Admitting that, even after the coming-into-force of the disarmament convention, armies recruited by a system of compulsory military service and possessing trained reserves will continue to exist side by side with armies consisting of professional troops, we must find out how it will be possible to compare these different types of army. If we compare, solely from the point of view of their number, all the men with the colours, including personnel from the point of view of their number, all the men with the colours, including personnel from the point of view of their number, including personnel not in service, we are obviously not comparing the forces on the same basis. The best way to apply the other methods of reduction indicated by Sub-Commission A would, apart from the abolition of military service, be of practical value. The object in view would, however, not be achieved by applying only one of these methods, because in that case the factor of personnel would only be limited in one particular direction, and consequently a State could still develop this factor in other ways and thus defeat the proposed reduction of armaments. It would therefore be best to adopt a mixed system, involving the simultaneous reduction of the annual contingent, the period of service with the colours, the total duration of service, material, registration and the regular personnel.

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The tables contained in the German proposals on the publicity of armaments might serve as a basis of discussion for the preparation of a suitable table for the reduction of personnel.

Each unit in the various categories of effectives which are to be dealt with (e.g., officers, trained men with the colours, reservists belonging to the first classes (1-5), reservists belonging to the next five classes (6-10, etc.), would be represented by a given coefficient determined by means of a scale graduated according to the military value of the various categories. These coefficients would be multiplied by the number of the units in each country; they would be added together and the aggregate number thus obtained for the whole of the personnel in all the States which signed the convention would express in comparable figures the military value of the personnel in the various countries.

If the Commission succeeded in devising a practical method of comparison of this kind, it would largely simplify the Conference’s task of fixing the proportion of armaments required to establish a just balance as between the different countries, for it would have removed the difficulty arising from the diversity of military systems which have grown up in the various countries as a result of their historical development and the requirements of national defence. If agreement could be reached on the proportion of armaments for the individual countries,
the fixing of a figure for the various component elements by means of which the authorised effectives will have to be determined (annual contingents, period of service, etc.) would no longer present any very serious difficulty.

II. — The Factor of “Material”.

(a) In modern warfare, and more particularly for the purposes of aggression, the question of the material at the disposal of troops is of supreme importance. Armies provided with modern weapons of war and abundant equipment and material have in the nature of things a superiority over opponents who are stronger in numbers but who are only provided with out-of-date and less abundant equipment and material. Accordingly, if no mention were made of “material” in the disarmament convention, this would give an entirely wrong idea of the proportion between the armaments of the various countries. Attention must, however, be given, when dealing with material, not only to the armament of troops serving with the colours but also to material kept in store, and this more particularly because such material gives the trained reserves their fighting strength.

War material can only be effectively reduced and limited by fixing maximum figures for the number of articles in the various categories of weapons dealt with. The object in view would not be achieved by laying down a maximum figure for budgetary expenditure. In the first place, it would not be possible by such a method to ascertain the material existing at the time of the coming-into-force of the Convention; Secondly, this method would furnish no information as to the nature of the armament—a matter of great military importance and, lastly, the credits entered in the budget would not, in view of the great differences, existing at different times and different places, in the purchasing power of gold and in the original cost of the articles, afford a suitable basis of comparison for the reduction of armaments. A complete list of all weapons, including even the smallest, would certainly not be required.

On the other hand, account would have to be taken of all kinds of weapons which play an indispensable part in modern warfare. In the first place, it would be essential to fix the number of weapons without which aggression, having regard to the present methods of warfare, would be at any rate a matter of the greatest difficulty, for example, tanks, bombing-planes and long-range heavy guns. The growth of the idea of disarmament should lead to the general abolition of the weapons. If, however, it is thought that the time has not yet arrived for such a step, an endeavour should at least be made in the Convention to reduce very largely, and to fix rigidly, the number of these weapons.

The best way to fix for each State the maximum number of each weapon would be to proceed in the manner we have already indicated for the personnel, and to prepare a table for the purpose. A discussion of the table proposed by the German delegation when the draft Convention was being framed might possibly suggest further improvements in the latter.

As we pointed out above, it should be borne in mind that the reduction of material has an important influence on the question of the trained reserves, since this reduction very effectively limits the possibilities of these reserves being employed on the outbreak of hostilities. It would accordingly perhaps be desirable for the Commission to endeavour, with the assistance of military experts, to indicate a kind of normal allocation by a process similar to that of the coefficients proposed for the personnel. In this case the system should have sufficient elasticity to allow of account being taken of the different position of individual countries. Should this effort prove successful, the work of the Conference would be considerably lightened, for it would be fairly easy to deduce the proportion to be laid down for material from the proportion fixed for personnel.

(b) The use of the chemical weapon is at present entirely prohibited by the protocol on the use of poison gases (as chemical substances can only be employed along with other weapons, it would be more accurate to speak of the chemical weapon and not of chemical warfare). It would, nevertheless, be desirable to renew the prohibition in the disarmament convention. Otherwise, it might happen that it would be permissible for certain States signatories of this convention to employ chemical methods of warfare (i.e., States which had not ratified the gas protocol), while other States would be forbidden to do so (those which had ratified the protocol). Further, the prohibition to employ the chemical arm would have to be supplemented by a prohibition to prepare for its use.

It would be desirable to consider whether the prohibition to employ chemical methods of warfare could not be made more effective by a general restriction in the use of the most important weapon by which chemical substances can be employed in war, i.e., the air weapon. The possibility might be considered of absolutely forbidding the dropping from the air of substances used in war, and the preparation of this form of warfare. This prohibition would apply, not only to the dropping of gas bombs, but also to the dropping of high explosive and incendiary bombs and to all other possible forms of chemical warfare waged from the air. It would thus have the merit of contributing towards mitigating the sufferings of the civilian population in time of war. In addition, this prohibition would be directed against military weapons which can be used, particularly for purposes of aggression.

III. — Settlement of Disputes.

It has been proposed that the application of the provisions of the disarmament convention should be ensured by the creation of a supervisory organ which would have the right to make enquiries on the spot, and that the convention should only contain such measures as could be controlled by such an authority. Nevertheless, it is evident that the majority of countries —
are not prepared to agree to so serious an encroachment on their sovereign rights. The linking up of the limitation—which is possible in itself—of certain armaments factors with supervision of this kind has accordingly proved to be more of an obstacle than a help to the Preparatory Commission in its work.

The best means to ensure supervision of the application of the convention would be to stipulate that any signatory State would have the right to raise the question of any infractions before a joint permanent committee, the members of which might be the same as the members of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission. This committee would then clear up the matter by written or oral proceedings and would endeavour to find by negotiation a suitable remedy for duly authenticated infractions. It might be well to consider whether it would not be desirable, with a view to the final adjustment of matters which it has not been possible to settle in this way, to provide a procedure similar to that laid down in the Minorities Treaties, by which an appeal could be made to the Permanent Court of International Justice.

ANNEX 3.

PROPOSAL BY THE CHINESE DELEGATION SUBMITTED BY GENERAL TSIANG TSOPING, REGARDING THE ABOLITION OF COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE.

C.P.D./139.
April 13th, 1929.

On behalf of the National Government of the Republic of China, I have the honour to submit a draft amendment which my Government wishes to bring up before the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference for discussion during the present session.

I have only to add that, in submitting this amendment, the Chinese delegation is actuated purely by the desire to speed up the Conference and to assure the success of the work which is absorbing the serious attention of men in responsible position, by offering a direct and practical solution to some of the questions which have not been successfully dealt with during the last session of this Commission.

(Signed) TSIANG TSOPING,
Delegate of the National Government
of the Republic of China.

PROPOSITION BY THE CHINESE DELEGATION.

"Whereas the High Contracting Parties consider that the system of universal military service tends to engender a warlike spirit in the minds of the people, intensify the antagonism of neighbouring States and thereby create the so-called 'militaristic nationalism' which is incompatible with the principles of the League of Nations.

"And whereas they recognise that, in view of the conclusion of the multilateral Pact for the outlawry of war, whereby the signatory Powers solemnly condemn war and renounce it as a measure for settling international disputes and as the instrument of national policy in their mutual relations, any system which is to militarise the entire population in preparation for war is contrary to the spirit and letter of the said Pact.

"They therefore agree that, henceforth, they will not adopt a universal compulsory military service, either in their home country or in their possessions or colonies, as a means of forming and organising their armed forces."

ANNEX 4.

TURKISH DELEGATION'S OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF DISARMAMENT.

C.P.D./142 (I).

Turkey is now taking a direct part in the work of this Commission for the second time. The Turkish Government has followed closely the peace movement during the past few years and has acquired the conviction that the centralisation of all the efforts to this end in an international Commission and the firm resolve that the work of the Commission shall be pursued
unbroken are due to the growing force of public opinion in all countries, which earnestly desires early and practical results.

It is in this belief, Gentlemen, that we are taking part in the Commission’s work, and are resolved to do everything in our power loyally and sincerely to promote a satisfactory and practical solution of the problem.

The year which has elapsed since our last meeting has been rich in results. It has been characterised by the signature of a highly gratifying number of international instruments, all of which have contributed towards the general promotion of security. Special importance attaches to the general Treaty concluded at Paris by which States solemnly undertook to renounce resort to war as an instrument of national policy.

At the last session of this Commission and in the course of the discussions of the Committee on Arbitration and Security, we indicated what we considered to be the best practical solution of the problem of security, and we maintained that, in our opinion, a scheme of treaties of conciliation and arbitration and pacts of non-aggression, further strengthened by a stipulation of “neutrality”, offered an excellent means of achieving our purpose.

We bring to this second meeting proposals which sufficiently show how faithfully the Turkish Republic has pursued the course indicated last year by the Turkish representatives at the two meetings referred to above.

The Turkish Government was not only among the first to accede to and to ratify the Paris Pact, but it early manifested its desire to be a party to the Moscow protocol, which it regards as giving added strength to the original pact.

Acting on these lines, we have also concluded various treaties of conciliation and arbitration containing those stipulations as to non-aggression and neutrality to which I have referred and we are at present negotiating other conventions of the same kind. As we have given practical effect to the views which we advocated in this place, we accordingly enter on this new session with increased strength and animated more than ever by that desire, which the Turkish Republic has always manifested, faithfully to serve the cause of peace.

It has been said that in the work we have undertaken the result depends mainly on moral disarmament. It has been stated in various publications that, if the solemn promises already made are to be something more than mere empty words, the practical solution of the problem must be found in the operation of treaties, and mainly in the action of the Treaty for the Renunciation of War.

But, Gentlemen, may we not regard moral disarmament as now being a reality? Those who have spread the feeling of moral disarmament among their people have themselves achieved the results to which I have referred. The Kellogg Pact would not have been accepted with such unanimity and enthusiasm, nor would our Commission itself have been able to pursue its work as it has done, but for the irresistible impulse which led so many nations to sign the Paris Pact and which has brought us here with the earnest desire, I feel sure, to arrive in the near future at that result for which the world is so impatiently waiting. There is surely no opposition or incompatibility between the undertakings solemnly entered into by the various States and the work of our Commission; in striving to find the means for general disarmament, we desire in fact to discover the surest and best method of giving effect to these undertakings.

The Turkish delegation accordingly considers that the ground has been sufficiently cleared and that there is nothing to prevent a solution of the disarmament problem which would satisfy public opinion throughout the world being now reached in our Commission and being submitted to a Disarmament Conference.

Accordingly, having previously stated our views on the question of security, we shall now lay before you a proposal supplementing our earlier suggestion and one which, in our opinion, is best calculated to settle the problem as a whole.

The greatest triumph of justice in international affairs has undoubtedly been the recognition of the principle of the equality of States, regardless of their power, their size or their numbers. With the growth of this idea, we have now reached a stage in international theory at which we can hardly speak any longer of the hierarchy of States and of the prerogatives resulting therefrom.

The proposal which we have the honour to submit to you is based on the principle of equality, a principle which has already proved its value and one which forms the best theoretical basis for the organisation of all national and international communities.

This principle, which has been fully admitted in the relations between individual States, should obviously apply with even greater force in the case of the most sacred right which a State possesses—the right of legitimate defence.

Our proposal, based on this legal principle, is not, however, rigid and unalterable.

We are prepared to accept any suggestions and to make any alterations and amendments required by circumstances; we should, indeed, if any more practical scheme likely to achieve the same object were submitted, be only too glad to accept that scheme, provided always that it would not increase the existing inequality or favour certain parties at the expense of others by assigning them proportional forces.
In making its proposal, the Turkish delegation has no other desire than to serve the noble and sacred cause of peace and universal fraternity.

The solution which the Turkish Government proposes for the problem of disarmament may be briefly indicated as follows:

The origin of many cases of aggression is to be found, generally speaking, in the inequality of existing forces and the opportunities which the maintenance of large effectives offers for rapidly carrying out attacks which are intended to secure certain objects and to satisfy certain ambitions. The fundamental idea in the system which we propose is to eradicate the war virus from the international community by providing, as far as possible, that all States should have equal peace effectives.

In essence, the idea which we put forward would therefore take the form of a system of a maximum contingent for all States without distinction.

Uniformity on these lines would be the ideal system of disarmament, but we consider it might at present be rendered somewhat more elastic by putting that contingent on a higher scale. We have adopted this modified form and we would indicate for your consideration the following scheme:

Having defined our object, we would propose that the maximum effectives should be the armed forces required by a large State to provide for its legitimate defence against sudden aggression.

Once the numbers were fixed in this way, States with forces in excess of this contingent would have to reduce to the limit fixed, and States whose effectives were below the limit fixed would not be permitted to increase their contingent, seeing that the basic principle is the reduction of armaments and not their increase, even if only a partial increase.

In practice, it would not appear that the fixing of the maximum contingent on the basis of a large country’s requirements for its legitimate defence would present any serious difficulties. We have indeed in this connection experience from which we can draw valuable conclusions.

To sum up, as the reduction of armed forces taken as a final stage towards disarmament forms the basis of the system we recommend, the maximum armed forces would be calculated on the basis of the legitimate requirements of a large country for its national defence. Armed forces exceeding this limit would be reduced accordingly, and those already below the limit would remain unchanged.

Such, in its main outlines, is the system of disarmament which we recommend.

We consider that the special merit of our proposal lies in the great simplicity of its conception and indeed its simplicity of application.

The proposal is inspired by good faith and we hope it will be carefully examined by the members of this Commission.

May the combined wisdom of this assembly find a practical and effective solution for a problem which is of the greatest humanitarian importance!

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ANNEX 5.

DECLARATION OF M. LITVINOFF, DELEGATE OF THE UNION OF SOCIALIST SOVIET REPUBLICS.

C.P.D. /147.

The passing of a resolution to-day by the Preparatory Commission, bringing to an end the discussion — only just begun — of the Soviet draft Convention for partial reduction of armaments, and depriving the delegations of the opportunity to express themselves conclusively on the fundamental questions of disarmament, induces the Soviet delegation to make the following declaration:

1. The Soviet delegation first took part in the Preparatory Disarmament Commission about eighteen months ago, beginning with the fourth session. Although this session had no other questions directly regarding disarmament to consider, discussion of the draft Convention for general and complete disarmament, presented by the Soviet delegation, was postponed until the next, the fifth session.

2. At the fifth session the above-mentioned draft Convention was discussed and the opinion of a considerable number of delegations expressed, but it was rejected as soon as the fundamental question of the desirability of carrying out complete disarmament was raised. No substantial arguments against the draft Convention were put forward, with the exception of reminders of the necessity for maintaining troops for the suppression of civil wars and national risings, and references to statutes and instructions of the League of Nations, said to prevent the Preparatory Commission from dealing with the question of general disarmament.

3. A new draft Convention was then presented by the Soviet delegation, this time for partial disarmament. The Soviet delegation’s proposal for the immediate consideration of its draft was rejected, although proposals presented to the Preparatory Commission in similar circumstances by other delegations received immediate consideration. Without giving any motives, the fifth session decided to postpone discussion of the Soviet draft until the sixth
session, although there were no other points concerning disarmament on the agenda of the fifth session.

4. Despite the demand of the Soviet delegation, no definite date was fixed for the next session and its convocation was left to the discretion of the President, and made to depend upon the issue of certain negotiations then going on between two States. After the lapse of five months, I sent an enquiry to the President of the Preparatory Commission as to the causes of the non-convocation of the sixth session. The same enquiry was repeated by me four months later, owing to the fact that the Commission had not been called, although the above-mentioned negotiations, on which the convocation of the session was supposed to depend, had already been completed (see Annex 1).

5. The sixth session was not convoked by the President until thirteen months after the fifth. The Soviet draft Convention for the partial reduction of armaments was submitted to discussion at three sittings, only seven delegates taking part in the debate on it, some of whom expounded its meaning for its further consideration, while others, who expressed themselves against this, were unable to produce any substantial argument either against the fundamental principles of the draft Convention, or against the Convention itself. The Soviet delegation invited the other delegations to define their attitude towards such questions without the solution of which no plan for the reduction of armaments can be drawn up. Attempts were made by certain delegates to make League of Nations statutes and the limited competence of the Commission an excuse for evading a vote on these questions. Although, at the demand of these very delegates, the bureau of the Commission gave as its considered opinion that the questions set by the Soviet delegation were fully within the competence of the Commission and corresponded to the nature of its work, the vote, which would have reflected the opinion of the delegates and their Governments, was not taken, and, in consequence, the sitting devoted to the consideration of the Soviet draft Convention proved mere wasted time; indeed, the whole of the fourth, the fifth and part of the sixth sessions were completely fruitless, not a single definite decision being reached which could have brought the Commission if only one step closer to the solution of the problem of disarmament. This was inevitable, for, although the Commission had before it no other conventions whatsoever on which work could be continued with the slightest benefit, it rejected both Soviet draft Conventions and all proposals made by the Soviet delegation. The draft Convention drawn up at the third session of the Commission, evoked, by its vagueness and lack of any objective criteria for disarmament, controversies that the Governments concerned have been unable to reconcile in the course of over two years, and that offer no hopes of disappearing in the near future.

6. In its declarations of November 30th, 1927, at the fourth session, and March 19th, 1928, at the fifth session, the Soviet delegation gave an exhaustive appraisal of the work of the Commission up to those dates. The whole work of the Commission up to the present moment falls under this same appraisal, which fully confirms the scepticism with which the Soviet Government accepted the invitation of the League of Nations to take part in the Preparatory Commission. The Soviet delegation is regretfully forced to state that its experience of co-operating in the Preparatory Commission leads it to extend this scepticism to the future work of the Commission also.

7. The Soviet delegation is now more than ever convinced that the ways and methods laid down by the Preparatory Commission cannot lead it to the solution of the problem before it. The Commission has made no progress for two years and cannot even proceed along the path mapped out by itself, owing to obstacles, which, even if overcome, must inevitably give place to others. The Soviet delegation is convinced that, by the methods adopted so far, it will be impossible for the Commission to prepare the necessary material for the Disarmament Conference, or material enabling the Disarmament Conference to pass any useful decisions. The result of such activities by the Preparatory Commission can only be the indefinite protraction of the question of disarmament, or the preparation of the failure of the Disarmament Conference. These activities are, moreover, to be deprecated, in that they conceal from the peoples in all countries, with any genuine disarmament, the policy of the Governments represented on the Preparatory Commission, which is chiefly directed, in the majority of cases, against any reduction of armaments whatsoever. Thus the Preparatory Commission acts as a sort of screen for the reluctance of the Governments to reduce their armaments, relieving them of responsibility in the matter of disarmament.

8. The consciousness of these facts might justify the Soviet delegation in withdrawing from the Preparatory Commission. Its decision to remain, nevertheless, in the Commission is chiefly due to those same considerations which induced the Soviet Government, despite its negative attitude to the League of Nations and its organs, to send a delegation to the Preparatory Disarmament Commission, namely, to give no excuse for attributing the failure and lack of results of the Preparatory Commission and Disarmament Conference to the non-participation in them of representatives of the Soviet Government. Public opinion the world over must be informed that the Soviet delegation from the first day of its work in the Preparatory Commission has taken the most active part in that work, presenting definite and perfectly practicable proposals in the direction of the utmost possible disarmament, exposing all arguments tending against disarmament, and all who, under various excuses, or with specious arguments, impede the matter of disarmament. The Soviet delegation intends to go on fulfilling this its task, thoroughly realising the utter lack of seriousness and the uselessness of the work to be done by the Commission in its sessions, so long as the concrete proposals made by the Soviet delegation are ignored. The Soviet delegation remains in the Preparatory Commission in the hope that the other Governments there represented will find themselves forced by the
pressure of public opinion, and especially by the demands of workers' organisations, to agree, if not to complete disarmament, at least to substantial reduction of armaments, when their representatives in the Preparatory Commission must inevitably be forced to turn again to those very Soviet proposals which the present instructions of their Governments have so far caused them to reject.

Geneva, April 19th, 1929.

ANNEX 6.

OBSERVATIONS SUBMITTED BY THE JAPANESE DELEGATION ON CHAPTER IV, CHEMICAL WARFARE.

I. In view of the connection between the limitation and reduction of armaments on the one hand, and the prohibition of chemical warfare on the other, which the authors of the proposal in question have endeavoured to bring out, it would be desirable to retain in the draft convention a special clause in which the High Contracting Parties would undertake to prohibit the use of chemical methods of warfare among them.

II. Since, moreover, the prohibition of chemical warfare has already been embodied in a special Protocol signed at Geneva on June 17th, 1925, and already ratified or acceded to by several States, it would likewise seem desirable that the obligations to be assumed in the draft under discussion should be brought into harmony with those already embodied in the Protocol above mentioned, in order that any future difficulties in application may be avoided.

III. It does not, however, seem desirable to lay down the same provisions in both conventions, but it would suffice to stipulate in the draft Convention that its acceptance ipso facto involves, ipso facto, the acceptance of the above-mentioned Protocol by States which have not already acceded thereto. This procedure will have the additional effect of hastening the acceptance of the Protocol by the greatest possible number of States.

IV. With respect to the question whether the provisions laid down in paragraph 3 of Chapter IV should be made a separate agreement or should simply be inserted as a part of the future general Convention, the Japanese delegation sees no special reason for making them a separate Protocol.

ANNEX 7.

PROPOSAL SUBMITTED BY THE ITALIAN DELEGATION WITH REGARD TO CHAPTER IV, CHEMICAL WARFARE.

The Italian delegation considers that the "Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of War", which was signed at Geneva on June 17th, 1925, affords the possibility of reaching a satisfactory solution of the problem of the prohibition of chemical warfare, in so far as such a solution is capable of realisation in practice.

In order to facilitate the work of the Preparatory Commission, the Italian delegation therefore proposes that the provisions of this Protocol be inserted in the text of the draft under discussion in connection with Chapter IV, or to replace the present text of Chapter IV by an article worded as follows:

"The High Contracting Parties which have not yet ratified or signed the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare signed at Geneva on June 17th, 1925, undertake to ratify it or accede to it as soon as possible."

The Italian delegation is prepared, however, to accept any other formula or solution which might render more effective in practice the prohibition of chemical warfare as defined in the Geneva Protocol.
ANNEX 8.

NOTE BY BARON ROLIN JAEQUEMYNS, BELGIAN DELEGATE, WITH REGARD TO CHAPTER IV, CHEMICAL WARFARE.

C.P.D./155.

At its meeting on April 20th, 1929, the Commission examined the single article constituting Chapter IV of the 1927 Draft, entitled "Chemical Warfare".

The first two paragraphs of that Article, prohibiting, respectively, the use in war of asphyxiating or poisonous gases and also the use of all bacteriological methods of warfare, encountered no objection.

These two paragraphs reproduce, indeed, in practically identical terms the Protocol adopted by the 1925 Conference on the trade in arms.

The last two paragraphs, however, which prohibit, firstly, the preparation, in peace time as well, of the use of the methods of warfare stated above, and, secondly, restrictions on the importation, exportation and manufacture of the substances in question, have encountered serious objections, which refer more particularly to the last paragraph and the possibility of determining beforehand whether the poisonous or bacteriological substances were imported, exported or manufactured with a view to war or for a wholly different and entirely innocent purpose.

We also had the honour, in agreement with M. Cobian, the Spanish delegate, to point out that it would no doubt be difficult to adhere to the absolute prohibition against Governments which themselves make use of the methods of war in question, and, consequently, desiring that this question of reciprocity might be duly laid before the Commission, we submitted at the meeting a proposal to add a paragraph framed as follows:

"These prohibitions may not be disregarded except against Governments which themselves make use of such methods of warfare."

This additional paragraph, if adopted, would thus constitute paragraph 5 of the article on "Chemical Warfare", or paragraph 3 of that article if the present paragraphs 3 and 4 were finally deleted.

We have indicated above the considerations which will doubtless make it unnecessary to retain paragraph 4, relating to importation, exportation and manufacture.

Paragraph 3, relating to preparation in peace time, is open to the serious objection, in any case, of precluding even preparation for defence against gases and also preparation for their use, or for the use of some of them, against an opponent who himself employs them.

These observations would appear accordingly to lead to the conclusion that paragraphs 3 and 4 should simply be deleted.

There is a further observation, however, to be made in regard to the proposed additional clause, whereby the prohibition might be disregarded against an opponent who does not himself comply with it.

Several delegates are uncertain whether, in this connection, the right to make use of chemical weapons on grounds of reciprocity, which would be conferred by the additional paragraph, would not tend to alter entirely the character of the prohibition as a rule of international law.

This objection does not appear to us to be conclusive, for it may be held that a certain latitude is allowed as regards the observance of rules of international law which the opponent has been the first to disregard, though such action may be considered regrettable in itself.

This objection, however, might rather lead to a distinction being made between the undertaking to abstain from the use of asphyxiating, poisonous similar liquids of the substances or processes constituted in all cases a crime against international law, in that such use is necessarily directed against the entire population, and no civilised Government would desire to be guilty of such a crime even against the armies of a criminal Government which itself resorted to these methods.

The above considerations have led us to drop our proposal for an additional paragraph referring to reciprocity in general terms and to introduce instead in the text of paragraph 1, regarding the use of asphyxiating, poisonous similar liquids, a subsidiary provision relating to the condition of reciprocity.

Consequently, paragraph 1 might be drafted as follows:

"The High Contracting Parties undertake, subject to reciprocity, to abstain from the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous similar liquids, of all analogous liquids, substances or processes."

On the other hand, paragraph 2 referring to the use of bacteriological methods of warfare would state, not that the High Contracting Parties undertake the obligation "similarly", i.e., to offend to reciprocity as in the case of asphyxiating and poisonous gases, but that they undertake it unreservedly.
Paragraph 2 accordingly would be drafted as follows:

"They undertake unreservedly to abstain from the use of all bacteriological methods of warfare."

The single article forming Chapter IV of the draft would contain only these two paragraphs. As regards the title of the Chapter, the wording "Chemical Weapon" proposed by Count Bernstorff might perhaps be accepted as being better than that of "Chemical Warfare", specially as the suggested title appears to be more in conformity with the headings of other chapters or sections of the draft Convention.

There is still a further question: Would it not be desirable to omit altogether this chapter in the draft Convention on the ground that it overlaps with the provisions of the 1925 Protocol on Chemical Warfare?

We consider that it would be better to retain it; this was, moreover, the view expressed by several delegates during the discussion. The object is, indeed, to regulate the use of a weapon or method of warfare, and for this reason the chapter in question would naturally be included in the Convention. It might also happen that the Governments acceding to the Protocol and those acceding to the Convention would not in all cases be the same, and in that event the Convention would not produce its full effects. Finally, if the Commission adopted the above suggestion to omit the chapter on chemical warfare, the Protocol in itself would not produce the same results, since various Powers have only agreed to the Protocol subject to a reservation regarding reciprocity, a reservation which, as indicated above, appears to be of a somewhat too general character.

In conclusion, we have the honour to propose that the President should submit to the Commission the following text for Chapter IV of the draft under discussion:

"Chapter IV. — Chemical Weapon.

"The High Contracting Parties undertake, subject to reciprocity, to abstain from the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or similar gases, and of all analogous liquids, substances or processes.

"They undertake unreservedly to abstain from the use of all bacteriological methods of warfare."

ANNEX 9.

AMENDMENTS TO CHAPTER I, "EFFECTIVES", SUBMITTED BY COUNT BERNSTORFF, GERMAN DELEGATE.

Article A.

The High Contracting Parties agree to limit the effectives in service in their armed forces, or land, sea and air formations organised on a military basis — and also effectives available without mobilisation and reserves with military training, entered on the registers and obliged by law to perform military service in case of war, liable to be called up without or by a mobilisation order — to the effectives determined in the tables enumerated below and annexed to the present Convention.
1. Land Armaments.

**TABLE I.**
(Same model for Table II.)

*Maximum Home Forces.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>H. Military Effectives</th>
<th>With the colours</th>
<th>Duration in days</th>
<th>Total duration of military service</th>
<th>Available without mobilisation</th>
<th>Reserve</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>Non-commissioned officers</td>
<td>Total effectives with the colours</td>
<td>Annual contingent</td>
<td>With the active army</td>
<td>Periods of training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-term service</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Remarks:**
1. "Long-term service" indicates, in the case of conscript armies, a longer period of service than that prescribed by law and, in the case of volunteer armies, a period of service exceeding one year.
2. Effectives "available without mobilisation" include men of the active army on leave until discharge, and men who have completed their service with the colours but do not yet belong, under the laws of the State in question, to the reserve proper.
3. "Reserve" effectives include classes discharged after completing their service with the colours or their period on the "available" list.
4. By effectives "available without mobilisation" and "in reserve" are meant men with military training entered on the registers and obliged by law to perform military service in case of war.
5. "Other ranks" are men having a lower rank or grade than that of non-commissioned officer.
6. Reserve effectives might be further subdivided according to age.

**TABLE II.**
(Same model as Table I.)

*Maximum Overseas Forces.*

1. Land Armaments.

**TABLE III.**
(Same model for Table IV.)

*Maximum Home Forces belonging to Formations organised on a Military Basis.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>H. Serving on land</th>
<th>Cadres</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Annual contingent</th>
<th>Service in days</th>
<th>Reserve</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>Non-commissioned officers</td>
<td>Other ranks</td>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>Non-commissioned officers</td>
<td>Other ranks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadres</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**2. Naval Armaments.**

**TABLE V.**

*Maximum Armed Forces.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>H.</th>
<th>C.</th>
<th>P.</th>
<th>Actually serving</th>
<th>Service in days</th>
<th>Available without mobilisation</th>
<th>Reserve</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Long-term service</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Officers and warrant officers</td>
<td>Petty officers</td>
<td>Total effectives actually serving</td>
<td>On the active list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.</td>
<td>Personnel for service in the fleet.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.</td>
<td>Personnel not intended for service in the fleet.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Remarks:**
1. "Long-term service" indicates, in the case of conscript navies, a longer period of service than that prescribed by law and, in the case of volunteer navies, a period of service exceeding one year.
2. Effectives "available without mobilisation" include men of the active navy on leave until discharge, and men who have completed their active service but do not yet belong, under the laws of the State in question, to the reserve proper.
3. "Reserve" effectives include classes discharged after completing their active service or their period on the "available" list.
4. By effectives "available without mobilisation" and "in reserve" are meant men with naval training entered on the registers and obliged by law to perform naval service in case of war.
5. "Other ranks" are men having a lower rank or grade than that of petty officer.
6. Reserve effectives might be further subdivided according to age.

**3. Air Armaments.**

**TABLE VI.**

*Maximum Armed Forces.*

*Note:* The table established for land armaments also applies to air armaments.
Article H.

In the second paragraph, replace lines three to five ("whose .......... Parties ") by the following passage : " who enlist for a period of service exceeding the period of active service prescribed by law ".

No change.

Article C.

Article D.

Add at the end : " It shall also include the organisation of reserve units and services ".

No change.

Article F.

Article E.

Insert the following clause, to form the second paragraph :

" (a) By ' overseas forces ' shall be understood the armed forces which each State undertakes to employ only for the defence of overseas territories and for police service in those territories."

The present paragraph (a) becomes (b) and paragraph (b) becomes paragraph (c).

Article I.

In each Contracting State having the conscription system, the total period of service which the annual contingent is compelled to serve shall not exceed the figure accepted by each of the High Contracting Parties.

For each man the total period of service shall be the total number of days of active service and of days of service during the periods of training which he undergoes. The period of active service shall be shown separately.

No register shall be kept of persons whose military obligations are terminated.

ANNEX 10.

COMMUNICATIONS FROM PRIVATE ORGANISATIONS.

A. INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS.

I.

The following resolution has been forwarded by a letter from the Secretary-General of the Labour and Socialist International, dated February 13th, 1929, and is embodied in numerous letters indicated below 1 :

" The . . . hopes that the Preparatory Disarmament Commission of the League of Nations will complete its work as soon as ever possible so that the solemn promises of disarmament made to all the peoples of the world may at last be fulfilled by the conclusion of a general Disarmament Treaty.

" It affirms that the will to peace of the peoples of the world should be expressed by the delegates of their Governments at Geneva with the object of achieving the real organisation of peace."

Argentina. — 131 letters.

Austria. — 63 letters, of which 18 on behalf of 557,843 members of organisations or persons present at the meetings.

Belgium. — 604 letters, of which 384 on behalf of 289,188 heads of families and 482,674 members of organisations or persons present at the meetings.

Bulgaria. — 1 letter.

Czechoslovakia. — 550 letters, of which 460 on behalf of 210,232 persons ; 1 on behalf of the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Workers' Party, whose memoranda are signed by : The Executive of the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Workers' Party, representing 130,000 members ; The Parliamentary Group of the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Workers' Party, representing 28 members ;

1 These letters include a few coming from sources other than Labour Organisations. In certain cases the letters are sent by Socialist Groups of legislative bodies.
The Senators' Group of the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Workers' Party representing 14 members; 451 political organisations and other sections of the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Workers' Party, representing 26,770 members.

**Denmark.** — 1 letter from the Danish Socialist Party, on behalf of more than 500,000 electors and 1 letter on behalf of 11,000 persons.

**Danzig.** — 3 letters, of which 2 on behalf of 6,179 persons.

**Estonia.** — 10 letters.

**Dutch Indies.** — 23 letters, of which 3 on behalf of 2,252 persons.

**Finland.** — 501 letters, of which 9 on behalf of 338 persons.

**France.** — 1,366 letters.

**Great Britain.** — 561 letters.

**Germany.** — 45 letters, of which 2 on behalf of 60,000 members of the Socialist Party and 652,000 electors, and 10 on behalf of 2,459,716 members of organisations or electors.

**Greece.** — 3 letters and a telegram from the Confederation of Labour.

**Hungary.** — 32 letters, of which 1 on behalf of 600 persons.

**Latvia.** — 4 letters, of which 1 on behalf of 5,000 persons.

**Netherlands.** — 4,984 letters.

**Norway.** — 1 letter, on behalf of 50,000 persons.

**Poland.** — 3 letters.

**Portugal.** — 1 letter.

**Roumania.** — 200 letters, of which 32 on behalf of 16,913 persons.

**Spain.** — 151 letters, of which 1 on behalf of 210 persons.

**Sweden.** — 5,558 letters, of which 5,367 on behalf of 1,747,959 members of organisations or persons present at the meetings, and 1 from the Central Executive Committee of the Syndicalist Organisations of Sweden, with 469,409 members.

**Switzerland.** — 172 letters, of which 27 on behalf of 3,333 persons.

**United States of America.** — 2 letters.

Socialist Party of Italian Workers Abroad, or other Italian Groups in various countries, 26 letters.

Jewish Socialist Party in various countries, 3 letters.

Chinese Social Democratic Party in Europe, 2 letters.

II.

The following resolution of the International Order of Good Templars has been forwarded by Lodges in the countries enumerated below:

"The International Order of Good Templars, having as one of the planks of its platform the cultivation of the ideal of the worldwide brotherhood of man, and working for international peace, has learned with great satisfaction that the League of Nations has taken up the idea of an international disarmament treaty, and that it has appointed a Commission to frame a proposal to that effect."

"In its session of .......... 1929, the Lodge .......... of .......... has resolved most earnestly to appeal to the Preparatory Disarmament Commission of the League of Nations to complete as soon as ever possible the framing of a proposal for solving the question of a general disarmament treaty."

"The Lodge hopes that, such a feasible plan having been worked out, the League of Nations will adopt it and use every effort to have it enforced."

"The Lodge expects the representatives of .......... to give their best support in Geneva to the efforts for international disarmament."

- Canada ................. 4
- Denmark ............... 89
- Germany ............... 1
- Great Britain ........ 3
- Hungary ............... 1
- Norway ................. 3
- Sweden ................. 74
- Switzerland ........... 1
- United States of America .......... 1

III.

Letter from the World Alliance for Promoting International Friendship through the Churches.

London, April 19th, 1929.

At the request of the Chairman of the International Committee of this Alliance, Bishop Ammundsen of Haderslev, Denmark, and in the name of the Committee, I have the honour
to enclose some copies of a report and resolution\(^1\) adopted unanimously by a congress of churchmen at Prague in August 1928.

The resolution therein contained has been forwarded to the Secretary-General by our President, Lord Davidson of Lambeth, and was circulated to the members of the Council of the League.

I beg most respectfully to ask you to communicate this document to the members of your Committee, as it gives the considered opinion of representatives from many churches in all parts of the world.

IV.

*Letter from the Continuation Committee of the Universal Christian Conference on Life and Work.*

*Geneva, April 30th, 1929.*

The World Alliance for Promoting Friendship through the Churches having sent an appeal to the League of Nations urging the hastening of the work of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission, the Continuation Committee of the Universal Christian Conference on Life and Work desires to state that it gives its strongest support to the resolution taken by the World Alliance. It has instructed me to transmit to you these declarations, for the Preparatory Commission.

These two large religious organisations, representing not only the majority of the Christian population of the whole world, but also one of the greatest forces for peace, express the hope that the Commission will not allow itself to be discouraged by the difficulties arising in the course of its work. These organisations are the mouthpieces of millions of peoples and Christians, who are waiting impatiently for a real step to be taken towards the disarmament which was promised to them some time ago.

V.

*Letter from the Executive Committee of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom.*

*Geneva, April 25th, 1929.*

The Executive Committee of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, now in session in Geneva, representing organised groups of women in twenty-five countries, has seen with feelings of the warmest satisfaction the draft amendment which has been presented to the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference by the delegate of the National Government of the Republic of China.

The Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom has, since its foundation in 1915, repeatedly urged that the system of universal military service should be abolished as a first step in the reduction of national armaments to which all the States Members of the League of Nations are now pledged under Article 8 of the Covenant and by the specific undertakings given at the time of the signing of the Versailles Peace Treaty. The International Executive Committee endorses all that is so admirably stated in the Chinese amendment, and there are many other reasons why a proposal to abolish conscription makes a particularly strong appeal to women.

The International Executive Committee believes that, if all the Governments would adopt the proposal made by the delegate of the Chinese Republic, an important step would be made towards establishing the peace of the world on a more secure foundation. It therefore urges the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference to give serious and favourable consideration to this proposal and calls upon all its national sections to obtain for it the fullest publicity and the effective support of public opinion.

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\(^1\) Resolution. — “Considering that feelings of general uneasiness and insecurity are increasing rather than diminishing in measure as the States appear to falter before the problem of disarmament or to be unable to solve it;”}

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VI.

Letter from the International Federation of Trade Unions, Amsterdam.

Amsterdam, March 22nd, 1929.

The International Federation of Trade Unions of Amsterdam decided, at the meeting of its Bureau on March 21st, 1929, to ask you to forward to the President and delegates members of the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament the following resolution:

"The International Federation of Trade Unions of Amsterdam, expressing the wishes of the 14 million workers of all countries whom it represents, expects of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission that it shall actively pursue its labours to secure as soon as possible — i.e., in the course of the year 1929, according to the decision of the last Assembly of the League of Nations — the convocation of the International Disarmament Conference.

"The International Federation of Trade Unions declares that a further delay in the work of disarmament, which was declared by the Peace Treaty and the Covenant of the League of Nations to be indispensable to the establishment of an assured and permanent peace, would be a disregard of pledges solemnly taken.

"The preparatory work of the Commission has made it possible to solve the technical problems of disarmament; and, furthermore, the Agreements of Locarno and Paris have provided additional conditions of security, which make it possible to effect disarmament to the lowest point consistent with national safety."

The International Federation of Trade Unions asks that the pacific desires of the workers of the whole world should be heard, and that peace by disarmament and arbitration should at last be organised by the League of Nations, whose essential mission this is.

It is hoped that this great act will to-morrow be a joyful and fruitful reality for all humanity.

VII.

Letter from the International Federation of Officials.

The Hague, March 30th, 1929.

We hereby take the liberty of asking you to bring to the notice of the President and delegates of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission the following resolution:

"The International Federation of Officials at The Hague, expressing the wishes of 400,000 officials of all countries which are its members, expects of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission. . . ."

(The continuation is identical with letter A.VI.)

VIII.

Letter from the Committee of the International Co-operative Women's Guild.

Prague, April 8th, 1929.

The Committee of the International Co-operative Women's Guild, meeting at Prague, and representing the housewives and mothers organised in the world co-operative movement, record their profound concern that, in spite of the fact that the nations, in signing the Kellogg Pact against war, have renounced war as an instrument of national policy, armaments and warlike preparations are dangerously increasing, and the Governments of the world in general show no disposition to take any serious or effective steps towards disarmament.

The Committee demand an immediate and drastic reversal of the policy of competition in armaments, and look to the Disarmament Commission of the League of Nations at its forthcoming meeting to initiate steps in this direction, and from the concrete scheme now before it to establish the basis of a Convention, to be submitted to a World Disarmament Conference within the next year, providing for such reductions in armaments as will lead within a specified time to total disarmament.
B. NATIONAL ORGANISATIONS.

I. 

Letter from the General Workers' Union of Spain.
(Unión general de Trabajadores.)

Madrid, March 29th, 1929.

The General Workers' Union of Spain decided at the meeting of its Executive Committee on March 28th, 1929, to ask you to bring to the notice of the President and delegates Members of the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament the following resolution:

"The General Workers' Union of Spain, which is the most representative and numerous national workers' organisation of our country, expects of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission...

(The continuation is identical with the letter of the International Federation of Trade Unions under A. VI.)

II. 

Letter from the Trade Union Commission of Belgium.

Brussels, April 3rd, 1929.

At its meeting of yesterday, the Bureau of the Trade Union Commission of Belgium took note of the letter sent to you by the International Federation of Trade Unions on March 22nd last, with a request that you should bring it to the notice of the President and members of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission.

The Bureau of the Trade Union Commission has the honour to inform you that it whole heartedly supports the resolution of the International Federation of Trade Unions. It asks you to inform the President and members of the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament that the 550,000 Belgian workers organised under the Trade Union Commission of Belgium strongly urge that the work of the Disarmament Commission should be pushed forward so that it should be possible to organise before the end of 1929 the International Disarmament Conference, whose work is at last to bring the durable peace solemnly promised to the workers during the terrible and agonising days of 1914 to 1918.

III. 

Letter from the Bund der Freien Gewerkschaften of Austria.

Vienna, April 3rd, 1929.

The undersigned have the honour to inform you that the Bund der Freien Gewerkschaften of Austria, which comprises in Austria 772,762 members of free trade unions, has taken note at its statutory meetings of the resolution of the International Federation of Trade Unions at Amsterdam, and has unanimously decided to submit it to the President and delegates of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission.

This resolution reads as follows.

(The resolution is the same as that contained in A. VI.)

IV. 

Letter from the Allgemeiner Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund.

Berlin, April 5th, 1929.

The Committee of the Allgemeiner Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund requests you to be good enough to communicate to the President and delegates of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission the following resolution:

"On behalf of its five million members, the Allgemeiner Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund expects of the Preparatory Commission that it will energetically pursue its work with a view to convening, before the end of this year, an International Disarmament Conference in conformity with the resolution of the last Assembly of the League of Nations. As regards the pacification of the world, the great majority of the German people desires in future that there will be entirely peaceful and amicable relations between all peoples.
It is on the basis of this interpretation that the German working classes, and more particularly the organised trade unions, welcomed President Wilson's well-known Fourteen Points, which alone morally enabled the German working-classes to accept the conditions of the Peace Treaty with all the conditions involved. In view of Germany's almost complete disarmament, and the heavy material charges she is bearing, the German workers will only persist in this state of mind if they can acquire the certainty that all the conditions of a sure and durable peace will be created in conformity with the Treaty of Peace and the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Preparatory Disarmament Commission has prepared the final solution of the technical problems on disarmament. The Locarno and Paris Pacts have given the assurance that the armaments of the various countries will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with national safety.

"Accordingly, in concert with the organised working classes in all the other countries, the five million members of our Federation ask that their pacific determination should at last be heard throughout the world, and that a state of affairs should be created enabling all peoples to substitute for warlike disputes pacific emulation on the lines of intellectual and moral progress.

"We firmly hope that serious efforts will at last be made to achieve this ideal so often proclaimed."

V.

Letter from the Trades Union Congress General Council.

London, April 4th, 1929.

We desire to call your attention to the following resolution, which has been passed by the International Federation of Trade Unions at Amsterdam, of which body the British Trades Union Congress is a constituent part:

(Here follows the resolution of the International Federation of Trade Unions at Amsterdam given under A. VI.)

In the opinion of the General Council, this declaration expresses what should be the aim of all civilised Governments in their foreign policy, namely, the elimination of armed force as the decisive factor in international relationships and the substitution for armed force of a policy based on reason, justice and co-operation. We earnestly trust that every effort will be made to finish the work of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission in order that the principle of disarmament may be universally accepted and applied, and peace assured at last among the nations of the world.

VI.

Letter from the Swiss Trades Union Association.

Berne, April 9th, 1929.

The Swiss Trades Union Association has the honour to ask you to communicate the following to the President and delegates of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission:

"The Swiss Trades Union Association, comprising the largest workers' federations of our country, addressed to the Preparatory Disarmament Commission an urgent invitation to hasten its work so as to hold an International Disarmament Conference before the end of 1929.

"All the peoples of the world aspire to peace. Promises were made to them by the Treaty of Peace and the Covenant of the League of Nations. These promises must be carried out. A sure and lasting peace can only be established on condition that all the countries of the world carry out disarmament and submit to compulsory arbitration. It is for the League of Nations to contribute with all its might to the realization of the hopes reposed in it to the lasting welfare of humanity."

VII.

Letter from the Committee of the Co-operative Workers Trade Unions of Denmark.

Copenhagen, April 9th, 1929.

In conformity with a decision of the Committee of Co-operative Workers Trade Unions of Denmark, dated April 8th, 1929, we request you to be good enough to communicate to the President and delegates of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission the following resolution:

"The Co-operative Workers Trade Unions of Denmark, representing more than fifty trade unions with over 150,000 members, hereby request the Preparatory Disarmament Commission to prosecute its work with the greatest energy so as to render possible a very prompt summoning of the International Disarmament Conference in the course of 1929."
"The Co-operative Trade Unions express the opinion that, unless it makes the greatest efforts to achieve immediate disarmament, confidence in the League of Nations will be greatly weakened. The Locarno and Paris Pacts, together with the work of the Preparatory Commission, now make it possible to achieve a genuine reduction on the armament of all countries.

"We must demand that the desire for peace, expressed and maintained by the workers of the whole world, should now be given concrete effect by means of disarmament and international arbitration."

VIII.

Letter from the Federation of Trade Unions in Poland.

Warsaw, April 13th, 1929.

The Federation of Trade Unions in Poland, expressing the wishes of its 300,000 members, expects of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission that it shall actively pursue its labours to secure as soon as possible — i.e., in the course of the year 1929, according to the decision of the last Assembly of the League of Nations — the convocation of the International Disarmament Conference.

The Federation of Trade Unions in Poland declares that a further delay in the work of disarmament, which was declared by the Peace Treaty and the Covenant of the League of Nations to be indispensable to the establishment of an assured and permanent peace, would be a disregard of pledges solemnly taken.

The preparatory work of the Commission has made it possible to solve the technical problems of disarmament; and, furthermore, the Agreements of Locarno and Paris have provided additional conditions of security, which make it possible to effect "disarmament to the lowest point consistent with national safety".

The Federation of Trade Unions in Poland asks that the pacific desires of the workers of the whole world should be heard, and that peace by disarmament and arbitration should at last be organised by the League of Nations, whose essential mission this is.

It is hoped that this great act will to-morrow be a joyful and fruitful reality for all humanity.

IX.

Letter from the Czechoslovak Federation of Trade Unions.

Prague, June 17th, 1929.

The Central Council of the Czechoslovak Federation of Trade Unions, at its meeting on April 11th, 1929, adopted the following resolution, which we would ask you to be good enough to forward to the President and members of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission:

"The Czechoslovak Federation of Trade Unions at Prague, expressing the wishes of more than 550,000 trade unionists whom it represents, associates itself with the resolution of the Amsterdam International Federation of Trade Unions adopted at the meeting of its bureau on March 21st, 1929, and hopes that the International Disarmament Conference may be convoked as soon as possible.

"The Czechoslovak Federation of Trade Unions expects that the work of disarmament, which was declared by the Peace Treaty and the Covenant of the League of Nations to be indispensable to the establishment of an assured and permanent peace, will not be further delayed. The Federation asks that the desires of all friends of peace, more especially of the workers of the whole world, should be heard, and that peace by disarmament and arbitration should be effectively organised by the League of Nations, whose essential mission this is."
ANNEX 11.

TEXTS DRAWN UP AT SECOND READING.

CHAPTER I. — EFFECTIVES.

C.P.D./175 (2).

Article A.

The High Contracting Parties agree to limit to the effectives determined in the tables enumerated below and annexed to the present Convention the effectives (land, sea and air) in service in their armed forces or in formations organised on a military basis.

I. Land Armaments.

Table I. — Maximum armed forces stationed in the home country.
Table II. — Maximum armed forces stationed overseas (optional).
Table III. — Maximum of the total armed forces of the High Contracting Parties.
Table IV. — Maximum of the forces belonging to formations organised on a military basis stationed in the home country.
Table V. — Maximum of the forces belonging to formations organised on a military basis stationed overseas.

II. Naval Armaments.

(Discussion of text of first reading, and the reservations relating thereto, adjourned.)

III. Air Armaments.

Table I (optional). — Maximum armed forces stationed in the home country.
Table II (optional). — Maximum armed forces stationed overseas.
Table III. — Maximum of the total armed forces of the High Contracting Parties.
Table IV. — Maximum of the forces belonging to formations organised on a military basis stationed in the home country.
Table V. — Maximum of the forces belonging to formations organised on a military basis stationed overseas.

Article H.

The tables, relating to land armaments mentioned in Article A above, shall indicate a maximum number of officers which each High Contracting Party shall undertake not to exceed. The said tables shall further fix a maximum number of soldiers, other than officers, who may have completed more than $x^2$ years of actual service with the colours. In conscript armies, the number of men whose service exceeds the legal period in force in their respective countries but is less than $x^2$ years shall be shown for each High Contracting Party in the annual statements for which provision is made in Article IA of Chapter V. The tables relating to air armaments mentioned in Article A shall indicate, in the form of aggregate figures for officers, non-commissioned officers and men together, the maximum number of soldiers who may have completed more than $x^2$ years of actual service with the colours. The number of men of the class mentioned in the second and fourth paragraphs of the present article who are actually with the colours shall be shown every year for each High Contracting Party in the statements for the preparation of which provision is made in Article IA of Chapter V.

Each country may, if it so desires, show for purposes of information, in a special column in publicity Table IA of Chapter V, the number of recruits not trained as defined in the national legislation who are embodied in the effectives of its armed forces.

(The to be discussed later as far as naval effectives are concerned.)

Article C.

By “formations organised on a military basis” shall be understood police forces of all kinds, gendarmerie, Customs officials, forest guards, which, whatever their legal purpose, can be used without mobilisation, by reason of their cadres, establishment, training, armament, equipment, as well as any organisation complying with the above condition.

1 The reservations and observations of the various delegations regarding these texts have not been included in the present document.
2 This figure will be determined by the duration of the longest period of actual service with the colours which is in force in the conscript armies of the High Contracting Parties at the time of the signature of the Convention.
Article D.

By "mobilisation" within the meaning of the present Convention shall be understood all the measures for the purpose of providing the whole or part of the various corps, services and units with the personnel and material required to pass from a peace-time footing to a war-time footing.

Article E.

When drawing up the tables mentioned in Articles A (Chapter I) and IA (Chapter V): by "effectives in service in the armed forces" and by "effectives in service in the formations organised on a military basis" shall be understood the average daily effectives reckoned by dividing the total number of days' duty by the number of days in the budgetary year.

(The discussion of this article as far as naval and air effectives are concerned has been reserved.)

Article I.

(Reservation of the text adopted at first reading, and of German proposal — document C.P.D./174 (1) — adjourned.)

CHAPTER II. — MATERIAL.

Section III. — Air Armaments.

Article AA.

Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to limit the air material in service in accordance with the figures laid down in the following tables.

The limitation shall apply to aeroplanes and dirigibles capable of use in war employed in commission in the land, sea and air forces, or in the formations organised on a military basis.

*Table A.* — The maximum number and total horse-power of aeroplanes and maximum number, total horse-power and total volume of dirigibles in service in their armed forces.

*Note.* — Any of the High Contracting Parties who so desire may annex to Table A the following tables for limitations similar to those in Table A:

*Table A (1).* — Aeroplanes and dirigibles in commission in the armed forces stationed in the home country.

*Table A (2).* — Aeroplanes and dirigibles in commission in the armed forces stationed overseas.

*Table A (3).* — Aeroplanes and dirigibles in aircraft carriers.

*Table B.* — The maximum number and total horse-power of aeroplanes and maximum number, total horse-power and total volume of dirigibles in service in their formations organised on a military basis.

*Note.* — Any of the High Contracting Parties who so desire may annex to Table B the following tables for limitations similar to those in Table B:

*Table B (1).* — Aeroplanes and dirigibles in commission in the formations organised on a military basis stationed in the home country.

*Table B (2).* — Aeroplanes and dirigibles in commission in the formations organised on a military basis in overseas territories.

Article AC.

Horse-power shall be measured according to the rules ........ (to be established by the Conference).

The volume of dirigibles to be expressed in cubic metres.

Article AD.

(Reserved for discussion during the examination of Article ZD).

Article AE.

1. The High Contracting Parties shall refrain from prescribing the embodiment of military features in the build of civil aviation material so that this material may be constructed for purely civil purposes, more particularly with a view to providing the greatest possible measure.
of security and the most economic return. No preparations shall be made in civil aircraft in time of peace for the installation of warlike armaments for the purpose of converting such aircraft into military aircraft.

2. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to require of civil aviation undertakings that they should employ personnel specially trained for military purposes.

They undertake to authorise only as a provisional and temporary measure the seconding of personnel to, and the employment of military aviation material in, civil aviation undertakings.

3. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to subsidise, directly or indirectly, air lines principally established for military purposes, instead of being established for economic, administrative or social purposes.

4. The High Contracting Parties undertake to encourage as far as possible the conclusion of economic agreements between civil aviation undertakings in the different countries.

**Chapter IV. — Chemical Arm.**

The High Contracting Parties undertake, subject to reciprocity, to abstain from the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or similar gases, and of all analogous liquids, substances or processes.

They undertake unreservedly to abstain from the use of all bacteriological methods of warfare.