Personally, he preferred the original proposal of Baron Rolin Jaequemyns, because he thought there was an objection in principle, though not very practical, to laying down in one Convention that it involved acceptance of a totally different Convention. He thought both proposals should be put to the vote. He suggested that it would be quite wrong to take a vote on either of them apart from the other. For instance, supposing M. Politis’s proposal were put to the vote, delegates would not like to vote against it unless there was the alternative. He thought it ought to be put to the Commission whether they preferred M. Politis’s plan or Baron Rolin Jaequemyns’ plan, and not first one and then the other.

M. POLITIS (Greece) in reply to Lord Cushendun, referred to the usual rules of procedure. There was the original text, to which certain delegations had proposed a radical amendment. It was usual in such cases to vote first on the amendment farthest removed from the original text. Accordingly, in this particular case, they must first vote on the speaker’s amendment, and, if this were rejected, they must then vote on the original text as amended by the Belgian delegation.

Lord CUSHENDUN (British Empire) said that he did not want to enter into a discussion with M. Politis, but he could not accept his version of parliamentary practice. It would have been perfectly correct to have voted first on M. Politis’s proposal, had this proposal been moved as an amendment. Since M. Politis had introduced his proposal the debate had been ranging round the Belgian proposal indiscriminately. Once an amendment was moved, the debate must be limited to the amendment, and anything outside that amendment was out of order. The Commission had not kept to M. Politis’s proposal, but a parallel discussion on the two proposals — the Belgian and that of M. Politis — and on a further one, introduced by M. Sokal — an amendment to the Belgian proposal and an amendment to M. Politis’s proposal — had taken place. The only way to regularise the position now was to take these parallel proposals and ascertain which of the two had the greater number of delegations in favour of it.

M. SOKAL (Poland) stated that he could not vote, as he did not know whether the observation he had put forward on behalf of several of the delegations would be accepted or not.

M. ANTONIADE (Roumania) made the same remark, and declared that he would abstain from voting.

The principle of the Belgian proposal was adopted by 13 votes to 7 in favour of the Greek proposal, 3 abstaining.

The President stated that the text of the Belgian proposal was as follows:

“The High Contracting Parties undertake, subject to reciprocity, to abstain from the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or similar gases and of all analogous liquids, substances or processes.

“...They undertake unreservedly to abstain from the use of all bacteriological methods of warfare.”

M. VALDÉS-MENDEVILLE (Chile) proposed that the second paragraph of the draft should be retained, i.e., that it should read: “They also undertake to abstain”, instead of “They undertake unreservedly to abstain.”

The text of the Belgian proposal was put to the vote, and was adopted by 11 votes to 10.

24. Discussion of the Polish Proposal regarding the Possibility of supplementing the 1925 Protocol.

The President submitted to the Commission the following proposal by the Polish delegation:

“The Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference reserves the right to submit to the Conference proposals concerning the chemical and bacteriological arm, in order to supplement and extend the provisions of the 1925 Protocol.”

M. SATO (Japan) asked whether they were considering a text to be added to the Draft Convention or a separate resolution.

The President replied that they were considering an independent resolution.

M. LITVINOFF (Union of Socialist Soviet Republics) asked whether, if they accepted the proposal of M. Sokal, they would be entitled to bring in new proposals at the Conference only on Chapter IV of the Convention. He presumed there would be full freedom at the Conference to bring in any proposals relating to Disarmament, not only on Chapter IV, but on the rest of the Convention. He was afraid that, by accepting M. Sokal’s proposal, this freedom would be restricted to Chapter IV. If his assumption were incorrect, he was prepared to vote for the proposal of M. Sokal.

M. SOKAL (Poland) said he felt that the members maintained their entire freedom of action with regard to the other Chapters of the Draft. The Polish delegation’s proposal was merely intended to express the hope that the Commission would lay before the Conference more ample proposals than those it had adopted that day.
M. Rutgers (Netherlands) said he did not see how the adoption of the present text would alter the situation.

M. Sokal (Poland) pointed out that a number of delegations had made a great concession in accepting the formula which the Commission had just voted. They asked in exchange that the Commission should vote the text he had proposed. It was a matter of the Commission before it terminated its work, expressing a hope that it would be able, when it submitted definite proposals concerning the limitation and reduction of the various arms, to submit at the same time concrete proposals for the limitation and reduction of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare. These delegations had, in a spirit of conciliation, accepted the text now voted, but they did not think that this was all that could and should be done.

Baron Rolin Jaequemyns (Belgium) asked whether they were referring the matter to the Conference or to the Preparatory Commission itself. In the latter case, the adoption of this recommendation would mean that the whole question would have to be rediscussed by the Commission. If the proposal meant that the matter was to be referred to the Conference, he was ready to accept the Polish proposal.

M. Politis (Greece) pointed out that, according to the text, the Commission contemplated the possibility of reverting to this question.

M. Sokal (Poland) said that it would be difficult to reply "Yes" or "No" to Baron Rolin Jaequemyns' question. If, as Count Bernstorff supposed, the present session would be the last before the Conference, it was clear that the Commission would not be able to take any further action in this respect, and that the Conference would be the body to discuss the problem of chemical and bacteriological warfare. But the Commission might possibly hold one more session before the Conference met, and in that case he would like them to state straightaway the possibility of reverting to a question of such great importance. Perhaps the Commission would be able at a new session to adopt precise proposals of a more ample nature than those which it had now accepted.

The Polish delegation's proposal was adopted.

Proposal of the Soviet Delegation regarding the Ratification of the 1925 Protocol.

The President submitted to the Commission the following proposal by the Soviet delegation:

"The Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference recommends all States signatories to the Protocol of June 17th, 1925, which have not yet done so to ratify it as soon as possible."

The President pointed out that this was a draft resolution quite separate from the draft Convention.

The proposal of the Soviet delegation was adopted.

The President stated that the next meeting would be public and that he would give a brief summary of the Commission's work during the two meetings in which it sat in Committee.

(The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.)

ELEVENTH MEETING (PUBLIC)

Held at Geneva on Wednesday, April 24th, 1929, at 10 a.m.

President: M. Loudon (Netherlands).

Statement by the President on the Results achieved in Committee on the Subject of Chemical Warfare.

The President. — The discussion on Chapter IV of our draft Convention began last Saturday and was continued on Monday morning. The Commission then went into Committee with a view to arriving at an agreed text.

The discussions in Committee assumed, however, a rather wide development. They were finally narrowed down to the following issue: whether it was desirable to retain the clauses relating to chemical warfare in a Chapter of the Convention, or whether, seeing that the prohibition of the use of certain kinds of weapons has no direct relation to the reduction of armaments — which is the object of the Convention — these provisions should not rather be placed at the end of the Convention in a separate article, providing that the ratification of the Convention would automatically involve accession to the Protocol of 1925. The aim of the latter proposal was to strengthen the Protocol of 1925 — which has only been ratified by a few countries — by a provision which would bind all the States signatories of the future Disarmament Convention. The Commission, however, by a small majority, adopted the Belgian
proposal, which retains the first two paragraphs of Chapter IV, introducing the principle of reciprocity into the first paragraph, and a declaration in absolute terms into the second paragraph. The text adopted was therefore as follows:

"Chapter IV. — Chemical Warfare.

"The High Contracting Parties undertake, subject to reciprocity, to abstain from the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or similar gases and of all analogous liquids, substances or processes.

They undertake unreservedly to abstain from the use of all bacteriological methods of warfare."

On a motion of the Soviet delegation, the Commission also adopted a recommendation to the effect that States which have not ratified the Protocol of 1925 should do so with as little delay as possible.

As regards paragraphs 3 and 4 of the draft submitted in 1927 by some of the delegations, the Commission examined these texts in conjunction with the new draft submitted by the French delegation. In the prolonged discussion which took place on these proposals, the difficult question of a possible system of control or of sanctions, with a view to assuring their execution, was also raised. Finally, the delegations which had submitted the draft of 1927 announced that they were prepared to agree to the omission of these two paragraphs, but that this must not be interpreted as meaning that the obligation undertaken in the first two paragraphs was in any way diminished. The Polish delegation pointed out that this represented a very serious concession, and the Commission decided, on the proposal of that delegation, to leave open the possibility of submitting to the Disarmament Conference proposals concerning the chemical and bacteriological arms, in order to supplement and extend the provisions of the 1925 Protocol. Naturally, this decision, which was adopted in order to emphasise the importance of the problem, does not imply any restriction whatever on the right of delegations to submit any proposal they see fit to the Conference, whether as regards chemical warfare or as regards any other question within the terms of reference of the Conference.

The proposal submitted by the Roumanian and Serb-Croat-Slovene delegations, the principle of which had been supported by the Polish and Persian delegations, provided for a system of mutual assistance and sanctions against a State which might violate the prohibition to make use in war of asphyxiating gases or bacteriological means. This proposal was not put to the vote and the delegations which had submitted it reserved their right to revert to it at the Conference.

Again, the Commission did not adopt the Soviet delegation's proposal to embody in a Protocol, supplementary to the Protocol of 1925, certain provisions extracted from the Soviet Draft for the Reduction of Armaments.

The Soviet delegation reserved its right to submit the same proposals to the Conference.

The German proposal to insert in Chapter IV a new provision concerning the air arm was not discussed.

MUNIR Bey (Turkey). — In view of the Belgian amendment which was accepted yesterday by the Commission, the Turkish delegation desires to make the following declaration:

The condition of reciprocity is implied in the spirit of the Protocol of 1925 concerning the prohibition to make use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous, or similar gases and bacteriological means;

By its introduction into the Draft Convention now under consideration, the reservation in the Belgian amendment might be construed as an interpretation in regard to the right of reciprocity of States which have ratified the Protocol of Geneva, but which have not thought it necessary to formulate a reservation already implied in their undertakings;

It is not for the Preparatory Disarmament Commission to adopt a provision such as to constitute an interpretation of an international act concluded independently;

The Belgian amendment, adopted by a majority of the Commission, cannot be regarded in any case as having an exclusive bearing on the Geneva Protocol and thus determining its absolute or conditional character;

The right of States which have ratified the Protocol of 1925 without reservation to invoke the tacit condition of reciprocity is not affected;

Lastly, the Commission is requested to take note of the present declaration which the Turkish delegation asks may be inserted in the Minutes.

The President. — This declaration will, of course, be inserted in the Minutes.

27. Declaration by the Turkish Delegation concerning the Problem of Disarmament.

MUNIR Bey (Turkey). — Now that we are about to begin our examination of the texts prepared by the Commission, I desire to submit a number of declarations of a general character which will make it possible to avoid frequent interventions in the debate. This will assist the work of the Commission.

1. Turkey, like several other States which are taking part in the work of this Commission, is not a Member of the League of Nations, and, accordingly, the Turkish delegation, for the time being, can only consider certain provisions of the Draft Convention from the standpoint of that special situation.

2. The Turkish delegation has communicated to the Commission the chief points of the proposal which it desired to make with a view to defining the criterion on which, in its view, the general reduction of armaments might be based.
Since this first suggestion was submitted, we have carefully followed the debates in this Commission, and it is clear from the general tendency of these debates that the moment is not favourable for a discussion of the suggestion which we had the honour to submit to you for consideration.

We feel that the Disarmament Conference will have to construct the fabric of the future Convention on data derived from two principal sources, namely, the determination, on the one hand, of the forms of armament to be reduced or limited, and, on the other hand, the criterion of reduction to be employed. The Preparatory Commission has so far confined its work to one only of these factors, for the present draft contains no provisions regarding criteria, or figures or coefficients of reduction, and, by a resolution adopted at the meeting on the 19th of this month, these matters were left for the Conference to decide.

As the Commission has thus indicated its intention of confining itself to the designation of the different forms of armaments to be reduced, and as the Turkish proposal relates only to the criterion to be fixed, thus falling within the category of objective criteria expressly left to the Conference to decide, the Turkish delegation considers that the discussion of its proposal would only tend unnecessarily to increase the Preparatory Commission's work and hence delay the convening of the Conference.

The Turkish delegation desires to thank the Bureau for having inserted Turkey's observations in the agenda and requests the Commission to note that the statement in question will be repeated before the Conference in connection with the discussion of criteria, figures and coefficients.

Accordingly, the Turkish delegation will take part in the discussion of the draft Convention subject to a reservation in regard to amendments and adaptations which would have to be made in the draft text if its proposal meets in principle with the approval of the Conference.

3. In considering the question of the reduction of armaments, the Government of the Turkish Republic adheres to the conception of peace-time effectives and armaments, and the proposal which the Turkish delegation intends to submit to the Conference will leave the criterion to be fixed, thus falling within the category of objective criteria expressly left to the Conference to decide, the Turkish delegation considers that the discussion of its proposal would only tend unnecessarily to increase the Preparatory Commission's work and hence delay the convening of the Conference.

The Turkish delegation consequently desires to state at once that it is obliged to formulate reservations, in regard to provisions designed to limit effectives in reserve and materials in stock, in general.


M. Sato (Japan). — Before we begin our detailed discussion on the question of air armaments, I desire to make the following declaration:

The day before yesterday, when we heard the very important declaration made by Mr. Gibson, I stated in a few brief general remarks the attitude of the Japanese delegation towards the problem of naval disarmament. We are now about to deal with the reduction of air and land armaments, and I desire to put before you a few quite general considerations concerning these two aspects of the disarmament problem.

It seems to me that we should compare the progress of our work in connection with naval armaments and other categories of armaments. As regards the reduction of naval armaments, we are in a very fortunate position, in that we know that it has already entered partly into the domain of practical realisation, more particularly as the outcome of the Washington Conference for the Limitation of Naval Armaments. Since then we have several times had occasion to make a detailed examination of this question, for example, at the Three Power Naval Conference at Geneva.

As regards the reduction of air and land armaments, however, we are only at the beginning of our investigations. Indeed, at any rate so far as international matters are concerned, we are still without practical experience, even though the greater number of countries, spontaneously and in the free exercise of their sovereign rights, have effected considerable reductions in their land forces.

Moreover, the origin, historical development and present organisation of air and land armaments varies considerably in the different countries, owing to their geographical situation and other circumstances peculiar to the individual States.

In the circumstances, it seems only logical that we should feel obliged to take into account the special situation of each country when we come to determine the elements to which reduction is to apply in the matter of air and land armaments, and we must also confine ourselves for the present to laying down broad general lines which will secure the acceptance of as many States as possible.

In the course of the general discussion which took place at the beginning of the third session of this Commission in 1927, I explained my views on this point.

May I be permitted to repeat what I said then:

"If we are to realise practical limitation or reduction of land, naval or air forces, the methods which we choose and the means which we employ must be easy of application and execution. If, with the aim of making disarmament as complete as possible, we adopted
complicated methods, we should encounter grave difficulties, in view of the great differences
in the geographical situation, the customs, and the organisations and institutions of national
defences in the various countries."

What I wanted to bring out in that passage of my speech was that, in preparing the first
practical scheme for the reduction of land and air armaments in particular, the actual circumstances
should lead us to concentrate all our efforts on the construction of a sort of general framework,
and that we should avoid any attempt to draw up detailed or rigid rules. In my view, it is
important to arrive at flexible formulae, because otherwise it will not be possible to take equitably
into account the diversity of situations obtaining, and many Governments might find great
difficulty in accepting the scheme which it is our duty to draw up. Since we are only preparing
the first stage in the practical realisation of land and air disarmament, we should be well advised,
I think, to content ourselves with tracing broad general lines to which everyone could agree,
rather than to seek at the outset to draw up a plan for the reduction of armaments which would
involve detailed and necessarily rigid rules.

In conclusion, may I express the hope that these observations will be taken favourably into
consideration by the other members of the Preparatory Commission.

29. Declaration by the Persian Delegation concerning the Problem of Disarmament.

Colonel RIAZI (Persia). — I desire also to submit a general declaration.
For the reasons set forth in our declaration of April 17th, to be found in the Minutes of the
third meeting of this session, with reference, further, to the resolution of the Assembly of 1923
concerning the situation of the South American States and other States similarly situated, and
in view of the fact that the regional agreements concluded by Persia do not provide for mutual
assistance in case of aggression, the Persian delegation desires to put forward certain considerations
to which it will revert at the Disarmament Conference when presenting and supporting quantitative
proposals, especially since, under paragraph 3 of Article 8 of the Covenant, agreement between
the signatories in regard to the limitation of armaments is to be for a period of at least ten years.
It would be impossible for Persia, a country which is now passing through a period of
transformation, and whose new military organisation is in its infancy, to accept any scheme for
the limitation of armaments before having had time to consider the country’s requirements, both
from the point of view of the pacification of Persia’s distant provinces and the maintenance of
internal order, and from that of national defence and the performance of international undertakings.
Apart, of course, from the security requirements of her islands, Persia has no overseas
territories to protect; but, on the other hand, like countries which do possess such territories,
she is obliged, in the absence of rapid means of communication, to keep garrisons in her outlying
provinces, in addition to the formations organised on a military basis.
Again, Persia requires a mobile army to ensure national security and the safeguarding of her
frontiers.
The Persian delegation simply wishes to point out the particular situation of their country
and to emphasise the fact that Persia’s sole care is to be in a position to maintain peace and order
within her borders and to constitute a factor of peace and stability in the Middle East.

30. Discussion of the German Delegation’s Proposal concerning Air Warfare.

The President. — In order to avoid any confusion, I should state that we have to take a
decision as to whether we will discuss the chapter on air armaments now or Count Bernstorff’s
proposal concerning air warfare. For my part, I think it would be preferable to commence
immediately our discussion of Count Bernstorff’s proposal.

This suggestion was adopted.

The President. — Count Bernstorff’s proposal is as follows:

“Air Arm.

The High Contracting Parties mutually undertake not to launch weapons of offence
of any kind from the air by means of aircraft, nor to employ unpiloted aircraft controlled
by wireless or otherwise, carrying explosive or incendiary gaseous substances.

They further undertake to make no preparations of any kind for the use of the weapons
of offence referred to in the previous paragraph.”

Count BERNSTORFF (Germany). — You have received a proposal in connection with Chapter IV.
to the effect that aircraft should be prohibited from dropping from the air any implements of
combat. From the point of view of attack, aircraft can hurl their bombs far beyond the war zone
properly so-called. They thus constitute an immediate threat to the civilian population. May
I remind you in this connection of the manner in which the honourable delegate for Belgium
described the dangers of such an attack at the first session of the Preparatory Commission for the
Disarmament Conference :

“We are shown by experts what chemical warfare and the bombardment of a city would
mean. Mr. Baker’s work, to which I have just alluded, contains the collected opinions of a
number of technical experts, who describe the aerial bombardment of a large city. Aeroplanes
causing fires that no water can extinguish, setting whole districts afame, lighting up the city and thus preventing it from protecting itself; bombs blowing up public monuments and centres of defence; the population compelled to seek refuge in the streets. Then, too, there are gases which, as now manufactured, are deadly whatever part of the body they touch. These gases, heavier than air, penetrate everywhere, into cellars, into the underground railways, leaving no refuge anywhere. The author of this prophecy calculates that the bombardment of Paris, Berlin or London for a few hours would claim at least five hundred thousand victims.

"If we allow things to drift and if chemical warfare and air warfare are free to develop, the result will be, not only that war will become more horrible, but, if I may say so, more cowardly, so that by an appalling paradox the only persons who will be comparatively safe will be the combatants themselves. Smearèd with oil, clad in garments that give them the appearance of deep-sea divers, and protected by every kind of mechanical contrivance, they will be more or less protected; the victims will be the old, the weak, and defenceless women and children, whose lives every civilised community surrounds with care and attention."

The terrors of air attack will increase as time goes on if we do not take far-reaching steps to prevent these attacks. Our work would not be complete if we merely prohibited the use of gas and allowed explosives or incendiary bombs to be thrown from aircraft, for this would seriously menace the civilian population and would bring warfare into peaceful regions that should remain unscathed.

I think I am expressing the unanimous opinion of the Commission in saying that the dropping of implements of combat from aircraft is one of the most effective forms of attack. Indeed, Sub-Commission A concludes in its report that high-power bombing aeroplanes are the very best offensive weapon in air warfare. They make it possible to attack a country at its very heart. I think it is particularly necessary that these means should be effectively controlled by disarmament, seeing that the anxiety of States for their security is a consequence of their fear of possible aggression. If aircraft were prohibited from dropping bombs as we have proposed, this would make it unnecessary to maintain bombing machines. Thus the purely offensive side of military aeronautics would be abolished, and we could then more easily arrive at a solution of the problem of air material. The adoption of this prohibition would, therefore, represent considerable progress in the question of disarmament and would, I am sure, be favourably received throughout the whole world. A large amount of literature already exists on the fears felt by populations exposed in a future war to aerial aggression. Our draft in Chapter IV was intended to banish the terrors of future warfare due to the development of modern technique.

We are already agreed that the use of the chemical arm should be renounced, but our efforts would be incomplete if we did not also agree upon the necessity of prohibiting generally the dropping of bombs by aircraft.

M. Sokal (Poland). — I have listened with great interest to all the arguments which the honourable representative of Germany has laid before us. I was very impressed, and I am sure that my colleagues were also struck, by the quotation Count Bernstorff read from the speech of the Belgian delegate, M. de Brouckère, concerning the horrors of war, and air warfare in particular. He used this as an argument to support his contention that we should prohibit the dropping of bombs from aircraft in time of war.

All of us still remember M. de Brouckère's remarkable speech. Even without this speech, there are among us so many representatives of countries which have suffered during the war that it is perhaps unnecessary to evoke the horror of air warfare and the indescribable sufferings endured by the civil population a few years ago. It is perhaps well, however, that Count Bernstorff should have reminded us of the fact, and caused us to reflect on the manner in which we should proceed to avoid a similar disaster in the future.

Count Bernstorff has come to the conclusion that we must ask the Commission to include in the Draft Convention an appropriate passage prohibiting such procedure in time of war.

We are all agreed on this point. We all feel that this is a horrible method of warfare. There will certainly be no divergence of opinion in the Commission as to that.

But as regards the way in which we should give effect to this conclusion, I think that Count Bernstorff is going in the wrong direction. He takes as his starting-point the view that such prohibition might in some way improve the situation in the future.

This is perhaps what we ourselves thought a few years ago.

In 1925 when the Protocol on chemical warfare was established, we all thought in this fashion. Since then our opinions have evolved and have progressed. We have come to the conclusion that it is impossible to prohibit any particular form of warfare and that it is warfare itself which must be forbidden.

The Polish delegation claims the honour of having made every effort to arrive in this domain at positive results. Some of you who have followed the interesting discussions at the Assembly of the League of Nations in 1927, will certainly remember the Polish proposals on this subject. Those efforts to obtain an admission that war should be prohibited, not any particular kind of warfare, but war in general, achieved their first success in the form of the Kellogg Pact. It would be, indeed, a mistake to revert to-day to the opinions we held in 1925, now that the Paris Pact has been signed — nearly twelve months ago — and will certainly
become a universal obligation in the near future. The path it has traced is the only path we should follow.

In regard to our Convention, there is a considerable difference between the line of conduct we are now following and Count Bernstorff's proposal. I would beg to remind you of the very clear and persuasive observations of our Vice-President, M. Politis. M. Politis drew the Commission's attention to a very serious point. He said, "Beware: if you endeavour to codify the laws of war, you will not succeed in your task!", and he supported his opinion, which is undoubtedly right, by juridical arguments.

But there are other arguments besides. Stand up before public opinion to-day, after the signing of the Paris Pact, and try to convene a Conference for the Codification of the Laws of War. What would public opinion say if, after decreeing the outlawry of war, the League of Nations began to deal with the regulation and codification of the laws of war?

I think that we can follow only one path, namely, to continue on the lines indicated by the Paris Pact and fight war, as such, by every means. As regards our Convention, we should remain within the sphere of the limitation and reduction of armaments. We should not endeavour to do two obviously contradictory things, namely, abolish war, on the one hand, and, on the other, attempt to codify its laws.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Socialist Soviet Republics).—The honourable delegate of Poland has rightly drawn attention to the situation in which we find ourselves. Nearly all the States have signed the Kellogg Pact renouncing and outlawing war, and yet here we are discussing the methods by which war should be carried on. These observations could have been made with equal force by the Polish delegate yesterday, when we were discussing the chapter on chemical warfare. But I wish he would go further and apply his observations to the reduction of armaments. Why should we only reduce armaments if there is to be no more war? The Soviet delegation draws the conclusion from the Kellogg Pact renouncing war that there should be no more armaments at all and, therefore, last year we proposed the abolition of all armaments. Such action would be logical, and it is the only link missing in the chain of pacifist efforts for the real abolition of war. I greatly regret that the honourable delegate of a neighbouring country—Poland—contributed no less, if no more, to the rejection last year of our proposals for total disarmament. If he wishes to be consistent, now, when the Kellogg Pact has become a fact, he will perhaps alter the position he took up last year and give his support at the Conference to our Draft Convention for total disarmament.

The position is, however, that the Preparatory Commission has not found it possible to accept our proposals, and, acting in this way, it has declared that, in spite of the Kellogg Pact and in spite of the solemn obligations which the States have undertaken in virtue of that Pact, we must still reckon with the possibilities of war. That being so it is ludicrous that we should endeavour to pass some measures which would at least either reduce the possibilities of war or lessen its horrors. Therefore I see no reason why we should not deal with the question of chemical warfare as we did yesterday, or why we should not discuss such questions as that proposed by the honourable delegate for Germany regarding the abolition of military aeronautics.

As to that proposal, I would point out that it is covered by the Soviet Draft Convention for the Reduction of Armaments, which has been discussed during this session. In the chapter on air armaments you will find a number of articles aiming at exactly the same purpose of making it impossible to extend the horrors of war to civil populations. It is with that end in view that we have proposed the abolition of special kinds of aircraft, to make the throwing of bombs on civil populations and populated towns and other localities impossible. Further, I would draw attention to Article 7 of Section II of the Soviet Draft Convention, which reads as follows:

"All implements of war directed primarily against the civil population which does not directly take part in the armed conflict (military aircraft and chemical weapons) must be destroyed as provided in the Special Convention."

This article is all-embracing; it deals not only with aircraft but also with other weapons which can be used against the civil population. Having introduced this article in our Draft Convention, it is logical for us to support in the fullest measure the proposal of the German delegation.

M. Massigli (France).—I would ask you to allow me to bring the discussion back to its proper sphere.

If we were considering the regulation of the laws of war with regard to the civilian population, I should have nothing to add to the observations already submitted. It would be sufficient to point out that such regulation is not within our competence. It might also be added that, in truth, the principle of sparing the civilian population from the horrors of war has for long formed part of international law. It is merely to be regretted that in the last war all the belligerents did not always bear this fact in mind. But that is not the question.

Count Bernstorff's proposal is not in the least equivalent to stating that the civilian population should not be bombarded. It prohibits absolutely the use of bombing aircraft. That is a military question which we may include within the framework of our Convention because, if bombing aircraft are abolished, perhaps—as Count Bernstorff suggests in another amendment—part of these provisions could also be modified.
Why should bombing aircraft be abolished? If I have rightly understood the arguments, two reasons have been put forward. It has been stated that bombing aircraft are a blind instrument of war and consequently are more likely to attack the civilian population. They are also an instrument of aggression.

It is certain that bombing aircraft can, in certain circumstances, be a blind organ, but are they the only means of warfare which are blind? Is not a cannon firing at a range of 120 to 150 kms. just as blind? I do not wish to bring into this discussion the memories of a past which will never return, but at any rate, gentlemen, remember the events which occurred eleven years ago. I need say no more.

With regard to the second question, I think that bombing aircraft may certainly be made an instrument of an attack, but they may also be an instrument of defence. Let us suppose the case of an attacked State against which another State is pouring out its military forces previously concentrated in secret. If the State thus attacked sends bombing squadrons to destroy the bridges over which the enemy transports are passing, the stations in which it is mobilising and detaining its troops, is it committing an act of aggression?

In reality the object of the German proposal is quite different; it aims at the partial abolition of military aircraft. It aims—I must apologise for saying this, but the very terms of the proposal oblige me to do so, since they awaken in me certain very definite memories—it aims at abolishing as far as possible, by placing all countries in the same position, the consequences experienced by certain countries as a result of certain treaties now in force.

That is neither our mission nor our task. We are not called upon to abolish military aircraft. I hope you will not misunderstand me. I do not mean to say that one day, in the near future perhaps, the problem of the abolition of military aircraft will not arise in a general form. Perhaps that, indeed, would be a very desirable eventuality. But, if so, the question will arise in different circumstances: there will be the problem of internationalisation, of punishment and of international action. At a Conference, lasting for a long time, such a question might be studied at leisure. But that is not our task.

I would, therefore ask the Commission to reject Count Bernstorff's proposal.

Count Bernstorff (Germany).—At the present juncture I find there is only one proposal counter to my own, namely, that my proposal should be rejected. Obviously I cannot oblige the Commission to discuss the German proposal or accept it. But I have been bound to submit it in pursuance of the instructions received from my Government. This question will also come up again before the Conference.

Personally, I am not in favour of retarding our work by engaging in general discussions. My Government desires, as I have said, to see the Conference's programme of work elaborated as soon as possible. It hopes that the Conference will be convened at the earliest possible moment. Nevertheless I am obliged to add a few words. I wish to state that no one has greater admiration than myself for the Kellogg Pact, to which reference has been made. It is the greatest progress which has been effected along the path of practical pacifism. It changes the whole aspect of the question. But if the Kellogg Pact is to be put into effect, the Conference might just as well be convened immediately and might prohibit all armaments, apart from such police forces as might be absolutely necessary. I would be very happy to accept such a proposal, which I am sure the Commission would also come up again before the Conference.

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Count Bernstorff (Germany).—Yes, the vote was taken and Baron Rolin Jacqemyns' arguments were accepted. That is why the reduction of armaments by prohibition is a principle that can quite well be adopted in the course of our discussion. Allusion has been made to certain treaty provisions. These provisions were drawn up by others. We accepted them. But at that time we were told that such reductions would be a model for further disarmament. I am aware that you do not at the present time intend to go as far as we do. All the same, they are a model. We therefore come here under the idea that our own disarmament is supposed to be a model for the rest of the world. The principle of reduction by prohibition forms part of the said provisions. Just now aircraft were compared to heavy guns. I may inform M. Massigli that we also intend later on to propose the prohibition of heavy guns.

M. Sokal referred to M. Politis's speech. But, eloquent though the Greek delegate may be, it is a fact that his principle was not accepted by the Commission. M. Politis's opinions cannot therefore be quoted as representing the opinion of the Commission.

M. Sokal (Poland).—No vote was taken on this principle.

Count Bernstorff (Germany).—Yes, the vote was taken and Baron Rolin Jacqemyns' arguments were accepted. That is why the reduction of armaments by prohibition is a principle that can quite well be adopted in the course of our discussion. Allusion has been made to certain treaty provisions. These provisions were drawn up by others. We accepted them. But at that time we were told that such reductions would be a model for further disarmament. I am aware that you do not at the present time intend to go as far as we do. All the same, they are a model. We therefore come here under the idea that our own disarmament is supposed to be a model for the rest of the world. The principle of reduction by prohibition forms part of the said provisions. Just now aircraft were compared to heavy guns. I may inform M. Massigli that we also intend later on to propose the prohibition of heavy guns.

If you do not accept this principle, that is your affair. But, if it be possible to accept it in naval questions, there is no reason why we should not accept it in connection with land armaments. Why reject the principle of reduction by prohibition when an effort is made to apply it to certain arms which would, to a singular degree, be of assistance to one Power in attacking another? I remember that, at the beginning of our discussion, three or four years ago, Viscount Cecil, the first British delegate, said that our main preoccupation should be to prevent aggression.

M. Corian (Spain).—Spain is an essentially peace-loving country. The Spanish nation is not by any means militaristic. That is why all Spanish Governments have been, are, and will be disposed to accept the most radical formulae with regard to the limitation of armaments.

The limitation of armaments raises a set of entirely different problems in each particular country. I am bound to state that, for Spain, bombing aircraft are absolutely necessary as
arms of defence, in view of the country's geographical situation, her long sea-coasts and very reduced naval strength.

Consequently, I cannot agree to a proposal prohibiting such arms, although I declare that Spain will naturally never employ those means of war against the civilian population of another State.

M. Sokal (Poland). — If I address the Commission for the second time it is because I should like, before we come to the vote, to reply briefly to the very courteous observations of the Soviet representative. I must first remove a misunderstanding. I think that M. Litvinoff somewhat exaggerated the part played by Poland at the last session of the Preparatory Commission when the first Soviet proposal was rejected. The part we played was much smaller than M. Litvinoff is good enough to suppose, since our delegation represented one-twentieth part of the Preparatory Commission which unanimously rejected the proposal in question. Moreover, this proposal was withdrawn by the Soviet delegation itself, and another was put forward in its place.

I am bound to say that, if Poland decided against this proposal, it was not because she was opposed to the adoption of as radical a measure of disarmament as possible. I have no need to explain that Poland is particularly anxious to obtain as complete and as rapid a disarmament as possible. M. Litvinoff, representing a neighbouring country, will understand that better than anyone. But we have always thought that the first Soviet proposal was not calculated to lead to that general pacification which must precede disarmament on the scale proposed.

In this connection I would beg to assure M. Litvinoff that, when he stated in his first speech that we seemed to be engaged in studying steps to be taken in war-time, he certainly made a mistake. We are here solely to discover means which will allow of a limitation and reduction of armaments. As Count Bernstorff said, quoting Viscount Cecil, the aim is to obtain as stable and durable a peace as we can. I think that, if the Kellogg Pact does not immediately lead to complete and absolute disarmament, that is simply because the Kellogg Pact does not establish absolute security; it is only a first step towards such security. Disarmament, as has so often been said, is precisely a function of this security. The Kellogg Pact can bring about disarmament to a degree equal to the security which this Pact provides. I have no need to remind you that it makes no provision for punishment or any other means capable of increasing the present degree of security. We hope that this first step will be followed by another that will allow us to obtain far more appreciable reductions. Our hope has always been, and still is, that we may proceed to a greater measure of disarmament as soon as the degree of security increases. But for any decision of this kind we must have the support of a system of penalties and mutual assistance. This is a general principle upon which the Covenant of the League of Nations itself is founded. The only method which the Members of the League possess to render a war impossible is to provide for collective punishment and collective mutual assistance. Unfortunately, we are not all here representatives of States Members of the League of Nations. The question arises in a slightly different light for States like the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. But the obligations flowing from the Covenant of the League oblige Members of the League to participate, if necessary, in operations for mutual assistance, as provided by the Covenant. This implies the necessity of only proceeding up to certain limits in the matter of disarmament. Moreover, national defence, which remains, even after the signature of the Kellogg Pact, an obvious and very natural duty, calls for an army proportionate to the situation of each country. I think that it was my duty to offer this short explanation to M. Litvinoff, in order to dispel any possibility of a misunderstanding with regard to the attitude of the Polish delegation.

The Honorable Hugh R. Wilson (United States of America). — If we are to take a vote, I would like to state briefly the reasons for the way in which the United States delegation will vote.

I do not for a minute say that the time will not come when we should, perhaps, attack the problem of the use of aircraft against the civilian population, nor even that we can exclude the hypothesis which M. Massigli brought out of the possibility of excluding aircraft altogether as a war weapon. But I do not believe that this is the time, in this Commission, to discuss such a complicated and endless problem. In the interest, therefore, of pursuing our work to a practical end, we shall vote against the proposition if it is put to the vote.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Socialist Soviet Republics). — It was not my intention to speak again, but since I notice a certain reluctance on the part of other delegations to speak, I shall myself take a few minutes for some observations.

I notice that the honourable delegate for Poland has somewhat modified the views which he expressed this morning. It seemed to me from his first speech that he took the Kellogg Pact seriously, and therefore imagined a future in which there would be no more war, when all the armaments retained will be used for other purposes — for example, for parading and drilling — when guns will never fire, when bombs will remain on the ground and will never be taken into the air and dropped. But he expressed himself quite differently the second time. He pointed out that the Kellogg Pact does not give any security against war, that it is bound to be broken and infringed and that therefore the possibility of war still remains. He withdraws, thereby, all the remarks he made about the needlessness of discussing these questions.
I will say a few words with regard to the remarks made by the honourable delegate for France. He rightly pointed out that, in addition to bomb-throwing, there are other weapons which can be used against civil populations. I think I anticipated this remark of his in my first statement, when I drew attention to certain articles in the Soviet draft proposal. For instance, Article 6 of Section II says:

“For the armament of land forces, the existing patterns shown in the tables at January 1st, 1928, shall be retained, except tanks and heavy artillery with very long range, which are essentially designed for aggression.”

M. Massigii will agree that it would have been quite consistent, in endeavouring to deal with bomb-throwing, to abolish other weapons from which civil populations might suffer. I will allow myself to disregard his legal strictures since only this morning we have passed a resolution on the prohibition of chemical warfare. If we can deal with the question of prohibiting certain poisonous gases, why not also prohibit other means of warfare such as bomb-throwing?

During the discussion yesterday in the Committee, some delegates gave expression to their anxiety as to the effect of certain decisions of the Commission upon public opinion. I do not agree with those who said that we need pay no attention to public opinion. The idea of calling a general Conference on Disarmament, and in particular Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which places on the Members of the League certain obligations for the reduction of armaments, are both due, not to the spontaneous desires of Governments to deal with these questions, but to the pressure of public opinion. It is therefore necessary to think of this public opinion in some degree when working for this or that solution.

In this connection, I would ask you to bear in mind that this is the eleventh meeting of our session, that we have been here for nearly ten days, and that not a single positive resolution has been passed by us. We have only achieved the rejection of certain points. The discussion of certain basic principles put forward by the Soviet delegation has been rejected. We have rejected proposals with regard to chemical warfare, and now it is evidently intended to reject another positive proposal made by the German delegation and seconded by the Soviet delegation. Surely the Preparatory Commission for Disarmament should not be made the burial-ground for proposals of this kind.

Lord Cushendun (British Empire).—I think it is clear from the discussion that has taken place that there is no general assent to the proposition of Count Bernstorff, and, that being so, I should like to explain in a very few words why I cannot support it, and why, if a vote is taken, I should have to vote against it. It is simply on this ground: it appears to me that his proposition is outside the scope of this Convention. After all, what he is proposing is not the reduction or limitation of any arm, but to regulate the use of weapons which are perfectly legal. Aeroplanes and dirigibles are quite legal, and it is impossible to abolish them because they are used for civil purposes. In addition to that, there is the case of explosives. The use of explosives is perfectly legitimate. Count Bernstorff is seeking to limit the particular use of these weapons, and I think that that lies outside the scope of this Convention.

One other observation I should like to make, because this matter does not appear to me to have been referred to. Unless I am very much mistaken, the dropping of bombs from aircraft is one of the things abolished — by agreement — by the Hague Convention of 1907. I leave it to the Commission to reflect how much value that abolition had and whether, if it were repeated in this Convention, it would be likely to have any more effect than the condemnation of this weapon which was deliberately agreed upon by the nations assembled at The Hague before the last war.

M. Politis (Greece).—I should like to explain my point of view in regard to this question. I do not think that we can simply reply “Yes” or “No” to Count Bernstorff’s proposal without giving rise to misunderstandings which might have unfortunate results.

I was very glad to hear what the honourable delegate of the British Empire said just now. I do not wish to re-open the discussion which was closed provisionally yesterday by the vote of a very small majority. I note, however, and I cannot but regret, that the arguments which Lord Cushendun used were not applied yesterday to that very question of chemical warfare. We should have achieved the same result, the result which I had proposed, that is to say, we should have left the question of regulating warfare outside the scope of our discussions. But I do not propose to dwell on this point.

The German proposal as I understand it resolves itself into three distinct points, which I think should be taken separately, if we are to get a clear view ourselves, and thus enlighten public opinion.

The first point is the one mentioned last: whether it is desirable to abolish military aeroplanes. This comes properly within our agenda under Section III of Chapter II of our Draft Convention, and Count Bernstorff might submit the proposal when this is under discussion, and the Commission would be able to take a decision with full knowledge of the case. There is no need, therefore, to decide now about this first point.

The second point concerns the question of using air bombs against the civil population. The Commission, I think is unanimous as regards this matter and it is impossible that this should not be the case. As M. Massigii reminded us, it is already a principle of international law that direct means of offence shall not be used against the civil population, whether by
means of land, naval or air artillery. This point may therefore be regarded as settled, and we need simply declare ourselves in agreement in regard to this humanitarian principle on which, I repeat, no doubt exists.

There remains the third and last point: the desirability and possibility of regulating the use of bombs from the air, if employed against the armed forces of the enemy. This question, as mentioned just now, was regulated in a general way at The Hague in connection with bombardment in general. The provisions of the Hague Convention apply to bombardment of all kinds, wherever the guns are situated, whether on land or in the air. It now remains to consider whether something should be done, in the light of the experience gained from the last war, to supplement the regulations laid down in the Hague Convention.

I would not say that such a discussion is outside the sphere of this Commission. We extended the question yesterday, and it would be somewhat contradictory if we said now that the question was not within our competence. I shall always maintain that it is not advisable to discuss this complicated question at a Disarmament Conference, because there is the risk that we might not arrive at a conclusion on the subject of disarmament, and a conclusion must be found.

Perhaps, if some day it is thought desirable to discuss the question of regulating bombing from the air, together with other questions relating to means of offence in time of war, it could be dealt with by a special Conference, but this raises a number of very delicate questions. I do not think that we should go into them at present. However, as repeated references have been made at this morning's meeting to the Kellogg Pact and to doubts which might arise in the public mind as to the efficacy of that great international act, I wish to say that I quite agree with M. Sokal when he says that it would be inconsistent, after proclaiming as a universal rule that wars of aggression shall be prohibited, to draw up a code of regulations governing the way in which war, although prohibited, shall be conducted. I would go further: not only would it be inconsistent, but it would involve serious inconsequence in practice. If we start by saying that wars of aggression are prohibited and then lay down rules for the conduct of such wars, we should, in my view, be showing extraordinary ingenuousness, for it is certainly ingenuous to imagine that a State which assumed in the eyes of the world the responsibility of violating this general obligation not to resort to war, would have any scruples in regard to supplementary obligations restricting its means of offence vis-à-vis the enemy. Any party guilty of violating the general undertaking would a fortiori violate the supplementary obligations. I think, therefore, that it would be not only inconsistent with the terms of the Kellogg Pact, but, considering the existence of this pact, quite useless to frame regulations now for the conduct of war.

Again, it has been urged: if you quote the Kellogg Pact as an argument for not proceeding to codify the rules of war — and you are perhaps right — why discuss the limitation of armaments? If wars of aggression are in principle prohibited, would it not be logical to declare that armaments are also prohibited? This system of logic is somewhat faulty, because, unfortunately, every country is obliged, and will perhaps be obliged for many years to come, to provide for its own defence.

Until we have at our disposal some international force to come to the assistance of a State unlawfully attacked, every country will have to provide, as far as possible, for its own defence. As I have repeatedly said here in Geneva, not only is this the right of a country, but its duty which it owes both to itself and to the international community.

I felt it my duty to place these views before the Commission, and I think, as regards Count Bernstorff's proposal, that it would be better, instead of voting on the proposal as a whole, to divide it up under the three heads which in my opinion, it comprises.

The President. — I should like to point out that to vote for or against the German proposal would not really reflect the opinion of the Commission. I propose, therefore, as M. Politis has suggested, that the three points should be taken separately, instead of voting on the proposal as a whole.

Baron Moncheur (Belgium). — The Belgian delegation fully appreciates the humanitarian principles by which the German delegate was actuated in proposing the abolition of a means of warfare, whose devastating effects on the civilian population have been so vividly described by M. de Brouckère.

I think, however, that the time has not yet come for this Commission to discuss the adoption of the radical measure proposed by Count Bernstorff, a measure which several countries — as M. Cobian has just suggested — could not accept at present in view of their particular circumstances.

M. Sokal (Poland). — I wish to remove a misapprehension on the part of M. Litvinoff, who regards my two speeches as inconsistent with one another. He will see from the Minutes that my statements are quite consistent. M. Litvinoff, with his passion for extremes, said that I had stated on one occasion that the Kellogg Pact gave absolute security, and on the other, that it gave no security whatever.

I made neither of these statements, but, keeping strictly to realities, I said that the Kellogg Pact gave us a certain measure of security.

M. Rutgers (Netherlands). — I have a few observations to offer. First of all I wish to point out that the Netherlands are among the signatories to the 1907 Declaration and must regard themselves as bound until the end of the third Peace Conference. Under this Declaration
they undertook not to throw projectiles or explosives by means of balloons or any other similar apparatus. I therefore do not see why the Netherlands delegation should not vote in favour of Count Bernstorff’s proposal. It may be said that the effect of the 1907 Declaration has not been very great. That is probably because it contained a clause providing that it would cease to be binding, in a war between contracting parties, directly a non-contracting party joined one of the belligerents. If the 1907 Declaration has not had much effect, that is due to the fact that the signatories were too few in number.

Nor can M. Politis’s remarks induce us to vote against the German proposal. If I have rightly understood his line of argument, he tells us that, as wars of aggression are forbidden, it would not merely be illogical to lay down rules for warfare, but such action would necessarily be sterile, because a party who did not respect the prohibition of warfare would not respect the rules of war. For my part I think this argument is capable of producing fatal consequences, because it precludes in advance all rules for war, not only on paper but also in practice: that white flag would no longer be respected, there would no longer be any obligations with regard to prisoners of war, there would no longer be any prohibition of the employment of poisons, which have been observed in every war.

I think that such a line of argument is extremely dangerous. Without expecting the rules of war to work miracles, I feel that we ought not to go to the other extreme and say that all rules of war are illogical and useless.

General de Marinis (Italy).—I have followed with the greatest interest the discussion which has taken place and will simply make a statement in connection with my vote. I will not go into the principle of the question of competence, for after the very enlightening arguments of some of our colleagues, who represent in this Commission the highest rank of specialists in international law, we are bound to note that they are not in agreement. Solely, for the practical reasons set out by the honourable delegate for the United States of America, I will refrain from supporting the German delegation’s proposal.

Dr. W. A. Riddell (Canada).—I think we are all agreed that the primary purpose of this Commission is to prepare a Draft Convention for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments—I trust for the reduction of armaments—but it is true that yesterday we made an exception in the case of asphyxiating gases and bacteriological warfare. I think it is understood in this Commission that that is not to be our method of procedure. We are here to draw up a Draft Convention, and it is for the Disarmament Conference to fill in the figures. If we decide to fill in “zero” (by interdiction) in a number of cases, which we did yesterday, and which the German delegation proposes to do again now; it seems to me that we are taking over a function appertaining to the Conference.

With the greatest desire to get to the largest possible measure of disarmament, my sympathies are strongly with the German proposal, but it seems to me that, if we continue to bring up such proposals, this will only take up the time of the Commission and side-track it from its main purpose, which is the Draft Convention the Conference will complete with the figures it can agree upon. I believe that the reduction of armaments will come about on a relative basis, and I think if we succeed in our purpose we shall get largely the result that the German delegation has in mind. I would like to see a large reduction, and I think that, when this matter goes before the Conference, the German and other delegations in sympathy with it will have an opportunity to make the figures as large as possible. That is the point I wish to make. We made an exception yesterday, but I do not think that should be our normal procedure. I think we should stick to the line of action we have taken previously and try to get along with our work as fast as we can. For the exception we followed yesterday, we had the example of the Washington Naval Conference, also the Convention for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms of 1925, and in this Committee we had, practically, unanimity. In fact, some of the members of the Commission thought we did not go far enough. Now anyone who has listened to the discussion and the votes knows there is no approach to unanimity. We are now facing a situation entirely different from the one we faced yesterday.

The President.—I think that we might now close the discussion. I will venture to make a last appeal to Count Bernstorff. It is now clear from the declarations that have been made that, if we take a vote now such vote would not truly reflect the Commission’s opinion. Under these conditions, would not Count Bernstorff consent to withdraw his proposal, at any rate for the present, submitting it later in another form?

Count Bernstorff (Germany).—I regret that it is quite impossible for me to withdraw a proposal which my Government has instructed me to submit. If, however, you wish to take the vote on a text which will clearly show the Commission’s wishes, I am at your disposal to discuss this text. I repeat, however, that I cannot withdraw my proposal. I note to my great regret that the Commission does not desire to accept it. Under these circumstances it is almost a matter of indifference to me to ascertain when and how it proposes to reject it. That is a matter for the Commission to decide. I will merely point to two facts:

1. We have made this proposal because Sub-Commission A stated unanimously that bombing aircraft were essentially an arm of aggression. This statement, I repeat, was made by the Sub-Commission unanimously.
2. I wish to inform M. Politis that I have not in any way requested the abolition of air warfare, as the proposal we shall discuss to-morrow proves.

I note that the Preparatory Commission considers that the time has not yet come to accept the German proposal. It wishes to wait for a few more years. For my part, I must say that in this case I hope I shall not be like Moses, who only saw the Promised Land from afar. I should like to live to enter the Promised Land myself.

The President. — As the Minutes will clearly explain the reasons for each delegation's vote, I propose that we should now take the vote.

M. Politis (Greece). — Before voting, or rather abstaining, I should like to know what "Yes" or "No" will mean precisely.

The President. — "Yes" will mean that the Commission is willing to add to the draft Convention the formula proposed by Count Bernstorff.

M. Politis (Greece). — And "No"?

The President. — The "No" will obviously mean that the Commission rejects this proposal.

M. Politis (Greece). — I shall vote "No", but it must be understood that I do not in any way intend, in voting against the German proposal, to authorise the aerial bombardment of civilian populations.

The German proposal, when put to the vote, was rejected on a show of hands. Five delegations voted in its favour.

General de Marinis (Italy). — I vote "No" on the same understanding as M. Politis.

M. Massigli (France). — I am sure that I shall be interpreting the wishes of all the delegations who have voted "No" in asking that their negative vote shall be understood in the light of M. Politis's explanation.

M. Westman (Sweden). — The Swedish delegation has voted "Yes" because it agrees with the Netherlands delegation's views and so as not to encroach upon any rule of international law.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Socialist Soviet Republics). — I do not quite understand the meaning of the declarations made by these delegations voting against the German proposal. Surely we are not here to establish our sentiments or sympathies; we are a Commission of political representatives of our Governments to state what our Governments are prepared to do. What importance is it to us to know what this or that delegate thinks personally — what his sympathies or sentiments are — if those sentiments are not to be translated into obligations undertaken by their Governments? I therefore propose that we disregard these declarations, and accept the meaning of the vote to be that their Governments are not prepared to take upon themselves any obligations with regard to the throwing of bombs.

Count Bernstorff (Germany). — I regret that the President should have accepted the vote under conditions which do not make its significance clear; but, as I have already said, the essential point for me was to know whether the proposal is accepted or not.

The President. — It is not my fault if the vote has not been clear and that it has been necessary to add explanations. You yourself asked for a vote on your proposal as it stood. The statements which have been made do in fact give a clearer meaning to the vote. Do the delegations which have voted "No" agree that their vote is to be interpreted in the sense indicated by M. Politis? This is the exact text proposed by M. Politis:

"The delegations which have not accepted the German proposal state that they do not in any way mean that the aerial bombardment of civilian populations is authorised."

This text was adopted by the delegates in question.

(The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.)
TWELFTH MEETING (PUBLIC)

Held at Geneva on Thursday, April 25th, 1929 at 10 a.m.

President: M. LOUDON (Netherlands).

31. Discussion on Chapter II Section III, Material of Air Armaments: Proposal by the German Delegation.

The President. — To-day we begin the discussion of Section III of Chapter II of the draft. Up to the present moment we have received three amendments to this section. The first of these is the German amendment. The German delegation proposes an entirely new draft of Article AA and to omit Articles AC and AD. The Soviet delegation has moved certain amendments to Articles AA and AE. Finally, the French delegation has proposed amendments to Article AA.

Of these amendments the German delegation’s proposal appears to be the most general in its terms. Accordingly, it should be taken first, and I therefore ask the Commission to begin the discussion of the German amendment, which is as follows:

Article AA.

"Each of the High Contracting Parties agrees to limit the air material in service, in reserve and in store, in accordance with the figures laid down in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material in service, in reserve and in store in the home country and in overseas territories</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Number of machine-guns for aeroplanes or dirigibles</th>
<th>Bombs* (in tons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. LAND.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>I. Fighter aeroplanes</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(a) With one seat</td>
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<tr>
<td>(b) With two seats</td>
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<td>(c) With more than two seats</td>
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<tr>
<td>II. Observation aeroplanes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Bomber aeroplanes *</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Day</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(b) Night</td>
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<tr>
<td>IV. School aeroplanes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>B. SEA.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Same as A.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Including aeroplanes in vessels.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>C. DIRIGIBLES.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Volume over 30,000 cubic metres</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Volume of 30,000 cubic metres or less</td>
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</tbody>
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* To be omitted if the German proposal in connection with Chapter IV, prohibiting the dropping of military material from the air, is adopted.

"The limitation will apply to aeroplanes and dirigibles capable of military use and intended for employment in the land, sea or air forces, or in formations organised on a military basis.

Article AC.

To be omitted.

Article AD.

To be omitted.
The original text of Article AA is as follows:

**Article AA.**

"Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to limit the air material in service in accordance with the figures laid down in the following tables.

**Table A.** — The maximum number and total horse-power of aeroplanes and maximum number, total horse-power and total volume of dirigibles in service in their armed forces.

**Table B.** — The maximum number and total horse-power of aeroplanes and maximum number, total horse-power and total volume of dirigibles in service in their formations organised on a military basis.

"The limitation shall apply to aeroplanes and dirigibles capable of use in war employed in commission in the land, sea and air forces, or in the formations organised on a military basis."

Apart from the difference in regard to material in reserve and in store — which is of a general character — the essential difference between the text of the German delegation and that of the draft is as follows: the German proposal, unlike the draft, takes no account of the total number of machines or of the total horse-power, or of the total volume of dirigibles. On the other hand, it distinguishes between different categories of aeroplanes: fighter-planes, observation planes, bomber planes and school planes. It also makes a distinction between these types according to whether they are land or sea planes.

In discussing the German amendment, we can begin by deciding whether we wish to adopt the system of categories proposed by the German delegation or to retain the criterion of the total number of machines and the total horse-power as decided at our session in 1927.

**Count Bernstorff (Germany).** — Before beginning, I wish to be quite sure that I am in order. I understand that we are now only discussing Article AA and not Articles AC or AD.

With a view to arriving at the simplest and clearest possible solution of the limitation of air material, I have submitted a proposal under which the criterion would be the number and categories of aeroplanes.

It is essential to have a perfectly clear idea as to the actual composition of the air army. Above all, we must be able to determine what offensive power it possesses. In explaining my proposal for the prohibition of launching weapons of all kinds from the air, I have already emphasised the great importance attaching to those forms of air armaments, which, by their very nature, have an offensive character — that is to say, bomber aeroplanes.

It will be necessary, in the first place, to limit this offensive strength. The definition of material by means of the "maximum number and total horse-power" allows of certain possibilities, which, in the interests of disarmament and security, can only be described as undesirable and even dangerous. Within the limits of the maximum figures laid down, a country might, for example, by restricting the number of its fighter and observation aeroplanes, increase the bomber aeroplanes and thus add to the offensive strength of its air armaments without violating the undertakings it had entered into.

My proposal contains no new principle. In the *Armaments Year-Book*, that classification appears for certain countries, particularly Belgium, the United States of America, the Netherlands and Portugal. I am accordingly convinced that all delegates will agree to adopt a classification by categories such as that which I have proposed. Agreement on this point would appear to be all the easier, as the criterion of total engine-power is somewhat vague and not sufficiently clear.

It is especially important to deal with the material in reserve and in store. Only by determining all the material which has been prepared for purposes of war is it possible to achieve effective limitation of air material. Should limitation not embrace the material in reserve and in store, States would be able to increase at pleasure the number of their aircraft in reserve and in store, and thus render the limitation of air material in general illusory.

**M. Westman (Sweden).** — The Swedish delegation considers that the draft Convention which we are now preparing must embrace the greatest number of factors utilisable in war. Our purpose is to diminish and to limit the power of aggression or the power of unforeseen attack.

We are therefore in favour of limiting not only aeroplanes in commission — an expression which incidentally is very difficult to define — but also aeroplanes in reserve and in store. Any Convention which ignored these two latter categories would rightly be criticised as being of doubtful efficacy.
Previously we had, perhaps, a hope that the rules for limitation might be replaced by rules for publicity. After the statements made during the past few days, more particularly by the Japanese delegation, we are forced to the conclusion that this road seems to be closed and that we shall easily arrive at the result that, as regards aeroplanes in reserve and in store, no provision will be made for limitation, reduction, or publicity.

The German proposal submitted would appear to be unsatisfactory, especially on one point; this proposal omits one of the criteria adopted in the Commission's draft Convention — the total engine-power.

If we accept the German proposal, States will be left entirely free to equip their military machines with extremely powerful engines, which will enable them to fly over enemy territory and drop bombs at a great distance from their starting-point.

In our opinion this would be leaving the door open for an air armaments race, and for competition between countries in the manufacture of extremely powerful aeroplanes.

The absence of any reference to engine-power in the German proposal is perhaps to be explained by that delegation's other proposal for prohibiting the dropping of bombs from aeroplanes. As the latter proposal was rejected yesterday, I hope that the German delegation will be good enough to accept the text which the Commission prepared on this point at its first reading.

I would add that we regard the tables submitted by the German delegation as being too complicated and we should like the data in question to be greatly simplified.

The President. — Before calling upon M. Sato, I should like to ask speakers to confine their observations to discussing whether we are going to adopt the system of categories proposed by the German delegation, or whether we are going to maintain the system of limiting the total number of machines and the total horse-power.

M. Sato (Japan). — I must say at once that I find it impossible to accept the German proposal of subdividing aeroplanes into categories. Sub-Commission A has already investigated the limitation of air material by categories and soon found itself obliged to renounce that method as lacking in precision.

The Sub-Commission in question very judicially pointed out that "the science of aeronautics is making rapid and incessant strides, and technical progress may consequently produce important alterations in the value of any given class of material. Any comparison of aviation material can therefore only be of provisional value, inasmuch as its results may become obsolete within a very short period, the length of which cannot be foreseen."

In other words, aviation is still evolving, and has not yet attained the same standard of development as maritime navigation, so that, if we engaged in long and highly technical discussions on the subdivision of aeroplanes by categories, we might expend a great deal of time without reaching any unanimous conclusion. From a practical standpoint, we should only be delaying our progress instead of expediting it.

Moreover, the requirements of different countries in regard to any category of aeroplanes will no doubt differ according to their special situation.

In these circumstances, it seems wiser not to attempt to make any very rigid distinctions or very detailed rules, but to leave our draft Convention as flexible as possible, as I pointed out yesterday. Indeed, if the method of limitation which we adopt is not flexible enough to be adjusted to the particular circumstances of different countries, it will not be equitable, and many countries will be disinclined to accept such a method.

In consequence, owing to the technical difficulty of classifying aeroplanes in separate and distinct categories, and in order to avoid attempting a scheme too rigid to be acceptable to many States, I must declare that I cannot accept the first German proposal.

Count Bernstorff (Germany). — I must repeat what I have already said. The essential point, for us, is the reduction of armaments. We hoped that our proposal would facilitate it by preventing fictitious reduction. It is a technical and not a political question that we are discussing. If the Commission prefers the other method, we are not going to say that we refuse to accept the text which it has already adopted at the first reading.

We might perhaps have a meeting of Sub-Commission A this afternoon: the technical experts could then agree as to the best method of obtaining a reduction of aeroplanes. It is for the Commission to decide on that suggestion.

M. Massigli (France). — I am in no way opposed to a technical enquiry if Count Bernstorff desires it and the Commission thinks it might be useful, but I am not sure if such an investigation is really necessary and whether it would not complicate the question.

I wish to give a simple illustration of the difficulties which we may encounter, if we adopt the suggestion which has just been put forward, and show how difficult it will be for certain air services to furnish the tables asked for. In the French army there are certain aeroplanes capable of fulfilling a variety of purposes; this applies to colonial planes and particularly those in Morocco. They are used for observation, fighting, instruction and bombing; they are equipped and adapted for all these purposes. In what category would they be shown? It would not be easy to say. I
really think that the proposal made at the first reading was the best; I am all the more inclined to think so because, if I am not mistaken, it was Count Bernstorff himself who proposed this formula, and it would, therefore, be easy for him to accept it. In this way we should save time; nevertheless, if the Commission desires a technical opinion, I am not at all opposed to it.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Socialist Soviet Republics).—Without attaching too much importance to the question whether we should single out aeroplanes with one, two or more seats, the Soviet delegation is prepared to accept the German amendment. But what is much more valuable is point III of the German proposal, in which is found a special heading for bomber aeroplanes. We discussed this question yesterday, so it is unnecessary to repeat the arguments. The question was raised of prohibiting bomb-throwing altogether; but, even though this proposal was not accepted by the Commission, there is still nothing to prevent the Commission from accepting some reduction in this special kind of aeroplane, of a type which will be very hurtful to the civil population. We should particularly support the singling out of bomber aeroplanes and a suitable reduction in their number. Whatever may be the fate of the German amendment, however, I take it that this will not prejudice the question of aircraft material in stock, and that this question will be discussed separately.

M. Markovitch (Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes).—According to the statement which the German delegate has just made, he appears to regard the question as of a technical nature. The Commission will doubtless find no difficulty in reaching an agreement on the best system to be adopted in this matter.

In my opinion, the question is primarily a practical one, and we must therefore find a solution which will be practicable. The Commission has already agreed to adopt as criteria the total number of aircraft and the total horse-power. That, I think, constitutes definite progress. On these two points I feel the Commission could achieve something very like unanimity.

The German delegation now proposes that we should go into details, and, from the purely technical point of view, that might perhaps be a better way. But could we secure unanimity, or a large majority, in favour of a method which, though perhaps technically better, might involve great difficulties as regards practical fulfilment? I think it would be better for the Commission to adhere to the view it has taken up.

There is one very important point in the German proposal which has not been raised, but which, in my opinion, constitutes its main defect. It relates to the question of supervision. We shall in any case be faced with immense difficulties in the general question of supervision. Imagine the situation of any Supervisory Commission required to supervise every category of aircraft, to examine the number of seats, and all the technical details, and you will at once realise the practical difficulties of its task. At this preliminary stage of our work it will be enough if we arrive at a reduction of the total number of aircraft and the total horse-power of the machines in service.

In my opinion, if we bear in mind the unanimous desire of all delegates to reach a practical result, purely technical questions should be relegated to second place. For that reason I cannot support the German proposal.

Count Bernstorff (Germany).—I repeat that our wish was to facilitate the reduction of armaments. Naturally, we are quite prepared to accept the Swedish proposal that we should take horse-power as an additional criterion.

My reply to the Soviet and Swedish delegations, as regards the question of material in stock and in reserve, is that that is a question of vital importance to us and that, if we accept the text of the draft in regard to the question of criteria, we shall still retain the same attitude in regard to material in stock and in reserve.

Mention has been made of supervision. We fully realise that the question of supervision will be discussed later and will prove very controversial. Nevertheless, I, personally, do not think it will be any easier to supervise horse-power than the characteristics of categories. I will not discuss that now, however.

In conclusion, I repeat that we are quite prepared to accept the Swedish proposal and should be glad to see it adopted by the Commission. Moreover, as the question is a technical one, we will not press our own proposal at all costs.

M. Sato (Japan).—I do not see the need of referring this question to a technical sub-committee. We have been discussing it for some years, more especially since 1926. Consequently we have to a certain extent become technical experts. In any case, our technical knowledge is sufficient to enable us to decide whether the division of aircraft into categories is a practical method. For my part, in view of the present development of aviation, I do not think it is, and I am therefore opposed to this method. Moreover, types of aircraft differ in different countries; some countries have aircraft of a very special type which it would be difficult to bring into any of the categories laid down in the German proposal.

I think, therefore, that, instead of referring the question to experts, it would be better to ask all the delegations to give their opinions. Moreover, to refer the matter to a technical sub-committee would still further delay our work. Ten days have already passed and we are as yet only beginning the second reading of our draft. We must speed up, and I therefore think we should settle this question here and now.
The President. — Since Count Bernstorff himself thinks this is a technical question, and as several speakers are in favour of retaining the text of our draft, I think I am interpreting the Commission's wishes by proposing that this text be retained. We must have a unanimously approved text, although reservations may still be allowed.

Count Bernstorff (Germany). — If the Commission is unanimous, and if we are not to revert to this point before the Conference, I am prepared to accept the text of the draft on this point.

The President. — We still have three points to discuss in the German proposal:
1. The proposed limitation of the number of machine-guns for aeroplanes and airships;
2. The proposed limitation of the total weight of air bombs;
3. The proposed extension of the limitation of the material of air forces to the material in reserve or in stock.

This last question is of a general character. It was raised by the German delegation at the first reading in connection with air as well as with land and naval armaments. It would perhaps be better to discuss these points jointly.

I propose, therefore, that we discuss the limitation of the number of machine-guns.

M. Massigli (France). — Are we discussing the number of machine-guns in use or the number in stock? They are two wholly different questions.

The President. — We shall begin by discussing the question of machine-guns in service. It seems to me, however, that the question of the number of machine-guns for aircraft and dirigibles, and the question of material in reserve and in stock, are so closely connected that they might be discussed together. The question is, therefore, whether you prefer to discuss the matter of material in stock now or on some other occasion.

The Honourable H. Gibson (United States of America). — I think we are all agreed that it is advisable to limit our discussion as much as possible to one point at a time. We have already on our agenda the question of material in stock, and, of course, the German proposal raises a very important question. I cannot help feeling that it would be a mistake on our part to embark on the discussion of such an important question in a casual way. I myself have observations to make on material in stock, but I should much prefer to reserve these until we have concluded the general discussion. I suggest it will give the German delegation equal satisfaction if we tackle this problem as a whole when we come to it as provided by the agenda, rather than tackle it in a piecemeal way. I therefore suggest the advisability of withdrawing this part of the German proposal temporariliy, on the understanding that it will be given the fullest possible consideration in detail when we come to the question of material in stock.

Count Bernstorff (Germany). — May I say in answer to Mr. Gibson that his proposition is perfectly agreeable to the German delegation.

The President. — I think we are all agreed to postpone this question. It was agreed to do this.

32. Discussion on Chapter II, Section III, Material of Air Armaments: Soviet and French Proposals concerning the Distinction between Home and Overseas Armaments.

The President. — I propose that we should proceed to discuss the Soviet amendment. We have to discuss point 2 of this amendment, which refers to the distribution of air armaments in the home country and in the colonies. We can discuss at the same time the French proposal which deals with the same subject.

Amendment of the Soviet Delegation.

2. After paragraph 3 of Article AA, add the following note:

"Note. — Tables A and B should show the distribution between the home country and the colonies of all the factors included in the tables."

Amendment Submitted by the French Delegation.

Article AA.

1. Add at the end of Table A the following note:

"Note. — Any of the High Contracting Parties who so desire may annex to Table A the following tables for limitations similar to those in Table A:

"Table A (1). — Aeroplanes and dirigibles in commission in the armed forces stationed in the home country."
“Table A (2). — Aeroplanes and dirigibles in commission in the armed forces stationed overseas.”

“Table A (3). — Aeroplanes and dirigibles in aircraft carriers.”

2. Add at the end of Table B the following note:

“Note. — Any of the High Contracting Parties who so desire may annex to Table B the following tables for limitations similar to those in Table B:

“Table B (1). — Aeroplanes and dirigibles in commission in the formations organised on a military basis stationed in the home country.

“Table B (2). — Aeroplanes and dirigibles in commission in the formations organised on a military basis in overseas territories.”

M. Massigli (France). — I am pleased to note that the purpose of our amendment is practically identical to that of the amendment submitted by the Soviet delegation. If M. Litvinoff desires to speak first, I am willing for him to do so.

The President. — M. Litvinoff has not asked to speak.

M. Massigli (France). — In the margin of the texts drawn up at first reading in Article AA, there is a reservation reading as follows:

“The delegations of the British Empire and France reserve for the second reading their decision on Article AA in so far as it suppresses the distinction between metropolitan and overseas air forces.”

The amendment submitted by the French delegation is intended to give form to this reservation. The question is an important one for Powers which possess Colonies, and I think that in its present form our amendment should readily gain general acceptance. We are not in any way proposing to withdraw colonial aviation from the effects of limitation. We might certainly have been tempted to maintain that colonial aviation, which has objects very different from those of military aviation in the home country, and is largely employed for purposes of civilisation, liaison, penetration and even exploration, should be treated on a different basis and on different principles. We are not, however, proposing anything of that kind. We agree to the limitation of colonial aviation; the only point is that a distinction should be clearly drawn in a table between it and military aviation in the home country.

I admit that it was stated during the discussion at the first reading that, on account of their mobility, it was useless to draw any distinction between aircraft in two kinds of aviation, and that aircraft detailed for colonial work could be readily concentrated in case of need at a point in the home country.

This is only partly true. We read every day of exploits accomplished by airmen who individually cover immense distances. Group flying and individual flying, however, are by no means the same thing. Nor must it be forgotten that, when we talk of flying and of aeroplanes, the term aeroplane is only symbolic: every aeroplane stands for ground personnel, repair and upkeep shops, and spare parts, which cannot be transported with the same rapidity and ease. The distinction, therefore, seems justified.

Moreover, it is in the interest of the Convention we are seeking to establish. If the Convention only lays down a single limit figure for the total air forces, any high contracting party will be free at any moment to concentrate the whole of its air forces at one point in its territory. If, on the other hand, a distinction is made in the Convention, then there is a maximum limit, and no contracting party will be able to transfer to the home country the surplus material it has been authorised to keep for the exclusive needs of its overseas territories.

In that case the limitation will be more effectual than that proposed in the tables. It will also be better suited to the end in view.

We have likewise included in our tables a draft Table A (3), “Aeroplanes and Dirigibles in Aircraft Carriers”. In our view this is a special category. An aircraft carrier can easily transport a large number of machines from one place to another in the home or colonial territory. It seemed to us wise, therefore, to provide for this possibility under a special head.

Yet again, this amendment is not obligatory in character; it says “any of the High Contracting Parties who so desire”. This does not alter the general position, but it seems to us that an amendment of this kind, which brings out more clearly the basis of the aggregate figures shown, is not without value, and that in any case it does not conflict with any individual interests.

General de Marinis (Italy). — We have before us two similar proposals from the Soviet and French delegations referring to Tables A and B of the article we are discussing. I am compelled to make a few observations on this matter.

I must confess that I see no reason for drawing a distinction between home and colonial aviation. Is there any essential difference between the equipment in the two cases? Obviously none.

In that case, what is the object of the distinction? I understand that it has been justified by the distance between the overseas territories and the home country.
I would point out, however, that all overseas territories cannot be regarded in the same way. The situations of different colonies in relation to their home countries are not comparable. Some colonies are remote from the home country, while others are quite close; some of them, so far from representing a dispersion of strength, really amount, as the experience of the late war shows, to a very considerable increase of strength for the home country, and form a reservoir of combatant and auxiliary personnel and material which must be taken into account.

There are, in short, some colonies which, owing to their geographical situation, could offer very appreciable assistance in any military operations that might be contemplated by the home country.

The amendments proposed by the French delegation assume that a distinction should be made between aviation material in the home country and that in service in the armed forces stationed overseas. It is quite true that this distinction would be optional. At the same time, I must make every reservation in regard to it, for I should not like the acceptance of these amendments to carry with it the acceptance of standards which failed to take account of the observations I have just made. I should like it to be understood that, when we come to fix the figures, we must always bear in mind the geographical position of overseas territories, and that consequently air armaments in the colonies, especially in colonies situated comparatively close to the home country, must be regarded as constituting an integral part of the air armaments of the home country.

M. MASSIGLI (FRANCE). — I will reply very briefly to General de Marinis, because, in view of certain expressions, I am inclined to think that I did not make myself perfectly clear.

Let me repeat that there is no question of making any change in Table A. Table A stands where it did. The proposal is to give certain countries which may wish to take advantage of it the option of making, so to speak, supplementary and complementary limitations.

Under the present Table A, a country which has colonial possessions and can demonstrate by the extent of those possessions the greatness of its needs could perfectly well concentrate all its air forces, including its colonial air forces, in the home country.

It is quite true, as General de Marinis states, that the geographical position of overseas territories is a very important element in determining the usefulness of the forces stationed there. I maintain, therefore, the proposal of the French delegate and to enforce our reservation in that sense.

Lord CUSHENDUN (British Empire). — As the French representative has already stated, a reservation on this subject was also made by the British delegation and appears in the original text. I should therefore like to state in a few words how we propose to act in this matter.

I support M. Massigli’s proposal, and I cannot understand how anybody can have any grievance, as he has put his amendment in a purely voluntary form. There might, perhaps, be objection to making it compulsory — though I should not myself feel that objection — but as it is purely voluntary, I cannot see how anybody can have any grievance in allowing these particulars to be given. I can quite understand that it might be, from some point of view, extremely convenient, and it would be only fair, I think, that those who have to maintain air forces overseas should be able to distinguish between the metropolitan forces and the overseas forces. At the same time, I can appreciate the point of view of General de Marinis, and I think there is some reason in his suggestion that there should be a further definition of what overseas forces are. I should be prepared, for instance, to support a suggestion, if it were made, for some definite distance from the capital of the metropolitan country to be the determining factor — or some such suggestion as that — so as to exclude those overseas forces which might be readily utilisable in the home country. That is a further detail, but in the meantime I am quite prepared to support the proposal of the French delegate and to enforce our reservation in that sense.

General de Marinis (Italy). — I should like to thank the representative of the British Empire for the statement he has just made. I am entirely in agreement with him, but the point that I emphasised and that I emphasise again is this: a very clear distinction must be drawn between overseas territories according to whether they are close to or remote from the home country. The forces stationed in these two classes of overseas territory cannot be treated on the same footing.

Lord Cushendun is good enough to accept this view. He agrees that, when the figures are to be fixed, the position of each overseas territory and its distance from the home country should be carefully borne in mind, so that we can decide whether the forces stationed in the territory in question can or cannot be regarded as an integral part of the home forces. As the proposal before us leaves it entirely to the discretion of the contracting parties whether or not they will take advantage of this amendment, I have no objection to it, but I must repeat my interpretation of it. We must not decide that, because an air force is stationed in the colonies, it is not to be included in the figures for the forces available in the home country. I maintain, therefore, the view that I have always held at our previous sessions.

M. Massigli (France). — I must apologise for prolonging the discussion. First of all, I must thank General de Marinis for not opposing our proposal. Secondly, for future reference and for
record in the Minutes, I should like to say that there can be no doubt that the Conference will take
into account the remoteness of overseas territories, their state of civilisation, and the necessity of
keeping forces there for police purposes. These, however, are factors to be considered by the
Conference. For the moment, we are not concerned with figures. General de Marinis will be
perfectly well able to uphold his interpretation at the Conference.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Socialist Soviet Republics).—It might seem at first sight that there is
no difference between the French and Soviet proposals, but in fact they are quite different. I
would say, further, that the French proposal excludes the principle on which the Soviet proposal is
based. What we have in view is the establishment of limits in aircraft, both in home countries
and in overseas territories, in an absolute manner; what the French delegation proposes is to
leave to the discretion of each Colonial Empire the power to redistribute its air forces between home
countries and colonies. The question is not only of interest to these States which possess colonies,
but also to all States which will take part in the Disarmament Conference. They will naturally
wish to know what will be the limits of the various elements of war in given national areas, and,
if we allowed some State arbitrarily to change the number of aircraft or other elements of war,
the whole system on which the reduction of armaments will be based would be destroyed. I do
not think, therefore, that we can leave it to the discretion of the Colonial Empires to decide this
question. It is one which also possesses a certain interest for the colonies themselves; the safety
and security of the colonies demand a certain limitation of the aircraft and war material which
can be stationed or stocked in them.

As the Commission is aware, the policy of the Soviet Government is entirely opposed to the
colonial system, and we should, of course, oppose the stationing in the colonies of any aircraft
or war elements belonging to home countries; but, naturally, such a proposal would hardly be
acceptable to the Commission or to the Conference. We therefore limit ourselves to proposing
certain reductions of armaments which might be used against the colonies themselves. An armed
conflict in colonies, in our opinion, also constitutes a kind of war, and we wish to eliminate such a
possibility. It is with this object in view that we propose to establish certain limits, separately
for home countries and for colonies, whereas the French proposal leaves the establishment of
limits entirely to the arbitrary decision of home countries themselves, which would decide the matter
from the point of view of their own interests. That is entirely different from the Soviet
proposal.

I would draw the attention of the Commission to the fact that in Chapter I, Article A, the
principle of the limitation of effective separately for home countries and for colonies is laid
down, and was passed by the Commission at the first reading of the 1927 Draft, and I see no
reason why we should not apply the same principle to aircraft. It would seem to me that the
proposal of various delegations, to leave the decision in the case of aircraft to the Colonial Empires
themselves, would hardly be justified. I would therefore, again emphasise the fact that there is a
fundamental difference between the proposal of the French delegation and that submitted by the
Soviet delegation.

General de Marinis (Italy).—In reply to what M. Massigli has just said, I would observe that
I quite agree that the fixing of figures is a matter for the Conference. We, however, are
here to prepare a draft Convention, to discuss its clauses, to state the reasons for our decisions,
and it is our duty to do everything we can to enable the Conference to succeed. I presume that
the Minutes of our proceedings will be put before the delegates to the Conference, and that is why
I am anxious to make my standpoint clear, and to explain why my Government thinks that all
available forces—not merely air forces—stationed in overseas territories near the home country,
or near the territory of another contracting party, should be regarded for the purposes of limitation
and reduction as an integral part of the armaments of the home country.

General Tsiang Tsoping (China).—The Chinese delegation wishes to make clear its position
with regard to the proposal put forward by the French delegation. China is surrounded by the
colonies of several Powers. We cannot ignore the fact that, owing to its special situation, strong
air forces in the various colonies near or around China would affect its military position. Air
forces in the overseas countries, in so far as they affect the position of other signatory Powers, for
instance extra-European countries represented here, must be more restricted than are the air
forces of the European Powers in their own countries if the Commission adopt the French proposal.

M. Sato (Japan).—We have before us two somewhat similar proposals. If I prefer the
French proposal, my reason is that it is more flexible than the other, and I would rather avoid any
rigid system.

May I refer to Table A 3, in the French proposal, which concerns aeroplanes and dirigibles
in aircraft carriers. Those of my colleagues who took part in the Commission’s proceedings in
1927 will doubtless remember that the Japanese delegation found much difficulty in accepting any
direct limitation of aircraft carried in aircraft carriers. We took the view that the British delegation,
also held that such a limitation was superfluous and it was better to limit the tonnage of aircraft
carriers, thereby automatically limiting the number of machines they can carry. Other delegations
however, said that they could not accept that thesis, but could only agree to a direct limitation
of aeroplanes in aircraft carriers. In a spirit of compromise, my Government eventually accepted this latter view. In 1927, that was as far as we could go.

We have now before us an entirely new proposal submitted by the French delegation — a proposal for a direct limitation of the number of aeroplanes and dirigibles to be carried in aircraft carriers.

According to my present instructions, I can neither accept nor reject this proposal. All I can do is to accept the proposal on the condition that it is optional and imposes no rigid obligation on any Government. Otherwise, it will be difficult for me to accept it. Let me make myself perfectly clear. I repeat that my Government has not abandoned its point of view as to the limitation of the tonnage of aircraft carriers. It still maintains that that is the best means of limiting the number of these aircraft. In 1927, however, it agreed to accept the view of the majority of the delegations, but only in a spirit of compromise.

If, therefore, we accept the French proposal, that does not mean that we accept the principle of limiting aircraft on the lines proposed by the French delegation. We only accept this proposal because it does not carry with it any obligation, nor does our acceptance imply recognition of the principle which the French Government proposes.

MUNIR Bey (Turkey). — The Turkish delegation desires to say that international security, which is to be brought about by the reduction of armaments, requires, generally, that the tables for the reduction of armaments should show their distribution between the home territory and the colonies.

General de Marinis (Italy). — It seems to me that we are all fundamentally in agreement that the distance between the home country and the colonies is a factor to be taken into account when the figures come to be put into the tables.

In the tables suggested by the French delegation, however, all overseas territories are considered as a whole without any distinction. My objection is not to the tables in themselves but to the fact that they should serve to establish limits for the air forces in the overseas territories taken as a whole. I should find no difficulty in accepting them if they made any mention of the element of distance to which Lord Cushendun referred.

In regard to this point I propose to submit a formula at an early meeting.

I shall vote for the French proposal subject to the reservation that I shall have the right to propose a note, in which consideration will be given to this element of distance, which I think has been accepted by several delegates.

M. Massigli (France). — I am very sorry, but I really must speak once more. I cannot follow this discussion. The French proposal is of an optional character and nothing more. It is, if I may say so, midway — in its underlying principle though not in its text, which involves no change — between the ideas embodied in Article AA as at present worded and those put forward by M. Litvinoff. M. Litvinoff was wrong in saying that his objections are to our proposal; they are directed against the proposal which the Commission passed in first reading.

I would reply to General de Marinis, who says that we are all agreed that the element of distance should be taken into consideration. I am not here to take up an attitude for or against any standard whatever, and I absolutely refuse to do so. I repeat that, in my opinion, that is not our business. If we begin to bring in standards of limitation, we are encroaching upon the province of the Conference. But if we do so, we shall have to deal with all standards of limitation. I seem to remember that, when we rejected the Soviet proposal at the beginning of our proceedings, we said just that — that we were not here to consider standards of reduction.

That being so, I have naturally no objection to General de Marinis making his proposals. I should not like the Minutes to suggest, however — having regard to the form in which General de Marinis's statements were expressed — that the Commission has taken any decision in regard to the standard of distance or any other standard.

General de Marinis (Italy). — I must repeat that I shall submit a note to the Commission on this subject later, and the Commission will then, of course, be free to accept or reject that note. I desire to state, however, that I have not proposed any criterion or standard in the matter now under discussion. What I proposed was a basic principle of supreme importance: Are all overseas territories to be treated on the same footing or is the Commission willing to admit that a distinction must be made between the various colonial territories?

I fully agree that there are some colonial territories which can be left entirely out of account for the purpose of armaments, because the forces stationed in them cannot exercise any direct influence on the forces in the home country; but I am equally convinced that there are other territories in regard to which it is absolutely necessary to take into account the forces stationed therein, because these forces can easily be placed at the disposal of the home country.

I should wish to see that principle, which I regard as of fundamental importance for the reduction of armaments, inserted somewhere in our draft Convention.

The President. — General de Marinis will, of course, have an opportunity of submitting a text to-morrow. I only hope it will not give rise to a long discussion.

We now have two proposals before us. They are, to some extent, analogous, but, nevertheless, entirely distinct. The Soviet delegation's proposal involves a binding rule,
whereas the French proposal involves an optional rule. As the Soviet delegation's proposal goes further, the Commission will be asked to pronounce upon it first.

So far, this proposal has only been supported by the Turkish delegation. I would therefore ask M. Litvinoff, since there is no question of unanimity, whether he desires that we should vote upon it, or if we may conclude that the Commission does not agree to its inclusion in our draft.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Socialist Soviet Republics). - I am not inclined to accept the silence of the delegates as an opinion one way or the other. Some people may not like to speak but still may be in favour of the resolution. I should prefer a vote.

Two delegates voted for the Soviet delegation's proposal.

The President. — We will next take the French proposal, which has been supported by several delegations.

Count Bernstorff (Germany). — May I be permitted to make an observation? I do not think that we can vote on the French proposal without having before us the text of General de Marinis's proposal, as it is my intention, which may possibly be shared by other delegations, to vote for the French proposal with General de Marinis's amendment. I should have been pleased to vote for the original text, but I shall only vote for the French proposal with General de Marinis's amendment.

The President. — As other delegations may be of the same opinion as Count Bernstorff, I propose that the vote should not take place until to-morrow, when we shall have General de Marinis's text before us.

Approved.

33. Discussion on Chapter II, Section III: Material of Air Armaments: Soviet Amendment to Article AA.

The President. — We now come to point 3 of the Soviet proposal concerning the addition of the following note to Article AA as a whole:

"Note. — The figures in Tables A and B should specify the maximum number of machines, their total horse-power, and a volume appreciably less than the volume in existence on January 1st, 1929."

M. Litvinoff (Union of Socialist Soviet Republics). — I will explain in a few words the reason for this suggestion. In the resolution passed by the Commission, a resolution suggested by the Bureau, it was stated that the Commission was going to prepare a scheme for the reduction of armaments, not only for limitation, but for a substantial reduction. I therefore thought it useful to remind the Commission of this decision, and not the Commission only. I thought it useful to bring to the notice of the future Conference that that was the intention of the Commission — not only limitation but reduction. The same observation would apply to the other Chapters of the draft Convention. It is not a new proposal, but a reminder not to leave out of sight in our future work, when the time comes for the establishment of figures, this important principle, which is one of the achievements of the present session of the Commission. The principle here set out has been supported by some delegations and, I suppose, accepted also by the British delegation.

M. Sato (Japan). — I will endeavour to express the opinion of the Japanese delegation in regard to this question. It does not seem to me that the Soviet proposal is at all equitable. It aims at limiting the number and total horse-power of aeroplanes to a figure which is to be appreciably lower than the figure on January 1st, 1929. That may be an excellent idea, but you cannot separate this question of the limitation of military aircraft from the question of civil aviation and its development. You cannot limit either the number or the horse-power of civil aeroplanes and, without such limitation, civil aviation will follow its normal course of development, with the result that, in a few years, it will attain formidable dimensions and an equally formidable horse-power.

Moreover, as there is no possibility of prohibiting the conversion of civil aeroplanes into military aeroplanes, it appears to be altogether illogical not to allow military aviation its normal course of development, which would enable it to compete with civil aviation if necessary. Therefore, unless you can limit civil aviation, we consider that the Soviet delegation's proposal is unacceptable.

Count Bernstorff (Germany). — As regards the Soviet proposal I should like to repeat what I said during the discussion, namely, that our object is to arrive at an appreciable reduction of all forms of armament; but is it necessary to make this remark in regard to each point? It is obvious that we desire to effect a substantial reduction of all classes of armaments.

The President. — This amendment appears to deal with the question of figures. I think, therefore, that only a very brief discussion is necessary.
M. RUTGERS (Netherlands). — I quite agree with Count Bernstorff. The Soviet proposal could not be included in the Convention when this is drawn up. Neither is it, strictly speaking, appropriate in a draft Convention. It would be more advisable to embody it in the form of general observations in the report to which the Swedish delegate has so felicitously referred.

Moreover, I do not think we could accept the text of the proposal submitted to us, which states that the figures in question should be appreciably lower than the figures on January 1st, 1929. If the limitation of material in stock is not accepted, and the figures in these tables are to apply to material in service, it is obvious that the latter will be lower than the figures on January 1st, 1929, as the latter also apply to material in stock. The drafting of this proposal will depend on the decision reached in regard to material in stock. I am in favour of the principle underlying this proposal, but we must wait until the report is drawn up before making its application general and drafting a suitable text.

M. POLITIS (Greece). — I should like to know why the date chosen was January 1st, 1929. Is there not a danger that by so doing you give an advantage to those Powers which, prior to that date, had made greater progress than other nations in military aeronautics?

The Hon. Hugh GIBSON (United States of America). — Frankly, I begrudge the time that this Commission has taken in discussing a proposal that is obviously out of order. We have ruled that quantitative proposals are only within the competence of the Conference. Furthermore, it is impossible to give instructions to the Conference in favour of the reduction of armaments. We have all manifested that, otherwise we would not have been here. I suggest that a stop should be put to this general discussion, and that our time should be utilised in getting on with the work. I therefore move that the point be declared out of order.

The President. — I have already pointed out that I am also of opinion that this is a question of figures and is therefore a matter for the Conference to decide.

M. LITVINOFF (Union of Socialist Soviet Republics). — I am aware that we are only discussing the general principle of the reduction of armaments. Of course, at the Disarmament Conference we shall have to use figures. I only want to have the general statement which was adopted by the Commission as to the principle of the reduction of armaments to be applied to the various chapters we are going to consider. The remarks made by the delegate of Japan would mean the exclusion of air armaments altogether if we have to take into account the progress of the development of civil aircraft. I am willing to substitute for the date January 1st, 1929, another date — January 1st, 1928, or 1927, if you like, but the level at some date must be taken as the actual level of armaments which must be reduced. I think I am in order in making this proposal. If the Commission decides now to include in its report to the Conference a general recommendation for the substantial reduction of armaments, I should be glad to withdraw my proposal.

The President. — Does Mr. Gibson desire me to ask the Commission whether it regards this amendment as outside its competence?

The Hon. Hugh Gibson (United States of America). — Yes, Mr. President.

The Commission decided that the Soviet amendment was not within its competence.

34. Discussion on Chapter II, Section III. Material of Air Armaments: Roumanian Delegation’s Reservation regarding Article AA.

The President. — There is one more question to decide with regard to Article AA. The Roumanian delegation has made a reservation at first reading regarding the limitation of the number of aeroplanes.

M. ANTONIADE (Roumania). — The Roumanian delegation made a reservation in connection with the limitation of the number of aeroplanes because it considered that the limitation of the total horse-power was sufficient, especially for certain countries whose aviation is purely of a defensive character. However, in a spirit of accommodation and in order to give evidence of our desire that the work of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission should be completed as soon as possible, we are prepared to withdraw this reservation, although we shall, of course, have to take into consideration the effect of the limitation of the number of machines in addition to the limitation of the total horse-power when we come to submit quantitative proposals to the Disarmament Conference. These proposals will be based on the strict requirements of our national defence.

(The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.)
THIRTEENTH MEETING (PUBLIC)

Held at Geneva on Friday, April 26th, 1929, at 10 a.m.

President: M. LOUDON (Netherlands).

35. Discussion on Chapter II Section III, Material of Air Armaments: Declaration by the Italian Delegation with regard to the Distinction between Home and Overseas Armaments: Adoption of the French Delegation’s Amendment to Article AA.

The President. — To-day we must finish the debate on the French proposal. General de Marinis has asked to make a statement on this subject.

General de Marinis (Italy). — At the end of yesterday’s meeting, I said that I proposed to submit to the Commission the text of a note setting forth the principle which I had the honour to explain to you; namely, that a division — even if optional — of air material into two tables, according to whether it is allotted to the home country or to overseas territories, must not lead it to be supposed that the Commission is prepared to consider air forces stationed in the home country and those stationed in overseas territories separately — as if they had no reciprocal influence upon each other for the purposes of a reduction of armaments — without taking into account that some of these territories, owing to their proximity to the home country, must be regarded from a military point of view as a continuation of the home territory.

As arguments analogous or similar to those which I advanced in support of my attitude on air armaments are also applicable to other forms of armament, I should have to submit a similar note in connection with other tables appearing in our draft Convention. I should thus be compelled to return to the same questions and to repeat the arguments which I developed yesterday and on other occasions in the Commission, and to ask you to record your opinion afresh in every case — a method which would certainly not conduce to the expeditious progress of our work.

In order to avoid doing so, and also in order that the views of the Italian delegation should be stated clearly and once for all, I now ask you to insert a reservation in the following terms in the draft Convention, at the end of Chapters I and II:

"In regard to the distinction between effectives and armaments in the home country and those in overseas territories, which had been introduced in some of the tables of Chapters I and II of the draft Convention, the Italian delegation desires to make a general reservation to the effect that, for the purpose of the reduction of armaments, the importance of any forces and material which a contracting party allots to its overseas territories may vary from the point of view of another contracting party, according to the geographical situation of the said overseas territories in relation to the home territories of the two contracting parties. It follows, therefore, that a contracting party will be justified in regarding the overseas forces of another contracting party as constituting a portion of the latter party’s home forces, where such a conclusion is justified by the proximity of the overseas territories in question to the home territories of the two parties."

M. Massigli (France). — I wish to thank General de Marinis for having been good enough to state the argument, which he developed yesterday, in the form of a personal opinion.

Naturally, I have no objection, and could not of course object, to the Commission taking note of this reservation. I merely wish to state that, so far as the French delegation is concerned, it maintains the view unanimously expressed by Sub-Commission A and given on page 67 of the report of that Commission in the following terms:

"The distinction between forces stationed in the home country and overseas make it possible to bring out separately the particular needs of countries with the responsibilities of overseas territories, where the requirements of policing and order necessitate most frequently larger effectives than are needed for external security, thus involving a special organisation of forces whose strength depends on whether the State in question is sufficiently powerful on sea to reinforce these forces when necessary."

I will content myself for the present with this general declaration. If the Commission should decide that reservations or interpretations put forward by delegations are to be printed — not in the report, which would be their natural place, but appended to the Convention itself — I should, of course, have to ask that my interpretation should also appear in the Convention.

General de Marinis (Italy). — Of course, if my colleague M. Massigli also wishes his declaration to be inserted in the draft Convention, I have not the slightest objection, but I do insist that my reservation should be inserted in the actual text of the draft Convention at the end of Chapters I and II, because in my opinion it represents a fundamental principle. Further, it is in conformity with the declarations previously made by several delegates, the
terms of which I could quote, but for the fact that I have not had time to read through all the
Minutes. I do remember, however, that the Netherlands delegate, in accepting the principle
of a distinction between home and overseas forces, observed that he justified the distinction
on the ground of the distance between the Netherlands colonies and the home country and the
difficulties of communication.

Lord Cushendun also said that he was perfectly prepared to examine a formula which
would establish a distinction between colonies, according to their distances from the home
country.

Consequently, as there is a fundamental principle at stake, I desire that my reservation
should appear in the actual text of the draft Convention.

M. RUTGERS (Netherlands). — I am not sure that the conclusion that General de Marinis
draws from the fact that a fundamental principle is at stake is a correct one. If a fundamental
principle is stated in a declaration, does it necessarily follow that that declaration should appear
in the draft Convention itself?

If I am right, we are all agreed upon the text of the draft Convention, and General de Marinis
himself has no objection to it. His declaration is concerned only with the conclusions that
may be drawn from the tables and the attitude that the Government may take up at the
Disarmament Conference. It is not concerned with the text of the Convention, which has been
adopted unanimously, and I therefore do not see why the declaration should be inserted in
our draft. I think it is preferable that General de Marinis’s declaration should appear in
the report which will be drawn up by the Commission to accompany the text of the Convention.
That is not a secondary place for it, since the report will contain a large number of fundamental
principles.

As a general rule, I think it is logical that a reservation should not be inserted in the actual
text of the draft if it does not strictly relate to that text. A fortiori, when there is unanimity
upon a text we should, I think, be weakening its force by inserting a reservation which does
not apply to it.

General DE MARINIS (Italy). — The honourable delegate of the Netherlands has not quite
rightly understood me. I would not venture to ask that a declaration which has not been
adopted by the Commission should be inserted in the draft Convention; consequently, I do
not ask that my statement should appear in the draft in the form of a declaration but merely
as a reservation.

It has been said that the draft should be adopted unanimously; but we are not unanimous
upon it. I accept these tables, but subject to that reservation. As a maximum concession,
I am prepared to agree that, instead of my reservation being printed in the actual text of the
draft Convention, it should be put in a note annexed at the end of the draft.

Count BERNSTORFF (Germany). — It seems to me that the question we are discussing now
is one which will often arise again during our discussions. Some delegations will only vote
for the text with certain reservations, and the Conference will have to decide on the fate of
those reservations.

I think, therefore, that it would be desirable to decide in principle here and now what
we are going to do if — as General de Marinis very rightly puts it — unanimity does not exist
in reality but only in appearance.

With regard to the question itself I may remind you that, in the observations I had the
honour to lay before the Commission, I said:

"If it is intended that the Convention should deal with these two categories separately,
an effort must be made to ensure that only those troops which a State undertakes to
employ solely for the defence and policing of its colonies should be regarded as colonial
troops."

For this reason, and because it is the view held by my Government, I associate myself
with the observations made by General de Marinis, and I wish to vote with the same reservation
as he.

The President. — I propose that we take note of the declarations made by General de
Marinis and Count Bernstorff, and leave it to the bureau to propose at the end of our proceedings
in what manner these reservations are to be annexed to the draft Convention or inserted in
it. By that time we shall probably have had other reservations made.

General DE MARINIS (Italy). — I must thank the President for his statement. I understand,
than, that my reservation will be annexed to or inserted in the draft Convention, and that
the only point remaining to be settled is whether it will be annexed or inserted.

The President. — My proposal was a wider one than that. I had also thought of the
possibility of inserting these declarations in the report.

General DE MARINIS (Italy). — I cannot agree to the insertion of my reservation in the
report. The report may be altered or it may disappear, and I am most anxious that the
reservation should be annexed to the draft Convention.

M. SATO (Japan). — I quite realise the importance of the difficulties with which the Italian
delegate has to contend. I should not care to join in the discussion of the actual substance
of his reservation, and I see no difficulty in accepting his point of view. The remarks I wish
to make are of a more general nature. It is undesirable that, by accepting his suggestion,
we should create a precedent which would enable all the members of the Commission to make
reservations.

We have met on this occasion for a second reading of the draft Convention, with the object
of disposing of the numerous reservations which were made at the first reading, and which
appear in the margin. General de Marinis has, of course, very good reasons for making his
reservation on the question of air armaments. If, however, we take the view that all the members
of the Commission are free to make reservations on any question, we shall be paving the way
for all sorts of difficulties which will interfere with our progress.

Consequently, I entirely agree with the President. At the end of this session of the
Commission, the bureau will consider how it can insert the Italian delegation's reservation.
What I want to repeat is that this is not an example to be followed by our colleagues; on the
contrary, they must do their utmost, and more than their utmost, to withdraw their old
reservations.

M. Markovitch (Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes).—I wish to second the
Japanese delegate's suggestion. This is a very important question, which affects the whole
progress of our work. If it is agreed that any delegation can ask for the insertion in the text
of the Convention of any reservations which it thinks indispensable, we shall never succeed
in formulating a unanimously agreed text.

What were we discussing yesterday? An amendment proposed by the French delegation.
The President asked that a vote should be taken. Certain delegations spoke in favour of the
proposal and others against. The Italian delegation agreed subject to a reservation. If we
take a vote, each delegation will have to answer yes or no. The reservation can be put into
the report if that is desired; but it must not be allowed to affect the force of the vote; that is
to say, the fact that the text of the amendment, if adopted, would be included in the draft.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Socialist Soviet Republics).—I fully sympathise with the delegate
for Japan, who is no doubt animated by a desire to bring the work of the Commission to a
speedy and successful conclusion. It would be a step backwards if we were to make reservations
on articles which have already been adopted by the Commission at the first reading. I hope,
however, that M. Sato and the other members of the Commission will admit that the Soviet
dlegation is in a particular position, because it did not take part in the first reading of the
draft Convention. Therefore, what is going on now in the Commission constitutes for the
Soviet delegation a first reading. Since the Soviet delegation has not had an opportunity of
making reservations before, it is bound to do so now.

As regards the particular question under discussion—the proposal of the French delegation
—I am compelled to make a reservation until that proposal is finally discussed at the general
Disarmament Conference. If, at the Conference, all Colonial Powers agree to deal separately
with the air armaments in the home country and those in the colonies—and that principle is
included in the draft Convention, thereby becoming obligatory for all States—that would
meet the wishes of the Soviet delegation. If, on the other hand, certain Colonial Powers agreed
to such a separate enumeration of their air armaments and others did not, the Soviet delegation
would be compelled to make a reservation on the whole question.

The President.—This is a question of procedure. Does the Commission authorise the
bureau to submit to it in due course an opinion regarding the method to be followed? I am
sure that General de Marinis will agree to this. We shall, of course, take note of his declaration,
and, when the time comes, the bureau will make a proposal.

We will now proceed to vote on the French proposal. If there are no objections, I shall
regard this as adopted.

The French proposal was adopted.

36. Discussion on Chapter II Section III, Material of Air Armaments, Article AC.

Article AC.

"Horse-power shall be measured according to the rules....
(to be established by the Conference).

"The volume of dirigibles to be expressed in cubic metres."

The President.—The German delegation has proposed to omit Article AC, in consequence
of their proposal to omit in Article AA the limitation of horse-power. This limitation having
been retained by the Commission, it appears that Article AC should also be retained.

Agreed.
37. Discussion on Chapter II, Section III. Material of Air Armaments, Article AD.

Observations and Reservations.

The German delegation makes a reservation regarding Article AD, in view of the fact that the development of a means of peaceful communication cannot be taken as a starting-point for armaments, except where this means of communication is of real military importance.

The delegation of the Argentine makes a reservation regarding Article AD.

The delegation of the United States of America makes a general reservation on the inclusion of provisions basing limitation upon the present development of civil aviation in other countries.

The President. — The German delegation has proposed the omission of this article.

Count Bernstorff (Germany). — I do not desire to repeat the same argument over and over again, but I would remind the Commission that the German delegation has made a reservation regarding this article, since the development of a means of peaceful communication cannot be taken as a justification for armaments, unless this means of communication is of real military importance.

The Hon. Hugh Gibson (United States of America). — The American delegation desires to support the proposal of Count Bernstorff for the deletion of this article.

At first reading, the American delegation made a general reservation regarding the inclusion of the provision for basing limitation upon the present development of civil aviation in other countries. We feel that a provision of this character has no logical place in our draft Convention, and I should like to explain the reasons for this view, in the hope that they will be taken into account in the decision of the Commission.

In the first place, it seems that this position comes perilously close to dealing in quantitative matters, which we are agreed should be left to the definite Disarmament Conference. As a practical matter, how are we to say, until we know what the definite figures of limitation are, whether or not the limitations are accepted in the light of civil aviation in other countries? If, as we hope, the figures are gratifyingly low, they will need no justification of this character; if, on the other hand, they are so high as to require explanation and justification, I feel that justification should arise from the figures themselves.

I certainly do not feel that this Commission should lay down the groundwork for limitation at figures so high that we must now begin to prepare justification for them. Above all, let us not begin, at this stage of our proceedings, to encourage our successors in the latter course by providing them with convenient excuses for high limitation, and that is what the placing of this article in this Convention amounts to.

Furthermore, it seems to me that we rather anticipate the trend of development of aviation during the period elapsing between now and the final Disarmament Conference. In view of the immense strides in the aviation industry and the immense progress in invention, how can we at this time accurately forecast or estimate the exact character of the problem with which the final Conference will have to deal? It does not take a wild flight of the imagination to believe that civil aviation in the near future will see the air as fully obstructed with aerial Citroëns and Fords as are our highways to-day. Certainly, it is a patent absurdity to lay down the rule that such development would give justification for unequal development of military aviation in the various countries.

Is it not more reasonable that we should deal with certain more or less constant factors, and avoid seeking to hamper the final Conference by definite provisions, which may have no application to the problem existing at the time of the final Conference? I venture to put forward the view of the American delegation on this subject, in the hope that my colleagues will share the opinion that the provisions of this article are out of place in this Convention, and that the Convention would be better for their deletion.

While we feel that it would be better to omit this article, we are not disposed to make our views an obstacle to the adoption of a single text, and I confine myself to asking my colleagues to give careful consideration to these remarks before taking a decision on this question.

M. Sokal (Poland). — I should like, Mr. President, to have your opinion and that of the Commission on a previous question regarding procedure. We have just heard the observations
of the representatives of Germany and the United States of America concerning Article AD. Before taking a definite stand with regard to this article, I should like to draw the Commission’s attention to Article ZD in the draft Convention which reads as follows:

“If, during the term of the present Convention, civil aviation in one or more of the contracting countries, or military or civil aviation in one or more of the non-signatory States, experiences such a development as to constitute a possible danger to the security of some of the High Contracting Parties, the latter shall report this change of circumstances to the Permanent Disarmament Commission under the conditions laid down in Article ZA above.”

As you will see, there is a close connection between the text of Article AD and that of Article ZD. Do you not think, Mr. President, that it would be preferable to postpone the discussion of Article AD until we come to Article ZD? In any case, it seems essential to examine these two articles together.

The President. — I do not see the use of postponing the discussion of Article AD until we come to Article ZD. The adoption or rejection of Article AD will in no way affect the decision to be taken on Article ZD.

M. Sokal (Poland). — I, of course, accept your decision, but I should like to point out that, if the discussions on Article AD and Article ZD are kept wholly separate, we shall be obliged to put forward the same arguments twice.

M. Politis (Greece). — I think this is a question which calls for particular attention. We may regard Article AD as setting up what has been called a criterion to determine the limitation and reduction of air forces. If Article AD has no object other than to explain the reductions indicated in Article AA, Article AD should surely not be retained in the Convention. It need only be mentioned in the report, to explain the reasons for the particular wording of the main Article AA.

We may take a different view, however; we may consider it useful to have this Article AD in the text of the Convention as a kind of clause capable of invalidating Article AA.

I will explain. Notwithstanding the limited time the Convention will be in force, if during that period any very radical change takes place in any country in the organisation of civil aviation, and if it is feared that this change will inevitably affect military aeronautics, the other countries may conceivably regard the limitative provisions which they accepted on the basis of a different air situation as thereby cancelled and they will have to be revised.

I would therefore draw attention to the two possible meanings of Article AD. If we accept the second, it seems to me essential not to leave the Article as it is, but to establish a connection — a very necessary connection — between it and the Article to which M. Sokal referred just now, Article ZD.

Why? Because it is obvious that, if we agree that a radical change in the civil aviation of other countries may act as a kind of invalidating clause, the individual contracting parties could not be allowed to judge for themselves matters of the revision, from their own standpoint, of the engagements they undertook under the Convention on the limitation and reduction of their air forces. If any of them raise the question on the basis of Article AD, it must be examined by an international organ such as that provided for in Article ZD.

But, you will ask, what is the use of Article AD? Would not Article ZD suffice in itself?

I think not. If you leave Article ZD as it is, what does it mean? It means that every contracting party may bring a complaint before the international organ, but the latter will be absolutely free to take action or not. If, on the other hand, Article AD lays down a kind of invalidating clause to come into operation in the event of a radical change taking place in the civil aviation of other countries, the international organ will be obliged to give careful consideration to any complaint lodged with it.

I must ask your pardon for this somewhat technical and dry analysis of the matter, but it seems to me most important that you should be sure of the exact meaning you wish to give to Article AD. If you regard it as merely setting up a criterion, it should be abolished. If you regard it as constituting a kind of invalidating clause, it should be combined with Article ZD, and in that case you must add to Article AD a clause to the effect that in these circumstances the provisions laid down in Article ZD will come into effect.

M. Massigli (France). — I should like to make a few observations, not for the purpose of settling the difficulty, which I clearly see, but to add further explanations.

M. Politis sees the problem very clearly. He did not, however, add that Articles AD and ZD were formerly paragraphs 1 and 2 of one and the same article of the French preliminary draft. They were separated when the texts were broken up as result of the submission of the various drafts. Nevertheless, the difficulty remains. M. Politis has stated it very clearly.

It is, perhaps, impossible to deal with either article without the other, since Article AD loses or retains its importance according to the view taken, in regard to Article ZD, of any form of revisory procedure. A case might arise where Article AD would, in the existing circumstances, be meaningless, and, as Mr. Gibson has said, it would be quite sufficient to mention in the Report that several of the Powers represented here expect, in the calculations which they will submit to the Conference for the purpose of showing their air requirements, to take into account the state
of civil aviation in various countries. That is a fact. If, however, as regards Article ZD, you do not succeed in reaching agreement upon any revisory procedure, the situation changes altogether. In that case, it is doubtful whether the present discussion is of any use at all; we cannot really examine Article ZD now, since it in itself presupposes that other questions have already been settled — that more or less permanent supervisory organisations have been established, as well as a procedure of revision, etc. In these circumstances, would it not be better, as M. Sokal proposes, simply to postpone this discussion until we come to Article ZD?

M. SATO (Japan). — I fully share the view expressed by M. Sokal and by M. Politis, and now by M. Massigli. There is a very close connection between Article AD and Article ZD. It seems to me highly expedient to postpone the discussion of this Article AD until we come to Article ZD.

I should like, at the same time, to emphasise the very close connection that exists between civil and military aviation. At the present stage of their development it is impossible to draw any clear distinction between the two. This question has been fully discussed by the Special Commission on the Manufacture of Arms and Implements of War. The majority of the members of that Commission are in favour of bringing civil aviation within the scope of the draft Convention on the Control of the Manufacture of Arms. This fact proves that we must take the civil aviation of the various countries into account in limiting their air armaments.

As it is quite impossible at present to prohibit the use of civil aircraft for military purposes, the development of civil aviation must be taken into consideration when the time comes to limit or reduce the air forces of the various countries.

Already in naval matters we have found that we cannot possibly draw any clear distinction between a warship and a merchant ship. When we discuss the reduction of naval forces, we are obliged, up to a point, to take into consideration the development of the mercantile marine of the different countries, and, in point of fact, fast ships of large tonnage may easily be converted into auxiliary warships.

The considerations I have just set before you in regard to naval disarmament show similarly the importance and necessity of taking the development of civil aviation in a country into account before we can determine the strength of its air forces.

I should like the explanation I have just given to be included in the report.

The PRESIDENT. — After the explanations which we have just been given, I think the Commission might agree to postpone the discussion of Article AD until we come to Article ZD.

This was agreed to.

The delegation of Italy makes a reservation with regard to Article AE.

Article AE.

"1. If the High Contracting Parties intervene in any capacity, whether directly or indirectly, wholly or partially, in civil aviation undertakings, they agree that the State organs dealing with the matter shall be quite separate from the organs dealing with military aviation. It is agreed that this undertaking does not prevent the union of civil and military aviation under a single Ministry provided that the two subjects are dealt with separately and independently.

"2. The High Contracting Parties shall refrain from prescribing the embodiment of military features in the build of civil aviation material so that this material may be constructed for purely civil purposes, more particularly with a view to providing the greatest possible measure of security and the most economical return.

"3. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to require of civil aviation undertakings that they should employ only personnel specially trained for military purposes.

They undertake to authorise only as a provisional and temporary measure the seconding of personnel, and the employment of military aviation material in, civil aviation undertakings.

"4. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to subsidise, directly or indirectly, air lines principally established for military purposes, instead of being established for economic, administrative or social purposes.

"5. The High Contracting Parties undertake to encourage as far as possible the conclusion of economic agreements between civil aviation undertakings in the different countries."
The President. — I will now open the discussion on Article AE. At first reading the Italian delegation made a reservation regarding this article, declaring that it had no fundamental objection to it, but that, having applied for instructions from its Government and not having yet received them, it could not make any formal statement for the time being.

General de Marinis (Italy). — I am authorised to withdraw that reservation. On this occasion I leave the matter to the Commission. If it thinks this article should be retained, I will agree; if it thinks the article should be deleted, I will not object.

The President. — I thank General de Marinis for his conciliatory attitude.

M. Massigli (France). — In connection with this article, I must point out what is obviously a misprint.

Paragraph 3 reads as follows:

"The High Contracting Parties undertake not to require of civil aviation undertakings that they should employ only personnel specially trained for military purposes."

This means: "I undertake not to ask civil aviation undertakings to employ 100 per cent of this special military personnel, but I could ask them to employ 99 per cent."

The text ought to be as follows:

"The High Contracting Parties undertake not to require of civil aviation undertakings that they should employ personnel specially trained for military purposes."

The President. — I would remind you that there is a Soviet amendment that the following should be added to Article AE (2):

"Any adaptation of civil aviation material to the establishment of armaments or to military uses is prohibited."

M. Lounatcharsky (Union of Socialist Soviet Republics). — There is no need to submit arguments on this amendment, as the meaning is perfectly clear. We wish to prevent any State from abusing its civil air force.

The President. — Has the Commission any objection to the amendment proposed by the Soviet delegation?

M. Sato (Japan). — I quite concur in the object of the addition proposed by the Soviet delegation. I see no objection to it, and indeed, I consider it of great importance. Nevertheless, I cannot see how it will be possible to carry this clause into practice, and I should like the Soviet delegation to give us some explanation on this point.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Socialist Soviet Republics). — I anticipated the objection which M. Sato has made with regard to control, but I would draw his attention to the fact that our proposal is not embodied in a separate article, but is rather in the nature of an amendment to Article AE, which deals with the same matter and which provides against the possibility of converting civil aircraft into military aircraft.

The question which M. Sato puts, as to how we are going to exercise control on this point could be applied to any of the articles of this Draft Convention. There is a provision providing for control at the end of the draft Convention, and I think the same control could be applied to the proposals of the Soviet delegation if they are accepted.

On a point of procedure, Mr. President: since delegates are reluctant to speak on the proposals we are making, I would suggest that you declare all such proposals if nobody opposes them — as adopted. I think that would stimulate discussion and the ideas of delegates, and would cause them to express their views.

M. Politis (Greece). — Paragraph 2 reads as follows:

"The High Contracting Parties shall refrain (the French text should read "s'abstiendront" instead of "s'abstiennent") from prescribing the embodiment of military features in the build of civil aviation material . . ."

This means that every Government undertakes not to require companies building civil aircraft to embody military features in such aircraft.

Is their undertaking limited to that alone? Are companies to be allowed — perhaps tacitly encouraged — to embody military features in civil aircraft?

In a word, what do we want to prohibit? The actual direct intervention of Governments alone? Or tolerance by the Governments of the fact that companies are embodying military features in civil aircraft?

If the undertaking is to be understood in the second sense, then it is badly drafted.
M. MASSIGLI (France). — I quite see M. Politis's point. If I am correct, this Article AE is reproduced verbatim from a proposal adopted at a meeting of civil experts at Brussels. The Commission thought it desirable to adopt it as a text for the Convention, but we must have no illusions as to the purport of this text, and I ask you to remember the technical opinion unanimously expressed by Sub-Commission A. You will find it on page 148 of its report; it emphasises the possibility of transforming any civil aircraft into a military aircraft, if not immediately, at any rate with great rapidity. This text of Article AE was adopted at the first reading, but I repeat, we must have no illusions as to its real meaning.

M. SOKAL (Poland). — M. Massigli has just reminded us of how this text came to be included in the draft Convention. It must be admitted that this text was drafted by airmen, and that is perhaps why, as M. Politis rightly observed, the wording is somewhat imperfect. I think that, if we examine the text carefully, we shall see that it is in the nature of a recommendation, and I think perhaps it would be preferable to place it elsewhere than in the draft Convention. It might be placed in an annex to the Convention.

In any case, I support M. Politis' proposal to send this text to a drafting committee, because it is not clear.

Baron ROLIN JAQUEMYS (Belgium). — I fully agree with M. Sokal as regards M. Politis's proposal to refer the text submitted to us to a drafting committee to have it made clearer. I should also like to make a few observations on the drafting of the second paragraph proposed by the Soviet delegation. It reads as follows:

"Any adaptation of civil aviation material to the establishment of armaments or to military uses is prohibited."

Does this mean that the Government cannot intervene to enforce modifications? In that case I quite agree.

If, on the other hand, the freedom of companies or persons building or working civil aviation equipment is to be curtailed, then I am entirely opposed to this principle.

I think it would be very dangerous for Governments thus to intervene to restrict the freedom of industry and commerce in transport material.

I should like, therefore, in order to be able to vote for the amendment proposed, to see it amended as regards form and also in the sense I have indicated, viz., that Governments should not be able to tell aircraft constructors to make their apparatus fulfil certain military requirements, but that transport contractors and aircraft constructors should retain their full freedom.

I may add that, in what I have said, I am adhering faithfully to the views of the Commissions which have considered this subject, and which have drawn attention to the importance of respecting civil aviation for the sake of its possibilities of development, which may contribute so much to the progress of civilisation.

The PRESIDENT. — Does the Soviet delegation agree with the Belgian delegation?

M. LITVINOFF (Union of Socialist Soviet Republics). — Our amendment goes further than the interpretation given by the Belgian representative. Our intention is not only that Governments should not encourage the use of civil aircraft for other purposes, but that they should take measures — legislative or otherwise — to prohibit such use. Measures limiting civil aviation are not sufficient. Private companies or individuals may be found who will regard themselves as more patriotic than their Governments and who might accumulate stocks of such aircraft, which could be used at any given moment for military purposes. To avoid this possibility, we propose that Governments should take measures to prohibit such construction and adaptation. In our view, if such a prohibition were infringed, it should be regarded as a violation of the Convention in the same way as if any other article of the Convention were contravened, and such violation would have all the consequences provided for in the clause relating to control and complaints.

Baron ROLIN JAQUEMYS (Belgium). — I have just prepared a text which, subject to revision by the bureau, might perhaps be adopted by the Commission. It reads as follows:

"The High Contracting Parties prohibit all measures which prescribe, in regard to civil aviation, arrangements for its adaptation to the fitting of armaments as for its employment for military purposes."

I quite agree with the proposal to prevent the intervention of Governments for the purpose of rendering civil aircraft adaptable for military purposes; but a policy of intervention, which would bar certain equipment on the ground that the Governments consider it more or less dangerous, seems to me very vexatious, and, in the interest of the development of the aircraft industry, to which my Government attaches great importance, I think it desirable, and indeed necessary, to oppose it.

The Honourable Hugh Gibson (United States of America). — I think the briefest way in which I can state the views of the American delegation is to say that I am in complete
agreement with Baron Rolin Jaequemyns. The American delegation is in a position to accept a provision that Governments shall not prescribe restrictions as to manufacture, as for constitutional reasons which I have often stated before, we should be unable to accept any provisions imposing on Governments obligations to prevent certain forms of manufacture.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Socialist Soviet Republics). — I would draw the attention of the Commission to Article NH, of the Draft Convention which reads as follows:

“No preparations shall be made in merchant ships in time of peace for the installation of warlike armaments for the purpose of converting such ships into vessels of war...”

I should be quite content if the same wording were accepted with regard to aircraft, and in a spirit of conciliation I agree to withdraw the amendment of the Soviet delegation and to have substituted for it an article similar to that which I have just read. I hope this will be acceptable to the Commission, for there is no ground for making any distinction between the adaptation of aircraft for warlike purposes and the adaptation of merchant ships for the same purposes.

The President. — M. Litvinoff’s proposal thus reads as follows:

“No preparations shall be made in civil aircraft in time of peace for the installation of warlike armaments for the purpose of converting such aircraft into military aircraft.”

Baron Rolin Jaequemyns (Belgium). — I agree to this alteration in the Soviet amendment, as its object is to express the same idea as mine, in the text I myself submitted to the Commission, in opposition to the Soviet delegation’s original amendment.

M. Litvinoff’s proposal was adopted.

Article AE was adopted subject to drafting amendments.

39. Declaration by the Spanish Delegation with reference to the Letter from Mr. Clifford B. Harmon, President of the International League of Aviators.

The President. — We have now discussed the whole of this Chapter. A certain number of questions have been reserved, such as the German proposal concerning the limitation of material and air armaments in reserve or in stock, the limitation of the number of machine-guns for aeroplanes and dirigibles, the limitation of the total weight of aeroplane bombs, the examination of the first paragraph of the Soviet proposal regarding aircraft material in reserve and in stock, and Article AD.

Before closing the discussion of this Chapter, I will call upon M. Cobian, who wishes to make a declaration.

M. Cobian (Spain). — I must apologise for taking up your time for a few minutes, but, in accordance with instructions which my delegation has received, I should like, before the discussion is closed, to express the cordial sympathy felt by my country for the generous idea which was communicated to the Commission by the President at our opening meeting. I refer to the letter sent to him by the President of the International League of Aviators.

We all recognise the beneficial effect upon world peace of the periodical conversations at Geneva between the leading men of all countries. Mr. Clifford B. Harmon’s suggestion for the formation of a United Air Force is made in the same spirit.

I know that it may be objected that such a question is outside the scope of our Commission and belongs more properly to that of the Committee on Arbitration and Security in accordance with the provisions of Article 16 of the Covenant. Nevertheless, whatever the body — this Commission, the Committee on Arbitration and Security, or the Council — which considers it, I trust that the idea may be entertained of holding such an air force at the Council’s disposal at Geneva for the maintenance of peace. I am convinced that many Governments would be prepared voluntarily to send aeroplanes to be kept here at Geneva at the Council’s disposal and to be replaced in rotation, and I believe that this fleet might form the nucleus of that international organisation which was advocated by the eminent pacifist, M. Leon Bourgeois, at the time of the creation of the League of Nations. I think this is all I have to say and I repeat my apologies for delaying the Commission’s proceedings.

The President. — Would the Commission agree to a recommendation in the sense of M. Cobian’s observations being transmitted to the Council and communicated in due course to the Assembly?

M. Litvinoff (Union of Socialist Soviet Republics). — In the course of our discussions, many proposals have been made — by the Soviet and other delegations — having more bearing upon the question of the reduction of armaments than has the proposal made by the delegate for Spain, and yet these have been considered as not coming within the competency of the Commission. It has been pointed out more than once that we are here to deal only with questions connected with the reduction of armaments, and I do not think the proposal just made has anything to do with that. It rather involves an increase of armaments or new military formations for special purposes. Further, it is connected with the general idea of sanctions, but a proposal in regard to sanctions has already been discussed in connection with
chemical warfare, and rejected by the Commission. I do not see, therefore, why we should adopt in any form whatsoever the proposal made by M. Cobian in regard to air armaments. For my part, I am absolutely opposed to any such resolution being passed or any such wish formulated by the Preparatory Commission.

M. COBIAN (Spain). — As I said just now, I anticipated the objections raised by the Soviet delegation. I realised that it might be objected that this question exceeds the scope of our Commission and could more fittingly be discussed by the Committee on Arbitration and Security; but, after listening to M. Litvinoff’s remarks, I should like to point out that nothing could be of greater assistance in maintaining the world’s peace than the institution of such an organisation, which I understand is now condemned or criticised by M. Litvinoff. There is no comparison between the suggestion I have made and the sanctions referred to in connection with chemical warfare. The object of the air force in question would be to maintain peace and not to impose sanctions or to be used in war. It would not be a form of armament but would be the nucleus of an international organisation which might put an end to national armaments more quickly than anything else.

The President. — This is merely a very interesting suggestion, and the fact of its brief discussion here will result in its being submitted to the consideration of Governments. I think therefore that we need only take note of it.

Agreed.

40. Discussion on Chapter I, Effectives.

The President. — The bureau received this morning a proposal from the German delegation which has not yet been distributed.

The Hon. Hugh Gibson (United States of America). — Mr. President, I assume that there would be no objection if, in the interests of brevity, some general remarks are introduced at the beginning of this discussion.

In taking up the Chapter on Effectives we are approaching for the first time questions on which difference of opinion has been so fundamental that neither of the two schools of thought within the Commission has hitherto found it possible to make concessions. In particular, the question of trained reserves gave rise, during the debates of Sub-Commission A, and again during the third session of this Commission, to earnest but inconclusive discussion.

Allow me in a few words to recapitulate the attitude of the American delegation on this problem. We have always maintained that trained reserves should be included with peace-time armaments, since both actually exist in times of peace. In our eyes, a nation which possesses an adequate and equipped trained reserve is in a position promptly to undertake offensive battle. Such a nation is therefore in a markedly more favourable position than one which must train its personnel and equip it. Untrained civilians cannot be turned into efficient fighting men without many months of training. Starting with these premises, the American delegation reached the conclusion that logic and fairness called for trained reserves being included among peace-time effectives in the draft Convention.

In these principles for which we stood during the first reading we still believe. Nevertheless, as I indicated the other day, I fully recognise that other delegations which hold opposing views believe in their theses with the same conviction. Therefore, if we are to reach an agreement — if we are to be able to join in a common draft — it will be necessary for concessions to be made not only on the part of one, but on the part of every delegation here present. With this in mind, I am able to declare that the United States Government, as a practical matter, is disposed to defer to the views of the majority of those countries whose land forces constitute their chief military interest, and in the draft Convention before us to accept their ideas in the matter of trained reserves.

I venture to express the hope that, as a corollary to this attitude, the delegations of other countries will in like manner make the maximum of such concession as they find possible. I do this in no spirit of bargaining. There are two ways in which the Commission can proceed further. The first is for each delegation to hold up the concessions it is prepared to make until the last minute, seeking in return to obtain other advantages for value received. This would inevitably result in months of negotiation and bargaining, and would certainly not truly represent the spirit in which we are met here.

The other method is for the delegations frankly to explain what concessions they are in a position to make, to lay their cards on the table, and to create a feeling of candour and harmony that will be conducive to the further success of our work.

It is in this spirit that I have made a fundamental concession to-day and it is, I am convinced, the method by which, if it finds favour with the other delegates, we can advance our work not only speedily but effectively, and, after three years and six sessions, offer to our Governments and peoples a positive accomplishment.

Count Bernstorff (Germany). — I have been so greatly impressed by the important statement made by Mr. Gibson that I should like to have time to reflect on his words and to be allowed to speak on the matter to morrow morning.

M. Massigli (France). — If, after hearing the important — and I may add historical — declaration to which we have just listened, I venture to address you, it is because you all know that, in regard to the question before us, the French delegation has, at former sessions, been under the
regrettable necessity of maintaining a point of view radically opposed to that of the United States delegation. And I confess that I greatly deplore the fact that M. Paul Boncour is not here to express to you better than I can the sentiments and ideas of which I desire to inform you to-day.

I have just listened with deep emotion to Mr. Gibson's statement, which is certainly, as Mr. Gibson says, of a nature to advance our work very rapidly. My country, as you know, has always held, and still holds, that the safeguarding of the vital principles underlying its national defence does not allow it to make any concession in regard to trained reserves. The French delegation adopted that attitude notwithstanding the desire of its head to make all concessions necessary to hasten the completion of your work, and when other delegations, for reasons for which we had the greatest respect, expressed the fear that the exclusion of trained reserves from the system of limitations was likely to cause anxiety as to the stability of peace, my country's representative maintained that attitude because he was firmly convinced that France did not, and could not, cherish any aggressive intention in maintaining her point of view.

The situation is now profoundly changed. Mr. Gibson, in the lucid explanation just given us, has invited us to lay our cards on the table and complete our work. I may be mistaken in my efforts, but it has always been my aim since I have been here to lay my cards on the table. For that reason, in expressing my thanks to Mr. Gibson for the declaration he has just made, I should like to state in reply that, so far as the French delegation is concerned, it will continue to play the game with its cards on the table, and to make every concession which it is within its power to offer.

M. SATO (Japan).- I fully associate myself with M. Massigli's remarks in reply to the important statement made by Mr. Gibson. To countries in which the conscription system is still in existence, this declaration opens an entirely new prospect. All the difficulties encountered at the first reading with regard to trained reserves are now removed.

After centuries of the feudal system, when we had an army composed of volunteers and regular soldiers, which caused us a great deal of trouble, we adopted the system of conscription sixty years ago. This system is still in force, and I can state definitely that my Government will not be prepared to make any radical alteration in that system.

For this reason it was very difficult, and even impossible, for my country to accept the proposal to limit or reduce trained reserves. The system in force in Japan necessarily results in the formation of trained reserves.

The declaration just made by Mr. Gibson has, however, reassured us, since it holds out to us the possibility of maintaining this system without the necessity of limiting trained reserves in any way.

On behalf of my delegation I desire to express my sincere gratitude to Mr. Gibson for the very important concession which he has made, without departing from his own standpoint, in order to take account of our difficulties in this connection.

I should like to state that in its turn the Japanese delegation will do its utmost to make every possible concession during the forthcoming discussions. Difficulties are bound to occur for which the Japanese delegation will be involuntarily responsible; but, while stating frankly its Government's reasons for differing from other delegations in this matter, it will, nevertheless, make every effort, if the arguments of those delegations prove convincing, to settle these difficulties.

(The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.)

FOURTEENTH MEETING (PUBLIC).

Held at Geneva on Saturday, April 27th, 1929, at 10 a.m.

President : M. Loudon (Netherlands).

41. Discussion on Chapter I, Effectives (Continuation).

The President. — We are continuing this morning the discussion of trained reserves which we began yesterday. I propose that we should then proceed to discuss the Chinese proposal, which is also of a fundamental nature. We will not examine the texts in detail until afterwards.

General de Marinis (Italy). — Mr. President, Gentlemen, as the representative of a country whose military organisation is based upon compulsory service, a system which has been imposed upon it by historical, social and also economic reasons, I desire to associate myself cordially with what was said yesterday by the delegates of France and Japan when they expressed their deep appreciation of the statement made by the United States representative in regard to trained reserves.
I also desire to pay a tribute to the broad spirit of conciliation displayed by Mr. Gibson and, I would add, to the eminently practical sense and the grasp of realities of which he gave us such very tangible proofs. I congratulate myself particularly on this development, because my instructions would not have allowed me to abandon the principles from which we have always approached the question of trained reserves.

Mr. Gibson concluded his statement by urging us to place our cards on the table. I think I have always given you proof of the frankness with which I have set forth my own ideas and my Government's point of view. I should like to add that, by my frankness, I have always endeavoured to attain the very object alluded to by Mr. Gibson. I have always hoped to reach agreements based on mere words but on substantial and precise agreements, taking into account the interests of all.

It is in that spirit that the Italian delegation will begin the discussion of the very important Chapter which we have now to consider.

Count Bernstorff (Germany). — Mr. President, Gentlemen, I rise to address you to-day on the subject of effective, a question which I should have had to deal with in any case, because I want to give all the attention they merit to the important statements made by the delegate of the United States of America.

Mr. Gibson had made a very impressive appeal to the spirit of conciliation. He has emphasised the necessity of accelerating by concessions, which should be as ample and as timely as possible, the work of the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament.

Speaking generally, I am entirely in agreement with the American delegate's view. Like him, I think that a Disarmament Convention can be concluded only if, on points where differences of opinion exist, we are prepared to make mutual concessions. Like him, I consider that every State represented on our Commission, instead of withholding the concessions it feels able to make until the last moment, ought to announce them at an early stage.

Before giving you evidence of our own spirit of conciliation, I should like to make clear one special aspect of the problem with which we are concerned. A Convention on Disarmament, even if it were only to constitute a first stage, could not be considered by Germany unless it provided for an appreciable reduction of armaments. I hope that on this point I am entirely in agreement with the United States delegate.

Indeed, how could any appreciable reduction of naval armaments be made at all if no change whatever were made in the sphere of land armaments? In this matter — that is to say, the question of an appreciable reduction of armaments — Germany, who is herself completely disarmed, has no concessions to make. The important point for us is to know whether the other States which are interested in land armaments are prepared, in execution of the Treaties and of the Covenant, to contemplate an appreciable reduction of armaments for themselves.

Accordingly, Germany can be asked only for concessions as regards the method by which an appreciable reduction of the armaments of States which are not disarmed may be brought about.

In the observations which I made on the eve of this session, I referred to such a concession in regard to the problem of trained reserves, which possesses a particular interest for us. It seems to me that that is entirely in conformity with the spirit of conciliation which has been referred to. I explained in those observations that the German Government is prepared to seek for a path which may lead to an agreement in this field.

Hitherto, in the Commission's discussions, there has been on one side a group of States — including Germany — which held that trained reserves would have to be included in the scope of a Disarmament Convention. On the other hand, another group of States maintained that the Convention should not apply to trained reserves. The suggestion submitted in my observations endeavours to find a compromise. In my opinion, it is quite possible to arrive at a method which, for purposes of comparing military effective, would enable a smaller value to be attached to trained reserves, particularly the older classes of reserves, than to the effective serving with the colours.

As I have already explained, this idea might be carried into practice as follows: a different coefficient of value would be given to the same number of men according to the category to which they belonged (e.g., officers, privates serving with the colours, classes 1 to 5, classes 6 to 10). By this method you would assign a lesser value to trained reserves, particularly those of the older classes. It resembles the method which, if I am not mistaken, the representative of the United States of America contemplates in the field of naval disarmament in order to compare the different categories of vessels.

If you adopt this system, it will no longer be necessary to answer the fundamental question whether trained reserves ought to be included in the Convention or not. We should only have to deal with the practical question as to the degree of value to be attached to the trained reserves. As regards the efforts towards conciliation which we must all endeavour to make, the method I have had the honour to propose to you would leave the door open to all kinds of contingencies, if the Commission is prepared in principle to solve this problem by means of conciliation.

The United States delegate said yesterday that his Government, which had hitherto shared the view of Germany and certain other States, adheres in principle to its opinion, but is prepared to support the opinion of the majority of countries which are chiefly concerned with land forces.

As regards ourselves, we could not accept a proposal which would sacrifice the element of trained reserves in a Disarmament Convention. We are still convinced that an agreement will always be possible, on the basis of mutual concessions, if the method of valuation which I have just proposed is accepted.
I would beg to remind you once more of the reasons why Germany cannot abandon her desire to have trained reserves included under the Convention. If the Disarmament Convention merely reduces or limits the effectives serving with the colours, the solution reached would, we feel sure, be purely a factitious one. Similarly, a country, which has at its disposal a certain number of troops serving with the colours, but with no, or very few, trained reserves or other effectives available without mobilisation, would appear in the scheme for the reduction of armaments to have the same figures as some other country, having the same number of men with the colours, but possessing also perhaps twenty times as many effectives and trained reserves. These reserves, which in time of war would be of the utmost importance, would not appear in the Convention at all.

The mischief would be particularly great, because it is precisely by means of trained reserves that a State can mobilise in a very short space of time a large number of soldiers having military training, and is thus able to carry out vast schemes of aggression.

I recognise that Mr. Gibson expressly took into account this aspect of the problem. The immense value of trained reserves has also been recognised by our experts on Sub-Commission A, who unanimously agreed that the conscription system enables military training to be given to every man fit to carry arms, and thus allows the whole force of a country to be utilised in time of war.

On the other hand, the experts pointed out that the characteristic of a voluntary army is the impossibility, except after a prolonged space of time, of opposing an invader in case of aggression or of taking part in collective action recommended by the League of Nations with other effectives than those maintained in peace time”.

The logical consequence of this view would be to demand the entire abolition of the conscription system. In that way the problem of estimating the value of trained reserves would solve itself and the comparison between different armies would be greatly facilitated. However, the German Government — and I venture to emphasise this point — has not asked for any general abolition of compulsory military service. That is a fundamental concession which Germany has made. The German Government has — if I may venture to say so — made two successive concessions: firstly, it refrained from asking for the general abolition of the conscription system in favour of the voluntary system which amounts to recognising the existence of trained reserves — and, secondly, it has proposed that the value of trained reserves should be estimated, not by their numbers, but by a scale of military values — a point on which agreement would have to be reached. No concession, I believe, has as yet been made in regard to trained reserves by any other country in the same conciliatory spirit.

In this connection I must refer to the special situation of Germany and the other countries disarmed under the Peace Treaties. There has been imposed upon Germany a system which not only reduces the effectives with the colours to a minimum, but also makes it impossible to form trained reserves.

A Disarmament Convention which neglected the question of trained reserves might be conceivable if all the signatory States had a free choice between a system of military service which enabled them to form trained reserves and some other system which did not enable them to do so. But here you have a group of signatory States, some of whom do not possess this freedom of choice, but who are obliged under the existing treaties to give up the formation of trained reserves, and a Disarmament Convention which neglected so important a consideration could not be regarded as equitable.

Among the representatives of the Power who consider it necessary to eliminate trained reserves from the Convention, some have already expressed their gratitude for the concession which has been made to them by the United States, and have announced their readiness to consider what concessions they can make themselves. The delegate of France added, however, that France could not make any concession whatever as regards trained reserves.

In these circumstances, you will understand the great interest with which I await the declarations which are to inform us what concessions are contemplated by these Powers.

The United States delegate very rightly rejected any idea of bargaining. Yet will not world opinion be tempted to regard it as a kind of bargaining if concessions granted in response to the concession made by the United States are offered in some totally different field of disarmament — a field other than that of trained reserves ?

The situation would be much clearer, I think, and our work would be considerably expedited, if the delegates who have declared their readiness to make concessions would say as much as possible in what field they propose to make these concessions. I attach the utmost importance to their replies, because it is on the nature of their replies that the future direction of the Commission’s work largely depends, and, in consequence, also the position which my Government will have to take up in regard to its work.

M. Rutgers (Netherlands). — I take this opportunity to explain the attitude of the Netherlands delegation with regard to the second reading of the draft Convention. Like all other delegations, we are anxious to obtain not only the most substantial but also the most rapid results possible.

At its first reading, and even before this, in Sub-Commission A, we supported proposals (and made certain proposals ourselves) for increasing the effects of the draft Convention. This policy, the primary object of which was to obtain the most substantial results possible and which might be termed a policy of maximum results, was not successful. The draft Convention contains a large number of proposals with which we are entirely in sympathy and which, from the point
of view of the reduction and limitation of armaments, have much to recommend them. Unfortunately however, they occupy only one column of the page and we fear that they are hardly likely to obtain general approval in the near future. We must now realise that we have to make a choice. We cannot continue to discuss various systems without any other result than that of adding to the number of rejected proposals and reservations.

If we go on in this way, a long time must still elapse before the Conference meets. Without concessions, we shall never achieve any result. The method of maximum results, to which I have referred, does not contain any promise of success. Nevertheless, we need not be reduced immediately to a minimum draft Convention which would not form an adequate basis for the summoning of a Conference; we must endeavour to find the highest point on which we can reach agreement.

We must remember that the problem before us is not technical or arithmetical but a political problem. If we are to arrive at practical results, it is no use taking a stand on logical arguments, however irrefutable, because it will be a long time before they can prevail. The Netherlands delegation is anxious that the work of our Commission should at last lead to definite results. In order to obtain these results it is absolutely essential to renounce a certain number of proposals made at the first reading, however well-founded they may be. If their adoption by the Commission in the near future is impossible, it is useless to prolong discussion on these proposals and thus delay all possibility of convening the Conference for which it is our duty to prepare.

We have been animated by two desires—the desire to obtain substantial results and the desire to obtain rapid results, and we must now concentrate on the latter. While maintaining the views previously put forward by the Netherlands delegation, we have decided to make many concessions in order to achieve results as quickly as possible.

This applies in the first place to the question of the limitation and the gradual reduction of trained reserves. In Sub-Commission A, as well as in the Plenary Commission, our delegation and others have strongly advocated such limitation. We have not changed our opinion and we shall seize every opportunity of effecting this limitation. We are willing to examine any proposal for even a partial limitation, but we realise that nothing can be gained by reopening a discussion which has run its course. What we have to do now is to decide whether we are to continue our work when it is obvious that the limitation and reduction of trained reserves are impossible. If a negative reply be given, and if the view be held that without this limitation and reduction of trained reserves it is useless for our work to continue, we shall have to consider whether it would not be better to ask the Council and Assembly of the League of Nations to release us from our task, which it would obviously be impossible for us to carry out. However, the Netherlands delegation has not yet reached that conclusion. We think it is better that we should continue our work, even if we have to recognise that the limitation and reduction of trained reserves are unobtainable.

We would lay stress on the extent of our concession, which implies, in effect, that the limitation and reduction of armaments will not affect large armies. Countries which in various parts of the world train year by year all their young men who are fit for military service, and which thus, in the name of security—and, as it has been called here, of democracy—organise huge armies, well trained, organised, staffed and equipped with all necessary material, and which could, in the case of mobilisation, be sent to the front in a week or two—these countries, I say, will not even be obliged to reduce their armies by a single man.

The day on which the advocates of the limitation and reduction of trained reserves agree to accept a draft Convention which does not provide for this limitation and reduction may be termed an historic day. That will be the day on which it is decided to renounce any effective limitation and reduction of land forces, or at least to postpone it sine die.

We fully recognise that the members of our Commission who are opposed to any limitation and reduction of trained reserves base their objections on grounds affecting their national responsibilities and that these reasons are deserving of respect; but that does not alter our view as to the result which will follow. The Netherlands delegation could accept responsibility for this decision if there were any likelihood of the Commission’s adopting at some early date a system for the limitation and reduction of trained reserves, but this, unfortunately, is not the case.

In making this concession, I asked myself whether it would not be better for me to do so with a good grace, by making the best of a bad job and showing that I was pleased to be able to assist our Commission in reaching agreement. But I decided that it would be merely a pretence for me to try and hide my delegation’s disappointment in the matter, and it would be a vain and unnecessary pretence because the Council, to whom our report will be submitted, the Powers convened to the Disarmament Conference and the general public when it reads our draft Convention, will see for themselves the scope of the agreement reached. They will ask with astonishment whether the Locarno treaties and the Kellogg Pact have lost all value and whether it is really impossible to reduce armed forces by a single man.

If the insignificant results achieved in regard to the reduction and limitation of land forces are not offset by substantial results in regard to naval armaments—and even if these are obtained,
the Convention must still be regarded as a limited and faulty document — the Council may ask whether these results justify the summoning of a Conference.

Before concluding, I should like to add a general observation. On more than one occasion, Mr. President, you have referred to the influence of public opinion on our work. As regards the question now before us we must acknowledge that public opinion has given us no guidance. So far as it takes any interest in our work, public opinion mainly desires that it should be completed as soon as possible, but as regards the fundamental controversies which have arisen in the course of our discussions it has given us very little guidance. Perhaps this is partly owing to the fact that it is difficult for the public to follow the progress of our work. We cannot expect the Minutes four Commission to be read except by a few specialists. In my opinion, the report of our Commission to the Council should include a summary of the proposals adopted or rejected and the chief reasons advanced on either side, and I hope the bureau will be able to entertain the suggestions made by M. Westman, the honourable delegate for Sweden, in this connection.

I think this matter is of some importance, because the decision not to limit or not to reduce trained reserves, which we shall be obliged to take, will not be the final decision on this matter. When our Commission has completed its work, the first Conference will meet, and it is already proposed that others shall follow. I hope, therefore, that if we have to accept defeat now, this defeat will not be final.

M. FIERLINGER (Czechoslovakia). — The United States representative made a statement to us yesterday which fully reflects the spirit of compromise and the breadth of view which animates both the citizens of his country and their distinguished President. I am confident that his declaration will materially help us to conclude a Convention for the Reduction of Armaments in the near future. Such a Convention will perhaps not be ideal; it will perhaps reflect the unstable condition of Europe; nevertheless, I am sure it will mark the first step towards a better future.

Several speakers have expressed the deep emotion which we all feel. I was about to cancel with very great pleasure the United States delegation's reservation noted in the margin of our draft, when I realised that, apart from the reference to trained reserves, the reservation also refers to formations organised on a military basis. The statement of the United States delegation does not touch this last point. If I am not mistaken, this special reservation relates to the troops maintained by the various States of the Union. These are militia intended for purely pacific purposes and are not under the direct control of the Federal authorities. They may not be used by those authorities and — what is more important — they may not be supervised by them either. I find that they have been mobilised to assist the civil population in times of disaster by flood or by fire.

I think we can accept the United States delegation's reservation, as our Convention will not affect forces which are organised on a military basis under the constitution of the various States of the United States Federation in virtue of their national sovereignty, and which are not under the orders of the Federal authorities.

M. WESTMAN (Sweden). — During the various stages of our preparatory work in these last few years, the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden and other countries have always urged the need for a limitation not only of troops with the colours but also of trained reserves, if any appreciable result in the reduction of land forces is to be achieved. Many other countries held a different view, and there thus arose these differences of opinion and disagreements which are universally regretted and which it is the duty of each and all of us to try to remove. We all realise our great responsibility in this respect, and we much appreciate the initiative which was taken yesterday by the United States representative, Mr. Gibson, because we regarded it as a serious attempt to enable us to emerge from the present deadlock. But I must say frankly that it is a hard road which he puts before us.

Like Mr. Gibson himself, we have not changed our opinion on the substantial issues; but Mr. Gibson's statement shows that the United States Government finds it necessary to propose a concession — a concession which will have to be made by those who think that a Disarmament Convention will be neither effective nor equitable if it omits an important element such as trained reserves, which are an essential part of the attacking force of a country.

I do not intend to repeat here the arguments which have been adduced in favour of our case. If they have not had the effect desired, it is certainly not for want of repetition.

I will merely remind you that a limitation of land armaments which only extends to troops serving with the colours will press very hardly on countries which only maintain professional armies or have only very small trained reserves, and also on countries which have a conscription system with a very short period of military service and which thus could not make any further reduction without reducing the annual contingent itself.

Such a principle of disarmament might very easily mean that countries having a long period of military service will maintain intact the whole of their forces available on the outbreak of war, whereas the forces of the other countries would be very appreciably reduced. Such a result is, in our view, far from satisfactory.

We fear the text of a Convention resulting from an agreement on such a basis would be very meagre and I therefore venture to hope that, when we come to discuss the other questions which have yet to be solved, the concession made will at any rate be on a mutual basis. In this connection
some delegations have made statements which we were very glad to hear. We all realise the great importance of agreeing upon a draft Convention which will enable the Council and the Assembly to summon a Disarmament Conference without delay. For a long time past we have been forced to recognise that we must be content with somewhat modest results; nevertheless, we must not underestimate the risk of going too far in that direction. An agreement reached on a minimum basis might lead, at the end of the work for disarmament, to a minimum of agreement.

If, at the present stage of our work, the Swedish delegation is to withdraw its opposition to a decision reached in the Commission by a large majority, to prepare a text on the basis of the limitation of effectives with the colours with no limitation of trained reserves, it is because we hope that appreciable results will be attained in the other fields of disarmament.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Socialist Soviet Republics). — I fully share the opinions here expressed as to the desirability of mutual concessions from delegations and the importance of these concessions for the achievement of general agreement as to the fulfilment of the tasks confronting the Preparatory Commission. Concessions, however, may tend in two directions. Either delegations withdraw their reservations and objections against such proposals as tend towards the greatest and most far-reaching reduction of existing armaments, arriving at unanimity on the ground of the greatest possible degree of disarmament, or concessions may be made by the acceptance of all these reservations and objections, thus arriving at unanimity on the ground of the utmost contraction of the scope of disarmament.

With deep regret, I find myself obliged to state that the spirit of conciliation and agreement which has been shown here by the honourable delegate for the United States of America, and which evoked considerable satisfaction from many delegations, follows the second path. I feel sure that all those outside these walls, who are expecting from the Preparatory Commission and the future Disarmament Conference substantial results, not only in the sense of easing the burden of militarism and lessening the weight of war budgets, and are also hoping for a diminution of the possibilities of war and a narrowing of the scope of future wars and their horrors, will share the disappointment felt by the Soviet delegation.

If I have understood aright the declaration of the honourable delegate of the United States, his country, as a sea Power, agrees to declare its disinterestedness in questions of trained reserves. It is ready to content itself with a reduction of effectives in service, without demanding a corresponding reduction, or indeed any reduction whatsoever, of reserves. To leave trained reserves out of numerical calculations entails leaving military stocks at their present level or even making allowance for their increase.

Reserves can only have any importance from the military point of view given the corresponding preparation and accumulation, in time of peace, of considerable stocks of all sorts of weapons of warfare, sufficient for the equipment, at least within the first months of war, of all reserves liable to be called up in case of war. It is quite obvious that, unless the draft Convention provides for the reduction of trained reserves and war material, the whole work of the Disarmament Conference will only lead to a certain, quite insignificant, reduction of effectives in service; that is, to some diminution of war budgets in respect to the maintenance of effectives. This reduction of budgets will be of an extremely limited nature, inasmuch as provision for the equipment of armies and for military stocks will not be reduced.

I have said that the numerical strength of effectives will only be slightly reduced, for the latter must serve as cadres capable of embracing trained reserves in case of mobilisation; and, so long as these reserves remain untouched, the cadres will have to correspond to them, so that no substantial reduction of effectives can be admitted. Thus, while leaving trained reserves and military material untouched, we are hardly likely to be able to bring any real influence to bear even on war budgets.

As I have already stated, the second and by far the most important aim of disarmament is the diminution of the likelihood of war, and also the limitation of the scope of future wars, i.e., the prevention of involving millions of persons, the whole male able-bodied population, in these wars, as was done in the last war. The Disarmament Conference will be unable to take any useful decisions in the direction of these aims if we allow each State unlimited freedom with regard to trained reserves.

The United States delegation seems to assume that the question of trained reserves is one for the so-called land Powers only, to be decided upon among themselves according to their own interests. I represent here a country that is eminently such a land Power, but I have been sent here not for the furtherance of the specific interests of my own country, nor for agreement with other countries — based on their taking into consideration the special interests of my country — in exchange for concessions to their interests.

I am authorised to declare that any agreement on the reduction of all sorts of arms, of all armed forces, both effectives in service and trained reserves, will be acceptable for the Union of Republics which I represent, if the same reduction applies equally to other countries. The interests of my country demand no exceptions whatever from the scheme for the reduction of armaments being worked out here; they demand no concessions from any other delegations. More, I am convinced that the interests of other countries, given the desire for peace and the absence of aggressive intentions, do not demand any compromise whatsoever in the matter of disarmament, and do not demand the withdrawal of any proposals directed towards disarmament. I consider that, if the aim of delegations is not merely the specific interests of their