making war upon all wars, not only on international warfare but on civil warfare, which is the most abominable of all forms of war. What we want is that armed forces should guarantee the security of States and not be used for wars of aggression and that there should be no contraband arms, which are perhaps more dangerous than any others. Finally, we do not wish to leave arms in the hands of those who might perhaps make use of them for purposes of disorder or for civil war. This will explain the importance we have attached to this question and the replies which have been made.

On the question of war material, M. Litvinoff quite rightly emphasised the importance of the work done here in connection with the manufacture of arms and ammunition. Last Monday, an exceedingly important examination of views placed on this question under the chairmanship of Count Bernstorff, and a desire was clearly expressed that the question should be resumed as soon as possible with a view to the summoning of a conference on the manufacture of arms, which question is so closely and intimately associated with the traffic in arms. There is a Convention on the latter subject which has so far been ratified by only three countries—including my own—and more general ratification partly depends upon the conclusion of this very convention on the manufacture of arms and ammunition.

Thus M. Litvinoff will see that all the questions which concern him have been studied here in great detail. He is indeed so familiar with all the work of the League of Nations that we can only express our regret that he has not yet considered the time arrived for his Government to become a Member of the League.

On this same question of arms, M. Litvinoff rightly pointed out that it could only be settled effectively by national and international control. I can assure him that the French delegation has given the matter most careful consideration, and he has devoted to this essential question, for he is aware that M. Paul-Boncour regards it as of vital importance. I hope that this thorough and detailed work will not be wasted, but may be resumed when we have before us the texts to which I am about to refer.

With regard to the other questions raised, particularly the place where treaties have been registered and the surprise which M. Litvinoff expressed that certain treaties, like the Treaty of Lausanne or the Traffic in Arms Convention, were registered in Paris and not at Geneva, I will leave it to others more qualified than myself to reply. I will only say that in some cases the Treaties referred to questions depending upon action by the Conference of Ambassadors, which was established in Paris. These, however, are points of detail and the time has not come to discuss them.

Thanks to M. Litvinoff, we have made a public examination of our consciences and have been able to ascertain exactly where we stand. The results, I think, are very gratifying, for they have shown us that we are not very far from our goal, provided, of course, that we remain within our terms of reference, that is to say within the framework of the League of Nations.

Although not a Member of the League, the Soviet Government has been good enough to take part in our discussions on the same conditions as the representatives of the United States and Turkey. Its delegation will understand that, as I have already said, it is impossible for us to abandon the methods we have hitherto adopted or to go outside our terms of reference. Possibilities are not used to make such fruitful and useful examination as the Soviet Draft, we might have been able to proceed during the present session to the second reading of our own draft Conventions for the limitation of armaments, for which purpose we were convened and for which the French delegation was prepared. As it is, I think that it would be better to adopt the proposal made the other day by the honourable representative of the British Empire and refer the Russian text for the examination of our Governments. The texts drawn up at first reading are not definitive, and could not in any case be adopted without a second reading, since there are certain points on which it was found difficult to reach an agreement, and which were only agreed to on condition that an understanding was reached upon other points.

But while we have been holding these very interesting political discussions, the technical experts of most of our delegations have had a certain amount of leisure which they have turned to good account. They have entered into or continued useful conversations dealing with the treatment of some of these delicate questions to which I have alluded and for which only partial solutions had been found; we hope that some final settlement will be reached as speedily as possible. One of the conditions of such settlement and one of the main conditions of success is an exchange of views not only between technical experts but between Governments. I am glad to say that we are far advanced along this path and there is no occasion to anticipate any very long delay before we arrive at appreciable results.

In these circumstances, I think that we should be wrong to neglect such an important factor of success. Nevertheless, we must not disappoint hopes based upon the result of our work, and, as M. Politis suggested the day before yesterday, when recommending Lord Cushendun's proposal, a practical solution would be to request the Secretariat, with the help of our Bureau, to collate with a view to the second reading the text of the Soviet draft Convention and the texts which we have already framed. Further, if Count Bernstorff has no objection, his new proposal concerning publicity in the 'Armaments Year-Book' might be inserted in its place in the corresponding chapter of the first-reading texts, so that all our work will be prepared for us by the time we meet again. As M. Politis suggested, we could leave the date of that meeting to be decided by our President, but I may be allowed, on behalf of the French delegation, to express a hope that in any case we may be convened in time to allow of the second reading being taken before the next Assembly.

Count Bernstorff (Germany). — In spite of the advanced hour, I should like to ask a question concerning the agenda. Having heard Count Clauzel’s speech—and I may be allowed to thank him for his kind references to myself—I am not clear whether we are still discussing Item 2 or whether we have passed to Item 3.

With regard to Item 2, I have already expressed my opinion and have nothing to add, but with regard to Item 3 I have still a great deal to say, and I should like to know when I may be allowed to say it. I understand that Count Clauzel much regrets that we have lost three days in discussing M. Litvinoff’s proposal and thought that, owing to this loss of time, it would no longer be possible to take the second reading of our own proposals. I am not sure that we ought to regard three days as a very long time to study a question which we have been discussing for a year. Three days is surely not very long compared with one year.

In any case, I shall be pleased to make my observations as soon as Item 2 is disposed of.

The President: I may be allowed to reassure Count Bernstorff. We are still dealing with Item 2 on our agenda and Count Bernstorff will have time tomorrow or next week to develop his ideas with regard to Item 3. The fact that, during the discussion, certain speakers, such as M. Politis and Count Clauzel, have passed from Item 2 to Item 3 does not make any difference. We shall take Item 3 tomorrow. The Bureau will draft a resolution which will summarise and conclude the discussion of Item 2 of our agenda, and I am sure that you will be willing to entrust the drafting of this resolution to your Bureau.

The Committee rose at 7.25 p.m.

EIGHTH MEETING (PUBLIC).

Held on Friday, March 23rd, 1928, at 10.30 a.m.

President: M. Loudon (Netherlands).

15. Statement by the American Delegation on Item 3 of the Agenda.

The Hon. Hugh Gibson (United States of America). — Mr. President—I had not anticipated speaking in regard to the question of the date for our next meeting at the present moment, but, inasmuch as the question has been broached, I feel impelled to rise early in the debate in order to state the views of the American delegation, particularly as I have learned in numerous conversations that a considerable amount of misapprehension exists to the effect that the American delegation is determined that the Preparatory Commission shall remain here to undertake an immediate second reading. Various reasons have been advanced for and against the undertaking of the second reading, and, to my surprise, a number of the arguments both for and against have been attributed to my delegation. I cannot but feel that there should be only one determining factor and that other considerations should be entirely secondary. After all, the essential consideration is to find and follow the path leading most directly to general agreement and to the termination of our labours. At the conclusion of the first reading, there were so many points of disagreement that we felt that nothing further could be accomplished in public meetings until after an effort had been made by direct negotiation between the various Governments and between groups of Governments to find a way, through mutual concession, to eliminate existing divergences. It was felt that only after eliminating a considerable part of the opposing views could we profitably embark upon the second reading with some prospect of drawing up a document so harmonious and so representative of accepted views as to offer a basis for calling a final Conference. Now, here we come to the meat in the coco-nut; have we or have we not by direct negotiation or in any other way achieved a sufficient basis of agreement to justify us in starting a second reading? We should each of us examine the question from that point of view and from that point of view only. If it can be demonstrated that a sufficient measure of agreement has been reached and that no insuperable obstacles are still to be removed, then by all means let us start at once upon a second reading. If, on the other hand, we conclude that no such progress has been made, then the only common sense course is for us to recognise the fact and to defer the second reading until such time as we are able to undertake it with a reasonable prospect of arriving at a successful conclusion. In connection with this, I think we should all shake off the idea that the only way to advance our work is to sit here in plenary session or in Committee. There are times when this is the obvious course to take, and there are other times when we can advance the work quite as much—perhaps far more—by outside negotiation, and our present problem is to determine which method of work is best suited to the present situation. So far as I can judge from informal conversations with my colleagues, the general consensus of opinion appears
to be that the time is not ripe for a second reading. If my estimate of my colleagues' views
is not accurate, the fact will be brought out in the general discussion, but, in any event, I
should like at this early stage in the debate to offer an expression of my opinion as to the method
for fixing a date for the renewal of our labours. I do this on behalf of the American delegation
only, but I trust that I am at the same time expressing the views of certain other States situated
at a considerable distance from Geneva.

I question the wisdom of fixing a definite date in any arbitrary manner, whether it be
May, July or October, since it is impossible now to foresee that the development of our work
will reach the desired point at any given date. The meeting of last November was fixed
arbitrarily and when it took place it was found that there was little that could be accomplished
for the moment. At the November meeting, March 15th was fixed, quite arbitrarily, in an
effort to give some measure of satisfaction both to those who wanted to proceed immediately
with the second reading and to those who felt it advisable to defer it to the more or less inde-
finite future. Now that we are here, a considerable number of our members feel it would be
unwise to undertake an immediate second reading. If we fix another definite date in the
future, I fear there is considerable risk that when we return we shall find ourselves again in the
same situation and obliged, after a pro-forma meeting, to take another adjournment of the
second reading.

Various Governments represented on this Commission are obliged to send most of the
personnel of their delegations from a great distance, which means detaching officers from their
regular duty for a considerable period of time. This is entirely justifiable at any time that
they can be profitably employed, and if an adjournment is deemed necessary, I know we are
all disposed to accept the decision in good part; however, I do feel it is hardly right to ask
such delegations to come back at some arbitrarily chosen date in the future on the chance that
we may be ready to work, particularly as there is another method of choosing the date of our
next meeting which would obviate the necessity for these long and unnecessary voyages.

Among all the questions which still remain to be solved, I feel safe in saying there is one
point on which we are all in hearty agreement, and that is that there is no member of this
Commission more concerned with the expeditious and effective handling of our work than our
President and no one whose opinion and sound judgment we value more highly. I submit
to my colleagues that, in the opinion of the American delegation, the sound and reasonable
thing to do would be for us to ask our President to keep in touch with developments and that
he be requested to convene the Commission as soon as matters have reached a point where
we can embark on the second reading under conditions calculated to promote an early and
successful conclusion of our labours.

While we should ask our President to reconvene whenever we can profitably embark on a
second reading still we should place a maximum time-limit within which a new session would
be obligatory. I cannot but feel that this is a somewhat contradictory solution in that it does
not fully meet our difficulties. Suppose we ask our President to convene us when he thinks
the time is ripe and at the same time we tell him that, whatever happens, he must bring us
back here to work by the month of July or August—with the confidence we possess in his
keen interest and his judgment, we know perfectly well that, if the time is ripe, he will convene
us by that date anyway. Therefore the provision is entirely superfluous. On the other hand,
if the situation is not ripe, on what possible ground should we all be brought back here again,
merely to take note of the fact that we are unable to proceed with the second reading? By
doing this, shall we not defeat our own ends? We seek to provide that we shall be called only
when we can be assured of profitable work, and then say that, even if the President does not
think the time is ripe, he must bring us back to a fruitless session. Surely this is taking away
with one hand what we give ourselves with the other.

We have already had two experiences of coming back here to consider the state of the
work and of reaching the conclusion that a postponement was desirable in the interest of the
work itself. It is inconceivable to me that we should not learn something from those experi-
ences. If we are going to ask our President to assume this very large responsibility of bringing
us back here when he judges the time has come, we are most heartily in favour of it, but let
us give him the freedom which is essential to the proper exercise of that responsibility: Other-
wise, I do not think we have a right to impose this duty on him.

I trust that my colleagues will accord their usual friendly consideration to what I have
said on this subject. If it is found that we are ready to continue our work, the American
delegation will gladly fall in with the wishes of the majority. If, on the other hand, it is felt
that, in the interest of the work itself, we can best employ our time in other ways and come
back at a later date to be fixed by the President, the American delegation will readily accept
the verdict of the majority.

The President. — We will not discuss the point raised by Mr. Gibson until we come to
deal with Item 3 of our agenda. We must first conclude the discussion on the second item.

16. General Discussion of the Draft Convention of Immediate, Complete and General
Disarmament submitted by the Delegation of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics
(Annex 2) (continued).

Tewfik ROUCHDI Bey (Turkey).—Mr. President, Gentlemen,—In the statement which
I had the honour to make the other day, I stressed the connection between security and dis-
armament and the conditions upon which the realisation of these two phases of security must
depend. I also indicated implicitly the views of the Turkish Republic on the question now
before us, and I do not propose to revert to them at the present stage of our discussions.
What I do desire to point out is that, after the animated debate which we have witnessed between the supporters of divergent policies, we must remember that the ultimate object—whether the method be total or partial disarmament or combinations designed in the interests of security—the ultimate object, I say, is to strengthen the foundations of peace between the nations in such a way as to make the renewal of war if not impossible at all events extremely difficult.

All the suggestions now before us simply represent means which are regarded as calculated to achieve this common object; there is, for example, the pacific settlement of disputes, the question of security and, lastly, disarmament and the limitation or reduction of armaments.

Still with the same object in view, the supporters of one of the two schools of thought regard security as most likely to produce the conditions which would have this result, whereas those who hold the opposite view envisage security as an automatic result of disarmament, which in its turn may be viewed either as an auxiliary factor of security or as a consequence of security itself.

Considering, on the one hand, the importance of the common aim which we are pursuing and, on the other, the heavy burden of responsibility which the Commission has assumed before humanity, the Turkish delegation is of opinion that schemes starting from either of these two divergent standpoints should be examined and discussed with equal thoroughness, in order to bring out the merits, defects, or any gaps which it may be necessary to fill if they are to be adopted.

Objective study of this sort is both desirable and necessary, as it is the duty of this Commission to examine every aspect of the questions submitted to it and to carry out such preparation as will facilitate the task of the Disarmament Conference when it meets. It is impossible as yet to foresee the result of the divergent views will secure the unanimous approval of that assembly, but, undoubtedly, valuable time will be saved if different plans can be submitted which represent the various schools of opinion. Was it not in view of these very considerations that the Committee on Arbitration and Security decided to prepare a number of model treaties and conventions corresponding to the moderate and extreme views expressed?

Such being the case, it would certainly be expedient to examine each of the schemes put forward without deciding beforehand whether to accept or reject the principles on which they are based.

In carrying out this examination, we should naturally have to consider whether the scheme is capable of realisation and, if the answer is in the negative, what modifications might be necessary to make it feasible; we should have to consider whether, once it had been carried into effect, it would really be capable of producing the promised results; whether, from the point of view of peace and security, its advantages outweigh its drawbacks; and, lastly, whether, when the situation it has in view has actually come to pass, it would place individual States in a position of equality as regards security.

In view of the conclusions expressed by the many speakers who, despite their criticism of the scheme, have urged that the Soviet delegation's draft should be carefully examined, I have no reason to think that these speakers hold views fundamentally different from those which I have just expressed.

As regards this point, I think that the proposal of the delegation of the Union of Socialist Republics should be discussed along with the Draft already submitted by the Preparatory Commission.

M. Rutgers (Netherlands). — In reply to the speech delivered yesterday by the delegate of the Union of Socialist Republics, I wish to add a few remarks in regard to the draft Disarmament Convention which he submitted. In the first place, I am bound to state, to my great regret, that the Soviet delegate's reply to my objections have by no means satisfied me.

I brought out two main points. The first was that his scheme made absolutely no mention of most of the principal causes which may lead to armed conflicts. I think I may regard this point as agreed, as I have received no reply on the subject.

My second point was that the scheme of disarmament put before us is not complete, and that war is still a possibility. I should like now to say a few words in regard to his reply. I said that great States which have a large population and long lines of communication could keep organised armed and disciplined police forces out of all proportion as compared with those of smaller States. He replied that, if there were any undue disproportion as between the greater and lesser States, it would be possible to modify the situation in favour of the smaller States. I do not know what the favour would consist of. Can it be regarded as a favour if the small State has a police force in excess of its requirements, or if the great States are obliged to be satisfied with inadequate forces?

But my objection did not refer to the question of proportion as between the police forces of large and small States. I emphasised the fact that these numerous disciplined, organised and armed forces could be used for purposes of war. There is no question of men armed with penknives, and this was no fit subject for joking. What was the reply? The delegate of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics said that this was a concession made to other States which considered that they had things to protect in their countries. But it seems to me that in every State there are things to protect. In every State there is a form of government which it is desired to preserve and to protect against attempts of revolution; there are big estates
and there are factories, whether they belong to the State or to private persons. In every State it is necessary to protect the lives of its citizens and the safety of foreigners. In this connection, I may remind you that, in the League of Nations itself, there have been discussions on the responsibility of States for the protection of foreigners against attacks. The organisation of protection indicated in Chapter III is therefore not an obligation peculiar to a given State but an obligation incumbent upon all States.

But, even assuming this police force to be armed with the simplest arms, it must be in a position to put down brigandage and attempts at revolution, and, I repeat, that this instrument of protection which each State needs can be used for war.

The delegate of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics also said: "But these are local police forces. They are police forces which will have no military organisation. They will be under the orders of the communal authorities and not under those of the Government". Nevertheless, there will be organised bodies, such as frontier guards, for example, which will have to be under the Government. There will have to be a certain grading in these police forces, and they will have to be at least equal to the forces they will be obliged to oppose. History has shown the danger of communes and decentralised autonomous authorities possessing the only armed forces in the country. It has been shown that the political influence of the police forces could become an element of destruction in a State. But I leave all these details on one side. I repeat that these police forces essential to each State may be transformed, not in several months but in a few days, into an army which would be the more formidable because there would be no stronger army to bring against it.

I should like to summarise in a few sentences the essential ideas which seem to be still in being after this debate. The kind of disarmament proposed to us will not be in the least complete. It cannot be complete as long as there is still anything to protect. The protection must be stronger than the threat. The protective force can always be used as a war force. War will therefore still be possible. The scheme does not touch any of the principal causes of armed conflict, and therefore it neither leads to disarmament nor provides any guarantee of security or peace. Moreover, as I said yesterday, it would upset the existing balance among the Powers and only replace it by instability and insecurity.

In my view, the best thing we can do is to reject a proposal which can lead to no useful results and proceed to the second reading of the draft Convention we have drawn up. I see no point in continuing the discussion of the draft submitted to us. The honourable delegate of the Turkish Republic has just asked a number of questions. I do not think we ought to close a discussion that has lasted for several days by asking questions. I think we are here to answer them, and, for my part, I have tried to do so. It may seem that the great majority of the members of this Commission have made it clear that they wish to close this debate. If we entered upon a fresh examination, a fresh discussion of the Draft, it seems to me that in the end the Powers and only replace it by instability and insecurity.

General DE MARINIS (Italy).—In his speech yesterday, M. Litvinoff had the courtesy to refer to the statement which I made in reply to his invitation to express our views on the Soviet delegation's Draft. I desire to thank him for his remarks and to reply very briefly.

M. Litvinoff said, in the first place, that he did not understand what was meant by this "just peace" to which I had referred when I said that peace must be such as to furnish all peoples the assurance of being able to live and develop in freedom.

My definition was perforce rather summary, but I thought that it was sufficiently clear for there to be no doubt as to its significance. A just peace, in my view, is one which not only obliges peoples not to go to war with one another but obliges them to take into account in their own interests the needs of other peoples, to appreciate these needs and not to raise obstacles to their satisfaction.

Nature has not treated all peoples with absolute equality. There are rich and poor among nations as among men. I am well aware that the idea of perfect equality among men is a mere Utopia; but I know also that there is such a thing as social justice, which demands that those who are more favoured by fortune should care for those who are not and see that they have a means of livelihood and opportunities for progress.

As, then, there exists a principle of social justice, there must also be an international justice, without which—whether the Soviet scheme is adopted or not—we cannot prevent all possibility of war.

That is what I meant when I spoke of an equitable peace.

M. Litvinoff then asked what relation there could be between my conception of peace and his scheme for immediate, complete and general disarmament. Here he placed me upon the horns of a dilemma which I do not hesitate to state in the crudest terms. M. Litvinoff said in effect: "Either you have at the back of your mind the idea of changing the present state of affairs by force, in which case you have no business to talk about peace; or you have no idea of resorting to force, in which case why do you want to keep your armaments since you can settle your difficulties by peaceful means?"

I am bound to admit that at first sight this dilemma seems irrefutably logical. At the same time, gentlemen, we must not put too much trust in logic, particularly when it is pressed into the service of sophistry. My answer to M. Litvinoff is this: None of us thinks of using armed force to change the present aspect of the world for our own profit; but we do afirm
generally been provoked, not by a desire to fight for fighting's sake, but by much more profound
however, I see that armaments have been a means of making war, but that the war has
peace in such a world will be more equitable.

That, gentlemen, is why I have said to M. Litvinoff that I doubt whether his scheme,
which does not take into account the considerations I have put forward, can secure the peace
of the world and constitute a true safeguard against war. I think my doubt is justified. I
will say more: for me, this doubt is a certainty.

M. Litvinoff reproached us with criticising the deficiencies rather than the contents of
his scheme, as if it were possible to appreciate the real value of a proposal and to know what
its contents are worth without considering its omissions. M. Litvinoff added: "Oh, I could
easily have made proposals for transforming this vale of tears into an earthly paradise, but
I did not do so because I was sure you would not accept them". But I think that it would
have been most useful—I may even say that it was essential—for him to demonstrate the
possibility of such a transformation in order to convince us of the possibility of immediately
achieving total disarmament.

The second point relates to the observations which I had the honour to lay before you
the day before yesterday with regard to the incompatibility of the Soviet Draft with the
Covenant of the League of Nations. I said that the idea of total and immediate disarmament
ran directly counter to the present structure of the League of Nations. In his reply, M. Litvinoff
forgot the adjective "present" and turned my argument against the League of Nations.
What he said was more or less as follows: "What! you say that the League of Nations will
only permit of a reduction of armaments! Take care! you will discredit it by giving the
impression that it constitutes an obstacle to total and immediate disarmament. Luckily
for you, this is not true, as the Covenant is not unalterable and you showed by your Geneva
Protocol that it was capable of amendments and improvements".

Now, allow me to say in all humility, as one who has always been a friend and supporter
of the League of Nations, that I was very much gratified to hear M. Litvinoff showing such
unexpected solicitude for our institution. But I could not help remembering the well-known
line of La Fontaine and thinking that these scruples really showed too much delicacy. Let
M. Litvinoff have no fear. The League of Nations runs no risk of being discredited for saying
...
that it cannot achieve the impossible. On the contrary, the confidence reposed in it by most of the countries of the world will only be enhanced if it proclaims frankly that it cannot hold out any false hopes. The Covenant is undoubtedly capable of improvement, and when conditions permit of immediate, complete and general disarmament, M. Litvinoff may be sure that the League of Nations will be only too glad to proceed to that step without waiting for any initiative from outside. I think that the Protocol of Geneva is an example that the League of Nations is seeking to improve its machinery and is capable of improving it. After all, what else was the Geneva Protocol but the means of strengthening the machinery for pacific settlement and the procedure for sanctions? To give effect to this double reform, it was stipulated that, as soon as the Protocol had been accepted, its provisions would be converted into a series of amendments to be introduced into the Covenant.

On this point we are entirely in agreement with M. Litvinoff. The Covenant of the League of Nations is not unalterable, it is open to unlimited improvement. But I cannot sufficiently emphasise that, in the successive and unlimited improvements of the Covenant, a logical sequence is necessary. We cannot amend and improve Article 8 without at the same time improving Articles 12, 13, 15 and 16. All these reforms must be inter-related; otherwise the edifice will become lop-sided and that is a danger which we wish to avoid. We desire the League to be firmer, and more and more rooted in the conscience of humanity and we want the institution to develop with all the vigour of which it is capable.

But here M. Litvinoff is no longer in agreement with us, for he says: "Why are you concerned with the obstacle which total disarmament may place in the way of the application of Article 16? Article 16 presupposes armed strife; but such strife will no longer be possible when the nations have laid down their arms, and when armaments have completely disappeared". M. Litvinoff will not be surprised if we are not entirely reassured by these arguments. As my friend M. Rutgers has just pointed out, even if the Soviet Draft is carried out, there will always remain sufficient armaments and, above all, sufficient possibilities of re-armament for the hypothesis of armed strife not to be regarded in future as a mere vain imagining.

But M. Litvinoff's optimism goes further. He says: "Why is it necessary to assume that States will always be distrustful of another or that, as soon as a general disarmament convention has been signed, it will be violated?" M. Litvinoff appealed to sentiment rather than to reason in quoting examples of certain countries which had no reason to be alarmed of their neighbours. Unfortunately, perhaps still more examples could be quoted of countries which are not able to reposes the same confidence in their neighbours; but why labour the point? M. Litvinoff has too much knowledge of human nature not to know that confidence between peoples, as between individuals, cannot be made to order: either it exists or it does not. This is a fact and no statesman worthy of the name can afford to forget it. I should like to add that, when this confidence between peoples does not exist, it is usually not an aberration on the part of their Governments but the painful result of past experience.

As regards the respect for treaties so confidently proclaimed by M. Litvinoff, I cannot help thinking that his own faith is not so very secure, since, in Article 60 of his Draft, he has provided for the case of breaches of the Convention he has proposed to us, and also, as I explained the other day, he has had to contemplate the necessity of organising measures against a State committing such a breach.

I noticed yesterday, when he was speaking of the necessity of having armed police forces along the lines of communication, that he said that the presence of such a force was necessary if only on account of the crimes which might be committed. But, gentlemen, if it is necessary to provide for the possibility of crimes within a country and to arrange for their prevention and punishment, why is the same hypothesis to be excluded in regard to international relations? Are there not criminals in the community of nations as there are in smaller societies? Are there not criminal States against which it is necessary to organise preventive and punitive measures in the interests of humanity? And as long as there is not an international police responsible for this duty of preventing and punishing international crimes, States will be obliged to make good the deficiency with their national armaments.

As a last resort, at the end of his speech, M. Litvinoff quoted against our opinion—which he no doubt regards as blind obstinacy—the will of the masses of the population, which he thinks are more impatient than we are for complete and general disarmament and will one day force it on their Governments. I know that M. Litvinoff is well acquainted with the popular mind, and I do not dispute that the "man in the street" may be more ready than we are to admit the possibility of immediate, full and general disarmament. But the man in the street is also quite ready to believe that many diseases can be instantaneously cured by some miraculous drug. Fortunately, however, for him and us, we have conscientious men of science and doctors who are able to undeceive him. I think, gentlemen, that our task is a similar one. We, too, by our work must endeavour to enlighten public opinion on present possibilities in regard to the limitation and reduction of armaments. For my part, I am firmly convinced that the debates we have just heard have largely contributed to do this, and have given us an opportunity of rendering this signal service to public opinion and especially to the masses of the population. I think myself, and I am sure the Commission will agree with me, that we owe to the Soviet Government, and especially to M. Litvinoff, the most sincere and cordial thanks for having given us this opportunity.
M. Lounatcharsky (Union of Socialist Soviet Republics). — I should first like to explain in a few words the questions to which M. Rutgers' criticisms were directed. May I be allowed to point out that that criticism goes too far—indeed, indeed, than he himself intended. Is M. Rutgers really in favour of a still more radical form of disarmament than we ourselves have proposed? Does he desire to make new proposals to abolish not only armies but police forces? I do not think so. And if not, do not his objections lose some of their force when applied to a scheme which only deals with the limitation of armies? M. Rutgers seeks to prove that we are in an impasse and that wars will continue to exist whatever happens. His speech seems to me the most pessimistic of all that we have heard. It is inspired by a complete distrust of humanity—a distrust which extends not only to the relations between nations but to relations between municipalities or between the latter and the State.

For our own part, we still believe that the disarmament we propose goes as far as is possible and that, although it does not perhaps give that absolute security which M. Rutgers is asking for, it does supply a far fuller measure of security than is offered by any proposals which have so far been made or which could be made.

It has been further urged against our Draft that moral disarmament, the disarmament of men's minds, should precede material disarmament. We hold exactly the opposite view. There is no doubt that total disarmament will be accepted with enthusiasm by the great masses of the people and there is every reason to suppose that, when it has been carried out, no Government will be strong enough to return to a militarist system with the object of engaging in a war of rapine.

General de Marinis's lofty ideal of social and international justice is in no way opposed to our proposals. The nations will undoubtedly be quite as capable of working to this great end when they are disarmed. If it is true that there are some nations which are too wealthy and which, from the point of view of international justice, ought to yield something to the poorer nations, we must remember that it is precisely these richer peoples which are the best armed. I do not think, therefore, that these armies as they are to-day will be able to help you in establishing justice and equity between nations.

I must point out that at this morning's meeting discussion has returned to our proposals, which proves that they are not perhaps as unpractical and as easy to refute as was thought, and even if the discussion may be closed in this Commission, that is not the case as regards public opinion.

M. Politis invited us to supplement our previous statements by a discourse on the system we propose for reforming humanity. We should be quite prepared to do this, but I am afraid that M. Politis would find it hardly in harmony with the instructions given to our Commission or with its terms of reference. Therefore we will not prolong this discussion, since what we have said during the debate would seem for the moment to be sufficient.

M. Politis appealed to public opinion. We make the same appeal and we have the same reasons as he to thank our critics. Nevertheless, the interesting discussions that have taken place do not prevent us from declaring that the practical object for which we came here is still unrealised.

The President submitted, on behalf of the Bureau, the following draft resolution regarding the draft Disarmament Convention submitted by the delegation of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics:

"The Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference,

"Having carefully examined the bases of the draft Convention for Immediate, Complete and General Disarmament submitted by the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics,

"Notes

"That practically all its members are of opinion that this Draft, while in harmony with the ideals of mankind, is, under existing world conditions, incapable of being carried into execution, that it can only be realised when international organisation is strengthened in respect both of methods of pacific procedure and the systematic organisation of sanctions, and that, consequently, the said Draft cannot be accepted by the Commission as a basis for its work, which work must be pursued along the lines already mapped out;

"But that, nevertheless, a large number of members of the Commission are of opinion that the provisions in this Draft might be examined by the various Governments with a view to ascertaining whether these provisions could not furnish valuable material for the second reading of the draft Convention for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments prepared by the Commission.

"Decides to pass to the consideration of Item No. 3 on its agenda."

If you are agreed upon this text, I will consider it adopted; on the other hand, if there is to be a discussion, I suggest that we postpone it until this afternoon.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Socialist Soviet Republics). — For my part, I support the second part of your alternative, since the hour is already so late that this sitting is due to come to an end, and we should not lose much time by postponing the final decision until our next meeting.
Count Bernstorff (Germany). — M. Litvinoff has proposed the postponement of the discussion of this draft resolution until this afternoon and I am in agreement with him. I would observe, however, that the last paragraph but one in the text before us appears to anticipate our decision on Item 3 in our agenda. For this reason, I think that it would be better to postpone a decision on this draft resolution until we pronounce on our future work. I am aware that the majority of the members of this Commission are not in favour of a second reading at the present session, but there are others who hold that this question was settled at our last session when the Commission unanimously decided that the second reading of the draft Convention should be taken during the present session.

The President. — The last paragraph but one of the draft resolution contains only a statement of fact, not a decision. Nor do the two preceding paragraphs contain any decision, which only appears in the last paragraph and refers to passing on to another item in the agenda.

Count Bernstorff (Germany). — I quite understand that the only decision in this draft resolution consists in passing to the consideration of Item 3, but if we decide—as I think we should—to hold the second reading at this session in accordance with the decision taken at the Preparatory Commission’s last session, the last paragraph but one of the draft resolution ceases to have any meaning, since it is impossible to refer documents to Governments with a view to a second reading if that reading has already taken place.

M. Rutgers (Netherlands). — The draft resolution only says that a large number of the members of the Commission are of this opinion. It is true that Count Bernstorff does not seem to be of this number, but it is nowhere stated that he is. If we proceed to the second reading to-morrow or this afternoon, it will be clear that this opinion was not followed, but it will remain a fact that it was expressed.

Count Bernstorff (Germany). — I really think it would be very simple to postpone our decision concerning this draft resolution until we have discussed Item 3 of the agenda. If M. Rutgers desires to submit to his Government an opinion which was not followed, he is at liberty to do so.

The President. — If there is no objection on the grounds of principle to the wish expressed by Count Bernstorff, we will pronounce upon this draft resolution after examining Item 3.

This was agreed to.

The Commission rose at 1 p.m.

NINTH MEETING (PUBLIC).

Held on Friday, March 23rd, 1928, at 4 p.m.

President: M. Loudon (Netherlands).


Count Bernstorff (Germany). — Mr. President,—At the beginning of our discussions you were good enough to say that, when we came to examine Item 3, we should be at liberty to discuss any questions calling for examination in regard to disarmament and the reduction or limitation of armaments. I have repeatedly mentioned in the past that, from the political point of view, we regarded publicity in the matter of armaments as a most important factor; to-day, however, I do not propose to dwell on this question of publicity, but wish rather to mention a technical point and, if you will allow me, to say a few words on the proposal which has been submitted to you.

On September 21st, 1927, I presented in the Third Committee of the Assembly a statement urging the necessity of enlarging and improving the Armaments Year-Book. In so doing, I was acting in accordance with the spirit of the Council resolution of July 1923, that is, I regarded the Year-Book as a means of realising the objects laid down in the last paragraph of Article 8 of the Covenant.

Under the terms of this paragraph, Members of the League have undertaken very definite obligations. For them the question of publicity in the matter of armaments appears to have been already decided in principle. They have assumed a perfectly definite undertaking unattended by any restrictions. The only point to be decided is how this undertaking is to be carried out.

But there are other States which, although not Members of the League, are collaborating wholeheartedly in the noble task of effecting a reduction of armaments, and they, I think, would wish that we should all be perfectly clear as to the armaments of the different States. How can there be perfect confidence between the peoples without one State giving another full and frank information as to the scale of its armaments? How can we achieve national
security as long as the States do not possess information in regard to the armaments of other States which may constitute a menace to their security? How, lastly, can we find a starting-point for any general plan of disarmament unless we know just what armaments exist? I do not think that I shall be accused of having sprung these proposals upon the Commission. I have not examined the draft Convention from this point of view, but my recollection is that there is a certain clause or clauses in the synoptic text where this particular proposal would be relevant, and I should have thought the proper time for discussing it was when we came to that point. If his proposal were discussed now, it might lead to a debate of considerable length. Some of us might even have to consult technical departments with regard to the precise form in which this information is to be given, but, at all events, I should have thought that for the moment, unless Count Bernstorff insists on our discussing this point, there is no such clause or clauses in the synoptic text where this particular proposal would be relevant, and I should have thought the proper time for discussing it was when we came to that point.

Lord CUSHENDUN (British Empire). — I do not rise for the purpose of offering any sort of opposition to, or even criticism of, what Count Bernstorff has just said. All I venture to suggest is that it may prove very inconvenient if we take up the particular point he has raised and discuss it at the present moment. I do not know whether Count Bernstorff would feel that his purpose was sufficiently achieved by his having made the statement to which we have just listened, but if we were following any strict order of procedure, I should suggest this is not the moment for this particular proposition.

I have not examined the draft Convention from this point of view, but my recollection is that there is a certain clause or clauses in the synoptic text where this particular proposal would be relevant, and I should have thought the proper time for discussing it was when we came to that point. If his proposal were discussed now, it might lead to a debate of considerable length. Some of us might even have to consult technical departments with regard to the precise form in which this information is to be given, but, at all events, I should have thought that for the moment, unless Count Bernstorff insists on our discussing this point, there is no such clause or clauses in the synoptic text where this particular proposal would be relevant, and I should have thought the proper time for discussing it was when we came to that point.
to the possibility of failure.

I think, therefore, it would be convenient, at all events in some form, to discuss the question raised in that paragraph, which was raised in an equally precise form—perhaps in a rather more precise form—this morning by Mr. Gibson and also by M. Politis. Otherwise, we shall get out of order and embark on a number of disjointed discussions which may perhaps make it very difficult to return to the main point which we have to take into consideration.

Count Bernstorff (Germany).—I may perhaps answer Lord Cushima right away in a few words. If the question is now to be decided whether there is to be a second reading at once, or whether it is going to be put off—I do not know, of course, how far—it is clear that I cannot expect that my proposal should be taken up now, because it is entirely bound up with the second reading, for which I may say at once we still have quite a lot of amendments if you are ready to take up the second reading now. Of course, we do not at all object to the discussion of our proposal being put off until the second reading. We brought it up because we had been told that this third item of the agenda was put down so that everybody could bring forward proposals which they thought useful in regard to the question of disarmament. I should be very glad if my colleagues would take up this matter at the second reading, whenever it may take place—a point which we are now going to discuss. But in case the majority should decide to put off the second reading—I do not know for how long—I would certainly take occasion in the Third Committee of the Assembly to return to this question, because, as I said at the beginning of my speech, we consider the question of publicity should be one of the most important in the whole matter of disarmament.

Lord Cushendun (British Empire).—I only want to acknowledge that Count Bernstorff appears to have met the point I have raised in a most reasonable spirit, and I thank him for doing so. I quite acknowledge that, if it should be the decision of the Commission to postpone the second reading until a future date, Count Bernstorff will be extremely well entitled to do so, as he proposes and bring this particular point in which he is interested before the Third Committee of the Assembly. I wish to make it quite clear that I do not express any sort of opposition to the merits of the point he has raised, which I confess is not really present to my mind; I do not know exactly how it would work out. I am speaking merely of the convenience of the time at which it should be brought forward—as to which Count Bernstorff has met us in such a very reasonable spirit.

The President.—What has just been said by Lord Cushendun and Count Bernstorff is entirely in conformity with the views of the Bureau, and we had already prepared the following draft resolution:

"The Commission:

I. Notes the proposals submitted by the German delegation regarding improvements in the League of Nations Armaments Year-Book, and, while reserving the examination of these proposals until its next session, commends them to the attention of the various Governments.

II. Decides to leave its President free to fix, according to circumstances, the date at which it would be most practically useful to convene a new session of the Commission to proceed to the second reading of the draft Convention on the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, regard being had to the progress of the work of the Committee on Arbitration and Security and to any observations submitted by Governments in regard to the draft Convention of the delegation of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, and to the above-mentioned proposal regarding the Armaments Year-Book.

This meeting will have to be held before the next meeting of the Assembly."

Before deciding upon the final text, I should like to ask if any delegates wish to speak on the actual substance of the resolution.

General de Marinis (Italy).—The Italian delegation is quite ready to go on to the second reading at once if the majority of the Commission desire to do so, but I must confess that I do not entertain any hope that the second reading would produce more tangible results than the first. For this reason I would not advise the Preparatory Commission to embark upon the second reading now.

If the majority of the Commission consider that the moment has not yet come, I should be prepared wholeheartedly to support the judicious suggestions put forward this morning by Mr. Gibson, namely, that we should postpone our next session until there is some hope of reaching an agreement and should not risk a repetition of the results of the first reading. Mr. Gibson demonstrated very clearly that, if the Commission means to reach an agreement, we must allow time for conversations to take place between the Governments, with a view to eliminating the most salient points of difference. Accordingly, if the Commission is in favour of postponing the second reading, I see no reason why we should fix any particular date or lay down that it is to be before the next Assembly. We are always making the mistake of trying to set the question a few weeks or a few months earlier. If the Commission thinks it fit to postpone the second reading, it should have complete confidence in the authority and experience of the President and leave him to fix the date for it. I wouldentreat my colleagues not to regard this question of a date as decisive, but to concern themselves with the responsibility which we shall incur when we come to the second reading if we lay ourselves open again to the possibility of failure.
Count Bernstein (Germany).—I have no intention of making a long speech, but simply wish to ask a question and trust that an answer will be forthcoming.

In the first place, however, I desire to congratulate the Bureau on its promptitude in preparing a resolution even before the discussion had taken place or the members of the Commission had expressed their opinion.

Secondly, as regards the first paragraph, I should be grateful if it could be explicitly stated that the object of the proposal submitted by the German delegation was that paragraph 6 of Article 8 of the Covenant might be carried into effect. We regard this as a most important point.

I come now to my question. When the Preparatory Commission decided to reject the radical proposals submitted by the representative of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, I thought that there would be an irresistible desire on the part of all of us, as members of an organ of the League, to show that, while we were not prepared to go as far as the Soviet scheme, we wished at all events to prove that we had the courage, the authority and the desire to take the first step. I regret that our discussions should conclude with a resolution proposing that we should do nothing at all when we have been accused by the representatives of the present Soviet Government of having done nothing. This resolution reminds me of the old song: “Malbrough s’en va-t’en guerre, ne sait quand reviendra: II reviendra-z’à Pâques ou à la Trinité.”

For the third time we have been asked to pass a resolution to do nothing and go home; for the third time we have been told that next time we shall do something. But I cannot vote a third time for a resolution barren of results.

You know quite well I am in an exceptional position. I do not care to talk about it, but I must do so for a few minutes. At Versailles we were given a draft declaring that the other Powers were going to disarm. If there is any intention of extending this draft, which we bring out on every occasion, we must at all events be told why. We are very indulgent creditors. We have always said: One step will do. But even that one step has not been taken. It is usual for creditors to receive at all events something on account, but we have not even had that. Again, gentlemen, I would remind you that M. Politis, with his customary eloquence and lucidity, proved that the total disarmament of Germany was incompatible with the terms of the Covenant. There is only one possible solution for this situation, namely, that the other Powers should descend to our level and come within the limits laid down in Article 8 of the Covenant. All we ask is that the first step should be taken.

I began by saying that I had a question to ask. This is it: Why do you wish to postpone the second reading? Are there any serious grounds for doing so? Have we not come here to try and eliminate whatever difficulties may exist? Let us begin with the second reading. Let us see what difficulties still exist. Let us telegraph to our Governments to ask if they can agree on these various points. I quite realise that the Governments must come to an agreement, for otherwise we cannot get on. But, gentlemen, I must point out, to my great regret, that during the last two years we have had no influence whatsoever on our Governments. They have done nothing at all in regard to our proposals. Are they going to do anything now? I do not know, but I may say that, unless I have an explicit assurance that they are at present taking steps to eliminate the difficulties which lie in our way, I cannot vote for the resolution now before us.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Socialist Soviet Republics).—I take it the discussion is going on with regard to both resolutions—the draft resolution which was presented this morning and the second resolution. What I have to say is the result of the first draft resolution this morning, although it has also a bearing on the last part of the second resolution with regard to the fixing of a date for the next session of the Preparatory Commission.

I pointed out in my speech yesterday that the opinions expressed by most of the delegations here with regard to our draft Convention leave no room for doubt as to the fate awaiting it at the hands of the Preparatory Commission. If the slightest doubts could have remained, these would have been immediately dissipated by the wording of the resolution drawn up to-day, the clarity of which left nothing to be desired.

The Soviet delegation notes with profound regret—which I am sure will be shared by the broad mass of the people in all countries whose aspirations have been so little understood by many of the speakers here—that the Preparatory Commission and most of the delegations represented here completely and resolutely reject, on behalf of their Governments, not only our draft Convention for total general disarmament but the very idea of total general disarmament itself. I say the idea, because the resolution drawn up to-day refutes the principle of total and general disarmament even as a basis for the further work of the Preparatory Commission.

The resolution does not even speak of transmitting our proposals to the Governments or the Disarmament Conference, as the honourable representative of Turkey proposed to-day, but merely mentions the possible extracting from our draft Convention of individual articles which may serve as material for other schemes quite foreign to the spirit of the draft Convention. As I remarked yesterday, we claim no copyright for our draft Convention, and anyone is welcome to make any use he cares of any of its articles for any purpose. I must insist, however, that the Soviet Government will take no responsibility for, nor give its name to, any partial use of its schemes. Moreover, the Soviet delegation and the Soviet Government...
its fundamental principles and leaving its less essential articles open for possible correction, by way of a basis for consideration, attributing enormous importance to the acceptance of principles. To avoid misunderstandings, I hasten to add that I offer this draft Convention not later than two years after the acceptance of this new draft Convention. The delegation reserves to itself the right to present a fresh proposal for further reduction of armaments, alteration and supplement, or even substitution by others.

As I have already indicated in the course of the first reading of this draft Convention, first expressing its preliminary opinion on its fundamental principles, the Soviet delegation considers that the institution of the principle of total by that of partial disarmament has brought about the abolition of armed conflicts, although it is ready to admit that it is possible that it might tend to the diminution of such conflicts, inasmuch as the increase of armaments is in itself one of the causes of the incidence of war.

The reduction of armaments may, moreover, have extremely desirable effects in easing the burden of militarism and relaxing the screw of taxation for the people of all countries, as well as freeing human forces for more productive labour and budgetary means for more useful ends. The reduction of armaments, if it proceeds along the channels which will be suggested by the Soviet delegation, might also result in minimizing the horrors of war.

The reduction of armaments may, moreover, have extremely desirable effects in easing the burden of militarism and relaxing the screw of taxation for the people of all countries, as well as freeing human forces for more productive labour and budgetary means for more useful ends. The reduction of armaments, if it proceeds along the channels which will be suggested by the Soviet delegation, might also result in minimizing the horrors of war.
delegation also reserves to itself the right, independently of acceptance or non-acceptance of its draft Convention, to return to its original draft Convention for total and general disarmament at the coming International Disarmament Conference.

Tewfik Rouchidi Bey (Turkey). — I had asked to speak in order to explain the views of the Turkish delegation on Item 3 of the agenda, in connection with the draft resolution just distributed, but, as the statement just made by the delegate of Italy exactly voices those views, it seems superfluous for me to revert to them.

Lord Cusshendun (British Empire). — Mr. President—I do not rise in order to make any comment upon the speech which was made just now by the honourable delegate of the Soviet Republic, except that I should like to pay it the compliment of saying that it appears to me to have been skilfully drafted for the purpose for which it is no doubt intended and to which I have no doubt it will be devoted. My object in asking to say a few words was rather to attempt to remove a misapprehension which I think may possibly arise from the speech made just now by Count Bernstorff.

In the course of his speech Count Bernstorff several times employed the phrase "the first step". He indicated that, if the Commission did not now proceed with the second reading, they would be open to the reproach of not even taking the first step, and in the course of his speech he referred to the provisions of Article 8 of the Covenant. I am quite certain that he had no intention whatever of causing any misapprehension, but it seems to me possible that some of his hearers who know what Article 8 has laid down, on hearing the reiteration of the phrase "the first step", may have drawn the conclusion that what Count Bernstorff intended to imply was that no first step had been taken to comply with Article 8. I am, of course, only entitled to speak for my own country, but certainly such a phrase is entirely inapplicable to our case.

If any second reading of these draft Conventions is agreed upon, as I hope it may be, it will by no means be the first step so far as Great Britain is concerned to comply with Article 8. This is not the appropriate time, of course, for going into details with figures, but when we come to discuss the details of the draft Conventions, I shall be prepared to give the figures, and I venture to think those figures, so far as Great Britain is concerned, will be very surprising to many members of the Commission who think my country has been backward in the matter of disarmament. I can show by reference to the strength of all the military services, even the army—our army, as everybody knows, is in any case a small one—even in the case of the army, still more conspicuously in the case of the navy, and also very conspicuously in the case of the air service, I can show enormous reductions of strength, enormous scrapping of war material and enormous economy in military expenditure with reference to all those services. As I say, I do not want to go into any detail with regard to them now, which I think would be inappropriate, but I hope the members of the Commission and those who may read of our proceedings in the larger world outside will not imagine—I believe the same is true of other nations, though I cannot speak for them—and I believe it would be a very great mistake to assume, that the first step in disarmament lies before us. We have travelled a very long road on the path of disarmament towards the goal which we desire to reach, which is compliance and strict compliance with Article 8 of the Covenant, and if, for the reasons which have been intimated, we are unable to continue in that work at the present moment, do not let that pessimistic view be put forward, and let the true facts be realised.

Count Bernstorff (Germany). — May I right away answer in a few words the speech of Lord Cushendun. Far be it from me in any manner to criticise or even minimise any steps which may be or have been taken by any of the Governments on their own initiative. Lord Cushendun must have misunderstood me, for that was not at all what I meant. I was only speaking of the work which has been given to this Commission by the League of Nations, and, according to the programme which has been given by the League of Nations to this Commission, we have in the course of the last two years come to an agreement on one point, if not on other points—we have come to the agreement that the disarmament plan of the League should be made in instalments, and what we now ask for is the first instalment, which was to be the first Disarmament Conference. We do not ask for anything else but the speedy convocation of the first Disarmament Conference for the purpose of making the first instalment of disarmament. I should like to make that absolutely clear; we do not ask for anything else, we never have and we never will; that is all we want, and we do believe that the political difficulties which are opposing the convocation of this first Conference are so small that if, in a few months, this Conference were to be called, the Governments would have ample time to get over the political difficulties. That is why I will later be able to make another proposal.

While on my feet, I should like right away also to say a few words on the Russian proposal. If I have understood M. Litvinoff aright, it seems to me that the first resolution submitted to the Commission has become superfluous, because, as far as I understand, he has now put before us a new proposition which more or less takes the place of the first. I do not know whether I have understood him aright. At any rate, whichever of the methods it is, I would certainly be very pleased if he could have the occasion of submitting his proposal to this meeting.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Socialist Soviet Republics). — In reply to Count Bernstorff, I regret that I have to disagree with what he says if he means that the first resolution has become superfluous owing to the fact that we have introduced a new draft Convention. In my opinion, that is not the case. I did not introduce this second Draft before, because we still had some
hope that you would accept our proposal for total general disarmament. It is only because we take it for granted that our proposal has been rejected that we bring in these new proposals for partial disarmament.

It is true the resolution has not been put to the vote, but since no one objected to the resolution except Count Bernstorff, and he only on the ground that it was connected with the fixing of the date for the second reading, I take it the vote has been already passed, if not formally, at least in fact. If this resolution is not accepted, I shall revert to our first proposal for total general disarmament: that is obvious.

M. Politis (Greece). — I wish to make a short statement in order to dissipate any misunderstanding as regards some words of mine quoted by Count Bernstorff. I put before you a view, which I believe to be correct, to the effect that immediate, complete and general disarmament is absolutely incompatible with the principles of the League, but I did not allude to any country in particular. What I meant to say was that, if all the States Members of the League gave up their present armaments, the application of the Covenant, and more particularly of Article 16, would be impossible. Obviously, however, the present structure of the League does admit of some exceptions in regard to certain countries Members of the League.

I need only quote one country which is not taking part in our present discussions: I mean Switzerland. In its resolution of February 12th, 1920, the Council agreed to the terms proposed by Switzerland in regard to her entry into the League. This resolution lays down explicitly that Switzerland, although a Member of the League, shall not be bound, in view of her special and exceptional situation, to participate in any military action taken by the League.

This shows that exceptions are possible in the application of the Covenant and that in exceptional cases States may not be required to undertake the same military responsibilities towards the League as other Members.

This is all I wished to say. My general principle holds good apart from certain exceptions, and these I mentioned.

Count Clauzel (France). — After Lord Cushendun and M. Politis, it is now my turn to reply to some of Count Bernstorff's allegations. He will not be surprised, for it is not the first time that I have had the honour of replying to him upon this point, and I will ask your indulgence if my arguments are no newer than the charges to which they are replying.

Count Bernstorff, who comes here as a creditor, once again seems in a great hurry to recover his debt.

Count Bernstorff (Germany). — This debt is of ten years' standing!

Count Clauzel (France). — Ten years, Count Bernstorff has just said! He will allow me to remind him that this credit, of the value of which I will speak in a moment, was attached to certain obligations accepted by his Government and that, according to the Treaties, these obligations were to be fulfilled within six months or a year, but it has, as a matter of fact, required seven years to fulfil them.

That being so, he will perhaps not be so very much surprised that it has taken some time to meet his demands of to-day. I may, however, be allowed to point out that the bill which he presents to the League may be a bill without cover. It is based upon two texts: on Article 8, which I had the honour to introduce into the discussion at the beginning and even before my friend M. Sato, leaving it to the skill of M. Politis to develop all its bearings. Count Bernstorff's bill is also based upon the Preamble to Part V of the Treaty of Versailles, to which I have already referred on several occasions. This Preamble is as follows:

"In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes . . . .""

Then follow the clauses imposed upon Germany by the Treaty of Versailles. The only reference, therefore, is to preparation of a limitation of armaments. M. Paul-Boncour, for whom I have the honour to deputise, has interpreted this text in a very wide and generous sense. He interpreted it as a legal and moral undertaking and in that form it has been accepted both by Count Bernstorff and by public opinion.

In continuation of what Lord Cushendun was saying, I would like to point out that that moral obligation has been fulfilled by the French Government just as it has been fulfilled by Great Britain. France made it a point to be the first to effect the reductions of armaments provided for, without even awaiting the result of deliberations which, I admit, take a long time and which we could have wished more rapid. I will not quote figures any more than the British representative has done. I will only remind you that, in 1922, Lord Cecil, in one of the League of Nations committees, paid a tribute to the efforts made by many countries, not only by his own and mine, to carry out reductions of armaments corresponding to the moral undertaking contained in the first paragraph of Article 8 of the Covenant.

When the time comes, the French delegation will furnish figures, as Lord Cushendun will do. In point of fact, these figures are already pretty generally known since the last military Law was voted by the French Chamber, and they can have left no doubt not only of France's pacific intentions but of her firm determination to effect all possible reductions of armaments within the limits of her own security.
As regards the legal aspect of the undertaking, that is obviously a matter for the Preparatory Commission. We have done all we can; other speakers have already explained it, and M. Politis this morning thanked the Soviet representative for having enlarged the scope of our discussion, so that public opinion and propagandists of all kinds could no longer doubt the efforts we have made, in spite of certain regrettable diversions.

We came here, I repeat, with the desire to succeed. The French delegation was prepared to take the second reading of the two French and Britain Drafts which had already been discussed. Like the Italian delegation, it was quite ready to discuss those Drafts. However, we are not here to outbid one another in any direction. Yesterday I gave certain reasons why the Commission should very seriously consider whether it could embark upon this discussion amid the confusion which has been imported into our programme by the successive proposals from the delegation of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, or whether it ought to refer these proposals to Governments. Lord Cushendun made this suggestion the first day in order that the second reading might be undertaken in that atmosphere of calm which will alone enable us to arrive at a satisfactory solution.

We are certainly not entitled to neglect the advantages of the negotiations which are at present taking place, and which I hope may largely contribute towards our success. But since yesterday, since this morning even, it seems to me that we have taken a serious step backwards.

Certain speakers have gone some way towards meeting the proposals of the Soviet delegation. In order to show that delegation and public opinion and the working classes, which the Soviet delegation claims to represent, that we are profoundly desirous of welcoming any proposals submitted to us, and although the Soviet proposals arrived at the eleventh hour, though it was not our fault that the Soviet Government did not formulate them sooner, we suggested that they should be placed on the same footing as those with which we had already been presented. Now, at the very last moment, M. Litvinoff makes new proposals, and submits a new Draft for a first reading. We are therefore asked to go back to last November—and that at a time when several members of the Commission, Count Bernstorff in particular, are accusing us of going too slowly and not proceeding at once to the second reading—we are now asked to re-embark upon a first reading of a text with which we are not even acquainted.

I must apologise for a charge I hope is unfounded. Yesterday M. Litvinoff declared that he had no intention of bringing charges against the League of Nations based upon differences in political thought. But if public opinion is to be given the impression that the League of Nations is finding it very difficult to solve the hardest problem with which it is faced, and that it is hesitating to attack the problem of the limitation of armaments with the necessary courage, that impression is entirely false. On the contrary, thanks to Lord Cushendun and other speakers, the amplitude of our discussion proves that the League of Nations and the Preparatory Commission are willing to examine all proposals. I will ask the Commission to consider this very definite question raised by the new proposals which the representative of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics has announced: Does it wish to go back to a first reading and thus put the clock back? Would it not be better to follow the wise proposal of the Bureau and take a deliberate step forward, without refusing—and without its being possible to say that we have refused—the collaboration offered to us, but within the compass of our earlier discussions, and with a desire to arrive at a conclusion along those lines as soon as possible?

Count Bernstorff (Germany).—I have no desire to prolong the discussion but I feel called upon to say a few words. I am accustomed to this little controversy which Count Clauzel has again entered upon with that never-failing courtesy of his. If we want to know the meaning of the Treaty of Versailles, I would suggest that M. Clemenceau, who spoke in the name of the Allied and Associated Powers, is its best interpreter. In the note of June 16th, 1919, M. Clemenceau, speaking on behalf of those Powers, replied as follows to our observations:

"The disarmament of Germany constitutes the first step towards that general reduction and limitation of armaments which the aforesaid Powers are seeking to realise as one of the best means for the prevention of war—a reduction and limitation of armaments which the League of Nations will be called upon to introduce as one of its first duties."

There can, I think, be no possible doubt as to the intention of M. Clemenceau's words. It is indeed unnecessary for me to recall this note, since M. Paul-Boncour stated, at an official meeting, that this constituted a moral and legal obligation.

As regards the moral obligation, everyone is at liberty to examine his own conscience and to decide whether he will or will not fulfil it. But the legal obligation is on another footing. In this case there can, I think, be no question of generosity. We do not anticipate generosity, for Germany's experience of the last few years has not led her to expect it.
I regret that there should have been a misunderstanding in regard to M. Litvinoff's proposals. I only meant to say that, if we are going to consider his second proposals, as I hope we are, it would seem that the other proposals could be put aside. If, however, M. Litvinoff decides to retain them should the second proposals not be accepted, that is, of course, his affair and not mine. In any case, I would like to say that I support any proposals for disarmament from whatever source they come. Germany will welcome anyone who desires disarmament.

I have not yet received a reply to my question as to why the second reading should be postponed. Count Clauzel has just said that the question is complicated by the proposals of the Soviet delegation. I have had the honour of belonging to this Preparatory Commission for the last two years and on at least twenty occasions speakers have stated that our work here was entirely useless because Russia was not represented. Now when the Soviet delegates are with us for the first time and say that they desire to discuss matters with us, the fact is to be taken as a pretext for doing nothing.

Count Clauzel (France). — I must apologise for speaking again but this time I will be exceedingly brief. Count Bernstorff has now presented me, as representative of France, with a fresh bill and I feel bound to meet it at once. He has introduced into our discussion the name of M. Clemenceau, who was Head of the French Government at the time of the signing of the Treaty of Versailles. He quoted a letter of M. Clemenceau with which all of us are well acquainted, and which really only contains the substance of the Preamble of Part V of the Versailles Treaty; I quoted to you the passage in question just now.

In the letter M. Clemenceau spoke of a first step towards the limitation of armaments. As I said, we have taken that first step in fulfilment of the moral obligation we had incurred and to which M. Paul-Boncour and now Count Bernstorff have alluded. The latter now reminds us of a legal obligation. I must point out that this legal obligation does not arise out of the Preamble to Part V of the Treaty of Versailles or from M. Clemenceau's letter. That undertaking cannot be imposed upon States represented on the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference which did not sign the Treaty of Versailles. The only legal undertaking for the latter is contained in Article 8 of the Covenant — I apologise for saying it again — upon which M. Politis has commented so clearly and so accurately. If it is our wish to fulfil this legal obligation as soon as possible and to take the first step referred to with the least possible delay — these are M. Clemenceau's words in the letter quoted by Count Bernstorff — I would strongly urge that we should allow no diversions but should continue as quickly as possible along the path laid down for us and upon which we have already entered.

The President. — M. Litvinoff, finding that the draft Convention for total disarmament which he submitted to us has not been accepted, has announced his intention of presenting us with a new Draft relating to partial disarmament. I must inform him that we cannot possibly discuss a new Draft at present. The Soviet delegation can send us its proposals, which will be placed upon the agenda of our next session, but I must tell him at once, and even before being acquainted with the Draft, that it can in no circumstances be examined during the present session.

With regard to the date of the next session, I would say, in reply to Count Bernstorff, that I do not understand how, in view of the text of the resolution before him, he can blame us for not fixing even an approximate date for that meeting.

Count Bernstorff (Germany). — I only said that I had not been told why the second reading should be postponed.

The President. — I will give them you at once, though you must be acquainted with them already. You know that nothing could be more satisfactory to us, and to me in particular, than to proceed to the second reading of the draft Convention, but as I have said time after time—and I think the great majority of the Commission have agreed with me—it is absolutely useless to undertake the second reading until the Governments most closely concerned have come to an agreement on the points on which they differ. Yesterday Count Clauzel practically assured us that these negotiations—for which we were all so anxious and which I myself have so frequently advocated—are really progressing well. The fact that Count Clauzel made this formal statement yesterday justifies us in nourishing high hopes. In the circumstances, I ask you, Why should we start the second reading now? Why not wait and accept the draft resolution submitted by the Bureau, in which it is proposed that the next session of the Commission shall take place in any event before the Assembly? General de Marinis and Mr. Gibson have been so very kind as to leave it entirely to me to fix the date. I can tell you here and now that the date will be before the next Assembly, though I cannot say exactly how many weeks or how many days before. I am quite prepared to give an undertaking to that effect, particularly as I am completely confident that what Count Clauzel said yesterday will come to pass.

M. Hennings (Sweden). — I only wish to say that I am also of opinion that no good purpose would be served by proceeding to the second reading of our Draft. On this point I am entirely in agreement with the President and Count Clauzel and other speakers. I
venture, however, to add that the reason why I think it is better once more to adjourn the
Commission and postpone the second reading of our draft Convention is that, according to
the information given yesterday, the conversations between certain Powers with a view to
overcoming the obstacles which prevented us from concluding our work last year have not
yet terminated successfully. Fortunately, Count Clauzel informed us that there was good
hope that these negotiations would shortly bring about important results, and it is for that
reason that I feel the best thing we can do is to await their conclusion. I would merely express
the hope that these negotiations will very shortly be crowned with complete success.

While expressing thus, for the reason I have just given, my agreement with the President’s
proposal, I wonder, however, whether it would not be advisable to make certain changes
in the draft resolution which has been submitted to us. According to this draft, we should
adjourn our work and entrust our President with the task of summoning another meeting,
regard being had to the progress of the work of the Committee on Arbitration and Security, etc.
In my view, these reasons are not of the first importance; the main reason is that we have
to await the conclusion of the conversations now in progress between certain Powers. I
venture, therefore, to propose that the end of the second paragraph of the resolution be deleted.

The PRESIDENT. — Before calling upon another speaker, I should like to tell M. Hennings
at once that I quite agree with what he has said. It is perfectly true that the final phrase
“regard being had to the progress of the work . . .” is not absolutely necessary; it refers
rather to the programme for the next session. In the circumstances, I think we might simply
delete that part of the paragraph.

The new text of this paragraph would then be as follows:

“II. Decides to leave its President free to fix according to circumstances the date
at which it would be most practically useful to convene a new session of the Commission
to proceed to the second reading of the draft Convention on the Reduction and Limitation
of Armaments, and expresses the desire that the date of the next session may be fixed in
any case before the meeting of the next Assembly.”

General DE MARINIS (Italy). — I understand, Mr. President, that your amendment,
consisting of the addition of the words “expresses the desire . . .”, represents, so to speak,
a semi-acceptance of the proposal made by Mr. Gibson and myself and supported by the
honourable representative of Turkey, to whom I have pleasure in offering my best thanks.

If you are satisfied with this formula—that, instead of relying entirely on you, the Com-
mission expresses a desire to meet again before the Assembly—I have no difficulty in accepting it.
Frankness compels me to state, however, that I know nothing of the reasons upon which
the good hopes expressed by the French representative are founded, and I must remind you
that the country I have the honour to represent has formulated a number of reservations to
the Draft, and that these reservations remain unaltered.

Count BERNSTORFF (Germany). — I should like to say, Mr. President, with all the respect
I feel for you, and in virtue of our old friendship, that I have no doubt whatever but am abso-
lutely convinced that you will do everything in your power to reach a successful conclusion of
our work. I am sure you will make every effort to point out to the Governments that a
forward step must be taken towards disarmament. But, at the first meeting of this session,
you yourself stated that your appeals to the Governments had hitherto fallen on deaf ears,
and I fear that they will be equally fruitless in the future. The experience we have had does
not allow us to believe that the Preparatory Commission will be listened to. I observe already
that the majority of the Commission proposes to reverse the unanimous decision reached at
the last session that the second reading should be taken now. As Mr. Gibson said, nothing can
be done against the majority, and, if the majority reaches such a decision, the minority, of
course, has to submit. I can only say: “Victrix causa diis placuit, sed victa Catoni”.

My object in saying this is to assist you in your dealings with the Governments, for we
consider that there are only very slight political difficulties, which could quite easily be
eliminated if there were a firm conviction that the League of Nations insisted on their
removal.

I therefore beg to move the following resolution:

“The Preparatory Disarmament Commission,

“Convinced that the general interests of peace demand that an initial step on the
path of disarmament should be taken as soon as is possible having regard to the present
conditions of regional and general security;

“Considering that the preparatory technical work for a first step on the road to
disarmament is sufficiently advanced for it now to be possible to summon a general
Disarmament Conference capable before all else of settling those predominantly political
questions which, in the present situation, impede any initial step towards the realisation
of the idea of disarmament;

“Recalling that the 1926 and 1927 Assemblies urged that such a Conference should
be held as soon as possible:
was followed when they were introduced was that they were given a first reading immediately.

I think by the British and by the French delegations. As far as I know, the procedure which

has been said— They are projects introduced, as far as I remember, by individual delegations,

to the Commission and is entitled to have those proposals considered.

Equal rights for all delegations means that each delegation has the right to put proposals

to place any delegation in an inferior position would mean stopping the work of that delegation.

would be absolutely impossible. That principle is the principle of equal rights for all delegations.

delegation, and which have not yet been seen by the other delegations, are not to be considered

by the Preparatory Commission. It will be taken by the Conference.

To-day we are continually referring to a second reading, but I think that we are rather

losing sight of the meaning of this second reading. A year ago, Viscount Cecil, in this very

building, proposed a draft Convention. Then M. Paul-Boncour rose and said:

"This method of procedure does not suit me at all; but, in deference to Viscount

Cecil and the British point of view, I will also submit a draft Convention."

M. Paul-Boncour added that he would have preferred merely to draw up a programme

for the Conference.

I did not intend to say that we should do absolutely nothing and rely on the Conference;

but I think it would be possible in two or three days to draw up a programme for the Conference

and leave all political discussions to the latter. It is clear that some day somebody will have

to decide for or against taking a first step. I repeat that I do not think this decision could be

taken by the Preparatory Commission. It will be taken by the Conference.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Socialist Soviet Republics).— That is not quite accurate.

The President. — At any rate, the original Draft has been set aside by the Soviet

delegation, which is to submit another Draft to us if the resolution proposed this morning

is adopted. We cannot, therefore, discuss these Drafts at present. That is my first reply.

Second reply: You ask what has become of the resolutions which we already discussed

this morning. You must be aware that we decided to combine these resolutions in one single

resolution, which we would put to the vote.

As regards Count Bernstorff's proposal, we have hardly had time to read it—that is

clear; but I could offer a few observations in this connection.

Count Bernstorff (Germany).— I wish to reply briefly to the criticisms levelled by my

friend M. Perez.

He said that our proposal was unacceptable because it was not in accordance with our

terms of reference.

day we are continually referring to a second reading, but I think that we are rather

losing sight of the meaning of this second reading. A year ago, Viscount Cecil, in this very

building, proposed a draft Convention. Then M. Paul-Boncour rose and said:

"This method of procedure does not suit me at all; but, in deference to Viscount

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and leave all political discussions to the latter. It is clear that some day somebody will have

to decide for or against taking a first step. I repeat that I do not think this decision could be

taken by the Preparatory Commission. It will be taken by the Conference.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Socialist Soviet Republics).— I am in a very difficult position.

The President has told us that the proposals which have just been introduced by the Soviet

delagation, and which have not yet been seen by the other delegations, are not to be considered

during the present session. He gave no arguments; he did not explain why they were not

to be considered. Therefore I am not in a position to argue. There is no argument, no reason

is given; therefore it is impossible for me to argue at all or to tell you anything to the contrary.

Why should not they be considered at this session? What did we come here for? Only
to decide that nothing can be decided; that we must go home without having done anything?

Or have we come here to discuss the question of disarmament? I have put in a proposal

for disarmament and nothing else. Why should not the Preparatory Commission for the

Disarmament Conference occupy itself with it now? I should like to have an answer to

this question. I have no doubt that what the honourable President has proposed is not any

arbitrary proposal, that there are certain reasons for proposing what he has done, but I would

humbly ask him to be good enough to take the Commission into his confidence and to tell

them what are his reasons. Why must we go home without having achieved anything?

There is one principle on which the common labour, the common work of the Soviet

delagation with other delegations would be possible, but if that were rejected, common labour

would be absolutely impossible. That principle is the principle of equal rights for all delegations.

To place any delegation in an inferior position would mean stopping the work of that delegation.

Equal rights for all delegations means that each delegation has the right to put proposals

to the Commission and is entitled to have those proposals considered.

What are the schemes or projects with regard to the second reading of which so much

has been said? They are projects introduced, as far as I remember, by individual delegations,

I think by the British and by the French delegations. As far as I know, the procedure which

was followed when they were introduced was that they were given a first reading immediately.

"Requests the Council at its next session to fix for the first general Disarmament

Conference a date as early as possible after the ninth session of the Assembly, and at

the same time to invite the various Governments to participate in the Conference.

"The Preparatory Disarmament Commission will be ready to place at the disposal

of the Conference all the documentation which it has so far prepared, together with any

further material which may be received in sufficient time."
The President did not propose to brush these proposals aside and keep them somewhere in the archives of the Secretariat of the League to mature. They were considered immediately. Why cannot the same procedure be applied in the case of proposals of the Soviet delegation?

Count Clauzel has complained of some confusion which has arisen. I leave him to judge how that confusion has been brought about. He tells us the Soviet delegation is endeavouring to make the Commission go backwards. As far as I understand it, there are two proposals before the Commission; one is the Soviet proposal to continue our work and take some steps forward. The other proposal, which Count Clauzel favours, is to go home. If to continue the preparatory work for disarmament means going backwards and to go home without doing anything means going forwards, I confess I shall probably never be able to understand the language used in the League of Nations!

I shall reserve my further remarks until the President has explained to us the reasons why our proposals cannot be considered at this session. In the meantime, there is only one remark I wish to make.

I take it the members of this Commission are not merely functionaries, mere servants of their Governments, but that they are responsible representatives of their countries and Governments, who have devoted themselves to the task of disarmament. I venture to express the hope that those who have undertaken this task are doing so because they have the cause of disarmament at heart. I would further add that they will regard the question of disarmament with rather more warmth than their own Governments. The Preparatory Commission should push the Governments represented here in the direction of disarmament. They should not merely wait for hints from their Governments: they should push their Governments forward. By going home without fixing any date for the next session, they are not doing anything in the way of inducing their Governments to take steps even for the elimination of the differences that exist between themselves. The Governments will not be in a hurry unless you tell them they must do this by a certain date. If you say you will meet in a month's time, you could induce the Governments to accelerate a settlement of the differences between them, but by fixing no date you do not do anything of the kind.

If, contrary to our views and suggestions, the Preparatory Commission decided not to proceed to the consideration of our new proposals, I certainly should be inclined to support the proposal made by the honourable representative of Germany to declare that the Preparatory Commission finds itself unable to prepare anything, and therefore passes on its work to the International Conference to see what can be done—or whether anything can be done—in the cause of disarmament.

Dr. Riddell (Canada).—I rise to a point of order, not to discuss the merits or demerits of adjourning this session, but in view of the lateness of the hour and the number of new questions which we have before us, I have much pleasure in moving that we adjourn, at 10.30 to-morrow morning.

Lord Cushendun (British Empire).—Whatever action may be taken on the motion which has just been made by the delegate for Canada, there is one remark that I should like to be allowed to make. The main question which we are now discussing, as I take it, and have been discussing for some time, is whether or not this present session should be continued to enable a second reading of the Conventions to go on. Several honourable delegates have advanced reasons why that should not be done, and in particular the honourable delegate for France made a speech just now in which he intimatted that there were a certain number of conversations proceeding which had not yet reached any actual result, but which he was hopeful might enable progress to be made with these Conventions at a later date, while the honourable delegate for Italy, following him, observed that, so far as he knew, there was no ground—he did not know of any ground—for good hopes that any such conversations would have a beneficial result; and therefore, before we separate for the night, I wish to give my reasons why I do not wish to support it to the honourable delegate for France, and, if I may say so in passing, I have found myself throughout these debates more in sympathy with Count Clauzel, whose forcible and reasonable speeches I have always admired. But I am, of my own knowledge, in a position to say that Count Clauzel has reason for the intimation which he has given. Any conversations that may be going on in which Great Britain is concerned are not in my hands personally, and therefore I am not in a position, of course, to give any definite information, and in fact I do not possess any very definite information, as to the precise stage which these conversations have reached; but I do know enough about it to know that Count Clauzel has perfect justification for the information he has given, and in those circumstances it appears to me to be the most elementary commonsense on the part of business men trying to arrive at a definite conclusion that—that being the state of the case—we should adopt the resolution which the Bureau has proposed in order to give effect to what appears to me to be the commonsense view.

Now, at this last moment, we have had a new resolution put into our hands by Count Bernstorff. I should be the first entirely to acquit Count Bernstorff of any desire to add to the difficulties of the situation or the difficulties of this Commission, but, while I am most willing to make that admission, I cannot deny that, if we are to-night or to-morrow to discuss this resolution, it will be a very considerable embarrassment to this Commission, and I should doubt, Mr. President—that is a matter for you to decide—whether it is in order. I confess, I that I share a good deal of the bewilderment that was expressed just now by the honourable delegate for the Argentine. This resolution has nothing whatever to do with the resolution on which I believe the Commission is engaged. I suppose that, if we do not pay too much regard to strict order, Count Bernstorff might propose his resolution by way of addition to the other, possibly by adding it to the Preamble; but shall we really gain anything by doing that? I
was under the impression that Count Bernstorff disliked quite as much as I do these rather
verbose resolutions which have no particular practical meaning. Now, does anybody imagine
that, if this resolution of Count Bernstorf's was added to the archives of the League of Nations,
anybody would be either the better or the worse for that? It does not appear to me that it
has any practical bearing, with one exception. There is only one thing to which I positively
object. I see that, in the first paragraph, Count Bernstorff speaks of the first step having still
to be taken. For the reasons which I gave in an earlier speech to-day, I am entirely unable
to accept that idea. Count Bernstorff was good enough to offer an explanation of what he
meant by it, but I am afraid that that explanation left me entirely unconvincend. It did not
appear to me really to deal with the point that I have raised, and if it comes to a discussion of
this resolution—which no doubt we should have to take paragraph by paragraph, and to which
there may be much more objection than we can see on the surface—at all events I shall have
to object to that particular phrase; and I really would, if I may respectfully do so, appeal to
Count Bernstorff to decide whether anything is to be gained by insisting upon the Commission's
turning aside from the only real point of substance and importance in order to pass a resolution
remembering something that the Assembly has done, and recalling this and recalling that
—which we are always doing—and then ending up by some request to the Council to do
something in some future session. If the Council is half as sensible a body as I take it to be,
it will pay no attention to our prayer. Whether that would be so, of course, I cannot prophesy,
but I am quite certain that, if that resolution were put into the hands of the Council, they
would smile at it and say, as we say in England: 'This is a resolution which is very skilfully
drafted, but it cuts no ice'.

If we are really to devote ourselves to practical affairs, do let us decide one way or the other as to whether this resolution drafted by the Bureau is to be
accepted, and if it is not to be accepted, if we are to go on with the second reading of the Conven-
tion in spite of the conversations that are going on, and therefore with very much less
likelihood of reaching any result, then let us know the truth, whether it is pleasant or unpleasant,
and we shall get forward with our business.

General DE MARINIS (Italy).—According to the translation which was given, the repre-
sentative of the British Empire declared that I had said that there was no reason why the
conversations recently held should not prove productive of results. This was not quite
what I did say. I stated that I was not aware of these conversations. I know nothing
whatever about them. And I repeat that, if these conversations are really taking place and
being carried on outside Italy, and if they do result in an agreement, such an agreement will
mean nothing so far as we are concerned, because we had no part in it. Hence all the
reservations that we have submitted would still hold good.

The President.—Two delegates are still down to speak, Count Clauzel and M. Sokal.
I would ask them to be good enough to speak to-morrow, and I propose, in accordance with
Dr. Riddell's suggestion, that we should adjourn our discussion until Saturday morning.
Before adjourning this meeting, however, I desire to state, in reply to M. Litvinoff, that it is,
of course, for the Commission to pass a decision in regard to the draft Convention which
the Soviet delegation proposes to submit. I simply said that, in my personal view, this
Draft could not be discussed at the present session. Such a scheme, unless I am mistaken,
must be of some importance, and would have to be subjected to calm and careful examination
and sent to the different Governments. If this is so, we certainly could not discuss it at the
present session. But, I repeat, the Commission will have to take a decision to-morrow if
M. Litvinoff will be good enough to submit his draft Convention in time.

The meeting rose at 7.40 p.m.

TENTH MEETING (PUBLIC).

Held on Saturday, March 24th, 1928, at 11 a.m.

President: M. LOUDON (Netherlands).


Count CLAUZEL (France).—I asked to be allowed to speak yesterday at the end of the
meeting in order to reply to an observation by Count Bernstorff with regard to a former speech
by M. Paul-Boncour and also to reply to a comment by M. Litvinoff on one of my former
remarks. I will reply to both very briefly; this will be all the easier because I think that I
can answer them to their satisfaction in a single speech.

As regards the question raised by the German representative, who pointed out that M.
Paul-Boncour had not at the outset been in favour of preparing a draft Convention and that
he had regretted the fact that Viscount Cecil had submitted a Draft, I wish to state that this
is not what actually occurred. It is perfectly true that M. Paul-Boncour would have preferred
preliminary conversations and a general exchange of views with regard to principles in the
Preparatory Commission before any Draft were submitted, since in that case a single Draft
based on this exchange of views and on these principles could have been drawn up by the
Commission itself and the Commission would not then have been faced with two Drafts, one
French and one English in separate columns. He felt that such a procedure would perhaps have saved time, but he did not insist, and all the members of the Commission will remember that he accepted with very good grace the other method which has been employed and which—I venture to say—has given fairly good results. His only desire was to gain time by securing a single basis for discussion prepared by a general exchange of views. I now turn to address my remarks to M. Litvinoff—obviously we have yet much ground to cover before we reach this starting-point and M. Paul-Boncour’s wishes are by no means about to materialise.

The delegation of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics brought us, or rather caused to be distributed to us, shortly before our meeting, a Draft entirely different from those which have been examined up to the present, since the object of the new Draft was total disarmament. The Soviet delegation invited us to examine its proposals. Thanks to the action of the representative of the British Empire, to the example given by him which has been followed by seventeen members of this Commission, it may be said that this first Draft has been examined almost article by article and that the great majority of the Commission, as I stated the other day, finds itself unable to approve these principles.

Having noted the fact, the delegation of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics caused a second Draft to be distributed to us yesterday evening. I am sorry to have to confess that I have not had time to examine this Draft in detail; I think, moreover, that most of the members of the Commission are in the same position. I was, however, struck at first sight by the fact that it differs from the former Draft submitted to us because the question is not one of total disarmament; the proposal is now to reduce armaments progressively, a distinction being drawn between different categories of countries. I would simply mention the fact that the idea of different coefficients of reduction according to these categories, which seems to me to be one of the main principles of the new Draft, has already been discussed by the Temporary Mixed Commission, on the proposal of one of Viscount Cecil’s predecessors, Lord Esher, and that the Commission decided against this system of coefficients. I merely refer to this point briefly in order to show that we are possibly not confronted by entirely new ideas which we have never yet discussed, but that we have before us once more a basic proposal which is entirely different from that on which we have worked hitherto.

M. Litvinoff, moreover, was careful to add that, if we did not accept his new proposal, he would have to refer to the French proposal along the very prudent suggestion made by Lord Cushendun to the effect that the matter should be referred back to the various Governments and that such points as can be accepted should be discussed when the French and British proposals come up for a second reading. The representative of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics stated that in that case he was not sure that the authors of the Soviet proposals would continue to support them.

I have therefore come to wonder whether, as the great French revolutionary of 1793 said, the Russian revolution also “devore ses propres enfants”. Above all, I wonder whether this threat—I was about to say tactical move—should not give us all occasion to reflect most seriously. His Excellency M. Perez pointed out yesterday evening, very wittily, causing the laughter which disarmed the Commission, that we were in a state of absolute confusion. It would be very desirable for this confusion to end at this session; in particular, it must not be allowed to occur again at the second reading which we shall sooner or later be called upon to undertake. We have invited the representatives of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics to co-operate with us. It would therefore be extremely desirable if we could arrive at some degree of co-operation. I therefore wish to repeat before that public opinion which will mark my words, as it has marked those of M. Litvinoff, that the essential condition of such co-operation is that it shall further the cause instead of undoing that which has already been accomplished.

As I am referring to the question of undoing work already accomplished, I am obliged once more to address my remarks to Count Bernstorff, to tell him that the original proposal he submitted yesterday to the Commission does not seem calculated to help matters on, in accordance with the desire which M. Clemenceau expressed in his letter to Count Brockdorff-Rantzau. If we accepted the proposal put forward yesterday by the German representative, we should indeed be making a move, but not in the direction indicated and desired by us. I am afraid that, on the contrary, we should be taking a backward step. I venture to hope that this is not the reason which led M. Litvinoff to support the proposal finally. As I was careful to point out in a previous speech, before Count Bernstorff submitted his proposal, we cannot under any circumstances forgo the second reading, in view of the stage we have reached in our work. I say again that the results attained are more satisfactory than some people pretend to believe. On certain important points, agreement has been reached at the first reading. I should be very glad if these agreements could be confirmed in writing as soon as possible, but I feel bound to point out that certain agreements are conditional on the solution of questions which have been left unsettled and which will not be reconsidered until the second reading.

I do not know whether our Commission would be entitled to ask now for the convening of a Conference; on this point, it is our President who must reply to Count Bernstorff. But in any case, when we have all emphatically stated more than once that we desire as careful a second reading as possible under the best conditions, when I myself, on behalf of the French delegation, have declared that I should be glad if the second reading could take place before the next Assembly, to forgo this second reading now would, I think, hardly be in keeping with that desire for progress which Count Bernstorff expressed yesterday.

Under these circumstances, it seems to me that we should have no difficulty whatever in emerging from the confusion to which M. Perez alluded yesterday, a confusion which is
more apparent than real and which, to be dispelled, only needs a little of that sunlight which is shining on the city of Geneva to-day.

We have to choose between two methods: the first is that to which I have just referred. We should not depart from our terms of reference which are to be found in the instructions successively given us from the time of the first Committee which established our questionnaire in 1925, approving in each case the progress of our work. We should, moreover, invite the representatives of countries non-Members of the League to co-operate within this framework—whether they be early comers, such as the representative of the United States, or later arrivals, like the representative of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, or the latest arrival of all, the representative of the Turkish Republic. These representatives cannot surely consider it strange—nor would public opinion think so—that we should ask them to participate in our work in the manner and on the lines indicated by the decisions of the League of Nations, by whom we have been convened.

The other method would be to take a flying leap into the dark, to abandon all that we have hitherto done, to discuss in perfect chaos—if I may say so—successive and even alternative proposals which merit a better fate than this, and which are entitled to receive serious consideration without haste, since haste is incompatible with careful and thorough examination.

I feel that all this was foreseen on Tuesday last by Lord Cushendun, when he suggested that all these proposals should be referred back to the Governments in order that the Preparatory Commission might examine them at its second reading, for which I say again I hope it will fix as early a date as possible.

The second proposal that the Bureau submitted to us yesterday embodied in principle, and in a form which seems, to me at least, perfectly clear, all the ideas I have just put forward. I think the time has come for the Commission to take a decision; further speeches will serve no purpose. I regret myself that I have been obliged to speak, trusting that my speech would be the last. The moment has come for the members of the Commission to shoulder their responsibility and take a decision with regard to the text which has been submitted to them, to reply at last "Yes" or "No", without ambiguity, to M. Litvinoff's question.

M. Sokol (Poland). — Mr. President—We were able this morning to cast a rapid glance at the second Soviet Draft. You yourself suggested yesterday that a detailed discussion of this Draft should be made at the Commission's next session. Although this is not yet a decision of the Commission, I adopt your suggestion and have no intention of going into the details of this Draft, but I should like to express my satisfaction at this Draft's having been submitted to the Commission to replace the previous Draft. My reasons are as follows:

I observe with pleasure that the new Draft is much closer we to the text of the preliminary Draft adopted at the first reading by our Commission. I am glad to find in the Preamble of this new Draft a factor which I have always regarded as essential, i.e., the factor of security. The Soviet delegation says:

"Considering the atrocious struggle between the various States for predominance in armaments and that the tendency to increase the number of weapons for murderous and destructive military purposes is one of the factors . . . ."

Although this is only in the Preamble, it shows that the Soviet delegation has taken this factor into consideration and this constitutes a material difference as compared with the first Draft. There are other chapters which will call for detailed examination. I would point out that the very important, and indeed essential, chapter on control seems to me as vague as the corresponding chapter in the first Draft, and I regret it.

But, gentlemen, my general impression of the Soviet Draft No. 2 is rather favourable than otherwise, and I quite agree with what Count Clauzel has said, that it contains a great many features which are familiar to those who have been members of this Commission for a considerable time. It may be said of this Draft, as it has been said of an opera, that "all that is good in it is not new, but all that is new in it is not good". I think that a detailed examination will show us what is good, and I should like to express once more my gratitude to the Soviet delegation for its sincere effort. I would call upon the other delegations to treat this Draft with respect, not with the scorn with which they treat the American draft, as is done in some of the speeches presented to this Committee. If we are not satisfied with this Draft, we must be careful not to shout down this honest effort.

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It is completely to misinterpret my ideas to impute to me any contempt for the working classes. I am very painfully affected by this remark of M. Litvinoff's, having spent the best part of my life in protecting this class. To reply to that criticism in the same courteous language as was addressed to me, I will say that I think this criticism most unfair.

Gentlemen, I will leave to the next session of the Commission the detailed examination of Soviet Draft No. 2, in conformity, I believe, with our President's intentions.

I should like to say a word more with regard to Count Bernstorff's proposal. The honourable representative of Germany spoke yesterday not only of a question which concerns us directly but also, and not for the first time, of Part V of the Treaty of Versailles, of M. Clemenceau's famous letter and of other things which do not concern us directly here. I think that the Commission's terms of reference give us quite precise duties, and if we depart too much from them we shall find ourselves embarking on political discussions of so wide a scope as the Commission's terms of reference give us quite precise duties, and if we depart too much

As regards the substance of Count Bernstorff's proposal, I understand that he suggests the abandonment of the second reading and the direct submission to the Council of a proposal for convening a Conference. He believes that, in so doing, we shall have fulfilled our mission. In this connection, I have two remarks to make.

In the first place, this procedure completely leaves on one side the preliminary Draft we have drawn up. It takes no account of all that has been done by the various Sub-Commissions which we have created and which have worked for many months. This is on the same plane as the Soviet delegation's proposal, the effect of which is to destroy the basis of discussion which we possess. The Soviet delegation at least proposes a draft Convention instead, while the German delegation proposes no alternative: it only proposes a Conference. I consider that we must persevere and follow strictly the guiding line of our work and continue the discussion of our preliminary Draft, endeavour to improve it and reach an agreement at the second reading before convening a Conference.

In the second place, I should like to say that I always like to hear Count Bernstorff speak and even to reread what he has said, and I venture to quote the statement which he made at the last meeting but one of the Preparatory Commission. You will excuse me making this quotation, which is very complimentary to me, but I nevertheless desire to read out this passage:

"I have listened with great interest to M. Sokal's speech in which he very clearly stated his view on the famous trilogy, Security, Arbitration and Disarmament... I only wish to say that it seems to me somewhat premature to send a report to the Council now..."

Count Bernstorff was at that time of the opinion that it was premature to send the question to the Council. We were in exactly the same position then as to-day, having finished the first reading and having decided to hold a second reading, and I see no reason to change our minds. I now agree with Count Bernstorff that nothing must be sent to the Council, as we have no definite proposal to submit to it. Count Bernstorff will answer that we had then decided to hold a second reading, whereas to-day we do not know when, or if, there will be a second reading. I am more optimistic. Yesterday certain representatives of great Powers made statements to which I attach great importance; on the basis of these statements, I think that may hope that the difficulties which came up at the first reading can be surmounted by those concerned. If these statements are not sufficient for Count Bernstorff, I will quote the President of our Commission himself, who expressed very definitely the hope that he would be able to convene us shortly for the second reading, trusting that meanwhile the difficulties which arose at the first reading would have been disposed of.

In conclusion, gentlemen, I should like to state that I am entirely in favour of referring the Soviet Draft No. 2 to the Governments. I could not accept the German draft resolution, which would upset all our work. I should like to see the Bureau's proposal in its final form, so as to be able to support it in the hope that this discussion, in which we have heard all the arguments for and against, may be closed by a decision to study the Drafts submitted to us during the session and to resume the second reading when this may be possible and expedient, so as to make that step forward which we all desire.

Lord CUSHENDUN (British Empire). — As a matter of order, would you assist us by telling us what we are discussing, Mr. President? There are a number of resolutions before the Commission, and I think it would help us if we knew which of them was under discussion. M. Sokal has just devoted his speech to two documents—the Draft submitted by the Soviet delegation last night and the resolution submitted yesterday by Count Bernstorff. I was under the impression that neither of these was under discussion at the present moment, and if that is so, my friend M. Sokal was out of order the whole time. At any rate, if we concentrate on one of the resolutions before us and either accept it or negative it, we shall surely get on more quickly than if we have half-a-dozen documents before us and range over the whole of them without concentration.

The President. — I thank Lord Cushendun for his remark. I think we should concentrate our attention on what I might call the preliminary question, that formulated in the draft resolution submitted by Count Bernstorff.
Count Bernstorff (Germany). — I did not desire to make a general defence of my proposal, but, now that several delegates have spoken on it, I should like to say that I am absolutely in agreement with those of my colleagues who asked that there should be a clear understanding. One of the first to insist on this clearness was Mr. Gibson. The majority of the Commission must therefore decide what it is going to do; and the minority must try to agree to the method selected. Our first proposal was to ask the Commission to proceed forthwith to a second reading of our draft Convention. This proposal not having been accepted, I submitted the draft resolution with which you are acquainted. I did this not to raise difficulties but to expedite our work. Our President himself told us that a great number of difficulties had been encountered and that hitherto his appeals to the Governments had met with no success. We were also told that the Governments had undertaken direct negotiations; but General de Marinis has informed us that this was not so.

It therefore seems to me that we ought to do something to force the hands of our Governments. After two years' work, I have reached the melancholy conviction that our Commission has not sufficient authority with the Governments; during these two years we have vainly asked the Governments to take some action. I therefore thought that, if the Governments knew that the Conference would take place at the end of the year, they would try to reach an agreement on their points of difference. This is the only reason for which I submitted my draft resolution, but at the same time I should like to add that we reject none of the work that has been done up to now; we simply place it at the Conference's disposal.

I have been told that I was departing from the Commission's terms of reference. But the latter do not say that we have got to draw up a draft Convention. Our task is simply to establish a programme, and I am convinced that a drafting committee appointed by us and setting to work at once could provide us in the course of next week with a programme for the Conference, since it is not very difficult to agree on a Conference programme.

If, moreover, the delegates consider that it is absolutely necessary to hold a second reading of our draft Convention, I have no objection to make. We shall have enough time between now and the date on which the Conference meets to hold this second reading. In fact, I am very much in favour of holding it. All that I ask is that we should get to work and do something.

I should now like to say a few words in reply to M. Sokal, with whom I have always had great pleasure in exchanging compliments. I do not want, however, to reopen the discussion of last night.

All the delegates who are interested in the place taken by the Treaty of Versailles in our discussions should re-read the speech made here on this subject by M. Paul-Boncour on April 8th, 1927. Among other admirable remarks, he said that our work was based on two texts, the Covenant and the Treaty of Versailles. This speech is so important and interesting that I should like the French Government to follow its custom in the case of great speeches and have it posted up throughout the country.

I do not wish to prolong this discussion any further, and I think we ought to take a majority vote. M. Sokal was good enough to quote what I said last year, but since then we have had a year of inaction, and it is for this reason that I have changed my opinion. A year ago I was still optimistic; I thought that we should be able to do something, but, instead of that, I find that we have done nothing.

In conclusion, I should like to reply in a few words to the remarks made at a previous meeting by Lord Cushendun on the question whether the expression "a first step in the sphere of disarmament" is justified in my draft resolution. I think this is only a misunderstanding on a question of terminology and that I can dispel it without difficulty. As I said yesterday, I am far from wishing to minimise the importance of measures which a State may have already taken to reduce its armaments to a certain extent on its own initiative and without assuming any international obligation in this connection. But, for the purpose of our discussions, we are not dealing with such isolated measures, since the basis of our work is Article 8 of the Covenant. From the terms of this article, and particularly of paragraphs 2 and 3, it is clear that it only refers to international engagements establishing a general plan which will involve co-ordination and a certain proportion between the armaments of the different countries. It is solely in that sense that I employed the term "first step" or "first stage". I would remind you that, in the Preamble to the draft Convention, according to the text proposed by the French delegation, the following clause appeared:

"Considering that it is now possible to contemplate a first step towards the limitation and reduction of armaments laid down in Article 8 of the Covenant . . . ."

If I remember rightly, the expression "a first step" gave rise to no objection on the part of any delegation, although the text of this Preamble was discussed in great detail. Similarly, in our discussions of December last, the expression "first step" or "first stage" was employed in the sense which I have just indicated. For these reasons, I consider that the use of the term in my draft resolution is fully justified having regard to the fact that, owing to the constant use of it made in our Commission, it has been given a special meaning referring solely
to the terms of Article 8 of the Covenant. However, in order to avoid any misunderstanding and in order to meet Lord Cushendun’s observations, I have no objection to the first paragraph of my draft resolution being worded as follows:

“A first step towards the reduction and limitation of armaments, as laid down in Article 8 of the Covenant.”

The President. — Before calling upon the next speaker, I should like to remind you that, for the moment, we are only discussing the German draft resolution.

M. Sato (Japan). — I will willingly confine myself to the German draft resolution. This draft requests the Council at its next session to fix a date for the first Conference on Disarmament, and it seems to me that, if we accepted this proposal, we should place the Council in a very embarrassing position. It was the Council which decided in 1925 to entrust us with the task of preparing a solid basis for a future Conference on the reduction of armaments. If we now adopt the German delegation’s draft resolution before having completed our task of preparing for the future Conference, we should be altering the terms of our instructions and we should incur a very grave responsibility not only before the Council and the Assembly but also before public opinion.

In my opinion, it is our duty to explore every possibility of agreement, so as to go to the very limits of our terms of reference and to accomplish the whole of our task, and not to stop halfway and request the Council to fix the date of the future Conference before we have done the necessary preliminary work.

Mr. President, I do not think that our Commission’s task is so simple. If it really wishes the success of the future Conference, the Preparatory Commission must do all the preliminary work, which does not merely consist, as Count Bernstorff thinks, in drawing up a programme of work for this Conference. It is for these reasons that, to my great regret, I cannot subscribe to the draft resolution submitted by the German delegation.

As the text of this resolution has some connection with the question of the second reading, and as Count Bernstorff alluded to the latter, I shall, with the President’s permission, say a few words on the advisability of a second reading during the present session.

In this connection, I am glad to say that I am in complete agreement with the proposal made yesterday by Lord Cushendun and Mr. Gibson. As there are still differences of opinion on several points between certain Governments and particularly in regard to naval matters, I do not think it expedient to begin the second reading now. As we desire to submit a single text to the future Conference for the Limitation of Armaments, a common ground must be found between the Governments concerned eliminating the present differences. This procedure is the more to be recommended in the present circumstances inasmuch as Count Clauzel has informed us that conversations are in progress and that there is good reason to hope for a successful issue. Lord Cushendun has confirmed this good news.

This point was very well understood by the honourable representative for Sweden when he submitted his amendment to the Bureau’s draft resolution, and thus showed the great importance he attached to the preliminary negotiations between the Governments concerned. I entirely agree with the reasons for his amendment, since they explain why the Commission desires to postpone the second reading to a later date, which, moreover, is not entirely an indefinite date.

The honourable delegate for Italy found it necessary to make certain reservations with regard to the negotiations in progress. But, in the present circumstances, I am inclined to favour this idea of preliminary direct conversations between the principal parties concerned. Without this necessary preparation, which will be useful in clearing the ground, I do not think that a second reading would give very satisfactory results.

This, of course, does not prevent us from taking into account the legitimate feelings of certain delegations and the impatience of public opinion, which fears the indefinite adjournment of our second reading. I desire to give them every possible satisfaction and, in order that we should retain their confidence, we must meet as soon as possible. This means that the Governments concerned must pursue the preliminary negotiations as rapidly as they can. The Japanese Government, which has always been a strong partisan of the limitation and reduction of armaments, will certainly support me when I express the fervent hope that the principal parties concerned will shortly succeed in finding a satisfactory basis of agreement.

M. Valdés-Mendeville (Chile). — I will confine myself to a few brief remarks with regard to the German draft resolution. In its original form, the first paragraph of this draft was, in the main, a repetition of the 1926 resolution, which was recalled in No. 2 of the resolutions of the last Assembly and which does not stand alone. It is preceded by a number of arguments and followed by further resolutions.

I note among the arguments the following: “The Assembly . . . being anxious to bring about the political conditions calculated to assure the success of the work of disarmament . . .” I would also draw your attention to the third resolution, which constitutes a whole programme of work for the Committee on Arbitration and Security: this resolution is nowhere recalled in the German draft. It is true that Count Bernstorff suggested amending the first paragraph, but I do not think that that would substantially affect my criticism. After resolution No. 2 of the 1926 Assembly, the latter requests the Council to urge the Preparatory Commission to hasten the completion of its technical work and to convene the Conference.
immediately that work is completed. The second paragraph in the German draft resolution notes that the technical work is “sufficiently advanced.” The Assembly, in the instructions it gave us last year—and they are, after all, instructions—speaks of the completion of the work. Can we say that it has been completed? Can we abandon our second reading, which, after the statements we have heard, we have reason to hope can soon be taken? Can we abandon the work of the Committee on Arbitration and Security, which has still to hold another session?

As I said just now, we are working in conformity with instructions from the Assembly. Similar instructions were given to the Committee on Arbitration and Security in Part III of the resolution, which speaks of considering measures which would enable States “to fix the level of their armaments at the lowest possible figures in an international disarmament agreement”.

Count Bernstorff has told us that we can prepare a programme for the future Conference in a few days. But what kind of a programme? I do not think we can draw up a skeleton convention, as we have tried to do in the case of previous draft conventions, leaving it to the Conference to fill in the necessary figures in accordance with political, demographic and economic conditions. It seems to me, therefore, that in the last resort it would be for the Assembly itself to reverse the instructions it has given us and in virtue of which we are now working. But we cannot submit to the Council a proposal which does not take account of all that we have hitherto done; we cannot suspend our work, considering it finished or as having failed, and tell the Council that we have prepared a new programme, which, moreover, could only be of a very embryonic nature if it were prepared in two or three days.

For my part, I am of opinion that Count Bernstorff’s draft cannot be adopted.

The President. — Before calling upon the next speaker, I should like to say a few words to Count Bernstorff.

We must not forget that we have received instructions from the Assembly to prepare for the Disarmament Conference. In virtue of those instructions, we are drawing up a programme for the Conference, and we agreed at the outset that this programme should take the form of a draft Convention. That being so, would it not seem strange to request the Council to fix the date of the Conference without our having been able to submit our programme, which, as I say, is in the form of a draft Convention? I do not wish to go into details or consider the legal aspect of the question. All I say is that it would be, to say the least of it, odd to approach the Council with such a suggestion. Moreover, the Council itself, like the Assembly, has on several occasions given us to understand that it approves our method of work.

I should like to reply to another point of Count Bernstorff. He told us that, if the date of the Disarmament Conference could be fixed now, Governments would feel encouraged to work for an agreement. I think, however, that all possible encouragement has already been given during the present session and that the Governments, most closely concerned realise in all earnestness that they must reach an agreement now. We have received very encouraging communications from Count Clauzel and Lord Cushendun, and that, I think, is sufficient to convince Governments of the necessity of taking a decision in this matter.

Count Bernstorff (Germany). — I must point out an apparent difference of opinion upon the Council’s decision. The Council transmitted this resolution “to the Preparatory Commission, requesting it to be good enough to make proposals in regard to the date on which it would be possible to convene the Conference, taking into account the probable progress of its labours, and, further, to establish the agenda of the aforesaid Conference”.

We can still quite easily establish the agenda. With regard to the phrase “taking into account the probable progress of its labours”, we can say that we shall be able to submit a programme before the Assembly. We can thus conform absolutely with the Council’s decision.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Socialist Soviet Republics). — Mr. President—I was first under the impression that we were discussing a matter of procedure, and wanted to know whether we were going to proceed to the second reading of the draft Convention of the Preparatory Commission, to the first reading of the new Soviet draft Convention, or, as the German delegate has proposed, to pass over our work to the International Conference for Disarmament. All these questions seemed to be interwoven. The President’s ruling to limit the present discussion to the consideration of the German delegation’s proposal puts me in some difficulty. As I said yesterday, if the proposal to give our draft Convention a first reading is rejected, I would support the proposal of the German delegation, but now I must speak directly on the German delegation’s proposal, without knowing the fate of our proposal for a first reading of our draft Convention. In the circumstances, I am bound to support the German proposal to convene as soon as possible the International Conference for Disarmament. It is high time to introduce some clarity into the whole question of disarmament if you do not wish to discredit the very idea. Some speaker mentioned the possible bankruptcy of the Disarmament Commission. I am very much afraid that, if we go on session after session and go away without achieving
any work, only deciding to come again, or not to meet at all, we shall contribute to the impression which is gaining ground abroad that the Commission is fated to an inglorious and, I think it is better to take stock of the state of things and to draw the necessary conclusions, to call the representatives of all the Powers—great and small—and to come to some decision on the question of disarmament; I do not feel sure that an International Conference, in the present circumstances, after the experience we have had here, would really result in any scheme for disarmament; but at least we shall know where we are—even if we are forced to the unfortunate conclusion that not only total disarmament but also the reduction of armaments still belong to the sphere of those ideals to which, in the opinion of many delegates, humanity has been aspiring for thousands of years, and will have to aspire for a considerable time yet.

Lord CUSHENDUN (British Empire). — We have been discussing this matter for two hours, and I am sure I can put my opinion in two minutes. I should like to thank Count Bernstorff for his goodness in offering to make a small drafting alteration in the first paragraph of his resolution. I am grateful to him for that courtesy, but I am afraid I shall have to show him it is not sufficient to meet my views.

I am opposed to Count Bernstorff’s resolution and to each and every paragraph of it, and I shall do everything in my power to persuade the Commission to refuse to accept it. There appears to me to be a very extraordinary contradiction between the first and second paragraphs of the resolution. The second paragraph tells us that the preparatory technical work has made such a complete advance that we do not want a second reading at all now and can pass on to an International Conference. The first paragraph tells us we have not yet taken the first step. How we can have made that large advance without having taken the first step is a very difficult thing to understand. I dare say Count Bernstorff draws some distinction between what he calls an initial step on the path of disarmament, in the first paragraph, and the preparatory technical work to which he refers in the second paragraph, but that is a very narrow point and a technical point. Either we have made sufficient advance, technically and otherwise, to be able to report to the Assembly that the work is now sufficiently complete to enable a Conference to be held, or we have not. I understood Count Bernstorff’s main objection to these discussions was that we had done practically nothing, and now his proposal is that we should do without a second reading.

This is a Preparatory Commission. The very name shows that we are to prepare the way for an International Conference. Count Bernstorff proposes that, although we are a Preparatory Commission, we should not prepare. I submit, on the contrary, that to do without that preparation would be simply to invite disaster in the Conference itself. That opinion has been expressed in the past, I believe, by many leading authorities, I think I can quote, in my own country, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and Sir Austen Chamberlain, and in France, I believe, both M. Herriot and M. Briand have expressed the view that it would be a most disastrous thing to go into a general International Conference unless the groundwork was carefully prepared by this Preparatory Commission. I am therefore absolutely opposed to the passing of this resolution, and I cannot help thinking we should be wasting the time of the Commission if we devote further consideration to it.

General DE MARINIS (Italy). — Several speakers having recalled statements I made yesterday regarding the conversations alluded to by Count Clauzel, and certain of these speakers having misinterpreted these statements, I should like to say a few words in this connection.

My friend the honourable delegate for Japan considered that I was making reservations with regard to these conversations. I was not doing anything of the kind. I should carefully avoid questioning the value of conversations very much which I should like to see lead to an agreement. Out of loyalty to my colleagues, however, I thought it my duty, when allusion was made to these conversations, to state that, if conversations were proceeding between other Governments, that did not in any way affect the situation of my own country. That situation remains what it was at the end of the first reading when, you will remember, I made a large number of reservations. That, I repeat, does not prevent me favouring these conversations, in which I hope that my own country will take part. But, as much importance has been attached to them, and as the honourable delegate for Sweden even said that he took note of them, I thought it necessary to inform my colleagues of the situation of my own country.

Now that I am speaking, I should like to say a word or two about the German draft resolution. I can sum up my attitude towards it by saying that I entirely agree with the remarks made by the delegate for Chile. I attach great importance to his observations and have come to the same conclusion, namely, that I cannot vote for the German draft resolution.

M. ROLIN JAEQUEMYS (Belgium). — I will conform to the instructions of the President and be exceedingly brief, and I will also observe his recommendation to consider only the proposal made by Count Bernstorff.

If we were now at the beginning of our session, I should be inclined to favour the principle underlying Count Bernstorff’s proposal. I should have felt then that it was only logical to proceed to a second reading—noting perhaps the necessity of postponing that reading in view of certain difficulties—and that we should not break up after considering nothing at all and merely saying that we might be more fortunate another time.
I therefore fully sympathise with Count Bernstorff's feeling, but, since then, circumstances have changed and new facts have to be considered. The first new fact is the original proposal for complete disarmament submitted by the Soviet delegation, upon which we have not yet taken a resolution but which the Commission would seem disposed to refer for discussion with other questions at our next session. This suggestion, which appears to be generally approved, presupposes another session, and it would be strange indeed if at that session we were only to discuss certain articles in the Soviet proposals without taking a second reading of the Commission's own Drafts.

Then there is another new fact. Count Bernstorff has submitted a proposal in regard to publicity—a very important proposal, which we shall have to discuss.

Then again, since yesterday evening or last night, we have received new proposals from the Soviet delegation contemplating a reduction instead of the abolition of armaments. We have already seen that these proposals are important, but they impinge upon all the schemes which we have ourselves been considering; I note a whole series of provisions concerning effective, material, aviation, control, etc. There is no doubt that these proposals are sufficiently important to deserve examination on a second reading. Again I would ask, Are we going to examine these proposals and neglect our own work? Surely not.

There is another very important new fact to which I personally attach especial value, because I do not wish, any more than Count Bernstorff, that the solution of this question should be indefinitely postponed. We have been pleased to hear of conversations which are proceeding between certain great Powers, and you will remember that I had already mentioned that the whole question was in the hands of the great Powers. These conversations give us reason to suppose that we shall have better chances of success at the next session.

In view of all these considerations, and even though at first sight Count Bernstorff's proposal had a good deal to recommend it, the situation would seem to have changed, and, as things are, it would be most surprising if we did not arrange for a second reading. I do not think that we can come to any other decision, especially in view of the observations made by the delegate for Chile, who pointed out that, before discussing the date of the Conference, we ought to await the conclusion of the labours of the Committee on Arbitration and Security, to which I think most of us attach great importance and which will have to be examined by this Commission.

The situation having thus changed, and being such that Governments cannot fail to provide us with the means of discussing this matter with prospects of success, I consider that Count Bernstorff's proposal has now no longer the same justification which it had when he first conceived it. It could perhaps be brought up again if necessary. I assure Count Bernstorff that I am fully in sympathy with his suggestion, since Belgium is as anxious for peace as Germany.

The President. — I think I may sum up the results of the discussion by saying that the great majority of the Commission is not in favour of Count Bernstorff's resolution. I think, therefore, that we should continue along the path we have hitherto followed and proceed to the second reading of our draft Convention.

Count Bernstorff (Germany). — I was about to make the same remark as the President. I have noted that the majority is against me for the second time, and I imagine that this will be my fate until the end of the session. I shall always be in a minority because there is this essential difference between ourselves and the majority, namely, that we desire to complete the work immediately, while the majority does not. Apart, however, from this fact, I naturally hope that the majority will convince me of its reasons, but, if it is to do so, I think it absolutely necessary to take more energetic steps than heretofore so that Governments may be persuaded to enter into useful negotiations. I do not think that this position has yet been reached. In view, however, of the rejection of our proposal, I shall have to make another statement. It will be of some length, and as it is already late, I will ask permission to make it this afternoon.

The meeting rose at 1.30 p.m.

President. — I call on Count Bernstorff, who has a declaration to make to the Commission. After he has spoken, I shall declare the closure of the debate on the draft resolution submitted by the German delegation.

Count Bernstorff (Germany). — I am submitting this declaration on the assumption that our proposal referring to the convening of the Disarmament Conference has been rejected by the majority of the members of our Commission.

Our discussion has now brought us to a stage at which I feel compelled to place before you the position in which we are situated. During the first five years of its existence—that is—until 1925, the League of Nations made a series of unsuccessful attempts to arrive at some positive result in connection with disarmament. The year 1925 marked a new stage in the work for disarmament. You will allow me to remind you that it was in virtue of a resolution of the Assembly of 1925 and in execution of that resolution that in December 1925 the Council appointed the present Commission.

From that time onwards, this Commission and its various Sub-Committees, after debates which lasted several months and with the aid of the most careful and thorough technical discussions, has accomplished a vast quantity of work. Sessions were held in May 1926, the autumn of 1926 in March and April 1927 and in December 1927. The present meeting constitutes our fifth session.

During the third session, which was held last spring, we succeeded in drawing up the draft Convention with which you are acquainted. That Draft is the first tangible result obtained from labours carried on for nearly eight years with the object of giving effect to the clauses in the Covenant relating to disarmament. The Draft was based on British and French proposals. At its session in June 1927, the Council expressed itself in sympathy with regard to this draft Convention. I would add that the representatives of France and the British Empire spoke in the most hopeful manner in regard to it. Everybody expected that in 1927 there would be a second reading of this draft Convention, and that that would mark the end of our preparatory work. In spite of these hopes, the date of the fourth session was fixed in such a manner that a second reading was not possible; it was decided to adjourn it to the fifth session; that is to say, to the present session, which was to meet on March 15th for that purpose. The decision to proceed with the second reading in March 1928 was adopted on a proposal by the President, which was unanimously accepted by the Commission. Nevertheless, once again our work is brought to a standstill. For my part, I must regret this lack of consistency, which may lower the prestige of our Commission. When, in December last, the delegation of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics presented its far-reaching schemes for disarmament, it was met with the objection that we should not on any account depart from the course which we had decided upon. They were told that “we should be committing a most dangerous error if we were to change our methods”, and, again, “that a man travelling through a forest would have a better chance of finding his way out if he kept on in one direction without inclining to the right or to the left, and that in any case he would thus attain a point where he would probably be better situated than in the centre of the forest”.

But I would point out that, in adopting the present course, we are neither maintaining the direction which we have hitherto followed up to the present moment, nor are we choosing a different road: we are simply standing still half-way. During the whole of last year, any impartial witness of our labours must have gained the impression from the proceedings of our Commission that, while appearing to continue to march forward, we were not in fact drawing a single step nearer to the goal set before us.

In view of the attitude which this Commission has adopted during the last few days, I would simply point out that we have taken no decision either to terminate the preparatory work for disarmament or to fix any date for the Disarmament Conference. I have no power to constrain the Commission to advance with greater speed. I do not think that, in urging the Commission to press on to a conclusion, I can be reproached with compromising our success in the future by wishing to achieve it forthwith. Nor would it be justifiable to argue, as certain remarks in the debate appeared to suggest, that the German Government and myself are alone desirous of urging the Commission to go forward. No, gentlemen; it is the Treaties which are urging us to go forward; we did not draw up the text of the Covenant; we did not draw up the Treaties. But the Covenant and the Treaties have been signed and solemnly ratified, and therefore they must be carried out. That fact was recognised by the Assembly. Need I remind you, gentlemen, that the Assembly of 1926 desired that the Disarmament Conference should meet before the autumn of 1927? Need I remind you that the Assembly of 1927 urged us to “hasten the completion of its technical work and to convene the Conference on the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments immediately this work has been completed”??
I am bound, to my deep regret, to declare that this resolution, together with the instructions given by the Assembly, have not received the attention which they deserved. I am bound to state that the peace with which the Commission has chosen to proceed is evidence of lack of zeal to give effect to the clauses of the Covenant.

The German Government, which has never ceased to press for greater speed in the work for disarmament in conformity with the Covenant and the Treaties, does not desire to be held responsible by the world’s public opinion for the fact that this Commission is showing itself constantly less able to fulfil the hopes which were based upon it when the Assembly and the Council entrusted it with a task of such importance and of such weighty responsibility in the eyes of posterity—namely, to prepare for the first Disarmament Conference.

As we are now to separate once more, contrary to all expectation, without having moved a single step forward, without having decided on the programme or the date of the Conference, there is manifestly only one course open to those who, like ourselves, desire the success of our labours in the interests of peace, namely, to make an appeal next autumn to the Assembly; to the Assembly which, three years ago—as it will then be—decree that this preparatory work should be undertaken; to the Assembly to which we ourselves, gentlemen, are responsible.

It need hardly be said that I should be well content if our Commission were able at the next Assembly to submit a draft Disarmament Convention which had passed its second reading, for such a Draft would be able to dissipate the doubts and grave apprehensions which I have been compelled to express here in the most public manner. Nevertheless, gentlemen, having regard to the course which our proceedings have now taken, it is to be feared that this hope again will be disappointed. In that case, the Assembly, which is the custodian of the prestige and authority of the League of Nations, will be the proper authority to direct our Commission to cease to give evidence in its too numerous sessions of such regrettable sterility. The Assembly will also be the authority best fitted to receive a report on the actual progress of the conversations between Governments which are constantly being alluded to here with so much fervour, but which, as we may again perceive, have taken place within an extremely modest and inadequate compass and which have not yet attained any practical result.

The President. — The discussion on the draft resolution submitted by the German delegation is closed.


The President. — I submit to the Commission on behalf of the Bureau the following revised text of its draft resolution:

"The Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference:

"I. Having examined the bases of the draft Convention for Immediate, Complete and General Disarmament submitted by the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, notes that the immense majority of its members are of opinion that this Draft, while in harmony with the ideals of mankind, is under existing world conditions incapable of being carried into execution, that it can only be realised when international organisation is strengthened in respect both of methods of pacific procedure and the system of sanctions, and that, consequently, the said Draft cannot be accepted by the Commission as a basis for its work, which work must be pursued along the lines already mapped out;

"II. Takes note of the proposal submitted by the German delegation regarding the last paragraph of Article 8 of the Covenant, and of the new draft Convention submitted by the delegation of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics on the question of the reduction of armaments, and, while reserving their consideration until its next session, commends them to the attention of the various Governments;

"III. Decides to leave its President free to fix, according to circumstances, the date at which it would be practically useful to convene a new session of the Commission in order to proceed to the second reading of the draft Convention on the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments. The Commission expresses the wish that the new session should begin in any case before the next session of the Assembly."

The Hon. Hugh Gibson (United States of America). — Mr. President,—It will be remembered that, in the course of the debate yesterday, I made a definite proposal that, when the time came to choose a date for our next meeting, we should refrain from choosing any arbitrary date and should leave to our President the duty and responsibility of calling us together at such time as, in his judgment, we could profitably embark upon a second reading. My proposal was honoured with the warm support of a number of my colleagues, among them the honourable delegates for Italy, Japan and Turkey, and several others.

I assumed that, in view of the fact that this proposal had commended itself to some at least of my colleagues, it would be taken into consideration in the drafting of the resolution on the subject of our next meeting. I confess to some surprise to observe from the wording of this resolution that my proposal has not been taken into account, and I feel impelled to ask on what grounds it was found impossible so to take it into account. My proposal was based on certain serious practical reasons of economy and convenience. I shall not take up the time of the Commission in recapitulating those reasons; I think you all have them fairly in mind. I can conceive just one ground, Mr. President, on which we should be justified at this time in deciding upon a definite limit such as is placed upon the freedom of the President in fixing a date. This would be the case only if we could be assured that the conversations
which have been alluded to in the course of the discussions here are proceeding so satisfactorily as to give us a definite assurance, or a very considerable assurance, that we can come back here at the date chosen with a sufficient amount of agreement to ensure success. If, on the other hand, there is no such assurance that we can come back to the original objections which have been alluded to, day by day to fixing a definite date. I need hardly say here that no delegation is more heartily in favour of proceeding with the work at the earliest possible moment when this can be done effectively. In order that my views may be quite clear, I should like to move an amendment to strike out the last sentence of the resolution.

M. LITVINOFF (Union of Socialist Soviet Republics).—Mr. President,—I hope you will understand that I cannot vote for that resolution, nor for any part of it. I cannot vote for Part I, which rejects our own proposal for total disarmament. I cannot vote for the last part, which does not fix any date for the next session of the Commission. I particularly object to the second part, in which the first reading of our new draft Convention for the Reduction of Armaments is referred to a later date. This is being done without any preliminary discussion; there has been no discussion on this point at all. It is a resolution quite new to me and I do not know—and I did not know last night—on what grounds the refusal to consider our proposals to now, at this session, is based. As the proposals for transferring the work of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission to the International Conference have been rejected, I venture to express a hope at the eleventh hour that some attempt may be made to bring new life into the Preparatory Commission, and I for one would like to be a contributor to this end by moving the first reading of the new Soviet draft Convention. Before doing this, however, I wish to refer shortly to a remark that was made this morning by Count Clauzel to the effect that I had said that we should not support our own draft Convention if it were to be adopted by other Governments, implying that our revolution is already devouring its children. I wish to assure Count Clauzel on this point. He evidently did not quite understand my words. I said that a Soviet Government would not necessarily feel itself bound by all the articles of the draft Convention. A part of the Draft is not the Draft itself. I should also like to qualify Count Clauzel’s remarks as to our draft Convention for total disarmament having received examination article by article at this session. A number of articles have, it is true, been scrutinised and subjected to severe criticism, but these have been the least essential points. The first thirty-six articles, which form the essence of the whole project, have not been touched on. Total disarmament—the very gist of our Convention—has been summarily rejected.

I should like, while I am about it, to explain to the honourable delegate for Poland that the Preamble of our new Convention, in calling armaments one of the factors of war, is not in contradiction with our previous statements. We have never asserted that armaments are the only cause of war, but that abolition of armaments would certainly stop war. The causes may be hydra-headed, but all these heads can be smitten off with one sword.

I now come to our second set of proposals. The resolutions now proposed seem to point to the existence of a desire among those present not to occupy themselves with our draft Convention for the Reduction of Armaments but to bring the session to a speedy end. It is easy to understand the human desire of those who have been here from the beginning of the Session of the Committee on Arbitration and Security to cease from their labours for a while, but they themselves can scarcely feel true satisfaction in bringing the session to an end when work still remains to be done.

Complaints have been made that we have, so to speak, sprung upon the Commission, at the eleventh hour, a new draft Convention. It will be understood that, while our proposals for total disarmament—which is and always will be our chief aim—had not been conclusively dealt with by the Commission, it would have been impossible for us to bring in proposals of less importance and excluding our first proposals.

I shall not now go into the merits of our draft Convention, although some parts of it have really been touched on by the speakers this morning. For instance, the honourable delegate for Poland said that what is new in our proposals is not good and what is good is not new. I think he will find himself in opposition to the honourable delegate for France, who told us this morning that there is nothing new in our proposals and that what is contained in them was long ago rejected. That means that what is good has been rejected! According to the honourable delegate for Poland, you have rejected what is good in our proposals.

I cannot understand Count Clauzel when he insists to-day, as he did last night, that the best way of doing fruitful work is to do nothing. I tried to obtain some explanation from him yesterday, but he has repeated the same statement to-day without giving any explanation.

I am trying to speak in English, but I am afraid that whatever language I use would always remain the Soviet language and would scarcely be understandable to the other delegations here. I shall therefore, try to speak a language which has been used here before on a similar occasion, when the first two schemes for partial disarmament were introduced by the British and French delegations. This is what was said at the time:

"Once those three great categories have been adopted, we can then go on to consider within each of them the general problems with regard to which an agreement is desirable on the question of principle before we go into technical details."

That was said by the President. That is exactly what we demand for our draft Convention—that you should first agree on the main principles and then pass on to the detailed discussion. That was proposed by the President when the first two schemes were introduced and I would ask him to be good enough to extend to us the same privilege.
Further, the delegate of the British Empire, Viscount Cecil, said:

"We are met formally to consider the results of the enquiries that our technical Sub-Commissions have been carrying out, but I agree that you must feel there will be a profound disappointment in the world unless we can show, at the end of our session, a definite and concrete advance in the path towards reduction and limitation of armaments."

That was said at the third session of this Commission. Since then, we have held our fourth and fifth sessions and nothing has been done. The same sentences can be applied to our present work.

Further on, Viscount Cecil says:

"The British Government have, I need not say in common with all the other Governments, been considering this question with the greatest care, and they have thought that probably the best way they can help in a solution of this very grave question is to present to this Commission a draft project of a Convention, not, of course, with a view of imposing the solutions there stated upon their colleagues—that would be an absurd pretension—but to form the basis of a discussion which we hope will be more fruitful than, and would naturally fall to the ground, and he would, of course, very naturally, have drawn up that Convention, and, before I proceed with my observations, I wish to ask the Secretariat to be good enough to hand round copies in English and French of that Convention."

That is exactly what I said last night; I said I would pass on our draft Convention to the Secretariat to be distributed to you for your consideration. That has been done. I must pay a tribute to the excellent work done by the Disarmament Section of the League, to which I can hardly give too much praise. We have now before us our draft Convention in both languages, and I see no reason why it should not be dealt with in the same way as was done at the first session with the British and French draft Conventions. The honourable delegate for Poland, M. Sokal, said at that time:

"It would be better for us to know both the British and the French Drafts before continuing the discussion, and to adjourn until Thursday or Wednesday afternoon."

He went so far as to propose an adjournment for several days to study the proposal and then proceed with further work. I would ask the delegate of our neighbouring country to be good enough to allow us the same privilege.

The last quotation I wish to make is from a speech by the honourable delegate of the United States of America, who said:

"The draft Conventions which have been submitted by the British and French delegations and the very important explanations which have been offered by Viscount Cecil and M. Paul-Boncour have given us a great deal of material calling for the most careful study. I confess I have not yet had time to examine these proposals with the care which they deserve. My military and naval associates are studying them carefully, but in a matter of such vast importance they feel they will require several days to do full justice to the subject.

"Realising the importance of the draft Conventions, I have telegraphed the full text of both of them to my Government, and I trust that within a few days I may be in possession of an expression of its views."

You will see from that what action was taken by honourable delegates in connection with other schemes introduced by other delegations. I ask you, Mr. President and gentlemen, why, in fairness, the same procedure should not apply in the case of our proposals. What are the obstacles in the way of considering at least the principles of our Convention and expressing views upon them? Why should we not proceed with the first reading in the same way as with regard to the other Conventions?

I therefore feel I cannot fulfil my task and the mandate I have received from my Government without moving in the most formal way the first reading of our new draft Convention on the Reduction of Armaments.

Lord CUSHENDUN (British Empire). — It appears to me that we are once more faced with a question of procedure which may be one of considerable importance, and I cannot help thinking that our deliberations have been very much and unnecessarily lengthened and the issues confused because we have not always kept clearly before us the exact motion or resolution which was for immediate consideration. At the present moment, we began by having put into our hands a resolution prepared by the Bureau, and discussion began upon that resolution, and Mr. Gibson moved an amendment to leave out the last sentence. Now, I do most earnestly hope that, whatever may be the opinion of the Commission with regard to the merits of M. Litvinoff's proposal (on which I do not wish to say anything for the moment), we shall get rid one way or the other of that resolution first. Surely it is obviously an elementary pretension—but to form the basis of a discussion which we hope will be more fruitful than, and would naturally fall to the ground, and he would, of course, very naturally, in order to give effect to his own views, vote against the motion of the Bureau, as he has told us he is prepared to do. If, on the other hand, the majority of the Commission sympathises with M. Litvinoff's position and agrees with his views, it is open to them to vote against the Bureau resolution in order to give him an opportunity of bringing his forward afterwards.
Surely it is impossible for us either to discuss or to vote upon the two at one and the same time? I shall have some observations to make upon the proposal of M. Litvinoff, because I should like to point out to the Commission, when the right time comes, that in my judgment, there is no sort of analogy whatever between the acceptance of the draft Conventions put forward by Viscount Cecil and M. Paul-Boncour last year and the proposal to consider the draft Convention of M. Litvinoff now. I do not think there is any analogy between the two cases; the circumstances are quite different. I do not, however, wish to go into that for the moment, because I should be making the very mistake which I am asking the Commission to avoid, and therefore I do earnestly hope that we shall come to a definite decision, if necessary by a vote, in order that we may know what the Commission thinks with regard to the resolution submitted by the Bureau.

With reference to the amendment proposed by Mr. Gibson, I think it is a very reasonable one. It seems to me to be rather contradictory first of all to say that we shall leave to the discretion of the President the convening of a meeting at a time when the circumstances make a successful issue probable, and at the same time to lay down a limit. That question presents itself to my mind as a sort of analogy with some scientific research. Scientific men may be engaged upon research to discover some particular substance—possibly a drug very desirable for the cure of disease—and they may devote all their energies and knowledge to the examination of that scientific subject. Surely it would be very absurd if some authority interested in their scientific enquiry were to say: “You must achieve a result by September 1st,” or, “You must achieve a result by October 1st.” All that you can do in such cases is to say: “Devote your energies to the matter, do not delay, and let us have results as soon as possible.” I entirely agree with Mr. Gibson that it is probably harmful to lay down limits. Surely it is impossible for us either to discuss or to vote upon the two at one and the same time.

I only raise these two points: first, that we should dispose of the resolution of the Bureau before we proceed to discuss M. Litvinoff’s proposal; and I suggest that we should support the amendment moved by Mr. Gibson.

The President. — I opened the discussion on the resolution as a whole to give an opportunity for an exchange of views; but I trusted that it would be brief. I agree with Lord Cushendun that we must now take the proposals in succession. I will begin with paragraph III, to which Mr. Gibson’s amendment refers. I request those who are about to speak to be good enough to confine their remarks for the moment to that amendment. You will remember that Mr. Gibson has moved to omit from the draft resolution the last sentence:

“The Commission expresses the wish that the new session should begin in any case before the next session of the Assembly.”

M. Rutgers (Netherlands). — If we were to omit only the last words: “before the next session of the Assembly”, we should still say that the Commission “expresses the wish that the new session should begin in any case”, which would be excellent. It is very desirable indeed that we should have some assurance that there will be a new session “in any case.”

I practised for some years as a barrister in the Law Courts at Amsterdam. I noticed a rather singular fact, namely, that my colleagues (not to mention myself), though they were very hard workers, only produced the work allotted to them at the very last minute of the time allowed, I cannot help wondering whether the conversations which Count Clauzel and Lord Cushendun have referred to would have taken place by now were it not that the military experts of the different Governments had been brought together at Geneva for our session. I feel that it may be desirable to ensure that our work should not be subject to further delays, as in the past, and that for that purpose we should fix some final date in order to be sure that we shall arrive at the goal we all desire. Consider what might happen if we do not mention any date in our resolution. The conversations in question are not being held in public. I do not know how our President is going to be kept constantly informed of the progress of those conversations. It may happen that the President, being anxious not to convene the Commission again without having received sufficient assurances that our goal can be attained, may not venture to summon us for another session because he may not be certain whether the conversations have been proceeded with. If we omit the last sentence, it is possible that we may never assemble again here. For that reason, I, personally, consider it rather important to retain this sentence.

Count Clauzel (France). — I have asked to speak in order to reply, in conformity with your invitation to the members of the Commission, to the amendment of Mr. Gibson, which has been supported by Lord Cushendun.

I would remind you that it is in part due to the insistence of the French delegation that the sentence now under discussion was added to the resolution. I have indeed, on several occasions, emphasised the desire of the French delegation that our work should attain fruition as early as possible. It was for that reason that I had asked that the second reading, during
which we shall study the proposals of the Soviet delegation, should be held before the next Assembly. That was evidence that it was my desire to take a step forward as early as possible. I have already explained my reasons at such length that it is unnecessary for me to take up the time of the Commission in repeating them. These reasons are recorded in our Minutes, and the public has had the opportunity of noting them. I only desire to express my regret to M. Litvinoff that my remarks were not better understood by him. I used to know Russian when I was a young man; I am afraid I have rather forgotten it. Besides, I should not have been able to make use of his beautiful language, as its use has not yet been authorised in the League of Nations. But he knows French very well and I am sure that he understood me perfectly, unless, indeed, perhaps he did not wish to appear to understand me; for in French we have a well-known proverb which says that “there are none so deaf as those who won’t hear.”

M. Litvinoff is very well aware—as is also Count Bernstorff—that the French delegation is extremely desirous of reaching positive results as early as possible and under the most favourable conditions. It is for that reason that we wished—that we still wish—that this second reading, during which the proposals of the Soviet delegation will be discussed, should be taken at the earliest possible date. I am compelled to give way before the arguments of economy and convenience which have been advanced by the representative of the distant Republic of the United States and which have been supported by Lord Cushendun with all the weight of his authority. I would gladly accept whatever wording may be thought best in this sense, it being understood that the desire which I have expressed on behalf of the French delegation will, in any case, be recorded in our Minutes. Or, if it should be possible to find some formula of compromise which would express a hope instead of a wish, and which would be acceptable to Mr. Gibson and the representative of the British Empire, I should be very glad to support it.

However that may be, I have had an opportunity of repeating once more that the desire of the French delegation is to reach positive results as early as possible and under favourable conditions.

M. Veverka (Czechoslovakia).—I desire to move the following wording, which might, it appears to me, easily reconcile the different points of view expressed in the discussion:

“The Commission expresses the hope that the new session should begin at the earliest opportune date and, if possible, before the next session of the Assembly.”

The Hon. Hugh Gibson (United States of America).—I think the wording suggested by the honourable delegate for Czechoslovakia is entirely responsive to the end that we have in view in that it removes the apparent contradiction between the two paragraphs. In order to give effect to my views, I shall be glad to withdraw my amendment and accept his.

The President.—The following is the text as now amended:

“Decides to leave its President free to fix, according to circumstances, the date at which it would be practically useful to convene a new session in order to proceed to the second reading of the draft Convention on the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments. The Commission expresses the hope that the new session should begin at the earliest opportune date and, if possible, before the next session of the Assembly.”

M. Hennings (Sweden).—I have been anticipated by M. Veverka. I had intended to propose an amendment almost in the same terms, but I accept the wording proposed by M. Veverka.

Munir Bey (Turkey).—The Turkish delegation desires an explanation in regard to paragraph III of the resolution. We observe that in paragraph II certain questions are reserved for examination at a later session of the Preparatory Commission, whereas in paragraph III the second reading of the draft Convention is alone referred to. Is it clearly understood that not only the second reading of the draft Convention but also the questions reserved for examination by this Commission, including the draft of the Soviet delegation, are also intended?

The President.—That is so. Paragraph II says “until its next session”. I think that we are agreed.

General de Marinis (Italy).—I have already expressed my approval of Mr. Gibson’s proposal, and I gave you my reasons. Now that Mr. Gibson accepts M. Veverka’s amendment, I am prepared to agree to that also, and I may add that I have every hope that our President will convene the Commission when his information allows him to feel sufficiently confident that our work will yield results somewhat more positive than has hitherto been the case.

Paragraph III was adopted as read by the President.

Count Bernstorff (Germany).—May I be allowed just one word? I did not vote on Mr. Gibson’s proposal because, after the discussions of the last few days, it must be perfectly clear that I shall not vote for this third part of the resolution at all, and as I vote against the whole resolution, I have no occasion to consider amendments.

The President.—We will now pass on to paragraph I of the resolution. Dr. Riddell has some remarks to make.

Dr. Riddell (Canada).—I would move to delete in paragraph I the words “in respect both of methods of pacific procedure and the system of sanctions”, for the following reason. The enumeration seems to the Canadian delegation to be entirely incomplete, and unless
you are prepared to complete it it is better to leave it out. It adds nothing to the principle itself, which you have stated, of the lack of international organisation; and in the third place, as it is worded it puts this Commission on record as stating that both the methods of pacific procedure and all systems of sanctions are inadequate: I therefore have pleasure in moving the deletion of those words.

General de Marinis (Italy). — The Italian delegation gives its hearty support to the proposal by the honourable delegate of Canada.

M. Sokal (Poland). — I think that we can hardly examine the resolution word by word and discuss each passage, or we shall never get to the end. I propose that we omit the whole of the first part of the paragraph, which does not in the least represent the idea we have expressed. What it means is that the Soviet Draft is in harmony with the ideals of mankind, but under existing world conditions is incapable of being carried into execution. I do not think we said that the Draft was in harmony with the ideals of mankind; we said that general disarmament was in harmony with those ideals. The wording used does not quite reflect the Commission's opinion.

I think, however, that remarks like this could be multiplied by the dozen, and it would take us a fortnight to examine the text. It would be much better simply to say that the Commission:

"Notes that this Draft cannot be accepted by the Commission as a basis for its work, which work must be pursued along the lines already mapped out."

The President. — The following is the text proposed by M. Sokal for paragraph I:

"Notes that the immense majority of its members are of opinion that this Draft cannot be accepted by the Commission as a basis for its work, which work must be pursued along the lines already mapped out."

M. Holsti (Finland). — I support M. Sokal's suggestion.

M. Perez (Argentina). — The Argentine delegation also supports M. Sokal's amendment.

Count Clausel (France). — The French delegation is also entirely in favour of M. Sokal's happy suggestion.

Dr. Riddell (Canada). — I shall be very pleased to withdraw my amendment in favour of M. Sokal's proposal, as the greater includes the less.

Paragraph I was adopted in the text proposed by M. Sokal.

Count Bernstorff (Germany). — I should like to ask for an explanation with regard to paragraph II. If I understood aright, it was decided, when adopting this paragraph of the resolution, not at present to discuss the new draft Convention submitted by the delegation of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics.

The President. — Yes, that is the correct interpretation.

Count Bernstorff (Germany). — As the Commission has not yet taken a decision on this point, I should like to state that I am always—at any time, day or night—ready to discuss all matters relating to disarmament, and that therefore I am perfectly prepared to examine M. Litvinoff's draft at once.

The President. — If that is the Commission's wish, it can, of course, open a discussion here and now on M. Litvinoff's draft Convention. It has, however, been pointed out that such a procedure would not be in conformity with the agenda and that the Russian proposals were submitted to us too late for discussion at our present session. We could, if we wished, modify the procedure, but I really think that in the circumstances it would be better to postpone the study of this draft Convention until our next session, and to submit it in the meantime to the various Governments.

Paragraph II and the draft resolution as a whole were adopted.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Socialist Soviet Republics). — Mr. President, I consider myself bound, before the Commission finally disperses, to make a short declaration expounding the point of view of the Soviet delegation and of the Soviet Government with regard to the results of that part of the work of the Preparatory Commission in which the Soviet delegation has participated.

You are aware, Mr. President, that the Soviet Government responded immediately to the invitation of the Council of the League of Nations to take part in the labours of the Preparatory Commission, and that it was not its fault that the Soviet delegation could not take part in the first three sessions. As soon as the Soviet delegation arrived to take part in the work of the fourth session, it presented, without wasting a moment of time, its proposal for the immediate consideration of the principle of immediate, complete and general disarmament. The proposal of the Soviet delegation was rejected by the Preparatory Commission, which only agreed to undertake its consideration at the next session. The fifth session, taking place three months after the fourth, considered the Soviet proposal in order to reject it. I am therefore unable to affirm that the Commission during the course of its fourth and fifth sessions has done anything positive by way of fulfilling those tasks for which it was created. In the course of the discussion of the Soviet draft Convention for total disarmament, we were told that the principle of total disarmament itself runs counter to the Covenant of the League
Nations and contradicts the mandate given to the Preparatory Commission, so that this principle cannot be made the basis of its further labours. We have been assured that the Commission can only do fruitful work by accepting as a basis the principle of the reduction of armaments.

True to the sincere desire of its Government to do everything possible to bring about even the partial diminution of the burden of militarism, the Soviet delegation, without wasting time on formalities, and firmly desirous somehow or another to achieve the tasks it had set itself for the reduction of armaments, immediately brought in its project for partial disarmament, based on the same principle as has been declared by all the speakers here to underlie the work of the Preparatory Commission.

The Soviet delegation is still unable to see any serious justification for any postponement of the consideration of a scheme capable in any way of lightening the burden of militarism and thus in itself diminishing the danger of war.

Despite the aspirations and insistence of the Soviet delegation for the most rapid possible achievement of that aim, the realisation of which humanity is awaiting, the Preparatory Commission has found it possible to postpone indefinitely the consideration of the Soviet draft Convention for partial disarmament.

Most of those coming to such a decision apparently consider that the realisation as speedily as possible of the problem of disarmament, if only partial, can wait. They consider apparently that humanity can wait indefinitely for the Preparatory Commission to find a convenient time for the resumption of work capable of causing some relief to the burden of incessant armament and diminishing the possibility of the repetition of a new massacre still more monstrous than the last.

Voices have been heard—I recall the words of M. Politis—comparing the work of the Preparatory Commission to that of a scientist in his laboratory. It has been ironically remarked that the ignorant do not understand the necessity for slowness in such scientific research.

I feel myself bound to declare that the Soviet delegation does not regard the work of the Preparatory Commission as similar to the research work of an astronomer endeavouring to find a new star or planet. Great as are the services of astronomy, humanity can wait for the discovery of new stars.

To agree to a similar slowness of work with regard to a question of such urgent practical politics as that of disarmament or reduction of armaments would be to ignore the true interests of humanity and the dangers with which it is continually faced.

May those who believe that they have indefinite time at their disposal for work in the Preparatory Disarmament Commission not receive a rude shock one day! We, for our part, knowing something of international relations, see these dangers and have tried to warn the Preparatory Commission to work speedily with a view to avoiding them.

The Soviet delegation cannot undertake any responsibility whatsoever for the delay in considering its draft Convention for partial disarmament. It emphasises with the utmost clarity that the responsibility for this delay, with all its possible consequences, must be laid at the door of the majority in this Commission.


The President.—Gentlemen,—We have now come to the end of our work, and it remains for me to draw up a balance-sheet of our session. I need not detain you long.

For a long time before the opening of this session, it was said on all sides, both among delegates and among the public, that this session would be of no importance. Now that our meeting is at an end, I venture to say that, on the contrary, this session has been undeniably important and interesting. Its importance consists above all in the fact that the delegation of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics has had an opportunity of freely developing its ideas in regard to total and general disarmament or, as its title reads, “immediate, complete and general disarmament”. On the other hand, the members of our Commission, with that frankness which distinguishes all our meetings at Geneva, have been able, without any circumlocution, to expound their criticisms and opinions in regard to the Russian proposals. It has been shown that the Russian Draft is impracticable, or, if I may be allowed to use the word of our draft resolution, “incapable, under existing world conditions, of being carried into execution”.

The new proposals by the Soviet delegation which were distributed to us yesterday evening have not been discussed. They will be submitted to the different Governments, and we shall see at our next session what use can be made of them.

You have asked me to convene this session as soon as possible, and I undertake to do so. You have left it to me to decide as to when. I need not repeat what I have already said a few days ago—that I shall not fix upon any arbitrary date of meeting. It is my hope that I shall be able to convene the meeting as soon as possible, probably before the next Assembly.

I may also recall that we have taken a firm decision, marked by the manner in which the Commission received Count Bernstorff’s proposal. We have decided not to abandon the method of work hitherto adopted, but to follow along the lines that we have already mapped out. We shall therefore take a second reading of our draft Convention.

1 See Annex 6.
On the present occasion, we have had the pleasure of welcoming a new delegation—that of Turkey—and we rejoice to learn that it will be taking part in the discussions of the Committee on Arbitration and Security.

We have also had among us, for the second time, the delegation of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. I hope that this will not be the last time, and I understand that that delegation will participate in our next session. May I say that its collaboration is very useful to us. Obviously, the clash of ideas, especially in the manner in which it is produced at the meetings in Geneva, is of the utmost importance, and Soviet criticism will always be useful to our discussions. I will, however, ask that delegation in all seriousness to attend our next and any ensuing meetings in a constructive spirit, and not with the idea of destroying the work we have already done. I may be allowed to make this request, for we are old and they are young, and in the study of these problems age has great advantages. It has experience. When I say “we” I mean our Governments. We have experience and along with that a very exact sense of realities. As I have said to you quite recently, we old ones understand the psychology and mentality of men and of the masses which make up nations. If the delegations of younger Governments will co-operate with us, we can achieve great things with our combination of youthful enthusiasm and ripe experience. I will ask them to come and join us in our laboratory of peace, in our disarmament laboratory, and help us to prepare a gradual disarmament, both moral and material, as we understand it and have always understood it—that is to say, a gradual reduction of armaments. If they will help us to do that, we shall avoid disappointing the peoples of the world, who may one day reproach us with having thrown dust in their eyes. (Applause.)

M. Valdés-Menéndez (Chile).—I have asked permission to speak at the conclusion of our work, in the first place to thank the President for the tact and impartiality he has shown in the direction of our discussions and for his devotion to the cause for which we are working. He has given fresh proof of it by the wise words he has just uttered.

There is one point I wish to make which has an important bearing on our future work. Nearly two years ago we lost the collaboration of Spain and Brazil, those two great countries whose delegates, inspired by the noble ideals of peace and international co-operation, had played a distinguished part in our work for the reduction and limitation of armaments. I am sure that all my colleagues will share the pleasure I feel at the resolution which the Spanish Government has taken to respond to the unanimous appeal addressed to it by the Council to resume its place in the League of Nations. This happy event gives us the certainty that we shall be able to count upon the valuable co-operation of Spain at the next session of the Preparatory Commission, and before we part I desired to express the importance I attach to this collaboration.

It would have been a particular pleasure to me to be able to extend the same congratulations to Brazil, for the collaboration of this great nation in our work would increase the importance and significance of the co-operation of the countries of Latin America with our Commission. We already enjoy the assistance of the representatives not only of the States Members of the Council but of the Argentine Republic, which has throughout given us such valuable help. I must, however, limit myself to expressing fervent hopes that Brazil will return to her place in the League. I hope, at any rate, that she will give our Commission that collaboration which she has continued to lend to several organs of the League of Nations, as we have all had occasion to note, and as the Brazilian Government itself recalls in its recent telegram to the President of the Council. (Applause.)

M. Litvinoff (Union of Socialist Soviet Republics).—We have disagreed during this session on so many points that I should like to end by agreeing on one point, although a very small one. I should like to express my gratitude for and appreciation of the excellent work done by the Secretariat of the League of Nations, and especially by the Disarmament Section, and for the efficiency with which they have served us during the session.

Lord Cushendun (British Empire).—I should like to be allowed, although it is a small point, to express the pleasure that I have in finding myself in complete agreement with M. Litvinoff.

The President.—I declare the fifth session of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference closed.

The Commission rose at 5.50 p.m.
ANNEX 1.

PROPOSAL BY COUNT BERNSTORFF
CONCERNING THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE COVENANT

In conformity with the Council resolution of July 1923, the Armaments Year-Book was created with a view to the “carrying out, as from the present time, of the intentions of the last paragraph of Article 8 of the Covenant”. Thanks to excellent work done by the Secretariat of the League, the Year-Book has continued to develop year by year. It cannot, however, give a clear idea of the armed forces at the disposal of the different States. The Year-Book does not yet fulfil the purpose mentioned in the last paragraph of Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, whereby Governments “undertake to exchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval and air programmes and the condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to warlike purposes”.

Exact information as to the armaments of States is the basis of that confidence which constitutes one of the surest guarantees of peace. It is impossible for States to estimate the requirements of their national security until they are informed concerning the armaments of other States which might threaten that security. Finally, no starting-point can be found for a general scheme of disarmament unless it is known what armaments are in existence before disarmament is carried out.

It would certainly not be expedient to make any essential change in the character of the Armaments Year-Book in its present form or to suggest any limitation of the information so far furnished. At the same time, it is essential that States should undertake to supply such information as is required to give a clear idea of the armaments which exist. In order that this information may be furnished on similar bases and presented in the Year-Book in a uniform manner, it is very desirable that it should, as far as possible, be given in tabular form.

Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations obliges Members of the League to furnish information on the three following points:

(1) The scale of their armaments;
(2) Their military, naval and air programmes;
(3) The condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to warlike purposes.

It is to these three points that the following proposals refer.

I. SCALE OF ARMAMENTS.

(a) Effective with military training at a country’s disposal on the outbreak of hostilities (see Tables I to IX).
(b) War material at a country’s disposal on the outbreak of hostilities (see Tables X to XII).

II. ARMAMENTS PROGRAMMES.

Details should be given as to:

(a) The plans of Governments as regards changes affecting organisation or material where such changes have been put in force by laws or decrees.
(b) The actual effects of these changes during the following year.

III. CONDITION OF SUCH INDUSTRIES AS ARE ADAPTABLE TO WARLIKE PURPOSES.

It is important in the first place to know what private and Government armament industries exist in time of peace. As the output capacity and particularly the training of engineers and workmen with experience in the manufacture of war material depend on the extent to which the armament industry is employed, it would be well to provide for information being given on this question, as in Table XIII.

In addition, it is important to know what will be the maximum capacity of the armament industries in case of war according to the reckoning of the State in question, and how far the plans of that State provide for assistance in the production of war material being given by other industries not engaged in the manufacture of such material in time of peace. These particulars might be supplied under Table XIV. The statistical data already furnished by the Armaments Year-Book would retain their full value. It would, however, be desirable to supplement and extend them. It might further be considered whether it would not be well also to supply information as to how far a State is lacking in important raw materials and how far it is dependent, in view of its particular industrial situation, on the importation of war material.

Lastly, it will perhaps be desirable to supplement the Armaments Year-Book by giving information on fortifications and on fortified bases for the naval and air forces.
Table I.
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<th>Long-term service</th>
<th>Total effectives with the colours</th>
<th>With the active army</th>
<th>Periods of training</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Non-commissioned officers</th>
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Remarks:

1. "Long-term service" indicates, in the case of conscript armies, a longer period of service than that prescribed by law and, in the case of volunteer armies, a period of service exceeding one year.

2. Effectives "available without mobilisation" include men of the active army on indefinite leave but liable to recall, and men who have completed their service with the colours but do not yet belong, under the laws of the State in question, to the reserve proper.

3. "Reserve" effectives include classes discharged after completing their service with the colours or their period on the "available" list.

4. By effectives "available without mobilisation" and "in reserve" are meant men with military training entered on the registers and obliged by law to perform military service in case of war.

5. "Other ranks" are men having a lower rank or grade than that of non-commissioned officer.