C. Any estimate of the actual value of peace-time armaments in time of war can be of no appreciable interest except as regards countries which have war industries and are rich in raw materials. All military men have experience of the enormous deterioration and damage suffered by arms and material in general, and of the immense consumption of munitions during a war, and they know how important it is that there should be an adequate supply of munitions. It is also well known that, whatever quantity may be available at the beginning of a war and whatever saving may be made, the stocks of material and munitions in hand can never suffice in themselves, but that renewals must keep pace with consumption and deterioration. Consequently, there can be no question of peace-time armaments being of any great value to a country which cannot effect renewals out of its own resources, having regard to the possibility that for one reason or another it might find itself unable to import. The conversion of peace-time armaments into war-time armaments is also dependent upon the industrial arrangements available. More especially, in connection with the distinction between civil and military aircraft, we do not think that the difference is great enough to justify the assertion that civil aircraft would be useless for war purposes. On the contrary, we are of opinion that heavy transport aircraft used for conveying passengers and mails could easily be converted into bombing machines, while light aircraft could be converted into scouts and fighting machines. Consequently, the whole of the aircraft of a country should be regarded as a military force, and evaluated at the actual number and power of the machines in use.

Question VII.

Admitting that disarmament depends on security — as, indeed, we believe, and have frequently maintained — it is obvious that any reduction which is to have useful results must affect the armaments of all countries without exception, and not those of certain limited regions. It is impossible to be certain what country might conceivably in the future attack another country, and to include those two countries in disarmed regions. If, for example, a measure of regional disarmament were carried out including a country X, and if in the future another country W not included in this regional disarmament should in any way appear likely to attack the first country, what would be the position of the disarmed X threatened by the fully-armed W? Moreover, if in this regional disarmament we followed the principle of including groups of contiguous countries, we should then find ourselves faced with the problem of the neighbours of the contiguous countries, and so on ad infinitum.

Since, therefore, regional disarmament seems to be so ineffectual, and general disarmament so difficult, we are of opinion that, in order to achieve the latter and more desirable end, something like the following process might take place:

1. Groups should be formed of countries linked by special treaties of security and mutual assistance, under the auspices and under the immediate supervision of the League of Nations, as complementary to the Covenant, and
2. A gradual, fair, and properly proportioned reduction of armaments should be carried out.

This line of action, we think, might lead to general disarmament, which is essential for the tranquillity and peace of the world.

We feel bound to emphasise the word "general", because there are some countries which are not Members of the League of Nations and which might conceivably not feel bound to submit to any decisions which the League might take, and in view of the position, in that event, of the countries bordering upon them, which might be disarming at the very moment when their neighbours were doing the reverse.

As regards the economic and military assistance (Question V(b)), contemplated in Article 16 of the Covenant, we regard this as being one of the most important points, and one of the most effective means of securing a considerable, and approximately general, reduction of armaments.

In our opinion, it is the only way to inspire that confidence and sense of security upon which disarmament entirely depends.

If, however, that confidence and sense of security are to be stable and absolute, we think that a complete scheme of action and financial and economic assistance for an attacked country should be drawn up in advance, on the following lines:

1. Determine the armed forces to be sent to the aid of the country attacked;
2. Determine the financial and economic assistance to be given;
3. Determine the exact measure in which each State should contribute either armed forces or material and funds for this assistance;
4. Determine the time-limit within which the armed forces sent to assist should arrive in the field, in order to prevent the risk of a serious attack, and to spare the attacked country such general or local catastrophes as might result from such an attack;
5. Draw up a full and clear scheme of operations, having regard to the special circumstances of each country and the possibilities of attack;
6. Contemplate the eventualities of a State which was expected to contribute assistance failing for any reason to fulfil its obligations in time, or to fulfil them at all, and decide upon the immediate measures to be taken to make good the loss due to such defection or impotence.
(7) Regard as null and void all treaties of alliance or special conventions existing with the attacking country;

(8) Assuming that the attack was premeditated and came as a surprise, the attacker having collected the forces needed for an invasion, it would be doubtful whether the assistance arranged for could be brought into operation in time to prevent such invasion. In this eventuality (a highly probable one):

(a) The country attacked should be assisted as speedily as possible, and all the measures contemplated in Article 16 of the Covenant should be carried out without delay;

(b) An ultimatum should be sent through the League of Nations to the attacking country, calling upon it to withdraw its troops at once and unconditionally, and to indemnify the attacked country to an amount to be determined on an estimate of the damage done;

(c) Hostilities should not cease, nor pressure upon the attacker be withdrawn, until he has acted as required by the ultimatum and has indemnified the country attacked; and

(d) If the armed forces sent for this purpose prove to be insufficient, they should be reinforced without delay, so as to compel the attacking country to accept the League's conditions.

If these conditions could be so realised as to inspire a sense of security and absolute confidence, there could, we feel, be no justification for any State refusing under such circumstances to reduce its armaments to a minimum.

Notwithstanding her precarious geographical situation, the immense length of her frontiers, the almost total destruction of her armaments during the recent wars, Greece would be most happy to find herself free to employ all her revenue in peace works and for peace purposes, for the comfortable settlement of her refugees, and for her internal development. She would naturally, therefore, reduce all her armaments to a minimum without delay, and without reservation; but before doing so she must have that sense of security, she must believe, she must have absolute confidence, in those to whom she would entrust her independence, the integrity of her territory, and her future existence.

Under those conditions she would immediately reduce all her armaments with a genuine and profound sense of relief.
REPORT OF THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL
ON THE WORK OF ITS FIRST SESSION

 Held at Geneva from May 18th to 26th, 1926.

The Preparatory Commission convened by resolution of the Council dated March 18th, 1926, met at Geneva from May 18th-26th, 1926. It elected as President M. J. LOUDON and, as Vice-Presidents, M. COBIAN and M. BUERO, delegates of Spain and Uruguay respectively.

From the outset the Preparatory Commission realised that the study of the questions submitted to it by the Council would be facilitated by the constitution of two special Sub-Commissions, composed of persons directly attached to the delegations forming part of the Preparatory Commission and consequently representing the opinion of their respective Governments. The Preparatory Commission intended to entrust one of these Sub-Commissions with the study of the military, naval and air aspects of the questions under consideration, while the other would devote its attention to the non-military aspect of these questions.

Presided over by the two Vice-Presidents of the Commission itself, these two Sub-Commissions, which would thus be in close touch with the Commission, would be in a position to observe faithfully the principles laid down for their guidance by the latter.

The Sub-Commission entrusted with the study of non-military questions has been authorised by the Preparatory Commission to ascertain the opinion of the organisations or persons it may judge advisable to consult on these questions, and particularly that of the Joint Commission set up by resolution of the Council. The Military, Naval and Air Sub-Commission has identically the same composition as the Permanent Advisory Commission as enlarged by the decision of the Council. The system thus set up by the Preparatory Commission therefore follows the main outlines of the organisation established by the Council.

The Preparatory Commission does not doubt that the Council will see fit to endorse its decisions, in which it has been guided by its desire to do all in its power to ensure the success of the task entrusted to it.

1.

On the proposal of the French delegation, the Preparatory Commission considers that the task entrusted to it by the Council should be undertaken on the understanding that every Government should have in view for the proposed Conference for the preparation of a disarmament agreement, definite and quantitative proposals accompanied by reasons in support calculated with reference to the degree of security existing at the date when the Conference meets.

2.

A. The Commission refers to its Technical Sub-Commissions the points stated below in order that it may be informed on the technical aspect of the questions submitted to it by the Council. The Commission is alone competent to deal with the political aspects of these questions in the same way that it has sole responsibility for the final answers to be given to the questions.

The President and the Vice-Presidents may take the necessary steps to co-ordinate the work of the two Sub-Commissions and to enable each to consult the other on any particular point.

Question I.

What is to be understood by the expression "armaments"?

(a) Definition of the various factors — military, economic, geographical, etc. — upon which the power of a country in time of war depends.

(b) Definition and special characteristics of the various factors which constitute the armaments of a country in time of peace; the different categories of armaments — military, naval and air — the methods of recruiting, training, organisations capable of immediate military employment, etc.

The Commission refers Question No. 1 to Sub-Commission A.
Question II (a).
Is it practicable to limit the ultimate war strength of a country, or must any measures of disarmament be confined to the peace strength?

With regard to Question II (a), the Commission is of opinion that it would not be practicable at the present time to limit the ultimate war strength of a country. On the other hand, it affirms that it is possible to limit the land, sea and air forces permanently maintained in peace time by the various countries or capable of immediate use without preliminary mobilisation measures. This principle is in any case without prejudice to the conditions of such limitation as determined by an examination of the remaining questions, notably Question V.

The Commission refers to Sub-Commission A the definition of the forces mentioned in the preceding paragraph and the study of the possibility of a wider limitation than that referred to above.

Question II (b).
What is to be understood by the expression "reduction and limitation of armaments"? The various forms which reduction or limitation may take in the case of land, sea and air forces: the relative advantages or disadvantages of each of the different forms or methods: for example, the reduction of the larger peace-time units or of their establishment and their equipment, or of any immediately mobilisable forces: the reduction of the length of active service, the reduction of the quantity of military equipment, the reduction of expenditure on national defence, etc.

Question III.
By what standards is it possible to measure the armaments of one country against the armaments of another, e.g., numbers, period of service, equipment, expenditure, etc.?

The Commission refers to Sub-Commission A the two following questions for its opinion:

(a) What are the standards by which it is possible to measure the (a) military, (b) naval, (c) air, armaments of one country against the corresponding armaments of another country?

(b) What are the methods by which the reduction and limitation of (a) land, (b) naval, (c) air, armaments can be effected, and what are the comparative advantages and disadvantages of each?

Note. — The following methods, amongst others, have been suggested: the reduction of the larger peace-time units or of their establishment and their equipment, or of any immediately mobilisable forces; the reduction of the length of active service; the reduction of munitions of war.

It has also been suggested that a limitation of armed forces might be effected by the reduction or limitation of expenditure on national defence.

The Commission wishes to have the opinion of the two Sub-Commissions on this last subject and on the conditions in which the above method might be applied, should they consider that it is practicable.

Question IV.
Can there be said to be "offensive" and "defensive" armaments?
Is there any method of ascertaining whether a certain force is organised for purely defensive purposes (no matter what use may be made of it in time of war), or whether, on the contrary, it is established for the purposes in a spirit of aggression?

The Commission refers to Sub-Commission A the following questions:

Are there any armaments (and, if so what) which are only capable of being used for the defence of a State's territory?

Is there any method of ascertaining whether a certain force is organised for purely defensive purposes (no matter what use may be made of it in time of war), or whether, on the contrary, it is established in a spirit of aggression?

Question V (a).
On what principle will it be possible to draw up a scale of armaments permissible to the various countries, taking into account particularly:

1. Population;
2. Resources;
3. Geographical situation;
4. Length and nature of maritime communications;
5. Density and character of the railways;
6. Vulnerability of the frontiers and of the important vital centres near the frontiers;
7. The time required, varying with different States, to transform peace armaments into war armaments?

As the armaments to be maintained in each country cannot be determined on the basis of mathematical considerations alone, the Commission, in order to allow of a profitable examination of the basis on which the reduction and limitation of armaments is possible, requests the two Sub-Commissions to investigate how far armaments in general are affected by factors 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7 enumerated in Question V (a) and refers factor 6 to Sub-Commission A.

Question VI.

(a) Is there any device by which civil and military aircraft can be distinguished for purposes of disarmament? If this is not practicable, how can the value of civil aircraft be computed in estimating the air strength of any country?
(b) Is it possible or desirable to apply the conclusions arrived at in (a) above to parts of aircraft and aircraft engines?
(c) Is it possible to attach military value to commercial fleets in estimating the naval armaments of a country?

The Commission refers Question VI to Sub-Commission A for its opinion.

Question VII.

Admitting that disarmament depends on security, to what extent is regional disarmament possible in return for regional security? Or is any scheme of disarmament impracticable unless it is general? If regional disarmament is practicable, would it promote or lead up to general disarmament?

The Commission asks Technical Sub-Commissions A and B to consider whether regional military, naval and air disarmament can be regarded as an important step towards general disarmament, and, should general disarmament not prove immediately practicable, what regions could be considered separately, from the point of view of the limitation of armaments.

Sub-Commissions A and B are requested to consider what factors the term “region” should connotate from the point of view of security and from the point of view of disarmament.

B. The Commission has examined the attached proposal submitted by the Belgian delegate.

Without expressing a definite opinion regarding the measures suggested in this proposal concerning which certain delegations have reserved their decision, the Commission has decided to refer this matter to the Technical Sub-Commissions, on the understanding that such reference does not prejudice the question in any way, either as regards the practicability of these measures or as regards any subsequent decision which the Preparatory Commission itself may take when it comes to examine the question from the general and political point of view.

The delegate of Italy reiterated his opinion that supervision would be ineffective and was inadmissible, and asked to have his view placed on record.

Proposal.

"The last paragraph of Article 8 of the Covenant of the League stipulates that 'the Members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval and air programmes and the condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to warlike purposes'.

"With a view to organising this exchange of information, Sub-Commission A has been requested to consider the advantages and disadvantages from the military point of view of the various methods which might be employed and in particular:

"(a) The organisation at Geneva of a permanent service for the collection of information received from the different Governments;

"(b) The conclusion of an international convention making it compulsory to publish all inventions which can be used in chemical or bacteriological warfare and in general all forms of warfare which are condemned by the opinion of the civilised world.

"Sub-Commission A is requested to investigate what would be the consequences from the military point of view of inserting in the Convention relative to disarmament, or in that regarding the prohibition of certain forms of warfare, provisions similar to those contained in the statute of the International Labour Office (Articles 411 to 420 of the Treaty of Versailles)."
"Sub-Commission B is requested to ascertain the consequences of such insertion from the economic point of view.

"Sub-Commission A is requested to consider to what extent the experience acquired regarding the supervision of disarmament points to the possibility from the military point of view of general supervision.

"Sub-Commission B is requested to state if such supervision offers any difficulties from the economic point of view and, if so, what difficulties?"

C. On the proposal of the delegate of the British Empire, the Commission decided to refer to the competent Sub-Commissions the questions defined below without prejudice to any Convention or Rule of International Law on the subject:

To Sub-Commissions A and B.

1. (a) Can factories normally and legitimately employed for chemical purposes, including dyeworks, be quickly adapted to manufacture poison gases?

(b) If the answer to the above is in the affirmative, how long would it take to effect the change?

(c) Can any proposals be made to prevent or hinder chemical factories from being used for the production of poisonous gases?

To Sub-Commission A.

2. (a) What are the means which would probably be employed for spreading gas and what would be the apparatus required?

(b) How long would it take to manufacture this apparatus, and how long would it take to superimpose this apparatus on the normal equipment of an aeroplane?

(c) Would the length of time referred to immediately above vary in the case of military or civilian aircraft?

3. (a) What is the information in existence as to the effect of the distribution of poisonous gas over closely populated districts?

(b) Have any experiments been carried out on this subject?

(c) Apart from the difficulty of equipping the entire population of a city with gas masks, are there any gases known against which a gas mask affords no protection?

Sub-Commission A is invited to consider what effective sanctions can be proposed for the enforcement of the international undertaking not to employ poison gas or bacteria in warfare.

3. Questions V (a) 8 and V (b).

8. The degree of security which, in the event of aggression, a State could receive under the provisions of the Covenant or of separate engagements contracted towards that State?

(b) Can the reduction of armaments be promoted by examining possible means for ensuring that the mutual assistance, economic and military, contemplated in Article 16 of the Covenant shall be brought quickly into operation as soon as an act of aggression has been committed.

A. The following very important proposal has been laid before the Commission by the French delegation:

Proposal.

"With reference to Question V (a) 8 and V (b), the Commission considers that, in order that a State should be able to calculate to what extent it can consent to the reduction or limitation of its armaments, it is essential to determine what method and what machinery are best calculated to give help to that State when attacked.

"The Commission therefore proposes to suggest to the Council:

"1. That methods or regulations should be investigated which would:

   (a) Facilitate the meeting of the Council at very brief notice in case of war or threat of war;

   (b) Enable the Council to take such decisions as may be necessary to enforce the obligations of the Covenant as expeditiously as possible.

"2. That the Permanent Advisory Commission should be instructed:

   (a) To define the measures necessary to comply with paragraph (a), No. 8;

   (b) To investigate the procedure which would allow of the rapid drafting of recommendations regarding the military assistance provided for in the second paragraph of Article 16 of the Covenant, when the Council shall have decided to make such recommendations;"
"(c) To investigate what measures should be taken in case of a conflict of which the Council shall have been notified, and when the latter shall have taken a decision, in order to prevent the development or preparation of hostilities, according to the precedent of the Greco-Bulgarian dispute.

3. That the Joint Commission should be instructed:

(a) To investigate the question of the improvement of the telegraphic and the telephonic communications of the different countries with the Secretariat of the League;

(b) To study what measures would be most appropriate, when the Council shall have so decided, to give most rapidly such economic and financial help as may be necessary to a State which has been attacked;

(c) To determine the composition and procedure of the Committees for the supply and allocation of resources which the League might set up for that purpose.

It has been objected that the aim of the proposal was to define and elaborate the machinery for carrying into effect the decisions taken by the Council of the League of Nations in virtue of Article 16 of the Covenant, and that constructive proposals of this nature belonged rather to the competence of the organs of the League of Nations than to that of the present Commission.

Without pronouncing any opinion on the validity of this objection, the Commission feels that there are obvious inconveniences in asking a body comprising representatives of countries not Members of the League of Nations to discuss new means of carrying out the provisions of an instrument which they have not signed.

The Commission has accordingly decided to forward the French delegation's proposal to the Council with a request that it should be immediately taken into consideration.

B. The Commission also decided to forward to the Council the following proposal of the Polish delegation, which is closely related to that of the French delegation:

Proposal.

"The Commission suggests to the Council that it would be well to consider whether a special organisation of regional assistance within the scope of the Covenant of the League would be likely to give the organs of the League effective help in supplying the assistance required and would thereby render the execution of the relevant articles of the Covenant easier and more expeditious (study of the machinery, form and procedure of regional assistance)."

C. The Commission has decided also to send to the Council the following proposal by the delegation of Finland:

Proposal.

"The Commission proposes that the Council should undertake the examination of special arrangements whereby a reduction of armaments agreed to by States unfavourably placed, owing to geographical or other exceptional circumstances, might be compensated in order to meet their requirements for security."

* * *

The United States delegation stated that it was anxious to favour every effort made with a view to disarmament, and that it therefore had no objection to certain proposals being discussed in connection with the obligations entered into by the Members of the League of Nations; but it naturally could not be bound in any way by such discussions in which it could not properly take part. This observation refers, in particular, to certain phases of the proposals reproduced in Nos. 1, 2 B and 3 above.

* * *

The German delegation stated that its exceptional position did not at present allow of its being heard before the Council, and therefore desired to be in a position to submit an opinion to the Council on the proposals which were referred to it in regard to Questions V (a) 8, V (b).

The suggested examination of the methods likely to bring rapid assistance to a country attacked, should not, in the opinion of the delegation, be based on the present position of armaments, which is only temporary. This examination should have as a starting-point a state of disarmament resulting from the Conference such that no country would be powerful enough to be in a position to assert its strength against that of the League of Nations. The examination of Questions V (a) 8 and V (b) could only give provisional results if it took as a starting-point the present position of armaments (see Minutes of the seventh meeting of the Drafting Committee).
LETTER AND MEMORANDUM BY THE FINNISH GOVERNMENT REGARDING THE PROPOSAL SUBMITTED BY IT TO THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION.

LETTER FROM THE FINNISH DELEGATE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

[Translation.]

Geneva, June 5th, 1926.

I have the honour to hand to you a memorandum prepared by the Finnish delegation, which deals with the questions raised by the proposal which this delegation had the honour to make at the last session of the Preparatory Commission and which the latter has decided to forward to the Council at the same time as the proposals presented by the French and Polish delegations (Document 3, pages 126-127).

The Finnish delegation considers that this memorandum makes clear the point of view of the Finnish Government on, at any rate, one important aspect of the problems raised by this group of questions and asks you therefore to forward to the Council this document in order that the Council may consider it when it discusses the proposals of France, Poland and Finland.

(Signed) R. ERICH.

MEMORANDUM.

[Translation.]

The Finnish Government has repeatedly expressed its sincere approval of the endeavours of the League of Nations to reduce the burden of armaments. At the same time, however, it has deemed necessary to underline the decisive importance of corresponding guarantees especially to States which, for historical, geographical or other reasons, stand in need of security. The efforts of the League to solve the problem of guarantees — e.g. the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, the Geneva Protocol and, subsequently, the detailed programme of the Preparatory Commission for the forthcoming Disarmament Conference — have clearly proved to what an extent the League is aware of the necessity of compensating by special means a reduction of armaments and military expenditure in general.

In accordance with the aforesaid aims, the Finnish delegation made, at the ninth meeting of the Preparatory Commission, May 26th, 1926, the following proposal:

"The Commission proposes that the Council should undertake the examination of special arrangements whereby a reduction of armaments agreed to by States unfavourably placed, owing to geographical or other exceptional circumstances, might be compensated in order to meet their requirements for security."

The Commission adopted the proposal.

In this more or less general programme for the benefit of a certain number of small States, there is one question to which the Finnish delegation wishes to draw special attention.

A certain number of small States, having practically no raw material for the production of war supplies and, furthermore, having consequently no war industry, must in peace time either: (a) buy stocks of war material to meet all the needs of emergency; or (b) keep large stocks of raw materials stored, and, in addition, create an industry capable of providing the army with sufficient supplies.

If a small State exposed to special danger has taken none of these precautions, it is bound, when attacked, immediately to import from abroad the stocks necessary for a successful defence. However, it goes without saying that such purchases surpass the financial capacity of perhaps most of the small States Members of the League. Mobilisation, and other measures necessitated by the various requirements of defence, will more or less at once exhaust the financial resources of the country. The additional supplies of war material required for the mobilised forces of the country must therefore be purchased by means of foreign loans.

Experience, however, has in only too many cases proved that, even in ordinary circumstances, it is a very difficult task for small States rapidly to raise a loan in foreign countries; how much more difficult will it be for them in time of war to place bonds in foreign banks! Most likely foreign banks would prefer to wait till the general scheme of financial assistance to be arranged by the League of Nations is made public.
This conflict between the vital interests of small States exposed to special danger and the endeavours of the League to reduce the military expenditure of States Members of the League must be settled by the League itself.

The Finnish delegation takes the liberty of making a few preliminary suggestions to that effect.

It might be possible for the League to make arrangements beforehand which would enable the Council to provide immediate financial assistance to any small State which was the victim of aggression. If, for example, the Members of the League, or some of them, were prepared, under certain conditions and within the limit of a maximum sum, to offer their guarantee in different proportions, the Council would, when the emergency occurred, be able to arrange for the issue of an immediate loan of such amount as might be needed within the maximum.

The Finnish delegation mentions this as an example of one way in which arrangements might be made for the Council to have financial means at its immediate disposal. There may be others, perhaps preferable, but this delegation suggests that in one way or another it is most desirable that arrangements should be made beforehand which would ensure that the Council should have financial resources at its disposal upon, or immediately after, the occurrence of an act of aggression. The Council could then arrange to place these resources, or such of them as it might decide to be necessary, at the disposal of the State or States attacked, under such conditions as it then thought appropriate, taking into account: (a) the economic, financial and military capacity of the small States attacked to defend themselves until the general assistance provided for in Article 16 of the Covenant is forthcoming; and (b) the corresponding resources of the aggressor.

The greater the disproportion between the small States and the aggressor, the greater should be the first instalment of the financial assistance to the victim of the aggression.

In view of the foregoing, the Finnish delegation has the honour to request the Council of the League of Nations to undertake, through the competent organs of the League, a careful examination of the practical means by which small States in need of special security owing to geographical or other exceptional circumstances could obtain sufficient guarantees as regards immediate financial assistance to enable them, in the event of their becoming the victims of an unprovoked aggression, to purchase war material and other supplies necessary for a successful defence until, in accordance with Article 16 of the Covenant, general assistance by the League is forthcoming.

The Finnish delegation is convinced that a number of small States Members of the League would warmly welcome any opportunity to express their views on this matter.
REPORT BY M. BENES TO THE COUNCIL, AND RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED ON JUNE 10TH, 1926.

The Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference has submitted to us a first report (Document 3), dated May 26th, 1926, on the work of its first session held at Geneva from May 18th to 26th, 1926.

The report may be divided into three parts. The first part deals with certain questions of procedure; the second describes the work of classification and analysis carried out by the Preparatory Commission to enable it to issue directions for the guidance of its Technical Sub-Commissions; and the third concerns proposals submitted by the French, Polish and Finnish delegations.

As regards the second part, I need not do more than emphasise the importance of the work done by the Preparatory Commission; and I am sure that the whole Council will join me in congratulating the Commission on the manner in which it has dealt with this first stage of its work.

In regard to the questions of procedure mentioned in the first part of the report, the Commission tells us that it decided to form two special Sub-Commissions composed of persons directly attached to the delegations forming part of the Commission and consequently expressing the opinion of their respective Governments. I have no doubt that the Council will endorse this decision, which, as the Preparatory Commission states in its report, was dictated by its desire to do all in its power to ensure the success of the task entrusted to it. The Preparatory Commission had the excellent idea of keeping in close touch with its two Sub-Commissions by appointing its own two Vice-Presidents to preside over them. Under the system thus established, Sub-Commission A, dealing with military, naval and air questions, performs the duties which were proposed for the enlarged Permanent Advisory Commission. Sub-Commission B works in relation with the Joint Commission, to which it is empowered to refer questions for advice, and has, indeed, already referred several. In order to ensure that close touch may be kept with the Joint Commission, this Sub-Commission has thought it desirable that its own Chairman should attend the Joint Commission's meetings. The Council will doubtless agree with me as to the desirability of the closest touch being kept; and, accordingly, following the Preparatory Commission's example, I would suggest that the Chairman of Sub-Commission B should also be Chairman of the Joint Commission.

With reference to the third group of questions in the Preparatory Commission's report, the Council will doubtless agree with the Commission that the French proposal which it refers to us is "very important." The proposal includes a number of somewhat complicated questions, some of which relate to facilities for the Council's meeting and work, and are thus more or less administrative in character, while others concern the most appropriate measures for preventing hostilities and the provision of economic and financial help for a State which has been attacked. The Polish and Finnish proposals are closely linked with the French proposal in several ways. With reference to the Finnish proposal, that Government has made a valuable contribution in a memorandum (Document 4) regarding the arrangements to be made beforehand in order to enable the Council to provide immediate financial assistance to any State which is the victim of aggression.

In view of the difficulties inherent in these questions, after consulting some of my colleagues, particularly the representative of the British Empire, I suggest that the French, Polish and Finnish proposals, as well as the Finnish memorandum, should be considered at the next session of the Council.

I therefore propose the following resolutions:

"The Council notes the decisions reached by the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference in regard to the organisation of its method of work, and decides to appoint the Chairman of Sub-Commission B to be Chairman of the Joint Commission attached to the Preparatory Commission."

"The Council adjourns to its September meeting the consideration of the French, Polish and Finnish proposals forwarded by the Preparatory Commission, and also of the Finnish Government's memorandum."