This was a delicate piece of work which should be entrusted to a committee possessing a great authority and consisting therefore of delegates representing the various interests involved. It should have plenty of leisure at its disposal. It was not indispensable for this Committee to be the same as the Drafting Committee, but it should be appointed by the full Commission before the end of the present session and not at the beginning of its next session, in order that it might work at its leisure between the two sessions.

After an observation from the Chairman to the effect that the Preparatory Commission must be left perfectly free to appoint the Committee proposed by Lord Cecil and an observation from M. Paul-Boncour, who stated that it should be quite understood that before any meeting of the Preparatory Commission or of the Drafting Committee, the technical reports would have to be submitted to Governments, the discussion on this point was adjourned to the next meeting.

M. Perez (Argentina) wished to explain the statements which he had made in the Preparatory Commission.

In his view, the Drafting Committee could do two things. It could re-group the items of the Questionnaire without making any change in the text of these questions. It could then take them and extract from each their political and technical aspects, etc. As far as he was concerned, he thought the questions should be grouped according to the following order: armaments, military forces, comparison between military forces, means of limiting armaments, proportion to be established between armaments, regional disarmament, control, arbitration. This would not have taken very long and, if it had been done at the beginning of the general discussion, it would certainly have made that discussion clearer. He himself had made such a classification, and he submitted a new Questionnaire to the Drafting Committee. (Annex I.)

M. de Marinis (Italy) thought that it would be necessary for the Committee first to agree in principle that a new Questionnaire should be drafted. If the Drafting Committee so decided, he asked that the proposal of M. Perez should be distributed before it was discussed.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire) stated that the Drafting Committee had been appointed to draft definite questions for the Sub-Commissions, and it could obviously not confine itself merely to submitting to these Sub-Commissions the questions in the form they bore at the moment, even if they were submitted in a better order, such as M. Perez had proposed. He had prepared a preliminary draft isolating in Question V the technical from the purely political aspects. He desired to circulate this draft before the discussion was begun.

M. de Marinis (Italy) thought that Lord Cecil had misunderstood him. He had merely wished to say that the proposal of M. Perez consisted solely in changing the order of the questions without changing the wording in which they were drafted. He had merely added that it would be necessary for the Committee to decide first whether to adopt this method. He had, however, not intended to oppose the proposal that the questions should be divided up according to their various aspects.

M. Paul-Boncour (France) agreed that a more orderly presentation of questions would be of real assistance. He would, however, draw attention to the following point. The Committee would have to forward to the technical Sub-Commissions the questions which they would have to investigate, together with the necessary instructions. The Committee might put the questions in a different order, but the only questions to be put were those to be found in the Questionnaire.

Lord Cecil (British Empire) denied that it was his intention to invent new questions. It was necessary to take the Questionnaire as a basis. He insisted, however, that it was absolutely necessary to control the technical Sub-Commissions and not to give them the responsibilities of the Preparatory Commission or the Drafting Committee. The Drafting Committee should have a very clear idea of what exactly it desired the Sub-Commissions to do and they should not be asked to do anything more.

M. de Brouckère (Belgium) desired to put an end to what he thought was simply a misunderstanding. He recalled the terms of the task as defined by the Council. The Council had asked the Preparatory Commission to meet and proceed to an exchange of views on the Questionnaire. This had been done. The Council had further asked the Commission to forward to assistant technical commissions for examination the military and economic aspects of the questions. This still remained to be done. The Drafting Committee's task was to prepare this work for the Preparatory Commission. The technical aspects of the questions would therefore have to be defined and instructions drawn up. The proposal of M. Perez was merely a proposal regarding the method which the Drafting Committee should follow, but that Committee might wish to examine the questions in a different order. As far as he was concerned, he had dealt in the general discussion with Questions V, VII and Annex II together.

M. Paul-Boncour (France) entirely agreed with M. de Brouckère. He desired merely that it should be stated in the Drafting Committee that it should be quite understood that the only questions to be examined were those contained in the Questionnaire and that they should remain in their present form.
Viscount Cecil (British Empire) thought that this was a very important point to be settled. He took for example Question II (b); most of the points covered by that question were partly political, partly technical in their aspect. There was, for example, the length of service. The only thing that Sub-Commission A should be asked was to explain the technical consequences of any change in the length of the period of that service. The question whether any changes were possible or desirable was of a political kind. It was therefore indispensable to divide that question into two, and this could not be done without changing the wording of it and without putting the question in another form. If the Drafting Committee could not do this, there was no reason for its existence.

M. Paul-Boncour (France) fully agreed that when the Committee had finished its work, the questions sent to Sub-Commissions A and B would have assumed a new form. He would, however, strongly emphasise that it was the Committee’s duty to examine the questions in their present form. Reserving the order of the questions, he desired the Committee to begin their immediate examination.

Count Bernstorff (Germany) entirely agreed with Lord Cecil regarding the division to be made between the various aspects of the question. It would be particularly unfortunate for Sub-Commission A to discuss questions of a political kind.

M. Matsuda (Japan) pointed out that, since the Questionnaire had been submitted to all Governments, a certain number of expert delegates already had instructions on the replies that they were to give to the questions. Delegates would therefore find no difficulty in discussing these questions in their present order. It was merely a question of separating and dividing the different aspects of each question. Further, there were entire questions, which had been submitted to Sub-Commission A. Only certain questions required examination and only the discussion of these would show when it had ended whether another order for the Questionnaire should be adopted before submitting it to the technical Sub-Committees.

M. Perez (Argentina) proposed that the Committee should begin by examining Question I and discuss the changes, which it would be necessary to make in the manner in which it was drafted. He explained that he had transposed part of Question I and combined it with Question II. After examination of Question II in the form he suggested, all the old Question I would have been dealt with.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire) strongly pressed for no discussion of the proposal before the text had been circulated.

(The Committee rose at 11.45 a.m.)

SECOND MEETING

Held on Friday, May 21st, 1926, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: M. Loudon (Netherlands).

3. Examination of M. Perez’ proposal (Annex I).

The Chairman, whilst expressing his personal appreciation of the work done by M. Perez, asked him to be good enough not to press his proposal. He considered, however, that this work could be utilised at the end of the deliberations.

M. Perez (Argentina) consented to the withdrawal of his proposal.

4. Examination of Question I.

The Chairman reminded the Committee that there were two proposals before it. One came from Lord Cecil (Annex II) and the other from the Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation (Annex III).

Viscount Cecil (British Empire) stated that he had only acted in accordance with the decision taken by the Preparatory Committee to refer the question to Sub-Commission A. With regard to the proposal of the Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation, this consisted in including in the armament of a country the elements constituting the total forces of that country. He was unable to see how this proposal could be considered from a practical point of view. It was impossible to obtain even an approximate idea of the total forces, which were, moreover, a variable quantity. The object of disarmament was to do away with the fear of aggression. The guiding principle which should govern the work undertaken was as follows: What were the forces with which aggression was committed? It was on this point that the Committee should concentrate its attention.
5. Examination of Question II (a).

Viscount Cecil (British Empire) read his proposal (Annex II) and stated that he attached no importance to the form given to his draft instructions.

M. DE BROUCKÈRE (Belgium) asked Lord Robert Cecil for an explanation of what he meant by "immediately mobilisable armaments" and "forces and war equipment that a State can have ready for war within a short interval". He explained his difficulty by the following examples: a country such as Switzerland trained all its citizens for a very short period. Upon mobilisation, its mobilisable effective was large. Another country might, on the other hand, have a very reduced army, but, without any law allowing for its use in war, it might possess a large number of private physical-culture societies giving the youth of the country a training equal or superior to the Swiss military training. Should the total of trained Swiss citizens be counted amongst the "immediately mobilisable armaments", whilst for the other country only its reduced army was counted? Another example: a country declared that it would make use of gas in war, and maintained for this purpose the necessary material in peace time. Another country made no declaration on the subject but possessed several factories capable of rapid adaptation for the production of gas. Should the factories of the first be counted as material immediately mobilisable and not those of the second? A similar situation could arise in the use of aircraft material. He therefore proposed to substitute the following formula for that of Lord Cecil: "material which a State could use for war within a definite lapse of time".

M. DE MARINIS (Italy) remarked incidentally that this definition covered all national material.

M. DE BROUCKÈRE (Belgium) remarked that it was necessary to determine what part of this national material was available at short notice, and he thought that the measures to be taken should bear upon facilities for military and industrial mobilisation.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire) considered that the question was not seen from the proper angle. With regard to the first example given by M. de Brouckère, the Swiss Army would be assessed like any other form of army. As to civilian physical culture societies, it would be necessary to consider whether the men trained by these societies could be put in the line immediately and this would be a question of fact. It was obviously difficult to prevent all possible camouflage. But this should be left until the plan was put into force. He agreed that, so far as chemical warfare was concerned, it would be necessary to make special regulations. But in principle it would not be wise to treat every element of industrial power as forming part of forces immediately mobilisable. In the opinion of the British experts, if the armed and equipped population that could be put into the line could be limited, this would be the best way of limiting the aggressive power of a country.

M. DE BROUCKÈRE (Belgium) understood the difficulties mentioned by Lord Robert Cecil but realised their seriousness. Under these conditions, either a control should be instituted,
which seemed the easiest answer, or, if it were impossible to distinguish between two kinds of mobilisable forces, only the peace effective should be taken into consideration and not the bulk of the trained men.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire) stated that he himself was not fully convinced of the excellence of his text, and that he would prefer to refer the question to the experts under this form: “We wish to diminish the aggressive force of a country; give us a description of the aggressive force of a country and show how it can be limited.” It seemed to him that the Preparatory Commission was agreed upon asking for a definition of this factor, which had been differently described by various authorities as peace armaments, mobilisable forces, forces immediately mobilisable, etc.

M. DE BROUCKÈRE (Belgium) proposed that the text should be modified as follows: “By armaments which can be immediately mobilised, are understood the forces and material which a State has at its disposal for use in war,” and he would suggest that Sub-Commission A should be referred to the Minutes of the Committee for a supplementary interpretation.

M. PAUL-BONCOUR (France) said he would like to bring back the Committee to the consideration of the Questionnaire. To him the question was clear. The question was not to determine what were known as peace armaments and eventual war armaments. From the moment of mobilisation the essential factor was that of eventual war armaments. Their importance depended upon the resources of the country and the speed of mobilisation. The expression “peace armaments” had on the contrary a clear and definite sense. Was it desired to limit only those armaments? That was the question. He would refer again to the dilemma described by M. de Brouckère. It was desirable to limit possible war armaments, but such a limitation was only possible with a continuous supervision of the whole of the forces of a country, and certain countries appeared to be little disposed to accept such supervision. In these circumstances he preferred to concentrate upon an object which was limited and more definitely ascertainable: the limitation of peace armaments. The observations which had just been made in regard to all the factors of the potential force of the country remained valid, but it was at the moment of the discussion of Question V — viz. the question of the method used in attributing to each country its quota of armaments — that it would be necessary to take these observations into account. The Convention by which the States would accept the allotted quota could, however, only cover permanent peace armaments. The only possible answer to Question II (a) therefore was to the effect that it was not possible to limit eventual war armaments.

Agreement, however, had not yet been reached as to the definition of peace armaments. It was not possible to include in peace armaments the elements which were mobilisable within a period more or less short, as there would always be an arbitrary factor in the determination of this period. Moreover, even if the period were fixed, how could States be prevented from hastening their mobilisation in the presence of an aggression? If it was desired to deal with this concrete and visible notion of armaments which were strictly peace armaments, it was necessary to go to the root of the matter and to consider the total potential force of the country.

If it were desired to consider the idea of mobilisation, it would be necessary to adopt a formula which would bring within the definition of peace armaments, armaments which were utilisable without it being necessary to publish mobilisation orders. He would propose this strict definition of peace armaments for two reasons, the first reason being that the definition was practical. The problem was merely to ascertain what were the elements in a country, either military forces or forces possessing a military organisation, which could be utilised without the country having passed from a peace to a war footing. The other reason was based on the considerations which had been put forward by Lord Robert Cecil. He firmly believed that by peace armaments was understood armaments which existed before the date of mobilisation, and it was only in respect of these armaments that a limitation could be effected, because a supervision of these forces was possible. He proposed accordingly to ask Sub-Commission A for a definition of peace armaments. He accepted the second sentence of the second paragraph of the memorandum of Lord Cecil concerning the factors which were mentioned under Question V.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire) said he was very much struck by the arguments of M. Paul-Boncour. He would not, however, desire to abandon the idea contained in the expression “immediately mobilisable armaments” which came, he believed, from the French delegation.

He proposed to put the following question to Sub-Commission A: “Can you practically limit the immediately mobilisable armaments of the country or must the limitation be confined to the armaments of peace?” That was a question exclusively technical. The problem was to know where a line of demarcation could be traced between immediately mobilisable armaments and eventual armaments.

M. DE BROUCKÈRE (Belgium) observed, in answer to M. Paul Boncour, that it seemed to him a very serious supposition that it was impossible to take account of immediately mobilisable factors. Aggression in the past had depended not only on peace effective but also on the speed of mobilisation.
M. PAUL-BONCOUR (France) agreed, but contended that peace armaments played a decisive part in determining the violence of the aggression, since they formed the nucleus of the armies. In order, however, not to shut the door on future possibilities, he would ask that the words "at present" should be added so that the proposition would be to the effect that it would not at present be possible to limit eventual armaments.

M. DE MARINIS (Italy) proposed in the second sentence of paragraph 2 to replace the word "can" by the word "must," in order to give expression to the majority of the opinions of the Preparatory Committee and in particular the opinions of France, Belgium and Germany, which had declared that it was necessary to take account of these factors in the evaluation of the armaments to be attributed to each country.

Viscount CECIL (British Empire) opposed this proposal. He thought that the question should be left as it stood until a decision was reached on Question V.

Mr. Gibson (United States) supported Lord Cecil. It was necessary not to prejudge the views expressed concerning Question V, which would afford a better opportunity of discussing the matter. He would like, however, to delete the words "to be allowed" in the last paragraph.

Count Bernstorff (Germany) pointed out, in reference to this last proposal, that the word "allotted" was the word in Question V.

Viscount CECIL (British Empire) said that he had inserted this phrase as a safeguard. It merely meant that Question V was not prejudged.

M. DE BROUCKÈRE (Belgium) thought that the draft was not a very happy one, since it was said that account could be taken of other factors, whereas up to that point no factor had been involved for the evaluation of the armaments.

M. PAUL-BONCOUR (France) proposed the following draft: "This principle shall not, however, prejudge the conditions of this limitation, as they may be determined upon an examination of the other questions and particularly Question V."

M. DE MARINIS (Italy) agreed with M. Paul Boncour and thanked him for his formula. He thought, however, that it should be noted that once again agreement was being reached in regard to the words used without any attempt having been made to reach an agreement on the substance of the question. He must repeat in all good faith, in order that there might be absolutely no doubt in regard to the attitude of Italy, that the Italian Government could never in any form adhere to a plan for the reduction of armaments which did not take full account of the potential war strength of a country, subject to the conditions which he had explained in his previous observations.

He would, moreover, add that Italy had the same sincere desire as all the other countries to arrive at a convention for the limitation of armaments.

Viscount CECIL (British Empire) thought that there was no great divergence of view between himself and M. de Marinis. His personal view was that, when the Committee came to estimate the proportions between the armaments of each country, a solution would probably be found by means more speedy, more simple and more empirical than the scientific method suggested by M. de Marinis.

M. PAUL-BONCOUR (France) raised objections to the wording of the third paragraph concerning immediately mobilisable armaments as opposed to additional forces and equipment which could only be utilised in war after a lapse of a substantial period of time. He thought it impossible to make any distinction between reservists called to the colours during the first three or first fifteen days of mobilisation. The word "mobilisable" therefore should be replaced by the word "utilisable". It would be for Sub-Commission A to define what armaments could be utilisable without mobilisation. The Committee had still to settle whether it would wish to extend reduction of armaments to cover results of mobilisation. As far as he was concerned, he did not think this possible.

M. DE BROUCKÈRE (Belgium) thought, however, that a question concerning the period of time should be put. He thought that this question should cover mobilisable elements until the beginning of hostilities.

M. PAUL-BONCOUR (France) remained of opinion that to fix any period would be arbitrary.

M. DE BROUCKÈRE (Belgium) replied that this was a question which could be referred to the experts.

M. PAUL-BONCOUR (France) pointed out that account should be taken in those circumstances of the very great difference between the facilities of mobilisation possessed by the various countries owing to the extent of their territories, their railway systems, etc.

Viscount CECIL (British Empire) quite understood the objections of M. Paul-Boncour. Nevertheless, he thought it would be possible to make a distinction between forces and material which did not require training or manufacture and forces and material which were begun to be collected on the day of mobilisation with regard to which a certain delay would be necessary before they could be put in the line. He thought, therefore, that it would be possible to seek for an estimate of such latent forces as were immediately utilisable.
M. Paul-Boncour (France) replied that he did not think it possible to make a limitation of the elements which came into play after the order to mobilise. To achieve that it would be necessary to enter into the organisation of mobilisation itself and establish an effective control in order to achieve any real limitation.

He did not think it would be possible to adopt the distinction drawn by Lord Cecil consisting in defining as armaments immediately mobilisable, those armaments mobilisable in a short period, and as eventual armaments, those which were created from the first day of mobilisation. To do so would be to take up the question of the training of reservists and their equipment. How could the League verify whether reserves were trained or not? How could any difference be made between reservists and members of physical training associations? How could any possible camouflage be prevented? The concrete and visible only could be dealt with and any limitation concerning elements so difficult to estimate might result in deceiving nations who were acting in perfectly good faith. At the moment it was only possible to limit the permanent forces permanently maintained in time of peace by the various countries or forces immediately utilisable without preliminary mobilisation measures.

M. Paul-Boncour proposed the following text as a commentary on Question 11 (a).

"With regard to Question II (a), the Commission is of opinion that it would not be practicable at the present time to limit the ultimate war strength of a country. On the other hand, it affirms that it is possible to limit the land, sea and air forces permanently maintained in peace time by the various countries or capable of immediate use without preliminary mobilisation measures. This principle is in any case without prejudice to the conditions of such limitation as determined by an examination of the remaining questions, notably Question V.

"The definition of these forces and the consideration of the possibility of limiting armaments capable of immediate use in war time are matters which should be referred to Sub-Commission A."

The proposed text was adopted.

6. Examination of Questions II (b) and III.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire) explained that he thought it would be more logical to put Question III before Question II (b), which covered the various methods for making reductions in armaments as a result of comparison. Further, he had added the abolition of compulsory military service to the list of possible methods. The British Government desired that this question should be discussed, even if it were considered to be impracticable. He would desire to have the opinion of Sub-Commission A on the results which might be achieved by such an abolition.

M. De Brouckère (Belgium) had no objection to the investigation of the question of the abolition of compulsory service, provided that it were well understood that such an investigation in no way prejudiced the matter. He would point out, however, that the Commission had not unanimously recognised that the abolition of compulsory military service was a means of achieving disarmament. Personally, his view was that to replace compulsory service by a paid voluntary service would be unfortunate.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire) agreed that there were objections to abolition. For the moment he would confine himself to a request that the question should be studied.

M. De Marinis (Italy) agreed that the question should be discussed, but thought it was not within the competence of Sub-Commission A to do so, for its nature was essentially political.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire) agreed. He had thought, however, that since the suggestion of the limitation of the length of service as a possible method had been made, it should be possible logically to go as far as to consider abolition. He was ready, however, to put the question elsewhere and in another form.

Mr. Gibson (United States) thought that, if the question were submitted to one of the Sub-Commissions, it would have also to be submitted to the other, for it had both military and economic aspects.

Count Bernstorff (Germany) thought that the question of compulsory service was one of the most important. It would be very useful for Sub-Commission A to discuss it and that it should also be discussed from the political point of view. He supported the proposal that the question should be submitted to Sub-Commission A.

M. Paul-Boncour (France) saw no difficulty in combining Question II (b) and Question III as Lord Robert Cecil and M. Perez before him had suggested. He also thought the wording of Lord Cecil’s note on this point to be very accurate. His view was, however, that paragraph (b) of Question II of the Questionnaire should be more accurately worded, leaving out mention of the abolition of compulsory service and reintroducing the reduction of the larger peace-time units, etc., which had been deleted from the list.

Regarding the abolition of compulsory military service, he thought that this question was not within the competence of Sub-Commission A and that in any case it could not be
submitted to it before the Preparatory Commission had discussed the matter. This discussion had not yet taken place for the following reasons: The Commission had not wished to impose on any particular country any particular form of military organisation. It had been of opinion that it should confine itself to discovering adequate means to effect reductions in each of these forms of military organisation adopted by countries in perfect freedom. The abolition of compulsory military service would mean imposing on countries a military organisation which they would not have chosen in the full exercise of their sovereignty.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire) withdrew from the enumeration contained in the note the mention of the question of the abolition of compulsory military service and reserved his right to raise this question when he thought fit.

M. PAUL-BONCOUR (France) proposed that the Committee should follow exactly the draft proposed by Lord Cecil, keeping exactly to the enumeration in paragraph (b) of Question II.

This proposal was adopted.

7. Examination of Question IV.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire) thought that it was now necessary to settle the difficulties which had arisen during the course of the discussion in the Preparatory Commission. In his view the result of that discussion showed that the Committee should settle the question whether there were armaments utilisable exclusively for the defence of a territory, for it was obvious that there were defensive armaments which could, nevertheless, be used for offensive purposes. Any armaments capable of being used for offensive purposes, whatever the intention of those who had established them, must be taken account of in calculating armaments. This principle also applied to formations such as volunteers, physical training associations, etc. He had put on one side the second phrase in Question IV, for he had been of opinion that it might give a very erroneous impression. He thought it would be impossible to maintain that the Committee should not concern itself with a force which might have been organised for purely defensive purposes, while it might prove possible to use that force for aggressive purposes.

Nevertheless, if the Drafting Committee insisted upon it, he would agree to submit the question to Sub-Commission A in the form given in his memorandum.

M. DE MARINIS (Italy) entirely shared Lord Cecil's opinion and approved the proposed amendment.

M. PAUL-BONCOUR (France) had no objection to make to Lord Cecil's formula. He thought, however, that it probably concealed a divergence of view which might arise in Sub-Commission A, for he continued in his belief that it was possible to determine what armaments could be used solely for defensive purposes. On the other hand, he hoped that the second paragraph would be retained. He thought it possible — and on this point he would like the opinion of Sub-Commission A — to attach significance to the progressive decrease which would be noted in the importance of the constituent elements — effectives, the length of service, the number of units, etc. — in any particular military system. The country preparing for an aggressive war did not systematically diminish all the different elements of its military organisation. To explain his meaning he proposed the following formula:

"Can an organisation of forces decreasing throughout a certain period be presumed to be for defensive purposes?"

Viscount Cecil (British Empire) thought the new wording more accurate. He did not see what reply could be made to it. Decrease in military forces was to be noted in general throughout Europe in all countries which had taken part in the war. Would it be possible for technical experts to draw any conclusions from this with regard to the intentions of the Governments concerned? He did not think it possible to maintain that the Committee should not concern itself with the reduction of the military system of a country which, as could be alleged, had shown its peaceful intentions by the continuous decrease in its armaments.

M. PAUL-BONCOUR (France) did not wish to insist on his proposal, but he reserved his right to renew it. He continued to think that a close and methodical analysis of the reductions made by a country in all the elements of its armaments carried out by successive stages over a definite period might give an indication of the sincerely peaceful desires of the countries so examined.

M. DE BROUCKÈRE (Belgium) pointed out that the second formula proposed by M. Paul-Boncour was essentially political. He was not very sure that this was the case with the wording in the Questionnaire. The question put in paragraph 2 of Question IV might be of vital importance. Those who had referred to it in the general discussion had all quoted examples which might be contested. The impression, however, remained that purely defensive organisations might exist which might prove to be not purely defensive. The Committee certainly needed technical advisers before it discussed the political aspects of the question.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire) remarked that all the examples quoted by M. de Brouckère would be studied for the reply to his first question. But for the second part of the question he still thought that there entered an element of appreciation of the intentions of Governments and that the military experts could give no advice on the point.
M. MATSUDA (Japan) accepted Lord Cecil’s formula for the first part of the question, but he wished — like M. Paul-Boncour — to be able to reopen discussion on the second part which the experts’ replies upon the first part would perhaps clear up to some extent.

M. PAUL-BONCOUR (France), pointed out that he only required the technicians to say whether it was possible, after a general study of the reductions effected in an organisation and after comparisons between successive budgets of the same army, to make certain that it was not an army of aggression. Having opened the question of the budget, he wished to take the opportunity of proposing that this question should also be submitted to Sub-Commission B. He thought it would be possible for a specialist in budgetary questions to determine tendencies translated by a budget, the more so as he considered the study of budgets constituted one of the possible forms of control; he therefore formally proposed the submission of the second part of Question IV to the two Sub-Commissions.

Viscount CECIL (British Empire) did not consider that an examination of the reductions made by a country should have any influence upon the principle which should serve as a basis for the reduction of armaments, otherwise the Commission might be led to show itself more liberal towards a country having effected its reductions than towards the others. He therefore proposed to ask Sub-Commission A to reply to the following question: “ Are there forms of military organisation which are more appropriate for defensive than for offensive purposes, and, if so, what are they? ” It was, for example, desirable to have indications as to the characteristics and possibilities of militia armies. Another possible question was as follows: “ To what extent can budgetary expenditure be utilised as a method for controlling military force? ” There would in this latter question be difficulties arising, notably from the comparisons to be made between budgets. The experts could perhaps indicate what changes should be made in the form of budgets to make them comparable. He thought, however, that these budgetary questions should form part of Question III.

M. DE BROUCKÈRE (Belgium) agreed with Lord Cecil as to the danger there would be in attempting to draw conclusions as to the intentions of Governments from their military policy. He, however, still thought that the first formula proposed had a military aspect. It should be a question fairly familiar to military authorities since it was part of their work to study neighbouring armies and to draw from the organisation of these armies conclusions as to the possible attitude towards their own country of the countries maintaining them. They should in fact ask these experts if they had methods for the examination of foreign armies. He was of opinion that this budgetary question should be submitted to the two Sub-Commissions.

M. SOKAL (Poland) entirely shared the opinion of M. de Brouckère, but he wished to add a commentary on the question in the sense of the explanations given by M. de Brouckère. Further, he thought that it would be of advantage to reverse the question and put it in the following way: “ Were there any definite indications of the absence of an aggressive element? ”

M. DE BROUCKÈRE (Belgium) thought it would be clearer to say: “ Were there any definite indications of the absence of an aggressive element? ”

M. SOKAL (Poland) replied that he had in mind more particularly organisations which, with the appearance of defensiveness, contained offensive elements.

M. DE BROUCKÈRE (Belgium) proposed that the intention of the Drafting Committee should be explained in the report.

M. PAUL-BONCOUR (France) pointed out that it would be better to use the word “ aggression ” instead of the word “ offensive ” in order to make the spirit of the discussion clear.

Viscount CECIL (British Empire) declared himself convinced by M. de Brouckère’s arguments and agreed to its submission to Sub-Commission A. Concerning the budgetary question, he proposed to add to the note on Question III, the following text:

“ It has also been suggested that a limitation of armed forces might be effected by the reduction or limitation of expenditure on national defence. The Committee wishes to have the opinion of the two Sub-Commissions on this last subject and on the conditions in which the above method might be applied, should they consider that it is practicable. ”

The Committee adopted Lord Cecil’s proposal and referred the second part of Question IV to Sub-Commission A.

(The meeting rose at 6.50 p.m.)
8. Examination of Question V (a) 1-7.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire) said that the Preparatory Commission had merely proposed that this question should be referred to the Drafting Committee, which was quite free to decide upon the procedure to be followed. In his opinion there should be a complete discussion of the last sentence of paragraph (a) and paragraph (b) which must be taken together.

He did not think that it would be of use to discuss the first part of paragraph (a) at the present stage of the work. The problem was to establish the proportions of the armaments, and this would be the most thorny question of the task to be undertaken. It should only be approached when agreement had been reached in regard to the other questions.

Owing to the general political position and the uncertainty of possible agreement on the other questions, he thought it would be preferable to postpone this discussion to a later stage of the work.

M. de Brouckère (Belgium) thought it would be difficult entirely to postpone this part of Question V, as it contained questions of detail to which reference had already been made in the other questions, for instance in Question II.

M. Paul-Boncour (France) asked Lord Cecil to say whether he wished to adjourn the discussion of the first part of Question V (a) to a subsequent meeting of the Drafting Committee.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire) replied that he wished particularly to avoid having a schedule of the distribution of the armaments attributed to each country established by the Drafting Committee. He thought that at the present moment this would be a foolish procedure. He would not, however, insist on preventing the technical organisations from undertaking an investigation into the details which were considered essential, although he had on many occasions expressed doubt as to the value of these investigations.

M. Paul-Boncour (France) said he did not think that precise proposals could be made by the Governments and submitted for discussion at a conference if they were not drawn up with reference to the factors defined in paragraph V (a). Even before the Conference, when the convention to be submitted to it was established, the countries would indicate the armaments which they required in view of the present position with regard to the question of security. An examination would take place, and the States would submit reasons in support of the proposals proposed by the technical bodies.

He proposed that the Committee should adopt in regard to Question V (a) the following formula:

"The armaments to be maintained in each country cannot be fixed on any principle involving a mathematical scale.

"At the same time, the Commission is of opinion that every Government should bring to the projected Conference for the preparation of a disarmament contract, definitive and quantitative proposals, accompanied by reasons in support, covering the three following points at least: (a) permanent establishment; (b) material in service; (c) expenditure on armaments, calculated with reference to the guarantees of security existing at the date when the Conference meets.

"In order to enable the Conference to examine the reasons put forward in support of the proposals made, and to adjust those proposals one to another, the Commission proposes to refer to the two technical Sub-Commissions the question how far armaments in general, and in particular the above three points (a), (b) and (c) are affected by factors 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7 enumerated in Question V (a), and to refer factor 6 to Sub-Commission A."

Viscount Cecil (British Empire) thought that M. Paul-Boncour was going much too fast. He did not wish to oppose the reference of the question to the technical Sub-Commissions, which might study, if they so desired, the influence of population on armaments, but it seemed to him unwise to wish to establish at once the method which would be applied in effecting the reduction of armaments. To establish the principles of this method before having studied the conditions under which they would be carried out was to put the cart before the horse. He would point out that the second paragraph of M. Paul-Boncour's formula gave an immediate
answer to Question III (b), which had been put to the experts: "What are the practicable methods by which the reduction and limitation of armaments can be effected?"

Possibly the reply given by M. Paul-Boncour was a good reply, but it would be necessary to examine it further.

He thought that the Committee might in any case examine the substance of the third paragraph of the formula of M. Paul-Boncour.

M. Paul-Boncour (France) said that his formula was essentially of a political character. It amounted to stating that there would come a moment when the Council would decide that the relative attainment of security enabled an international conference to be called, and when the Governments would have to make proposals for reductions. These reductions would clearly have to cover the constitutive elements of the military organisations.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire) replied that the Drafting Committee had asked the experts on the previous day to inform it what were the best methods of reduction. He himself had proposed one method, which he had subsequently withdrawn. He admitted that sooner or later it would be necessary to discuss these points. It was, however, at that moment impossible to say that the Governments would effect compulsory reductions in regard to the three elements enumerated — effective, material of war and expenditure. It seemed to him, in particular, that this method, which might perhaps he applied to land armaments (which M. Paul-Boncour probably had particularly in mind), would not enter into consideration so far as aerial and naval armaments were concerned. The problem was to make an inquiry into the best method to be adopted for each of the kinds of armaments and not to lay down any principles before the result of these enquiries was known.

M. Paul-Boncour (France) said he did not understand why the enquiries of experts would have the effect of modifying the necessary principle that the reduction must cover at least — and he would emphasise the expression "at least" — effective, material (including naval units) and expenditure. Convinced, however, that the proposals could not affect any other factor, he would consent to suppress this enumeration. He would, however, maintain, as an expression of the desire for practical results, the principle that the nations should at a given moment come forward with precise proposals accompanied with reasons in support. The problem was to know whether it was possible to effect reductions of armaments without considering potential war strength. A large number of countries represented on the Committee did not think it was possible to do so.

M. de Brouckère (Belgium) thanked M. Paul-Boncour for not insisting upon his enumeration. He considered that the reduction should cover other factors than those enumerated. He agreed to maintain the second paragraph, and he associated himself entirely with the reasons given by M. Paul-Boncour, which laid stress on ensuring that the Governments should present proposals and arguments to justify them. He would point out, moreover, that this procedure was contemplated in Article 8 of the Covenant.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire) said he accepted the retention of the second paragraph of the formula provided the paragraph ended at "reasons in support". Nor did he see any objection to keeping also the first paragraph, although he did not think it was very clearly drafted. He would ask that the third paragraph should be examined in detail.

M. Paul-Boncour (France) asked Lord Cecil whether he agreed to keep the two last lines of the second paragraph.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire) observed that the draft referred to "the guarantees of security existing at the date when the Conference met" and excluded other means of ensuring security, in particular, disarmament itself.

M. Paul-Boncour (France) agreed to suppress the word "guarantees", which could be brought in later if justifiable. He insisted that the first paragraph should be retained. Many countries thought that it was not possible to use mathematical scales in order to settle questions of disarmament which were very complex.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire) said he did not understand, after examination of the third paragraph, what Sub-Commission B could have to say regarding, for example, the influence of population on armaments.

Mr. Gibson (United States) noted that the proposal of M. Paul-Boncour differed radically on many points from the methods contemplated in Question V. He wondered whether the first paragraph did not prejudge the question of naval armaments. He would therefore ask for time to study the text before pronouncing an opinion.

M. Paul-Boncour (France) denied that he desired unduly to hasten the discussion; he explained that he had divided these questions between the Sub-Commissions for reasons which appeared to be justified by common sense. Thus, Point 6 of the enumeration contained in Question V (a) seemed to him to be only of a military character. Point 7 was certainly one for the two Sub-Commissions. Point I, which Lord Cecil had taken as an example, raised demographic questions in regard to which Sub-Commission B might present useful conclusions.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire) said he did not wish to restrict the enquiries, although he believed them to be largely useless. The reply of M. Paul-Boncour, however, caused him
to fear that these enquiries might be carried too far. It was very necessary to avoid long
tasks which might prove to be futile and perhaps injurious. He would like to place it on record
that he considered the greater part of these enquiries would be useless.

M. De Marinis (Italy) thought that the majority of the points had, as M. Paul-Boncour
pointed out, both a military and an economic aspect. He agreed with M. Paul-Boncour
in desiring that the two Sub-Commissions should remain closely in touch, and he would like this
procedure to be established. As regarded the question of population, he was happy to seize
the opportunity to make some observations. The value of a population could be established
in relation to the needs which it was required to meet in the country to which it belonged.
In a depopulated country the population available for reserves was decreasing; in an over-
populated country the difficulties of food supplies in time of war were enormous. Over-
population also influenced the security of the country in that the need to procure work for
the whole population was a factor which considerably affected order and security.

M. De Brouckère (Belgium) also supported the reference of these questions to the Sub-
Commissions, which M. Paul-Boncour had proposed. It would be well not to restrict unneces-
sarily their field of enquiry.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire) was disposed to accept the third paragraph replacing
the word "enable" by the word "facilitate".

The Chairman said that Mr. Gibson had asked for an adjournment of the proposal of
M. Paul-Boncour until the afternoon meeting.

M. Paul-Boncour (France) said he did not think that the anxiety of Mr. Gibson in regard
to the first paragraph was well founded. As the problem was to view armaments as a whole,
which certainly could not be expressed by a mathematical scale, the mere idea of potential
war strength destroyed the mathematical idea. The problem might not have been the same
of the Washington Conference, as the Conference was considering a single category of arma-
ments and, within this category, the limitation of a single naval class.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire) thought it would be going too far to say that the idea
of a mathematical scale for naval armaments was excluded. It might also happen that a
proportional reduction of a mathematical fraction — for example, one-tenth — might be
proposed, applicable to the whole schedule of armaments already unanimously accepted.
He proposed that, in order to render the idea clearer, the words "principle involving" in
the first paragraph should be suppressed.

M. Paul-Boncour (France) agreed to this suppression.

(The discussion of the formula thus amended was adjourned to the next meeting.)

9. Examination of Question V (a) 8 and V (b).

M. Sokal (Poland) asked Lord Cecil to explain the meaning of his note on Question V
(Annex IV). It seemed to him that Lord Cecil considered that the means of pressure to be
exercised on the aggressor would be brought to bear in chronological stages, whereas, in his
opinion, they should be simultaneous.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire) said that some did in fact think that military interven-
tion should be immediate, whereas others believed that it would be necessary to graduate
the application of Article 16. He had intended to lay down that there were three different
methods of pressure and that the Council would use them when and how it considered necessary.

M. De Brouckère (Belgium) said he thought that the discussion had reached an extremely
delicate point. The members of the Council and of the Committee of the Council knew what
were the negotiations as the result of which Question V (b) had been drafted. Some countries
said that Article 16 gave valuable guarantees but that they needed to be defined and organised
in order to be brought rapidly into play. This object might be attained by different means,
among which regional agreements might be contemplated. Paragraph I of Article 16 of
the Covenant created two duties; the first was to break off relations with the aggressor and
the second to give all possible economic and military assistance to the party attacked. Para-
graph 2 merely indicated that the Council would recommend the way in which the military
sanctions should be brought into action. The principle of obligation, however, was formal.
It existed morally and legally.

It did not seem to him that this obligation would be found in the note of Lord Cecil. It
was said in the note that it was very difficult to apply the economic weapon to the aggressor,
since the countries which applied it would probably do more harm to themselves than to the
aggressor State. It seemed to him that it would be necessary to ascertain how such losses
might be diminished, while the obligation itself was maintained. A country would run risks,
either by exercising a blockade against a State which broke the Covenant or by participating
in military sanctions, but it was the duty which they owed to international solidarity to accept
such risks.

It seemed to him that in proportion as greater precision was requested as to the guarantees
furnished by Article 16, the obligations incumbent on States which had signed the Covenant had
continually been attenuated. It seemed to him that again in this instance the considerations
put forward by Lord Cecil weakened the economic guarantee just as the military guarantee had already been enfeebled. The result would be that the States would continue to bring to the table of the conference the proposals which they were in a position to make.

Viscount CECIL (British Empire) thought that M. de Brouckère had misconceived the intention of his note. Personally he had discussed Article 16 so often and at such length that he had thought that the ideas which he submitted would be clear to everybody. His conception of Article 16 was as follows: If resort was had to war and there was a breach of the Covenant, an act of war was committed by the aggressor against all the Members of the League of Nations, and it became the duty of the Members of the League to put all their economic and military forces at the disposal of the League if the Council so decided. Without, however, it being necessary to set in motion a general war, it might be considered that economic measures alone would suffice to stop the aggression. It was not always necessary to employ all the weapons in the armoury. For example, the Council might confine itself to recommending a diplomatic severance of relations without calling upon the Members of the League of Nations to declare war on the State which had broken the Covenant. Each of these States would ask its nationals to discontinue commercial relations, but, as all States were not Members of the League, it might happen that the results of these economic measures would be to transfer all the commerce of the aggressor State to countries which were not Members of the League. Then, if the situation so required, the States Members of the League might proceed to a declaration of war, which would give them the rights of belligerents and particularly the right to establish a blockade. One must not, however, always think of legislating to meet great catastrophes. It might happen that simple measures, such as a diplomatic severance of relations, or economic measures, even incomplete, might suffice, without it being necessary to take military action.

He would like to reassure M. de Brouckère as to his intentions. He did not wish to limit in any way nor to suggest any doubt as to the obligations of Article 16. He would point out, however, that the Second Assembly, which had been greatly concerned with this question, had thought that the first stage in international action should be a mere severance of diplomatic relations. He would also draw the attention of M. de Brouckère to a very delicate point: what would happen if a certain number of great countries refused to enter upon a war against a powerful aggressor? Would there still be an obligation for the small countries? It was in order to settle this problem that the Second Assembly had proposed that the Council should immediately be called together in order to determine whether there had been a breach of the Covenant, so that all doubts might be set at rest and so that a moral pressure might be exercised on all the Members of the League, which would not then be able subsequently to dispute the fact that a breach of the Covenant had occurred.

M. DE BROUCKÈRE (Belgium) thanked Lord Cecil and said that he was not entirely reassured. It seemed to him that Article 16 was not aimed at small disputes but at the crime of aggression characterised by resort to war. In this case it seemed to him impossible that successive stages of international action could be discussed.

Viscount CECIL (British Empire) drew attention to the Greco-Bulgarian incident. The Council felt no doubt that there had been aggression. Nevertheless, before setting on foot international military action, it began by issuing recommendations to the two countries concerned, and a solution was reached. In similar cases the Council might give instructions of this kind, or go still further in the application of sanctions without bringing the whole of Article 16 into play.

M. DE BROUCKÈRE (Belgium) said he did not remember whether, in the example quoted, the Council had actually recognised that there had been a resort to war. In his opinion, according to Article 16 of the Covenant, when a State had recourse to war, it had by doing so committed an act of war against all the Members of the League, which were therefore in a state of war with that country. To be in a state of war with a country, however, did not imply that resort would be had to acts of war. The States Members of the League might therefore remain expectant until the Council had taken a decision. But it was dangerous to admit a priori that a State was under no obligation until the Council had come to a unanimous decision. For if this point of view were admitted, there would be a considerable weakening of Article 16. He also felt some anxiety as to the question raised by Lord Cecil, when he had referred to the case of a small State alone, when a State had resorted to war, it had by doing so committed an act of war against all the Members of the League. To be in a state of war with a State which was attacked, and which would not be helped by any of the countries surrounding it, as each of them was waiting the decision or the example of its neighbour. It was accordingly necessary to ascertain the exact meaning of Article 16 in order that States might, with a full knowledge of the facts, bring to the table of the conference the proposals which they were in a position to make.

Viscount CECIL (British Empire) said it was not true that a state of war existed under Article 16 between Members of the League of Nations and the State guilty of a breach of the
Covenant. The latter had committed an act of war; but the other States had to decide whether they desired to be in a state of war with it. This interpretation had been given unanimously in a resolution adopted by the Assembly in 1921. He was convinced that nothing in his note was contrary to the interpretation contained in that resolution.

(Documents C. P. D. (C, R. 7 and 8 (Annexes V and VI) containing the proposal and memorandum of M. Paul-Boncour relating to Question V (a) 8 and V (b) were distributed to the Drafting Committee.)

Viscount Cecil (British Empire) said that, at a first examination of these proposals, he thought that it would be difficult for him to discuss them in the absence of instructions from his Government. It seemed to him that they involved amending the Covenant, and he would inform his colleagues of the attitude which he would perhaps be obliged to assume at the next meeting.

M. Paul-Boncour (France) asked that the Committee should not prejudge the question until it had heard his explanations.

(The Committee rose at 1 p.m.).

FOURTH MEETING,

Held on Saturday, May 22nd, 1926, at 5 p.m.

Chairman: M. Loudon.

10. Examination of Question V (a) I-7 (continuation).

Mr. Gibson (United States) reminded the Committee that he had asked for a postponement of the decision to be taken on the proposal of M. Paul-Boncour, of which the new draft was as follows:

"The armaments to be maintained in each country cannot be fixed on any principle involving a mathematical scale.

"At the same time, the Commission is of opinion that every Government should bring to the projected Conference for the preparation of disarmament contracts, definite and quantitative proposals, accompanied by reasons in support, calculated with reference to the guarantees of security existing at the date when the Conference meets.

"In order to enable the Conference to examine the reasons put forward in support of the proposals made, and to adjust those proposals one to another, the Commission proposes to refer to the two technical Sub-Commissions the question how far armaments in general are affected by factors 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7 enumerated in Question V (a), and to refer factor 6 to Sub-Commission A."

He had examined this document in a spirit of friendly co-operation, and he hoped that M. Paul-Boncour would accept his observations in the same spirit. He considered it premature to ask the Sub-Commissions to undertake the enquiries embodied in the first two paragraphs. Moreover, he thought that it was outside the competence of the Drafting Committee to give these instructions. The task of the Drafting Committee was to divide the seven questions into definite interrogations to be put to the two Sub-Commissions. The first two paragraphs of the proposal prejudged questions of principle which should remain open for discussion. Possibly these affirmations of principle were correct, although he was not himself in a position to say whether armaments could or could not be determined according to a mathematical scale. As to the second paragraph, it seemed to him impossible to say at once what should be the nature of the proposals to be made by each Government, and the Drafting Committee was not qualified to dictate a formula for these proposals. It might happen that the Preparatory Commission, instead of asking the Governments for proposals, would present the Governments with suggestions for their approval. He would insist on his keen desire to give an opportunity for the discussion of the ideas contained in the note, and he believed that it would be necessary to take advantage of the presence of a body of qualified experts in order to submit these ideas to examination. He would venture therefore to submit the following text, which was intended to replace the proposal of M. Paul-Boncour:

"In order to allow of a profitable examination of the basis on which the reduction and limitation of armaments was possible, the Commission proposes to refer . . ."

The text would continue as in the third paragraph of the proposal of M. Paul-Boncour.

M. Paul-Boncour (France) said that he had no intention of unduly hastening the discussions or of obliging the Drafting Committee to take decisions, but he would observe that the same procedure must be applied to the other questions under discussion. The task of the Drafting Committee was to furnish the Sub-Commissions with guiding principles, or at least
to submit guiding principles for the approval of the Preparatory Commission. It was possible, of course, to postpone any discussion of the questions, but he thought that in this case the experts, whose task would not be very definite, would only proceed to their examination of the questions with a good deal of reserve.

Mr. Gibson (United States) thought there was a misunderstanding. He did not mean that guiding principles should not be given to the Sub-Commissions but that it was necessary not to limit the questions in advance and exclude points which had not been discussed by the Committee. He thought, for example, that technical experts might give their opinion on the possibility or impossibility of establishing mathematical scales. In view of the fact that a preliminary study was being made, it was advisable that the study should be as broad as possible. The second paragraph did not seem to him to contain a guiding principle of interest to a Sub-Commission. If, moreover, this paragraph was to express the point of view of the Drafting Committee, it would be necessary to discuss it more completely.

M. Paul-Boncour (France) explained that his object was to emphasise the desire to arrive at definite proposals which the Governments, on seeing the technical reports, would have to formulate with their reasons in support of them. He did not insist that this text should be introduced into the guiding principles given to the Sub-Commissions.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire) said that he had accepted the text. He also understood the objections of Mr. Gibson to the first paragraph, which might perhaps raise difficulty in regard to naval armaments. He was much impressed by the observations of M. Paul-Boncour on the second paragraph. It seemed, indeed, difficult to begin a discussion on a disarmament scheme without having the proposals of the Governments on their own disarmament. He saw no objection to warning, fairly soon, the Governments which would have to prepare these proposals.

Mr. Gibson (United States) thought that the Governments would be in a better position to formulate these proposals when they had received the result of the work which had been done. He thought that the two texts were being put in the wrong order. It was for the Preparatory Commission to make proposals to the Governments and not to ask the Governments for proposals. At any rate the resolutions submitted were foreign to Question V(a). He also feared that these resolutions might give the impression that the Preparatory Commission was trying to avoid responsibility.

M. Paul-Boncour (France) explained that he introduced this text in reference to Question V(a) with a view to the reasons in support which were requested, in order to indicate that the technical experts would have to study the factors which would enter into these reasons in support.

M. de BroUCKERE (Belgium) proposed that he should be permitted to seek a formula which he would introduce into his report and which would reconcile the two points of view.

M. de Marinis (Italy) observed that it would be impossible for the Governments to make quantitative proposals. Reduction of armaments in a country would obviously depend on what the neighbouring country would do. A Government, after having heard the declarations of its neighbour, would perhaps be led to alter its proposals. It was accordingly necessary to allow for two stages in the process.

M. de BroUCKERE (Belgium) replied that the text should cover the last stage and that the first proposals of the Governments would necessarily be relative.

Mr. Gibson (United States) said he would not for the moment object to the maintenance in a sentence of the report of the expression "calculated with reference to the degree of security existing at the date when the Conference met", but he would reserve the right to take up the discussion of this expression later.

After an exchange of views, in which M. Matsuda, M. Paul-Boncour and M. de BroUCKERE took part, it was decided that the second sentence of the note of M. Paul-Boncour should be inserted in the report in a form to be decided by the Rapporteur.

M. de BroUCKERE (Belgium) said, in reference to the first paragraph, that in spite of the objections to which Lord Cecil and Mr. Gibson had drawn attention, it would be interesting for the experts to emphasise that it was unnecessary to embark in the direction of mathematical calculations, and he proposed that the formula should be modified as follows:

"Exclusively mathematical considerations cannot suffice to determine the armaments to be maintained in each country."

M. Paul-Boncour (France) did not think that this text corresponded with his views. He would prefer in this case to leave the question open and ask Sub-Commission A to what extent it was possible or impossible to take account of mathematical proportion in the matter of naval, land and aerial disarmament.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire) said that in his opinion it was impossible to arrive at a reduction of land armaments by means of indices, but that it might be possible that mathematical proportion would have some part to play in respect of naval and aerial disarmament. He would accept any formula which expressed this idea.
M. DE BROUCKÈRE (Belgium) submitted for Question V (a) as a whole the following text:
"As the armaments to be maintained in each country cannot be determined on the basis of mathematical considerations alone, the Commission in order to allow of a profitable examination of the basis on which the reduction and limitation of armaments is possible, requests the two Sub-Commissions to investigate how far armaments in general are affected by factors 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7 enumerated in Question V (a) and refers factor 6 to Sub-Commission A.

This text was adopted.

11. Examination of Question V (a) 8 and V (b).

M. PAUL-BONCOUR (France) explained that there had been distributed a series of proposals (Annex V) and an explanatory memorandum (Annex VI) which was no more than a personal commentary. The discussion should be directed only to the proposals.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire) explained that he had no instructions to speak on the substance of the proposals. He wished, however, to consider their character. They amounted to a suggestion that the Council should have an investigation made in regard to the steps to be taken in the event of pressing danger. That was a question of interest to the League of Nations, which was not within the competence of the Preparatory Commission, as the Commission did not belong to the League of Nations. The Commission was justified in considering the question of security but not in making proposals to the League of Nations on the application of the Covenant. Part 3 of the proposals raised still further difficulties. It proposed that a series of measures should be examined for submission to the Council with a view to the application of Article 16. Nothing in the Questionnaire warranted proposals of this kind.

He did not mean that it might not be useful to study these questions, but they could not be studied by that Committee, which included countries which were not Members of the League. It was, moreover, possible for the French Government to submit these proposals to the Council and to ask the Council to authorise the proposed investigations. The result of the investigations might then perhaps come before the Preparatory Commission.

He would repeat that the Committee might discuss the extent to which Article 16 was effective but not the remedies whereby its defects might be remedied.

M. SOKAL (Poland) thought that the proposals of M. Paul-Boncour were closely bound up with the drafting of Question V (b). M. Paul-Boncour proposed to study by what means the machinery of Article 16 might be put into operation, and this was precisely the question which was raised.

He thought it was indispensable to find some means of procedure which would enable this discussion to go forward, as it was of extreme importance not only for his country but for very many other countries.

M. DE BROUCKÈRE (Belgium) shared the view of M. Sokal. He thought that the search for measures to facilitate the rapid putting into force of the sanctions contemplated in Article 16 was precisely the question raised in V (b), and that the proposals of M. Paul-Boncour were calculated to facilitate this enquiry. He was, however, much struck by the argument of Lord Cecil, which drew attention to the fact that the Committee was not an emanation of the League of Nations. It would result from this, however, that the Committee was not qualified to interpret Article 16 and that the memorandum submitted by Lord Cecil himself should not have been examined.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire) recognised the justice of the observations of M. de Brouckère and declared that he withdrew his memorandum (Annex IV).

M. PAUL-BONCOUR (France) said that the delicate position in which the Committee found itself had not escaped his notice. Nevertheless, in approaching the two questions V (a) 8 and V (b), the Committee was dealing with the kernel of the Questionnaire. These questions raised the problem of the interpretation of Article 16 and its application, and the Committee had to deal with questions which were within the exclusive competence of the League of Nations, while, assisting in its discussion, there were States which had come to take part in them although they were not Members of the League. These two paragraphs of Question V concerned not only the application of the Covenant but also the special agreements, and particularly the agreements of Locarno, which, as the delegate of Germany had justly said, were one of the reasons for the present meeting. The Committee had therefore to consider questions which did not concern all its members, either because they did not belong to the League of Nations or because they were not signatories of the Locarno Treaties.

The States would find themselves unable to submit concrete proposals for disarmament if they could not make an exact calculation of their security, and for this purpose they must know how the Covenant and the Locarno Treaties would work — that was to say, how the Council and the way in which the Council acted would work so far as these two diplomatic instruments were concerned. There was no question of making amendments to the Covenant — a proceeding which would exceed the competence of the Committee — but merely of gaining a clearer idea of the working of the Council and of the Covenant. States which were conscious of their vital interests needed to know very precisely, in order to calculate their security, within what period of time the Council would come together, when it would deter...
mine the aggressor and when the recommendations in regard to military and economic assistance would be executed. The recent example of the Greco-Bulgarian dispute had shown the vital importance of these questions. As it happily happened, everything on that occasion worked quickly. Nevertheless, the position had come to the edge of catastrophe. It was accordingly indispensable that this rapidity of working should be ensured beyond all doubt.

He would refrain from referring again to texts which had been put aside because they required from States engagements into which they were not willing to enter. The problem now was to foresee how the decisions would be taken and how they could be rapidly applied. He was persuaded that any disarmament conference would be necessarily obliged to deal with the question of the greater precision to be achieved in this matter; otherwise it would achieve reductions which would be negligible.

The procedure suggested by Lord Cecil to settle the difficulties to which he had drawn attention in regard to the competence of the Preparatory Commission seemed to him necessarily to involve a certain delay.

For this reason he had presented his proposals to the Preparatory Commission.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire) said that the problem was to draft under Article 16 a code of procedure regulating the application of the Article. The details of such a code went very far, and certain of them might perhaps go beyond the Covenant. He believed that proposal 3 (a) had already been studied by the Council. Proposal 3 (b) seemed to him very dangerous. It might happen that the Governments thought that the rules to be submitted were not those which they desired to see applied, and it might also happen that these rules would involve new obligations.

He did not think the procedure which he had suggested would involve any very great delay. The Council would probably entrust the examination of the proposals to its Committee, which was very qualified to undertake it. In any case there would be a delay, for he would himself be obliged to ask for instructions. He recognised that M. Paul-Boncour might have confined himself to indicating the difficulties of applying Article 16, and he recognised the desire of his colleague to hasten the work. He could not, however, help thinking that it was impossible for the Preparatory Commission to study these proposals. The Treaties of Locarno, for example, were drafted in terms even more general than those of the Covenant. The signatories of these Treaties would be extremely surprised to see the Preparatory Commission establishing precise rules for their application. He must insist on the point that the Preparatory Commission, although convened by the League of Nations and although bound to make a report to the Council, was not competent to submit proposals relating to the working of the League of Nations. He asked formally that this question should be adjourned or withdrawn from discussion in order to be submitted to the Council if this was considered desirable.

M. Paul-Boncour (France) said he could not accept this procedure. It was not for the French Government to raise a question of this kind before the Council. It was a question to be examined by the Preparatory Commission, since it was raised in the Questionnaire. He would repeat that there was here an essential factor in the question of the reduction of armaments, and that States would not be able to make calculations in regard to the reductions to be agreed upon unless they knew exactly how the decisions of the Council would operate. He had proposed solutions in a way that would emphasise his desire that the technical Sub-Commissions should keep upon practical ground. He saw no valid reason why he should withdraw these two questions from the Questionnaire.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire) formally declared that it was impossible for him to discuss these proposals, since he had never known either privately or officially that he would be called upon to examine them.

M. Paul-Boncour (France) said he did not insist on the form of his proposals, but he would ask what could be proposed in order that the technical Sub-Commissions might deal with these two questions which figured in the Questionnaire.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire) did not see any objection to the French Government submitting its proposals to the Council. He was himself ready to vote a resolution to the effect that the Preparatory Commission had not the competence to study them and that it considered that they should be referred to the Council. In reply to the question as to what should be done with these two Questions in the Questionnaire, he would remind the Committee that he had proposed that the discussion should be adjourned, and that this proposal had been rejected.

M. de Brouckère (Belgium) said he would like to remind the Drafting Committee of the history of these questions. The Committee of the Council had not been able to obtain agreement in drafting them. The Council succeeded in drafting them and sent them to the Preparatory Commission. He did not understand why the Preparatory Commission should refer to the Council the technical factors to be included in these questions. The factors in question were technical factors, which it was necessary to abstract in order that they might be forwarded to the Sub-Commissions.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire) persisted in thinking that it was impossible for the Commission to establish a code of application for Article 16. The only thing possible was to examine the defects in the present procedure, and he did not think that such an examination would lead to any useful result.
M. DE BROUCKÈRE (Belgium) replied that the Committee could not escape the obligation of studying the technical aspects of these two questions. He would endeavour to isolate them for discussion.

(The meeting rose at 7 p.m.).

FIFTH MEETING

 Held on Monday, May 24th, 1926, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: M. LOUDON (Netherlands).

12. Examination of Question V (a) 8 and V (b) (continuation of the discussion).

The Chairman explained that in the event of the Drafting Committee replying affirmatively to Question 5 (b), the question would arise of the competence of the Drafting Committee and of the Preparatory Commission in view of the conditions explained by Lord Cecil at the last meeting.

M. PAUL-BONCOUR (France) said that the question of competence might be argued, but he understood quite well that for reasons of convenience and regard for the States which were not Members of the League of Nations, but which had accepted the invitation to attend the discussions, the question should be submitted to another body.

He had therefore agreed with Lord Cecil on a proposal which would be submitted to the Drafting Committee, but he desired it to be clearly understood that his intentions were merely confined to examining the carrying-out of the decisions of the Council and not to modifying or interpreting the Covenant or to creating new undertakings for the Governments. He was looking at the matter on the supposition that the Council had met and had taken decisions, and all he desired was that the method of hastening the meeting of the Council and the execution of its decisions should be examined.

He would submit the following text:

"The following very important proposal has been laid before the Commission by the French delegation:

"With reference to Question V (a) 8 and V (b). the Commission considers that in order that a State should be able to calculate to what extent it can consent to the reduction or limitation of its armaments, it is essential to determine what method and what machinery are best calculated to give help to that State when attacked.

"The Commission therefore proposes to suggest to the Council:

1. That methods or regulations should be investigated which would: (a) facilitate the meeting of the Council at very brief notice in case of war or threat of war; (b) enable the Council to take such decisions as may be necessary to enforce the obligations of the Covenant as expeditiously as possible.

2. That the Permanent Advisory Commission should be instructed: (a) to define the measures necessary to comply with paragraph (a) No. 8; (b) to investigate the procedure which would allow of the rapid drafting of recommendations regarding the military assistance provided for in the second paragraph of Article 16 of the Covenant, when the Council shall have decided to make such recommendations; (c) to investigate what measures should be taken in case of a conflict of which the Council shall have been notified, and when the latter shall have taken a decision, in order to prevent the development or preparation of hostilities, according to the precedent of the Greco-Bulgarian dispute.

3. That the Joint Commission should be instructed: (a) to investigate the question of the improvement of the telegraphic and the telephonic communications of the different countries with the Secretariat of the League; (b) to study what measures would be most appropriate, when the Council shall have so decided, to give most rapidly such economic and financial help as may be necessary to a State which has been attacked; (c) to determine the composition and procedure of the Committees for the supply and allocation of resources which the League might set up for that purpose.

"It has been objected that the aim of the proposal was to define and elaborate the machinery carrying into effect the decisions taken by the Council of the League of Nations in virtue of Article 16 of the Covenant, and that constructive proposals of this nature belonged rather to the competence of the organs of the League of Nations than to that of the present Commission.

"Without pronouncing any opinion on the validity of this objection, the Commission feels that there are obvious inconveniences in asking a body comprising representatives of countries not Members of the League of Nations to discuss new means of carrying out the provisions of an instrument which they have not signed."
The Commission has accordingly decided to forward the French delegation's proposal to the Council with the request that it should be immediately taken into consideration.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire) thanked M. Paul-Boncour for having agreed to the reference of these questions to the Council, which would only involve a very slight delay since the Council would be meeting on June 7th. He accordingly thought it unnecessary to discuss the terms of the proposal. So far as he was concerned, he would see that his Government was in a position to take a decision at the next meeting of the Council with the full knowledge of the facts.

Count Bernstorff (Germany) said that the proposal seemed to him so simple and so opportune that he could accept it immediately.

Mr. Gibson (United States) said that he did not wish to make any commentary on this proposal, as he felt that the delegation of the United States, in view of its special position, could do no more than abstain from the decision to be taken.

M. De Marinis (Italy) adhered in principle but said he would be happy to postpone the decision until he had been able to make himself more familiar with the text.

M. Matsuda (Japan) said he was also happy to note the agreement which had been reached and agreed to the procedure suggested.

M. Paul-Boncour (France) thanked Count Bernstorff for his observations.

The Chairman noted that an agreement in principle had been reached and adjourned the decision until after the document had been distributed.

13. Examination of Question VI.

The Chairman thought that any commentary on this question was useless, as the Preparatory Commission had decided to send it to Sub-Commission A.

The Drafting Committee agreed.

14. Examination of Question VII.

M. Sokal (Poland) said that almost all the speakers had recognised that no appreciable progress could be made in the direction of disarmament without the institution of a definite and clear system, with firm and concrete undertakings, which would give the nations which would benefit from these undertakings a feeling of security. The experience of the last few years had shown that international solidarity, even as represented by the League of Nations, was not sufficient for it to be possible to define the obligations of the Covenant in the form of an instrument applicable to all possible cases. The discussions of the Committee had led the British delegation to affirm that its Government was not disposed to take any steps whatever which would have the effect of increasing the obligations incumbent upon it under Article 16, unless such an undertaking was balanced by the effective adoption of a general plan of disarmament.

The Polish delegation was happy, however, to note that the British Government had, on the other hand, submitted a particularly interesting suggestion for the practical realisation of security. He would refer to the speech made by Sir Austen Chamberlain in March 1925 to the Council of the League of Nations in which he said: "His Majesty's Government conclude that the best way of dealing with the situation is, with the co-operation of the League, to supplement the Covenant by making special arrangements in order to meet special needs.

It seemed that a good many objections would disappear if a system of assistance could be devised, not from the world-wide point of view but from a more limited point of view which embraced regions which were strictly defined.

In order to find a basis for such a system, it was necessary to define what was understood by "regions". Special agreements already embodied an effort to give concrete form to mutual assistance in the event of the disturbance by an aggressor State of the peace established by the treaties. It must be observed that these agreements had already produced effects in local disarmament, but that, on the other hand, they did not always cover interests which were sufficiently broad. In the event of aggression upon a State A by a State B, a State C would not be guaranteed against all the possible consequences of this aggression and was thus compelled to maintain armed forces in order to be in a position to meet this possibility.

The interdependence of economic interests made it necessary for him to point out that none of the existing special agreements covered a region which was sufficiently extensive to enable it to constitute a regional system of assistance, security and disarmament. In order to allow of a regional disarmament, it would be necessary that a regional international solidarity existed, implying regional guarantees and regional undertakings to afford the necessary help.

He accordingly thought that it was necessary to submit to the technical Sub-Commission for examination the definition of regions so far as security and disarmament were concerned. He also thought that it would be very useful in connection with the proposal submitted by M. Paul-Boncour to study the methods of application and mutual assistance within the limits of a region.
With this object in view, he would submit the two following proposals:

1. The Commission asks technical Sub-Commissions A and B to consider whether regional military, naval and air disarmament can be regarded as an important step towards general disarmament, and, should general disarmament prove impracticable, what regions, from the military, naval or air point of view, can be considered separately for purposes of disarmament. Sub-Commissions A and B are requested to consider what factors the term "region" should connote from the point of view of security (degree of regional corporate feeling depending on political, economic and social ties and on the geographical situation).

II. After giving a definition of "regions" from the point of view of security and disarmament, Sub-Commissions A and B are requested to consider whether a special organisation of regional assistance within the scope of the Covenant of the League would be likely to give the organs of the League effective help in supplying the assistance required and would thereby render the execution of the relevant articles of the Covenant easier and more expeditious (study of the machinery, form and procedure of regional assistance).

Viscount Cecil (British Empire) said he did not see any objections a priori to the first proposal. The second proposal raised the same difficulties as the proposals of M. Paul-Boncour, and should receive the same treatment. He was not in a position to discuss the substance of this proposal. He thought that the Council would find it very difficult to define the provisions of Article 16, but for the moment he would confine himself to asking M. Sokal to agree that this question should be submitted elsewhere.

M. De Marinis (Italy) agreed with Lord Cecil concerning the observations which he had just made in regard to the second proposal. He would ask for the adjournment of the discussion of the first proposal so that he might have time to study it.

(The discussion was adjourned to the following meeting.)

15. Examination of Annex II.

M. De Brouckere (Belgium) submitted the following proposal concerning the supervision which in the mind of the Council was implicit in the questions submitted to the Advisory Committee:

"The last paragraph of Article 8 of the Covenant of the League stipulates that the Members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval and air programmes and the condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to warlike purposes."

"With a view to organising this exchange of information, Sub-Commission A has been requested to consider the advantages and disadvantages, from the military point of view, of the various methods which might be employed and, in particular:

- The organisation at Geneva of a permanent service for the collection of information received from the different Governments either in reply to questionnaires or through representatives of the League accredited to these Governments who would have duties similar to those of military attaches in embassies and legations;
- The conclusion of an international convention making it compulsory to publish all inventions which can be used in chemical or bacteriological warfare and, in general, all forms of warfare which are condemned by the opinion of the civilised world.

Sub-Commission A is requested to investigate what would be the consequences from the military point of view of inserting in the convention relative to disarmament, or in that regarding the prohibition of certain forms of warfare, of provisions similar to those contained in the statute of the International Labour Office (Articles 411 to 420 of the Versailles Treaty).

Sub-Commission B is requested to ascertain the consequences of such insertion from the economic point of view.

Sub-Commission A is requested to consider to what extent the experience acquired regarding the supervision of disarmament points to the possibility from the military point of view of general supervision.

Sub-Commission B is requested to state if such supervision offers any difficulties from the economic point of view and, if so, what difficulties."

He thought that the supervisory organisation alone would be able to increase appreciably the scope of the disarmament measures. He had therefore been led to define his views on the question.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire) said he would first submit some preliminary observations on the proposal of M. de Brouckere. It seemed to him that the conclusion of a convention concerning inventions was much more a political than a technical matter. The organisation of an information service appeared to him open to objection, as there existed already at Geneva an information service, and the despatch of military attaches of the League to the Governments would give rise to serious criticism. Above all, he would draw the attention of the Committee to a very important point. There was in the Covenant an Article 11 which had already been extensively used, and which, with the authority of the interested States, enabled all kinds of investigations to be made without it being necessary to provide for a
special complicated system. In the wish to give greater precision to the methods of investigation, there was a risk of hampering or restricting to a great extent the initiative of the Council, which in each case chose the form of enquiry which was the most appropriate. It would be, in particular, very disconcerting if the report of the experts demonstrated the disadvantages attaching to investigations in view of the fact that they already existed and that they were working to the general satisfaction.

M. DE BROUCKÈRE (Belgium) observed, in the first place, that he had made no proposals but had merely asked for an enquiry by the technical experts into the points to which he had drawn attention. He was not convinced by the criticisms of Lord Cecil. He thought that the two Sub-Commissions might give useful information concerning the objections which might be raised to a convention regarding inventions, based upon the necessities of national defence and economic needs.

He was well aware that there was a section in the Secretariat whose duty it was to collect and publish military information. He thought, however, that publications of this kind could be extended.

With regard to the more important question of enquiries, he did not think that the questions raised would weaken the strength of Article 11. He had looked for precedents in international legislation and he asked the Sub-Commissions to say whether these precedents were applicable to disarmament. He was still of opinion that if something concrete was to be achieved, a form of control must be accepted. This would encounter strong resistance which would probably manifest itself when the experts began to discuss the matter. In view, however, of the fact that those Governments who sincerely desired to disarm must be upheld by public opinion and that, to make this possible, public opinion must be kept informed, it was preferable to face those objections as soon as possible.

M. DE MARINIS (Italy) had on several occasions had an opportunity of saying that the Italian Government was in principle opposed to the idea of supervision. He would therefore make every reservation with regard to these proposals. He would not, however, oppose their submission to the Sub-Commissions in view of the fact that he would principally combat them in his capacity as an expert. He saw, further, the following grave objection, especially with regard to the second paragraph. That paragraph stipulated for an exchange of information and for the despatch of representatives of the League of Nations to the various Governments. But such proposals could not be applied to States which were not Members of the League. He did not think, therefore, that it would be of any use to consider such a suggestion, which might make it still more difficult for other important countries whose presence was necessary if any disarmament scheme were to be achieved, to take part in the work of disarmament. He asked Mr. Gibson to give his views on the proposals of M. de Brouckère.

Mr. GIBSON (United States) thanked M. de Marinis for the consideration he had shown for the opinion of the Government of the United States in that matter. He would make the following declaration. Although the Government of the United States was not a Member of the League of Nations, the American delegation in no way desired to do anything which would hinder the Commission in the examination of the question submitted to it. It did not in the least degree desire to prejudice the examination of these questions. There would be during the conference some discussions in which the American delegation could not properly participate and some in regard to which it would be obliged to make reservations, but he hoped the presence of the American delegation would not lead other delegations to exclude from discussion matters which were of interest to them and that there would be no hesitancy in beginning the discussion of those questions which might prove such as to make for the progress of the Committee's work.

M. MATSUDA (Japan) thought that the question of supervision was principally of a political kind, and it was for this reason that it seemed to him to be difficult to go further in the matter. He would point out that this question was not in the Questionnaire. He had no objection to discussing it on an appropriate occasion but he would draw the Committee's attention to the prudence which should be exercised in any matter affecting the sovereignty of States.

M. SOKAL (Poland) pointed out that the Committee was entering upon a discussion of the principle contained in the question, while M. de Brouckère had confined himself to proposing merely that it should be submitted to the Sub-Commissions. Mr. Gibson was right. The free discussion of any question which might produce a positive result should be allowed. He thought that the ideas underlying the proposal of M. de Brouckère were within the scope of the Questionnaire, and he warmly supported his proposal.

M. DE MARINIS (Italy) repeated that if the Committee thought it of use, he would not oppose the submission of this question to the Sub-Commissions. On the other hand, he agreed with M. Matsuda, who had demonstrated that the question of supervision was not comprised by the Questionnaire. He would further point out that this question was a very delicate one and would considerably increase the difficulties of the Sub-Commissions. He asked M. de Brouckère therefore to consent to adjourn the discussion of the question.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire) urged M. de Brouckère to with draw the paragraph concerning military attaches. He would complete M. de Brouckère's proposals by others which seemed to him to be still more urgent. They concerned chemical warfare. He would like to put to the Sub-Commissions the following questions: "Can factories established for
other purposes be used for the manufacture of poison gas? What changes would be necessary, and how long would such changes take? Is there anything that can be recommended in the organisation of such factories that would render a transformation of that kind impossible or more difficult? What apparatus is necessary for distributing gas? How long does it take to manufacture such apparatus? What are the facts as to the effect of the distribution of gas over large centres of population? What experiments could be conducted with the object of obtaining such information? " There were already in existence international agreements against the use of poison gas. " Is it possible to create any international sanctions for the enforcement of these agreements?"

M. DE BROUCKÈRE (Belgium) said that the proposals of Lord Cecil were excellent and that they could be easily adopted. He was ready to withdraw from his proposal the passage concerning military attachés. He could not agree with the objection put by M. de Marinis concerning the competence of the Committee. The report of M. Bene adopted by the Council spoke of supervision, and the discussion of the Preparatory Commission, in which M. de Marinis himself had taken part although he had made reserves regarding the principle underlying the question, had raised the matter, thus showing that the question was upon its agenda.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire) also pointed out that the Council had submitted to the Preparatory Commission any question which had been dealt with by the Council Committee and by itself by attaching the Minutes of its discussions to the report. He was under the impression that in the invitation addressed to countries not Members of the League, the Council had pointed out that the enquiry into disarmament would be as wide as possible.

Mr. Gibson (United States) said that in the invitation sent to his Government it was said that the task of the Committee consisted in preparing for a Conference on disarmament and that its discussions should deal with questions such as... The list of questions was not therefore inclusive.

With regard to the proposal of M. de Brouckère, he said that he had no desire to make any objection to the first and to the second paragraphs, for he had understood that the proposal was that States Members of the League should exchange information as laid down in Article 8 of the Covenant. If, however, this exchange of information should also extend to States not Members of the League, he would be compelled to make reservations regarding the second paragraph. He would, however, add that the Government of the United States had already furnished military information to the Secretariat.

M. DE BROUCKÈRE (Belgium) explained that he had only quoted the text of Article 8 in order to show that there was nothing new in his proposal. He was ready to delete the second part of the second paragraph.

M. DE MARINIS (Italy) agreed that the proposal should be submitted to the Sub-Committees, where it would be possible for reservations to be made. He remained convinced, however, that the question was not within the competence of the Preparatory Commission.

The proposal of M. de Brouckère, as amended, was adopted.

16. Examination of Question V (a) 8 and V (b) (continuation).

The proposal submitted by M. Pauli-Boncour (see above, under No. 12) was adopted.

(The Committee rose at 12.45 p.m.)

SIXTH MEETING

Held on Monday, May 24th, 1926, at 3.30 p.m.

Chairman: M. LOUDON (Netherlands).

17. Examination of Question VII (continuation of the discussion).

The Chairman reminded the members of the Committee that they had before them the proposal made by M. Sokal at the preceding meeting, and the following proposal made by Mr. Gibson:

"The Commission consider that regional agreements constitute one of the most practicable methods of approach to the question of the limitation of armaments, and particularly of land armaments, and that Sub-Commission A be directed to consider what regions may, from a military point of view, be taken separately for the purpose of the limitation of: (a) land armament, and (b) to what extent, if at all, regional agreements in the matter of naval armament are practicable."
M. Sokal (Poland) thought that the first part of Mr. Gibson's formula could be incorporated with his first proposal. The second part of Mr. Gibson's proposal would necessitate a complete discussion.

M. de Brouckère (Belgium), whilst delighted with the initiative taken by M. Sokal and Mr. Gibson, wished at the same time to observe that it should remain understood that the regional disarmament agreements were only in the nature of an alternative which was not to be adopted unless the general disarmament, mooted in accordance with the actual terms of Resolution XIV, was recognised as impossible.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire) asked for an explanation of the second phrase of M. Sokal’s first proposal. He thought that in any case the Sub-Commissions should be entirely free to examine this regional idea without their examination being limited to the elements enumerated in the parenthesis. The regional idea might be much more elastic with regard to disarmament. It would be possible to imagine a European disarmament agreement, just as it was possible to imagine one limited to the Scandinavian States.

The United States delegation was right in thinking that a region, from the point of view of land armaments, was not necessarily a region from the naval point of view, fleets having a mobility different from that of armies.

The Secretary read the following text, proposed by M. Sokal and Mr. Gibson, to replace the first phrase of the first proposal of M. Sokal and the proposal made by Mr. Gibson:

"The Commission considers that regional agreements constitute one of the most practicable methods of approach to the question of the limitation of armaments, and ask Sub-Commissions A and B, should general disarmament prove impracticable, what regions, from the military, naval or air point of view, can be considered, particularly for purposes of disarmament.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire) asked M. Sokal to withdraw the second phrase of his first proposal.

M. Sokal (Poland) regretted that he could not see his way to do this. He explained that the second part was a guiding principle for the Sub-Commissions and was connected with the first part. These guiding principles, however, did not prejudge the question, and it was in fact possible that the Sub-Commissions might be led to consider Europe as constituting a region in order to find a basis for European regional agreements.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire) thought that Question VII as drafted was clearer than the new formula. In order to satisfy M. Sokal, he proposed to add to it a definition of the term "region" — (a) from the disarmament standpoint, (b) from the security standpoint.

Mr. Gibson (United States) called upon M. Sokal to accept Lord Cecil's proposal.

After an exchange of views, the following formula was put before the Committee:

"The Commission asks technical Sub-Commissions A and B to consider whether regional military, naval, and air disarmament can be regarded as an important step towards general disarmament, and, should general disarmament not prove immediately practicable, what regions could be considered separately from the point of view of the limitation of armaments.

Sub-Commissions A and B are requested to consider what factors the term "region" should connote from the point of view of security and from the point of view of disarmament."

M. de Marinis (Italy) stated that in principle he was not opposed to this formula, which was more or less limited to the reproduction of Question VII. He only asked what the Sub-Commissions would be able to reply. This regional idea was of a political nature. It might be asked what were the countries in whose interest it was to make such agreements and what countries were in a position to do so. But from the military standpoint the meaning of this regional idea was not clear. It was possible, if necessary, to imagine an ideal military region having regard to strategical and geographical considerations, etc.; but in reality it would perhaps be made up from portions of States and would not respect political frontiers. He did not wish to press this point, but he had wished to warn the Committee of the difficulty in which Sub-Commission A would be placed.

The above text was adopted.

M. Sokal (Poland) realised that his second proposal had a strong resemblance to the proposals made by M. Paul-Boncour relating to the machinery of the League of Nations in case of a breach of the Covenant. He therefore suggested that the Committee should follow for his proposal the same procedure as in the case of M. Paul-Boncour’s.

M. de Brouckère (Belgium) supported this proposal.

The proposal was adopted.

18. Examination of Viscount Cecil’s Proposal relating to Chemical Warfare.

Lord Cecil’s proposal concerning chemical warfare was read. See Annex VII, part II (c).
M. De Marinis (Italy) expressed doubts as to the competence of Sub-Commission A in the matter of the last paragraph, since the sanctions to be sought might be of a political nature.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire) explained that he had wished to retain an extra chance and leave it possible for Sub-Commission A to make interesting suggestions.

Count Bernstorff (Germany) thanked Lord Cecil for his proposal, which admirably represented the idea that he had expressed, that disarmament should be begun by the elimination of chemical warfare.

Lord Cecil's proposal was adopted.

(The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m.)

SEVENTH MEETING,

Held on Tuesday, May 25th, 1926, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: M. Loudon (Netherlands).


M. de Brouckère, Rapporteur, read his draft report paragraph by paragraph (Annex VII).

Section II (a), Question I.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire) said he had understood that the two Sub-Commissions would be able to consult one another when they so desired. He would prefer that this should be explicitly stated at the end of the first paragraph.

M. de Brouckère, Rapporteur, pointed out that there might be a risk of prolonging the discussions by leaving the two Sub-Commissions free to refer questions mutually to one another.

M. de Marinis (Italy) observed that the delay would be as great if they referred questions to one another through the Preparatory Commission.

After an exchange of observations between the previous speakers, M. Pérez and M. Paul-Boncour, the Committee adopted the following formula as a continuation of the first paragraph:

"The President and the Vice-Presidents may take the necessary steps to co-ordinate the work of the two Sub-Commissions and to enable each of the Sub-Commissions to consult one another on any particular point."

Question II (a).

Viscount Cecil (British Empire) pointed out that the first paragraph was in flagrant contradiction with the second, which did not exactly express what had been decided upon. In the first paragraph the possibility was affirmed of limiting the forces immediately utilisable without mobilisation, whereas, in the second paragraph, it was asked whether this limitation was possible. The second paragraph should ask whether anything more was possible, as, for example, the limitation of utilisable forces during a certain period dating from mobilisation.

M. de Brouckère, Rapporteur, associated himself with the view expressed by Lord Cecil. This view was in conformity with what had taken place, and it moreover represented his personal opinion. The Committee had agreed in affirming that it was possible to limit peace effectives and in submitting to enquiry the possibility of going further by way of limitation.

It had always been considered that the speed of mobilisation was an important factor. He thought that in order to enlighten the Sub-Commission a note drafted as follows might be added:

"The sense to be given to the words "armaments capable of immediate use" was defined during the exchange of views which took place among the Committee. The Minutes relating to the matter will be communicated to the technical Sub-Commissions.

M. Sokal (Poland) thought that there was in fact a contradiction between the first and second paragraphs. In order to abolish this contradiction, it would be sufficient to leave the affirmation contained in the first paragraph as it stood and to limit the second paragraph to asking what were the methods of limitation the possibility of which was affirmed.

M. Paul-Boncour (France) agreed that the problem should be put in the way requested by Lord Cecil and M. de Brouckère, it being understood that, as stated in the Preamble of Section II, the political aspect of the question raised was not prejudged.
The Committee adopted the following draft of the second paragraph of Question II (a):

"The Committee refers to Sub-Commission A the definition of the forces mentioned in the preceding paragraph and the study of the possibility of a wider limitation than that referred to above."

Questions II (b) and III.

M. DE MARINIS (Italy) said he wished to modify the text of paragraph (a) so as to indicate that the problem was to compare the total armaments of a country with the total armaments of another. He proposed to add the word "total" to the text.

Viscount CECIL (British Empire) replied that this draft would result in causing comparisons to be made between naval armaments and aerial armaments, whereas it was only possible to compare naval armaments with naval armaments.

M. PAUL-BONCOUR (France) said he understood and shared the difficulty of M. de Marinis who desired, in asking for a comparison between the same kinds of armaments of the various countries, to lay down that the armaments of a country formed an indissoluble whole. As a matter of fact, this idea did not appear anywhere in the report, as it had not been questioned or disputed.

Viscount CECIL (British Empire) said that it was understood that, when a scale of armaments was adopted, it would be necessary to consider the total armaments of a country. In the paragraph under discussion, however, the problem was only to compare things of the same kind.

M. DE MARINIS (Italy) said he was satisfied with this explanation.

An amendment was made in the French text which did not affect the English text.

Question V.

M. DE MARINIS (Italy) said that the Drafting Committee had considered a proposal from the Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation (Annex III) which might be taken in connection with Question V. The Committee had decided to refer it to the Sub-Commission for information.

Viscount CECIL (British Empire) thought that this proposal, which dealt with general information and the conclusions of which appeared to be in contradiction with the views of the Drafting Committee, should be attached to Question II (a).

M. DE MARINIS (Italy) thought, on the contrary, that the proposal did not go against the conclusions of the Drafting Committee as regarded Question II but that it was intended to insist especially on the considerations of potential war strength as covered by Question V.

Mr. GIBSON (United States) thought that it would be more regular to refer all proposals made to the technical Sub-Commissions together with the Minutes, without giving preference to any particular proposal.

Viscount CECIL (British Empire) supported this proposal, all the more readily as there were proposals which no one had yet had an opportunity of studying and which would probably be submitted to the Sub-Commissions.

Section III.

Count BERNSTORFF (Germany) made the following declaration:

The Commission has decided to refer Question V (a) 8 and V (b) to the Council of the League of Nations, in view of the obvious difficulty of having these matters dealt with by a body in which countries, not Members of the League of Nations, are represented. I willingly associate myself with this decision, which was accepted not only by me but also by all the members of the Commission as a good solution of the disputes which have arisen in the Commission. It has not been possible, however, to discuss the subject-matter of the questions referred to the Council. Moreover, in view of the special position of Germany, which, according to the very happy formula of the distinguished representative of France on the Council, has become morally a Member of the League of Nations, my country is not yet in a position to make itself heard on the Council. For this reason I will make the following declaration:

I do not wish to dispute the necessity of determining the method and the machinery which will enable the assistance from which a State may benefit to be rapidly set on foot. I consider, however, that it would be more practical to adopt a different point of departure for the solution of the problem.

The suggested examination of methods of rapidly setting on foot the assistance from which a State attacked may benefit should not, according to my view, be based on the present position of armaments, which is, we hope, only temporary and which should be improved and definitely established by the work of our Conference. The investigations to which I have just referred should rather start from the point of view of a position in regard to disarmament such as will be brought about by the final result of our work. This disarmament should be of such a character that no State would be sufficiently powerful to bring a superior force against
that of the League of Nations. Such State, however, should maintain sufficient forces to ensure that, as a result of the combination of the forces of the various associated States, the League of Nations would be sure of being able to make its wishes effective.

I am not here contemplating the entirely special case of my own country. What I am saying rather applies to the various States of Europe, which have already achieved a certain reduced scale of armaments. If these States are to be in a position to bring effective assistance to a State attacked against a State possessing military forces of superior strength, it is clear that their united armaments should be stronger than the forces of any possible aggressor.

For this reason, according to my opinion, the examination of Questions V (a) and V (b) can only reach satisfactory results if we take as a point of departure a certain appropriate scale of general disarmament. The measures contemplated by the French proposal can only yield provisional results which, according to my opinion, are hardly calculated to accelerate the final solution, namely, universal disarmament.

M. Paul-Boncour (France) said he did not see any objection a priori to the views expressed by Count Bernstorff, whose text, moreover, contained expressions which the French delegation had already used, almost in the same terms.

He considered with Count Bernstorff that disarmament should be of such a character that no one would be able to hold in check the assembled forces at the disposal of the States Members of the League. Count Bernstorff objected that the French proposals would have a more precise significance when a disarmament agreement had been achieved. The present importance of these proposals, however, in the view of the French delegation, was that they enabled each country to estimate its margin of security.

Count Bernstorff (Germany) said he had no intention of raising any objection to the French proposal. Germany, however, was not on the Council, and, as the question had not been discussed by the Commission, he had taken this opportunity to express an opinion.

There was an exchange of views between Lord Cecil, M. de Brouckère and Count Bernstorff on the procedure to be followed in submitting the declaration of the German delegation to the Council.

It was decided that the declaration should be inserted in the Minutes and that the report would refer to it in a phrase the drafting of which was left to Count Bernstorff and M. de Brouckère.

The report was adopted.

(The meeting rose at 12 noon.)
C. ANNEXES TO THE MINUTES OF THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION FOR THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE AND OF THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE

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ANNEXES TO THE MINUTES OF THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION AND THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE

Annex I.

PROPOSED MODIFICATION OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE BY M. PEREZ (ARGENTINE).

Question I.

What is to be understood by the expression "armaments"?
Definition and special characteristics of the various factors which constitute the armaments of a country in time of peace; the different categories of armaments (military, naval, air).

Can there be said to be offensive and defensive armaments?

(a) Is there any device for distinguishing between civil and military aircraft? If not, how can the value of civil aircraft be computed in estimating the air strength of any country?

(b) Is it possible or desirable to apply the conclusions arrived at in (a) to parts of aircraft and aircraft engines?

Question II.

Definition of the various factors — military, economic, geographical, etc. — upon which the power of a country in time of war depends.
Methods of recruiting, training, organisations capable of immediate military employment, etc.

Is it possible to attribute a military value to commercial fleets in estimating the naval force of a country?

Mobilisation.
The necessary delays, varying according to States, in transforming peace armaments into war armaments.

Potential armaments.

Question III.

By what standards is it possible to measure the armaments of one country against the armaments of another, e.g. numbers, period of service, equipment, expenditure, etc?

Question IV.

(a) Is it practicable to limit the ultimate war strength of a country, or must any measures of disarmament be confined to the peace strength?

(b) The various forms which reduction or limitation may take in the case of land, sea and air forces; the relative advantages or disadvantages of each of the different forms or methods — for example, the diminution of the larger peace-time units and of the forces composing them or of any immediately mobilisable forces; the diminution of the length of active service; the diminution of the quantity of military equipment; the diminution of the expenditure on national defence, etc.

Question V.

(a) On what principles would it be possible to draw up a scale of the armaments which might be allotted to each country, taking account of:

Population;
Resources;
Geographical position;
Length and nature of maritime communications;
Density and character of the railways;
Vulnerable frontiers and great vital centres near the frontiers;
Necessary delays, varying according to States, in transforming peace-time armaments into war-time armaments;
Degree of security which that country could, in case of attack, receive in virtue either of the provisions of the Covenant or of special undertakings given to it.

(b) Can the reduction of armaments by promoted by examining possible means for ensuring that the mutual assistance, economic and military, contemplated in Article 16 of the Covenant shall be brought quickly into operation as soon as an act of aggression has been committed?

Question VI.

Admitting that disarmament depends on security, to what extent is regional disarmament possible in return for regional security? Or is any scheme of disarmament impracticable unless it is general? If regional disarmament is practicable, would it promote or lead up to general disarmament?

Question VII.

Is it possible and necessary or desirable to establish international supervision in order to make sure that countries kept within the limits of the scale of armaments which had been fixed for them?

How should this supervision be established — by creating within the League of Nations an international disarmament office to be responsible for this supervision, or would it be necessary to rely on the intervention of the military and naval attaches and subsequently refer the matter to the League of Nations?

Question VIII.

Is it possible and necessary or desirable to establish international supervision in order to make sure that countries kept within the limits of the scale of armaments which had been fixed for them?

How should this supervision be established — by creating within the League of Nations an international disarmament office to be responsible for this supervision, or would it be necessary to rely on the intervention of the military and naval attaches and subsequently refer the matter to the League of Nations?

As regards Question II (a) the Commission is of the opinion that it is not practicable to limit the ultimate war strength of a country and that measures of disarmament must be confined to immediately mobilisable armaments. It is understood, however, that other factors, such as those mentioned in Question V of the Questionnaire, may be taken into account in estimating the armaments to be allowed for each country.

By “immediately mobilisable armaments” are meant such forces and war equipment as a State can have ready for use in war within a short interval from the date of the commencement of its mobilisation, as opposed to those additional forces and equipment which can only be utilised in war after the lapse of a substantial period of time.

The Commission desires the advice of Sub-Commission A as to:

(a) What are the elements which should be included within the “immediately mobilisable forces”?

(b) The time which for this purpose should be taken as the period of mobilisation.

As regards Question II (b) and III:

(a) The standards by which it is possible to measure the (i) military, (ii) naval, (iii) air, armaments of one country against the corresponding armaments of another country;

(b) The practicable methods by which the reduction and limitation of (i) land, (ii) naval, (iii) air, armaments can be effected, and the comparative advantages and disadvantages of each.

Note: The following methods, amongst others, have been suggested. The reduction and limitation of the length of service of conscripted forces; the abolition of conscription; the reduction and limitation of the quantity of military equipment; the reduction and limitation of expenditure on national defence.

As regards Question IV:

Whether there are any armaments (and, if so, what) which are only capable of being used for the defence of a State’s territory.
As regards Question VI:

(a) Is there any device by which civil and military aircraft can be distinguished for purposes of disarmament? If this is not practicable, how can the value of civil aircraft be computed in estimating the air strength of any country?

(b) Is it possible or desirable to apply the conclusions arrived at in (a) above to parts of aircraft and aircraft engines?

(c) Is it possible to attach military value to commercial fleets in estimating the naval armaments of a country?

As regards Question VII:

Is any scheme of disarmament impracticable unless it is general, or, if regional disarmament is practicable, what regions may, from a military point of view, be considered separately for the purposes of disarmament?

Annex III.

DECLARATION BY THE DELEGATE OF THE KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES.

The formula defining armaments and material subject to reduction or limitation should cover all the factors which make up the total strength and resources that a country can use in war, irrespective of the practical possibility or impossibility of limiting all these factors. This would be the method of fixing the subject to be considered and weighed in estimating and measuring armaments.

This strength having been established, each country would be allotted armaments in proportion to its needs, regard being had to the factors which are to serve as criteria. The proposed reduction and limitation of armaments for any given country would not operate upon this portion of the constituent elements of its national strength, which, in the nature of things, must not be limited, but which, nevertheless, is a real factor in the national strength of the country. These elements would not be touched, in order to allow of the untrammelled development of all the forces and potentialities of the country, but, since their importance could be estimated, they should be included in the allowance of armaments assigned to each country.

Annex IV.

NOTE ON QUESTION V, SUBMITTED BY VISCOUNT CECIL.

It is understood that the object of the eighth paragraph of Question V (a) and Question V (b) is to secure an examination as to the meaning and effect of Article 16 of the Covenant and what modifications, if any, in its machinery should be made in order to render its operation more effective in an emergency.

There are three stages contemplated in Article 16. In the first stage, economic pressure is to be put upon the Covenant-breaking State, short of war. If the League comprised all the Powers in the world, it is evident that a good deal might be done in this way. For instance, if all the Powers in the world combined to refuse exports to a particular country, it would put very considerable economic pressure upon that country, equal, indeed, to a complete blockade. But so long as all countries are not Members of the League, pacific economic pressure of this kind can only be exercised effectively in a very few cases. It would, of course, always be possible for all the Members of the League in such a case to sever diplomatic relations with the Covenant-breaking State, and this was in fact recommended as the first step in the resolutions adopted by the Second Assembly as rules for guidance in the enforcement of Article 16. The moral effect would be very considerable if all the Members of the League combined to carry it out, but beyond the severance of diplomatic relations it would not in most cases be easy to go far without a declaration of war in the absence of universality of the League. For if a number of States combined to refuse exports to the Covenant-breaking State, but some important countries continued to export to her, the principal effect would be to transfer the export trade from the States combining to exert economic pressure to those States which stood outside the combination, and apart from special cases such as that of a State completely surrounded by States Members of the League which could prevent the passage of supplies from all sources, economic pressure of this kind would hurt those who exerted it more than the State against which it was directed. The Economic Committee might therefore be asked to consider under what conditions economic pressure short of war can effectively be exercised against the Covenant-breaking State. The next stage contemplated by Article 16 is the declaration of war by all the Members of the League.
that were done, the States would become belligerent and would have all belligerent rights
and could carry out economic pressure, such as was exercised in the late war, with great
efficiency, because a League blockade would in almost all cases be a very effective instrument
to cut off all intercourse between the Covenant-breaking State and any other State in the
world.

One exception, however, would have to be made to this, and that would be when the
Covenant-breaking State had a land frontier with a State that was not a Member of the League.
No question for either Sub-Commission A or B appears to arise with respect to this
matter apart from the questions, which will have to be considered later, as to the machinery
for bringing such economic pressure into effect.

Thirdly, there are the military measures contemplated by Article 16. These are to be
employed only after an express decision to that effect. Here the only questions that arise are
as to the machinery for bringing that military action into being.

With respect to all these forms of pressure the question of machinery becomes exceedingly
important, because rapidity is in such matters essential to efficiency. A skeleton machinery
was drawn up by the Second Assembly of the League, but it may well require re-consideration.
In the meantime it might be worth while to ask Sub-Commission A what military value they
would attach to economic pressure of the second class after the declaration of war; for before
the declaration of war its value would usually be almost entirely moral, and they might
further be asked within what time they conceive such economic or military pressure would
have to be exercised to be of any value. Here it seems very difficult for even the highest
military experts to lay down any positive rule, and it does not seem likely that they would be
able to make any reply except that the more quickly such pressure is exercised the more effective
it will be. As to any proposals for making more precise and efficient the machinery that would
be employed, that is a purely political or politico-legal question. It would not be a suitable
question to submit to either Sub-Commission. But perhaps such a body as the Drafting
Committee might later on take it into consideration. As far as the British Government is
concerned, though they will be very ready to consider what further resolutions, if any, ought
to be arrived at in this connection, they desire to make it quite clear that they are not prepared
to take any step whatever in the direction of increasing their obligations under Article 16
except in return for the effective adoption of a general scheme of disarmament. There is
nothing new about this attitude; it is the one they have always adopted in all the negotiations
and discussions which have taken place on this subject. Subject to this, they are ready
to consider suggestions as to economic pressure or economic assistance under Article 16 as
well as improvements in the machinery for putting it in force.

Annex V.

PROPOSAL BY M. PAUL-BONCOUR : QUESTIONS V (a) 8 AND V (b)

In order that a State should be able to calculate to what extent it can consent to the
reduction or limitation of its armaments, it is essential to determine what method and what
machinery are best calculated to give help to that State when attacked.

The Preparatory Commission therefore proposes:

(1) To suggest to the Council that methods or regulations should be investigated
which would:

(a) Facilitate the meeting of the Council in the shortest possible time in case
of war or threat of war;

(b) Enable the Council to take such decisions as may be necessary to enforce
the obligations of the Covenant as expeditiously as possible.

(2) To instruct Sub-Commission A:

(a) To investigate the procedure which would allow of the rapid drafting of
recommendations regarding the military assistance provided for in the second para-
graph of Article 16 of the Covenant, when the Council shall have decided to make such
recommendations;

(b) To investigate what measures should be taken in case of a conflict of
which the Council shall have been notified and when the latter shall have taken a
decision in order to prevent the development or preparation of hostilities.

(3) To instruct Sub-Commission B:

(a) To investigate the question of the improvement of the telegraphic and
telephonic communications of the different countries with the Secretariat of the
League;

(b) To study what measures would be most appropriate, when the Council
shall have so decided, to give most rapidly such economic and financial help as
may be necessary to a State which has been attacked;
(c) To determine the composition and procedure of the committees for the supply and allocation of resources which the League might set up for that purpose;

(d) To lay down the rules for keeping at the disposal of such committees up-to-date information regarding the economic deficiencies of different countries and their eventual needs should they be the object of aggression.

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Annex VI.

MEMORANDUM BY M. PAUL-BONCOUR IN SUPPORT OF HIS PROPOSALS RELATING TO QUESTION V (a) 8 AND V (b) (ANNEX V).

Guarantees for security which can at present be afforded by the League of Nations in relation to the reduction of armaments.

I.

It is essential that every State should at least be able to form an estimate of the guarantees of security available in order to be in a position to calculate what limitations of armaments it can consent to.

Consequently our aim must be, if not to obtain new guarantees, at least to organise existing guarantees, so that, when need arises, they should have the maximum of effectiveness.

II.

Whether in the matter of averting an armed conflict which is threatening, or of going to the help of States which are the victims of an aggression, the part played by the Council of the League of Nations is of supreme importance. There are various stages in its action which present different aspects, but they all have one essential in common: rapidity of decision and action is of the highest importance.

The Council must: (1) meet; (2) have at its disposal all the information necessary for its decisions; (3) draft its recommendations or resolutions; (4) organise their application.

1. Meeting of the Council.

The Council is convened by the Secretary-General of the League, either upon his own initiative (Article 11 of the Covenant), or at the request of a Member of the League.

For this purpose it is necessary: (1) that the Secretariat at Geneva should receive rapidly information or the requests calling for a meeting of the Council; (2) that the Secretariat should convene with the utmost despatch the members of the Council at a suitable place and date; (3) that the members of the Council should respond to this invitation, or, in case of need, send substitutes.

The settlement of the recent Graeco-Bulgarian dispute has furnished a valuable precedent in this respect.

In order to obtain the maximum rapidity: (1) the improvement of telegraphic and radiotelegraphic communication with Geneva is essential; (2) maximum delay should be laid down, for instance 48 hours, between the reception at Geneva of a request or of certain information justifying the meeting of the Council and the meeting itself; (3) the automatic replacement of those members of the Council who cannot arrive in time at the place of meeting by the diplomatic representatives of their country in the nearest capital; (4) organs of information available for the League on the spot in places where conflicts are likely to occur should be improved and increased gradually as political circumstances may allow. The presence of neutral officers on both sides of the Graeco-Bulgarian frontier, as a consequence of recent incidents, furnishes an example of what can be done in this way.

2. Basis for a Decision.

Before drafting its recommendations, the Council of the League, in the majority of cases, will desire to collect on the spot all information of a nature to throw light on the events. It will therefore cause an enquiry to be made, and bodies will have to be constituted to carry out these investigations and sent to the scene of the dispute.

All this will take up valuable time. It is therefore most important that the composition of these organs should be settled in advance and that their mode of operation should be made the subject of regulations, etc.

It is evident that such organs could be used both in cases of "provisional measures" during the procedure of the settlement of a dispute, and in the case of a conflict which has already resulted in hostilities or in the violation of a neutralised zone.

The missions can therefore be of various kinds, but at least it would be all to the good if the rules for the constitution and operation of these organs were identical and, above all, if they were drawn up with the main idea of achieving the maximum possible rapidity of action.
3. Drafting of the Council's Decisions.

Except in cases expressly stipulated to the contrary, decisions of the Council will have to be unanimous.

The maintenance of the rule of unanimity is considered fundamental by a number of States. Any automatic definition of the aggressor which would not leave each State free to decide whether it was an aggressor or whether it was in consequence obliged to help the country attacked has no chance of being accepted. The Protocol of Geneva was rejected by certain States as much because it organised systems of automatically determining the aggressor as because it involved obligations of too "universal" a character.

Doubtless peace cannot be properly organised, and there can be no certain guarantees as long as the veto of a single member of the Council can paralyse the action of the latter, and one must not give up hope of being able to remedy the grave disadvantages of the rule of unanimity which must be over-ridden in the case of a brutal and flagrant case of aggression. This must be the task of future Assemblies. Amongst the decisions which the Council can take in case of a sudden outbreak of hostilities is to demand an immediate armistice. The precedent of the recent Greco-Bulgarian dispute has proved how effective this measure can be if it is taken with sufficient rapidity. In order that this rapidity, which is an essential condition of success, should always be possible, it is necessary that unanimity should not be required, at least when a decision of this nature has to be taken. Perhaps it would be possible to have this question gone into.

4. The Dispatch of Help.

Once a decision has been freely taken, if it is to be effective, it is essential that it should be carried out rapidly. As regards military assistance, it would hardly appear possible to lay down any general rules on account of the large number and the extreme variety of cases which might arise. It is quite probable that those States which responded to the recommendations referred to in the second paragraph of Article 16 of the Covenant would co-ordinate their efforts by means of direct contact between their respective general staffs. Those States which took an effective share in the operations would at first be few, and some of them perhaps would already have concluded more or less definite agreements in advance. All that is possible would, indeed, desirable to ask of the League of Nations in such matters is that its recommendations should be made very rapidly. The Permanent Advisory Commission should investigate beforehand what procedure would be the most expeditious.

Economic and Financial Assistance. — In virtue of Article 16 of the Covenant this assistance is obligatory for every country, and in practice every country could take part in it. A co-operation which in certain cases would have so universal a character would need to be organised in advance if it was to become effective with sufficient rapidity.

We all know how impossible it is to solve the problem of the reduction of armaments without being checked at every step by the question of the inequality of potential war strengths, unless we succeed in rendering these potential strengths sufficiently comparable by means of economic and financial assistance, so that the deficiencies of certain countries can be taken into account in fixing their peace-time armaments.

Should definite figures be also established with regard to this form of assistance? Clearly not. To do so would be almost impossible in view of the variety of cases that might arise; moreover, it would be an attempt to obtain undertakings and guarantees of to some extent a "universal" character.

On the other hand, we can and we must insist that the method, the machinery and the rules of this mutual assistance in the different branches of economic and financial activity should be settled in advance; that provision should be made in advance for setting up committees for the supply and allocation of resources and that data should be collected with regard to the nature and approximate amount of help which would be required by each country, assuming it was thrown upon its own resources as regards raw materials, food, armaments, transport, credits, etc. The countries which would be asked to supply this assistance, and the amount they should respectively contribute would naturally only be determined when the time came and in pursuance of a decision by the Council, but rules and methods must be studied in advance. In this way there will be some guarantee that mutual assistance will come into play with sufficient rapidity and certainty, without the Members of the League being asked to subscribe to definite and premature undertakings.

III.

To sum up, the countries exposed to dangers of aggression cannot abandon their constant doctrine of treating the questions of security and of armaments in conjuction, and they must insist not only on disarmament being preceded by security, but on only disarming in proportion to the guarantees and security provided.

Their one desire is that these guarantees should be sought by successive stages and with direct reference to the Covenant of the League of Nations and to the Locarno agreements.

In any case, before asking for any fresh guarantees, they desire the organisation of the guarantees already given, with a view to ensuring that they will come into play with speed and certainty.
Annex VII.

DRAFT REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION BY THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE

Rapporteur: M. L. DE BROUCKÈRE (Belgium).

In conformity with a decision taken by your Commission in setting up the Drafting Committee, the latter, while reserving the more specially political aspect of the Questionnaire for decision by your Commission itself, has stated in the following report, which it requests you to adopt, the points in the various questions to be considered which fall more particularly within the competence of the two technical Sub-Commissions.

I.

On the proposal of the French delegation, the Preparatory Commission considers that the task entrusted to it by the Council should be undertaken on the understanding that every Government should have in view for the proposed conference for the preparation of a disarmament agreement, definite and quantitative proposals accompanied by reasons in support calculated with reference to the degree of security existing at the date when the Conference meets.

(a) The Commission refers to the two technical Sub-Commissions the following points in connection with the Questionnaire, the study of which was entrusted to it by the Council, and requests them, while reserving the political aspect of the questions involved for decision by the Commission itself, to give it their opinion on the technical aspects falling within their respective competence as defined below:

Question I.

The Commission refers Question I to Sub-Commission A. The Sub-Commission might consult Sub-Commission B on this point if necessary.

Question II (a).

With regard to Question II (a), the Commission is of opinion that it would not be practicable at the present time to limit the ultimate war strength of a country. On the other hand, it affirms that it is possible to limit the land, sea and air forces permanently maintained in peace time by the various countries or capable of immediate use without preliminary mobilisation measures. This principle is in any case without prejudice to the conditions of such limitation as determined by an examination of the remaining questions, notably Question V.

The Commission refers to Sub-Commission A the definition of the forces mentioned in the preceding paragraph and the study of the possibility of limiting armaments capable of immediate use in the event of war.

Questions II (b) and III.

The Commission refers to Sub-Commission A the two following questions for its opinion:

(a) "What are the standards by which it is possible to measure the: (i) military, (ii) naval, (iii) air, armaments of one country against the corresponding armaments of another country?"

(b) "What are the methods by which the reduction and limitation of (i) land, (ii) naval, (iii) air, armaments can be effected, and what are the comparative advantages and disadvantages of each?"

Note: The following methods, amongst others, have been suggested: the reduction of the larger peace-time units or of their establishment and their equipment, or of any immediately mobilisable forces; the reduction of the length of active service; the reduction of munitions of war.

It has also been suggested that a limitation of armed forces might be effected by the reduction or limitation of expenditure on national defence.

The Commission wishes to have the opinion of the two Sub-Commissions on this subject and on the conditions in which the above method might be applied, should they consider that it is practicable.
Question IV.

The Commission refers to Sub-Commission A the following questions:

"Are there any armaments (and, if so what) which are only capable of being used for the defence of a State’s territory?"

"Is there any method of ascertaining whether a certain force is organised for purely defensive purposes (no matter what use may be made of it in time of war), or whether, on the contrary, it is established in a spirit of aggression?"

Question V.

The armaments to be maintained in each country cannot be determined on the basis of mathematical considerations alone, and in order to allow of a profitable examination of the basis on which the reduction and limitation of armaments is possible, the Commission requests the two Sub-Commissions to investigate how far armaments in general are affected by factors 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7 enumerated in Question V (a) and refers factor 6 to Sub-Committee A.

Question VI.

The Commission refers Question VI to Sub-Commission A for its opinion.

Question VII.

With reference to Question VII, the Commission asks technical Sub-Commissions A and B to consider whether regional military, naval and air disarmament can be regarded as an important step towards general disarmament, and, should general disarmament not prove immediately practicable, what regions could be considered separately, from the point of view of the limitation of armaments.

Sub-Commissions A and B are requested to consider what factors the term "region" should connote from the point of view of security and from the point of view of disarmament.

(b) The Commission has examined the attached proposal submitted by the Belgian delegate. Without expressing a definite opinion regarding the measures suggested in this proposal concerning which certain delegations have reserved their decision, the Commission has decided to refer this matter to the technical Sub-Commissions, on the ground that such reference does not prejudice the question in any way either as regards the practicably of these measures or as regards any subsequent decision which the Preparatory Commission itself may take concerning them when it comes to examine the question from the general and political point of view.

The delegate of Italy reiterated his opinion that supervision would be ineffective and was inadmissible, and asked to have his view placed on record.

"The last paragraph of Article 8 of the Covenant of the League stipulates that "the Members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval and air programmes and the condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to warlike purposes”. With a view to organising this exchange of information, Sub-Commission A has been requested to consider the advantages and disadvantages, from the military point of view, of the various methods which might be employed and, in particular, the organisation at Geneva of a permanent service for the collection of information received from the different Governments.

"The conclusion of an international convention making it compulsory to publish all inventions which can be used in chemical or bacteriological warfare and, in general, all forms of warfare which are condemned by the opinion of the civilised world.

"Sub-Commission A is requested to investigate what would be the consequences, from the military point of view, of inserting in the Convention relative to disarmament, or in that regarding the prohibition of certain forms of warfare, provisions similar to those contained in the statute of the International Labour Office (Articles 411 to 420 of the Treaty of Versailles).

"Sub-Commission B is requested to ascertain the consequences of such insertion from the economic point of view.

Sub-Commission A is requested to consider to what extent the experience acquired regarding the supervision of disarmament points to the possibility from the military point of view of general supervision.

"Sub-Commission B is requested to state if such supervision offers any difficulties from the economic point of view and, if so, what difficulties."

(c) On the proposal of the delegate of the British Empire, the Commission decided to refer to the competent Sub-Commissions the questions defined below:

To Sub-Commissions A and B:

"1. (a) Can factories normally and legitimately employed for chemical purposes, including dyeworks, be quickly adapted to manufacture poison gases?

"(b) If the answer to the above is in the affirmative, how long would it take to effect the change?

"(c) Can any proposals be made to prevent or hinder chemical factories from being used for the production of poisonous gases?"
To Sub-Commission A.

"2. (a) What are the means which would probably be employed for spreading gas and what would be the apparatus required?

(b) How long would it take to manufacture this apparatus, and how long would it take to superimpose this apparatus on the normal equipment of an aeroplane?

(c) Would the length of time referred to immediately above vary in the case of military or civilian aircraft?

3. (a) What is the information in existence as to the effect of the distribution of poisonous gas over closely populated districts?

(b) Have any experiments been carried out on this subject?

(c) Apart from the difficulty of equipping the entire population of a city with gas masks, are there any gases known against which a gas mask affords no protection?"

III.

Sub-Commission A is invited to consider what effective sanctions can be proposed for the enforcement of the international undertaking not to employ gas or bacteria in warfare.

(a) The following very important proposal has been laid before the Commission by the French delegation:

"With reference to Question V (a) 8 and V (b), the Commission considers that in order that a State should be able to calculate to what extent it can consent to the reduction or limitation of its armaments, it is essential to determine what method and what machinery are best calculated to give help to that State when attacked."

The Commission therefore proposes to suggest to the Council:

1. That methods or regulations should be investigated which would:

(a) Facilitate the meeting of the Council at very brief notice in case of war or threat of war;

(b) Enable the Council to take such decisions as may be necessary to enforce the obligations of the Covenant as expeditiously as possible.

2. That the Permanent Advisory Commission should be instructed:

(a) To define the measures necessary to comply with paragraph (a) No. 8.

(b) To investigate the procedure which would allow of the rapid drafting of recommendations regarding the military assistance provided for in the second paragraph of Article 16 of the Covenant, when the Council shall have decided to make such recommendations.

(c) To investigate what measures should be taken in case of a conflict of which the Council shall have been notified, and when the latter shall have taken a decision, in order to prevent the development or preparation of hostilities, according to the precedent of the Greco-Bulgarian dispute.

3. That the Joint Committee should be instructed:

(a) To investigate the question of the improvement of the telegraphic and the telephonic communications of the different countries with the Secretariat of the League;

(b) To study what measures would be most appropriate, when the Council shall have so decided, to give most rapidly such economic and financial help as may be necessary to a State which has been attacked;

(c) To determine the composition and procedure of the committees for the supply and allocation of resources which the League might set up for that purpose.

It has been objected that the aim of the proposal was to define and construct a mechanism for executing the decisions taken by the Council of the League of Nations in virtue of Article 16 of the Covenant, and that a constructive proposal of this nature was more a matter for the organisations of the League of Nations than for the present Commission.

Without pronouncing any opinion on the force of this objection, the Commission considers that it is difficult to ask a body comprising representatives of countries not Members of the League of Nations to discuss fresh means of carrying out the provisions of an instrument which they have not signed.

The Commission has accordingly decided to forward the French delegation's proposal to the Council with the request that it should be immediately taken into consideration.

(b) The Commission also decided to forward to the Council the following proposal of the Polish delegation, which is closely related to that of the French delegation:

"The Commission suggests to the Council that it would be well to consider whether a special organisation of regional assistance within the scope of the Covenant of the League would be likely to give the organs of the League effective help in supplying the assistance required and would thereby render the execution of the relevant articles of
the Covenant easier and more expeditious (study of the machinery, form and procedure of regional assistance)."

The United States delegation stated that it was anxious to favour every effort made with a view to disarmament, and that it therefore had no objection to certain proposals being discussed in connection with the obligations entered into by the Members of the League of Nations; but it naturally could not be bound in any way by discussions in which it could not properly take part.

This observation refers, in particular, to certain phases of the proposals reproduced in paragraphs I, II (b) and III.

Annex VIII.

DRAFT REPORT TO THE COUNCIL BY THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION REGARDING ITS PROCEDURE.

(To be inserted as the beginning of the Report on the Commission's work.)

The Preparatory Commission convened by resolution of the Council dated March 18th, 1926, met at Geneva from May 18th to 26th, 1926. It elected as President M. Loudon, and, as Vice-Presidents, M. Cobián and M. Buero, delegates of Spain and Uruguay respectively.

From the outset, the Preparatory Commission realised that the study of the questions submitted to it by the Council would be facilitated by the constitution of two special sub-commissions composed of persons directly attached to the delegations forming part of the Preparatory Commission and consequently representing the opinion of their respective Governments. The Preparatory Commission intended to entrust one of these sub-commissions with the study of the military, naval and air aspects of the questions under consideration, while the other would devote its attention to the non-military aspect of these questions.

Presided over by the two Vice-Presidents of the Commission itself, these two sub-commissions, which would thus be in close touch with the Commission, would be in a position to observe faithfully the principles laid down for their guidance by the latter.

The Sub-Commission entrusted with the study of non-military questions has been authorised by the Preparatory Commission to ascertain the opinion of the organisations or persons it may judge advisable to consult on these questions, and particularly that of the Joint Commission set up by resolution of the Council. The Military, Naval and Air Sub-Commission has identically the same composition as the Permanent Advisory Commission as enlarged by the decision of the Council. The system thus set up by the Preparatory Commission therefore follows the main outlines of the organisation established by the Council.

The Preparatory Commission does not doubt that the Council will see fit to endorse its decisions, in reaching which it has been guided by its desire to do all in its power to ensure the success of the task entrusted to it.

Annex IX.

MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED TO THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION FOR THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE BY THE GREEK GOVERNMENT.

QUESTION I.

A. In Time of War.

In addition to the armed land, sea and air forces, which constitute the main armament, the following factors should also be taken into serious consideration, in order to determine the extent of the armaments and their value, and the power of the country in time of war:

1. Financial resources and national wealth;
2. Raw materials which are, or can be, used for war purposes;
3. Industry, trade, war manufactures, and works and factories which could, by any kind of adaptation, be converted into war factories.

On this point we may make a few observations which are highly important from our point of view.

It is obvious that an industrial country, rich in raw materials, can very easily and speedily obtain, in the event of war, armaments and war material of every kind. Supplying all needs of this kind from its own resources, without having to import anything, such a country is in an incomparably stronger position than a non-industrial county which is poor in raw materials. A country of the latter class, being obliged to import everything required for the defence of its territory, would always be threatened by the tragic eventuality of finding itself disarmed and unable to arm in time against an impending danger.

To take our own case, Greece is almost completely without national industries, and has to import all her raw materials. This is particularly unsatisfactory as regards the navy, which requires enormous quantities of raw materials owing to the complexity of modern naval equipment.
At the same time, a reduction of armaments, whether in peace or in war, could not in practice be imposed on any countries but those which have no war industries and no raw materials, and even then it could only be done by strict control and, if necessary, by a blockade to prevent all exports to the country concerned. On the other hand, it would probably be very difficult, if not impossible, to enforce such a control against countries which are well provided.

This fact, which gives rise to a striking inequality between States which produce arms, etc., and States which do not, is specially deserving of close examination, and should be regarded at the same time as a vital factor and as a basis in estimating the extent to which, and the proportion in which, the armaments of each country are to be limited.

As was stated in the course of the discussions which took place at the Conference on the Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in Implements of War, unless due weight is given to this fact, any convention which might be concluded would not be founded on equality and justice, but would create a privileged class among the Members of the League of Nations, and would consequently fail to attain the goal at which the League is aiming. Such are the observations which we, as a non-producing country, feel bound to put forward.

(4) The road and railway systems, and maritime communications, which, in the event of mobilisation and war, could be used for concentrating troops when mobilised, and for transporting material.

There can be no doubt that the nature and the security of these lines of communication are a highly important factor in the prompt and easy arming of a country. The more exposed the communications and the more remote the producing countries, the more difficult do concentration and arming become. On the other hand, a country which borders on producing countries or is in their neighbourhood, and whose lines of communication are secure, can arm, concentrate and carry out transport operations in general with ease and rapidity.

In Greece, which is an essentially mountainous country and almost completely devoid of railways, traffic is carried almost entirely by sea. Greece must therefore secure her maritime lines of communication at all costs.

(5) Facilities for producing chemicals and gases (chemical and bacteriological warfare, which we trust, will never occur again);

(6) The geographical situation of the country (as contemplated in Article 8, paragraph 2, of the Covenant of the League of Nations), the countries which border upon it, the length and nature of its frontiers and the directions from which it might be exposed to attack, as also the extent of the danger from each direction and each possible attack.

Greece, having an immense number of islands, is in a unique geographical situation. As the country is not self-supporting, the maintenance of its food supply would be highly problematical if its maritime lines of communication were not secured.

(7) Fortifications;

(8) The military divisions of the country.

B. In Time of Peace.

The military strength of a country in time of peace would appear to depend principally upon the following factors:

(1) Method and system of recruiting;

(2) Length of service with the colours;

(3) Length, system and methods of instruction for recruits;

(4) Military schools for officers and non-commissioned officers;

(5) Staff Colleges, technical schools, and general training of officers and n. c. o's;

(6) Important manoeuvres held from time to time, when reserve classes are called to the colours;

(7) Arms and material of every kind in service, in store, in process of manufacture, or on order, and the value and power of such arms and material;

(8) Training of youths in schools and colleges where preliminary instruction can be given.

Question II.

(a) Assuming that the object of reducing armaments is to preserve peace and, as far as possible, to avoid armed conflicts and solutions by violence of disputes arising between two countries, it is clear that, if this object is to be practically and effectually attained, the instrument—that is to say, the armed forces which a country could control for this purpose—should be reduced to a minimum. That is what we understand by the reduction of armaments. As to the practicability of reducing war strength or peace strength, we consider that the two things are the same, the latter being the nucleus of the former and the former the complement of the latter.

As these forces are based on the military training of the population by the peace establishment of the army, and on the preparation in peace time of the material needed for the war establishment, it follows that the initial objective of the reduction of armaments should be the limitation to a minimum of: (i) the number of men receiving military training; and (ii) the quantity of arms and war material in general manufactured and purchased.
If, however, any country is to carry out such a reduction with complete thoroughness—if, in particular, it is to abolish military training—it must at the outset be able to take its stand firmly on these facts: (1) that its independence and the integrity of its territory will always be secured and respected; (2) that, if danger threatens, speedy and effectual help will be forthcoming; (3) that, if attacked, it will not be surprised in a position of inferiority to the attacking country; and (4) that the reduction of armaments will take place in all countries without exception, and on a principle of equality as defined in the reply to Question I above.

The point then arises: Could these four fundamental assumptions easily be realised and secured? In our opinion, the problem of reducing armaments is very closely bound up with the provision of mutual assistance under the Covenant of the League of Nations, or under special defensive treaties which have been or may be concluded with that object.

It is perfectly true that the Covenant specifies the measures to be taken against unprovoked attack. At the same time, it is worth noting:

1. That the relevant clauses of the Covenant are binding only upon the States Members of the League, and in particular that they refer only to possible disputes between States Members;

2. That, while the geographical situation and other special circumstances of one State regarded as an aggressor and a Covenant-breaker might be such that the League of Nations could promptly take against that State all the measures provided for in Article 16 of the Covenant, there might be other States whose geographical situation and special circumstances would prevent the League of Nations, however good its intentions might be, from taking those measures promptly against them, and being in time to afford adequate protection to the attacked or threatened State and to secure its independence and territorial integrity.

This awkward but undeniable fact is clearly worthy of close attention and careful examination. If a country is to disarm, it is essential that it should be given absolute confidence—in other words, should be unshakably convinced that, in sacrificing its armaments to the ideal of peace, it is not at the same time sacrificing its freedom and its very existence to the greed of another country, and to its own credulity.

(b) Assuming, then, that the peace establishment of an army is nothing but the nucleus and the school of the war establishment, and approaching the question from a purely technical point of view, we are of opinion that, in order to secure a genuine reduction of armaments, it is essential:

1. To reduce the number of units in the land, sea and air forces;
2. To reduce the establishment of each unit;
3. To reduce the existing stock of material and to control its manufacture;
4. To reduce military expenditure to a minimum;
5. To put out of action, for military purposes, all arms and war material factories above a certain number to be fixed;
6. To reduce the number of cadres and the number of civilians undergoing military training (recruits);
7. To reduce the period of service with the colours and to limit the period of instruction mentioned above.

In the case of short-service naval forces, the period of service with the colours should not be reduced beyond certain limits, since the training of crews to use the complicated equipment of to-day is a long process. Moreover, if the period of service with the colours for naval recruits were reduced too far, this would lessen the value of the training, and would consequently increase the cost. In the special case of naval forces, therefore, it would be preferable to aim at a reduction in the number of units, rather than at a reduction of the period of service with the colours.

8. To prohibit, as a general rule, the transfer of any warship from one Power to another, either as a gift or for a consideration (this provision is already made in the Treaty of Washington).

Exceptions to this rule might be allowed at the request of a country one of whose possible adversaries had not discharged its obligations in connection with the reduction of armaments.

9. To abolish all secret expenditure and to maintain strict supervision over expenditure;
10. To refrain loyally from all propaganda abroad and from all designs upon the territory of another country;
11. To avoid all rivalries which might lead to a conflict of any kind.

But how and by what means could the realisation of these conditions and the loyal observance of these principles be ensured?

In the matter of naval armaments, it is easy to ascertain whether a country has genuinely carried out any decisions that may have been reached as to the reduction of armaments. This is made clear by the results of the Washington Treaty. The verification of naval armaments becomes still easier if the country in question has no national naval industry (shipyards, gun factories, etc.).

In regard to other armaments, however, on what lines should we proceed?
To resort to the system of supervision by special commissions would be to admit and demonstrate at the outset that good faith and mutual confidence do not universally exist. As regards the system of commissions to supervise the loyal execution of the clauses of a treaty or convention, it cannot be said to have been a complete success. Thus the aim cannot be attained except on the basis of mutual confidence, sincerity and good faith. As to the growth of sincerity and solidarity between the various States and nations up to the point at which they would be a guarantee of peace, that, we think, is a question for the future, and not for the very near future, because it depends upon the general moral improvement, in an approximately equal degree, of men and nations; and unhappily this process of evolution does not yet appear to have reached the level that might be desired.

At the same time, we are firmly convinced that the only way to arrive at practical solutions is to pursue undaunted the study of this complicated problem.

**QUESTION III.**

In order to measure the armaments of one country against the armaments of another, it is essential to examine and compare separately the following elements in each country:

1. Land, sea and air effectives;
2. Peace and war units of the land, sea and air forces;
3. Arms, ammunition and war material available for use;
4. War industries and war manufactures in general;
5. Budgets of the Ministries of War, Marine and the Air;
6. Extraordinary expenditure of the above Ministries;
7. Periods of service with the colours and military training;
8. Strength of cadres.

In comparing these elements and estimating their weight, however, it is absolutely essential to take into due consideration certain other factors which are very closely linked with the above:

(a) Geographical situation;
(b) Length and nature of frontiers;
(c) Population;
(d) Total area; and
(e) Financial situation.

In the matter of naval armaments the following points should also be considered:

(a) Number of ships of each type;
(b) Age of ships;
(c) Armament of ships (guns, torpedoes, mines, etc.);
(d) Defensive armament against gun-fire, aeroplane bombs, and torpedoes, mines, etc.;
(e) Speed;
(f) Ratio of expenditure on new building to total naval budget;
(g) Auxiliary craft (tugs, trawlers, etc.), and auxiliary craft requisitioned in time of war.

Further, in examining the above elements, account should be taken of the following factors in each country:

(a) Geographical situation;
(b) Length and configuration of coastline and islands; naval bases;
(c) How far the country is dependent upon overseas trade;
(d) Mercantile marine and commercial ports;
(e) Aptitude of the population for navigation and trade;
(f) General financial position of the country, and extent to which its economic life depends upon sea communications.

To compare armaments on this basis is a highly complicated and detailed task, but it is essential if a fair idea is to be obtained. A superficial comparison in which the special circumstances of each country were not adequately considered would yield incorrect results; it might lead to the conclusion that the armaments of a certain country were adequate or excessive, where a more thorough investigation might have demonstrated the contrary.

**QUESTION IV.**

Of all the armaments of a country, none can be regarded as purely and exclusively defensive except defensive works, such as forts, fortresses, entrenched camps, blockhouses, etc., and coastal artillery (so far as it is stated and known to be for use as such). All other armaments, such as arms in general, war material, etc., can be used either for defensive or for offensive purposes. It would appear that their description as defensive or offensive armaments depends entirely upon the use to which the country intends or is obliged to put them, and not on their nature or process of manufacture, since the same armaments could be used both for defence and for attack.
In the case of naval armaments, there are none which are either purely defensive or purely offensive. Mobile defence flotillas, and even submarines, are defensive armaments no less than coastal batteries, mines and anti-aircraft defences. The submarine, which might at first sight be regarded as an offensive weapon, is really only one weapon of the strategic defence. It is essentially the weapon of the weaker party—one of the most effectual defences of a country which has to protect its vital interests at sea, but which is surrounded by neighbours with powerful fleets and unable to compete with them in the matter of surface vessels. Consequently, it would be unfair to make such a country do away with its submarines or limit their number. On the other hand, mines—in themselves a purely defensive weapon for the protection of coasts and naval bases—become, when carried by mine-laying cruisers or submarines and sown in the open sea or off the enemy coasts, a weapon of the strategic offensive.

Only by a comparative study of the naval forces of the different countries, having regard to the factors mentioned in the reply to the previous question, is it possible to decide whether the number of vessels of each type which a country possesses exceeds the limits of purely defensive armament.

It is thus impossible to lay down any definite rule for deciding whether armaments are offensive or defensive, and how they are likely to be used, unless we are thoroughly acquainted with the private ideas, intentions and views of their owners. Yet could we ever say that we were so well acquainted with the intentions and the private ideas of a country that we knew how its armaments would be used and could accordingly proceed to reduce our own unreservedly on that basis, in the certainty that these armaments were intended for defence? It would be extremely risky to answer in the affirmative.

**QUESTIONS V AND VI.**

A. As we have already pointed out in examining the previous questions, in order to lay down principles on which a scale of armaments permissible to the various countries could be drawn up, it would be advisable, after consideration and detailed investigation, to take into account:

1. Geographical situation and special circumstances of each country from the point of view of security;
2. Contiguous States, relations with them, their probable ideas and intentions;
3. Length, nature, and vulnerability of frontiers, e.g., unique vital points dominated by positions in the neighbouring State, lines and centres of communication situated close to frontiers and in exposed positions, important districts or towns and vital centres open to attack in any form, etc.;
4. Armored forces of contiguous countries;
5. National wealth and financial, commercial and industrial resources of the country, with special reference to raw materials and war industries, particularly as compared with the neighbouring countries;
6. Area and population;
7. Nature, length and density of lines of communication;
8. Nature and value of the assistance which the country might expect, either from other countries under existing conventions or treaties, or from the League of Nations under Article 16 of the Covenant.

B. In the special case of naval armaments, it should be granted as a principle that the armament allowed to each country must be adequate:

a) To protect it against any attack by neighbouring naval Powers;

b) To protect its maritime communications and trade, provided that a thorough investigation has shown that maritime trade is a vital factor in the economic life of a country;

c) To provide for the concentration and transport of the army by sea in the event of mobilisation;

d) To secure the country's food supplies even if the adversary has so great a superiority at sea that he can, without risk, enforce a close blockade.

We cannot emphasise too greatly how important it is for us to protect our communications and our maritime trade, which is one of our principal sources of wealth and is vital to our existence. It should be observed that the countries bordering on Greece have no appreciable oversea trade. In the event of war, if one of those countries had a few swift warships (whether surface vessels or submarines), it could quite easily attack our oversea trade, and so dislocate our national economic system that we should be obliged to surrender.

It is therefore only fair and reasonable that Greece, who has no aggressive intentions, should be allowed, so long as general and complete disarmament is regarded as impracticable, to possess a fleet more powerful than the strongest of the fleets of her neighbours in the Balkans and the Aegean Sea, and a fleet adequate to protect her vital interests.

In order, however, to bear witness to the purely defensive aims of its naval policy, the Greek Government would be willing to consider reducing the number of its capital ships provided that similar measures were taken by all the neighbouring countries, including those which are not Members of the League of Nations, and that certain conditions, which it will specify at the proper time, were fulfilled.