renounced? Obviously not. Yet, knowing that civil aircraft can be converted in a few hours into military aircraft, we shall, if we do not take civil aviation into account, merely be beating about the bush. The same is true of chemical warfare. I could cite further examples, but I do not wish to become involved in technical details which are not really necessary to prove my point.

What, then, is to be done? Is it not clear that the problem will be insoluble unless we accept and seriously consider this new idea of industrial mobilisation and make every effort to prevent such mobilisation from assuming proportions which would be dangerous to all countries — unless, in other words, we adopt the methods of publicity and control?

I am well aware that I am now coming to the most important and difficult part of my argument. I do so with mingled hope and fear. In the collection of documents supplied to us by the Secretariat, attention is drawn in Annex II to the very encouraging statements made on behalf of France and Great Britain by M. Paul-Boncour and Lord Cecil, who have both strongly insisted upon the necessity of control. I am filled with hope, too, when I read on page 16 of the report that the representatives of Great Britain, France and Spain have expressed the opinion that the question of an international control capable of ensuring the limitation of armaments will have to be submitted for consideration to the Preparatory Commission, the French delegation urging the special need of this supervision during the procedure of arbitration and conciliation provided by the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Those are very encouraging signs, but there are also grounds for fear. The question is complicated and difficult; it impinges on very big interests, and something warns me to be cautious in approaching this matter. I am a great admirer of diplomatic prudence and circumspection, although I have generally been prevented by the defects of my character from practising those virtues. At this moment, however, I would not take refuge in diplomatic caution even if I were capable of it, for on this question both my instructions and my conscience bid me speak.

For this is a vital question and according as we do or do not solve the problem, we shall succeed or fail in our task.

The danger must be realised, and the League of Nations has frequently drawn our attention to it. It has published a celebrated document on chemical warfare and on war in the air, which has been reproduced by hundreds of newspapers and which has caused a very great sensation. We are shown by experts what chemical warfare and the bombardment of a city would mean. Mr. Baker's work, to which I have just alluded, contains the collected opinions of a number of technical experts, who describe the aerial bombardment of a large city. Aeroplanes causing fires that no water can extinguish, setting whole districts afame, lighting up the city and thus preventing it from protecting itself; bombs blowing up public monuments and centres of defence; the population compelled to seek refuge in the streets. Then, too, there are gases which, as now manufactured, are deadly whatever part of the body they touch. These gases, heavier than air, penetrate everywhere, into cellars, into the underground railways, leaving no refuge anywhere. The author of this prophecy calculates that the bombardment of Paris, Berlin or London for a few hours would claim at least five hundred thousand victims. An American writer informs us that there are gases known which would permeate a radius of fifty miles around New York, destroying all life and continuing to exercise their deadly effects for a whole month, the bombardment being renewed every week.

If we believe the threat to drift and if chemical warfare and war in the air are free to develop, the result will be, not only that war will become more horrible, but if I may say so, more cowardly, so that by an appalling paradox the only persons who will be comparatively safe will be the combatants themselves. Smeared with oil, clad in garments that give them the appearance of deep-sea divers, and protected by every kind of mechanical contrivance, they will be more or less protected; the victims will be the old, the weak, and defenceless women and children, whose lives every civilised community surrounds with care and attention.

That is the danger ahead of us, and what are we going to do about it? Are we going to employ remedies that are useless? Are we simply going to sign conventions prohibiting the use of gases? That will be no solution. There is not a single country which, after signing such conventions, will not find it necessary and will not have the right to produce gases as a defensive weapon or in order to prepare a counter-offensive. And, as you know — for during the discussion our attention has been particularly drawn to the fact — defensive and counter-offensive measures inevitably provoke an offensive. The offensive, however, means the destruction of cities and the annihilation, or, at any rate, the degradation of humanity. It means the end of civilisation. In the face of that knowledge are we to say that nothing can be done? Are we going to discuss the proportion to be established as regards guns, and a number of other questions of the same kind, and leave untouched this vital problem, which must be solved if we have any serious intentions at all, or unless, as I said this morning, we only wish to settle historical questions without any thought of live problems?

This brings me to the penultimate question which I wish to discuss. I am firmly convinced that even if all the Members of the League, the States assembled here and those who will be invited to attend the Disarmament Conference, fail to conclude a convention for publicity and control, all will not be lost, and regional conventions will perhaps, to a certain extent, save the situation. But I wish to point out once more, with all the emphasis I can command, that before I resign myself to the acceptance of so imperfect a solution, I shall continue to hope that general supervision is possible: for if I am to be told that considerations of national prestige will not allow of such a course, I confess that the argument is quite incomprehensible to me.
Gases are not the only scourge which threatens humanity. There are famines, floods, earthquakes and plague. What have we done to combat these? We have organised control and publicity. Thanks to the admirable initiative of the Italian Red Cross, we have founded an International Union for Relief against disasters. We have applied supervision and publicity in the case of epidemics. If a ship arrives to-morrow in a French, British or Belgian port and a sailor shows symptoms of malignant fever, the ship will be put in quarantine. And, if it is found that this sailor is not suffering from plague or cholera even, but from some more than usually serious form of insanity, the country in question will be obliged to agree to publicity and to notify the matter to all Governmeers will be the result that all over the world every ship coming from the infected port is put in quarantine. This involves a serious material loss to the State which fulfils its obligations, and yet no country has hesitated to consent to these sacrifices in the common interest.

Can we then admit that there should be no supervision or publicity in the case of gases? Can we allow the continued preparation of these instruments of death in laboratories which, we know, are preparing them? Can we allow science to be diverted in this way from its purpose and, instead of serving life, to assist in the destruction of all that is really humane among human beings?

That would surely be a contradiction of terms that the conscience of mankind would never permit.

I therefore repeat what I said just now. I think that, even if we are unable to obtain a general agreement on this point, we need not despair; a solution may still perhaps be found in the general adoption of separate agreements. Personally, I was much struck by the wording of Question VII: "Admitting that disarmament depends on security, to what extent is regional disarmament possible in return for regional security?"

At first sight we are tempted to reply: "To no extent." It has always been a kind of axiom that only a general and universal agreement could obtain for us security and disarmament. I think that in this matter we must be careful to avoid over-rigid formulas. I think we should consider the scheme of disarmament if we were to declare that, as long as there is one refactory country in the world, the good-will of others will be unsatisfying and that they cannot disarm at all. Naturally, if my security is only guaranteed by a regional arrangement, and if a number of my neighbours or of the Powers which might attack me remain outside the Convention, my disarmament will be less complete. But it will hardly encourage the world to adopt regional agreements, if we are going to attribute to them no sort of significance from the point of view of disarmament.

For my part, I am convinced that, with good-will, and in view of the amount of security already existing in the world, we can even now take a first step. Moreover, there is nothing to prevent a country from taking the lead, and it is possibly by voluntary and spontaneous disarmament that the first results will be achieved. Obviously it will be difficult for some countries to accept a scheme of disarmament put forward by the League of Nations, because that scheme will imply an obligation subject to compulsory revision only once every ten years, and because a country which in the interval finds that it has been deceived—and its security not being so great as it was led to suppose—is forbidden to take the precautions which this situation demands. There is not the same obstacle in the way of voluntary disarmament, and I am inclined to think that if our work continues and if the atmosphere of security in the world spreads, we shall see an even larger number of States beginning, without awaiting further action, to disarm, though doubtless within modest limits. Several countries have already set an example. The Scandinavian States have made a start. M. Paul-Boncour has told us of the measures for the reduction of armaments taken by France. I could tell you of what we have done in my country—and it is a good deal. Each has done as much as circumstances have permitted. I believe that this movement will grow and that it is perhaps the right way to begin. Possibly the best way to achieve a result is not to agree on formulas but to start the actual wheels in motion.

In this case, however—and these are my last words—those who make a start must not do so to their cost, and, when a scheme for general disarmament is being prepared, the basis to be taken for calculating further reduction must not be the situation as regards disarmament in which certain countries have voluntarily placed themselves. If such a basis were taken, countries with good intentions, far from being encouraged to set an example, would be tempted to postpone their plans for decreasing armaments, and the effect of the measure will be entirely contrary to the objects we all have in view.

(The meeting rose at 6.25 p.m.)

SIXTH MEETING (PUBLIC)

Held on Thursday, May 20th, 1926, at 11 a.m.

President: M. Loudon (Netherlands).


M. Dumitresco (Roumania) [Translation]: Before stating our views with regard to Questions V and VII, I feel bound, on account of the great importance of these questions, to state on behalf of my Government that Roumania is fervently attached to peace and will
never commit the crime of aggression against any of her neighbours. The accredited representa-
tives of my country have announced to the League of Nations that Roumania is ready to
conclude pacts of non-aggression with all her neighbours without exception.

With regard to Question V, we think that, in order to establish a ratio between the arma-
ments which each country could be allowed to maintain, the recommendations to be made
should be based on the following principles:

1. Every country needs to maintain such armaments as are strictly necessary for its
own security. All of us are, I think, agreed on this principle, which, moreover, is contained
in Article 8 of the Covenant.

2. Disarmament is a function of security, and consequently the degree of disarmament
which a country should be required to undertake must depend on the degree of security
enjoyed by that country, taking into account its situation and the sure and effective additional
 guarantees on which it can rely.

Far be it from me to contest the value of the theory advanced by the British delegate
that security is a function of disarmament. I should like, however, to point out that this
theory, though true as a theory, cannot in practice be applied without risk and danger
to countries which, for geographical, historical or other reasons, have been the constant
victims of aggression and are naturally anxious to ensure their safety.

Were all countries equally secure, I, too, should subscribe to this theory. But as they
are not, and as we must base our future action on the de facto situation of the world, we cannot
help seeing the danger which this theory would entail for many countries. I therefore favour
the French delegation’s principle that disarmament should be a function of security. Rou-
mania, who, in the course of her history, has suffered from a long series of invasions, is so
situated that her national security is bound to be a source of constant anxiety.

3. In order to estimate the proportion of armaments which a country may be allowed
to maintain, we must take into account the degree of security it enjoys. In order to do so
it will not be sufficient to consider and calculate the value of the factors specified in Ques-
tion V(a). We should compare them with the same factors in neighbouring countries and
take into account the mobilisable forces and war potentiality of those neighbours with whom
an armed conflict might occur in case of aggression on their part.

We must, of course, take into account the value of any defensive alliances which a country
may have concluded in order to increase its guarantees of security, and of any assistance
which the League might afford in so far as Article 16 of the Covenant might be applied effec-
tively and without delay.

In any case every country must be allowed to maintain such armaments as are strictly
necessary to prevent the invasion of its territory until its allies or the League can send it
effective assistance. We might thus, we think, succeed in establishing a proportion between
the degree of security enjoyed by a State and the armaments absolutely necessary for its
security. I therefore request that the text of Question V should be altered so as to conform
to the above principles.

Roumania will welcome any regulations which may lead to the abolition of chemical
warfare.

With regard to paragraph V(b), our opinion is as follows: It is clear that if the economic
or military assistance referred to in Article 16 of the Covenant can be provided with speed
and certainty, it will facilitate the reduction of armaments. We must therefore try to discover
some procedure by which Article 16 of the Covenant could be applied to individual cases.
It should be remembered, too, that economic and financial sanctions against a very
large State with great powers of resistance would prove very ineffective, and consequently
increased military assistance must be regarded as legitimate and indeed indispensable as
a guarantee for the security of the countries which are neighbours of such a State. We have
discussed the control of armaments, and I think this would be an admirable measure, but
armaments cannot always be effectively controlled when the country in question is a very
large one.

With regard to Question VII: Disarmament, as I have said, is a function of security.
Regional security may increase general security; but the political, economic and military
interdependence of all countries and the fact that armed conflicts may become general,
especially when Great Powers are engaged, inclines us to believe that we must have general
security before we can have general disarmament.

In the meantime the best policy to follow would, we think, be to increase the number of
regional agreements as the first step towards regional security.

M. ERICH (Finland) [Translation]: I think attention should be drawn now, at the very
outset, to the great importance of the question of security for smaller States which are so
situated as to be particularly exposed to the danger of aggression, which possess only
limited means and material resources, and who are themselves firmly attached to peace.

These States cannot effect any real reduction or limitation of armaments unless the
following conditions are fulfilled: Certain basic provisions of the Covenant — in particular,
Articles 10 and 16, two articles which are very intimately connected — must be rendered
more effective, must, as it were, become living realities, so as to inspire greater confidence
in those nations which rightly rely on these provisions as an important guarantee of their
security.

More than one country regrets that the Geneva Protocol of 1924 came to naught; we
should not lose sight of the underlying ideas of that important document, the spirit of which
is still recognised by the League. Regional security, which may be obtained by pacts of
loyally in the spirit of the Covenant, Article 8 of which lays down that national armaments
have been asked to find an answer.

begins to co-operate with you in studying the political and technical questions for which we
shall be reduced to the minimum compatible with national security.

question. On the contrary, it is prepared, now as here to fore, and in the future, to co-operate
regional agreements (which might be concluded on lines to be laid down by this Commission)
agreements has been adopted as the surest means of securing general approval for the principles
of disarmament and peace throughout the continent.

M. BELLO-CODESIDO (Chile) [Translation] : Mr. President, I should like briefly to state
my country's views on the question we are now discussing.

The Commission is aware that the disarmament question assumes very different aspects
in Europe and America. Whereas in the European Continent the problem is the reduction
of excessive armaments which may constitute an immediate menace to international peace,
the American countries are entirely free from any such danger. No American country possesses
armaments which could cause any anxiety in this respect, and we therefore have to provide
not for a reduction of armaments but for their limitation. In Europe the question is one of
putting an end to a danger; in America we have to forestall a danger.

If security must be a condition of disarmament — and I personally am convinced of that fact — the factors on which security itself is dependent are very different in different
continents.

There is no menace to the independence of any American State, nor does any require a
guarantee from other States.

The expenditure and sacrifices which national defence imposes on the various States
are entirely governed by the requirements of their security, taking into account their geo-
ographical position, population, power of production, wealth, etc.

The efforts which have already been made in America to ensure peace throughout that
continent have been of a preventive and a moral nature. In this connection I should state
that the problem of disarmament figured on the agenda of the last Pan-American Conference,
held at Santiago de Chile, and it is interesting to note that the Conference concluded it neither
opportunity nor practicable, for the time being, to establish any hard and fast rules, for such
rules could not correspond to the present state of our organisation, or keep pace with our
constant development. On the contrary, being faced with factors similar to those we are
now considering, the Conference held that it would more easily attain its object if it prepared
a pact of Continental security to strengthen the machinery for the peaceful settlement of
disputes.

This pact, known as the Gondra Pact, after the eminent Paraguayan statesman who
proposed it, has become a living reality and has already been ratified by a number of American
States, including the United States, Brazil and Chile.

In view of these special conditions obtaining in the American Continent, this pact of secu-
ity, in conjunction with our uniform practice of arbitration, fulfils our desire for moral
disarmament and peace throughout the continent.

The third factor of the inseparable combination "arbitration, security and disarmament" assumes quite a different aspect in Europe, but, since in Europe also the system of regional
agreements has been adopted as the surest means of securing general approval for the principles
embodied in the Geneva Protocol — of which the Pacts of Locarno constitute a first and import-
tant stage — we hold that disarmament can follow the same course, and that by successive
regional agreements (which might be concluded on lines to be laid down by this Commission)
the work of organising peace might be completed.

The observations I have made regarding the various aspects of the problem should not
be taken to mean that my country has ceased to take an interest in the general solution of the
question. On the contrary, it is prepared, now as here to fore, and in the future, toco-operate
lovingly in the spirit of the Covenant, Article 8 of which lays down that national armaments
shall be reduced to the minimum compatible with national security.

I felt bound to make this general statement on behalf of my country before our delegation
begins to co-operate with you in studying the political and technical questions for which we
have been asked to find an answer.
M. Sokal (Poland) [Translation]: The whole discussion up to the present has shown, as indeed was natural, that there is a close connection between the purely technical and the political aspects of the problem of disarmament. This is due to the fact that armaments do not in themselves constitute a real danger to peace: the danger is due rather to political and psychological causes. It is quite obvious that if all States were resolutely prepared to forgo war, they would settle all their disputes by peaceful means, disarmament could become an effective reality within a much shorter period than that we are forced to contemplate. I think we should never lose sight of the main consideration, which constitutes the basis of our work and is summarised in three words: arbitration, security, disarmament. In the matter of arbitration, certain countries, including, I am glad to say, my own, have undeniably made a very considerable effort. As regards guarantees of security, we are only at the start of our journey along the great road which will lead to universal peace. Every step towards security must necessarily connote a diminution of armaments.

The country I have the honour to represent is unfortunately not in so privileged a position with regard to her security as Switzerland, for instance, whose security is almost absolute, thanks to her system of international guarantees provided by treaty. Poland would be the first country to make important reductions in her armaments if she could obtain effective international guarantees for her security. As my country, like many others similarly situated, has barely attained what I might call the "beginnings" of security, it can only consider the "beginnings" of disarmament. But Poland has not abandoned the hope of attaining a degree of security which will enable her to reduce her armaments to the level already attained in the United States of North America, where there is only one soldier to every thousand inhabitants. I wish to state here that the desire to strengthen the general security of the country by treaties of guarantee and by all other means is the bedrock upon which every Polish Government bases its foreign policy.

I have wanted to refer to the exceptional difficulties which Poland has to overcome in this direction, as a country hemmed in on all sides by non-Members of the League and do not all share in the League's work of pacification. We should, moreover, remember that States, particularly those which possesses no natural frontiers, may be forced to supply the lack of such frontiers by fortifications of an essentially defensive character.

Turning from future ideals to present realities — and we are bound to do so, for we have experienced all the horrors of that modern warfare which our honourable Belgian colleague so vividly described yesterday — we should consider in what directions these real and material results can be attained. We cannot limit resources in men, natural wealth, industrial equipment, or means of transport — all the factors, in short, which in practice cannot be limited yet which form part of the conception described as war potential. Nevertheless, this idea might be applied very satisfactorily when we come to consider the necessary conditions for the limitation of armaments, and the extent to which such limitation is practicable.

I think, moreover, that we could increase our sense of confidence and security if we improved the working procedure of the Council when it is called upon to start the machinery for providing assistance. The problem at present is how we can establish a definite procedure for the Council to follow in cases of aggression, independently, of course, of the immediate military steps which the countries directly interested may take in virtue of Article 16 of the Covenant or under special agreements concluded within the framework of the Covenant. The Council should be able to decide at once who is the aggressor and what steps must be taken to ensure that the promises contained in the League's promises in case of unprovoked attack. But at present the Council possesses no rules of procedure under which it could in cases of this kind take rapid and effective action. The precedent of the recent Graeco-Bulgarian dispute shows how salutary such action can be if all the Council's machinery can be brought into operation in time. The dispute in question proves that we ought to consider the establishment of such rules, so that the Council may, in urgent cases, have at its disposal all the documentation it requires and be fully informed as to the situation on the outbreak of the conflict. Naturally, the Council would always be free to take what decisions it chose, but only if it possesses definite rules, will it be able to act with sufficient speed in the many incidents which may constitute a menace to peace.

Moreover, we should consider the establishment of another organ — which would almost certainly be of great utility — whose duty it would be to prepare the execution of the future programme of disarmament. This organ might also play an important part in operating a system of control for the protection of countries whose intentions are perfectly bona fide.

I have every hope, therefore, that our Commission will be able to reach a certain number of practical solutions, provided it does not undertake too vast a programme. Keeping before it the main and vital question — security — it may lead us to disarmament by gradual stages, according to the individual situation of each country. I very much doubt whether the mathematical processes which have been proposed, scientific though they may be and scientifically applied, could ever be of much use. In questions of national defence there are so many intricate and interrelated factors that we might, working on strictly mathematical lines, arrive at entirely absurd results.

Personally, I think that the Commission would be doing good work for the League if it proposed the consideration of rules to assist the Council in one of its principal tasks — that of settling disputes, and setting in motion the whole machinery of immediate and effective assistance to be afforded to countries which may be victims of an unprovoked attack.

Mr. Gibson (United States of America): The American delegation has not intervened in certain phases of the discussion yesterday and to-day in so far as it related to questions of
the limitation of land and air armaments such as are raised in Question VII. This has been because of its views on the matter of regional disarmament. The general views of my Government upon the broad question of the limitation and reduction of land and air armaments have already been stated. In so far as the answer to the specific questions contained in Question VII is concerned, the American delegation would certainly agree that the degree of security obtained may and probably will have a very decided effect on the extent to which land armaments in Europe may be reduced.

It represents, however, that many of the factors involved are different in different regions of the world, and that the matter of security must be given a different evaluation for a group of European countries than for a group of countries in the western hemisphere. This follows from difference in location, difference in population, difference in the development of communications, and to a certain extent difference in national political situations. In consequence, the limitation of land and air armaments in one or more countries of the western hemisphere can have little or no effect on such a question arising in one or more countries in Europe; in other words, the reduction or limitation of the land or air armaments of a South American country could neither logically nor practically be made contingent upon similar action on the part of a Scandinavian country.

This leads us logically and inevitably to the conclusion that in its practical aspects the question is largely regional in character. Being regional in character, and being influenced by factors which vary in importance in different regions of the earth, it would appear that the only practicable solution is to attempt to solve the question on a regional rather than a universal basis.

In this connection I should like to emphasise a view set forth on the opening day of the Conference and touched on by other speakers, to the effect that the limitation of competitive armaments is one of the methods of increasing the security of any State. I believe that if we wait until absolute security has been obtained before making any advance in the direction of the limitation of competitive armaments, we shall find ourselves in a vicious circle which will prevent us from obtaining no arms limitation and at the best an inadequate degree of security.

In view of the regional character of the question, I feel it would hardly be fitting for the American delegation to intervene at this time by proposing a formula which would be applicable in regions upon which the size of the American land and air forces does not have a direct influence.

In conclusion, I may add that the premise on which Question VII is based — namely, that disarmament depends on security — may well have a very important bearing on the limitation of land forces in Europe. This consideration, however, does not have the same importance in the western hemisphere. There circumstances have made it possible for the problem to be approached from a different angle. For the most part a mutual reduction of land armaments has been carried to a point where the security sought has largely been attained through this voluntary reduction of armaments, and it has not been necessary to await political agreements in the matter of national security.

M. Perez (Argentine) [Translation]: The Argentine Republic considers that disarmament should be reached by means of regional conventions, and that general disarmament can only be the outcome of collective regional disarmament. In no case should armaments be reduced below the level necessary for national defence, but the requirements of national defence should not be allowed to create a feeling of anxiety or insecurity in neighbouring countries. Regional conventions are therefore necessary.

As regards the Argentine in particular, however strong her army may be, it could never be a source of anxiety to her neighbours, in view of the manifestly pacific character of her foreign policy. The Pacific tendency of Argentine policy is abundantly demonstrated by the following facts: The Argentine has signed arbitration treaties with Italy in 1898 and in 1907, with Paraguay in 1899, with Uruguay in 1899, with Bolivia in 1902, with Chile in 1902, with Spain in 1902, with Brazil in 1905, with Portugal in 1909, with France in 1910, with Great Britain in 1910, with Venezuela in 1911. She also concluded with Chile, in 1902, a treaty for the limitation of naval armaments on the basis of naval equality.

This long list — and no nation could submit a longer — fully demonstrates the peaceful character of the foreign policy of the Argentine Republic, a loyal and sincere policy based on the strict and integral observance of treaty obligations.

In this spirit of international conciliation, the Argentine is happy to co-operate in the splendid efforts now being made by the League of Nations to eliminate the horror of war and help, by its example, to spread and strengthen throughout the whole world the idea of arbitration, which is shortly destined to become the best guarantee of peace and deprive all armaments of the aggressive character that renders them so dangerous.

Count Bernstorff (Germany) [Translation]: I have followed with very great interest the discussions which have taken place these last few days, and I now venture to offer a few observations. I have listened with the greatest respect, but the arguments adduced have sometimes given me the impression that the speaker was at greater pains to discover why we could not disarm than how we could begin to limit armaments. It is not my wish to discuss the numerous expressions which have been employed in these controversies. My neighbour has employed the term "peace potential". I should like to apply this term to my own remarks.

We very much hope that we shall reach an agreement. We realise that such an agreement is not immediately practicable and that we will have to obtain it by degrees and by limiting armaments partially until a better day dawns. We have listened to arguments which might, I think, have been employed before the late war — and yet surely the present situation of the
world is absolutely different, because the League has changed the outlook of the whole world. I was surprised in these discussions on security to hear so little mention made of the League itself. At the present time there can only be war between the League of Nations and an aggressor State. Any other war is inconceivable. I therefore think we have talked a little too much about security. We fully realise that every country desires security, for we ourselves do not possess it, but if I may refer to the resolution adopted by the last Assembly in virtue of which this Commission was convened, I note that the Assembly says:

"... and, in conformity with the spirit of Article 8 of the Covenant, requests the Council to make a preparatory study with a view to a conference for the reduction and limitation of armaments, in order that, as soon as satisfactory conditions have been assured from the point of view of general security as provided for in Resolution XIV of the Third Assembly, the said conference may be convened and a general reduction and limitation of armaments may be realised."

When the Council declares that such security has been attained within the meaning of Resolution XIV, then the agreement on disarmament will take full effect. Our discussions should therefore be based on the hypothesis that security already exists in the world and that we are establishing a system of disarmament which will be as soon as we have worked out its practical details. Most speakers seem to regard only the present state of the world, whereas they ought to look forward to the time when each nation has reduced its armaments to a strict minimum in conformity with the terms of the Covenant.

When that time has come, it will obviously be easier for the League to afford effective assistance to States threatened by aggression.

In Germany we have had very considerable experience of disarmament and very little experience of armaments in the last eight years. I was much struck by the speech of my colleague M. de Brouckère describing the appalling effects which would be produced by air warfare and gas attacks. I cannot see why we should not effect immediate progress by prohibiting air warfare and the employment of gas.

This question was touched upon at Washington, and an agreement was drawn up, but it has not yet been ratified by all the Governments. Disarmament might perhaps be started in this manner, and the fact of our having obtained a tangible result, apart from all the other forms of disarmament on which the opinions of the various countries are so divided, would have a great effect on public opinion.

M. de Brouckère tells us that every country should be in a position to defend its capital and civil population against air attacks. "To prevent a State from taking these measures would be an act of cynical cruelty" were his words. It was not I who spoke of "cynical cruelty", but I might point out that this is the situation in which we ourselves have been placed; our country is forbidden to take such defensive measures. I do not wish to refer to the past, but this example shows that in certain cases disarmament may be wrongly applied, that in several cases the disarmament imposed on us is not all in keeping with the aims we should have in view, and that if we are to have a scheme of disarmament, that scheme should be conceived on different lines.

I now come to war potential - a question which may be approached in several ways. It has been said that the industries of a country are a highly important factor to which we should direct our attention. I feel, however, that we ought not to consider merely the number of industries in a country; to my mind the important point is how, and to what extent, peace industries could be converted into war industries. In Germany our industries could not be thus converted. It is common knowledge that our industrial centres are situated near the frontier and that this industrial potential strength could be destroyed in a few hours. I am simply putting the matter theoretically; I do not wish to conjure up unpleasant memories, but the history of these last few years has proved that one industrial region of Germany is rendered absolutely useless as soon as the situation becomes clouded. I repeat, however, that my only aim is to discover common ground for creating better conditions in Europe through the agreement we hope to reach.

The weak points of a country should also be taken into consideration - for instance, the difficulty it may experience in feeding its population and replenishing its stocks of raw materials (particularly those which come from the colonies), its geographical situation and the defensive value of its frontiers.

Personally, I find that on several points the Questionnaire goes rather too far into detail. I am afraid that, if we spend so much time over details, we shall make no progress. Some questions, I repeat, have been treated in rather too detailed a manner, while others, I am astonished to observe, have not been touched upon at all in this document. For instance, why has no mention been made of the abolition of air warfare and the employment of gas in war? Why is there no reference to heavy artillery and tanks? That is surely an important point. You are aware that, under the terms of the treaties, Germany possesses no heavy artillery. It should be possible to prohibit certain forms of armaments. That would be a great step forward. There is also the question of colonial troops, which is important, because these troops constitute a reserve of man-power.

I repeat that these observations should not be regarded as proposals emanating either from myself or from the German Government. We feel that we ought to succeed in limiting armaments. We think that this is vital, for if we fail to find a solution, public opinion will be grievously disappointed and we should be seriously undermining both our own prestige and that of the League. We are prepared to co-operate sincerely in the search for a formula to which all, without exception, can subscribe.
Viscount Cecil (British Empire): If I venture to address the Commission again, it is because so many important speeches have been made, and I should like to comment upon them.

I will begin by taking note of and welcoming the very important appreciation of the international situation made by the last speaker when he said that in his view the institution of the League of Nations had entirely changed the aspect of these questions, and that it was inconceivable for any loyal Member of the League to enter on a war except in accordance with the Covenant of the League. That is a declaration to which the British Government would warmly accede, and of which it entirely approves. I cannot imagine any circumstances in which the British Government would find itself at war with any Member of the League, or indeed any civilized power, except in pursuance of the Covenant of the League of Nations, unless there was an actual attack on the British Empire, which is not within our contemplation at all. I believe that, whatever Government was in power in England, that would certainly be their policy, and the people of the country would permit of no other.

I have another observation to make in a moment about another suggestion of Count Bernstorff but, before I come to that, I want to say with what immense pleasure I, in common, believe, with every other member of this Commission, listened to the very admirable and eloquent speech of M. de Brouckère yesterday. Many of the things which I should have perhaps wished to say, less perfectly than he has said them, I need not trouble about now, because I can adopt without any qualification what he said upon them. In particular, all the earlier part of his speech and the part about chemical warfare I certainly adhere to most fully.

He made one suggestion at the end of his speech which is of great importance. He suggested that whatever might be the ultimate outcome of our deliberations, since necessarily they may take some considerable time, it would be most desirable that as far as possible every country should proceed in the direction of voluntary disarmament. That is certainly the earnest desire of the British Government, and perhaps it may be of interest to the Commission if I gave a figure which would indicate this."..."
doing what we can at the present moment. As the French proverb very truly says: "Le mieux est l'ennemi du bien."

A good deal has been said about chemical warfare, and we shall none of us forget for a very long time the picture which M. de Brouckère drew of the chemical warfare in a war of the future. I know there are some people who have an easy optimism and set aside these prophecies as the fruit of the excited imaginations of experts. I do not believe that is the least true. I have tried to give some attention to the question of air warfare, and I am quite satisfied that the air warfare of the future will be at least as terrible as anything that has been described in this room or out of it. I remember a little personal experience which I will venture to recount to the Commission. Before the last war I picked up an English book consisting of descriptions, in the nature of essays in a dramatic form, of what the next war would be like. I read two or three of them, but they were to my mind so horrible that I put them aside with just that easy optimism that I have been describing. Yet I am bound to say that, looking back on those essays, I realise they were in no way an exaggeration but rather an under-estimate of the horrors of war as we endured them in the late war; and I am satisfied that the statements which have been made as to chemical warfare, unless we can succeed in doing something to prevent its horrors, will prove to be under-estimates rather than over-estimates of the horrors of any future war.

I noticed Count Bernstorff's proposal that we should forbid aerial warfare altogether, and particularly chemical warfare. I certainly do not rule out that as a possibility, but I doubt whether that would by itself be a sufficient security. I am afraid the history of the world shows that, when a nation is fighting for its existence, it is too probable it will use whatever weapons are available without sufficient regard to mere undertakings of this kind. Still I do not wish to deny that such undertakings are useful. All I can say is that though we have had the Washington Treaties condemning the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and though we had a reaffirmation of that in the Draft Convention for Traffic in Arms, I have not observed that either of those declarations has lessened the activities of the various nations in preparing for such warfare in the future.

Let me read the solemn declaration that was agreed upon last year.

"The undersigned Plenipotentiaries, in the name of their respective Governments:

Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices has been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilised world; and

Whereas the prohibition of such use has been declared in Treaties to which the majority of Powers of the world are parties; and

To the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part of international law, binding alike the conscience and the practice of nations:

Declare that the High Contracting Parties, so far as they are not already parties to treaties prohibiting such use, accept this prohibition, agree to extend this prohibition to the use of bacteriological methods of warfare, and agree to be bound as between themselves according to the terms of this declaration.

All that is admirable as far as it goes, but I think we have to go further than that if we possibly can, and find practical means for extending our disarmament scheme, whatever it may be, to chemical warfare as not the least important — perhaps indeed the most important — of all the subjects that we have to discuss. M. de Brouckère was very hopeful as to what can be done, and I am certainly not less hopeful than he. I am going to ask him if he thinks it will be a good thing to put down on paper exactly what his proposals amount to. I am not quite sure that I appreciated what they were. He said we want publicity and control. I think publicity would be a very good thing as far as it can be secured, and I do not say that control is a bad thing. I want to know, however, exactly what it is that M. de Brouckère wants. The difficulty with regard to the manufacture of poisonous gases is, I understand, that, by a most unfortunate provision of nature they are extremely easy to manufacture, and that in fact all the dye factories in the world can be very easily transformed into factories for poisonous gas. I do not quite see how control is going to help. As everybody knows, the dye factories exist in large quantities in various parts of the world. I am not putting my question because I am anxious to have definite and practical proposals before this Commission as soon as we can get them, and the question I put is, what exactly is the contemplated control and what would it do to check the possibility of the manufacture of poisonous gases. I have not seen the proposals, and I should be very grateful if we could have very definite proposals as to what is exactly contemplated in the matter.

After all, chemical warfare, important as it is, is only one aspect of the question we have to consider. The danger that exists is that, though we are all theoretically in favour of disarmament, each of us, when we come to consider our own country, sees imperative reasons why no disarmament, or at any rate no material disarmament, should take place. That is the danger. I do not say that it exists in this Commission, but that is undoubtedly the danger in our discussion. We must definitely admit that, if anything is to be done, we must be prepared to face that problem for our own countries as well as for other countries. I am sure we can do it, because I am sure the great mass of public opinion of the world and of Europe demands it, and in this matter, as in all others, it is public opinion that is the ultimate force on which the League of Nations in all its activities must count. But the great work of education is essential. We have to convince public opinion, not that disarmament is desirable, for that is quite clear, but we have to convince it that it is practicable, and that something may be
done. We have to get a new point of view in order to establish that idea in the minds of the peoples of the world. We have to make them regard armaments not as a national privilege which it is a sacrifice to abandon but rather as a national burden, which they should be glad to be free from, if arrangements could be made to relieve them of it. Surely that is the true view on which all armaments should be considered, particularly at the present time, when all over the world we are groaning under financial and economic difficulties. There is not a country in Europe that is free -- certainly my own is not -- and undoubtedly nothing would do more to restore financial and economic confidence, on which financial and economic stability ultimately depend, than a real step towards disarmament. I am convinced it would breathe a new spirit into the whole of our economic relations and make things entirely different from what they are at present. We must all admit that not only would it be an economic relief but that of course disarmament is the only hope of peace. I hope therefore that we are going straight on to some definite and practical steps, and for that reason I am going to ask the Commission whether perhaps these general observations have not gone on long enough and whether we could not return to the detailed consideration of the remaining questions. There is Question V, which has two parts, dealing with two of the most important aspects of the whole of our subject. M. de Brouckère has indeed dealt with the first part, but I think he is almost the only speaker who has. I am not quite sure — I never have been quite sure — whether the mode of approaching the question indicated in the first part of Question V will turn out to be the most practical. In that I share the view of M. de Brouckère, but I do not think you could possibly develop, as it were, an index number out of all the considerations set out in the first part of Question V (a) and then apply that index number to each country so as to obtain the amount of armaments that it should be allowed. I am sure M. de Brouckère was perfectly right when he said that any such mathematical approach to the question was not practicable. Probably something quite different will have to be done. You will have somehow to get some kind of estimate of what is necessary for each country’s defence. It may perhaps be found on what that country in fact asked for at some agreed period, or it may be in some other way, but I think that you have to consider what modifications are to be made in it, having regard to the considerations set out in Question V and to other considerations. Then you will have to make some kind of rough guess at what is the reasonable amount to be allowed to each country. That question will have to be discussed. That is very much, as I understand it, M. de Brouckère’s view. If that is so, I venture to suggest that not much at this moment can be done with regard to Question V. It can evidently only be approached with any hope of a fruitful result when we have really solved the other difficulties before us. Therefore, while I hope we shall all be considering it and forming our own ideas as to what ought to be done about it, I would suggest to the Commission that there is nothing we can practically do at this moment except to consider it and to press on with the other problems before us. I am quite satisfied that, when we have reached a solution of these problems, we shall find ourselves in a far better position to approach the final problem of the scale of armaments. Here I would point out that there is a discrepancy between the English and French texts of Question V. The English text speaks of “scale” and the French of “proportion”, two different conceptions. I think we shall be able to approach the solution of that problem much more successfully when we have reached that stage in our enquiry.

As regards the second part of Question V, this is a very interesting and important question and has already been referred to by several speakers. I have no proposal at present as to how it should be dealt with, and I very much hope that some definite practical proposals will be made with regard to it. The French version of Article 16 of the Covenant contains the words “military and economic”, and that is somewhat misleading. By examining possible means for ensuring that the mutual assistance — economic and military — contemplated in Article 16 of the Covenant shall be brought quickly into operation as soon as an act of aggression has been committed?” I suppose everybody would agree that the answer to that literally and grammatically would be yes, but I imagine that the purpose of the question is to have an examination into what practical measures ought to be taken in order to put Article 16 into operation. That is a difficult question which, though very largely of a political character, might possibly comprise other elements as well. Therefore, before we refer it to any Committee, I think we ought to be very clear what it is we are going to ask that committee to answer. A mere reference of the question as it stands to a committee would serve no useful purpose in my judgment and might indeed lead us into embarrassment.

Then we come to the question of the control or supervision of disarmament, the international supervision of disarmament — a very thorny and difficult question. There again I hope we shall have some definite and practical proposals. Indeed, the more I consider this problem the more anxious I am to get to the stage when we shall be considering not general principles but actual propositions as to what it is suggested the nations of the world should be asked to agree to in this matter — in other words a draft disarmament treaty or convention. I am not sure whether we have reached the stage yet when we can set about drafting such a treaty, but I am very sure that our discussions will be to a very large extent in the air and unreal until we get down to definite practical proposals to which we are to say yes or no whether we agree. And indeed, so strongly do I feel this that I should very much like my colleagues to consider this possibility, namely, that after we have concluded our proceedings at this session — that is, after the Drafting Committee has proposed to this Commission certain questions which are to be put to our technical Committee — we shall adjourn, because I do not see what else we can do as a full committee when that has been done; but I think we might perhaps go as far as to say this: that, when those answers come back and before even they are considered by this Commission again, we might ask the Drafting Committee
on the basis of those articles, to draw up definite propositions for the consideration of this Commission. What those propositions may be will necessarily depend upon the answers we get, and it may well be that it will be essential to draw up alternative propositions for the consideration of the Commission. But the Drafting Committee should be asked, in my view, before we summon the whole of this Commission again, to get something on paper which will enable us to discuss practically and fruitfully the problems that are before us. Otherwise I am very much afraid that the discussion will tend to assume an unreal air, and that will be not only bad for the progress of our work itself but will certainly convey a very bad impression to those who are watching us with immense anxiety and interest outside.

(The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.)

SEVENTH MEETING (PUBLIC)
Held on Thursday, May 20th, 1926, at 4 p.m.

President: M. Loudon (Netherlands).

17. Discussion of the Questionnaire submitted to the Commission; Questions V, VII and Annex II (continuation).

Mr. Gibson (United States of America): I ask for the privilege of speaking once more in this discussion merely to support the proposal made by Viscount Cecil at the conclusion of this morning’s debate concerning the need for reaching agreement as to the immediate goal of this Commission. Indeed, if he had not approached the question this morning, I should have done so this afternoon, for I consider it highly important that this question should be settled now so as to facilitate profitable work on the part of our Sub-Committees. When the Sub-Committees have made and returned to us their reports, we shall, I trust, be in possession of a large amount of valuable material and information, but that will not complete our task. It will be only a first step in that direction. The President, in his opening statement on Tuesday, reminded us that it was the task of this body to prepare a programme for a conference on the reduction and limitation of armaments. I think we can all agree that the working out of formulas concerning the question is but one step towards the preparation of such a programme. It therefore seems to me that we should have clearly in mind just what the character of that programme is to be and what form the final act of this Commission is to take. Is it to be a mere memorandum embodying answers to the seven questions? Is it to be a definite agenda framed for a future conference or is it proposed to be carried still further into the form of a draft convention or conventions to be submitted to such a conference as a basis for discussion? Our Sub-Committees can hardly start work intelligently before we have discussed this problem. Our decision will influence the character of their work and will determine the form of their report. They should, it seems to me, be instructed clearly as to the wishes of our Commission; whether we desire a mere memorandum embodying an answer to each of the seven questions, whether we expect a report which can form the agenda of the conference or conferences, or whether their report should be in such form as to be readily embodied in a draft convention or draft conventions by this Commission. It seems to me essential that we should give attention to this question before the conclusion of our general discussion, so that, when the technical committees have made their reports, we shall be able to utilise them at once in a practical manner. I propose that the Commission give its attention to this question before the Drafting Committee goes to work, not necessarily now but before the conclusion of the general discussion; and I suggest therefore that it would be interesting to hear expressions of the views of the other delegates on this subject.

M. Veverka (Czechoslovakia) [Translation]: Mr. President, I had the honour to explain my views in the statement I made yesterday, which to some extent anticipated the general discussion of Questions V and VII and Annex II. I will therefore confine myself to a brief re-statement of the general view held in my country, namely, that there is a very real interdependence between security and disarmament, an interdependence both in theory and in fact. This interdependence will always be my guiding principle in any decision that has to be taken on the questions before us.

With regard to certain special questions, it is clear that both points of Question V and the whole of Question VII are intimately connected.

Question V deals with that part which we have called “potential war strength” and which, as I said yesterday, is measurable and calculable. The Technical Commission will have to develop and enlarge Question V in this direction, since I presume that we on this Commission are furnishing our technical commissions not only with professions of faith but with instructions.

With regard to Question VII, it is my opinion that regional agreements inevitably affect the structure and composition of the “potential” strength of each country, for the security
given to a State by a guarantee of help or an undertaking to assist in case of attack, may render partly superfluous any additional measures of armament which would otherwise be indispen-
sable. Consequently, I think that regional agreements can to a certain extent lead to a
reduction of armaments.

Obviously the more precise and comprehensive the guarantee the more effective and
drastic the measures of reduction.

Reverting to point (b) of Question V, I am certain that it would appreciably help to
reduce and limit armaments if we were to devise suitable means to ensure that the mutual
economic and military assistance contemplated in Article 16 of the Covenant should be
brought quickly into operation.

At this point, however, I feel bound to reply to another question, or rather to an objection
raised this morning, namely, that the Commission has not sufficiently considered the help
and assistance granted to each Member of the League of Nations by the Covenant. But since
under the Covenant every State Member is free to judge for itself how far it will help another
Member which is attacked, the latter can only rely on its own judgment in estimating the
assistance it will probably receive from each of the other Members. We are once again faced
with the same question, which is, in my opinion, the crux of the whole problem. I think that
if the obligation to help a State which is attacked were more precisely defined in advance,
and if this obligation were less dependent upon the judgment of each Member which is to
offer assistance, we should not have been asked to discuss the matter round this table.

In accordance, as always, with its traditions, my country will gladly support any concrete
proposals for practical limitation which are compatible with its own security. As the wish
has been expressed that each country should place something definite upon the table, I beg
to say that my Government has informed me that the Czechoslovak Parliament has just
reduced the military budget by twenty per cent.

M. de Mello-Franco (Brazil) [Translation]: I had no intention of again stating before
an organ of the League the Brazilian Government’s policy in regard to the problem of dis-
armament.

We had the honour to sign the Treaty of Versailles, and we are consequently one of the
States which founded the League. Since then we have had the honour of sitting on the Council
of the League and have therefore had several opportunities, either in the Assembly, in the
Council, or on the technical organisations of the League, to set forth our national policy,
which is essentially and invariably a pacific one.

On all occasions we have afforded our wholehearted though modest assistance in all
the schemes brought forward since the creation of the League with a view to fulfilling the
supreme aim of the Covenant, as expressed in Article 8, namely, general disarmament-guaran-
teeing and consolidating peace throughout the world. We even co-operated in certain
schemes although we did not consider that they took sufficient account of the special situation
of the American countries.

Take, for example, the Draft Treaty of Mutual Guarantee submitted to the Assembly
and based on the preliminary draft by Lord Cecil and Colonel Réquin, the French Govern-
ment expert. The Brazilian Government considered that that treaty, by seeking to give
organic form to mutual assistance, laid down in principle that the obligation to give assistance
was confined to States belonging to the same continent as the country attacked. In conse-
quence of this restriction, such mutual assistance would really be useless to countries like
Australia, for example, or the South American States.

The force of this contention becomes particularly apparent when we remember that the
United States is not a Member of the League. The American States which are Members of
the League are not armed, and in the event of attack they could not therefore help the State
attacked, whoever the aggressor might be. It is inconceivable that one American State will
ever attack another, but, supposing for the sake of argument that it were true, it is clear
that the assistance upon which an American State could reckon, if attacked, would, according
to this draft treaty, be of no avail. Such assistance would be dependent on the time taken
by the assisting State to mobilise, its transport facilities, the organisation of its supplies and
the existence of special operating bases. Most American States are unfavourably situated
in these respects, and, for lack of the necessary resources, it would in practice be impossible
for them to render assistance. The same observation applies to naval and air assistance.

Nevertheless, Brazil supported this scheme, in spite of its shortcomings, because she regarded
it as a step towards a system for the pacific settlement of international disputes and towards
the organisation of peace by justice. It is true that Article 6 of this Treaty allowed for supple-
mentary agreements for the sole purpose of enabling certain States to provide for mutual
defence and facilitate the application of measures prescribed by the general treaty, by deter-
mining in advance the assistance which they would render in the event of a specific attack.

In this connection the Brazilian Government pointed out that, in spite of the dangers and
disadvantages of separate treaties, each State, when it came to consider the possibilities of
fresh wars, could undoubtedly, within the limits of certain, foresee the probable aggressor and thus
be led to adapt its armaments to the nature and extent of the dangers to which it was exposed
on any given frontier. For the same reason, too, it would naturally, in common prudence,
take measures to obtain, by means of regional agreements, help from other countries in
defending any particularly threatened frontier.

Accordingly, separate treaties can be condemned on psychological grounds, but, as the
supreme and ultimate object of the problem is national security, it would be unreasonable
to reject them absolutely unless some other solution were found which would offer security
to threatened countries and reassure public opinion by a real guarantee of peace and the certainty of protection against external attack. It was for that reason that we proposed the system of regional treaties. We are prepared to conclude such treaties. We have taken our share in all the efforts which have been made to bring about disarmament. As you know, after Lord Cecil's Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance was abandoned, it was hoped that the question would be solved by the Geneva Protocol. Brazil hastened to sign this Protocol; unfortunately it never came into force, but that was not our fault. We are ready to approve anything which may lead to disarmament, but we think that this end will best be attained by developing the system of arbitration and by a fuller acceptance of the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. In pointing forward these considerations we regarded the problem in its general and universal bearing, and we gave our approval to the draft which granted to States Members of the League the right to reaffirm and consolidate, by regional treaties, the mutual guarantees provided for in the general pact.

I am not one of those who claim that the problem of disarmament is of no immediate concern to the American countries. On the contrary, I think that this problem concerns them too, though in a special way. To be sure, it does not concern them in the same way as European countries, but, as my friends and colleagues, the delegates of the Argentine and Chile, have aid, we, too, regard the limitation of armaments as the fixing of a certain scale of armaments in conformity with Article 8 of the Covenant of the League. There are countries whose armaments exceed this limit, while there are others which have not reached it. The whole problem consists in fixing specifically, for each country, the amount of armaments recognised as the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations. For countries which are poorly armed, and which have not reached this limit, reduction is virtually impossible.

In any procedure based on the Covenant of the League, that is the one argument which we must regard as the Magna Charta upon which all armament agreements concluded under the League's auspices must be based. Fortunately, the settlement of this question involves no difficulties for the American States.

We all regard our armed forces as intended exclusively for the maintenance of internal order, and if we think of the matter in connection with affairs beyond the confines of our own territory, it is from the point of view of defence only, and all that concerns us is the means of defending ourselves against attack from outside.

If, as M. Veverka pointed out, the Covenant of the League and international agreements can remove all dangers from outside, the forces required by each country will, of course, be simply those intended to ensure internal order.

To use M. Veverka's actual words, "the more comprehensive the League's guarantee the more drastic the measures of disarmament."

I have only spoken in order to show the Commission that it is the firm intention of the Brazilian Government to pursue its traditional international policy, which, as our co-operation in the League has often proved, has always been directed towards peace. The Brazilian Government will adhere to any peace treaty made with its sister States and neighbours in America. The policy which, ever since our independence, we have pursued towards each and every country has always been based upon arbitration. With us, arbitration is not merely a pious wish; it is actually applied in our international policy.

Following the example of my friend and colleague, M. Perez, I may say that my Government has up to the present signed more than thirty arbitration treaties with countries all over the world and has settled by arbitration the difficult questions which we inherited from our constituent States. By arbitration, too, we settled a vexed and thorny frontier question with our brothers of the Argentine Republic: it was submitted for arbitration to Mr. Cleveland, of the United States. In the same way we settled the Guiana frontier question with the French Government by submitting it to the arbitration of the Swiss Government; and we also had recourse to the arbitration of His Majesty the King of Italy in the settlement of a dispute with the British Government.

Accordingly, arbitration in our country is a traditional practice and not a mere theory. We have always been enthusiastic supporters of the pacific settlement of international disputes and of the establishment of peace by organised judicial means.

It is on these lines, with these pacific aims, that Brazil, whatever future position she may hold in the League, and whatever her relations with individual countries, will pursue her international policy. I proclaimed these intentions on behalf of my Government at the memorable meeting of the Fifth Pan-American Conference at Santiago de Chile to which my friend M. Bello-Codesido referred this morning.

The primary aim of my country's international policy is to live at peace with all the peoples of the earth and to draw ever closer the bonds of friendship which unite us with our American brothers.

M. HENNINGS (Sweden) [Translation]: After the statements that have been made by almost all my colleagues, I feel it my duty to add a few brief remarks on the main question before us.

The Swedish Government has always sought to co-operate loyally in the League's work in connection with the reduction and limitation of armaments. I think I may even claim that interest in this question, which is so vital to the future of humanity, is nowhere greater than in the country which I have the honour to represent.
Sweden has quite recently effected a considerable reduction — about 30 per cent — in her armaments budget, and I entirely agree with M. de Brouckère’s very apposite remark that Governments should be given every encouragement to pursue this path and voluntarily restrict their armaments.

At the same time my Government is of opinion that individual effort — if I may use that term in speaking of States — is not enough, but that it is also desirable to obtain treaty undertakings of as general a nature as possible with a view to the reduction of armaments. The Swedish Government was therefore delighted to receive an invitation from this Commission, and it attaches particular importance to the discussions which are now taking place. My Government is all the more anxious that the work of this Commission should be definitely successful, because it is profoundly convinced that — as Lord Cecil so truly said — a reduction of armaments is in itself one of the main guarantees of a State’s security and is one of the best ways of creating an atmosphere of mutual confidence. I am also inclined to believe that the guarantees established by the Covenant and other international agreements already in existence may furnish us with a basis for accomplishing at least the first stage towards more complete disarmament, although I fully recognise that account must be taken of the especially exposed position of certain States.

Several speakers, and in particular M. de Brouckère in his admirable speech yesterday, have laid stress on the importance of abolishing certain particularly cruel and dangerous features of modern warfare. I need not tell you that my Government will gladly and wholeheartedly welcome any proposal of this kind.

I hope, however, that the Commission will not be content to study this aspect of the question only but that our work will result in proposals for the reduction of all limitable armaments. Only by adopting that policy can we show public opinion anything tangible as the outcome of our work, anything which will be clearly reflected in that most unpopular document of our time — the taxation form.

In these circumstances I can only agree with Lord Cecil, who, in concluding his speech this morning, urged the Commission once it has received the technical opinion of our Sub-Commission, to abandon once and for all the field of general discussion and take some definite step towards the reduction of armaments.

With regard to the question raised just now by Mr. Gibson, namely, whether such a step should or should not take the form of a draft convention, I think that sooner or later such a draft will have to be prepared. What remains to be considered is whether we should proceed in two stages — that is to say, whether we should first establish a formula to serve as a basis for a convention and then proceed to frame the convention itself or whether it would be better, once the purely preparatory work is concluded, to proceed directly to draft the convention.

M. De Marinis (Italy) [Translation]: I feel I must say a few words about the control referred to to-day. The question of international control has often been dealt with by the League and has called forth serious objections from certain delegates. With my usual frankness which remains undaunted even when I feel that I am perhaps running counter to the opinions of colleagues who honour me with their sympathy and friendship, I will tell you that public opinion in my country is against control. Personally, I fully share that view. The idea of control is very attractive on paper, and at first sight it seems to offer complete and wholly satisfactory guarantees. In practice, however, this is not so, and the possible disadvantages and dangers of applying it greatly outweigh any advantages it may offer. We must trust countries when they undertake to observe the pacts they have signed. If a country is suspected of bad faith, you may be sure that country can quite easily render any control illusory and ineffective. As a soldier, I have very definite views on this question, and I can support them with examples.

How could this control be applied in practice, since it amounts to a definite avowal of mistrust of the country which has to submit to it?

To be really useful, the control must cover the whole economic life and, more especially, the industrial life, of the country. If a country is suspected of bad faith, you know perfectly well that the places it would be most useless to supervise would be barracks and military stores. On the other hand, every corner of the producing factories and their entire plant would have to be examined, and a special service would have to be organised to search for hidden war material, etc. All these researches would probably reveal nothing, but they would certainly lead to friction and bad feeling — in a word, an atmosphere of misunderstanding and resentment would be created.

In endeavouring to serve the cause of peace, we might engender friction, which might become exceedingly dangerous, and we should submit peoples to tests which I fear they would be most unwilling to undergo.

In consequence, the steps taken would be technically ineffective and would give rise to practical difficulties and create the risk of wounding susceptibilities which after all are very natural and which I think we should be wrong to disregard. That, Gentlemen, is what would result from organised international control.

At this moment, when we are about to inaugurate the work of disarmament, when we are attempting to find what formula and what preliminary steps would be acceptable to all; when we are still at the opening pages, as it were, of the new chapter which we wish to write in the history of international life, we are already thinking of our closing words; we are trying to organise control in all countries — a matter which ought to be left till the final stage.
This method does not seem to me the best. It would, I think, be far wiser to go slowly, to proceed stage by stage, and postpone the question of control until we have obtained experience from the measures we adopt, until we see the results of their application and find out what must be done to improve them and whether it will ultimately be necessary, for purposes of supervision, to carry them out to the full.

May I add a few words regarding the work of the Drafting Committee? I rather think we may be going beyond the limits of the task which, for the present at least, is the only one that has been set us. If you will allow me, I will read you a resolution of the Council which provided for the constitution of this Commission, and in virtue of which the delegates of certain countries not belonging to the League of Nations, and whom we are all glad and honoured to see among us, were invited to join us. These resolutions will be found in the document entitled: “List of Questions to be considered by the Preparatory Commission (Report of M. Benes, adopted by the Council on December 12th, 1925) :


“(3) To convene a meeting of this Commission on February 15th, 1926, at Geneva, in order that it may be duly constituted and that it may engage in a preliminary exchange of views regarding the accompanying list of questions, and may refer, if necessary, to the Technical Commissions attached to it the examination of the military and economic aspects of the questions which it has to consider.”

As you all know, the date of the meeting was postponed from February 15th. Thus, for the moment at any rate, we are not asked to frame schemes and drafts for the International Conference. According to the Council’s decision we are only required to collect data, to make enquiries (which will be considered later in preparation for the programme of the Conference) and, for this purpose, to set the Technical Commissions to work.

M. PAUL-BONCOUR (France) [Translation]: Gentlemen, I have already ventured to regret the absence of a general discussion. I think that lack is now supplied, and in a very satisfactory manner. The discussion which has just taken place will enable our Drafting Committee to do a useful piece of work, which could not otherwise have been done. I hope it will be able to begin as soon as possible, and I am almost sorry to have to postpone for even a few minutes the moment when it can begin. In view, however, of the many statements which have been made this morning, it might cause some misunderstanding if I, too, did not express the views of my country on all these questions.

It was really the wording of Question V which led to this general discussion. It covers everything: “On what principle would it be possible to draw up a scale of armaments taking into account population, resources, geographical situation, maritime communications, railways . . . .”

In the dim and distant past, when I was engaged in studies which, had I continued them, might have launched me not where I am but into the company of the many distinguished sailors whom I see around me, it was the custom to put the classical problem in the form of a practical joke: “Calculate the age of the captain from the length of the vessel and the height of the mast.” Clearly, if we were to take the text in a literal sense, we might suppose that those who drafted the Questionnaire had submitted a similar problem to the Preparatory Commission; but that is not the case. The mathematical training of my friend de Brocckère has carried him a little too far on this point. I might even say that, if it were a question of proportion — and it is not — we should be obliged, in the case of several of these factors, to calculate the inverse proportion. We are all agreed that if the population of a country is to be one of the factors of disarmament, it would be in inverse proportion; otherwise we should be inflicting cruel injustice. There is, however, no question of mathematical proportion, whether inverse or direct.

But we must not be led, either in this question or in others, to pin our faith to mathematical scales. Not in that way shall we solve the armament question. The Questionnaire only includes these factors because they must be provided for in future conventions, in the independent proposals which nations will make and in the policy to be adopted by the other nations towards such proposals — in a word, they must be allowed for in whatever contract is concluded. That is their significance.

On the other hand, of course, a small country which has only a limited number of inhabitants and, in the event of attack, would only have an extremely small reserve of men, may quite legitimately require to take greater precautions. Similarly, countries with long and difficult maritime communications are certainly justified in maintaining a large fleet without incurring any charge of aggression. All those factors are not even technical in their nature; they are mere common sense. Still, although they may be so, none but the technical experts can define them. We must think that all we have to do in this matter, as in many others, is to refer the point to the technical organisations, and we cannot usefully discuss the question until they have completed their very difficult work.

Nevertheless, there is in Question V, which merely enumerates factors, one matter which is on a different plane and of a different kind. It is essentially a political matter, and we alone are qualified to deal with it, we alone can give the technical organisations the necessary guidance; and if they were to meet without our having exchanged views and given them this guidance by means of a formula which our Drafting Committee will provide for us, if we were to set the technical organisations to work without informing them of our views, we should be wasting their time, and I am afraid we should have begun our work on entirely wrong lines. I refer to No. 8 of paragraph (a) “The degree of security which in the event of aggression a
State could receive under the provisions of the Covenant or of separate engagements contracted towards that State . And I would also include the corollary paragraph (b), which puts the question: " Can the reduction of armaments be promoted by examining possible means for ensuring that the mutual assistance, economic and military, contemplated in Article 16 of the Covenant, shall be brought quickly into operation as soon as an act of aggression has been committed?"

As Lord Cecil very rightly said, this question obviously cannot be answered by a simple " Yes " or " No" ; if the answer is " Yes", the technical military and economic organisations must be told upon what bases they are to work and what plans we are expecting from them.

These two paragraphs, then, following upon the enumeration of factors of varying importance, have led to, and also explain, the very general discussion which is taking place on this point. It constitutes, in point of fact, the necessary link between security and disarmament.

Undoubtedly many States — certainly the country which I have the honour to represent — are only here because our work is based upon this fundamental principle, which has been enunciated again and again in Assembly resolutions, and links together the three conceptions: arbitration, security and disarmament.

Where does this chain of thought lead to? To dreams? No, for if we believed in our heart of hearts that this was nothing but a dream and a hallucination, it would be our duty to abandon our work as hypocritical and contemptible. This is not a dream, not a hallucination. Our final goal, the climax of this thought, its most complete expression, is — to use the words spoken this morning by the German delegate — that there must not, shall not, be any future war between one State and another, between one group of States and another; there cannot, there must not, be any war other than a war waged by the League of Nations against a State guilty of aggression. You know all that that connotes. It does not simply mean that the State attacked will have the purely moral satisfaction of receiving all the League's encouragement and sympathy, and that the League, after deciding who is the aggressor, will look with a favourable eye upon the efforts made by the victim to escape from the latter's grip. It means that all the States Members of the League will employ their whole economic, military, naval and air forces to help the country attacked; it means such a degree of assistance that security is assured through the obvious disparity between the forces which any single State can muster and the combined forces of all the States Members of the League.

What form can this complete chain, as I have just defined it, assume?

It can take two forms, and my country has given its unqualified support to both. The first arose immediately after the war when the world was still reeling under the blows of the struggle. It was the formula which the strong yet subtle mind of M. Léon Bourgeois, whom none of us here will ever forget, proposed at the Hotel Crillon. He demanded that the League should have an international force at its disposal: he declared, with that passion for logic for which we are sometimes blamed but which is, I submit, only the outcome of clear-mindedness, that the League could only ensure the execution of its decisions if it were backed by an international force. That formula was rejected, for reasons that are quite intelligible. The proposal was prompted by an extreme passion for logic, and indeed its aim may, nay, ought to be our own final aim — to ask the nations to accomplish an act of international faith by sacrificing in what is the most direct expression of their sovereignty, their national forces. France gave way.

The second and more elastic proposal, which at one time was almost accepted, was that, while each State would be left in possession of its own forces, it would undertake, in certain specified ways, to place these forces at the disposal of any State which, either by arbitral means or by the League itself, was declared the victim of an attack. That conception first found expression in that Treaty of Mutual Assistance in which Lord Cecil, M. de Jouvenel and Colonel Réquin, who is still helping me to-day, lent such valuable aid. That Treaty was a finished, complete and, I think, practical piece of work. My country accepted it without reservation; the military and naval staffs and commanders accepted it too. But it was ultimately rejected. It was then re-fashioned and given the still more plastic form of the Protocol, which many of those here present helped to prepare in September 1924, and which, I am sure, has left indelible memories in the hearts of many. France was the first to sign the Protocol. It was ratified by the Committee for Foreign Affairs unanimously and without distinction of party.

But the Protocol too was rejected, and, as you know, those who rejected it had sound reasons, or at any rate had their reasons, for rejecting it. That is enough. It is a condition of our collaboration that we never criticise any decision that a State takes in virtue of its sovereignty. I only mention the matter in order to show that every scheme which has been framed for the general organisation of security — and which is therefore calculated to lead to general disarmament — has been accepted by France; and she is ready to do so still. On the present occasion, however, we are dealing with realities: the general security resulting from the precise organisation of an international pact: comprising, therefore, precise obligations which will allow any State whatever to say to itself if attacked: " I am certain that in such and such a form, within such and such a time, and to such an extent, I shall be helped by the States Members of the League to which I belong. " If there is no organisation of this kind, there can obviously be no question of total or general disarmament. However, we are here; and for our own part we are here with the firm intention to achieve success. Nay, more: we are here, and able — to employ those words of mine which M. de Brouckére was good enough to quote yesterday: " each placing on the table whatever he can contribute towards the reduction of armaments " — able, I say, to point to the considerable reductions.
we have already made and the still greater reduction we are ready to make under an international contract which should be the outcome of our work.

Note that relative and partial security implies relative and partial disarmament. The connection between the two is so close that the same epithets apply, and, in order to ascertain what reductions and disarmament are consistent with actual facts, we are compelled to consider the nature and extent of the security which the different States, and principally, alas! the European States, at present enjoy.

We are gathered here because there are to-day certain guarantees of security which, while I would neither overestimate nor undervalue them, did not exist yesterday, and which have consequently made our present work possible. There are the Locarno agreements — which cover a number of countries, and among them those most immediately concerned with the question before us — and there is also the Covenant of the League itself. I am firmly convinced that, if certain and complete security is to be attained, the Covenant needs those precise definitions which we have so earnestly sought for during past years; nevertheless, such as it is, it exists. It constitutes vague and wide but unquestionably just obligations, which have been properly observed by all those who signed them. The Covenant exists and has had its effects. We have had many recent examples of that, and I am greatly indebted to the smaller nations — and when I speak of "smaller" nations, they will understand that I speak in no disparaging sense quite the contrary; I am greatly indebted to the smaller nations, both those which are represented here and those which are not, for setting an example in regard to the Covenant and its arbitration which the larger States, let us hope, will follow.

It is the League’s privilege to create, on the initiative of the Great Powers, a jurisprudence which they themselves will one day be obliged to adopt.

We must remember, then, that the Covenant exists.

In order, however, to strengthen this very necessary bond, which is, as you realise, the whole object of my appeal, we must agree upon one point; namely, that the Covenant requires definition. The idea of possible aggression, even if it is a mistaken one — and it very often is mistaken — is an element of rivalry in armaments. Europe succumbed to these rivalries and, if she continued to experience them, she would perish. The possibility of being attacked, the feeling that measures of defence must be increased in order to ward off a possible attack, must yield to the material and moral certainty that aggression is no longer possible, so that each of us may come to the final act with enthusiasm, without haggling or chicanery, making really large reductions, if not achieving that total disarmament which the world is earnestly hoping to see.

But for this to be possible we must admit that the Covenant requires certain definitions. There are nations which for geographical or historical reasons may be exposed to attack; on this point I appeal in all sincerity to the big maritime nations which are protected by the very elements themselves to realise the state of mind (it may be mistaken, and I agree it often is, but it is psychologically inevitable) in which continental nations live, especially those whose history, politics and geography have not secured them from the dangers of important conflicts. I beg the big maritime States to appreciate this attitude of mind and to realise that continental nations cannot obtain the guarantee they expect until they are sure of two things. The first is that the process of determining the aggressor shall not be unduly slow. At those tragic crises, when days are hours and hours minutes, such countries must know that the organ working here in Geneva is working well, that the machinery is in good order, that it will operate quickly and determine immediately who is the attacked and who the attacker. That this may be possible, we must openly admit the necessity of defining the Covenant more closely. The rule of unanimity which guarantees the sovereignty of the different States which make up the League must be maintained, but on the other hand it is necessary to introduce certain amendments of a juridical nature which will give States an assurance that the aggressor will be determined without hesitation and in the shortest possible time.

Then there is another point. Once the question of aggression has been settled, the State attacked must be able to count upon the speedy assistance, economic and military, promised by the Covenant. This is the express intention of the last two paragraphs of Question V, and it is on this point that precise instructions must be given to our technical organisations.

We cannot revert indirectly to texts which have been rejected by sovereign Powers. We cannot refashion, even piecemeal, a protocol which certain States found it impossible to accept; nor is there any question of asking them to give in advance those detailed undertakings which in my opinion would have been essential to provide complete security; but, while strictly adhering to the engagements contained in the Covenant, we must seek practical and positive methods of appealing for this assistance so that it may be given in time. It will, I agree, depend on the discretion and the good faith of the signatories of the Covenant, but we must begin by determining the methods of employing it, the precise methods by which it may be rendered, if we are to achieve any real reduction of armaments, if we are to create that atmosphere of genuine security which the signature of the final act will bring us.

I think that all this constitutes an abundance of useful work for our technical organisations, which are indeed admirably equipped for the purpose. I am sure that if we refer for their consideration to the text we have been discussing since yesterday, they will be able to furnish us with details as to the methods and machinery in question. We are not creating any fresh undertaking which is not in the Covenant: we are only seeking to make the execution of these undertakings practicable and speedy.

And this brings us back to the essential question of procedure with which we are faced in the case of each of the questions, and also to the question raised by Mr. Gibson, with the
practical common sense so characteristic of the great American republic. What is the Drafting Committee to do?

I think that, as M. de Marinis pointed out just now, the task before us is very clearly defined by the mission entrusted to us by the Council of the League. The Council realised that there could be no useful discussion, or rather proposals, until the technical organisations had first performed a piece of work which has not yet been performed and which could not be performed until the present discussion had been held, since the technical organisations can only execute the instructions given them by this Commission: and we had to meet in order to give these instructions, which indeed form the very essence of our work.

Lord Cecil proposed just now that when the technical organisations have completed the necessary work, the Drafting Committee should meet again to consider the results. May I be allowed to reserve my opinion on this point until we have exchanged views with the Drafting Committee itself? I am strongly in favour of this method, because otherwise the Preparatory Commission would not have re-met except to discuss proposals which had already begun to take shape.

I am wondering — and I shall be only too glad to explain my reasons to Lord Cecil and my colleagues — whether the Drafting Committee would not be exceeding its powers by this procedure. The Drafting Committee does not represent the whole of the Preparatory Commission. Its functions, like those of the technical organisations, are those of an executive body whose duty it is to find formulas for the views and opinions expressed in the Preparatory Commission. The technical organisations cannot supply these directions, nor ought they to do so. Their duties must remain purely technical. I consider — I might say I fear, since your method would be far quicker — that the Preparatory Commission must itself decide on the directions, opinions and concrete proposals which the Drafting Committee will reproduce in exact formulas. We shall discuss this matter again in the Drafting Committee. I only wish to explain to you why I cannot yet take a final decision on this point.

That, Gentlemen, is all I have to say. On this question I desired in all sincerity, and I hope without hurting anyone's feelings, to indicate the exact position of my country, and also, I think, of more than one of the countries represented here, especially the Continental States, who are anxious, nay, determined, to achieve something tangible, something substantial. This work must necessarily be accomplished in an atmosphere free from memories and fears such as is inevitably created by a discussion of questions of this kind, but we should like to be free at least from the fear that the reductions agreed on may one day prove a national danger.

During the discussion of these questions, and in consequence of all the factors they comprise, we have considered many problems, but I do not wish to dwell on them. I think that the general discussion is closed, or is about to be closed, and that we are ready for the work of the Drafting Committee. I will only venture to add this one remark. M. de Brouckère said yesterday, in an admirable speech which revealed his sound qualities of heart and mind: "Let us at least do what is most urgent and try to avert one deadly peril to mankind and to civilisation, namely, chemical warfare." The German delegate repeated those words this morning. I should like to point out that the League and the States represented in it have done their duty: the League has performed its part in this matter.

I beg you not to forget the discussions we held last year at almost the same time of the year. If I am not mistaken, in this same room, during the Conference on the Traffic in Arms and Ammunition. Those discussions were of great importance. It is surely a disgrace to civilisation that commerce should go so far as sometimes to profit by the traffic in arms against its own country for purely commercial ends. We have erected a solid edifice, a convention on the traffic in arms, which does not put a stop to the reduction of armaments, but which is nevertheless the first step towards reduction. That reduction, with all due respect to my neighbour M. de Marinis, would, I think, be difficult to contemplate without some suitable form of control. That, however, belongs to the morrow, and we will not talk of it to-day. If the traffic in arms continues, you will realise the gap that will be formed in our work.

The first step was taken last year, but that step must be confirmed. With regard to the Convention on the Traffic in Arms, my country, which did not come here empty-handed, has done its duty. On May 9th, that Convention was ratified by the President of the French Republic, and we shall notify this ratification as soon as a certain number of producing Powers have also ratified it. The work we are doing here cannot be completed until the Governments have also done their share. Having raised this question, I desired to explain what my country is doing. The Convention will not be put into force until a certain number of States mentioned in the Convention itself have also ratified it.

We have spoken of chemical warfare. May I add that we might also, I am sorry to say, have spoken of bacteriological warfare? For until we have completed our task, there can be no fresh advance in science which cannot be made to serve a deadly purpose.

I shall not forget, too, that something has already been done, and that last year, in this very room, at this very time. While we were discussing the traffic in arms, the United States delegate, Mr. Burton, spoke on the subject of chemical warfare. We appreciated Mr. Burton's many weeks' co-operation, just as we appreciate Mr. Gibson's collaboration with us this year — as indeed we always appreciate working with the delegates of the great Republic of the United States when they are good enough to seek our company, raised the question of chemical warfare.
He proposed the Protocol against gases, and immediately the representatives of several nations, including my own, rose to say that they entirely agreed with the delegate of the United States, who, be it mentioned, was making that proposal in the name of the President of the United States himself. We signed that Protocol against gases. France also has just ratified it, and it only awaits the necessary ratifications by other States to take its place among international agreements.

So you see, Gentlemen, that, after all, we are not inaugurating anything absolutely new. We are proceeding slowly but surely on our way, and we shall arrive at the end of our present journey all the more safely if we can exercise the necessary patience. We are covering a series of stages which will one day lead us to that still distant goal which I mentioned when I rose to speak and to which I point again at the close.

The President [Translation]: If, as I hope, the general discussion is closed, I propose that we should not meet in full session to-morrow but request the members of the Drafting Committee to hold a meeting to-morrow morning at ten.

We shall probably know to-morrow afternoon when the Preparatory Commission can next meet to receive the Drafting Committee's Report.

(The meeting rose at 6.35 p.m.)

EIGHTH MEETING (PUBLIC)

Held on Tuesday, May 25th, 1926, at 6 p.m.

President : M. LOUDON (Netherlands).


The President [Translation]: Since our last plenary meeting the Drafting Committee has met several times under my presidency, and you will find the result of its work in M. de Brouckère's report, which was distributed to you this afternoon (Annex VII). Most of the delegates did not receive this report until very late. We very much regret this mishap, but I hope that will not prevent us from beginning to discuss it.

M. COMNÈNE (Roumania) [Translation]: It is a fact that most of the delegates only had a few minutes to acquaint themselves with the report. I think that I shall not be alone in expressing the opinion that it is impossible to do any useful work or to take part in the discussion to any purpose and with any knowledge of the matter in hand. I therefore propose the adjournment of this meeting until this evening or to-morrow morning.

M. ERICH (Finland) [Translation]: I agree with M. Comnène and support his proposal.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire): I think M. Comnène's motion is reasonable, and I suggest we should immediately agree to it. The only doubt in my mind is whether to have an adjournment at once. If the Rapporteur has any explanations to give about the report, it might be a good thing for him to make those explanations this evening; we could then adjourn until to-morrow morning at ten o'clock. I do not think it would be a good thing for us to continue this evening, because I feel we should have a really serious opportunity of discussing the report. In that I entirely agree with the representative of Roumania. I hope nobody will find anything startlingly revolutionary in the report, but I think everyone should have an opportunity of examining it before being asked to make any statement upon it.

M. DE BROUCKÈRE (Rapporteur) [Translation]: This report was discussed at length in the Drafting Committee. Every word of it has been well weighed, and it marks a unanimous agreement. I think that it is beyond the limits of my duty to make any comments upon it, since I might fail to interpret our common views with sufficient accuracy. I therefore think that the only thing I could do would be to read the report itself if the members of the Commission feel that this would serve any useful purpose.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire): I think it would be a very good thing to have the report read through and then we could see what it contained. There might be some points arising out of it to which some member of the Commission might like to refer.

The President [Translation]: I desire to draw your attention to the document which has just been distributed (Annex VIII) and which is to be inserted at the beginning of the report in place of the first paragraph, which is intended for the Commission and not for the Council.

M. DE BROUCKÈRE (Rapporteur) read the preamble and Section 1 of his report.

M. MARKOVITCH (Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) [Translation]: The wording of Section 1 does not seem to me quite clear. I do not understand the meaning of the words
"that the task entrusted to it by the Council should be undertaken on the understanding that every Government should have in view . . . ." On whose understanding — that of the Governments, the Commission or the Sub-Commissions?

Pursuing the same train of thought, I should like to know whether all the Governments are requested to submit definite proposals or are they only recommended to do so? In the latter case, I should be glad if the wording could be made more clear.

M. DE BROUCKÈRE (Rapporteur) [Translation]: M. Markovitch's doubts will be quickly removed if he will read the few lines of introduction to the report. Our duty was to prepare questions which had then to be examined by the Sub-Commissions.

The Sub-Commissions are called upon to do experts' work, but naturally the form their labours will assume must depend upon the object in view. We therefore desired to explain to them why they were being asked to undertake such work.

Interpreting — accurately I hope — the discussion which took place here, the Committee agreed to state that the concrete result to be attained on the termination of our work, would be to persuade each Government to consider certain proposals for the reduction of armaments. This statement was expressed by the sentence: "the Preparatory Commission considers that the task entrusted to it by the Council should be undertaken on the understanding that every Government should have in view for the proposed Conference for the preparation of a disarmament agreement, definite and quantitative proposals accompanied by reasons in support calculated with reference to the degree of security existing at the date when the Conference meets."

M. MARKOVITCH (Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) [Translation]: I do not wish to prolong the discussion on a question of drafting. At the same time it seems to me rather curious not to define an idea on which all are agreed. According to the explanation given by the Belgian delegate it seems to have been agreed that the final result of the work should be expressed as follows: "every Government should be requested to submit definite proposals, accompanied by reasons . . . ."

I should now like to know whether the recommendation is addressed to Sub-Commission A or whether it constitutes the result of the work of our Commission.

M. DE BROUCKÈRE (Rapporteur) [Translation]: I thought I said just now that the recommendation is made in view of the work of the Sub-Commissions, and is necessary in order that the latter may be aware of the nature of the work they have to undertake.

If you will allow me to make a general observation, I will add that we are seen to be altering the decision we reached a few minutes ago. We had agreed to adjourn the discussion. The explanations asked for are beginning to take the form of amendments, and I am not sure whether it would be wise to make amendments in the text before we are completely acquainted with the report. If we make alterations at the very beginning, we run the risk of their being at variance with the text that follows. I think it would be better to acquaint ourselves with the report. We can make any alterations which may be necessary, when we have read the whole report and when we have reached an agreement on the observations submitted.

The President [Translation]: As M. de Brouckère proposes, I think it would be better first of all to conclude the reading of the report.

M. MARKOVITCH (Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) [Translation]: I had no intention whatever of proposing any amendment; I simply desired certain explanations with regard to the meaning of Section 1.

M. DE BROUCKÈRE (Rapporteur) finished reading his report.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire): I want to reply to the point raised a few moments ago by the delegate of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. My understanding of paragraph 1 is that it means this: The Drafting Committee thought that any examination of proposals for disarmament must begin by each country setting forth what it thought were the armaments necessary for it, and therefore it would be well to state at the very outset that the whole enquiry would proceed on the assumption that such statements would be made. That is certainly the meaning of the English text. I cannot speak with authority as to the French text, but the English text says quite definitely: " . . . on the understanding that every Government should have in view for the proposed Conference for the preparation of a disarmament agreement, definite and quantitative proposals accompanied by reasons . . . ." It was not so much a recommendation as a statement of what the Drafting Committee believed this Commission might lay down as a necessary preliminary to any enquiry into the disarmament question for the purposes of the final Conference.

M. MARKOVITCH (Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) [Translation]: After listening to the explanations given by the British delegate and after glancing again at the English text, I note that there is a difference of wording between the English and French texts. It would, I think, be well to make this point clear.

I suggest that we should not discuss the details of the report at this juncture (because if we did we should have to go into the substance of the questions), but to postpone discussion until to-morrow. There are certain questions I should like to ask, but, if I put them now, I fear I should be blamed for going into the matter too deeply.
As soon as the present discussion is concluded, I should like to ask the President another question regarding the second item on our agenda.

The President [Translation]: If everyone agrees, we might adjourn this discussion.

This proposal was approved.


The President [Translation]: The delegates of the Hungarian and Greek Governments have each forwarded to us a rather lengthy memorandum which has just been printed. These documents will be distributed to you to-morrow.

Nevertheless, if the authors of these memoranda desire to speak on the subject, I will request them to do so now.

M. DENDRANIS (Greece) [Translation]: I am instructed by my Government to submit to you a memorandum on the question before your meeting, namely, disarmament. As this document will be distributed to each of you, there is no need for me to read it, but I venture to accompany its distribution with a few remarks. None of these remarks will be new to you, but I hope you will appreciate their intention and expediency.

First of all, I wish to assure you that my Government is, as you are probably aware, extremely glad to note the efforts now being made to obtain disarmament. My Government and the whole Greek nation wish you every success. I am happy to be able to assure you that Greece will do everything in her power to assist the work of the Commission, which recommends itself to the Greek people because its ideals are so lofty, because it promises to confer such immense benefits on mankind, and because it calls for unanimous good-will. The object in view is magnificent, but the difficulties are many and serious.

I need hardly say that the Greek Government is extremely anxious to reduce the crushing financial burden which weighs upon our people, as upon all others. You can therefore rely upon its absolutely sincere and effective collaboration. This is a fact that can be counted upon in advance; it is a solid truth which will not be shaken by the following considerations, for these considerations apply not to the urgent need for disarmament, but only to the conditions without which disarmament would be practically impossible — in other words: security.

No country anxious for its security will ever consent to sacrifice its means of defence unless it obtains some practical and adequate protection against all danger of attack and aggression. In the very nature of things, Greece is pre-eminently a State which must subordinate all disarmament to absolute security, guaranteed in a practical manner.

The Greek Government considers that in order to obtain general disarmament, it would be necessary to adopt the following means:

1. Groups should be formed of countries linked by special treaties of security and mutual assistance under the auspices and under the immediate supervision of the League of Nations, as complementary to the Covenant;

2. A gradual, fair and properly proportioned reduction of armaments might be carried out.

This line of action we think might lead to general disarmament which is essential for the peace of the world.

We feel bound to emphasise the word "general", because there are some countries which are not Members of the League and which might conceivably not feel bound to submit to any decisions which the League might take, and also because of the position, in that event, of the countries bordering upon them, which might be disarming at the very moment when their neighbour was doing the reverse.

As regards the economic and military assistance contemplated in Article 16 of the Covenant, we regard this as being one of the most important points and one of the most effective means of ensuring a considerable and approximately general reduction of armaments.

In our opinion it is the only way to inspire that confidence and sense of security upon which disarmament entirely depends.

If, however, that confidence and sense of security are to be firm and untroubled, we think that a complete scheme of action and financial and economic assistance for an attacked country should be drawn up in advance, on the following lines:

1. Determine the armed forces to be sent to the aid of the country attacked;

2. Determine the financial and economic assistance to be given;

3. Determine the exact measure in which each State should contribute either armed forces or material and funds for this assistance;

4. Determine the time-limit within which the armed forces sent to assist should arrive on the field in order to prevent the risk of a serious attack and to spare the attacked country such general and local disorders as might result from such an attack;

5. Draw up a complete and clear plan of operations, having regard to the special circumstances of each country and the possibilities of attack;

6. Contemplate the possibility of a State which was expected to contribute assistance failing for some reason to fulfil its obligations in time or to fulfil them at all, and

As the Hungarian Government withdrew its memorandum on June 3rd, 1926, this is not included in the Annexes.
decide upon the immediate measures to be taken to make good the loss due to such
defection or inability;

7. Regard as null and void all treaties of alliance or special conventions existing
with the attacking country;

8. Assuming that the attack was premeditated and came as a surprise, the attacker
having collected the forces needed for an invasion, it would be doubtful whether the
assistance arranged for could be brought into operation in time to prevent such invasion.
In this eventuality (a highly probable one):

(a) The country attacked should be assisted as speedily as possible and all
the measures contemplated in Article 16 of the Covenant should be carried out
without delay;

(b) An ultimatum should be sent through the League of Nations to the attack-
ing country calling upon it to withdraw its troops at once and unconditionally, and
to grant the attacked country an indemnity to be fixed on the basis of an estimate
of the damage done;

(c) Hostilities should not cease, nor pressure upon the attacker be withdrawn,
until he has complied with the terms of the ultimatum and indemnified the country
attacked, and

(d) If the armed forces sent for this purpose prove insufficient, they should
be reinforced without delay, so as to compel the attacking country to accept
the League's conditions.

If these assumptions could be so realised as to inspire a sense of security and absolute
confidence, there could, we think, be no justification for any State refusing under such cir-
cumstances to reduce its armaments to a minimum.

Notwithstanding her precarious geographical situation, the great length of her frontiers,
the almost total destruction of her armaments during the recent wars, Greece would be most
happy to find herself free to employ all her revenue in works and for purposes of peace, for
the comfortable settlement of her refugees and for her internal development. She would
like to reduce all her armaments to a minimum without delay and without reservation; but,
before doing so, she must have that sense of security, she must believe, she must have absolute
confidence in those to whom she entrusts her independence, the integrity of her territory
and her whole future existence.

Under those conditions she would immediately have reduced all her armaments with a
genuine and profound sense of relief.

Mr. President, I thank you for your kind attention, and express my most sincere hope
that the work and efforts of this Conference will be crowned with entire success.

The President [Translation]: I thank M. Dendramis for his communication and will
call upon the Hungarian representative to speak.

General TANCZOS (Hungary) [Translation]: On May 19th I had the honour to submit
to the Preparatory Commission, through its President, a memorandum on disarmament, which
will be distributed to the members of the Commission to-morrow. For the moment I only
desire to inform you that this memorandum explains and summarises the Hungarian attitude
towards the problem of disarmament. It has been prepared with all the care which the
question calls for, and if perhaps it is a little lengthy, that simply emphasises the importance
which my country attaches to the solution of this problem.

As so much time has already elapsed, I wrote to the President yesterday a letter which
you have before you asking the Commission to refer this memorandum to Sub-Commissions
A and B with a request that they should report on it to the Preparatory Commission. I beg
you to agree to this proposal.

The President [Translation]: I thank the Hungarian representative for his communica-
tion.

M. BUERO (Uruguay) [Translation]: I merely wish to obtain a ruling on a certain point.
After hearing the interesting statements of the Greek and Hungarian representatives, I
venture to draw your attention to a passage of the Council resolution of December 12th, 1925,
which reads as follows:

" Any State not represented on the Commission shall be entitled :
" (a) To submit memoranda on matters in which it is specially interested ;
" (b) To be heard in support of these memoranda."

The following lines, however, say ;

" Moreover, the Commission will always have the right, in the case of special ques-
tions, to call in the assistance of any State which in the opinion of the Commission may
be particularly interested in these questions."

It would seem that the representatives of Greece and Hungary were heard in virtue of
paragraph 1, which I have just read; I think, however, that it would be very desirable if
they could sit with us on the Commission. Here, then, is the actual point I wish to raise. Does
the Commission consider that the right given by the Council to " call in the assistance, in the
case of special questions, of any State which, in the opinion of the Commission, may be parti-
cularly interested in these questions " can also be claimed by the Sub-Commissions ? I will
ask the full Commission to give a ruling on this subject.
The President [Translation]: I think I can reply to M. Buero's question at once and in the affirmative. The same document says (Chapter III, No. 5): "The authority referred to in sub-paragraphs 3 and 4 above is accorded to any sub-committees which it may establish within itself", and under No. 4: "It may also summon and hear any persons whose special qualifications are calculated to facilitate its work on a given subject.

Accordingly, I do not think there can be any possible doubt in the matter.

M. Buero (Uruguay) [Translation]: The paragraphs mentioned seem to me to differentiate. One says: "It may also summon and hear any persons whose special qualifications are calculated to facilitate its work on a given subject", and the other says: "Moreover, the Commission will always have the right, in the case of special questions, to call in the assistance of any State which, in the opinion of the Commission, may be particularly interested in these questions.

There is a difference between calling in a person's assistance and obtaining his opinion. "Calling in assistance" is an active thing, not excluding initiative on the part of the person called, whereas "hearing" is quite a different matter.

I am making a special point of this question in order that there may be no difficulty when the Sub-Commissions meet.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire): I think the distinction is fairly clear. The Commission is composed of representatives of States, and it would therefore be quite right for it to be given (as it has been given) power to call in the assistance of any State. On the other hand, it would be wrong to give a sub-committee the power to call in the assistance of States. Sub-Commissions consist of individuals and not of States. They could not therefore call in the assistance of a State. It is right that they should be allowed to call in the assistance of any individual who can help them, however; and that is the power which has been given to them. Paragraph 4 of heading III on page 46 of Document C.P.D.1 says: "It may also summon and hear any persons whose special qualifications are calculated to facilitate its work on a given subject". That is more than simply hearing them; it is hearing them with a view to facilitating its work. I think that gives reasonable powers to the Sub-Commissions to hear anyone, whether as representing a State or a particular interest or as having special qualifications, if they think consultation with him will assist their work.

The President [Translation]: Is M. Buero satisfied with this explanation?

M. Buero (Uruguay) [Translation]: Quite.

M. Markovitch (Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) [Translation]: The paragraph quoted by M. Buero lays down that "the Commission will always have the right, in the case of special questions, to call in the assistance of any State which in the opinion of the Commission may be particularly interested in these questions."

At the present stage in our work it seems to me that we cannot consider this possibility. We have not yet emerged from the period of general discussions. I should also like to make a proposal with reference to the Hungarian memorandum. I think we should apply the procedure adopted in the case of the Drafting Committee's report, that is to say, we should be allowed time to examine it and then, at a later meeting, with full knowledge of the contents, decide whether it should be referred to a Sub-Commission.

M. Veverka (Czechoslovakia) [Translation]: I should like to draw attention to the following passage in the letter from the Hungarian delegation:

"I must point out that the Hungarian memorandum deals mainly with technical military questions, but naturally touches in places on the military and political aspects of the general question of disarmament."

By the use of the word "naturally", General Tanczos has clearly expressed the inseparable connection between the political and economic elements and the military and technical aspects. In view of this connection I see no possibility of simply referring the memorandum to a sub-committee. We are here to give directions to the Sub-Commissions; I therefore support M. Markovitch's proposal.

M. Comnène (Roumania) [Translation]: I would venture to remind you that the usual procedure at international conferences at Geneva is never to examine a document until it has been submitted to the members of a Commission, in order that the latter may form an opinion as to its nature and contents. For that reason I support the proposals of my Serb-Croat-Slovene and Czechoslovak colleagues.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire): It is eminently reasonable that my colleagues should desire time to consider the documents put before them. At the same time, may I present this aspect of the case. Quite clearly the object of the scheme of this Commission is to take care that though representatives of certain States formed part of the Commission, yet all the Members of the League should have complete equality of access to the Commission and the same right of laying before the Commission, or its various organs, any information or any views it desired. As I understand, the Sub-Commissions appointed will have access to the proces-verbal of all our discussions, and it is obviously right that, if the representatives of Hungary and Greece had actually been members of this Commission, it would have been possible for them to make speeches in which they would have laid before the Commission everything they have put into their memoranda. In order, no doubt, to save the time of the
Commission, they have preferred to put those observations into writing and communicate them to the Commission. It seems to me, subject to what my colleagues may think, that these communications must be treated in the same way as the procès-verbaux of the discussions of this Commission, and the same treatment must be given to them as to the observations made *viva voce* by any member of this Commission. I do not wish to press for any decision to-night if my colleagues desire time for consideration, but it seems to me we could not do otherwise than send communications made to us by the States Members of the League to the Sub-Commission for information in the same way as they will have before them the proces-verbal of our discussions here. As an illustration, I might add that we had before us in the Drafting Committee a very interesting communication from the Serbian Government. We considered what should be done, and we all decided that it must be sent with the other papers as a matter of information to the Sub-Commissions for their consideration when dealing with the questions which those observations referred to. I do not think we can do otherwise than treat States which are not Members of this Commission on a perfect equality with the States which are actually represented here.

M. Markovitch (Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) [Translation]: I must apologise for reverting to the question, but I think there is a misunderstanding. If Hungary had been represented on the Preparatory Commission, we should have had the pleasure of hearing the arguments put forward and explained by her representative. We, in turn, should have been able to explain our views on any special points arising in the course of the Hungarian representative’s declarations. Such, however, was not the case, and the Hungarian representative has revealed himself of his absolutely legitimate right, which is not disputed by anyone, to submit a memorandum. He accompanied it by a statement, in which, as the Czechoslovak representative pointed out, he expressly declared that the memorandum touches on the political aspects of the question.

I therefore requested our President to allow us time to read the document before deciding to refer it to the Sub-Commissions. I appeal to the British delegate to agree with me that this is the only fair procedure, for it is the procedure which Lord Cecil himself applied in the case of the suggestion I submitted to the Drafting Committee. Lord Cecil was opposed to that suggestion, and, to quote the Minutes, he declared that "he hoped the Committee would not refer the documents without accepting the responsibility. It may, however, be agreed that the proposal of the Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation should be submitted by that delegation directly to Sub-Commission A".

M. Veverka (Czechoslovakia) [Translation]: I merely wish to make it quite clear that I do not for a moment dispute the right to submit a memorandum to this Commission, or to make a statement on the subject. I have simply pointed out that General Tanczos has himself warned us that this document had a certain political bearing, and this determined us to ask that the discussion should be postponed until to-morrow.

M. Comnène (Roumania) [Translation]: I must apologise for addressing the Commission once more. I thought the question was a very simple one. The Sub-Commissions are, it seems to me, offshoots of the full Commission. Hitherto, no question has ever been submitted direct to a Sub-Commission. The reasons for this are evident. Whatever the suggestion may be, the Sub-Commission can only examine it from its own particular technical aspect. How can it examine a question until we ourselves have examined it in full session, and afforded the Sub-Commission the necessary guidance? I seem to remember that at the first and second meetings of this Commission we discussed this question at some length and said that it would be better to examine every important problem in its general aspect, so that we could supply the Sub-Commissions with certain indications. How can we possibly offer any critical observations, or even state that we are in agreement with the views advanced by our friend, M. Dendramis, the Greek delegate, and by General Tanczos, when we are not even acquainted with the contents of their memoranda?

By to-morrow, however, we may — indeed I trust we shall be in a position to do so — formally state that we entirely agree with the suggestions contained in these memoranda. The documents in question will then assume quite a different character, and the Sub-Commissions will be able to examine them in the light of the statements made in this Commission which will perhaps record an agreement.

The President [Translation]: The Greek and Hungarian memoranda will be distributed to you, and, if you like, we will discuss them to-morrow afternoon.

20. Appointment of Chairmen for Sub-Commissions A and B.

The President [Translation]: We have decided that Sub-Commissions A and B shall each be presided over by one of the vice-presidents, but we have not decided which Sub-Commission each of these gentlemen is to preside over.

I propose that you appoint M. Cobian Chairman of Sub-Commission A, and M. Buero Chairman of Sub-Commission B.

(Adopted.)

M. Cobian (Spain) [Translation]: I beg to thank the President and the Commission for the great honour they are conferring upon me. I must ask the Commission and my friend
M. Buero, to accord me a favour. The work of Sub-Commission A will be long and difficult; I wonder whether M. Buero would be willing to help me in my duties as Chairman, and whether the Commission will authorise me to seek his assistance, in case I may have to leave Geneva.

M. BUERO (Uruguay) [Translation]: I will take the opportunity afforded me by M. Cobian's question to thank the Commission again for the honour they have conferred on me in electing me Chairman of one of these important Sub-Commissions. I must confess to you in all frankness and sincerity that the task seems beyond my powers. I accept the offer, however, with great pleasure, and I will do my best to fulfil my duties. My acceptance is prompted by the sympathy I have always had for this great institution and its work. For the last three years I have regularly attended the Assemblies of the League, and have even been among those who have criticised it; but I have every confidence in its work. It seems to me that all who, like myself, believe in the ideal of peace and international solidarity must give the League their full and unstinted aid. These words anticipate my reply to M. Cobian's request. Sub-Commission A is particularly difficult to preside over owing to the pre-eminently technical problems with which it deals. But if my presence can help, I have great pleasure in consenting in advance to assist my friend M. Cobian, and, if necessary, replace him, although I am perfectly sure that I shall but inadequately fill his place.

M. DE BROUCKÈRE (Rapporteur) [Translation]: In communicating my report to you I am afraid I was guilty of an omission: I forgot to mention that the report is supplemented by two Annexes. One will contain the documents transmitted to the Drafting Committee, such as the proposal by the Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation and the statement by the German delegation. The second Annex will consist of the whole of the Minutes of the Commission and of the Drafting Committee.

(The meeting rose at 7.50 p.m.)

NINTH MEETING (PUBLIC)

Held on Wednesday, May 26th, 1926, at 10.30 a.m.

President: M. LOUDON (Netherlands).


Section I.

M. COMNÈNE (Roumania) [Translation]: To say that my Government urgently desires the universal reduction of armaments is an obvious platitude. The pacific desires of the people whom I have the honour to represent are traditional. At the very dawn of her re-birth in 1879, at the Berlin Congress, Roumania claimed the privilege of disarmament and neutrality in order to avoid being drawn into the competition in armaments which was even then beginning. But, alas! her voice was unheeded. Last year once more, her chief representative — the Minister for Foreign Affairs — speaking from the platform of the League, even before Locarno, offered her neighbours a pact of non-aggression. It was a voice crying in the wilderness. Nevertheless, the Roumanian Government, steadfast to its purpose, has sent a large delegation to Geneva in order to offer a modest contribution to the work of this Commission. May I venture, with due respect but quite definitely, to express the regret felt by the Roumanian delegation — regret which, I would add, is shared by other delegations — that it has not been given an opportunity to participate effectively in all the work hitherto carried out. And yet I am convinced that all of us here, and the Governments we represent, are in duty bound, after all the blood that has been shed and the sufferings that our peoples have endured, to reach some definite and practical result.

Am I wholly satisfied with the results obtained by the very important Committee which we decided to call the Drafting Committee?

I come before you, as I always have done, determined to be frank, to abandon those vague, subtle and outworn formulas which are so repellent to young democracies. I desire to express what is felt by a nation of 18 millions, whose past history has been one long and mournful tragedy. I think the document submitted to us by M. de Brouckère is an admirable piece of work, excellent from more than one point of view, and I beg to offer my sincere congratulations both to him and to the members of that important body, the Drafting Committee. Nevertheless, I venture to make a few observations which the Commission will, I trust, think worthy of consideration.
I am glad to say that I have the support of an authority who will be questioned by none — I refer to the Secretary of State of the United States of America. A short time ago he made a public speech which we read in the Press. I have before me a version which, though not official, is at any rate semi-official. It contains certain passages which the present Commission will undoubtedly consider worthy of note. I refer to the following:

"The desire for further limitation of armaments is universal, but with that desire there is a most natural demand for security. We would not be candid with ourselves or just to others if we did not recognise the peculiarly fortunate situation of our own country in this respect. With our detached position and our geographical isolation from those areas of the world where conflicting territorial or political issues have led to the maintenance of large standing armies, we have been able to reduce our land forces from the more than 4,000,000 men under arms in 1918 to a present regular army of about 118,000 for the more than 118,000,000 of our own population and that of our overseas possessions. Thus, as regards land armament, we have voluntarily reduced to a minimum. We have every reason to rejoice that our situation has permitted this, but no justification for overlooking the different problems with which other countries are faced."

And further on he adds:

"Our people are practical idealists. They believe in dealing with what is visible and tangible."

Let us be idealists but let us follow the counsel of this illustrious American citizen and be practical as well.

Do you really think it possible to advise nations whose history has been one long martyrdom to divest themselves of that last minimum of security, afforded, in most cases, by armies which have been through the war and which are as a rule small and imperfectly equipped, without offering them anything in exchange? Frankly, I say that it is impossible, and I for one could never countenance a discussion on any scheme which did not make definite provision for those countries' security.

"Thus, point 2 states as follows: "In the present state of the world many Governments would be unable to accept the responsibility for a serious reduction of armaments unless they received for it something in exchange a satisfactory guarantee of the safety of their country." Would we not paraphrase the terms of Resolution XIV, using exactly the same expression, if necessary, in speaking of security, and substitute for the term "security" the words "satisfactory guarantees of the safety of their country"? I think this would have the twofold advantage of stating the Commission's exact intention and at the same time showing that the Commission does not propose to modify in any way, or even to interpret, the texts which we have received from the Third Assembly."

M. de Brouckère (Rapporteur) [Translation]: I thank the Roumanian representative for the undeserved praise which he has bestowed upon me. The report perhaps deserves this flattering appreciation, but then I am not its author. All I have done is to take the Drafting Committee's resolutions and place them in their proper order, with the necessary connecting sentences. I collected these flowers from the Committee's table; I bound them together for the undeserved praise which he has bestowed upon me. The report perhaps deserves this flattering appreciation, but then I am not its author. All I have done is to take the Drafting Committee's resolutions and place them in their proper order, with the necessary connecting sentences. I collected these flowers from the Committee's table; I bound them together with coarse string, but their perfume is their own.

If I were really the sole author of the report, I should feel ashamed to have submitted to you a document containing so many blemishes of style. This document, however, is a composite work, and you know how such documents are drawn up. The misunderstandings which at first arise have to be removed, divergent views are eventually harmonised and concessions are made. In this way a kind of harmony is attained, but the greater the harmony of ideas, the less harmonious are the terms in which they are expressed. The less pliable the words are less pliable than ideas. A principal statement is taken from one quarter, a subordinate sentence from another, and the result is something which would shock a grammarian.

When this point has been reached, there are two possible courses to take in order to avoid difficulties. Either the text can be adopted as it stands, and if it contains any small points which are not clear, they can be elucidated by a study of the relevant documents and Minutes;
that is what I will call the "historical" method, and it is this method which I have thought preferable in the present circumstances. But there is another method. The Committee's work can be recast and rendered smoother: the Gothic edifice which was built up by gradual stages can be transformed into something more regular — something in the Grecian style, for instance. Someone possessing the requisite abilities might have undertaken this; what deterred me was not so much the difficulty as the risk involved in recasting the text: I might not have reproduced the exact shades of meaning which were intended by the authors of the original version.

I understood from yesterday's discussion that certain members wished to have a clearer text. I have endeavoured to comply with this wish and have drafted certain proposals: but I have hidden them up my sleeve and shall not produce them unless I am definitely asked to do so; I shall do my best to persuade the Commission to adopt the other — the historical — method, and shall endeavour to expound Section I of the Report.

I am much impressed by M. Commène's arguments, and particularly by his contention that it is morally and politically impossible for a nation to lay aside its armaments unless it is assured of absolute security, and that no nation could do otherwise than make its armaments proportionate to its degree of security. I think we all share that feeling. It was very forcibly put by the United States representative. It is, if I may say so, the common ground of all the League's discussions, and the League has been careful to make it, at any rate in part, the basis of all our work. After all, what is our real status? Is this a Disarmament Conference? No; it is a Preparatory Commission for a Disarmament Conference. And when is the Conference itself to be convened? When the Council considers that there is sufficient security throughout the world. The Sixth Assembly's resolution is quite explicit in this respect:

"... And, in conformity with the spirit of Article 8 of the Covenant, [the Assembly] requests the Council to make a preparatory study with a view to a conference for the reduction and limitation of armaments in order that, as soon as satisfactory conditions have been assured from the point of view of general security as provided for in Resolution XIV of the Third Assembly, the said Conference may be convened and a general reduction and limitation of armaments may be realised."

Thus, at the time when preparations were being made to constitute this Commission, care was taken at the outset to refer to Resolution XIV. It was explicitly stated that the Disarmament Conference would be held when, in the Council's opinion, satisfactory conditions were assured from the point of view of security. The only point which arose was whether steps should be taken, before it was certain that these conditions would be fulfilled, to carry out preparatory work so as to lose no time and not to leave the nations in suspense when security was at length established. It was in these circumstances that the decision was taken to proceed to the preparatory work at once. I think, therefore, that the Roumanian representative may be quite easy on that point. If that were not so, if the resolution were still not clear on this point, I may say that I should be as unwilling to accept it as he. I am just as anxious about security as he is, and, laying aside for a moment my role of Rapporteur, I would remind you that at the session of the Council in December last, when it was still uncertain — as the question had not yet been sufficiently discussed and misunderstandings still existed — whether security would be taken into consideration in the preparatory work itself, the Belgian delegate said:

"Belgium cannot understand that a plan for the reduction and limitation of armaments should be drawn up without taking into account the nature, extent and promptitude of the aid which a State against which an act of aggression is committed might receive."

"If the investigation of this question is not included now in the scheme of preparatory work, Belgium formally reserves the right to demand its inclusion at a later date."

I have quoted this passage in order to show that the Roumanian delegate's anxiety is shared by us all, and I think I have made it clear that when the Council invited us to collaborate in this work it was on that distinct understanding.

If it is decided that the Conference itself will not meet until the Council considers that satisfactory conditions have been assured from the point of view of security, it is none the less true that this degree of security will not necessarily be the same for all States and that the particular security of each will have to be taken into consideration. That, however, is expressly stated in the first part of the report, and the members of the Council realised this statement to be so important that they separated it from the Questionnaire and placed it at the head of the report itself as a kind of general proposal, in the light of which all the rest of the report ought to be read. The wording is not very clear, because it has been redrafted several times. The original proposal was worded as follows:

"La Commission de rédaction estime que chaque gouvernement devra apporter . . . des propositions précises accompagnées de justifications sur la base de la sécurité existant au moment de la convocation de la Conférence."

This text was perfectly clear. It contained the words "sur la base de la sécurité existant", and for the following reason. The point at issue here is not the general security of the world; that is one of the conditions on which the Conference is to be summoned. The point is the particular degree of security which we are to consider as well. Several objections to this
text were raised, however, one of which appeared to be a very serious one. We were asked: "Are you going to decide here and now that each State is to submit its proposals and that the duty of the Disarmament Conference will be to receive these proposals? Is it not conceivable that the contrary process might take place and that the Conference should propose measures of disarmament to the various States? In that case the States would not submit them but receive them.

Now, as the time has not yet come to discuss the principles underlying the questions submitted to us, the time had not yet come to decide the method to be employed and that the way had to be left open to employ either method, and consequently the word "apporter" should be replaced by "envisager".

Then, however, the other question arose. Originally this text was placed under Question V. It was said that it was of general application and should be placed at the head as a kind of preamble, but, that being so, we had to give it what journalists call a "chapeau". The "chapeau" was a very elegant one, of English make. They attempted to find a French counterpart, and the counterpart is not, I admit, a very happy one. We might perhaps try to discover something better. In any case, the point is only of formal importance, and I am not sure whether, in altering the form, we might not also be altering shades of meaning and involving ourselves in further lengthy discussions. Clearly the Committee had no intention of submitting to the Commission a ne pariætur text. It simply proposed a basis on which the Committee could work as it pleased. In all probability new ideas will be added to those already existing in the report.

I do not know whether, when our text has been changed, its form will be improved, but the idea underlying it will probably be improved. However that may be, I would beg my colleagues, when dealing with the text as a whole, to give their undivided attention to its underlying idea and not to trouble about its absolute formal correctness. As Rapporteur I am at any rate officially responsible for the form of the document, and I admit that I hesitated when the time came to submit it. I thought that, if I retouched the text, the whole question might have to be reconsidered and our work would be delayed. On the other hand, if I left the text as it stood, I should be held responsible for two or three glaring errors in French. Nevertheless, I preferred to take the blame for the style.

Section II.

M. Markovitch (Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) [Translation]: Section II includes Question V. In regard to this question I venture to ask why mathematical considerations have been introduced which do not exist in the Questionnaire and were not examined by the Commission. Unless the reasons for the introduction of this mathematical element are explained to us, I propose that the first sentence be deleted and that Question V be worded as follows:

"... In order to allow of a profitable examination of the basis on which the reduction and limitation of armaments is possible, the Commission requests the two Sub-Commissions to investigate ..."

M. de Brocquère (Rapporteur) [Translation]: This sentence was discussed at greater length than any other, and it is also one of the most essential. To put the matter briefly, there are two ways of considering the possible solution of the disarmament problem. We can try to find a formula which, on the basis of certain factors such as length of frontier, population, etc., will enable us to determine by mathematical rules the forces at a country's disposal. It must be admitted that, as the text of Question V was submitted to us by the Council, some of us might be led to suppose that this was the method contemplated.

The other idea is to determine the forces which a country should be allowed to possess on the basis of concrete considerations, more especially with reference to its security and its geographical, economic and social conditions.

The discussions by the Commission showed that both methods have their merits and that it would be most unfair to ignore the great services rendered by the mathematical method in regard to the limitation of naval armaments, or, at any rate, the limitation of the number of ships of certain types. But we are all agreed that, in dealing with the problem of general disarmament, mathematical considerations are inadequate and that it would be a mistake to try to find any simple formula. We also thought that this should be explicitly stated, as otherwise the experts might have worked on wrong lines. They might have thought that, being given the length of frontiers and of railways, the population and other factors of the same kind, they were being asked to tell us what forces could be placed at the disposal of a given country — in which case it is highly probable that they would simply have replied that the problem was insoluble, and we should have been no wiser than before.

We thought, therefore, that we ought to give them some guidance and say to them: "What we are asking you to do is not to find a mathematical formula but to show us how these factors influence the various kinds of armaments which a country can possess."

I think these considerations fully justify the inclusion of this sentence, which is a very useful one and should serve to guide the military and civil experts in their work.

General Kalafatovich (Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) [Translation]: I desire to speak about Part (c) of Section II, which deals with chemical warfare.
The question of chemical warfare has been carefully considered both by our Commission and by the Drafting Committee. It is fully deserving of our attention by reason of its enormous importance to the whole world, and we should feel great satisfaction at the discussions which have taken place on this question. At the same time I feel that these discussions and their results have taken a direction which is calculated to endanger the very basis of this important question.

At the meeting of the plenary Commission on May 20th, Lord Cecil spoke as follows:

"I noticed Count Bernstorff's proposal that we should forbid aerial warfare altogether, and particularly chemical warfare. I certainly do not rule that out as a possibility, but I doubt whether that would by itself be a sufficient security. I am afraid the history of the world shows that, when a nation is fighting for its existence, it is too probable it will use whatever weapons are available without sufficient regard to mere undertakings of this kind. Still I do not wish to deny that such undertakings are useful. All I can say is that though we have had the Washington Treaties condemning the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and though we had a re-affirmation of that in the Draft Convention for the Trade in Arms, I have not observed that either of those declarations has lessened the activities of the various nations in preparing for such warfare in the future."

As you know, the Protocol on Chemical and Bacteriological Warfare was unanimously adopted in this very room on June 17th, 1925, by the Conference on the Supervision of the Trade in Arms, which was attended not only by almost all the Members of the League of Nations but by the United States of America, Germany and Turkey.

This Protocol, which has already been quoted by Lord Cecil, constitutes a solemn undertaking by all these States finally to renounce chemical warfare.

As everyone knows, the existence of this Protocol is due to the initiative of the American delegation, and that initiative was enthusiastically welcomed by the whole Conference without exception. The Conference rightly held that mere restrictions on the traffic in gases would constitute no guarantee against the horrors of chemical warfare; it desired to go much further and boldly proposed the total abolition of this horrible form of war.

In this it was entirely successful, thanks to the unanimous approval given by all the delegations, among which I would particularly mention the German delegation, Germany being at that time the only Great Power which had not adhered to the Washington Agreements, and being also, as we know, one of the largest chemical Powers in the world.

The Conference on the Supervision of the Trade in Arms was very proud of this Protocol, which certainly constitutes the most important part of its work.

I am wondering, therefore, whether our Commission is entitled to question its value. It was adopted by an international conference, and it solves the thorny question of chemical warfare finally and categorically. There is no doubt that this solution is the best and the only effective one. All others are only half-measures and of hardly any account compared with the solemn and universal undertaking loyally given by a whole Conference without constraint or pressure.

It now only requires the necessary ratifications for the Protocol to come into force. M. Paul-Boncour told us the other day that France had just ratified it. For the moment she is the only country to have done so. In my modest opinion our Commission should be content with requesting the Council to recommend the signatory Powers of the Protocol to hasten their ratifications. For my part I am authorised by my Government to state that it proposes to ratify it as soon as possible. It is, however, desirable that the big military and chemical Powers should be the first to ratify, and the others will no doubt quickly follow suit.

In view of what I have just said I think that this is hardly the moment to revive the question of chemical warfare. By casting doubt upon the value of this Protocol and the good faith of its signatories, our Commission might alienate public opinion, and the spectre of chemical warfare would again raise its head. This would compel all the States to proceed with or institute chemical armaments — a step which would inevitably lead to a fresh armaments race. A solemn undertaking freely given by all States is surely worth far more than the few useless opinions or regulations which we could frame now. On the contrary, it is better that we pin our faith to this Protocol and hasten its ratification by all countries. We shall then be entitled to hope that the present endeavours of States to prepare for chemical warfare will cease. The security obtained will allow of disarmament in this direction.

In conclusion, I have the honour to suggest that the Commission should consider whether it would not be preferable to omit the whole of Part (c) and simply recommend the ratification of the Protocol on Chemical and Bacteriological Warfare.

At the same time, the final paragraph of Part (c) is quite in place, for it raises the question as to what sanctions could be proposed for the enforcement of the international undertaking not to employ poison gas or bacteria in warfare. The Sub-Commission might very well give its opinion on this subject. I also suggest that it is necessary to include among chemical weapons incendiary material which, when thrown from aeroplanes, might be almost as dangerous to large centres of population as poison gases.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire): I am glad the question has been raised so definitely as it has been by the last speaker, but I think he has misinterpreted the purpose of these questions. The purpose is not in the least to throw doubt upon the engagements that were taken at Washington and at Geneva in reference to chemical warfare, but it is rather to lead up to the proposition as to what we should do to see that those engagements are carried out:
and, in order to lead up to that proposition, it is desirable we should have before us as clearly as possible the situation with regard to the various matters set out. I do not think there is any one of those enquiries which could reasonably be held to be in any respect an attack on the validity of the Convention. After all, we must treat things as they are and look at the reality of things and not hide ourselves in mere words or aspirations. Everybody who reads the papers knows quite well that there is scarcely a country, certainly not one of the larger countries, which is not carrying on experiments in connection with chemical warfare, perhaps not for the purpose of using it aggressively but in order to be prepared should it be used aggressively against themselves. Large sums of money are being spent every year upon those preparations, and it is very important we should realise the fact and not merely ignore it in the hope that it will disappear, for that would be the policy of the ostrich which is said to bury its head in the sand and thereby believe that it becomes invisible. I am therefore strongly of the hope that it will disappear, for that would be the policy of the ostrich which is said to bury its head in the sand and thereby believe that it becomes invisible. I am therefore strongly of opinion that we ought to treat this matter seriously, by making enquiries to ascertain what the situation is in which we stand, and that, with the information before us which can be furnished by Sub-Commission A, we ought to consider the last paragraph, which I understand General Kalafatovitch has no objection to. In these circumstances I very much hope that the Commission will not attempt to strike out these proposals. I am quite certain, if the Commission were to take such a course, its action would be very much misunderstood by public opinion.

M. de Brouckère (Rapporteur) [Translation]: I should like to observe, with regard to the substance of the question, that the points raised by the British delegation are purely technical. They may be summarised as follows: "What does gas warfare consist of?" I think that not even the State most sensitive with regard to its good faith need be alarmed or feel any uneasiness on that point. The only question which is not of this kind is the last, regarding which the Serb-Croat-Slovene delegate raises no objection. As M. Commêne reminded us just now, we must consider the situation as it is at present. We must not be led by our ideals to lose touch with realities. Without expressing any opinion as to the value of a Convention which would bind States in the matter of chemical gases, it must be noted that at the moment there is no such convention. Although a number of diplomatic instruments have been signed, no one has ratified them, and only a few States, including France, have announced their ratification at an early date.

Count Clauzel (France) [Translation]: The French Government has actually ratified the Convention concluded last year; it is only the notification of this ratification which has not yet been made. This will take place as soon as a number of other ratifications have been made.

M. de Brouckère (Rapporteur) [Translation]: I had thought that this ratification was only proposed; I apologise for my mistake. Still, the majority of States have not yet ratified that Convention. Accordingly, chemical warfare is not forbidden by any international instrument, and we have every reason to be uneasy about it. Lord Cecil does not even go so far, since he is content to ask the experts what gas warfare consists of and what means are employed for spreading gas.

M. Matsuda (Japan) [Translation]: For a long time Japan has attached great importance to the question of chemical warfare. Last year in this very place the question was discussed by the Conference on the Supervision of the Trade in Arms and Ammunition. It was the American delegation which first proposed the prohibition of the traffic in gases. The Japanese Government, at all times anxious entirely to abolish the use of asphyxiating gases, proposed, with the support of the American delegation, to provide for the abolition of the use of these gases in time of war. That proposal was accepted by most of the delegations, and a convention was signed on the matter. I am glad to learn to-day that the French Government has actually ratified it, and I believe that our Government will shortly do likewise. Even supposing, however, that this Convention comes into force, Lord Cecil's proposal is of great practical value, for the Convention only contemplates the prohibition of the use of gases in time of war. We, however, are also concerned with the present state of affairs and the question of how gas may be employed. In order to obtain the abolition of gases in time of war, it is useful to know what experiments have so far been made in this direction. If these gases are used by a belligerent in time of war, many complications will arise, for other countries at war will be induced to make use of them also.

For these various reasons I am entirely in agreement with Lord Cecil's proposal.

M. de Marinis (Italy) [Translation]: I would remind my colleagues who took part in the Conference on the Supervision of the Trade in Arms and Ammunition that I had the honour to submit to them various observations on the use of gases and on the futility of any regulations which aimed at suppressing the trade in raw materials employed in the manufacture of these gases. I proposed the immediate consideration of the final aim—that is to say, the prevention of chemical warfare. At that time the representative of the United States had submitted a proposal with which I heartily concurred. That proposal, indeed, accorded with the attitude of the Italian Government, which, in February 1923, had already ratified the Washington Convention on Chemical Warfare. I think, therefore, that there is no need for me to assure you that the Italian Government, by repeating the ratification of that Washington Convention, will shortly ratify the Protocol on the abolition of chemical warfare.
The only objection is that as far as I know it would be rather rash to say that there were any existing conventions. There are conventions that have been signed and agreed upon, but, as far as I understand it, there is no convention actually in force on the subject.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire): I would suggest the following words to be added: "without prejudice to any convention or rule of international law on the subject."

Section III.

M. Markovitch (Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) [Translation]: With regard to Section III, which concerns the French delegation's proposal, I will venture to draw attention to a few points that are not quite clear. This proposal contains two parts. The first part is a statement; the second contains these words: "The Committee therefore proposes to suggest to the Council: (1) that methods or regulations should be investigated which would facilitate . . ."

When these proposals were discussed by the Drafting Committee, it was found that there was a certain difficulty in requesting the Council of the League to undertake measures with regard to these regulations, and that this work would be of a constructive nature lying outside the competence of our Commission. Consequently, and also because the Commission includes States which are not Members of the League, it was decided — and we are asked to approve this decision — to refer the French delegation's proposal to the Council, asking it to consider that proposal immediately. I presume — and this is the reason why I rose to speak — that this reference only concerns the second part of the French proposal and that we are perfectly free to vote on the first part, which refers to Question II, without modifying, or even threatening to modify in any way whatever existing regulations in regard to the procedure of the Council of the League. In Question II (a), which we have accepted, we read as follows: "The Commission is of opinion that it would not be practicable at the present time to limit the ultimate war strength of a country. On the other hand, it affirms that it is possible to limit the land, sea and air forces permanently maintained in peace time by the various countries, or capable of immediate use without preliminary mobilisation measures." That is what we say it is possible to do immediately. We are then told: "This principle is in any case without prejudice to the conditions of such limitation as determined by an examination of the remaining questions, notably Question V".

Now, the proposal by the French delegation, and more particularly the first part, refers to Question V, and I fully accept it as being in the spirit and sense of all the arguments we have here adduced. If there is no way of separating these two parts, I should in any case pay particular attention to it now, but I feel I ought to make this remark in reply to the assertion that no convention has at present been ratified.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire): I must apologise for speaking in M. Paul-Boncour's absence, but he has been called away. M. Comnène reminded us just now of the Conference on the Trade in Arms held last year, in which I had the honour to take part. I had, however, the same honour earlier at The Hague in 1907, and I venture to remind you that I supported the proposition prohibiting the use of gases was expressly signed in 1907, and that Convention has been expressly referred to in all the Treaties of Peace. I do not think that we should pay particular attention to it now, but I feel I ought to make this remark in reply to the assertion that no convention has at present been ratified.
the statement contained in Question II is of quite the same nature as the one we are now considering. In Question II the Commission inserted a general statement which finds its application outside the limits of any particular inter-State convention. At present we are concerned with the application of particular conventions arising, for example, out of the Covenant or of certain inter-State agreements like those of Locarno; and after consideration it seemed to us all rather difficult to ask States which were not parties to these agreements and not Members of the League to adopt a definite attitude towards these points and to say whether they should or should not be rendered more promptly applicable. We thought that that was a question for those States represented here who are Members of the League. That is why we thought it well to refer this general consideration not exactly for examination by the Council but as forming a kind of general introduction—a statement of reasons if you like—to the questions referred to the Council.

M. ERICH (Finland): [Translation]: The Commission rightly emphasises the great importance of the French delegation's proposal. The Finnish delegation also fully appreciates the French and Polish proposals, the aims of which coincide with what Finland regards as absolutely necessary, namely, to increase the practical value of Article 16 and other fundamental provisions in the Covenant. It is simply on this account, therefore, that I venture to recall the statement I made at a meeting a week ago, and to submit the following proposal in order that perhaps still more definite consideration may be given to the special interests of secondary States which are peculiarly situated as regards their geographical position, the state of their armaments and their degree of security. The proposal has just been distributed to you and runs as follows:

"The Commission proposes that the Council should undertake the examination of special arrangements whereby a reduction of armaments agreed to by States unfavourably placed, owing to geographical or other exceptional circumstances, might be compensated in order to meet their requirements for security."

The Finnish delegation has great pleasure in supporting the French proposal. At the same time I venture to submit to the French delegation and to the Commission a slight amendment, constituting a modest and purely formal addition to point 2 (b) in the French proposal, in which reference is made to the second paragraph of Article 16 of the Covenant. The measures provided in Article 16 of the Covenant are also contained in Article 17, paragraphs 1 and 3. Accordingly, it would be well to supplement point 2 of the French proposal by a reference to paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 17 of the Covenant. I venture to hope that the French delegation will have no objection to this.

M. COMMÈNE (Roumania): [Translation]: I have the honour to support the Finnish proposal.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire): I have no objection at all to the Finnish proposition being sent with the Polish and French propositions to the Council; indeed, I think they have a right to ask for the same treatment as has been accorded to two of their colleagues, and I should imagine that by inserting the Finnish proposal under paragraph III (b) that could be done. So far as I am concerned, I should have no objection to that.

As regards the point raised on Article 16 as to how they choose to state their proposition, that is a matter for the French delegation to decide, but, if I may say so, I think their drafting is right and that the drafting suggested by my Finnish colleague is wrong. Article 17 merely applies to Article 16; therefore anything that is done to facilitate the execution of Article 16 automatically becomes equally applicable to Article 17, and I think as a matter of drafting that there is no necessity to make any change, though this is entirely for the French delegation to decide.

Count CLAUDEL (France): On behalf of M. Paul-Boncour, who drafted the proposal, I am authorised to accede to the wishes of the Finnish delegate. Lord Cecil's well-chosen observation, however, had also occurred to me. Article 17, being a function of Article 16, is implicit in any reference to Article 16. Nevertheless, if M. Erich insists, I am prepared to meet his wishes.

I support Lord Cecil's proposal to add the Finnish proposal in the report to the French and Polish proposals.

M. ERICH (Finland): I should be fully satisfied if the reference to Article 17 could also be introduced into the French proposal. At the same time I quite see Lord Cecil's point, and I shall be content with a mere insertion in the Minutes.

The President: It is understood that the statement by the Finnish delegate shall appear in the Minutes and that the Finnish proposal shall be included in the report.

M. MARKOVITCH (Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes): [Translation]: Now that M. de Brouckère has explained that what is said in Question II does not refer to the first part of the French proposal, and that the reservation expressed in Question II remains intact, I can withdraw my proposal. It must, however, be understood that the referring to the Council of the two parts of the French proposal does not mean that the first sentence of this proposal has not been accepted by the Commission, but only that it was not discussed.
M. DE BROUCKÈRE (Rapporteur) [Translation]: If the discussion of the report is finished, and since it seems that the fears I expressed at the beginning were somewhat exaggerated and that the details of drafting are not such as to create serious differences of opinion between us, I will ask permission to amend the introductory sentence to Section II of the report, which is badly drafted and obscure. I propose to you the following wording:

"The Commission entrusts its Technical Sub-Commissions with the enquiries defined below in order that it may be informed on the technical aspect of the questions submitted to it by the Council, the Commission alone being competent to consider the political aspects of these questions, just as it is also alone responsible for the final answers to be given to them."

This new wording was accepted.


Mr. GIBSON (United States of America): May I call attention to a point of procedure which is raised by the document entitled "Draft Report to the Council by the Preparatory Commission regarding its procedure" (Annex VIII). I received the impression by yesterday's discussion that it was intended to embody the text of this document in the Report of the Drafting Committee to the Preparatory Commission if and when that report was accepted by the Preparatory Commission, and that the combination of the two would form the report of the Preparatory Commission to the Council. Therefore I should like to enquire whether it is proposed to send to the Council the League merely document C.P.D.16 (Annex VIII) or whether it is proposed to send the Report of the Drafting Committee with Document C.P.D.16 embodied in it? My reason for raising this question is that document C.P.D.1 C.R. 15 (Annex VII) is a report submitted to the Preparatory Commission by the Drafting Committee, and without some specific decision by this body I do not see how it becomes part of a report to the Council. I do not wish to offer any objection to this course, but I raise the question merely for information.

Further, I desire to make it clear that, in view of the fact that my Government is not a Member of the League of Nations, it would necessarily abstain from participating in submitting any report to the Council of the League, although it would not object if any other members of the Preparatory Commission individually or collectively should care to do so. I shall, of course, transmit this and all other reports of the Preparatory Commission to my Government for its information.

The PRESIDENT [Translation]: It is understood, I take it, that the Commission must first of all adopt the Report of the Drafting Committee (Annex VII) before it is sent, together with Annex VII, to the Council, seeing that the latter will be a sort of introduction to the report to be submitted to the Council.

The two drafts were unanimously adopted (Annexes VII and VIII).

The PRESIDENT [Translation]: Personally, I am not in favour of distributing thanks all round, and I hope that you all share my views on this subject. I think, however, that we should make one exception to this rule. M. de Brouckère said that all he had had to do was to tie up a nosegay with a piece of coarse string. I think you will all agree with me when I say that M. de Brouckère, by his wonderful clearness of vision and method of work, both at the full meetings and in the Drafting Committee, has done much more than that; he has revealed himself as a first-class gardener. It is largely owing to him that the flowers have blossomed and I am sure that we are all extremely grateful to him for his work.

(Applause.)

M. DE BROUCKÈRE (Rapporteur) [Translation]: I think the only suitable form of congratulation would be for everybody to congratulate everybody else. We have all been humble workmen, but I think that we can take leave of each other now with the pleasurable feeling that our work has been well done, and that all the objects we have had in view during this first phase of our labours have been achieved. It will be a great pleasure for us to think that there is now every prospect of success for this modest beginning of what is perhaps the vastest, boldest and noblest enterprise which mankind has ever conceived.

23. Memoranda by the Greek and Hungarian Governments (continuation).

The PRESIDENT [Translation]: We now come to the second item on the agenda: the memorandum submitted by the representatives of the Greek and Hungarian Governments.

You only received the Hungarian memorandum this morning, so that most of you have had no time to acquaint yourselves with its contents; but I am told that the delegates who are most closely interested in this question received a copy of the document yesterday evening from the Hungarian delegate himself (General Tanczos). I think they have had time to examine it and that we might begin the discussion immediately.

M. MARKOVITCH (Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) [Translation]: I have had time to glance through the memorandum submitted by the Hungarian delegation. I found it to contain a number of military observations of considerable interest, and I think that the memorandum might be of general use, and of particular use to Sub-Commission A.
I venture, however, to offer a few observations before we vote on the transmission of this document to the Sub-Commissions.

In the first place there is a passage in the memorandum (Annex I) in which reference is made to the influence of the Treaty of Trianon on the natural features of Hungary, the number of her inhabitants, and her geographical and economic situation. I do not quite understand why the Hungarian delegation decided to mention the influence of the Treaties of Peace on the situation of Hungary in a memorandum on disarmament. Perhaps the Sub-Commission will decide that point.

Another observation is this: there is an assertion made by the delegation in its memorandum concerning the character of the army of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes; I only mention the reference to my own country. The Hungarian delegation alleges in its memorandum that the army of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes constitutes a menace to Hungary. I feel bound to state that my country's army does not constitute any menace to any State, and certainly not to Hungary. I do not propose to discuss at length the absolutely peaceful—character of my country's policy. I am sure you are all well aware that, ever since the conclusion of peace, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes has pursued a policy of national reconstruction, and a policy of agreements with all its neighbours, which has resulted in the effective settlement of all questions left outstanding after the war. As regards Hungary more particularly, I may say that neither the Belgrade Government nor the Serb-Croat-Slovene nation as a whole harbour any feelings of animosity, hostility or hatred of any kind towards the Hungarian nation.

We were extremely sorry at the last Assembly of the League to hear the Hungarian representative (Count Apponyi) state that Hungary was not prepared to conclude pacts of non-aggression with her neighbours for reasons which she did not desire to state in greater detail. When a country makes declarations of that kind, I do not think it has any right to question the purely defensive character of its neighbours' armies. Not having had time to consult the Belgrade Government, I cannot say what its exact views are on this subject. But I know—and I can say it without any fear of subsequent contradiction—that the Belgrade Government is prepared at any time to conclude with its neighbours a pact of non-aggression under the auspices of the League of Nations—a pact which would provide Hungary with guarantees which no nation contiguous to my country could minimise or question.

I have felt bound to make this statement in connection with the memorandum. I am not opposed to its being referred to the technical Sub-Commissions, provided that my observations appear in the Minutes.

M. Comnène (Roumania) [Translation]: I entirely agree with the statement made by my honourable colleague the delegate for the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. I must nevertheless do justice to General Tanczos, for I believe we are agreed as to the procedure to be followed. That, I think, is proof that I was not over-optimistic yesterday when I said that, if we had time to examine the document, we should probably discover a formula which would satisfy everyone. I think that this formula has been found. In confirmation of this I would refer to General Tanczos' letter of May 24th, 1926. In this letter the General states that, while questions other than purely technical questions should be left to the Preparatory Commission itself—that is to say, all questions of a political nature which would have to be examined by the full Commission—he formulated, subject to this proviso, a simple request that his memorandum should be communicated to the Sub-Commissions. He added further on: "Would you kindly inform the Royal Hungarian delegation at Geneva as to the date on which the question will be discussed by the Sub-Commissions and, subsequently, in plenary session." Consequently, the General always had in view the possibility and necessity of a public discussion of this memorandum and its examination by the plenary Commission, which has full power to act in the matter.

In these circumstances, seeing that, in the first place, the document is of capital importance, and, secondly, that it was not communicated to us in time for us to transmit it to our Governments and receive the necessary instructions, I should be glad if you would take note of the formal reservations I submit on behalf of my Government regarding the contents of this communication and its conclusions. Subject to these reservations, I am not opposed to the document being referred to the Sub-Commissions. I must, however, stipulate that they should only examine it within the general framework of the report which we have adopted.

M. Veverka (Czechoslovakia) [Translation]: After reading the Hungarian document, I realise still further how wise it was of General Tanczos to mention to us yesterday that the military and political parts of his memorandum were intimately connected. The political aspects are not merely intimately bound up with the military aspects; they quite outweigh the latter and even indicate the ulterior object of the memorandum.

In order to avoid any painful incident at this meeting—for the discussion might take an awkward turn in view of the expressions employed in the document and the arbitrary figures it contains, I merely note that, apart from the Hungarian memorandum, no mention has been made in this Commission of any need to modify the groundwork of the treaties of peace. I therefore conclude that it is the present situation as established by the treaties of peace which should be the starting-point of our discussions, and that any deviation from this principle would retard that general reconciliation which is an essential condition for general disarmament. If no objection is raised to this principle and the conclusion I draw from it, I agree with Lord Cecil that the Hungarian memorandum and its technical considerations should be referred to our Sub-Commissions.
I should like to supplement the statement of my honourable colleague, M. Markovitch, by drawing your attention to the fact that my chief (M. Benes, the Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs) made an offer in the Czechoslovak Parliament last February of a pact of non-aggression to the Hungarian Government.

General Tanczos (Hungary) [Translation]: I have noted the statements of the Roumanian, Serb-Croat-Slovene and Czechoslovak delegates, and will report the matter to my Government. For the present, I do not wish to enter into a discussion of these questions.

M. Dendramis (Greece) [Translation]: I merely wish to express my satisfaction that the Greek memorandum has not given rise to any objections.

Count Bernstorff (Germany) [Translation]: I do not know whether I have rightly understood the observations of the Czechoslovak delegate. Unless I am mistaken, he told us that we ought to contemplate the reduction of armaments on the basis of the situation created by the treaties of peace. This question does not arise. On the contrary, my impression is that our discussions have all along been concerned with the future reduction of armaments. We are agreed, I think, that our object is universal disarmament. We cannot therefore take as a starting-point the situation which existed when the treaties of peace were established. Were we to consider the armaments of that period, the reductions which we could contemplate would appear to be enormous, but they would in reality be practically nil. We cannot draw any comparison between the war armies of that time and the armies which may have to be maintained in the future.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire): I did not understand that the representative of Czechoslovakia proposed to crystallise the armaments of Europe at the exact point at which they stood at the date of the signature of the Treaty of Versailles. All I understood him to say was that he was prepared that the memorandum of the Hungarian Government should go to Sub-Commission A on the understanding that there was no proposal by this Commission that the Treaty should be modified. I think we are all agreed that that is the basis on which we must work.

M. Del Marinis (Italy) [Translation]: I have not yet had time to read the two documents submitted to us by the Hungarian and Greek Governments. I therefore reserve my opinion as to their contents, though I agree to referring them to the Sub-Commissions in order that the latter may subject them to a purely technical examination.

Count Clauzel (France) [Translation]: I entirely agree with M. de Marinis' view regarding the Hungarian document, which neither I nor M. Paul-Boncour have had time to read.

Regarding the wishes expressed by the Hungarian Government under letters (a), (b), (c) and (d) in the conclusions of the memorandum, I would wish to reserve my opinion as fully as M. de Marinis, Lord Cecil and, I think, most of the members of this Commission. I wish to point out that these reservations were expressed in very satisfactory terms by our Roumanian, Czechoslovak and Serb-Croat-Slovene colleagues. Now that we have arrived at the end of so friendly a discussion and seem to have reached a provisional conclusion — I say "provisional" to satisfy my American friends — this, the end of the first stage, is not, I submit, an opportune moment to enter upon a political debate of the importance which this discussion might assume if, for example, the treaties of peace were to be brought into the question.

It should therefore be understood that every reservation is made with regard to the political question. This attitude is entirely consonant with the desires of the Council and the spirit in which the Council appealed for the co-operation of all States Members and non-Members of the League which are not members of the Preparatory Committee, in asking them to assist us in our work, in allowing them to send memoranda and in inviting them to be present when these memoranda were discussed. I think that this was the request which General Tanczos desired to make in his letter, and we can certainly comply with it.

It is the technical and military parts of the memorandum which will be referred, in the same way as other similar proposals, to the technical Sub-Commissions for their consideration, all questions of a political nature being entirely held over for the present.

M. Veverka (Czechoslovakia) [Translation]: I should like to say that the interpretation given to my remarks by Lord Cecil is correct, and I approve it.

The President read the following draft resolution:

"The Preparatory Commission decides to refer for the consideration of the two Sub-Commissions, the memoranda submitted to it on behalf of the Greek and Hungarian Governments, in so far as these memoranda concern the questions referred to these Sub-Commissions by the Preparatory Commission."

The draft resolution was adopted.


M. De Marinis (Italy) [Translation]: I should like to know, Mr. President, what you think can be done when the Sub-Commissions have finished their work. Do you think it would be desirable for this Commission, on a first hearing and in plenary session, to proceed
Viscount Cecil (British Empire): I think this is a matter which the Commission should certainly consider. Indeed, I ventured to make a suggestion of a somewhat similar kind at an earlier meeting of the Preparatory Commission. It is entirely a matter for the Commission what they consider to be the best way of getting on with their work. My own opinion is that sooner or later a smaller body will have to be appointed to consider the reports of the Sub-Commissions, which are likely to be voluminous and complicated, and extract from them the definite propositions which would be submitted to the whole Commission, but it is, of course, a matter for consideration whether that should be done now or whether we should wait to see the reports first and then appoint a small commission later on. I am all in favour of the most practical course, and on the whole I am in agreement with M. de Marinis that it would be best to appoint such a commission now. On the other hand, I can quite understand there may be other views on the subject, and therefore, like M. de Marinis, I do not make a definite proposition on the subject but merely express the hope that my colleagues will say quite frankly and freely what their views are.

M. Matsuda (Japan) [Translation]: I am sure the suggestion made by M. de Marinis is an excellent one. I think, however, that we might adopt the other alternative suggested by Lord Cecil. The idea of forming a smaller committee is already to be found in the report itself, second paragraph, Section II, in which it is stated that: "the President and Vice-Presidents may take the necessary steps to co-ordinate the work of the two Sub-Commissions and to enable each to consult the other on any particular point". The idea of co-ordination is already there, and it may assume a more material form later on. I think for the present we ought to continue our work in the ordinary way and carry out M. de Marinis' suggestion as and when occasion arises.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire): I quite see M. de Marinis' intention. We know from experience that the smaller the committee the easier the work of drafting. On the other hand we have found in the course of our discussions that it is desirable for all members of the Commission to take part in all our work, because they then understand the formulas which have been submitted and are better able to grasp their bearing.

We are, I confess, anxious to co-operate in every stage of the work as far as our modest means permit; we should like to feel that we are, each of us, doing our share in solving all the questions submitted to us.

I therefore venture to request the members of the Commission to agree to the proposal that, as soon as the Sub-Commissions have finished their work, the full Commission should meet in order to consider the results achieved.

The work which we have accomplished to-day in a very few hours proves that our meeting in full Commission does not complicate our work.

The President [Translation]: Would it not be desirable, when the two Sub-Commissions have drawn up their reports, for these reports to be communicated to all the members of our Commission? When each delegation has had time to study the reports, we could meet again in private session.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire): I should like to consider the suggestion as to whether a private meeting is really a very great advantage. I do think we might be round a table instead of being strung out all over the room, only the actual chief delegates, of course, being round the table. That is evident. I think there might be something in that, but personally I am very doubtful whether we should gain anything by having the full Commission sitting in private, or at any rate whether we should not lose a good deal more than we should gain by that. I should certainly decline to accept that suggestion straight away. I think if we are to have a meeting of the plenary Commission to receive these reports, we should leave it to them to decide whether they will consider those Reports in private or in public.

Mr. Gibson (United States of America): Would it not be well for us to fix now a definite date for the report to be submitted either to the full Commission or to the smaller committee which has been spoken of, or should not some definite provision be made so that the President and Vice-Presidents, on reaching agreement, would themselves be in a position to summon the next meeting of our Commission?

The President [Translation]: I think it would be preferable not to fix a date. I assure you that I am quite prepared to get into touch with the two Vice-Presidents as soon as we know that the reports of the Sub-Commissions are near completion.

Mr. Gibson (United States of America): Would it not perhaps tend to stimulate continuous work if we did fix a date? The President and Vice-Presidents could retain the ability, if the work was not quite sufficiently advanced, to adjourn the date which had originally been fixed, giving reasons for the adjournment.

The President [Translation]: We might perhaps fix the date by which the reports should be completed.
Viscount Cecil (British Empire): I must say I hope my American colleague will consider again whether that is a desirable thing to do. It seems to me almost impossible to foresee how long the discussion of the very elaborate questions we have submitted to the Sub-Commissions will take. They may take weeks, they may take months, I do not know; and I am much more anxious, I must say, in this matter to proceed with care and caution than I am to proceed with rapidity. I am sure that there is much greater prospect of useful work and of complete agreement if we do not try and go too fast. After all, this is one of the biggest questions that has been submitted to the world; how you can limit and reduce armaments. It is a revolution in international thought if it can be brought about. We must not expect that it will be brought about with great rapidity; it must take time. It requires a great deal of education of the whole world, and perhaps some of the more important persons in the world, before that can be accomplished, and I think it would be a great mistake to do anything at this meeting which would appear to be hurrying things unduly. I think we had better say to our Sub-Commissions: "Consider these problems carefully and thoroughly; do not hurry yourselves; do not waste time, of course, but do not hurry yourselves; make your investigations thorough and complete; and then leave it to the President and the Vice-Presidents to summon the Preparatory Commission.” I think, with the greatest respect to my American colleague, that is quite understood, is it not?

Mr. Gibson (United States of America): Nothing was further from my thoughts than the idea of trying to hurry the Sub-Commissions in the very intricate and important work which lies before them. My only thought in proposing a definite date was that this might serve as an encouragement to continuous work and to avoid adjournments. However, I am quite disposed, while I do feel that it might be well to have some definite date towards which we could look forward for a reconsideration of these questions, to acquiesce in any settlement of the question which may be generally agreeable to my colleagues.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire): I thought you had made it quite clear that the reports will be sent to the members of the Commission before the Commission is summoned. That is quite understood, is it not?

The President [Translation]: Yes, that is so. The reports will be sent in a few days before the Preparatory Commission meets, in order that everyone may have time to examine them carefully.

Count Clauzel (France) [Translation]: Was it not laid down that the reports of the Sub-Commissions should be communicated to the Governments?

The President [Translation]: The communication of these reports to the delegates implies that they will be transmitted to the Governments.

I propose that Sub-Commission A shall meet on Friday, May 28th, at 10.30 a.m. and that Sub-Commission B shall meet this afternoon at 3.30.

This was agreed to.

25. Close of the Session.

The President [Translation]: We have now completed the first stage of our work. I hope you do not expect me to make a closing speech, for this is not an end but a beginning.

Without thanking any of you in particular — were I to do so, you would note that I should begin by thanking M. Paul-Boncour, Lord Cecil, M. de Marinis, M. de Briouckère and I should certainly not forget those who are morally but not actually Members of the League, and also a gentleman who represents a Government not belonging to the League but whose sincere help is much appreciated and will doubtless greatly contribute to our success — I should like to point out how deeply I have been struck in the course of our discussions, both in the full Commission and in the Drafting Committee, by the excellent spirit which has pervaded all these meetings. We must all have noticed how each of us has striven to understand and appreciate the point of view of the others, how efforts have continually been made (to employ an expression which I saw in a newspaper this morning) to find a possible point of fusion so that our divergent views may be combined. If I might venture to offer one word of advice to our two Sub-Commissions, I would urge them to emulate the spirit which has permeated our Commission and to work with the same object. Let common sense be your watchword, for common sense, I am sure you will agree, is the most important thing of all. In your meetings raise all possible objections, because out of these objections spring a clear conception and a sure indication of the path that should be followed.

In addition to common sense, maintain a steadfast resolve to succeed, and, if you can, strengthen this resolve with enthusiasm, for nothing big has ever been done in this world without enthusiasm. I do not mean the enthusiasm which manifests itself in the form of eloquent speeches and fine words but a real enthusiasm which carries you, as it were, on the wings of the wind towards the achievement of your ideal. Work hard, take no head of sceptics and remember that some day, by working as you do, you will accomplish great things, and you will progress far along the road which leads to the fulfilment of Article 8 of the Covenant: reduction of armaments. (Applause.)
Viscount Cecil (British Empire): I am quite sure that you would wish, before leaving, to express to the powers that be our great gratitude that we should have had such an admirable President. I am sure that the spirit to which he has so very properly and so very feelingly alluded has been largely due to the conciliatory and admirably understanding way in which he has conducted our debates. I trust and believe that the Chairmen of the two Sub-Commission will be inspired by his example and spirit.

I do not wish to make a speech but merely ask you to join with me in expressing our complete appreciation of the way in which we have been presided over during this session.

The President [Translation]: I sincerely thank the members of the Commission for their kind words.

(The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.)
B. MINUTES OF THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE
OF THE
PREPARATORY COMMISSION FOR THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

_Held at Geneva, May 21st - 25th, 1926_

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First Meeting (Friday, May 21st, at 10 a.m.):
1. Appointment of a Rapporteur .......................................................... 80
2. Procedure ......................................................................................... 80

Second Meeting (Friday, May 21st, at 3 p.m.):
3. Examination of M. Perez' Proposal (Annex I) ..................................... 82
4. Examination of Question I ................................................................. 82
5. Examination of Question II (a) ......................................................... 83
6. Examination of Questions II (b) and III ........................................... 86
7. Examination of Question IV .............................................................. 87

Third Meeting (Saturday, May 22nd, at 10.30 a.m.):
8. Examination of Question V (a) 1-7 .................................................... 89
9. Examination of Question V (a) 8, and V (b) ..................................... 91

Fourth Meeting (Saturday, May 22nd, at 5 p.m.):
10. Examination of Question V (a) 1-7 (continuation) .......................... 93
11. Examination of Question V (a) 8 and V (b) (continuation) ............. 95

Fifth Meeting (Monday, May 24th, at 10.30 a.m.):
12. Examination of Question V (a) 8 and V (b) (continuation) ............... 97
13. Examination of Question VI ............................................................ 98
14. Examination of Question VII .......................................................... 98
15. Examination of Annex 2 ................................................................. 99
16. Examination of Question V (a) 8, and V (b) (continuation) ............. 101

Sixth Meeting (Monday, May 24th, at 3.30 p.m.):
17. Examination of Question VII (continuation) .................................... 101
18. Examination of Viscount Cecil's Proposal relating to Chemical Warfare. 102

Seventh Meeting (Tuesday, May 25th, at 10 a.m.):
19. Examination of the Draft Report to the Preparatory Commission of the Drafting Committee ........................................... 103
MINUTES OF THE MEETINGS OF THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE

FIRST MEETING

Held on Friday, May 21st, 1926, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: M. Loudon (Netherlands).

1. Appointment of a Rapporteur.

On the proposal of the Chairman, the Committee appointed M. de Brouckère Rapporteur.

2. Procedure.

The Chairman reminded the Committee that its duty was to proceed to a division of the technical and political aspects of the items contained in the Questionnaire in order to make it possible to draft definite questions and to give instructions to the two technical Sub-Commissions. The Drafting Committee would then draw up a report for submission to the full Commission, which might then give it further instructions. He considered it his duty to point out that the proposal of Lord Cecil to the effect that the Drafting Committee should meet at the conclusion of the work of the technical Sub-Commissions and before a fresh meeting of the Preparatory Commission had given rise to certain doubts on the part of various delegates.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire) explained that his suggestion had been made for purely practical reasons. The following would be the order of work. The Preparatory Commission would give instructions to the technical Sub-Commissions; these, after lengthy meetings, would draw up reports which might not prove to have been unanimously adopted, and these reports would be forwarded to the Preparatory Commission. That Commission, however, was far too large a body to be able to extract definite proposals from these reports, and it would have to entrust this duty to a committee. It would also be necessary for Governments to be very accurately informed as to the results reached at Geneva in order that delegations should not meet with unexpected obstacles on the part of their own administrations.

If, therefore, the principal points in the technical reports of the Sub-Commissions could be forwarded to Governments before the meeting of the plenary Commission, the Governments would be able to give definite instructions to their delegates. Were such a procedure not to be followed when the full Commission met, it would find itself called upon to deal with the reports of the technical Sub-Commissions, containing for the most part questions drafted in the form of memoranda and not as definite proposals. It would be under the necessity of appointing a committee which, urged on to do so by the full Commission, would hastily draft for the discussion of the full Commission a summary containing the essential points of the technical reports. The full Commission would discuss this summary without having had time to communicate it to Governments and consequently without its being possible for delegates to receive instructions.

M. Paul-Boncour (France) thought Lord Cecil's proposal of great interest. Nevertheless, he would point out that the task of the Committee was very delicate. It might prove difficult to summarise a report without running the risk of appearing to anticipate to a certain extent the decisions of the Commission. With regard to the instructions to be given by Governments to their delegates, the reports of the technical Sub-Commissions would perhaps make it possible for Governments to give them before receiving a summary of these reports.

Lord Cecil (British Empire) replied that experience had shown that the Government offices only replied to definite questions, and if reports drafted in very general terms or very lengthy reports were sent to them, they would confine themselves to giving equally general instructions to their delegates.

M. Sokal (Poland) submitted, in connection with this proposal, that the Chairmen of the technical Sub-Commissions should be called upon to take part in the discussions of the Drafting Committee.

This proposal was adopted.

M. Matsuda (Japan) asked Lord Cecil for explanations regarding his proposal.

Viscount Cecil (British Empire) explained as follows: The Preparatory Commission would in his view be incapable of extracting definite proposals from the technical reports.