Explanation of the System of Limitation. — General limitation of aviation (military and civil) as a whole, established on a sufficiently wide basis not to hamper the normal development of civil aviation, and accompanied by a particular limitation of military aviation, the latter also comprising a separate limit for the mother-country and for its overseas possessions.

Example: A State accepts a limit of 500,000 horse-power for the total motive power of its aviation (military and civil) as a whole, and at the same time a limit of 200,000 horse-power for its military aviation, of which 125,000 horse-power are assigned to the mother-country.

Special Advantages of this System.

1. The various countries signing the Convention would be assured that, for the duration of the latter, the total air force of each for war purposes would not exceed a certain maximum.

2. If, while the Convention was in force, the civil aviation of one or more countries developed to a greater extent than was provided for at the moment of signature, this development would not be prevented; the countries concerned could and should, in virtue of the Convention, reduce their military aviation by a quantity equivalent to the increase in their civil aviation as soon as the limits stipulated were exceeded. The result would therefore be a reduction in the air armaments maintained in time of peace.

The delegations of the ARGENTINE, the BRITISH EMPIRE, FINLAND, GERMANY, the NETHERLANDS, SPAIN, SWEDEN and the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA consider that Sub-Commission A is not called upon by its directives to discuss, or is in any way qualified to discuss, a method which has as a result the limiting of civil aviation.

CHAPTER V. — METHOD OF LIMITATION APPLICABLE TO DIRIGIBLES.

The methods of limitation indicated above for aeroplanes are also applicable to dirigibles, with the possible exception of the method based on the “numbers of aircraft of service types to be maintained in commission in first-line combatant units of the metropolitan forces, to the exclusion of overseas forces”.

The following method, submitted by the delegations of BELGIUM, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, FRANCE, ITALY, JAPAN, POLAND and the KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, is also added:

METHOD BASED ON THE LIMITATION OF THE TOTAL VOLUME OF MILITARY DIRIGIBLES IN SERVICE.

We have already noted that, from the technical point of view, the principal characteristics determining the value of a dirigible bear a close relation to its volume. We are thus immediately led to consider the method consisting in the limitation of the total volume of dirigibles.

This method has the following Advantages and Disadvantages:

Advantages.

(a) It permits of the simultaneous limitation of the number and characteristics of dirigibles.

(b) It leaves the States concerned free to distribute as best suits their needs the horse-power at their disposal, permitting them to have either a certain number of dirigibles with a fixed horse-power or a smaller number of dirigibles with a higher horse-power. When a State desires to increase the horse-power of all or any of its dirigibles, it will be obliged to reduce the number and vice versa.

(c) To be applied, this method necessitates only an interchange of information between the States concerned, within the framework of the Convention concluded by them. It is therefore relatively simple to apply.

Disadvantages.

(a) As this method only ensures the limitation of the material in use, it makes it possible to increase the material in reserve while keeping the latter at the immediate disposal of the units. If it is desired at the same time to limit the reserve material, this method must be supplemented by another.

(b) It does not take into account the aircraft of civil aviation which has a military value for purposes of war.

The delegation of the BRITISH EMPIRE draws attention to its declaration concerning air matters as a whole.
PART V. — METHODS OF LIMITATION COMMON TO THE THREE MAIN CATEGORIES OF ARMAMENTS.

CHAPTER I. — PERSONNEL AND MATERIAL.

The delegations of BELGIUM, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, FRANCE, ITALY, POLAND, ROUMANIA and the KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES submit Text A following:

A. METHOD OF LIMITATION OF TOTAL EFFECTIVES, SERVING IN TIME OF PEACE, OF THE LAND, SEA AND AIR FORCES.

Definition of the Method. — Limitation of the total peace-time effectives, military and organised on a military basis, as defined in the Reply to Question I, Part III, Chapter I, paragraph 1.

Advantages.

1. This method is simple and has a very great elasticity, since it gives to each country the latitude of distributing its effectives between the land, sea and air forces in the manner best suited to its defence.

2. It is necessary to use this method in combination with any particular method of limiting the effectives of one of the main categories of armaments in order to make that particular method of limitation effective, especially in the frequent cases where certain effectives of this category form part of another category, either organically or administratively.

3. Its elasticity is more particularly suitable to countries where aircraft are not organised as an autonomous force.

4. Finally, if applied alone or in combination with other methods for limiting the total effectives of the three main categories of armaments available for countries in time of peace, it affects one of the more obvious signs of the total military power of each country.

Disadvantages.

1. This method treats en bloc elements whose nature and object are very dissimilar, and requires in principle to be combined at least with one limitation special to land effectives.

2. It might be superfluous if a limitation of effectives were applied individually to the effectives of each of the three main categories of armaments.

For methods of application, see:

(i) Text submitted by the delegations of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Roumania, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Spain and Sweden in Part III on the Limitation of Naval Effectives;

(ii) Text submitted by the delegations of the Argentine, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, Italy, Japan, Poland, Roumania and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, in Part III, on the Limitation of Land, Naval and Air Effectives as a Whole;

(iii) Text submitted by the delegations of Japan and Sweden in Part IV, on the Limitation of the Effectives of Aviation;

(iv) Texts included in Part II, on the Limitation of Land Effectives present with the Colours.

Limitation of the Period of Service. — It is obvious that the limitation of the period of service applies as much to naval and air effectives as to those of the army and that it has the same advantages and disadvantages (see Part IV).

The disadvantages, however, may be aggravated for the navy and air force by the large proportion of specialists in both, who require a comparatively long period of training, and also by the need of ensuring a certain stability among the crews.

For these reasons, the limitation of the period of service in the navy and air force may differ from that agreed upon for the land forces.

Limitation of Material common to the Three Categories of Armaments. — Field and siege artillery and the artillery with which merchant vessels may be armed, machine-guns, rifles, ammunition and, generally, material common to the three categories of armaments obviously cannot be treated differently according to whether they are stored in naval, military or air arsenals.

Therefore, if the methods of limiting material contemplated in Part II with regard to land armaments were found to be applicable, it would be necessary to extend them also to similar material of the navy and air force.

The same would apply to the methods of limiting manufactures or importations of war material, should they be considered applicable.
Limitation of Trained Reserves. — In an armed conflict between two States or groups of States of which one has a very large superiority in naval armaments, the latter would be at liberty to employ in land operations those trained effectives of its navy for which it would have no use in naval operations.

Similarly, in many countries, some of the effectives who have completed their active service in the navy and air force are placed as reservists among the effectives of the land forces. The reservists of the land forces, therefore, cannot be considered apart from those of the navy and air force.

If, contrary to the belief of the above delegations, it was thought that trained reserves can be limited, all the methods examined in this connection in Part II with regard to land armaments would also have to be applied to naval and air armaments.

Furthermore, the trained reserves of the army, navy and air force, the personnel of the mercantile marine, merchant vessels, the personnel and material of civil aviation and the material in stock of the army, navy and air force must be regarded as forming part of a nation's war strength, and that it is impossible to limit some directly without the others being limited also.

B.

The delegations of the BRITISH EMPIRE, CHILE, FINLAND, GERMANY, the NETHERLANDS, SPAIN, SWEDEN and the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA consider that it is unnecessary to add to the three parts regarding methods of limitation of land, naval and air armaments a special part on the methods of limitation common to the three categories of armaments.

They base this opinion on the fact that, in general, in the parts dealing with the limitation of the three categories of armaments separately, the attention of the Preparatory Commission has been already drawn by certain delegations to the points which, in their opinion, the different categories of armaments have in common.

CHAPTER II. — LIMITATION OF EXPENDITURE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE.

The delegations of BELGIUM, CHILE, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, FINLAND, FRANCE, ITALY, POLAND, ROUMANIA, the KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES and SPAIN submit Text A, as follows:

A.

Definition of the Method. — Limitation by each country of its total annual expenditure on national defence and, in particular, of its annual expenditure for certain of the main items which, after a technical study of budgets, it may be found desirable to limit separately, such as purchase, manufacture and new construction, maintenance of effectives, upkeep of material. It is desirable in this limitation to denote separately the expenditure relating to each category of armaments. This is particularly essential for expenditure on air armaments.

At the same time, as regards purchases of material, manufacture and new construction, a rigid annual limitation of expenditure under these heads cannot be contemplated when this expenditure necessarily corresponds to a programme the execution of which will be spread over a number of years and will depend upon the financial capabilities of each country and the potential output of its national defence industries.

A limit must therefore be set to the total sum allotted by each country to purchases, manufacture and new construction during the validity of the Convention, and it must be granted that, while in principle the annual expenditure may not exceed the total expenditure divided by the number of years during which the Convention remains operative, each country will retain the right, on production of supporting evidence, to carry forward unexpended funds in respect of any financial year or years to the years following.

In order that the execution of this method may be verified, it would entail the production of extracts from budgets. The extracts, which must be furnished in a standard form, will show the relation between the figures it contains and those contained in the official documents of the State concerned.

They must refer to the whole of the expenditure actually incurred and to each of the main items of expenditure which it has been found desirable to limit separately.

Advantages.

(a) The limitation of expenditure on national defence constitutes one of the most tangible signs of the limitation of armaments. It is certainly that which is most likely to be understood by public opinion.

(b) It is likely to alleviate the financial situation of numerous States which are at present going through a period of financial and economic crisis. It will thus assist in the recovery of these States.
The limitation of expenditure may compensate for the imperfections of the other methods of limitation of armaments.

In this connection, it constitutes a very necessary supplement to the direct limitations applying to each of the three main categories of armaments. It is particularly essential for the limitation of air effectives, as the direct methods suggested for this purpose are all very imperfect. The quality of material and its frequent renewal — the most important factors for air forces can only be reached through the expenses they involve.

Moreover, the necessity of taking into account the military value of civil aviation raises difficulties which can only be solved by the limitation of the subsidies which enable civil aviation to be carried on.

In particular, the limitation of expenditure will render it possible to gauge in each State the scale on which war material is being purchased and manufactured, regard being had to the need of replacing worn-out material and to the factors which place certain countries in a special position — incomplete, out-of-date or worn-out material, small arms and guns of very different designs, industry comparatively undeveloped, thus not permitting of the manufacture of such material and necessitating the purchase of the greater part or of the whole of that material abroad.

The limitation of expenditure may be checked by the examination of public documents and the production of extracts from budgets, and thus requires no direct investigation in the interior of the different States.

Disadvantages.

1. The limitation of expenditure referred to in the definition of the method would be ineffective:

(a) If it did not cover all the expenditure on national defence. Certain items of expenditure, however, are often included in budgets other than those of the ministries of national defence under headings which do not define their true character. Other expenditure is incurred as a result of gifts or subsidies by private individuals or groups of individuals, and for that reason does not appear in the budgets.

(b) If it did not apply both to the total expenditure on national defence and to each of the main divisions of this expenditure (maintenance of effectives, upkeep of material, purchases and manufacture, new construction, etc.). The discrimination made between the different kinds of expenditure is not, however, the same in all budgets.

(c) If it did not apply to the actual total of expenditure without any deduction. In some budgets, however, certain receipts (sale of old material, material transferred to other ministries or to private persons) are deducted from the expenditure on national defence.

(d) If it was not applied in practice not only to the budget estimates proper but also to the expenditure actually incurred, a statement of which must be furnished by the States as early as possible.

2. Any method of limitation, however clear it might be, would lose a great part of its value if it were not accompanied by the periodical publication of extracts from uniform budget accounts, which must be related to the official documents of the States concerned and which will be the easier to draw up in proportion as the budgets have been honestly established.

The delegations of ITALY and SPAIN do not agree to the second paragraph of the Definition and to the second and third paragraphs of advantage (c) above.

B.

The delegations of the ARGENTINE, GERMANY, JAPAN, the NETHERLANDS, SWEDEN and the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA are of opinion that the reduction of national expenditure on armaments — a result which it is highly desirable to obtain by means of the limitation and reduction of armaments — would automatically follow any effective limitation and reduction of armaments.

In view of the fact that the expenditure attaching to the establishment and upkeep of armaments constitutes neither a real measure of such armaments nor an equitable basis for the limitation of armaments, the above-mentioned delegations are convinced that a limitation of budgetary expenditure would not constitute in itself a practicable or equitable method for the limitation of armaments.

C.

The delegation of the BRITISH EMPIRE does not consider that Sub-Commission A is competent to express a technical opinion upon methods of budgetary limitation.

It considers that any proposed methods should be submitted in the first place to financial experts qualified to examine their advantages and disadvantages from a technical financial point of view.

1 This information is of the kind provided for in Article 8, paragraph 6, of the Covenant of the League of Nations.
CHAPTER III. — FINAL OBSERVATIONS.

The delegations of BELGIUM, CHILE, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, FRANCE, ITALY, POLAND, RÓUMANIA and the KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES submit the following text:

The above-named delegations declare that one of the technical consequences of certain methods of limitation of armaments considered in the present report would be that the defensive preparations of the different countries adhering to the Disarmament Convention would be disclosed to a certain extent.

By thus sacrificing, in part, the technical advantages of secrecy in regard to preparations for national defence, these countries would be placed in a less favourable position than at present.

This consequence of the limitation of armaments would be particularly disadvantageous to countries situated in a region containing one or more States which did not adhere to the Disarmament Convention.

Sub-Commission A draws the attention of the Preparatory Commission for Disarmament to the above-mentioned difficulty.

SECTION III

PART I.

No declarations.

PART II.

Declaration by the Delegations of BELGIUM and FRANCE.

METHODS OF LIMITING THE EFFECTIVES WITH THE COLOURS.

I. Two methods of limiting effectives with the colours have been considered.

The first affects all the effectives of every kind, military and organised on a military basis, trained and untrained, in the home country and in overseas territories.

The second involves separate limitations for military effectives in the home country, effectives organised on a military basis in the home country and effectives in overseas territories.

It has further been pointed out that these two methods might usefully be combined.

II. As, however, this last point has been disputed, the delegations of Belgium and France desire to submit the following explanations to the Preparatory Commission:

Two cases may arise:

1. The case of countries whose home troops cannot for some reason be employed in overseas territories or the troops from their overseas territories in the home country. For these countries, the total limitation obtained by adding together the separate limitations may not be necessary, but can do no harm.

2. The case of countries which can transfer troops from the home country overseas and vice versa. For these countries, we must distinguish between:

   (a) Effectives permanently stationed in the home country;
   (b) Available effectives, all or some of which can be stationed in the home country or overseas as required; and
   (c) The minimum effectives permanently required overseas.

The limitations will be: for the home territories of these countries, $a + b$; for their colonial territories, $c + b$; but as a total limitation they can accept a limitation equal not to the total of the partial limitations (which would be $a + 2b + c$) but to $a + b + c$.

It is therefore desirable to combine the method of total limitation with the method of separate limitations for home and overseas effectives.

B.

Declaration by the Delegations of the BRITISH EMPIRE, CHILE, FINLAND, GERMANY, the NETHERLANDS, SPAIN, SWEDEN and the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

I.

METHOD OF LIMITATION APPLICABLE TO THE ANNUAL CONTINGENT.

The above-mentioned delegations desire to point out, as regards the method of limitation of the contingent enrolled annually below the numbers eligible for recruitment, that there exists an appreciable difference between conscript armies as regards the proportion enrolled.
This difference was especially noticeable before the last war. Further, the total number of those eligible for recruitment can never be enrolled, so that there always has been and always will be inequality of military burdens, which may, however, be compensated in various ways.

During the last few years, certain countries, forced thereto by economic and social reasons, have effected an appreciable reduction in their military expenditure and personal charges by reducing their contingent — a proof that this method may be efficacious.

II.

METHODS OF LIMITATION APPLICABLE TO TRAINED RESERVES.

(a) The above-mentioned delegations are of opinion that trained reserves constitute in peace time elements of the greatest importance and are ready to be employed from the outbreak of war. They consider that trained reserves do not form part of war potential and are therefore limitable by one or other of the proposed methods or by a combination of two or more of these methods.

They are also of opinion that the proposed methods are not aimed at limiting the war potential of a State but simply refer to the limitation:

1) Of the forces employed in peace time;
2) Of the forces prepared for war time (trained reserves, material in reserve).

Limitation of trained reserves and material in reserve thus in no way implies limitation of “ultimate war forces” created during hostilities by means of the general resources at the disposal of each country. (See reply to Question I, Section II, Part I, A.)

A brief examination of these methods will show that they are entirely technical and practical in character.

(b) The above-mentioned delegations are of opinion that the problem of the limitation of trained reserves should be examined by Sub-Commission A simply from the technical military point of view.

The Preparatory Commission held that the task entrusted to it should be undertaken on the understanding that every Government should have in view proposals accompanied by reasons in support calculated with reference to the degree of security. It instructed Sub-Commission A, however, to deal simply with the technical aspect of these questions (document C. 301. 1926. IX, paragraph 2). Hence, in the opinion of the above delegations, the question of security does not come under consideration when Sub-Commission A is required to reply to questions submitted from the technical military point of view.

The question as to whether it is at present possible, from the political point of view, to take measures with a view to limitation of trained reserves should not in any way affect the technical solution of the problem. The Preparatory Commission simply expressed the opinion that it was not at present possible to limit the ultimate war strength of a country. It affirmed that it was possible to limit the permanent peace-time forces and referred to Sub-Commission A for examination the question of the possibility of a wider limitation.

As regards trained reserves, this examination has led to the conclusion that the methods of limitation of trained reserves are at present applicable from the technical point of view.

C.

Declaration by the Delegation of JAPAN.

METHODS OF LIMITATION APPLICABLE TO TRAINED RESERVES.

Trained reserves constitute the very foundation of the system of military organisation based on a conscripted army, and constitute an essential factor in the national defence of the countries which have adopted this system.

From the technical point of view, the delegation of Japan is prepared to submit for the examination of the Preparatory Commission all methods of limitation of reserves which could be applied fairly and equitably in all countries. For the reasons stated below, however, it must raise serious objections to any methods of limitation which only apply to “trained reserves” in the narrower sense.

I.

In modern warfare, the importance of technical specialisation is constantly increasing. If hostilities should begin by a surprise attack carried out by certain special units, civilian technical experts of all kinds might immediately be able to play a very important part.

Moreover, in the countries which took part in the last war, there will still exist for a long time to come a large number of men who have seen active service. Even if after the war they have not remained at the disposal of the military authorities, these men possess a very great value, since they have obviously acquired an experience which no peace-time training could possibly give.

Furthermore, account must be taken of young men who have received preparatory military training or sport training, and who might therefore be used at the very outset of hostilities in the armed forces, after receiving complementary instruction — which might be given...
during the period of political tension preceding a war. Such a period of tension may be a
long one, since the tendency of modern international political organisation is to postpone by
various methods the moment when a dispute may lead to armed conflict. Under these
circumstances, those countries which possess the potential war strength and abundant
resources in man-power might during that period train for military uses men who had
previously received nothing but ordinary physical training.

Therefore, when "trained reserves" are taken into consideration, all such elements which
may be used in the same way as trained reserves must be assigned exactly the same degree
of importance, and it is essential that they should be treated on the same footing. For this
reason the delegation of Japan considers it right that these elements should be included among
the trained reserves or be treated as such. On the other hand, in the case of certain countries
which possess conscripted armies but from which there is large-scale emigration, account
should be taken of the fact that a great many reservists would only be able to return to their
country in case of war after delay more or less long.

II.

It will be seen from the foregoing that all countries which took part in the great war,
whether they have conscripted or voluntary armies, must possess millions of trained ex-soldiers,
and the question whether these are subject to military laws or not does not appear to the dele-
gation of Japan to be of great importance, since laws can be altered when necessity arises.

Reserves already existing — for which obviously no limitation is possible — are approxi-
mately comparable in all countries.

It would also, however, be of interest to know what in actual fact is the quality of the
reserves which are now being trained. It is an incontrovertible fact that since the war, all
countries with conscripted armies are tending, for various reasons, to reduce the length of
military service; this constitutes a serious risk for these countries, since reduction in the length
of military service is not always accompanied (for political, financial and social reasons) by
the measures essential for maintaining the training at the high level which would appear
desirable. Therefore, the military quality of the young reservists tends more and more to
deteriorate.

On the other hand, the preliminary military training of young men, whether in units of
the army or not, or at universities, schools, etc., is becoming more and more usual in all countries,
and this may compensate for the reduction in the length of military service or, to the largest
possible extent, for the fact that, with the system of voluntary recruitment, especially with long-
term service, only a relatively small number of reservists can receive training. It would therefore
perhaps not be an exaggeration to say that, so far as reservists are concerned, the inequalities
between the two systems of recruitment (voluntary and conscription) are tending to disappear.

III.

It has been said that, immediately after mobilisation, a conscripted army possesses a greater
power of immediate attack than a voluntary army. But the delegation of Japan doubts
whether, in a future war, this difference would, in fact, make itself immediately felt. Before
this power of attack can be brought into play, all the reservists which a country has at its
disposal must be equipped with the most up-to-date material, since the part played by material
will be ever more important in future wars. A country, however rich, will ever be capable of
maintaining in peace time, and of constantly renewing so as to keep pace with technical
progress, all the material necessary to arm all the units which might be constituted with the
trained reserves available. Thus, so far as can be foreseen, the characteristic feature of the
beginning of future wars will be industrial mobilisation, and the measure of success with
which this is achieved will often determine the result of the war. It will, therefore, no longer
be the race for the concentration of man-power on the frontier which will be of importance in
the future but the race in the manufacture of material for the equipment of the men available.

In this race, the advantage will obviously lie with the countries possessing the greatest financial
and industrial resources. If the time which this total mobilisation would require is taken into
consideration, whatever the resources of the country and whatever the plan of campaign
may be, it can at once be realised that there would be time to undertake and complete the
instruction of all the untrained men. In these circumstances, it would not be too much to say
that, in modern warfare, the true power of attack belongs to the country possessing the
least potential war strength, and not to the country possessing the greatest number of reservists.

In view of the foregoing considerations, the delegation of Japan has come to the following
conclusion:

No methods of limitation are either just or equitable which only apply to reservists
having served in the regular army, and which leave outside the scope of this limitation tech-
nical experts of every kind, young men who have received training making them capable of
utilisation in war, whatever the organisation may be in which they have received such train-
ing, as also men who have seen active service.

The delegation of Japan considers that the case of reservists who have served in the regular
army is exactly on a par with that of civil aviation in relation to military aviation. No doubt
it may be argued that reservists are trained for war, whereas the civil air force is not; but
if it is true that the civilian air force may be used at the very outset of war for military purposes,
it is of little importance, from the military point of view, what its original purpose may have
been. For this reason, the delegation of Japan has always held the opinion that civil aviation
must be taken into account in the limitation of the military air forces. The delegation of
Japan notes with regret that, among all the methods which have been considered with a view
to the limitation of trained reserves, not a single one takes into account the various other factors which should be placed on the same footing as the latter, and which must equally be limited if the trained reserves are. In short, not a single method has been proposed which would make it possible to draw an equitable distinction between trained reserves and the various other factors constituting potential war strength. It has, however, been generally recognised that potential war strength cannot be limited and, on the other hand, that account must be taken, to the greatest possible extent, of the inequalities in potential war strength, when the level of the peace-time armaments of the various countries comes to be determined.

Although the differences in the resources in trained reserves inherent in the two systems of recruitment tend to disappear, these differences should, to a certain extent, be taken into account and the direct limitation of trained reserves should be abandoned.

D.

The delegations of CZECHOSLOVAKIA, FRANCE, ITALY, POLAND, ROUMANIA and the KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES associate themselves with the above declaration submitted by the delegation of Japan, and at the same time desire to draw attention to the arguments they have put forward on the same subject in their reply to Question II (a), and in the declarations contained in Section III of the reply regarding Questions I and II (a).

PART III.

A.

Declaration by the Delegations of the BRITISH EMPIRE, CHILE and the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Paragraph 5(d) of “General Principles” (page 79)

The above-named delegations do not concur in the interpretation attached by certain delegations to the word “organise” contained in “General Principles”, 5 (d) when this implies the right to construct any type of vessel considered desirable.

These delegations are of the opinion that such interpretation would tend to disturb the established scale of armaments and, while possibly desirable in the interests of any particular country, is contrary to the interests of the nations as a whole.

B.

Declaration by the Delegation of FRANCE.

Methods of Limiting the Floating Material of Naval Armaments.

The delegation of France desires to make the following observations to the Preparatory Commission:


It appears useful to point out that, of the five methods of limiting the floating material of naval armaments which have been submitted by various delegations, four amount to a limitation of the total tonnage.

These four systems are based upon a somewhat arbitrary division of ships into a number (more or less great) of classes or groups. They all provide in the case of each of these classes for a limitation of the tonnage of the total number of ships grouped in them. The sum of the partial tonnages gives a total tonnage of which neither the parts nor the total must be exceeded.

The first two methods (total tonnage and total depreciated tonnage) contemplate only one class. The third, which aims at an extension of the Treaty of Washington (Application C), involves four; the fourth, tonnage by classes (Application A), contemplates six.

The fifth system, which is based not upon tonnages but upon the number of ships in each class (Application B), also divides ships into classes, but in this case the definition is so elastic that the number of classes cannot be fixed, although it would appear to range from six to thirteen, judging from the documents and declarations from the delegation which suggested this method.

These points being fixed, it is possible to analyse these systems or methods according to a general principle which is of undeniable value, viz., that, in the limitation of entire naval armaments, the more classes subject to independent limitation are created, the more the position of the country which heads each class is strengthened.

1 The principle is equally applicable to the question of the interdependence of armaments.
It should be pointed out that the number of classes contemplated by each method varies as the strength of the country which suggested it, and that the number of delegations in favour of each method has varied inversely as the number of classes contemplated by the method.

It is also interesting to note that all the nations of Europe represented, with the exception of Great Britain, have pronounced in favour of the method involving the smallest number of classes, i.e., total tonnage, because its application would give them the greatest confidence of security.

These delegations have pointed out that, in any method of limitation, an increase in the number of classes would favour the more powerful navies to the detriment of the remainder, and even more so as the former would control more accessory resources, such as harbours, naval bases, ports of call, positions commanding focal points of maritime trade routes, none of which have been covered by any limitation.

The delegation of France is therefore of opinion that the weaker navies — which are in the majority — have considered the method of limitation by total tonnage as the only one corresponding to their own defensive interests, and one which would at the same time give scope for a most effective limitation of naval armaments.

It is for the Preparatory Commission to decide whether a limitation of naval armaments should meet the requirements of the weaker and more numerous navies, or those of the few navies which have all-powerful fighting units at their disposal and also war potentials such that the other navies would not be in a position to threaten them in any way.

2. Special Observations on the Method of Limitation by Classes.

In regard to the conditions for the application of methods based on classes, the delegation of France would observe that, in its opinion, Applications A and B of this method have not been so comprehensively examined by the Naval Committee as would have been desirable in order to enable the Committee to give a still better justified technical opinion to the Preparatory Commission.

The definitions of these applications involve numerous figures which are left entirely vague, although they are intended to define by maximum tonnages or calibres of weapons the conditions under which the systems are to be applied.

This vagueness, indeed, is such as to make it absolutely impossible for the States to study and prepare the "precise quantitative proposals" which they are asked to bring to the Conference.

In order to remedy to some extent this vagueness of the definitions and to enable Sub-Commission A to answer all questions put by the Preparatory Commission, the delegation of France has suggested that the opponents of these systems should give these unknown quantities values as little arbitrary as possible; and it is on the basis of these figures, selected in accordance with the Washington Treaty, that the method has been discussed.

As the criticisms of the advantages put forward and the statement of the disadvantages of Applications A and B of this method have had to be drawn up on these assumptions, the criticisms and disadvantages in question cannot be said to be complete or final.

In proof of this, we need only consider the two following examples:

1. Should the final Conference decide to limit the maximum tonnage of capital ships (which now reaches 40,000 tons) to a much lower figure, such as 20,000 tons, one of the disadvantages of the method would become much less grave, because the lessening of the gap between the extreme limits of tonnage of vessels defined as capital ships would make the definition of this class, and subsequently the application of the method, less inequitable.

At the same time, such an agreement, which would represent an important step towards disarmament, could not be applied equitably to all countries unless all ships of more than 20,000 tons were scrapped as soon as the Convention came into force. Otherwise, the three biggest navies, which alone at present include ships of 35,000 tons and which, moreover, have modern capital ships of an average age of eight years, would retain for twelve years at least a crushing superiority over fleets which do not contain units of that tonnage and could not build them.

2. If, instead of fixing the displacement which a cruiser cannot exceed without becoming a capital ship (Washington Agreements) at 10,000 tons, it were decided to make this displacement smaller, e.g., 6,000 tons, the disadvantages of the method would be considerably aggravated. The consequent weakening of cruisers would largely increase the war value of...
in merchant vessels capable of being used as auxiliary cruisers. Such a measure, therefore, would be of no profit except to the nations with the largest commercial fleets.

This reduction in the maximum tonnage of cruisers would also reduce the period during which they can remain at sea and consequently shorten their radius of action. This, again, would be to the advantage of countries having a large number of naval bases, ports of call and strategic points on the main sea routes.


In addition to all the disadvantages of the classification of warships and the vagueness of the classes, there is, in the case of applications A and B, the very serious condition — essential in application A — of the limitation of the calibre of torpedoes.

The delegation of France wishes to repeat that, in its opinion, the maintenance of such a clause is sufficient alone — irrespective of the other disadvantages of these applications, vital though they are — to condemn them out of hand. It would have the result of depriving nations which have no large capital ships (dreadnoughts, super-dreadnoughts and post-Jutlands) of all chance of defending themselves against such warships.

Moreover, any limitation of the calibre of torpedoes would have the effect of limiting considerably the efficiency of this arm by limiting its range. This cannot be accepted, in view of the range of guns, which would remain unlimited inasmuch as the fixing of limits for the length of guns measured by calibre and for angles of fire has not been contemplated.

On this point, the delegation of France wishes to observe that one of the five delegations which submitted all the methods of limitation by classes has proclaimed itself unfavourable to the limitation of the calibre of torpedoes. Such a limitation, indeed, would considerably reduce the efficiency of submarines as against capital ships. Countries with small navies could not accept such a restriction of their best weapon of defence and could not consent to special measures of limitation being taken against these vessels, which constitute the essential defensive arm of weak fleets.

4. Observations on the Note to Application C.

From the technical point of view, the excepting of submarines from the note to Application C is incomprehensible. The note is designed to moderate for surface ships the strictness of the rules for replacement by classes, in order to improve or facilitate the application of the method. The submarine is a priori far more a defensive than an offensive weapon.

Further, it should be pointed out that the fact that the countries in favour of classes and against total tonnage find it necessary to make one of their methods more or less elastic in its application shows that, in order to make their method applicable, they are forced to make it as like the total-tonnage system as possible.

This proves that only the method based on total tonnage can be universally applied for the limitation of naval armaments, because it is equitable for all concerned.

C.

Declaration by the Delegations of the ARGENTINE, the BRITISH EMPIRE, CHILE, JAPAN and the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

METHODS OF LIMITING THE FLOATING MATERIAL OF NAVAL ARMAMENTS.

The delegations of the Argentine, the British Empire, Chile, Japan and the United States of America have on several occasions urged that the report on the reduction and limitation of naval armaments should be presented in a simple form, and one which would be readily comprehensible to those who have not followed the deliberations from the beginning.

For this reason, they consider it desirable to point out that the difference between the method of limitation by total tonnage and limitation by classes is not fundamental, the essential difference lying in the manner of application.

In both methods, the requirements of a country must originally have been calculated on a basis of classes.

In the case of limitation by classes, the manner in which the tonnage agreed to is to be utilised is made public and an undertaking given that such declared utilisation will be adhered to during the life of the agreement.

In the case of limitation by total tonnage as advocated by certain delegations, such publication and undertaking are denied and uncertainty is bound to result.

The delegations of the Argentine, the British Empire, Chile, Japan and the United States of America attach great importance to the publicity of the naval intentions of each country, and affirm that it is only by such means that uncertainty can be removed. They repeat that it is difficult to devise a method where the letter cannot be complied with and the spirit evaded, but they contend that this is rendered more difficult in the method of limitation by classes.

The above delegations most emphatically assert that the method of limitation proposed by them in no way denies to a country the right to claim such naval forces as it may deem essential for security.

\[\text{Table II.}\]

| Merchant Vessels of speed higher than 14 knots and consequently capable of use as Auxiliary Cruisers. |
|---|---|
| **Tons** | **Tons** |
| Great Britain | 3,323,563 | Japan | 200,220 |
| United States | 993,407 | Netherlands | 237,956 |
| France | 404,856 | Spain | 90,960 |
| Italy | 356,109 | Sweden | 59,784 |
D.

Declaration by the Delegation of CHILE.

ALTERATIONS AND MODERNISATIONS TO WARSHIPS.

The delegation of Chile, wishes to draw the attention of the Preparatory Commission to the following declaration:

Account must be taken, in any rules for replacement and also in any comparison between ships, not only of the date of completion but also of any extensive alteration or modernisation a ship may have undergone.

The delegation of Chile is of the opinion that, since such alterations or modernisations have the effect of increasing greatly the fighting value of a ship of more or less the same age and not reconstructed or modernised, the rules in question must, in such special cases, entail a proportional reduction of the original age in order to render fair and equitable their application in all circumstances.

E.

Declaration by the Delegation of CHILE.

METHOD OF TONNAGE BY CATEGORIES.

On several occasions during the discussion of the general method of reduction and limitation by categories, various delegations have expressed the opinion that this method is not convenient for nations with small navies.

Without any intention of reopening this discussion, the delegation of Chile wishes to state that, from the days of the Pan-American Conference held in Santiago de Chile in 1923, at which time the problem of a possible reduction of armaments on a fair and practicable basis was presented as one of the points for consideration, the Government of Chile maintained, as a leading principle for the reduction and limitation of naval armaments, a method based on total tonnage of different categories, believing that this method gave a very fair standard of measurement of the naval strength of all countries, and was easy to apply in that case.

In the present circumstances, the delegation of Chile is convinced that any of the applications contemplated in the general method of limitation by categories will render practical results among the South American States which are in possession of small navies which include capital ships as well as other classes of combatant vessels. These South American States have maintained for years a certain relative naval strength in so far as their naval programmes are concerned, and in our opinion it is of primary importance that this relativity be maintained and that all uncertainty regarding future construction be reduced to the minimum. In so far as naval armaments are concerned, we think that a feeling of security between our neighbours and ourselves will continue to exist if we adopt a system of reduction and limitation by categories, and have an agreement by which the replacement of obsolete units may be made in accordance with the requirements and within certain limits.

Other disadvantages of the total-tonnage method so far outweigh the possible advantages that in our opinion such a method cannot be applied equitably to small navies.

We believe that the torpedo may be considered in certain conditions as an offensive weapon, and that at the ultimate Conference an agreement should be reached limiting the maximum size of the torpedo-tube as well as the maximum calibre of the gun.

For the above reasons the delegation of Chile has associated itself with the views expressed by the delegations of the Argentine, the British Empire, Japan and the United States of America, believing that this document presents a method which is quite logical and equitable for a future solution of the problem under consideration.

F.

Declaration by the Delegations of the ARGENTINE, the BRITISH EMPIRE, CHILE, JAPAN and the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

LIMITATION OF MATERIAL IN RESERVE.

The above-named delegations are of the opinion that reduction and limitation of actual naval tonnage automatically impose a practical reduction and limitation on the material in reserve.

As far as essential naval strength is concerned, ships constitute the ultimate measure of such strength, and additional material without ships is of no fighting value on the sea. Therefore, it is useless to provide a large amount of material beyond the actual need for ships, but
due allowance must be made for a necessary replacement reserve. It must be remembered that, when a ship is sunk or captured, it cannot be replaced except by new construction.

The advantage of confining limitation to objects the existence of which is known to the whole world is manifest and hence the vexatious question of control is avoided.

The delegations of the Argentine, the British Empire, Chile, Japan and the United States of America wish to emphasise their opinion that, when definite and tangible objects for limitation exist, as in the case of naval armaments, the addition of auxiliary factors, such as naval material in store and in reserve, can only complicate the problem of reduction and limitation of armaments and thus jeopardise the prospects of success of the Conference.

G.

Declaration by the Delegations of the ARGENTINE, the BRITISH EMPIRE, CHILE, JAPAN and the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

LIMITATION OF NAVAL PERSONNEL.

The above-named delegations consider that the term “naval personnel” refers to all personnel, active and reserve, trained essentially for service afloat.

A vessel-of-war to-day combines within itself the most highly developed and complicated specialised technical organisation known, in which each unit must be co-ordinated to the fullest degree to ensure efficiency.

To effect this requires considerable time and, furthermore, the necessary training can only be given afloat. Accommodation aboard ship is restricted and hence an effective limit is imposed upon the number of men who can receive real naval training. It is realised that a certain percentage of naval personnel is employed on shore at schools of instruction and also to carry out essential naval activities related intimately to the fleet, but it should be recognised that such naval activities on shore naturally will be based on the size of the fleet. It may be asserted, therefore, that trained naval personnel and reserves are in fact governed and automatically limited by the size of the war fleet.

There is a popular belief, dating from the sailing-ship era, that the merchant marine is a source of almost unlimited supply for the personnel of the war fleet. On the contrary, however, experience has shown that in time of war the men of the merchant service cannot be spared from their normal calling.

The delegations of the Argentine, the British Empire, Chile, Japan and the United States of America wish to emphasise their opinion that, where definite and tangible objects for limitation exist, as is the case with naval armaments, the addition of auxiliary factors such as naval personnel can only complicate the problem of reduction and limitation of armaments and thus jeopardise seriously the prospects of success of the Conference.

H.

Declaration by the Delegations of the ARGENTINE, BELGIUM, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, FRANCE, ITALY, POLAND, ROUMANIA and the KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES.

COMPARISON OF METHODS OF RECRUITING NAVAL PERSONNEL.

The above-named delegations consider that the countries which use the voluntary system enjoy, as regards naval armaments, the very great advantage of the stability of their crews and that this allows them to obtain the maximum efficiency, whereas countries which employ the method of conscription have to change a considerable part of their crews every year, a proportion which exceeds 50 per cent in certain countries. On the other hand, as regards reserves, the situation of countries which are organised on the voluntary system is approximately similar to that of countries using the method of conscription. In both cases they are obliged, in fact, to draw on the crews of the mercantile marine in order to make up the complement of men necessary for them in case of mobilisation. The number of reserves at the disposal of the different countries for their navies does not, therefore, necessarily depend upon the system of recruiting but rather on the extent of their mercantile marines and their fishing fleets.

J.

The Delegations of the NETHERLANDS and SWEDEN, while associating themselves in principle with the views expressed in the criticisms, refrain from any opinion on the references made to treaties to which their respective countries are not signatories.
PART IV.

A.

Declaration by the Delegation of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

LIMITATION OF AIR ARMAMENTS.

The delegation of the United States is firmly of the opinion that practical progress in the matter of the limitation or reduction of air armaments can be made only by the consideration of methods applicable to visible and tangible armaments which are actually in existence. These visible and tangible armaments which are in existence consist of two principal classes — personnel and material.

In regard to personnel, methods of limitation should be brought to bear upon, first, forces maintained with the colours in time of peace and, second, upon trained reserves, which have been defined as those men who, having completed their period of service with the colours, are still under a legal obligation to serve their government in case of mobilisation. Any effort to extend methods of limitation beyond these two classes of personnel, or an effort to include in these forces a portion of the civil population who have had no military training and who legally are not in the same class as trained reserves, will inevitably foredoom such methods to failure.

In regard to material, methods of limitation should be confined to material actually in service with the forces serving with the colours, or to material held in reserve for the purpose of arming and equipping the trained reserves in event of mobilisation. Any effort to extend methods of limitation to, or to take into account, material normally in the hands of the civil population and not subject to exclusive governmental control for war purposes, will inevitably foredoom such methods to failure.

The delegation of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA cannot concur in any method which envisages a limitation of manufactures and imports of military air material, for the reason that such a method is impracticable and unjustified, and raises many political questions which appear to be entirely outside of the purview of Sub-Commission A.

The delegation of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA desires that it be clearly understood that it cannot accept any consideration of, or taking into account, either the personnel or the material of civil aviation in any method proposed for the reduction or limitation of air armaments. Both the personnel and the material of civil aviation and of the aeronautical industry constitute a part of the resources of a country. Any method of limitation or reduction whose application extends beyond dealing with visible air armaments is unacceptable.

B.

Declaration by the Delegation of FRANCE.

METHODS OF LIMITING AIR ARMAMENTS.

During the 1914-18 war, air forces were employed for the first time in war. The services which they were able to render to other classes of armaments and also as an independent arm have steadily increased and furnish some indication of the particularly important part which aviation will play in a future war. It would therefore be of the utmost importance to limit air armaments as speedily as possible, with a view to checking the great advance which this new arm seems likely to make if it is not prevented by some form of regulation.

In considering the possibilities of limitation, one exceptionally serious difficulty is encountered which is brought out in the reply to Question VI: at the present stage of aeronautical science there are, from the military point of view, no essential differences between civil and service aircraft. This is a point of vital importance which dominates the whole problem of the limitation of air armaments.

As far back as the Washington Conference in 1921, the Committee on Aircraft had noted that the development of civil aviation and the development of the air forces of a country could not be separated. In the report of this Committee, which was unanimously adopted by the representatives of the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan and the United States of America, it was stated that:

"Objections in detail to each suggested method of limitation have been advanced above — there is one insuperable objection which is common to every method, namely, the close relationship which at present exists between civil or commercial aeronautics and air power. Unless civil and commercial aeronautics are strictly limited, a nation desiring air power in excess of the limit imposed or agreed to will develop its civil and commercial aeronautics to any extent desired".

The same Committee consequently adopted the following final conclusion:

"The Committee is of opinion that it is not practicable to impose any effective limitations upon the numbers or characteristics of aircraft, either commercial or military, excepting in the single case of lighter-than-air craft".

Since that date, the difficulty mentioned has not disappeared but, on the contrary, has been accentuated by the constantly increasing development of civil aviation. It may be asked if this difficulty is absolutely insurmountable and if it will force us to accept as final the conclusion of the Washington Conference. This is not our opinion.
If it were admitted that a limitation of air armaments was impossible, the task of general limitation which has been undertaken would be seriously jeopardised. It is impossible to contemplate the reduction of land and naval armaments while air armaments are allowed to develop freely. Such a procedure would enable a country to direct its main efforts to increasing its air force and to developing this arm to such a pitch that it would be in a position to impose its will by using or threatening to use its air force alone. It is therefore of the highest importance to bring about a limitation of air armaments.

It has been suggested, with a view to simplifying the problem, that military aviation should alone be limited, no account being taken of civil aviation in the various countries. This is undoubtedly a simple method — in our opinion, indeed, too simple. It is obviously impossible to obtain anything but a false result by eliminating at the outset one of the main factors in a problem. In practice, the main result of such a system of limitation would be to give much greater importance to the other factors in the air power of the various countries for war and, in particular, to civil aviation. It would not appear to be acceptable to States in which civil aviation is but little developed.

An acceptable system of limitation can accordingly only be found by keeping constantly in view the close connection between civil aviation and military aviation. It must then be recognised that the various countries occupy very different positions, which, however, may be regarded from two main points of view.

1. In certain countries, civil aviation is already of importance and, by reason of favourable circumstances, is certain to develop. The air force which these States may employ in war depends not only on their peace-time air armaments but also on their mobilisation air armaments (civil aviation reservists and specialists, military aircraft in reserve and civil aircraft which may be requisitioned).

In the case of these States, regard being had to all the other factors necessary for determining their armaments, peace-time air armaments, on the one hand, and service aircraft kept in reserve for mobilisation, on the other hand, may be limited in relation to the extent of the contribution furnished to them on mobilisation by the personnel and material of their civil aviation.

The limitation, and even the reduction, of the air armaments of these States is highly desirable. It would appear to be possible, although, in fixing the limits, account would have to be taken of disturbances in equilibrium produced by differences in the development of civil aviation in the States concerned.

2. In other States, civil aviation is of small importance and the prospects of development are small. A country of this class, concerned for its security, will have to take account of the development of the civil aviation in other countries and, to compensate for the position of inferiority in which it would be placed in time of war as against countries possessing important civil-aviation forces, will be led to increase its peace-time air armaments and to maintain larger mobilisation armaments.

The limitation of the air armaments of these States may only be agreed to on condition that any increase in civil aviation in the other countries is accompanied by an equivalent reduction in military aviation.

* * *

Conclusions. — The limitation of air armaments is a particularly delicate question by reason of the fact that aeronautical science is constantly advancing and that civil aviation may constitute a means of warfare almost as important as military aviation.

This question of limitation, the utility of which is indisputable, must therefore only be approached with the utmost prudence, by taking into consideration the main factors in the problem without eliminating any of these with a view to simplification. Any check experienced would have disastrous consequences. It might lead to the very air-armaments race which it is our object to prevent.

Consequently, the technical considerations on which the Preparatory Commission might base a sound decision are as follows:

1. Any limitation of air armaments established without taking account of civil aviation could not be acceptable to all countries: it would be too disadvantageous for those countries in which civil aviation is not likely to develop on a large scale.

2. A limitation of air armaments in service in peace time (effectives and material in service) would appear to be capable of giving satisfactory results, with the express reservation, however, that it is fixed with the fullest consideration for the importance and the possibilities of development of civil aviation in all the countries concerned.

3. If more extensive limitation is desired, the sole practical solution, from the military point of view alone, would be the general limitation as a whole of military and civil aviation. To decide whether such a limitation is possible, it is essential to ascertain and appraise the economic consequences which it might entail: Sub-Commission A does not possess the necessary qualification or powers to examine these consequences.

The delegations of BELGIUM, CHILE, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, ITALY, POLAND, ROUMANIA and the KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES support declaration B above.
C.

Declaration by the Delegation of the BRITISH EMPIRE.

RELATING TO AIR MATTERS GENERALLY.

The delegation of the BRITISH EMPIRE desire to make their general position on air matters quite clear by means of this single declaration. They do not propose submitting declarations on various minor points in Questions (a) and (b) of the Commentary on II(b) and III, or VI(a) and (b).

With reference to the Reply to the latter Question (VI(a) and (b)), they have collaborated in obtaining a joint text which, in their opinion, will give an accurate representation to the Preparatory Commission of the degree of compromise and agreement which it was possible to reach after months of discussion. They consider that they will be rendering the greatest assistance in their power to the Preparatory Commission by retaining intact the primitive text, which they consider reflects most faithfully the general attitude of the Air Sub-Committee.

With regard to Questions (a) and (b) of the Commentary relative to II (b) and III, the delegation of the BRITISH EMPIRE wish clearly to state that they do not consider themselves responsible or in any way bound by all the various statements in these Questions. The sole method for which they are responsible is Method No. 1, viz., Limitation by Numbers of Aircraft of Service Types to be maintained in commission in first-line combatant units of the metropolitan forces, not including overseas forces.

They have studied with the greatest attention the various alternative methods put forward, and with some they find themselves in some measure in agreement; with others they are obliged clearly to express their disagreement in particular, they refer in this respect to methods contained in Chapter II, paragraph 6, and III, viz., Method based on the Limitation of Manufactures and Imports of Military Air Material, and a Combined Method based on a knowledge of the development and possibilities of the development of civil aviation.

The delegation of the BRITISH EMPIRE, moreover, find themselves in an equally definite position with regard to the System of Limitation of Military and Civil Aviation as a whole. As has been pointed out, they consider that the political and economic considerations underlying this proposal are of so important a nature as to debar a technical consideration at the present moment and—in common with the delegations of the Argentine, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United States of America—they have definitely refrained from any discussion on the merits of the method.

D.

Declaration by the Delegation of FRANCE.

LIMITATION OF TRAINED AIR-FORCE RESERVES.

The delegation of FRANCE submits the following observations regarding the methods of limiting trained air-force reserves, which were not put forward until the second reading (Section II, Chapter I, paragraph 2, page 114):

1. The delegation of FRANCE does not think that this limitation can be carried out on the principles established for the limitation of the land forces. The only reserves that concern the air force are specialists employed in civil aviation and in the aircraft industry, and these are not limited by the proposed methods. The other reservists are not specially detailed to the air force; they are interchangeable, and may serve in other arms or be transferred to the air force from those arms.

2. The delegation of FRANCE fails to see how the limitation of the annual contingent can limit the trained air-force reserve. The portion of the contingent allotted to the air force is not limited; there is nothing to prevent any country from increasing it, provided that it reduces accordingly the portion of the contingent allotted to the army and navy.

3. The delegation of FRANCE makes the same observation as regards the abolition of compulsory military service.

In the opinion of the delegation of FRANCE, if the direct limitation of trained reserves were possible, it would have to be applied to all the three main categories of armaments taken as a whole in order to be effectual.

E.

Declaration by the Delegation of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

COMBINED METHOD (Chapter III) OF LIMITATION OF AIR ARMAMENTS.

The delegation of the UNITED STATES of AMERICA cannot accept the combined method of limitation as outlined on page 119. It is believed that any method for the
limitation of air armaments which tends to raise grave economic and political questions is so fraught with danger as to jeopardise the success of any Convention for the Limitation or Reduction of Armaments of which it may be a part.

The method as outlined is indeterminate as to length of time and may be vitiated at the volition of one of the high contracting parties upon grounds which heretofore have been considered untenable in any international Convention. Unless this or any other method is put into force for a definite period of time and is binding upon all signatories alike, it is certain to be ineffective.

The method as outlined visualises a limitation upon civilian aeronautics and is certain to result in a serious retardation of its legitimate development. In addition, the limitation envisaged, applicable as it is to civilian aviation, will block the development of the science of aeronautics and the growth of the legitimate aeronautical industry.

The application of this method necessarily would involve some system of international control of military aeronautical matters, a control of civil aeronautics and, either directly or indirectly, an international control of the legitimate commercial activities of a country which contributes to its aeronautical industry. The system of control which must necessarily follow the application of this method would seriously jeopardise the success of any Convention entered into for the limitation or reduction of armaments.

The delegation of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA believes that consideration of any method which involves such grave economic and political questions is entirely outside the competence of Sub-Commission A and should be considered only by some joint economic and military committee competent to handle the serious questions involved.

The failure to include a limitation on trained reserves and reserve material would militate against a full limitation of air armaments.

For the foregoing reasons, the delegation of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA finds itself unable to accept the method in question.

F.

Declaration by the Delegation of GERMANY.

COMBINED METHOD (CHAPTER III) OF LIMITATION OF AIR ARMAMENTS.

The delegation of GERMANY agrees with the Declaration E above, made by the delegation of the United States of America, on the Combined Method of Limitation of Air Armaments.

It wishes to add the following observations:

In this method the signatory Powers are obliged to give information concerning the estimated normal needs of their civil aviation for the duration of the Convention. The result of giving such information would be:

1. That all States would have to exercise supervision over private civil aviation firms for the period preceding the Convention, and introduce the necessary legislation to permit of its being done;

2. The economic and technical freedom of civil aviation would be seriously restricted for the duration of, as well as for the period preceding, the Convention;

3. It would encourage unfair competition by prematurely making known the economic and technical intentions of civil-aviation firms and organisations, which might entail serious consequences of an economic and even of a political nature;

4. The civil-aviation activities of a country would be weakened to the advantage of other countries which were less concerned from an economic point of view.

In other words, the proposed method would be tantamount to subordinating the legitimate economic interests to military and political aims.

PART V.

A.

Declaration by the Delegations of the BRITISH EMPIRE, CHILE and the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

METHODS OF LIMITATION COMMON TO THE THREE CATEGORIES OF ARMAMENTS.

The delegations above mentioned desire to submit the following opinion in regard to the joint consideration of land, naval and air armaments.

They believe that the ultimate success of any effort toward the reduction and limitation of armaments lies along the line of isolating from the general problem as many concrete questions as possible and therefore feel that the joint consideration of the reduction and limitation of land, naval and air armaments would tend to render more difficult definite achievement along any one line.
B.

Declaration by the Delegation of SWEDEN.

LIMITATION OF TOTAL LAND, NAVAL AND AIR EFFECTIVES.

During the examination of the method of limitation of total effectives serving in time of peace the delegation of SWEDEN refrained from taking part in the discussion or from expressing any opinion.

The delegation of SWEDEN has always considered it necessary, in order to achieve an effective limitation of peace-time effectives, to make this limitation apply not only to land effectives but also to naval and air effectives, and this opinion has been expressed by the delegation on several occasions.

It desires to recall the fact that, when stating its opinion on the question of the interdependence of the different arms, the delegation recognises that, in a given country, a certain interdependence between the different categories must be considered as necessary, and that, in fixing limits for each of these categories, account must be taken of their corresponding interdependence in the neighbouring countries.

Similarly, in the Naval Committee, the delegation of Sweden accepted a declaration to the effect that a general disarmament Convention must consider the limitation of the personnel of the land, sea and air forces as a whole. This declaration, in the opinion of the delegation of SWEDEN, is a recognition of the fact that it is essential to limit the personnel not of one arm only but of the three arms.

A limitation of the personnel of the three categories as a whole must, in the delegation's opinion, be achieved by a limitation of all the three main categories of arms.

Parts II, III and IV already outline the methods necessary for the limitation of each arm, and the delegation of SWEDEN therefore considers it superfluous to consider a joint method, even assuming that this method in itself is not unacceptable.

The delegation of SWEDEN is, moreover, of the opinion that it will be easier to achieve an effective result by a limitation of the personnel of each of the three arms separately than by a limitation of the personnel of the three arms as a whole.

The delegations of FINLAND, GERMANY, the NETHERLANDS and SPAIN associate themselves with the principles set forth in the above declaration.

C.

Declarations by the Delegations of BELGIUM, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, FINLAND, FRANCE, POLAND, ROUMANIA and the KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES.

LIMITATION OF EXPENDITURE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE.

With reference to the method of limitation of expenditure which has been discussed by Sub-Commission A, the above-named delegations desire:

(i.) To refute the principal objections which have been raised against this method;

(ii.) To put forward a definite proposal for the limitation of expenditure, which should overcome the difficulties that have arisen in the course of the debates.

Refutation of the Objections raised against the Method discussed by Sub-Commission A.

1. Objections and Principles.

(a) The delegations opposed to the principle of limitation of budgetary expenditure asserted that "there can be no equitable limitation of expenditure by international agreement unless a comparison is made".

The delegations of BELGIUM, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, FINLAND, FRANCE, POLAND, ROUMANIA and the KINGDOM of the SERBS, CROATS and SLOVENES are of opinion that expenditure on national defence does not constitute a standard for the comparison of armaments and that no system of limiting expenditure on the basis of coefficients can be accepted; but they regard it as possible for each country to make, with a view to the preparation of a disarmament agreement, reasoned proposals for the reduction or limitation of their military expenditure on the basis of their present expenditure — quite apart from any idea of comparison with other countries — to supplement the detailed arithmetical proposals for the limitation of their armaments.

The examination and discussion of the reasons adduced in support of these proposals will enable due regard to be paid to the considerations of equity which were put forward during the discussion.

Moreover, the most elementary principles of equity demand, in the first place, that rich countries should not be allowed to increase their armaments expenditure indefinitely while the armaments of other countries are automatically limited by the situation of their finances.

(b) The same delegations asserted that it was technically possible to secure an effective limitation of all forms of armament by direct methods and that there was therefore no justification for the indirect method consisting in the limitation of expenditure.
The delegations of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Finland, France, Poland, Roumania and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes are of opinion that it is not possible to limit all forms of armament by direct methods, and that therefore the limitation of expenditure will make it possible to limit indirectly those armaments which it has not been possible to touch directly by fixing a maximum limit for the expenditure which may be incurred in respect of these armaments.

Moreover, the undertaking given by the signatory States not to exceed a certain fixed figure of armaments expenditure will make it a practical impossibility for them to increase their military strength beyond a certain limit. In this sense, the limitation of expenditure will be the most thorough and tangible method of preventing competition in armaments.

2. Difficulties of Application.

(a) It was stated in the course of the discussion that it would be extremely difficult to draw up a rigid programme of unalterable expenditure “on account of changes in organisation or recruiting during the period over which the Convention operates”.

This difficulty can be overcome by introducing into the Convention readjustment clauses which will make it as elastic as is required.

(b) In theory, it will be very difficult to agree upon a definition of national defence expenditure subject to limitation.

In practice, however, the problem can be solved, as the financial experts have suggested, by a definition to be decided upon by common consent, and with the utmost care, with a view to the future Convention. After the budgets have been studied from a technical point of view, it will be possible to cover all expenditure on national defence as thus defined, no matter under what items it may figure in the budget.

(c) Thus the technical study of the budgets, keeping within the scope of the opinions expressed by Sub-Commission A, will make it possible to limit the total military expenditure of all States simultaneously; but it will also be possible to define certain classes of expenditure in which any increase might reveal an increase in the military strength of the country, and these classes of expenditure it would therefore be desirable to limit separately.

(d) By requiring States to furnish a detailed account of their actual expenditure, the proposed method will bring to light any reductions of expenditure in certain budgets.

(e) Although the annual production of uniform extracts from budget accounts may not show accurately the actual expenditure by all countries during the financial year, it will, at least, reveal any supplementary credits or withdrawals of credits in addition to the appropriations shown in the budgets actually passed.

Owing to the variety of methods employed in drawing up budgets, it will be a complicated matter to prepare these uniform extracts from budget accounts; but this difficulty can be overcome by a technical study of the budgets.

The production of extracts from budget accounts will make it possible, without direct investigation within the countries concerned, to the execution of the limitations agreed to and observe the changes in the military strength of each country in the period during which the Convention operates.

Machinery for Limitation of Expenditure.

I.

The figures for limitation of expenditure will be calculated, as regards part of the expenditure, on the basis of any direct limitations of armaments (effectives and material) which may have been agreed to.

On the other hand, expenditure on forms of armament which it has not been possible to limit directly will be limited on the basis of arguments adduced by the States concerned.

All together, therefore, we shall obtain for each country a maximum budget which that country will undertake not to exceed.

II.

(a) This maximum budget will be calculated in respect of each country on the basis of its present expenditure.

It will involve decreases in that expenditure proportionate to the reduction of armaments agreed to by the State concerned.

Provision may be made for possible increases to meet specific exceptional circumstances, the existence of which must be conclusively proved at the time when the Convention is drawn up, e.g., the necessity of completing or reconstituting exhausted stocks, replacing obsolete, worn-out or unsuitable material, manufacturing or constructing essential material, or, in the case of countries with industries still undeveloped, making the necessary purchases, or adjusting pay, salaries, and wages to the cost of living.

Any increases over its present expenditure which may thus be contingently allowed to a country may only be used for the purposes for which they were allowed and justified.

(b) The limitation will apply to expenditure both on personnel and on material.

It will apply to all national defence expenditure, even if part of it is borne on other budgets than those of the military ministries, and irrespective of the reasons for which it is so borne.
If the military budgets include expenditure other than on armaments, such expenditure will be excluded from the limitation.

(c) The maximum budget of each country will show separately:
The maximum total annual expenditure on national defence;
The maximum for certain classes of expenditure, which, after a technical study of the budgets, it may be thought desirable to limit separately. For example, in the separate cases of land, naval and air armaments: expenditure on purchases, manufacture and new construction, upkeep of material and maintenance of effective.

As regards expenditure on the purchase of material, manufacture and new construction, the total amount so expended during the period of validity of the Convention should be limited in the case of each country; and it should be stipulated that if, as a general rule, the annual expenditure cannot exceed the total divided by the number of years during which the Convention remains in force, each country will be allowed, conditionally upon justification, to carry over any funds not expended during one or more financial years to subsequent years.

III.

The maximum budget as described above may be modified, conditionally upon justification, on the ground of any changes which may take place in the military organisation of the signatory States during the period of validity of the Convention.

IV.

The figures, expressed in the national currency, to which the total expenditure and certain classes of expenditure will be limited may be automatically modified every year in accordance with variations in the cost of living.

V.

The execution of undertakings given in regard to the limitation of expenditure will be secured by the annual production of uniform extracts from budget accounts. Each extract will be sent in as early as possible, and should show:
The total expenditure;
The annual expenditure in each of the classes of expenditure which it has been thought necessary to limit separately.

D.

The delegation of CHILE supports the principle of limitation of expenditure, but entirely reserves its opinion on the application of that limitation to separate classes of expenditure.

E.

Declarations by the Delegations of the ARGENTINE, GERMANY, JAPAN, the NETHERLANDS, SWEDEN and the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

LIMITATION OF EXPENDITURE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE.

The above-named delegations are of the opinion that, while the reduction in national expenditure on armaments is highly desirable as one of the results to be attained by the reduction and limitation of armaments, this result would automatically follow from any effective reduction and limitation of armaments. They are strongly of the opinion that monetary expenditure for the creation and maintenance of armaments does not afford either a true measure of armaments or a fair basis for limitation of armaments. They hold this opinion for the following reasons:

1. The direct and indirect costs of personnel under the conscriptive and voluntary systems are so variable in different countries and in their overseas possessions and are influenced by so many different factors that these costs are practically impossible of simple and equitable conversion to a common basis.

2. Due also to differences in rates of pay, production costs, maintenance charges, costs of labour and material, varying standards of living, variations in the rates of exchange and lack of uniformity in the preparation of budgets, any attempt to apply this method of limitation would be unfair and inequitable.

3. The method of limitation of expenditure is an indirect method of obtaining a limitation or reduction of armaments. All methods heretofore considered have been positive and direct; the application of an indirect method seems highly undesirable as a means of accomplishing what might better be accomplished by direct methods. The above-mentioned delegations maintain their opinion that, from a technical standpoint, armaments can be effectively limited by direct methods.

4. While comparison without limitation is possible, obviously there can be no equitable limitation of expenditure by international agreement without a comparison. In other words, comparison of expenditure is a prerequisite to equitable limitation of expenditure. Therefore,
since comparison cannot be made between budgets of different countries, as has been agreed upon in the study of standards of comparison, it will be impracticable to use a budgetary method in any formula for the reduction and limitation of armaments.

For these reasons, the above delegations are firmly of the opinion that the method of limitation of armaments based upon the limitation of budgetary expenditure is impracticable, inequitable and hence inadmissible.

Since the mandate of the Preparatory Commission calls for a reply to this question only in case the limitation of expenditure is considered practicable, and since, in the opinion of the above-mentioned delegations, the method seems inapplicable, it would appear that the reply to the question submitted should be that the limitation of expenditure is not a practicable method for the limitation or reduction of armaments.

F.

Decleration by the Delegation of SWEDEN.

The delegation of SWEDEN makes the following declaration in addition to Declaration E above.

The fixing in an international convention of a maximum limit for the armaments of different countries does not mean that this limit must necessarily always be reached. A country which, owing to its present favourable political situation, finds it possible and desirable so to do might content itself for the time being with armaments inferior to those which it would have the right to maintain under the Convention.

Whereas, in the question dealt with in the declaration E above by the delegations of the Argentine, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United States of America, the limitation of expenditure would be the logical result of the limitation of armaments, it would rather seem possible, in the case mentioned above, first to fix the sum to be allocated for the military budget, the latter then being taken as a basis for establishing the military organisation. One can thus speak of a method of limitation of armaments by means of a limitation of expenditure, but this method would be simply the outcome of the financial situation and internal policy of the country, and not of technical military considerations.
QUESTIONS CONTAINED IN THE COMMENTARY
WITH REGARD TO QUESTION IV.

SECTION I. — TEXT OF THE QUESTIONS.

Question IV.

Can there be said to be “offensive” and “defensive” armaments?

Is there any method of ascertaining whether a certain force is organised for purely defensive purposes (no matter what use may be made of it in time of war), or whether, on the contrary, it is established for the purposes in a spirit of aggression?

The Commission refers to Sub-Commission “A” the following questions:

Are there any armaments (and, if so what) which are only capable of being used for the defence of a State’s territory?

Is there any method of ascertaining whether a certain force is organised for purely defensive purposes (no matter what use may be made of it in time of war), or whether, on the contrary, it is established in a spirit of aggression?

SECTION II. — TEXT OF THE REPLIES.

Sub-Commission A submits the following reply unanimously:

PART I.

Are there any armaments (and, if so what) which are only capable of being used for the defence of a State’s territory?

Generally speaking, and subject to the conditions stated below, any component elements of armaments, which are incapable of mobility by means of self-contained power or can only be transported after a long delay, can only be used for the defence of that territory in which they are erected.

The most important of these component elements are the following:

A. Defences against Sea-borne Attacks.

I. Fixed Defences.

Shelters, obstacles and permanent works for the use of armaments such as gun platforms, excluding the armament and transportable equipment.

Fixed installations for observation and for signalling and communications of all kinds, such as: buried and submarine cables, look-out stations, road-beds of narrow-gauge railways.

Boom defences.

II. Mobile Defences.

Vessels of small sea-going efficiency and low power of endurance capable of use only within a strictly limited distance of the national coast-line. But in this case proximity to the coast of another State or to an important commercial trade route would confer on such craft, in spite of their limited radius of action, a high offensive value.

Further, since all such craft are capable of being transported either as a whole or in sections, they cannot be considered as purely defensive.

B. Defences against Attacks by Land.

The following can only be used on the spot for the defence of a State’s territory:

All parts of defensive systems which are in the nature of obstacles and cover for troops, permanent works for the use of armaments such as gun platforms and, in exceptional circumstances, certain armaments which are in turrets or cupolas.

Fixed installations for observation and for signalling and communications of all kinds connecting up the various parts of the defence system, such as buried cables, observation posts, road-beds of narrow-gauge railways.

Permanent camouflage installations.
C. Defence against Air Attacks.

The following can only be used for the defence of the towns and vital points of a territory:
- Permanent anti-aircraft gun emplacements;
- Permanent searchlight emplacements;
- Balloon screens;
- Permanent listening and observation posts;
- Permanent camouflaged installations.

The systems defined under A, B and C above—in the same way as the natural geographical obstacles which protect the frontiers of certain countries (mountain ranges, seas, marshes, etc.), or in combination with the obstacles—enable the necessary time for the assembling of the forces required to repel an invasion to be gained with the help of comparatively small covering forces. In some cases they might also allow of the economising of certain forces which can be employed in other defensive, offensive or counter-offensive operations.

The category of organisations which can only be used for territorial defence cannot be said to include:

1. Organisations the principal purpose of which is obviously to enable long-range artillery or air attack to be brought to bear on the communications of a neighbouring country or its exposed points near the frontier, and which are not indisputably justified by the necessity of protecting specially exposed points in the country concerned;

2. Naval or air bases the principal object of which is not to defend the territory or vital communications of the State to which they belong, but
   (a) Either to cover the assembling of supplies, materials for repairs, etc., in order to extend the striking range of the naval or air forces;
   (b) Or to command for the benefit of a single country certain routes used by international sea-borne trade.

PART II.

Is there any method of ascertaining whether a certain force is organised for purely defensive purposes (no matter what use may be made of it in time of war), or whether, on the contrary, it is established in a spirit of aggression?

CHAPTER I.

A method may be contemplated which, if it would not enable the assertion to be made that the military, naval or air organisation of a country is set up for purely defensive purposes, would at least furnish useful indications as to the trend of that organisation.

This method is based upon the following considerations:

A system which is developing in such a manner that it does not lend itself, or lends itself less and less readily, to aggressive operations, suggests the absence of aggressive designs on the part of the State possessing that system.

Technically speaking, the smaller the quantity of mobile and up-to-date material, the smaller the number of immediately available trained effectives and mobilisation facilities in a military system, the less will that system be suitable for aggressive purposes, taking into account such fundamental differences as may exist between armies recruited on the voluntary system and those recruited by conscription.

From a technical point of view, therefore—on the strict condition, of course, that the period considered is fairly extensive—indications of the defensive tendency of a military system will be apparent:

1. Where the quantity of new and up-to-date material manufactured or imported is small, so that the average age of the available material is fairly high and the quantity of such material is decreasing or remains constant;

2. Where the number of immediately available effectives is decreasing or is at all times small, and where in conscript armies such effectives contain a large proportion of men with the colours who have not yet completed their training;

3. Where the term of service with the colours is decreasing or short, the men being discharged immediately or shortly after completing their elementary training;

4. Where the refresher courses are comparatively infrequent, are given only in the armed forces or in the organisations which are officially authorised to give military training and are only designed to maintain the standard of training reached during military service without any attempt at improvement;
(5) Where the expenditure on national defence is steadily decreasing or is kept at a comparatively low figure, and consists:

(a) To an appreciable extent, of expenditure devoted to the construction and maintenance of fixed defence systems, naval patrolling forces for the protection of lines of communication and naval forces specialising in coast defence;

(b) To a comparatively slight extent, of expenditure on new manufacture or on the purchase of new material.

In the case of countries where the financial conditions do not always allow a regular programme of renewal of obsolete material in the army or navy, an occasional increase of expenditure on national defence cannot be regarded as an indication of a contrary tendency.

Further, useful indications in regard to the defensive character of the armed forces of any State may be afforded by the fact that these forces are unfitted for aggression, as they do not possess the trained men or material necessary for modern offensive warfare.

**Chapter II.**

The principal test whether a force is designed for purely defensive purposes or built up in a spirit of aggression remains in any case the intentions of the country concerned. It is perfectly possible for a certain force to be organised for defensive purposes in the strictest, most candid meaning of the term, and yet for that same force to become on the other hand an offensive force after a variable length of time. Many reasons might account for such a change; the most obvious would, of course, be a change in policy of the country concerned, such that this country, which previously was genuinely inspired by pacific purposes, might develop a bellicose spirit. In this case the instrument which could fairly be described as a defensive weapon would become undoubtedly an offensive weapon after a variable length of time.

**SECTION III.**

**A.**

*Declaration by the Delegations of the ARGENTINE, FRANCE, ITALY, JAPAN, POLAND, ROUMANIA and the KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES.*

The above-named delegations, while declaring that the various points enumerated in the fifth sub-paragraph of paragraph 1 of Part II of the Reply to Question IV may furnish indications of the defensive purpose of any military organisation, desire to direct the attention of the Preparatory Commission to the case of countries whose armaments have not yet reached the size or standard of perfection corresponding to their defensive requirements.

For such countries, the fact that they may proceed to increase or perfect their armaments should not be taken as an indication of offensive or aggressive intentions, provided that just cause is shown for the changes in question.
QUESTIONS CONTAINED IN THE COMMENTARY
WITH REGARD TO QUESTION V (a).

SECTION I. — TEXT OF THE QUESTIONS.

Question V (a)
On what principle will it be possible to draw up a scale of armaments permissible to the various countries, taking into account particularly:

1. Population;
2. Resources;
3. Geographical situation;
4. Length and nature of maritime communications;
5. Density and character of the railways;
6. Vulnerability of the frontiers and of the important vital centres near the frontiers;
7. The time required, varying with different States, to transform peace armaments into war armaments?

As the armaments to be maintained in each country cannot be determined on the basis of mathematical considerations alone, the Commission, in order to allow of a profitable examination of the basis on which the reduction and limitation of armaments is possible, requests the two Sub-Commissions to investigate how far armaments in general are affected by factors 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7 enumerated in Question V (a) and refers factor 6 to Sub-Commission A.

SECTION II. — TEXT OF THE REPLIES.

Sub-Commission A submits the following text unanimously, with the exception of two amendments proposed by certain delegations to Chapters I and IV. These amendments are given in the chapters in question.

PREAMBLE.

The enumeration, in the reply to Question I, Part II, of the various factors on which the strength of a country depends in war time had already led to stress being laid, particularly in Chapter III of Part II of that reply, on their influence on armaments. This was also the case when consideration was given to the special characteristics of the three great classes of armaments (Reply to Question I, Part III, Chapter II) and the standards of comparison between armaments, regard being had to the differences in situation between the various countries (Reply to Question (a) of the Commentary with regard to II (b) and III : Part I, paragraph 2 — Part II. Preamble to Chapters II and III).

The influence on armaments of the various factors mentioned in Question V cannot indeed be definitely formulated, and it varies greatly from country to country. Each country accordingly is alone in position to define what this influence is, in so far as it is concerned.

Furthermore, to appraise the influence of one of the factors enumerated in Question V on the armaments of a country, this factor must be regarded in the first place in relation to the other factors referred to in that question, and more particularly in relation to the resources, the economic situation and the geographical situation of the country in question.

For example: In the case of a country with limited resources or a country placed in a precarious economic position — and therefore not self-supporting in regard to articles of prime necessity — the armaments required to ensure the necessary supplies for the country are greatly influenced by a high density of population.

Conversely, in a country with great resources and a low density of population, the influence of the latter on armaments is also considerable in order that it may defend its possessions and independence.

The area of the country and the length of its frontiers influence armaments necessary for the defence of that country and must be considered in relation to the number of inhabitants and to the geographical situation.

The following general observations, however, are submitted.
CHAPTER I. — INFLUENCE OF THE POPULATION.

Reference has already been made (see Reply to Question I(a)) to the great importance of the population, since modern warfare employs a nation’s entire resources in manpower, either in the form of combatant forces or for the purpose of maintaining and supplying these forces, account being taken of the supply of men who might be obtained from overseas territories and of those forces which, on the other hand, would be kept for policing those territories, and further allowing for the military training of the population.

Subject to the reservations set forth in the last paragraphs of the Preamble, the following conclusions may be stated:

(a) The population of a country directly influences, though in a manner varying with circumstances and the fidelity of the population to the established order, the effectives intended to ensure the internal security both of the home territory and the overseas territories of a State (police, gendarmerie and military forces strictly so called) to the extent to which they contribute to the internal security of such territories.

(b) The effectives intended to ensure external security depend on political and geographical conditions and the risk of conflict. According to the figure of population, a country may be able to adopt various systems of military organisation for the purpose of raising the men so required (volunteer system, conscription, etc.), which systems produce different effects in respect of the number of men trained for military service. A large population facilitates the recruiting of these effectives, since it allows of a choice being made and since it may decide the State concerned not to train all its available men. On the other hand, a country with a comparatively small population may, in order to secure the effectives corresponding to the needs of its security, be compelled to choose recruits of poorer quality, or to incorporate the whole of its contingents, or even to maintain several contingents with the colours.

Thus, in principle, countries with a small population are compelled to call upon a greater proportion of men for their defence than those countries with a larger population.

The delegations of the ARGENTINE, BELGIUM, CHILE, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, FINLAND, FRANCE, ITALY, the NETHERLANDS, POLAND, ROUMANIA, the KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, SPAIN and SWEDEN add to the last sentence of this chapter the following words:

For instance, when they border on countries with much larger population than their own.

CHAPTER II. — INFLUENCE OF RESOURCES.

Adequate economic resources facilitate the building up of peace-time armaments, and may allow of a protracted war being waged by reducing to a minimum the consequences of a blockade.

On the other hand, inadequate resources compel a country:

(a) To create in advance, should its financial means permit, the stocks of material and of supplies required for its existence and defence;

(b) To maintain permanently the forces required to ensure, as far as possible, the uninterrupted protection of the communications by which it might receive indispensable supplies and assistance from outside.

From this point of view, it must be recognised that inadequate resources exercise a great influence on the armaments required for the security of a country. A country which is not self-supporting and must draw food supplies for its population from a distance would run grave risk if it was unable to guarantee the arrival of the supplies which are necessary to it. Similarly, a country whose soil is poor in fuel and in minerals, or which is deficient in some commodity essential for the conduct of war, might find itself in the most serious difficulty if, in order to arm and maintain the forces intended for its defence, it could not ensure the arrival in time of the raw materials or products in which it is deficient, and the consumption of which in war time is exceedingly rapid.

As a result, a country so circumstanced must possess armaments strong enough to guarantee as far as possible the command of its lines of supply, and in particular of its sea routes.

CHAPTER III. — INFLUENCE OF THE GEOGRAPHICAL SITUATION.

The situation of a country in relation to its neighbours depends on policy and geography combined. As regards the latter, the armaments which a country requires may differ according as:

It consists of islands, peninsulas or continental territories, continuous or disconnected;

It has or has not free access to more than one sea and to the high seas;
It is or is not exposed to the risk of effective blockade;
It may be attacked simultaneously on more than one frontier, whether these consist of demilitarised zones or not;
It is or is not on the traditional lines of invasion or the great international highways;
It possesses points the occupation of which would have a considerable strategical importance for other Powers which may come into conflict with each other;
And, generally speaking, its more or less exposed situation gives or denies it, in the event of war, the time required to prepare and bring into operation the forces which it may possess for its national defence.

Moreover, the geographical situation may exert a real influence on the effective employment of armaments: the defence in particular may be very largely strengthened by the nature of the ground.

The influence of the geographical situation is particularly felt by small States which adjoin stronger neighbours. Not being safeguarded by a favourable geographical situation, these small States may think themselves permanently exposed to danger, and this will induce them to build up armaments which could not be regarded as of an offensive nature.

Although the geographical situation partly determines the size of a country's armaments, it only affects the aerial armaments of a State protected by the sea in so far as the size of the sea guarantees this State against danger from this form of warfare — a factor which varies with the progress of technical aeronautics.

CHAPTER IV. — INFLUENCE OF THE NATURE AND LENGTH OF MARITIME COMMUNICATIONS.

The influence on armaments of the nature and length of communications by sea appears in one of the following forms:

(a) Naval forces adequate to the task of protecting, as far as possible, the maritime communications of countries whose existence and defence depend on supplies obtained from overseas, account being taken of the distance of the centres of supply (of indispensable raw material, manufactured products, fuel and foodstuffs) and the economic importance and vulnerability of the communications with these centres, regard being had to the geographical situation, and particularly to maritime straits and the proximity of foreign naval or air bases;

(b) Or naval forces commensurate with the total extent of the maritime communications, both between the various territories placed under the sovereignty, protectorate or mandate of one and the same country and the non-contiguous parts of the same territory, account being taken both of the economic and strategical importance and the vulnerability of each line of communication;

(c) Or, failing adequate naval forces, the accumulation of stocks of every kind, and particularly of war material, especially if the country under consideration does not produce such material;

(d) Or, failing adequate naval forces, the permanent maintenance, in each of the territories liable to be isolated by an interruption of maritime communications, of the military forces and supplies necessary to ensure their defence independently of any possibility of reinforcement.

The delegation of the UNITED STATES of AMERICA adds to paragraph (b) of this chapter the following words:

The delegation of the United States of America is of the opinion that the words "or mandate" should be omitted from this paragraph, since the status of mandates is a subject of political consideration rather than one of technical consideration.

CHAPTER V. — INFLUENCE OF THE DENSITY AND CHARACTER OF THE RAILWAYS.

In considering the influence on armaments in general of the density and military value of railways, separate attention should be given to:

(a) The railways in the particular country;
(b) The railways in neighbouring countries.

The density, grouping, carrying capacity, technical nature and general lie of the railways affect the possibility and rapidity of concentration and strategical manoeuvres. They may necessitate ultimately a number of peace effectives, and particularly of covering effectives, the magnitude of which will depend upon the difficulty experienced in reinforcing or moving them. In addition, the vulnerability of the railways (number of works and railway centres; lines skirting land or sea frontiers) exercises an influence on the strength of the land, sea or air forces required to ensure the defence of the country.
When the railway system does not allow of direct communication taking place between all parts of the territory of a State, other means of transport assume greater importance, and this has an influence on the armaments required for their protection.

A dense network of railways, consisting of a large number of lines converging on disembarkation bases in the neighbourhood of the frontier which, with the aid of abundant rolling stock, would enable large forces to be carried in a short space of time, may in certain cases readily lend itself to operations of aggression on a large scale.

The armaments required by a country may, from this point of view in particular, be influenced by the threat resulting from the density and the military value of the railways of a neighbouring country.

Again, the inadequacy of the railway system may compel certain countries to provide supplies of various materials at suitable points.

**CHAPTER VI. — INFLUENCE OF THE VULNERABILITY OF THE FRONTIERS AND OF THE IMPORTANT VITAL CENTRES NEAR THE FRONTIERS.**

The vulnerability of the frontiers resulting directly from their length as well as their nature, *i.e.*, the greater or lesser facilities of access or facility of being crossed which they afford—this vulnerability, as also the number and proximity of important vital centres to these frontiers, may necessitate:

(a) The organisation of the military, naval and air defence of these land and sea frontiers in the home country and overseas;

(b) The permanent maintenance of land, sea and air covering forces sufficient to protect national mobilisation;

(c) The rapid mobilisation of naval, air and land forces required to meet any attack and repel any invasion which might reach exposed vital centres, and consequently the need of these forces being prepared and trained beforehand.

**CHAPTER VII. — INFLUENCE OF THE TIME REQUIRED, WHICH WILL BE DIFFERENT FOR DIFFERENT COUNTRIES, TO CONVERT PEACE ARMAMENTS INTO WAR ARMAMENTS.**

As a result of this influence, the extent of peace armaments and covering forces will depend on the time required to bring the national resources into operation.

**SECTION III.**

No declaration was made.
QUESTION VI.

SECTION I. — TEXT OF THE QUESTION.

(a) Is there any device by which civil and military aircraft can be distinguished for purposes of disarmament? If this is not practicable, how can the value of civil aircraft be computed in estimating the air strength of any country?

(b) Is it possible or desirable to apply the conclusions arrived at in (a) above to parts of aircraft and aircraft engines?

(c) Is it possible to attach military value to commercial fleets in estimating the naval armaments of a country?

SECTION II. — TEXT OF THE REPLIES.

PART I. — REPLY TO QUESTION VI (a)

Chapter I.

Is there any device by which civil and military aircraft can be distinguished for purposes of disarmament?

Sub-Commission A submits unanimously the following text, with the exception of the amendments presented by the delegations of the Argentine and Germany, which appear below.

Rapid as the development of aviation has been during the last war, and despite the fact that this development took place in response to military needs and was therefore of immediate benefit to military aviation, it did not lead to the evolution of a special type of war aircraft differing from civil or commercial aircraft in the same way that warships are of special type and are built on entirely different principles from merchant vessels.

Generally speaking, the principal technical characteristics of civil aircraft are with a few slight differences similar to those of military aircraft, or at any rate of certain military aircraft. The relative importance of each of these characteristics (horizontal speed, climbing speed, maximum altitude it can reach, useful load, radius of action, ease of handling, etc.) depends chiefly, in the case of each aeroplane, whether civil or military, on the combination of the horse-power and of the wing area.

The establishment of any distinction between civil and military aircraft in accordance with technical characteristics must therefore be recognised as impossible.

On the other hand, there can be no doubt that aircraft are fitted out and equipped differently according to the purpose for which they are intended. But as they do not all fulfil the same purpose, civil aircraft cannot always be compared with each other, any more, indeed, than military aircraft. There are, however, considerable similarities between civil aircraft and certain military aircraft. Thus the difference between heavy commercial aeroplanes and racing aeroplanes is very great and is similar to the difference which exists between long-range bombing aeroplanes and fighters. On the other hand, a commercial transport machine may be very similar to a heavy bombing machine.

As regards aeroplanes of a specifically civilian type, their essential difference from aeroplanes of a military type consists in the special way in which they are fitted out, or in the special design of the fuselage.

They could be adapted for certain military purposes in a short time, varying according to circumstances from a few hours to a few days:

Either by fitting them with military equipment;
Or by the substitution of a fuselage of a military type for a fuselage of a civil type;
Or by the substitution of a high-power engine for a low-power engine;
Or by altering or completely replacing the wing.

The speed with which these transformations can be carried out will normally largely depend on the extent and condition of the aircraft industry of the country concerned, or, alternatively, on the reserves in stock of the adaptations referred to above.
From the above, it may be concluded that it is not at present possible to establish definite rules based on adequate grounds for differentiating between civil and military aircraft from the point of view of their possible utilisation for military purposes.

Note: Civil dirigibles may undoubtedly under certain circumstances be employed for reconnaissance or bombing operations, and therefore cannot be differentiated from military dirigibles.

The Delegations of the ARGENTINE and GERMANY substitute for paragraph 3 and the first sentence of paragraph 4 of the preceding text: "The establishment of any distinction... down to "are intended", the following sentences:

The establishment of a distinction between civil and military aeroplanes simply on the basis of their distinctive technical characteristics must therefore be recognised as impossible. But the combination of these technical characteristics; build, fitting and equipment, of civil and military aeroplanes is entirely different according to the special purpose for which each class is indended.

They add to the last paragraph but one, after the words "referred to above", the following passage:

Should a country not possess the reserve stocks necessary for the above-mentioned adaptations, the period for adaptation shall be extended in the case of new fuselages by a few weeks and in that of new engines by as much as several months.

They substitute for the second part of the last sentence, "from the point of view... military purposes", the following passage:

Notwithstanding, the above-mentioned general criteria for special types of civil aircraft designed for particular purposes make it possible to distinguish this kind from other kinds of civil aircraft and from military aircraft, on the basis of the following considerations:

(a) Degree of suitability for military purposes, having regard to the time necessary for adaptation;

(b) Degree of suitability for military purposes, having regard to utilisation for fighting purposes — (i) suitability for combat; (ii) suitability for auxiliary services, such as the training of pilots, etc.; (iii) absolute impossibility of employment for purposes of war.

CHAPTER II.

If this is not practicable, how can the value of civil aircraft be computed in estimating the air strength of any country?

The Delegation of GERMANY submits the following text:

Text A.

The military assessment of a country's civil aircraft cannot possibly be effected on the bases adopted, in the comparison of armaments, for the establishment of standards for armaments (reply to Question (a)) in the Commentary of the Preparatory Commission relating to Questions II(b) and III, Part IV (Criteria relating to Air Armaments, Chapters III and V). A numerical assessment of this nature would lead to entirely false conclusions as to the military value of the civil aircraft.

In order to obtain a correct total assessment, it would be necessary rather to establish the following distinctions:

(a) Degree of rapidity with which civil aircraft can be used for military purposes, with reference primarily to the time and means required for conversion:

- Purely military aircraft, built as such, but employed only as civil aircraft.
- Aircraft built for civil purposes, but so constructed as to admit of employment for military purposes. They are of high military value but not of full military value;
- Aircraft built specially for civil purposes and not utilisable without conversion. Their military value is even less, and they are normally suitable only for auxiliary service behind the lines.

(b) Graduation of the suitability of civil aircraft for military purposes, established from the technical point of view, on the basis of the following classification:

- Civil aircraft which can be used for fighting purposes.
- Civil aircraft suitable for auxiliary service (e.g., liaison, training).
- Civil aircraft of no value for military purposes.

On the other hand, it is necessary to recognise that the military value of the aggregate of civil aeroplanes of a country depends in certain cases on the importance of the military aviation of this country. For example, the fact that a country possesses an important military aviation facilitates to a certain extent the use of its civil aeroplanes for war purposes.
While civil aircraft may be taken into consideration in estimating the potential strength of a nation, such civil aircraft should not be accepted as a factor entering into any comparison of air armaments undertaken with a view to the limitation or reduction of armaments.

Note. — The military value of a civil dirigible can be determined, like that of a military dirigible, by volume and horse-power.

The Delegations of the ARGENTINE, FINLAND, JAPAN, the NETHERLANDS, SPAIN, SWEDEN and the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA submit the following text:

Text B.

The principal technical characteristics of civil and military aircraft being the same, the military value of civil aircraft can be computed by similar technical considerations as applied to military aircraft, but the degree of value may be different according to the type of aircraft.

Consequently the absolute military value of civil aircraft cannot be accurately determined, but all civil aircraft should be taken into consideration in estimating the total air strength of a country; this shall not, however, prejudice the question of any limitation of civil aircraft.

On the other hand, it is necessary to recognise that the military value of the aggregate of civil aeroplanes of a country depends in certain cases on the importance of the military aviation of this country. For example, the fact that a country possesses an important military aviation facilitates to a certain extent the use of its civil aeroplanes for war purposes.

Note. — The military value of a civil dirigible can be determined, like that of a military dirigible, by volume and horse-power.

The Delegation of the BRITISH EMPIRE accepts Text B above, replacing in the second paragraph the words “total air strength” by the words: “potential air strength”.

The Delegations of the ARGENTINE and the UNITED STATES of AMERICA add to Text B above the following paragraph:

While civil aircraft may be taken into consideration in estimating the potential strength of a nation, such civil aircraft should not be accepted as a factor entering into any comparison of air armaments undertaken with a view to the limitation or reduction of armaments.

Note. — The military value of a civil dirigible can be determined, like that of a military dirigible, by volume and horse-power.

The Delegations of BELGIUM, CHILE, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, FRANCE, ITALY, POLAND, ROUMANIA and the KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES submit the following text:

Text C.

The technical characteristics of civil and military aircraft being the same, for the purpose of computing the military value of civil aircraft, in estimating the air strength of a country, the same standard must be employed as that used for estimating the military value of military aircraft.

In point of fact, a country's civil aircraft constitutes for that country mobilisation material which is utilisable, by means of requisition, in the same conditions as military aircraft in reserve.

Consequently, for the purpose of computing a country's air strength, all civil aircraft must be taken into consideration as being equivalent to military aircraft in reserve, and the military value of the aggregate of both types may be estimated on the basis of the aggregate horse-power of the engines with which such aircraft is equipped.

Note. — The military value of the aggregate of civil dirigibles can likewise be determined by the total volume of such dirigibles.

PART II. — REPLY TO QUESTION VI (b).

Is it possible or desirable to apply the conclusions arrived at in (a) above to parts of aircraft and aircraft engines?

Sub-Commission A unanimously submits the following text:

The reply given above to Question VI (a) shows that, at the present stage of aeronautics, civil aircraft could be used to a certain extent as military aircraft; consequently, spare parts of these aircraft could also be utilised for military purposes. Engines and spare parts of engines could be so used with even greater facility, because civil and military aircraft are in certain cases fitted with engines of the same type.

Accordingly, it is practically impossible to draw a distinction between civil and military spare parts.

Moreover, in view of the large number of spare parts, the fact that they are widely distributed and the difficulty of counting them, the quantitative estimate of the spare parts would be attended by extremely grave difficulties. The taking stock of complete spare engines is not possible owing to the fact that these engines can be stored in component parts.
Consequently, in estimating the air strength of a country, it does not appear practically possible to take spare parts into consideration.

PART III. — REPLY TO QUESTION VI(c).

Is it possible to attach military value to commercial fleets in estimating the naval armaments of a country?

(The replies which have been printed across the entire page have been agreed upon unanimously.)

Text submitted by the Delegations of the阿根廷, British Empire, Chile, Finland, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United States of America:

1. The answer to this question must be in the affirmative as there can be no doubt that commercial fleets have a military value.

2. Merchant ships, however, vary widely in their construction and hence in their suitability for military purposes. Some are designed for cargo-carrying purposes only and, as such, may have no protection against under-water attack, as their compartments must be large for cargo space. Some burn oil, others coal; some have turbines, some reciprocating engines, others internal-combustion engines. To all these varying characteristics must be added the age factor. For these reasons, any comparison which could be made between the military value of commercial fleets on any basis of tonnage, numbers or general characteristics would be to a great extent arbitrary, and the result misleading.

3. Generally speaking, it can further be asserted that the military value of a commercial fleet is constituted in the first place mainly by the ships of more than approximately 1,500 tons and whose speed is greater than 14 knots, that is to say, ships capable of being used, if necessary, as auxiliary cruisers and blockade-runners; in the second place, by ships capable of being used as patrol boats, minelayers and mine-sweepers. Which of the two categories is the more important must depend on the circumstances.

4. The combatant value of merchant ships varies in inverse ratio to the size and armament of the auxiliary combatant vessels (light forces) of the war fleet.

5. The military value of the commercial fleets of a country, as a whole, varies in proportion to its own size and the size of the naval forces of the country.

6. Neither its combatant value nor the military value can be stated numerically.

Text submitted by the Delegations of France, Italy, Poland, Roumania and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovanes:

1. The answer to this question must be in the affirmative as there can be no doubt that commercial fleets have a potential military value.

2. Merchant ships, however, vary widely in their construction and hence in their suitability for military purposes. For these reasons, any comparison which could be made between the military value of commercial fleets on any basis of tonnage, numbers or general characteristics would be to a great extent arbitrary, and the result misleading.

3. The term “commercial fleets” includes fishing vessels, pleasure craft, etc.

4. The combatant value of merchant ships and the military value of commercial fleets depend on the circumstances in which they are utilised in war time, and it would be very difficult to express them beforehand in figures.

5. The term “commercial fleets” includes fishing vessels, pleasure craft, vessels belonging to State administrations and private administrations for various services.
7. Any method for the reduction or limitation of naval armaments can apply only to the war vessels of the different countries and should not interfere with the expansion of commerce or the building of merchant vessels.

8. The military value of commercial fleets should be taken into consideration in the proposals submitted to the Disarmament Conference, regard being had to the considerations set out in paragraphs 4 and 5 above and the fact that, in the case of countries whose existence depends on overseas supplies, the safeguarding of their lines of maritime communication constitutes a heavy responsibility in time of war.

9. Nevertheless, any agreement which may be reached in regard to the limitation and reduction of armaments should include the regulation of the preparatory measures permitted in time of peace with a view to the conversion of merchant vessels into auxiliary cruisers.

Note. — The question of the legitimacy of arming merchantmen in time of war being of very great importance, Sub-Commission A refers that question to the Preparatory Commission so that the latter may, if it thinks fit, ask a competent organisation to examine this important question, whose fundamental character is political and juridical.

The delegation of CHILE does not agree with the note above.

SECTION III.

A.

Declaration by the Delegations of BELGIUM, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, FRANCE, ITALY, POLAND, ROUMANIA and the KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN MILITARY AND CIVIL AIRCRAFT.

During the discussions in Sub-Commission A, the above-mentioned delegations upheld the following view: In submitting Question VI to Sub-Commission A, the Preparatory Commission asked the Sub-Commission to enquire into the possibility of distinguishing between civil and military aircraft from the sole standpoint of their possible military utilisation. The object of this was to furnish the Preparatory Commission with a sound basis for estimating the possible influence of civil aviation on any limitation or reduction of air armaments.

Consequently:

1. The above-mentioned delegations ignored the economic aspect, which concerns Sub-Commission B.

2. They considered the question with reference to the present state of aviation and not to its state at some unspecified date in the future.

3. Though it is obvious that civil and military aircraft have not the same object, they considered that any distinction between them based on the "object" or, more accurately, the use for which they were built is artificial. An aeroplane is always designed to have the best possible flying qualities, and these are then applied indifferently, or with slight changes, to civil or military uses.

These delegations have therefore compared civil and military aircraft in themselves, with reference to their principal technical characteristics.

B.

Declaration by the Delegation of GERMANY.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN MILITARY AND CIVIL AIRCRAFT.

Preliminary Observations.

The purpose of civil aircraft is economic; it determines the characteristics peculiar to this type of aircraft. When examining Question VI(a) and (b), neither the Air Committee nor Sub-Commission A could deal with the economic aspect of the question, as this would have been outside their competence.

It should be noted that the question was therefore examined simply in one aspect — from the point of view of military experts, while the equally important task of considering it from the economists' point of view was left untouched.
I. Differences between Civil Aircraft in Different Countries. — The development of civil aircraft has varied very considerably in different countries since the war and up to the present day.

In certain countries, the experience obtained in the building of military aircraft has been applied directly to the building of civil aircraft, and more particularly of commercial aircraft. In others, the development of civil aircraft has followed more independent lines. The many practices which had crept into the building of military aircraft during many years have been abandoned in consideration of the new purposes in view, and this for several reasons. The essential requirements determined by the technical aspects of communications and by economic laws have proved more powerful than the constructional restrictions dictated by military requirements. In many countries, the official regulations concerning resistance in construction and safety in flight have thus been considerably modified.

The main differences existing in different countries as regards the general technical characteristics of civil aircraft are due to the fact that some big industrial undertakings concentrate on important military orders, subordinating the manufacture of civil aircraft to these, while other establishments concern themselves solely with the manufacture of civil aircraft, and neglect, wholly or in part, the manufacture of military aircraft. The result of this difference in orders has been that, for reasons of economy, construction has come to be determined by the main product of any industrial undertaking. The character of spare parts, complete parts or whole aircraft has been influenced to such an extent that the original object is no longer recognisable. The independent evolution of civil aircraft will only be possible in undertakings which give up the building of military aircraft or make it secondary to the production of commercial aircraft.

2. Definition of the Term “Military Aircraft”; Gradation of the Fighting Value of Military Aircraft. — Before discussing the “military” value of civil aircraft, the term “military aircraft” must be defined.

The value of the total air forces is determined by the number of military aircraft designed for fighting purposes. The chief types are bomber (torpedo-carrying), fighter and scout aeroplanes. In addition, a certain number of “auxiliary aeroplanes” may be employed, as required, for transport and intelligence services behind the line and for training. Requirements in regard to the last-named aircraft are not unlimited but are in proportion to the number of aircraft available for fighting purposes.

3. General Bases of the Distinction between Civil and Military Aircraft. — The factors governing the construction of military aircraft are exclusively determined by military purposes, except in the case of the above-mentioned auxiliary aircraft, whose military importance is only indirect. The factors governing the construction of commercial and sports aircraft are determined by their special purposes.

The following are the requirements of military and civil aircraft respectively:

Military Aircraft.

1. Highest possible maximum altitude and speed, both limited only by the useful load, which varies according to type. Radius of action determined by tactical requirements.

2. Flying qualities as satisfactory as possible, e.g., ease in handling, etc.

3. Special armament and equipment.

4. Field of fire or sight for crew, more particularly for co-operation in fighting.

5. Protection from enemy fire by adequate constructional resistance of all the parts. Protection of petrol from incendiary projectiles.

Civil Aircraft.

1. Requirements very variable as regards radius of action, maximum altitude and useful lift tonnage according to the special needs of commerce, sport, etc.

2. Great ease in handling neglected in favour of safety in flying — at all events, for commercial aircraft.

3. Comfort of passengers, particularly for commercial aircraft, i.e., fuselage very spacious and convenient; distribution of weight inside the fuselage different from that of military aircraft. Maximum safety of passengers, with security against damage or crashes.

4. Absence of armament or military equipment, the subsequent fitting of which is often impossible or difficult for constructional reasons.

5. Frequent neglect of field of fire and sight for crew of civil aircraft in directions of decisive importance for air warfare (e.g., upwards or downwards, upwards, behind, below the fuselage).

6. No technical means of protection against enemy fire. Frequent impossibility of installing arms or fitting bombs owing to the construction of the aircraft.
7. Weight of construction reduced to the minimum compatible with the standards for military resistance, in order to obtain maximum output, leaving higher costs of production out of consideration. Relatively short period of service and hence little obsolete material.

8. Production on a big scale of aircraft of the same class and of the same types, permitting of mass employment in battle (in groups, squadrons, etc.), and easy to fit out. Small number of types of engines throughout the air force, manufactured at home if possible.

9. Presence restricted to national territories, apart from a few unimportant exceptions.

The above table, which shows, side by side, some of the essential differences between civil and military aircraft, also establishes the fundamental points by which they may be distinguished from one another. These points are based upon the general characteristics of the two types, and are the more pronounced if builders of civil aircraft have not been unduly influenced by the results of military experience.

4. Possibilities of Converting Civil Aircraft. — Civil aircraft whose horse-power is not much lower than that of the most recent types of military aircraft may admit of conversion, to a varying degree, for military purposes.

Conversion for military purposes necessitates:

- Material ready prepared;
- Money;
- Time and labour, according to the extent of the preparations made in time of peace.

A civil aircraft may be more rapidly converted if the main parts, such as the following, have been prepared in advance:

- Military fuselage;
- Engines of a higher horse-power;
- Complete spare or supplementary wings;
- Special military equipment.

The characteristics of a certain proportion of civil aircraft make any conversion useless, as these aeroplanes are too weak to admit of an increase in efficiency, for constructional reasons or on account of their flying qualities, or because the difficulties and outlay attending such conversion exceed the advantage which might be expected from it.

If a civil aircraft is so constructed as to admit of conversion for military purposes, this means from the outset a corresponding sacrifice as regards economic value.

The great difficulties and heavy expenditure attending the conversion of special types of civil aircraft designed for special purposes make it somewhat doubtful whether countries will be inclined in time of peace to engage in preparations with a view to facilitating this process. Owing to the difficulties inherent in such transformation and the length of time involved, the value of this method seems highly questionable.

It is thus probable, in view of the above-mentioned reasons and the present level of technical efficiency, that the different countries will give up any idea of peace-time preparations for the costly conversion of this class of civil aircraft, which would involve the preparation of fuselages and other main parts, such as engines, etc. It will be judged preferable to expend the necessary outlay on purely military aircraft.
Conclusions.

The assessment of civil aircraft for military purposes (if this proceeding is decided upon) should, in view of the foregoing explanations, take into account two factors:

(a) Degree of suitability for military purposes, having regard to the time necessary for adaptation;

(b) Degree of suitability for military purposes, having regard to utilisation for fighting purposes — (i) suitability for combat; (ii) suitability for auxiliary services, such as the training of pilots, etc.; (iii) absolute impossibility of employment for purposes of war.

This means that an examination of each type of aircraft would be necessary with reference to suitability for military purposes. The technical consequences of such an examination, which would cover the industrial field of civil aviation in the different countries, are incalculable. On the other hand, the distinctive elements provided therein are beyond dispute.

The delegation of Germany is of opinion that to adopt the formula: "a civil aircraft is equivalent to a military aircraft" would be to ignore the actual essential difference between the two types.

Nor does the delegation of Germany think that it would be possible equitably to determine the value of civil aircraft by a method of approximate assessment, e.g., according to total horse-power, even allowing a certain percentage reduction. It has been suggested that the comparison should cover the total horse-power of all civil aircraft and that the latter should be assessed at, say 75 per cent of the value of military aircraft. Such a method of comparison would also lead to absurd results, because it could not take into account the immense differences in the character of civil aviation in the different countries, but would simply represent an arbitrary solution of this complicated question.

For the above reasons, the delegation of Germany has from the outset opposed the suggestion of a numerical assessment as a general means of computing the value for military purposes of the civil aircraft of different countries.

C.

Declaration by the Delegation of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

ASSESSMENT OF THE MILITARY VALUE OF CIVIL AIRCRAFT.

In regard to Chapter II in reply to the first part of Question VI, the delegation of the United States is strongly of the opinion that a consideration of civil aircraft in estimating the potential strength of a nation is useless because such civil aircraft cannot be accepted as a factor entering into any comparison of air armaments undertaken with a view to the limitation or reduction of armaments. There is a present and growing distinction between civil and military aircraft. An attempt to convey the impression that civil aircraft may be efficiently used for military purposes conveys a false idea to the Preparatory Commission. While some civilian aircraft may be used for some military purposes, in the same way that some civilian automobiles may be used for some military purposes, the inclusion of all civil aircraft in considering the air strength of a country is untenable from the point of view of the limitation and reduction of armaments.

The delegation of the United States does not agree with the alleged importance of civil aircraft in estimating the air strength of a country, because civil aviation itself is merely a resource of a country and it should not be thrown into high relief or subjected to any special consideration from the point of view of the limitation or reduction of armaments. The air armaments of a country should be considered in the same light and be accorded the same treatment as the other two categories of armaments, and hence the inclusion in the reply to Question VI of a statement which indicates that civil aviation, which is merely a resource of a country, should be considered in a different light in regard to the armaments of a country from any other resource is unacceptable to the delegation of the United States.

D.

Declaration by the Delegations of FRANCE and the KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES.

ASSESSMENT OF THE MILITARY VALUE OF COMMERCIAL Fleets.

The above-mentioned delegations consider that, in all methods of comparing and limiting naval armaments, account should be taken of the addition of strength furnished by the mercantile marine to the navy in time of war.

Seeing that all the technical delegations have recognised the military value of the merchant fleets, it would be inequitable to omit so important a factor on the ground that their potential military value cannot be estimated exactly.

It must be pointed out that the tonnage of merchant ships suitable for conversion into auxiliary cruisers varies, among European nations, for example, between 3,300,000 tons.
and only a few thousand, and it has been generally admitted that these ships represent the
greater part of the fighting value of the merchant fleets.

The reasons given in support of the argument that any comparison between the military
values of the merchant fleets is quite arbitrary are equally applicable to the navies, but it has
nevertheless been accepted that a comparison can be made between navies on the basis of
their total tonnage.

Just as, in the case of merchant ships, warships, even of the same type, have, according
to their age, greater or less protection against submarine attack; some warships burn coal,
others mazout; some have turbines, others reciprocating engines, and others internal-combus-
tion engines. But there has never been any question in the Naval Committee of Sub-
Commission A of considering such factors as of capital importance in the comparison of
navies.

Consequently, these delegations still maintain that, although it cannot be exactly
calculated, the fighting value of merchant ships suitable for conversion into auxiliary cruisers,
which constituted the most important part of the military value of the merchant fleets, may
be calculated sufficiently accurately to be taken into account in the comparison or limitation
of naval armaments properly so called.

It should, of course, be clearly understood that they do not contemplate the possibility of
limiting the merchant fleets in any way.

These delegations finally add that, although the majority of the Naval Committee of
Sub-Commission A considered that the military value of the merchant fleets could not be
estimated by the method suggested by the delegation of France, this in no way proves
that the problem cannot be solved in a more satisfactory manner at the final Conference.

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1 Total tonnage of merchant ships of more than 1,500 tons and steaming more than 14 knots suitable
for conversion into auxiliary cruisers:

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QUESTIONS CONTAINED IN THE COMMENTARY REGARDING QUESTION VII.

SECTION I. — TEXT OF THE QUESTIONS.

Admitting that disarmament depends on security, to what extent is regional disarmament possible in return for regional security? Or is any scheme of disarmament impracticable unless it is general? If regional disarmament is practicable, would it promote or lead up to general disarmament?

The Commission asks Technical Sub-Commissions A and B to consider whether regional military, naval and air disarmament can be regarded as an important step towards general disarmament, and, should general disarmament not prove immediately practicable, what regions could be considered separately, from the point of view of the limitation of armaments. Sub-Commissions A and B are requested to consider what factors the term “region” should connote from the point of view of security and from the point of view of disarmament.

SECTION II. — TEXT OF THE REPLIES.

The delegation of the BRITISH EMPIRE submits the following reply:

The delegation of the British Empire is of opinion that the political considerations in this question so much outweigh the technical considerations as to render it impossible for it to take part in the discussion.

It followed with great interest the debate which ensued, and is satisfied that the nature of the discussion provided the fullest justification for the position which it found itself compelled to take up.

The delegation of GERMANY submits the following:

The delegation of Germany, being of opinion that in this question the political aspect is predominant, approves the following report only in so far as the replies contained therein to the questions raised are given from a purely technical military standpoint.

The delegations of BELGIUM, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, FINLAND, FRANCE, ITALY, POLAND, ROUMANIA and the KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES submit Text A below.

The delegations of the ARGENTINE, CHILE, JAPAN, the NETHERLANDS, SPAIN, SWEDEN and the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA accept the following Text A with the reservations indicated at the end of each chapter.

Text A.

PREAMBLE.

Before replying from the technical point of view to the questions put to it on the subject of Question VII, Sub-Commission A desires to emphasise the fact that the distinction between the technical and the political aspect of this question is particularly hard to define. The following general observations from a technical point of view are, however, submitted for the consideration of the Preparatory Commission.

B.

The delegations of GERMANY, the NETHERLANDS, SPAIN, SWEDEN and the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA add to the first paragraph of this preamble: “and that the latter is predominant”.

CHAPTER I.

Can regional military, naval and air disarmament be regarded as an important step towards general disarmament?

A.

To the extent to which the armaments of a State depend upon the armaments of other States, the disarmament of one or of several States is calculated to facilitate the disarmament of other States, which are thus enabled to fix their own armaments in relation to those of the first-mentioned States.
If, therefore, it is possible, now or in the future, to limit the armaments of a State or of groups of States in a particular region, it may, in consequence, be possible to limit the armaments of the States in that region and therefore in other regions in accordance with the special needs of each State and the conditions of life and security peculiar to it, particularly as regards States on the border of such a region.

It should, however, be pointed out that regional disarmament should not cause a State Member of the League of Nations to decrease its armaments below the level compatible with its security and the execution of international obligations, such as those referred to in Articles 8 and 16 of the Covenant, on which the possibility of other States disarming might depend. This observation applies in particular to States which possess geographical or strategic positions of paramount importance to the security of other States.

B. The delegations of the Netherlands and the United States of America omit, in the third paragraph of the above chapter, the words: "and the execution of international obligations, such as those referred to in Articles 8 and 16 of the Covenant".

C. The delegation of the United States of America adds the following to Text A in Chapter I above.

Since the United States of America is not a Member of the League of Nations, the delegation is constrained to dissociate itself with the last paragraph of this chapter and to refrain from expressing any views on its subject-matter.

CHAPTER II.

Should general disarmament not prove immediately practicable, what regions could be considered separately, from the point of view of the limitation of armaments?

A. From the technical military, naval and air point of view, the armaments and the degree of security of a State depend upon the armaments of all the States which could intervene effectively either to give assistance to it or to fight against it in any conflict in which it may be engaged.

Theoretically, for the purpose of the contractual limitation of armaments, a region can therefore only be limited by obstacles such that most of the States situated beyond them would be unable to intervene effectively in the region concerned. Under the conditions of modern warfare, such a region is generally very vast and embraces, apart from exceptional cases, a whole geographical continent. It would furthermore be natural — always, of course, from the theoretical point of view — to include in a Convention for the Limitation of Armaments in respect of a particular continent, States which, as a result of their freedom of action at sea, could intervene in the said continent although situated in other continents.

B. The delegations of Chile and the United States of America strongly dissent from the statement made in the last sentence of the chapter above.

CHAPTER III.

What factors should the term "region" connoted from the point of view of security and from the point of view of disarmament?

A. Apart from the considerations set forth above with regard to the limitation of armaments, it is necessary to take the following points into account:

(a) From the standpoint of security, a region should include all States whose territory or any one of whose national frontiers or whose essential communications might be directly threatened by any conflicts breaking out in the said region. If all or any of these risks of conflict are covered by arbitration and security agreements, there may be a greater or lesser degree of regional security.

(b) Greater or lesser degrees of disarmament may correspond to this degree of security in the aforesaid region.

(c) If, therefore, a Convention for the Limitation of Armaments must apply in principle to all the States capable of intervening on a particular continent, the scales of armaments stabilised by the Convention may vary according to the degree of security enjoyed by each of the said States.

1 Sub-Commission A expressed no opinion on the question of the interests which a State might have in other regions (possibility of conflicts susceptible of threatening its nationals, property, etc.).
Moreover, the conclusion of a regional agreement which provides for the security of the metropolitan territories of a given country does not necessarily ensure the security of its overseas territories situated outside the continent under consideration; and vice versa.

(d) In view of the preceding, it is obvious that any conflict which may arise in the interior of a given region may in certain cases force each State in the region to take military measures in order to cope with the repercussions such a conflict might entail.

B.

The delegations of CHILE and the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA strongly dissent from the statement in paragraph (c) of Text A of Chapter III above.

CHAPTER IV. — CONCLUSIONS.

A.

As a conclusion to the above general considerations, and regarding the question from a technical point of view, regional military, naval and air disarmament may be looked upon as a step towards general disarmament, and this step will be more important in measure as the region considered is vaster and lends itself more readily to the technical organisation of a system of possible mutual assistance guaranteeing each of the States of the region against any aggression.

B.

The delegation of the UNITED STATES strongly dissents from the statement made in the last phrase of Text A of Chapter IV above beginning “and this step”.

C.

The delegation of JAPAN expresses no opinion on the aforesaid last phrase.

D.

The delegation of the ARGENTINE does not express any opinion regarding Text A of Chapter IV above.

SECTION III.

A.

Declaration by the Delegations of CZECHOSLOVAKIA, FRANCE, ITALY, the KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES and SPAIN.

DELIMINATION OF REGIONS.

The above-named delegations, which regard regional disarmament merely as a makeshift, consider that, from the technical point of view, all States capable of acting in the same theatre of operations should be included in one and the same disarmament convention. This would bring within any disarmament convention countries which, by reason of the preponderant strength of their naval armaments, corresponding to their political power or the requirements of their security, possess freedom of action at sea. Such countries may, if they possess suitable naval bases, intervene at points throughout the entire world. They would no doubt require some time to raise and transport large forces and military material, but experience has shown that their intervention in land warfare might prove decisive.

In addition, even with their peace-time military and air forces, they may, if such forces are carried by their navies, take immediate possession of points of strategical importance the occupation of which at the outset of a war may exert considerable influence on the attitude of the various countries and on the corresponding land operations.

Lastly, they may, by means of their navies, which are always immediately available, even from the opening of hostilities seriously interfere with the transport which enables certain countries to bring troops from their overseas territories for the defence of the threatened home country; or the transport enabling these countries to reinforce the troops in their overseas possessions if the latter are attacked; or, finally, the transport intended to supply these countries with the raw material, arms, munitions, foodstuffs, etc., necessary for the conduct of operations by land, if not indeed for their very existence.

Again, these States which possess freedom of action at sea may frequently lend very effective assistance to other countries, particularly by ensuring their supplies and in this way affording them advantages which may ensure them victory on land. The granting of such assistance depends, however, on geographical conditions, the possibility of passing through certain straits and the “existence in the country attacked” of facilities for supplying and repairing the fleets giving assistance.
No country can, therefore, estimate the armaments required for its security without taking account of the armaments of States which may intervene effectively in this way throughout the world, and this necessarily implies the participation of the latter States in any disarmament convention, even a regional convention.

B.

Declaration by the Delegation of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

REGIONAL DISARMAMENT.

In Section II, Chapter II, paragraph 2 of Text A, submitted as a reply to Question VII by certain delegations, the following sentence appears:

"It would furthermore be natural — always, of course, from the theoretical point of view — to include in a Convention for the Limitation of Armaments in respect of a particular continent, States which, as a result of their freedom of action at sea, could intervene in the said continent although situated in other continents."

Furthermore, the following passage also appears later on in this reply:

Chapter III. "(c) If therefore a Convention for the Limitation of Armaments must apply in principle to all the States capable of intervening on a particular continent, the scales of armaments stabilised by the Convention may vary according to the degree of security enjoyed by each of the said States."

These statements would seem to indicate that States having freedom of action at sea would have to be parties to all regional agreements in every continent. The question asked by the Preparatory Commission reads as follows:

"... Should general disarmament not prove immediately practicable, what regions could be considered separately, from the point of view of the limitation of armaments?"

The implication of the two passages quoted above is that, in so far as naval Powers are concerned, there are no regions. The delegation of the United States, on the contrary, considers that this question should be answered in the affirmative. The conditions prevailing in different parts of the world are so varied and the factors entering into the situation are so divergent that constructive achievement in the matter of the limitation of land armaments appears to lie in regional agreements rather than in an effort to work out a general plan for the limitation of land armaments applicable to the whole world. For these reasons, the delegation of the United States cannot subscribe to the above-quoted passages in the reply given to this question, which appears to exclude the possibility of concluding regional agreements.

Furthermore, the concluding paragraph of Text A of the reply to Question VII submitted by certain delegations reads as follows:

"As a conclusion to the above general considerations, and regarding the question from a technical point of view, regional military, naval and air disarmament may be looked upon as a step towards general disarmament, and this step will be more important in measure as the region considered is vaster and lends itself more readily to the technical organisation of a system of possible mutual assistance guaranteeing each of the States of the region against any aggression."

Again, the delegation of the United States strongly dissents from the statement italicised in this paragraph, since it largely negatives the idea of regional agreements by emphasising that their conclusion should be dependent upon the problematical conclusion of a system of treaties of alliance or of mutual assistance.