The delegations of FRANCE, the NETHERLANDS, POLAND, ROUMANIA and the KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES submit the following alternative text for the last paragraph:

"Ships which have exceeded their age-limit shall be counted only as a part of their tonnage in estimating total tonnage, the said part to be decided upon by the ultimate Conference."

The delegation of ITALY expresses no opinion on the possible compensation to be allowed for the possible retention of ships beyond their age-limit.

Advantages of the Method.

Submitted by the delegations of BELGIUM, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, FINLAND, FRANCE, ITALY, the NETHERLANDS, POLAND, ROUMANIA, the KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, SPAIN and SWEDEN:

1. It fulfils satisfactorily the pacific aim intended, since, by limiting the ensemble of warships which enter into the composition of fleets, it prevents the possibility of their increase and thereby any competition in armaments. Moreover, it avoids naval competition since it fixes for each country a maximum fighting value corresponding to the best distribution of its tonnage, from the point of view of number and type of vessels and with due regard to its special conditions.

2. It satisfactorily fulfils the aim of reducing the financial burdens of the various countries since it makes it possible to limit, in the case of each country, the effort entailed by the whole of its naval construction and hence the corresponding financial effort.

3. It is an equitable method because the principles on which it is based apply to all fleets of whatever type of vessels they may be composed, and is not contrary to the interest of any of the maritime Powers.

4. It ought to be acceptable to all countries because it leaves to each the maximum latitude as regards distributing and arranging its tonnage in the manner best suited to its own national defence interests, i.e., it will enable each to obtain the maximum value from the tonnage built; in this way it will allow maintenance of the relative fighting value of the different fleets, which is dependent upon relative total tonnage.

5. It is suited to the conditions of security of all countries since it allows them to replace the tonnage of their obsolete units by units corresponding to the requirements of security at the time, each State preserving the right, if it desires, to postpone its own new constructions until it knows the direction taken by new construction in other countries.

Criticisms of the Advantages.

Submitted by the delegations of the ARGENTINE, the BRITISH EMPIRE, CHILE, JAPAN and the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

1. It is not considered that this method fulfils satisfactorily the pacific aim intended, since, by affecting armaments as a whole, it permits rather than prevents competitive building within the total tonnage allowed. It must be strongly emphasised that the total tonnage of a fleet does not necessarily give any indication as to its fighting value.

2. This is not invariably the case since the cost per ton of construction of small ships is proportionately greater than in the case of larger ships, e.g., if battleships are replaced by submarines, the expense of construction per ton will be more than doubled.

3. Unless the principle upon which the method is based takes into consideration the classes of vessels of which the fleets are composed, the effect of its application will be that the distribution of the tonnage allowed will be very indefinite. Consequently, the method cannot be considered otherwise than contrary to the interests of other maritime Powers.

4. Although, doubtless, highly desirable from the point of view of any one particular country, yet when applied to all countries such latitude will open the door to competition of a more or less aggravated nature which will militate strongly against establishing and maintaining an equitable relativity in armaments between nations, which it is the principal aim of the Conference to provide.

As regards the last part of this paragraph, see the criticism of paragraph 1.

5. Here again one of the chief objections to this method which emerges is that the security of other countries appears to have been left out of consideration.

The right of any country to postpone new construction is common to all methods, but the underlying idea of the latter part of this paragraph appears to give to the country which has waited
6. Within the limits of the total tonnage allowed, each State is afforded the possibility of obtaining, either through the choice of types of vessel suitable to its defensive requirements or through a larger number of less powerful units, an advantage compensating to some extent for its relative inferiority. This, moreover, renders aggression by a more powerful country less likely. The option referred to, however, is strictly limited, for each State, by the need of maintaining in its navy a suitable composition corresponding to its strategical and tactical requirements, by endeavouring to secure the best arrangements as between the number of vessels of each kind and their individual strength.

This option is, moreover, automatically limited by the terms of the rules regarding replacements, the effect of which is to permit the average annual replacement of only a fraction of the total tonnage, this fraction varying between one-twentieth and one-twelfth and being usually less than one-sixteenth.

7. It can be applied permanently because it renders it possible, without any need to modify the Convention, for each country to renew its naval material at a rate known to all, which is governed by the age-limits adopted, and because it allows renewals to be undertaken according to the progress made in technical directions and the necessities of the moment.

It is effective because it applies satisfactorily to all the material which has to be limited, and because it only applies to elements which can be readily determined.

8. The rules on which it is based are clear and their application is as simple as possible.

Note. — The principle of the auxiliary rule concerning the possibility of slightly exceeding the total tonnage allowed is favourable to States which keep units a great advantage, and to encourage it to build against its neighbours. This would apply more particularly to the richer and stronger Powers.

The plea that this method may lead to a competition in disarmament seems utopian and unsound, and even may be dangerous to the success of any Convention.

No country whose existence depends on overseas communications can afford to speculate in such a matter.

6. In order to succeed, the Conference must establish relative strengths between countries, which relative strengths must remain unchanged during the life of the Convention. Total Tonnage, as admitted in Advantage No. 6, aims at disturbing this relativity. While the figures given are doubtless theoretically correct, it is considered that in practice the fraction of tonnage becoming obsolete in any one year may considerably exceed the figure given, as fleets are composed of various categories.

7. The application of a method which permits continual and unexpected changes in the composition of a fleet can only be regarded as dangerous and will inevitably necessitate a modification of the Convention to meet the new situations as they are created.

It applies to all the material afloat only in its totality, but is ineffective because it permits within that totality the possibility of frequent changes in actual naval strength.

8. Rules for the application of any method must be based on information as to the elements to be dealt with in order that such rules may be applied intelligently. It is not understood how agreement can be reached between nations as to limitation of naval armaments unless the component elements of such armaments are known and evaluated.

As regards this auxiliary advantage, the critics of "total tonnage", with the exception of the ARGENTINE delegation, contend that:
beyond their normal limits of age, since it enables them to a certain extent to remedy the defects of their fleet due to this cause by building new units; it also makes it easier to keep their naval shipyards active and, in consequence, to maintain the technical standard of their labour.

Any replacement of obsolete tonnage should be governed by specific rules. The exercise of the right to replace a proportion of obsolete tonnage while still retaining in service the units so replaced would in itself disturb the scale of naval armaments and might in extreme cases result in a serious augmentation of the total tonnage of a fleet.

To keep naval shipyards active and thus maintain the technical standard of their labour is an advantage applicable to all methods.

Disadvantages of the Method.

Submitted by the delegations of the ARGENTINE, the BRITISH EMPIRE, CHILE, JAPAN and the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

1. Fleets are composed of units which are capable of classification and evaluation (vide official, semi-official and other publications). To arrive at the total tonnage to be claimed, these units must be taken into consideration, and to convert these unit factors into comparatively meaningless figures which disguise the proposed composition of fleets will render very difficult an agreement as to reduction and limitation of naval armaments.

Criticisms of the Disadvantages.

Submitted by the delegations of BELGIUM, FRANCE, ITALY, POLAND, ROMANIA, the KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS and SLOVENES, SPAIN and SWEDEN.

1. There is no possibility of calculating exactly the value of the component units of fleets owing to the great variety of the characteristics which go to make up the fighting strength of those units. Equally there is no possibility of making a precise classification. The official classifications vary in different countries, and those followed in publications are vague and could not in any way serve as a basis for the precise provisions of a Convention.

The Washington Conference was forced to recognise the impossibility of arriving at a definition of the various classes of warships in existence, even for the five signatory Powers only, and was therefore compelled, merely for the purposes of the treaty, to define in a technically arbitrary fashion the vessels to be built in future.

The general term “battleships” includes coast-defence vessels, monitors, pre-dreadnoughts, dreadnoughts, super-dreadnoughts and post-Jutland vessels, whose tonnage varies from 2,200 to 41,000 tons; similarly, the term “cruiser”, as generally used, includes vessels of from 1,300 to 13,600 tons, and the term “torpedo-boat” includes vessels of from 60 to 2,400 tons.

All this shows that any comparison of the strength of naval armaments based on an analysis of the classifications of fleets is bound to give rise to error in its results. Moreover, in connection with the second sentence of paragraph 1 opposite, there are many countries with limited financial resources which, when fixing the total tonnage to be claimed, will have to take into consideration not only the units theoretically necessary for their security but also the annual sums which they see.

The delegation of ITALY expresses no opinion on the above note.
2. In order to arrive at any equitable basis for the reduction and limitation of naval armaments, the strength of the various fleets concerned necessarily must be compared. Such comparison is not possible unless the component elements of the fleets are evaluated. This method does not admit of evaluation of the component elements since only their sum total is considered; therefore the strength of the various fleets cannot be compared.

3. The above disadvantage will be greatly magnified, especially in the case of limitation of naval armaments, particularly as regards future construction, since neither the elements to be retained nor those to be constructed will be known in advance of the adoption of naval programmes.

4. The lack of knowledge of naval strength of different countries, due to the fact that no limits are fixed for each class of ship, would produce a feeling of insecurity and mistrust.

5. This method would permit a country to effect changes in its tonnage, within the tonnage allowed, by building all ships of one type, thus placing other countries in a disadvantageous position and prompting them to change their naval programmes in order to meet such conditions.
generally speaking, twenty years would be required for a country to rebuild the whole of its fleet in such a manner that the fleet would consist of units of one single type.

6. If this method be adopted and advantage taken of its conditions, the maintenance of equilibrium will be impossible.

6. The present method, on the other hand, makes it possible to assure all countries of the maintenance of the relative equilibrium once established; it enables them to obtain the best possible value from the tonnage allowed them, and, owing to the elasticity permitted in the matter of replacements, they can maintain the relativity by adapting their new construction to their technical and political needs at the time being.

7. By fixing one maximum limit to the individual tonnage of warships, this method would allow increases in the size of cruisers, aircraft carriers, destroyers, submarines and other classes of vessels, thus opening the door to competitive building within the allotted tonnage.

7. Within the limits of the maximum individual tonnage allowed, a country may legitimately increase the dimensions of certain units which it is about to construct so far as its available replacement tonnage permits. This increase in dimensions, however, automatically involves a decrease in the number of units; but as, owing to tactical and strategical considerations, that number can never be diminished to any great extent, the increases in individual tonnage that may be contemplated are bound to be very limited.

8. Lack of knowledge of the intended utilisation of all or part of obsolete tonnage for the construction of new ships would in itself create a feeling of insecurity and mistrust among countries.

8. Owing to the length of time required for the construction of naval units and the necessity experienced by every country of spreading its construction over a period of years, no feeling of insecurity or mistrust can be created between different countries as a result of lack of information as to the use it is proposed to make of the whole or part of the obsolete tonnage.

Method 2. — Total Depreciated Tonnage.

Submitted by the delegations of FRANCE, POLAND, ROUMANIA, the KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES and SPAIN.

LIMITATION OF TOTAL DEPRECIATED TONNAGE OF THE NAVAL ARMAMENTS OF EACH STATE, THE LATTER BEING FREE TO DISTRIBUTE AND ARRANGE THAT TONNAGE IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS DEFENSIVE INTERESTS.

The general lines of this method are as follows:

Definition of total depreciated tonnage. — The total depreciated tonnage is the sum of the depreciated tonnages of all individual ships capable of employment as fighting units. Surface vessels under a certain tonnage and armed with guns under a certain calibre may, however, be regarded as non-fighting units for the purposes of the limitation and reduction of armaments.

(a) The undepreciated tonnage of each unit may be determined in the manner indicated in the total-tonnage method.

(b) The depreciated tonnage of each vessel is calculated on the basis of age, according to a table in the following form, in which undepreciated tonnage is represented by 100.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age: Years</th>
<th>Vessels of over 3,000 Tons</th>
<th>Vessels of from 1,500 to 3,000 Tons</th>
<th>Vessels of from 100 to 1,500 Tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(The same values indefinitely.)

The decision as to the definite values should be made by the ultimate Conference.

(c) No warship shall have a tonnage greater than the maximum tonnage decided upon.

(d) No gun mounted in a warship shall have a calibre greater than the maximum calibre decided upon.

(e) The total depreciated tonnage allowed to each State according to the above scale is 75 per cent of the total undepreciated tonnage asked for and justified on grounds of security.

(f) Any reconstruction of units entailing an increase of their fighting value (change of armour, calibre of guns, types of boilers or engines) should be regulated or compensated for.

The decision on this point, as well as the rules or figures, should be left to the final Conference.

**Advantages of the Method.**

Submitted by the delegations of FRANCE, POLAND, ROUMANIA, the KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES and SPAIN.

It possesses most of the advantages of the total-tonnage method, together with the following special advantages:

- The method of limitation by total depreciated tonnage deals primarily with comparison and replacement of tonnage from the point of view of the age factor, and is applicable to tonnage by classes as well as to total tonnage. This method is not primarily a method of reduction and limitation but is essentially an auxiliary factor that may be applied to any method.

In any agreement for reduction and limitation of naval armaments, a nation should be able to give to the ultimate Conference a programme showing in detail the classes of ships which it wishes to construct, in order that agreement may be reached as to the undepreciated tonnage to be allotted to that nation. If a programme is not agreed upon in detail, and a nation is allowed a certain undepreciated tonnage with full liberty to employ this tonnage in any way it may see fit, a condition of insecurity and uncertainty would result among other nations. Following the same argument, after an undepreciated tonnage has been agreed upon, the right to replace depreciated tonnage, whether it be gradually or at the time of obsolescence of units, should be fixed in order that all Powers concerned will know exactly how their percentage of depreciated tonnage can be used.

**Criticisms of the Advantages.**

Submitted by the delegations of the BRITISH EMPIRE, CHILE, JAPAN and the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

The method of limitation by total depreciated tonnage deals primarily with comparison and replacement of tonnage from the point of view of the age factor, and is applicable to tonnage by classes as well as to total tonnage. This method is not primarily a method of reduction and limitation but is essentially an auxiliary factor that may be applied to any method.

In any agreement for reduction and limitation of naval armaments, a nation should be able to give to the ultimate Conference a programme showing in detail the classes of ships which it wishes to construct, in order that agreement may be reached as to the undepreciated tonnage to be allotted to that nation. If such a programme is not agreed upon in detail, and a nation is allowed a certain undepreciated tonnage with full liberty to employ this tonnage in any way it may see fit, a condition of insecurity and uncertainty would result among other nations. Following the same argument, after an undepreciated tonnage has been agreed upon, the right to replace depreciated tonnage, whether it be gradually or at the time of obsolescence of units, should be fixed in order that all Powers concerned will know exactly how their percentage of depreciated tonnage can be used.
I. It requires no rule or date for replacement.

2. The factor of age is automatically taken into account in the limitative figure, and comparison is thus made easier.

3. Part of the depreciation of old units is automatically compensated for, while the variations of total undepreciated tonnage are kept within very narrow limits, even in extreme cases (more theoretical than practical).

4. This method possesses the maximum of elasticity, because it enables the construction of new units to spread over a period of time, by combining all the available tonnage due both to the scrapping of old vessels and to the depreciation through age of the entire fleet.

5. It is the only method by which, in comparisons and calculations, no account need be taken of units which for any reason have been scrapped before attaining the age-limit.

6. It is the only method which allows of the replacement of such units, as also of any vessels which may become useless in practice owing to defects in design or construction.

Note. — The delegations of FRANCE, ITALY and POLAND acknowledge in principle all the advantages of this method except Nos. 5 and 6. That is why they consider that this method should be supplemented by a rule preventing the scrapping of units before they reach their age-limit, which would do away with Advantages 5 and 6.

The delegation of SWEDEN acknowledges Advantages Nos. 2 and 4.

Disadvantages of the Method.

Submitted by the delegations of the BRITISH EMPIRE, CHILE, JAPAN and the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

1. While this is a very interesting and ingenious auxiliary method of comparison of naval armaments and also of

I. Any agreement for the reduction and limitation of naval armaments which has no rule or date of replacement could not be complete and would not meet the conditions necessary to a stable agreement.

2. While the factor of age is automatically taken into account, and the age comparison is simplified, the very important factor of prior knowledge as to how the percentage of tonnage to be replaced would be employed is not included.

3. Part of the depreciation of old tonnage is automatically compensated for, provided the nation concerned wishes to retain depreciated tonnage. Otherwise, according to this method, such a nation would be free to replace the major part of depreciated tonnage by new construction in any way it desired.

4. The element of elasticity as applied to reduction and limitation of armaments is not considered an advantage, but a serious disadvantage. Any agreement for the reduction and limitation of naval armaments in order to be effective should be so fixed as to have a minimum rather than a maximum of elasticity, not only in replacement but in additional new construction.

5. This paragraph would seem to be a disadvantage instead of an advantage. Account must be taken of units which have been scrapped if they are to be replaced by new construction.

6. In accordance with this paragraph, a country would have the right to scrap her entire fleet under conditions not clearly defined, regardless of age of units, and replace the major part of her entire tonnage in any way desired, which would result in an unstable international condition tending inevitably to disturb the relativity existing between different naval Powers and offering inducements to other naval Powers to enter a race in competitive building to meet new existing conditions.

Criticisms of the Disadvantages.

Submitted by the delegations of FRANCE, POLAND, ROUMANIA, the KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES and SPAIN.

1. Since to each ton of depreciated tonnage a certain maximum of non-depreciated tonnage corresponds, it is
prescribing replacement programmes, it is not in itself a method by which reduction and limitation of naval armaments may be effected.

2. It is incomplete due to the fact that no rules or dates of replacement of obsolete tonnage are prescribed, thereby tending to instability in agreements reached for the reduction and limitation of naval armaments.

3. No provision is made by which countries will make known at the ultimate Conference their intention as to use of undepreciated tonnage.

4. The great elasticity of this method is apparent. A country may decide to scrap all of its existing tonnage and may have the right to replace the major part of it in any way she may desire. Such a condition would result in disturbing relativity among different navies obvious that, by limiting depreciated tonnage, non-depreciated tonnage is also limited.

2. It is, on the contrary, better than the other methods since, in spite of the absence of rules, it tends to ensure the maximum stability. Indeed, the necessity for having the greatest number of ships possible prevents a State from having its fleet composed solely of new units since, by so doing, the total tonnage of the whole of these units should be inferior by 25 per cent to the non-depreciated tonnage asked.

If, on the other hand, a State allowed its fleet to become old, the value of that fleet will decrease in proportion to its age, and, in order to regain its normal value, it would be necessary to renew it by a series of 25 per cent of the tonnage spread out over twenty years. Indeed, it is easy to see that a fleet, however old it may be, always retains a value of 50 per cent of its tonnage. The limit being fixed at 75 per cent, the first replacement programme can be 25 per cent of its total tonnage. At that moment the depreciated tonnage will have reached its limit and it will be necessary to scrap the old ships in order to be able to continue building. But as the old units are only reckoned for half their tonnage, should the State in question wish to retain the number of units it considers necessary, it will have to wait for a certain ageing of the new units in order to obtain, from their depreciation, the necessary extra tonnage which would permit the building of another series of 25 per cent of the tonnage.

Consequently, States needing, on the one hand, to retain the necessary number of units and having, on the other hand, the fear of being for a long time in a position of obvious inferiority, will be obliged to carry out their building steadily.

3. Each State will have to show that the depreciated tonnage asked for in accordance with its armaments programmes does not exceed the limit agreed upon. However, the right of each State to arrange its tonnage freely in a manner which it considers the most suitable for its security, its finance and its industry is one of the characteristics of this method as well as of that of total tonnage.

The advantages and disadvantages of this particular characteristic having already been stated at length during the study of total tonnage, it seems unnecessary to state them again.

4. The instance of scrapping the whole of a fleet seems to be purely theoretical. Should it happen, however, this method is the only one capable of preventing its entire replacement. Indeed, the time-limits fixed by the other methods are always the lowest.
and would tend to increase the feeling of insecurity.

Accordingly, it would be possible, by allowing the whole fleet to become old, to replace it entirely, whilst the method of depreciated tonnage never allows more than 75 per cent of the fleet to be built.

5. Theoretically, a country could increase its total tonnage by 25 per cent if all its units exceeded an age of fifteen years, but to reach this limit it would be necessary to allow all ships which have a combatant value to become old. Consequently, it is practically certain that the oldest units would be some thirty-five years old. A fleet thus composed would in no way cause anxiety to other countries. In any case, this composition could not be maintained for long because the oldest units would become so old that they would be utterly useless and, as already shown, it would take that country a very long time to restore itself.

The delegation of SWEDEN acknowledges Disadvantages Nos 1, 2 and 4.

Method 3. — Limitation by Classes.

(Applications A, B and C).

Submitted by the delegations of the ARGENTINE, the BRITISH EMPIRE, CHILE, JAPAN and the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

The characteristics of this method are that limitation and reduction of naval armaments can be effected by classes of combatant vessels.

The above-named delegations submit the following three applications and are in general agreement with the advantages set forth in each case.

They wish to draw attention to the practical possibility of combining all or any two of the Applications A, B, and C of the method of limitation by classes, the decision as to the most efficient and acceptable way being left to the Preparatory Commission.

Application A. — Tonnage by Classes.

Definition. — By the term "tonnage by classes" is meant the total tonnage of each class of combatant vessels.

The term "combatant vessels", as used, includes capital ships, aircraft-carriers, cruisers (of all kinds), flotilla leaders, destroyers, submarines and such other special types as may be included by agreement.

Classes of Ships. — (a) A capital ship may be defined as a vessel-of-war not an aircraft-carrier, of heavy armament and protection, whose displacement exceeds ........ tons and/or carries a gun whose calibre exceeds ........ inches.

Maximum for displacement : ........ tons.

Maximum for calibre of guns : ........ inches.

(b) An aircraft-carrier may be defined as a vessel-of-war designed and constructed for the specific and exclusive purpose of carrying aircraft, and with such deck facilities that aircraft can be launched therefrom and landed thereon.

Maximum for displacement : ........ tons.

Maximum for calibre of guns : ........ inches.

(c) A cruiser may be defined as a vessel-of-war of medium armament and protection and whose displacement exceeds ........ tons and/or carries a gun exceeding ........ inches in calibre.

Maximum for displacement : ........ tons.

Maximum for calibre of guns : ........ inches.

(d) A destroyer (including flotilla leader) may be defined as a vessel-of-war of high speed (........ knots), slight protection, and having torpedoes as its main armament.

Maximum for displacement : ........ tons.

Maximum for calibre of guns : ........ inches.

Maximum diameter torpedo-tubes : ........ inches.
(e) A submarine may be defined as a vessel-of-war possessing the power of submerging and navigating below the surface of the water.

(f) A mine-layer is a vessel-of-war specially fitted for carrying and laying mines.

(g) Surface craft below a certain tonnage, speed, and number and calibre of guns may be considered as non-combatant for the purposes of reduction and limitation of armaments; also fuel ships, supply ships, tenders, repair ships, tugs and mine-sweepers.

(h) The tonnage of each combatant vessel may be determined in the same manner as given under the method of "Total Tonnage".

In the application of tonnage by classes, it is essential that:

1. The total tonnage allowed in each class of combatant vessel be prescribed;
2. The maximum tonnage of the unit of each class be prescribed;
3. The maximum calibre of gun allowed for each class be prescribed;
4. The maximum diameter of torpedo-tubes be prescribed.

Note. — The age of ships should be taken into account as an auxiliary consideration.

In arriving at the value of the tonnage already possessed by any Power with a view to possible reduction, consideration should be given to the ages of the individual units in each type in order to arrive at an equitable agreement as to immediate scrapping and replacements.

That the life of the unit of each type, that is, period when replacement may begin, be uniform and fixed by agreement between the Powers concerned.

That the standard by which the tonnage of the individual unit is measured, that is, what should be considered the standard tonnage of the ship, be prescribed.

That the complement in personnel of each unit, the speed, range, amount of ammunition carried and other essentially unit characteristics be left to the discretion of each Power except as noted above in regard to limitation of the maximum calibre of guns and the maximum diameter of torpedo-tubes.

That the question of protection in the shape of armour, both as to thickness and arrangement, and under-water subdivision be left to the individual Powers, only with the proviso that the maximum tonnage of each unit should not be exceeded.

In the case of existing armaments where the reduction in any types may be necessary in order to arrive at an equitable allotment in that type, the following general methods may be considered.

1. Maintaining the present size of the individual units and reducing the number of units in order to come within the allotted tonnage;
2. Reducing the size of individual units in replacements and maintaining the number of units;
3. Reducing both size and number of units in replacements;
4. Extending the lives of the units of the different types, thereby deferring replacements.

Advantages of Application A.

Submitted by the delegations of the ARGENTINE, CHILE, the BRITISH EMPIRE, JAPAN and the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

1. It allows a fairly accurate comparison between naval strength of different countries.

Criticisms of the Advantages.

Submitted by the delegations of FINLAND, FRANCE, ITALY, POLAND, ROUMANIA, the KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, SPAIN and SWEDEN:

1. This method does not permit of an exact comparison of the ensemble of the naval strength of each of the different countries.

Even in the case of fleets composed of the same classes, it only permits of a partial comparison of their strength, that is, in the matter of corresponding classes. The diversity of type in the vessels placed according to definition in the various classes is so great that tonnage, the only possible common measure, constitutes the sole criterion for any comparison of strength. Com-
2. An equitable allotment of tonnage in each class of combatant vessel is possible and practicable.

3. It is applicable to all naval Powers having the same general classes of ships, and especially to large naval Powers having a number of different classes.

4. It has been practically applied and is in effect at the present time in so far as capital ships and aircraft-carriers are concerned, and is working satisfactorily.

2. In order that all countries, and particularly those which do not possess big navies, should be equitably treated, the tonnage allowed should amount for each class to the maximum which such countries consider may be necessary before the expiry of the Convention; this would mean the allocation of tonnage in excess of their actual requirements, as each country would be legitimately entitled to insist on a certain margin in each class, instead of claiming a single margin for its total tonnage. This would inevitably lead, except perhaps in the case of navies having a large number of ships, to a result at variance with the object in view, namely, the reduction to a minimum of the armaments of each country and the expenditure connected therewith.

3. As suggested in Advantage 3, this method does not admit of general application. While applicable to very big navies similar in composition and comprising vessels of every class and of very similar if not practically standardised types, it is not suitable for moderate or small navies, which do not always possess vessels of every class and whose vessels, as placed according to definition in the various classes, generally vary very considerably from the characteristic types in the corresponding classes of big navies.

4. An attempt was recently made to extend the principles of the Washington Treaty to all countries possessing vessels coming under the definition of warships laid down in that treaty; this attempt, which was given a material form by the Rome Conference, showed the extreme difficulty, not to say the impossibility, of generalising the application of these principles in any equitable fashion.

Further, the delegations of FRANCE and ITALY, who were signatories to the Treaty of Washington, maintain that this treaty has not resulted in the application properly so called of tonnage according to classes in the case of their respective countries. Each of these Powers expressly reserved the
right to employ its tonnage allocation for battleships as it might think fit, subject to the condition that no vessel should exceed 35,000 tons displacement and that the total tonnage of such vessels should not exceed the 175,000 tons laid down in the Treaty.

Further, the delegations of FRANCE and ITALY point out that the rules laid down in the Treaty of Washington for replacement and scrapping of obsolete vessels will only come into force at the end of the naval holiday which has not yet expired. It would thus be premature to express any considered judgment on the practical working of the treaty as a whole.

5. As already applied to capital ships and aircraft-carriers it has stopped competitive building in these classes.

6. If extended to other classes of ships, it will stop competitive building in those classes.

Disadvantages of Application A.

Submitter by the delegations of FINLAND, FRANCE, ITALY, NETHERLANDS, POLAND, ROUMANIA, the KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, SPAIN and SWEDEN:

Explanation of the Disadvantages given to the Definition of the Method of Limitation based on Tonnage by Classes of Ships (Application A).

Preamble.

Unless Sub-Commission A submits precise definitions of classes to the delegations of FRANCE and ITALY declare that this holiday, which is based upon the maintenance of the status quo, has created a precedent the regrettable effect of which has been to engender fears that a future Conference might follow the same example. The maintenance of the status quo would result in considerable advantages for the nations which are best armed and the average age of whose naval armaments is the lowest, as compared with nations which have already reduced or have not regularly renewed their armaments.

5. The competition in naval armaments was stopped as the result of a naval holiday and not of the application of tonnage by classes; in actual fact, no method of limitation can be put into effect during a naval holiday.

Further, the delegations of FRANCE and ITALY declare that this holiday, which is based upon the maintenance of the status quo, has created a precedent the regrettable effect of which has been to engender fears that a future Conference might follow the same example. The maintenance of the status quo would result in considerable advantages for the nations which are best armed and the average age of whose naval armaments is the lowest, as compared with nations which have already reduced or have not regularly renewed their armaments.

6. The final result would be, as it were, to crystallise the composition of the fleets, with all the drawbacks already mentioned. The net result would be to make the strong still stronger and the weak still weaker, as the strongest would be superior not only in the matter of the ensemble of their fleets but also as regards each of the classes of vessels.

The delegations of the NETHERLANDS and of SWEDEN made a Declaration concerning the above criticisms.

Criticisms of the Disadvantages.

Submitted by the delegations of the ARGENTINE, the BRITISH EMPIRE, CHILE, JAPAN and the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
Preparatory Commission for approval, the majority of Governments will presumably encounter great difficulties in giving their delegates to the final Conference definite instructions enabling them to discuss the method of limitation by classes of ships with a full knowledge of the facts.

It is therefore essential that the Naval Committee should be able to give a reasoned technical opinion on this method, and that it should frame the requisite definitions beforehand, in their main lines at least, the final Conference naturally remaining free to modify them, if it deems fit, in order to meet the requirements of the countries not represented on the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference.

Moreover, although the method does not a priori exclude the idea of reducing the maximum tonnage of ships below the existing figure, it has seemed desirable, for the purpose of subjecting this method to examination, to keep within the conditions prevailing in present day fleets and to take the highest existing figures as the tonnage and calibre data used to define classes of ships. Considered in this way, the definitions of the method in question, are found to have the following disadvantages:

(a) In order to avoid conflicting with the definitions given in existing agreements and to allow for ships at present in service, it would be necessary to assign to one and the same class not only post-Jutland ships, super-dreadnoughts, dreadnoughts and pre-dreadnoughts, i.e., ships whose tonnage varies under present circumstances between 41,000 and 15,000 tons and whose maximum calibre of guns varies between 406 and 240 mm., but all ships other than aircraft-carriers whose tonnage exceeds 10,000 tons, no matter what the calibre of their guns may be, and, further, all ships (small battleships, coast-defence ships and monitors) of a tonnage in some cases below 5,000 tons, owing to the fact that the calibre of their guns exceeds 203 mm. Technically speaking, this would be arbitrary.

(b) Similarly, it would be necessary to assign to the aircraft-carrier class ships of 33,000 tons, capable of carrying large numbers of aeroplanes, and others which, by reason of their small tonnage, can only carry a comparatively small number, as well as any ships temporarily converted into aircraft-carriers for experimental purposes.

Furthermore, it would be very difficult, without proceeding in a manner even more arbitrary, to define, for instance, ships which are in the nature of super-dreadnoughts forward and aircraft-carriers aft, owing to flying decks having been fitted to the latter portion of such ships, or, again, ships which may, in the navies of certain countries
with limited financial resources, be so equipped as to be available for use either as aircraft-carriers or mine-layers, according to circumstances.

Technically speaking, such ships are quite conceivable.

(c) Similarly, if, for purposes of defining the cruiser class, the limiting characteristics were fixed at a maximum tonnage of 10,000 tons and maximum calibre of guns of 203 mm., and at a minimum tonnage of 3,000 tons and a minimum calibre of 15 cm., ships of entirely dissimilar fighting value would thus be grouped together.

(d) In the destroyer class, very fast ships of a tonnage ranging from 3,000 tons to 200 tons, and carrying guns of a calibre which would vary between 15 cm. and 65 mm., would be placed on the same footing.

(e) It would further be impossible to know how to classify ships of small tonnage and medium speed (sloops or gunboats) which exist in many navies and whose armament does not, generally speaking, include torpedoes. There would be no other way of overcoming this difficulty except by increasing the number of classes which would give rise to further complications.

(f) In the case of States signatory to the Washington Treaty, a submarine built in the future and carrying a gun exceeding 203 mm. calibre would, under the definitions of the treaty, have to be included in the capital-ship class.

(g) The extension of the life of various types of units and the resulting postponement of replacements would afford a great advantage to the nations in whose fleets the average age of the combatant units taken as a whole is lowest at the present moment; that is to say, in practice and at the present moment, to the most powerful navies.

(h) It should finally be emphasised that the terms “and/or” appearing in the definitions referred to produce wholly dissimilar results according as the one or the other is adopted.

The Washington Treaty uses “or”.

1. The lack of precision of the definitions given and the great difficulty, if not the impossibility, of drawing up definitions which are at the same time precise and capable of being applied in a general manner to the extremely varied types of ships which exist, and which in the future will probably exist in the navies of the world, prevents all general and equitable application of methods based on the division, necessarily arbitrary, of ships into classes.

1. The following remarks also apply to the explanations given in the left-hand column above.

It is considered entirely possible to draw up definitions of the types of ships sufficiently precise to make a reasonably satisfactory assignment of such ships to the different classes. Since ships have been in existence seamen have been able to classify them in such a manner as to convey, even to landsmen, a reasonably clear idea of their types. It would therefore seem
reasonable and logical for technical experts attending the ultimate Conference to agree upon a sufficiently precise definition of each class of ship for all practical purposes. The definitions given under this application are considered sufficiently clear to convey to the technical advisers to the Governments interested the general characteristics of the types defined.

There should be no difficulty in assigning to special classes special types of ships, such as monitors, coast-defence ships of small tonnage, river gunboats, etc. It seems needless to attempt to deal with types that exist only in imagination. Classes of ships are evolved as a result of experience gained and such experience tends towards standardisation of types.

There is no provision in the limitation of tonnage by classes requiring or even suggesting the maintenance of the existing figure in maximum tonnage of ships. It is important, however, in order to arrive at any limitation and reduction of naval armaments, that a maximum tonnage of the unit in each class be fixed and that the total tonnage of the class be so prescribed as to prevent competition in the building of ships of each class.

2. The definition of the application of this method prescribes the limitation of the diameter of torpedoes as one of the essential conditions of its application. It may be observed in this respect that a limitation of the calibre of torpedoes will risk making that weapon ineffective against very large ships. The result would be that this application will be inequitable for all navies which have no dreadnoughts, superfine dreadnoughts or post-Jutland ships, since these navies will no longer be able to defend themselves effectively against warships of those types.

It should further be emphasised that any limitation of the calibre of torpedoes will reduce their radius of action, while this method allows that there shall be no limitation of the range of guns. In these circumstances, the possible utilisation of torpedoes will be limited to a much greater extent than that of guns, which will be a great advantage to navies possessing large ships and a detriment to those navies possessing small ships.

3. This application does not accord well with the pacific object in view since, although it to some extent prevents the armament race and therefore apparently serves the cause of peace, it nevertheless tends to increase
international mistrust for the following reasons:

(a) First of all, it is evident that any method which tends to standardise different types of vessel is very much in favour of those navies which have the largest number of units of each of those types. Limitation by classes will lead navies which are in a position to do so to standardise in each class of vessel by adopting the maximum individual tonnage allowed.

The employment of this application is therefore more to the advantage of large navies than of medium-sized and especially small navies.

(b) While this application is calculated to reduce the naval armaments of countries with similarly constituted fleets and with a large number of similar units, it is not likely to secure a fair reduction in the naval armaments of countries with a small number of units of each class or no ships at all of certain classes. The fact that these countries may, at any moment, feel the need of vessels of classes which they do not possess or possess in insufficient strength would certainly cause all countries concerned for their security at sea to claim, with good reason, to be granted additional tonnage in vessels of each of the specified classes. This increase of tonnage, which may one day be made necessary by the advancement of naval science or by circumstances, would — in view of the technical necessity of having at all times a certain number of vessels of the same type — be greater according as the maximum individual tonnage fixed for each class is itself greater.

This application therefore inherently implies an increase of armaments which would be contrary to the aim in view, namely, reduction, and in practice the execution of authorised construction may, in the case of certain countries, result in a perfectly legitimate increase of their armaments.

4. This application would only diminish to a limited extent the financial burdens of the different countries because, while it makes possible a limitation of the expenditure of each country on its naval construction, it does not enable them to give to each ton constructed the maximum value corresponding to their particular defensive interests; Powers and has inspired confidence instead of mistrust in the fulfilment of the agreement. Therefore it is difficult to understand how standardisation can produce mistrust.

(a) The reduction and limitation by classes prescribe specific ways to reduce and limit each class of ships and thus reduce and limit the naval strength of different countries. Limitation by classes does not in itself lead to the adoption of the maximum tonnage as the standard unit of the class; therefore it is difficult to be more to the advantage of large navies than to small navies.

(b) Reduction and limitation by classes is equitable in that it can give a fair reduction and limitation in naval armaments of countries with a small number of units in any class, since at the ultimate Conference the agreement reached would specify the amount of tonnage allowed for each country in each class, thus fixing for the duration of the agreement the relative strength of navies of different countries. Therefore, as this relative strength would remain constant, there would be no change in relative security between countries and no necessity for any country to claim an additional tonnage in any class. The conclusion reached that the application of this method therefore inherently implies an increase of armaments is not in accordance with existing facts, nor is it a logical deduction.

4. It is essential to maintain the principle that any agreements between nations for the reduction and limitation of naval armaments must be an honourable compact between nations indicating, above all, their honest intention to reduce the irritation incident to competitive building and, by eventual reduction, lessen the possibility of war.
accordingly, as was said above, it induces them to claim with perfect justice, in respect of each class of vessel, a larger tonnage than they would really require if they were free to dispose of that tonnage to their best advantage. Moreover, it induces them to bring up the tonnage of their new units as near as the numerical law permits to the maximum individual tonnage allowed, in order that their units may not be outclassed — thus involving further expenditure.

5. This application is not fair to all countries because the elements of which it is composed cannot be equitably applied to all fleets, owing to their different composition and the great diversity in the types of vessel of which they consist. In fact, the inexact and arbitrary definition of classes of vessels inevitably leads either to the establishment of a very large number of classes or to the classification within one class of vessels whose tonnage and characteristics vary within such wide limits that, technically speaking, the qualities of some vessels in one class may be said to be more akin to those of vessels in another class than to those of certain vessels in their own class.

6. At the same time, for the reasons explained in paragraph 4 above, the tendency to replace obsolete units by others nearer to the maximum tonnage allowed would result either in an increase of the necessary auxiliary works (ships, docks, ports, canals, etc.) in countries which have the financial capacity for such an increase or, on the contrary, in the renunciation by countries with insufficient financial resources of part of their allowed tonnage, without their being able to adjust the proportion of their forces by constructing other types of vessel. The latter situation would be that of most navies which, generally speaking, unable for various reasons to build units of the highest individual tonnage allowed.

7. This application cannot ensure national security for countries which do not possess very large naval armaments, that is to say, which have not a sufficient margin to meet any political or technical changes which may occur during the operation of the Convention through unexpected improvements in material or through inventions or new ideas. Reduction and limitation of naval armaments, as such, cannot accomplish the levelling to a common footing of all nations. The reasoning contained in the paragraph opposite is founded neither on experience nor logic; therefore, the conclusion that further expenditure is involved by adopting the method of limitation by classes is not warranted.

5. Reduction and limitation by classes will be fair and equitable to all countries concerned if properly and fairly applied. It can be properly and fairly applied if and when an earnest and concerted determination to reduce and limit naval armaments is reached by nations.

The definition of classes of vessels may be made sufficiently clear to technical naval experts for all practical purposes without being necessarily arbitrary. Every ship in existence or building at the present time is capable of classification.

6. The replacement of obsolete types may be controlled by future agreement. It is possible that agreement may be reached by which obsolete types are not to be replaced. The principle of replacement does not in itself make it compulsory for a nation to renew an obsolete type.

Generally speaking, the slips, docks, ports and canals of countries are regulated more by the commercial tonnage than by naval tonnage. It may be said that the harbour facilities are a determining factor in the design of ships.

7. No method of reduction or limitation of naval armaments can by itself ensure national security for small as well as large nations. No matter what margin may be given to meet political or technical changes, a small country would not be able to place itself upon a parity in naval strength with a larger country. The argument in the paragraph opposite seems rather to advocate decided instability in any agreement that may be reached than stability.
8. This application almost entirely deprives the different countries of their indispensable power to organise the defence of their territory on continuous lines and to the best advantage since it no longer permits them, as at present, to replace the tonnage of vessels which have reached the age-limit as they think fit, in accordance with their defensive interests at the moment and taking due account of their financial resources and technical improvements.

9. This application is not permanently applicable. It does not allow full account to be taken of the constant improvements in naval science, and therefore any important advance in this science should in fairness necessitate a revision of the Convention, in order that certain countries may not suffer to the advantage of other countries which, owing to the size of their allotted tonnage in each class, would have a larger margin to meet dangers resulting from the practical application of these technical improvements.

10. This application is by no means simple, and the inexactitude of its definitions might lead to serious difficulties with regard to its enforcement. It would be necessary to make numerous exceptions to these regulations, and this would certainly have unfortunate results, since most countries would be compelled to claim a special manner of application for themselves.

Application B. — Limitation in Numbers of Ships by Classes.

In this application, the number of ships of each class is used as a basis for the limitation and reduction of naval armaments.

(a) Definition of Classes. — This specific definition should be established by the ultimate Conference.

(b) Limitation. — 1. Agreement should be reached at the ultimate Conference as to the number of ships in different classes which each country undertakes not to exceed for an agreed period.

2. A limit of individual tonnage and calibre of gun to be mounted should be fixed for each class.

3. The maximum calibre of torpedo to be carried in any warship or aircraft to be fixed.

To meet the difficulty of formulating one method applicable equally to all navies, it is suggested that the Convention should, in the first instance, be subject to revision after a short period of time.

(c) Replacement. — 1. An age-limit should be fixed at the ultimate Conference for each class; except in case of loss, no ship should be replaced before this age-limit is reached.

2. Except where otherwise provided for in the Convention, any ship should be replaced by a new vessel in the same class. It need not be of identical tonnage provided the maximum individual tonnage for the class is not exceeded.

3. Except where otherwise provided for in the Convention, a vessel on being replaced should be “scrapped”.

Notes. — (a) In cases where a country does not wish to repeat a vessel in any particular class when such vessel reaches the age-limit, she should state, at the ultimate Conference, what number and type of vessel she proposes to construct as a substitute. In certain cases, alternative proposals could be entertained, especially as regards the smaller types of ships.
(b) It is emphasised, to avoid misunderstanding, that there is no implication that a country should build any type of ship which her requirements do not justify. This note is inserted because, during the discussions of the Naval Committee, the idea has emerged that this system of limitation would entail a small country constructing capital ships in spite of these vessels being entirely unsuited to the requirements of its navy.

Advantages of Application B.

Submitted by the delegations of Argentina, the British Empire, Chile, Japan and the United States of America.

1. It fulfils all the conditions laid down under General Principles, Part III, Chapter I.

2. A ship is a definite tangible unit whose strength and combatant qualities are well known, and existing fleets are composed of these units. This manner of application, therefore, simplifies the problem of initial reduction and limitation.

3. It would permit each country to leave the Conference with exact knowledge as to the maximum strength of all other navies during the life of the Convention. The possibility of surprise is therefore eliminated.

4. Limiting numbers in classes and establishing a maximum tonnage for each class renders it impossible for any country suddenly to alter the composition of its fleet in such a manner as to...

Criticisms of the Advantages.

Submitted by the delegations of Finland, France, Italy, Poland, Roumania, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Spain and Sweden.

1. This application does not satisfy the conditions laid down in the General Principles in Part I, as will appear from the list of disadvantages given below.

2. Though it is no doubt true that a ship is a tangible unit, we should, if the argument based on the simplicity of this method were pushed to its logical conclusion, arrive at the limitation of fleets simply by the total number of units composing them.

But although known for each unit, the power and fighting value of ships vary greatly one from another; and even units of the same class do not possess a definite and constant value. It is therefore clear that one cannot fairly take as a unit of measurement one which is essentially variable.

3. This application would no doubt enable each country to know exactly the maximum power of all the other navies; but this maximum would in many cases be only a theoretical one. For the actual power might vary considerably, according to the types which countries possess or may in future adopt, in the different classes, in order to meet the special exigencies of their security; this application cannot, therefore, permit the different countries to form an accurate estimate of the actual future strength of the navies of other countries.

In any case, if the countries, so as to safeguard themselves against all risks, were to base the requirements of their security on the maximum possible strength of other navies — as they would be justified in doing under this method — the employment of this method would lead to a considerable augmentation of the world’s naval armaments.

The countries which do not possess great naval resources would certainly leave the Conference fully aware of the permanent condition of inferiority in which it would have placed them.

4. It would be possible to replace the vessels of the smallest tonnage in each class by a corresponding number of units of heavier tonnage of the same class. Thus, unless it is proposed to...
disturb the equilibrium of naval armaments or to be construed as a threat to others.

have a large number of classes in order to confine each of them in narrow bounds, the tonnage of a fleet might vary within such wide limits that the equilibrium established might be disturbed to an extent which would be felt as a grave menace by other countries.

5. It is not conceivable so to frame a Convention that, while complying with the letter, the spirit cannot be evaded. It is contended, however, that such evasion is more difficult by this than by any other method since, in order to outbuild a vessel in one class, it is necessary to sacrifice an equivalent number of vessels in the class above.

Disadvantages of Application B.

Submitted by the delegations of FINLAND, FRANCE, ITALY, the NETHERLANDS, POLAND, ROUMANIA, the KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, SPAIN and SWEDEN:

1. The lack of precision of the definitions put forward and the great difficulty, if not the impossibility, of framing definitions which shall be at the same time precise and capable of being applied in a general manner to the extremely varied types of ships which exist (see explanation of the Disadvantages, page 92), and will probably continue to exist, in the navies of the world prevents any general and equitable application of methods which are based on the division — inevitably of an arbitrary character — of ships into classes.

5. This consideration clearly shows the unfairness of the proposed method. Navies possessing a large number of units per class would alone be able, under this method, to sacrifice certain units in a given class in order to build a corresponding number of units designed to outclass the vessels of the class below in other navies.

Criticisms of the Disadvantages.

Submitted by the delegations of the ARGENTINE, the BRITISH EMPIRE, CHILE, JAPAN and the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

1. Ships now comprising the fleets of the world are capable of rough classification which would be sufficiently accurate to permit an agreement as to limitation by the means advocated.

The definitions and maxima for classes as proposed refer to future construction, and in this connection it may be remarked that:

(a) Classes of ships are evolved as a result of experience, usually war experience, and such experience tends to standardise types and to render more marked the difference between them, e.g., there is now a more marked difference between the capital ship and the cruiser than existed before the war.

(b) While there may be in existence to-day certain ships the exact class of which is difficult to define, it is believed there will not be any great desire to repeat such in future, more especially as, under any Convention, a ship once built must be retained for the number of years agreed upon before becoming eligible for replacement.

This does not apply to ships such as coast-defence battleships, which are the result of special requirements.

As the disadvantage outlined in paragraph 1 refers to comments contained in the explanations of the Disadvantages on page 92, the following remarks are offered in reply to those observations:

(i) It is considered that all capital ships of the future will probably be of the post-Jutland type, by which is meant a ship
2. The definition of Application B of this method contemplates a limitation of the calibre of torpedoes as one of the conditions of its application. It may be observed in this respect that a limitation of the calibre of torpedoes will risk making that weapon ineffective against very large ships.

The result would be that this method (Application B) will be inequitable for all navies which possess no dreadnoughts, super-dreadnoughts or post-Jutland battleships, since these navies will no longer be able to defend themselves effectively against warships of those types.

It should further be emphasised that any limitation of the calibre of torpedoes will reduce their radius of action, although this method (Application B) lays down no rules designed to limit the range of guns.

In these circumstances, the scope for the use of torpedoes will be limited to a much greater extent than that of guns. This will be greatly to the advantage of navies which possess large ships and to the disadvantage of navies which possess small ships.

3. Considering the very great variety of vessels in the different navies of the world, the method of Application B would probably result in the establishment either of a very large number of classes or of a large number of exceptions; in either case, the method would prove very complicated in practice.

3. The intention in this application is that countries should declare, at the ultimate Conference, the number of ships in each class of their existing fleet they propose to retain and by what ships they propose to replace those becoming obsolete during the life of the Convention.

Study of the list of existing navies and published building programmes shows that there are no ships building or projected to-day which do not belong to an easily defined class, from which it may be concluded that the number of classes need not be unduly large or the number of exceptions very great.

4. The method of Application B does not correspond to the pacific object in view since, while tending to prevent a race in armaments and thus to serve combining the maximum offensive and defensive powers possible to her size. The tonnage of such ships will depend on the requirements and financial resources of the country constructing them.

(ii) It is possible that most men-of-war will, in the future, carry a certain number of aircraft, but this does not mean that all men-of-war are to be considered as aircraft carriers.

(iii) Similarly, both cruisers and destroyers may be fitted to carry a certain number of mines without their ceasing to be cruisers or destroyers.

2. There is no suggestion that the limit to size of torpedoes should be such as to render this weapon ineffective, and all countries would have an equal opportunity at the ultimate Conference of seeing that their interests were not adversely affected by such limitation.

The range of the torpedo, as of the gun, would be the maximum possible for the diameter or calibre agreed upon. It is assumed that the limitation of calibre of gun is intended to arrest competition in offensive weapons, and a limitation in size of the torpedo, also an essentially offensive weapon, appears equally desirable on those grounds.

4. The limitation of capital ships and aircraft-carriers has stopped competitive building in these classes between certain Powers and has inspired
the interests of peace, it will tend to accentuate international mistrust, since it will arouse apprehensions due to the following causes:

(a) A numerical limitation of the vessels in each class will tend, in all navies which are able to do so, to a standardisation in each class, by the adoption of the accepted maximum tonnage for each vessel. But any standardisation of the different types constitutes a considerable advantage for the navies which possess the largest number of units of each of these types.

(b) Although it is adapted to reduce the naval armaments of countries whose fleets are composed of similar units and of tonnage approximating to the maximum figure accepted for each ship, it would be ill-suited to effect a reduction of naval armaments in countries which do not possess units of all categories. Considerations of the possibility of some day requiring vessels of classes which they do not at present possess, or not in sufficient numbers, would certainly induce countries which are anxious concerning their future security at sea reasonably to claim and to obtain the assignment of a certain number of vessels in each of the classes which may be specified. These supplementary vessels, whose construction might some day be rendered necessary by the progress of naval technical science or by circumstances, would entail an increase of tonnage and consequently of naval armaments. Having regard to the technical necessity for each country to avoid building vessels inferior to those of other navies in the same class, these increases would tend to become greater as the maximum individual tonnage laid down for ships of each class is greater.

The application of this method of Application B therefore contains inherent causes for an increase of armaments in other words, for a result contrary to the reduction which is aimed at; these causes might lead, in a sense, to a race in armaments owing to the tonnage of vessels laid down being increased up to the limits prescribed for each ship.

The advancement of naval science led to the 45,000-ton Hood, and it was only by agreement that the growth in size of ships was arrested and the maximum size of capital ships reduced. Unless a similar check is placed upon other classes, the cruiser would rapidly grow into a vessel indistinguishable from the capital ship.

There is no suggestion that the developments of naval science should not be embodied in existing ships or in new construction, provided the maximum tonnage for any particular class were not exceeded.

Finland, France, Italy, Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, the Netherlands, Poland, Roumania, Spain, Sweden (continued).

(a) It is reasonable to assume that countries in the future will, as at present, construct ships in accordance with their particular needs, and it is not obvious why a classification of units should result in the construction of vessels larger than actually required, or why standardisation especially favours navies possessing the largest number of units in each class. It may be remarked that the British Government has already authorised the construction of cruisers well inside the maximum tonnage now fixed.

(b) Existing navies are now composed of units, and it would be for each country to declare, at the ultimate Conference, by what unit or units it is prepared to reduce its fleet. Thus the proposed reductions become instantly apparent to all, and hence it would seem that this application of reduction and limitation by classes is especially suited to all countries.

“The possibility of some day requiring vessels of classes which they do not at present possess” would seem to depend primarily on similar changes in other navies, and it is precisely the object of limitation by classes to restrain such changes and thereby reduce “anxiety concerning future security at sea”. The claim for a number of vessels in any class in excess of actual requirements would not, therefore, appear to be justified.
5. It would not fulfil the aim of reducing the financial burdens of the different countries because it would not leave them free to derive the maximum value, corresponding to the special necessities of their national defence, from every ton laid down. It would therefore impel them to claim, quite legitimately, a larger number of vessels of each class than would be really necessary. Moreover, it would induce them to make the tonnage of new units approximate to the accepted maximum tonnage for each ship, for fear lest their units might be outclassed and hence these would be a fresh impulse to expenditure.

6. It is not equitable for all countries, because the basic elements which compose it are not applicable in the same way to all navies, owing to the great diversity of types of vessel of which they must necessarily consist, having in view the special and differing conditions which they are required to fulfil.

The vagueness and arbitrary nature of the definitions of the classes of ships would have the effect either of producing a very large number of classes, or of placing in one and the same class vessels whose tonnage and characteristics vary so widely that it might be said, from a technical point of view, that the qualities of certain ships in one class were more similar to those of ships in another class than of certain ships in the same class.

As a result, the use of this method of Application B might lead to considerable errors in the relation between the effective values of the armaments assigned to the different countries, unless it were possible, in each class, to build a single type of vessel which would be the same for all countries — and this would be almost impossible, since every navy is bound, when building its ships, to take account of the special requirements of its position and its security.

7. Although the rules for the replacement of units which have reached their age-limit might serve to prevent a too-rapid renewal of fleets, they could not prevent the proportion originally established between the forces from being disturbed. Indeed, countries which, for financial reasons or for other reasons (docks, ports, canals), are not in a position to keep pace with technical progress in the construction of certain classes of ships would only be able to build vessels of those classes which would have lost all value under the

5. Emphasis is again laid on the fact that reduction and limitation is applied to existing fleets and that countries will, at the ultimate Conference, state what they consider to be their requirements.

The Conference will aim at establishing a relativity among naval armaments commensurate to each country’s requirements and will not result in the reduction of all navies to equality. The Conference cannot succeed unless all countries agree to preserve the relativity established. This being the case, it cannot be seen what incentive there would be for countries not now possessing ships of the maximum permissible size to build such as a sequel to an agreement for limitation of armaments.

The reasons for which maxima are proposed are given under paragraph 4 above.

6. See criticism on paragraph 5 and also on paragraphs 3 and 4.

7. The closer replacement units correspond to the units replaced, the less will the relativity between navies be disturbed. Limitation by classes tends, therefore, to stabilisation to a far greater degree than limitation by total tonnage. A limit for tonnage and calibre of gun for the unit in each class tends towards equality for all countries.

As already stated, the underlying principle of any agreement as to reduction and limitation of naval armaments
must be the honest intention to reduce the irritation incident to competitive building, and the argument that all countries must build units of the maximum tonnage allowed appears to lack foundation.

8. It would not enable all countries to provide for their national security because, although it would allow them to increase the individual tonnage of vessels in each class, up to the maximum tonnage accepted, it would not make it possible for them, even by sacrificing vessels of another class, to increase the number of their units in any given class in order to meet new essential requirements.

9. It would not allow countries to arrange and distribute the tonnage of their obsolete vessels to the best advantage of their defence requirements or of their financial capabilities at the time being; consequently, it would deprive them of the essential right of pursuing a continuous policy in the organisation of their defensive resources.

10. It would not make for the permanent application of the Convention since it would not enable a country to replace, in another class, the material which had become obsolete in some class whose value was likely to be greatly decreased by the progress of naval technical science. It would follow that each important step forward in that science should, in justice, involve a revision of the Convention in order to prevent certain countries from being prejudiced in their interests.

Application C. — Total Tonnage of Capital Ships; of Aircraft-Carriers; of Auxiliary Surface Ships, and of Submarines.

This application includes the limitation and reduction of naval armaments, dividing the tonnage into four main classes as given above.

The definitions of capital ships and aircraft-carriers and auxiliary surface ships and submarines are as given under Application A, but more concise definitions should be agreed upon at the ultimate Conference.
This application depends upon the following principles, which should be taken into account:

(a) The same general conditions as to fixing the tonnage, maximum size of guns any age of replacement as applied to capital ships and aircraft-carriers of certain countries signatord to the Washington Treaty should be followed in these classes.

(b) The age of replacement of auxiliary surface ships and of submarines should be fixed.

(c) The limit of maximum tonnage of the unit and maximum calibre of guns for auxiliary surface ships and submarines should be fixed.

(d) Surface ships below a certain tonnage, speed, and number and calibre of guns should be excluded from limitation; also fuel ships, supply ships, tenders, repair ships, tugs and mine-sweepers.

(e) The standard by which the tonnage of the individual unit is measured — that is, what should be considered the standard tonnage of the ship — should be prescribed.

(f) The complement in personnel of each unit, the speed, range, amount of ammunition carried and other essentially unit characteristics should be left to the discretion of each Power except as noted above in regard to limitation on the maximum calibre of guns.

(g) The question of protection in the shape of armour, both as to thickness and arrangement, and under-water subdivision should be left to the individual Powers, only with the proviso that the maximum tonnage of each unit should not be exceeded.

*Note.* — For certain countries under special conditions, an agreement should be made so that such countries may have the right to construct auxiliary surface ships in the place of capital ships and aircraft-carriers by utilising the tonnage in these latter classes.

**Advantages of Application C.**

Submitted by the delegations of the ARGENTINE, the BRITISH EMPIRE, CHILE, JAPAN and the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

1. It facilitates the reduction and limitation of naval armaments for the reason that it is based upon an existing agreement which has fulfilled to a certain extent the object which is aimed at.

2. It gives to each country the right of utilising to the best of its special interests the total tonnage allowed in auxiliary surface ships without taking account of cruisers, destroyers, etc.

3. It assures efficient results in the execution of the Convention because the divisions of the four classes are clear and concise and do not lend themselves to equivocation.

**Criticalisms of the Advantages.**

Submitted by the delegations of FINLAND, FRANCE, ITALY, POLAND, ROUMANIA, the KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, SPAIN and SWEDEN:

1. The French and Italian delegations point out that the Washington Agreement is confined to five Powers and that, moreover, as regards their two countries, the agreement practically amounts to a sort of application of the method of limiting total tonnage.

The Rome Conference, which was held for the purpose of extending the principles of the Washington Treaty to all the Powers possessing vessels corresponding to the definition given of a capital ship, showed the great difficulty, if not the impossibility, of equitably extending the application of these principles to medium and small navies, even as regards ships to be constructed in the future.

2. It must be recognised that, in proportion as the number of classes in a method of limitation is reduced, the drawbacks of this application also diminish, as it is thus brought closer to the method of limiting total tonnage.

3. If the divisions between the different classes should in practice be based on the definitions of the different types of ships fixed by the Washington Treaty, they would be clear but arbitrary: their general application to all navies would then be inequitable and,
Disadvantages of Application C.

Submitted by the delegations of FINLAND, FRANCE, ITALY, the NETHERLANDS, POLAND, ROMANIA, the KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, SPAIN and SWEDEN.

The disadvantages recognised to be inherent in the Application A of the method of limitation based on tonnage by classes apply to this one also, but in certain cases the disadvantages are slightly attenuated.

These disadvantages are as follows:

1. It does not secure the peaceful object in view because, although it does set some limit to the competition in armaments, it tends — in spite of the special provisions contained in the Note which terminates the definition — to increase international mistrust, as it is more advantageous to large fleets than to medium fleets and a fortiori small fleets.

Although this application may reduce naval armaments in the case of countries the fleets of which are organised on much the same lines and include a considerable number of similar units, it cannot ensure a just reduction in the naval armaments of countries possessing few or no units of the classes in question. This has been recognised in the above Note as regards surface vessels. However, countries taking into consideration their safety at sea and the possibility of requiring at some time or other vessels of classes of which they do not possess a sufficient number (particularly submarines, to which the Note does not apply) will certainly ask — and they will be fully entitled to do so — to be allowed additional tonnage in vessels of each of these classes.

As such an increase in tonnage might one day become necessary as a result of the progress in naval technique or other circumstances, this increase will — in view of the technical necessity of always possessing a certain number of vessels of the same type — be all the greater in that the individual maximum tonnage fixed for each class will itself be greater.

There is therefore in this application an inherent cause of increase in armaments, which is contrary to the object in view, i.e., reduction. This cause might, by the carrying-out of authorised programmes of construction, lead in practice in certain countries to a quite legitimate increase in their armaments.

moreover, very difficult to carry out, even in the future, owing to the widely different circumstances (financial, geographical, etc.) of the various countries.

Criticisms of the Disadvantages.

Submitted by the delegations of the ARGENTINE, the BRITISH EMPIRE, CHILE, JAPAN and the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA :

The statement made in the first part of this “Disadvantage” seems somewhat contradictory. The limitation of capital-ship and aircraft-carrier construction has stopped competitive building in these classes between certain Powers and has inspired confidence instead of mistrust in the fulfilment of the agreement. Therefore it is difficult to understand how this application can produce mistrust.

The reduction and limitation by classes prescribe specific ways to reduce and limit each class of ship and thus reduce and limit the naval strength of different countries. Limitation by classes does not in itself lead to the adoption of the maximum tonnage as the standard unit of the class; therefore it cannot justly be said to be more to the advantage of some navies than to others.

Reduction and limitation by classes is equitable in that it can give a fair reduction and limitation in naval armaments of countries with a small number of units in any class, since at the ultimate Conference the agreement reached would specify the amount of tonnage allowed for each country in each class, thus fixing for the duration of the agreement the relative strength of navies of different countries. Therefore, as this relative strength would remain constant, there would be no change in relative security between countries and no necessity for any country to claim an additional tonnage in any class. The conclusion reached that the application of this method therefore inherently implies an increase of armaments is not in accordance with existing facts, nor is it a logical deduction.
2. It does not entirely fulfil the object in view of diminishing the financial burdens of the various countries, because, though it may result in some limitation of the efforts expended by each nation on naval construction, it does not enable countries to obtain, for each ton constructed, a maximum value from the point of view of their individual defensive requirements; it therefore encourages them, as we have said above, to put forward quite legitimate requests for tonnage in the classes of vessels referred to greater than that which would in fact be sufficient for them if they were free to organise their resources as they thought best. Moreover (see text of Advantage 2), it should be observed that, if the Disarmament Conference really desires to attain the objects aimed at, particularly the economic object, the Convention to be concluded should, in the first place, stipulate an appreciable reduction in the individual maximum tonnage and the maximum gun-calibre of capital ships below the corresponding limits fixed by the Washington Treaty, rather than take that treaty as a basis. Otherwise countries might be involved in considerable expenditure by reason of the fact that they will always endeavour — as is their right — to obtain the maximum power from the units they construct, which generally means additional expenditure for the construction and adequate improvement of ports, docks and canals.

3. It is not just to all countries because, as the Rome Conference showed, its basic factors are not applicable to all fleets on account of the different ways in which fleets are organised and on account of the great difference in the types of vessels of which they are composed.

In cases in which the special provisions in the Note might be applied, these disadvantages, due to the diversity of types of vessels, would be diminished in the case of surface vessels, but would still exist in view of the fact that submarines are excluded.

4. It makes but inadequate provision for the national security of countries which do not possess very large naval armaments — that is to say, countries which do not possess a margin sufficient to meet all the changes in the situation which may occur while the Convention remains in force, either from a political standpoint or from a technical standpoint, by the sudden discovery of improvements in materials or inventions or new ideas.

5. It does not allow the various countries freedom — which is so essential — to pursue, in their best interests, the national security of countries which do not possess very large naval armaments will be sufficiently met by the latitude which must be left in the Convention in order to take political and technical changes into consideration. Moreover, a margin proportionately greater for one navy than for another cannot exist, because each country will be allowed a navy just sufficient for its needs of security.

To permit a country in this entirely free manner to replace its tonnage as it may see fit would tend to

2. It is essential to maintain the principle that any agreement between nations for the reduction and limitation of naval armaments must be an honourable compact between nations, indicating, above all, their honest intention to reduce the irritation incident to competitive building and by eventual reduction lessen the possibility of war. Reduction and limitation of naval armaments as such cannot accomplish the levelling to a common footing of all nations. The reasoning contained in this paragraph is founded neither on experience nor logic; therefore, the conclusion that further expenditure is involved by adopting this application of the method of limitation is not warranted.
a continuous policy in the organisation of
of their defensive resources, since it does not
allow them to divide and dispose of all their
available tonnage in such a way as to secure the
best possible defence of
their interests at any given time,
taking into account their budgetary
possibilities and improvements in

6. It might not prove to be very
durable in practice since it would not
allow countries to take full account of
the possibilities of progress from a
technical and scientific standpoint. Pro-
gress of any importance should in all
justice imply a revision of the Conven-
tion, in order to prevent certain coun-
tries from being placed in a position
of inferiority with regard to other coun-
tries possessing, as a result of the large
amount of tonnage by classes allocated
to them, a far wider margin to meet
the dangers resulting from the appli-
cation of such technical developments.

7. Its application would be relative-
ly simple only if the special provisions
in the Note were applied to all nations.

8. The exclusion of submarines from
the advantages of the Note, which per-
mits, in certain cases, the replacement
of capital ships and aeroplane-carriers
by auxiliary surface craft, places at
a disadvantage medium and small fleets
in which the submarine constitutes a
very important defensive arm. Such
fleets are therefore placed at a great
disadvantage as compared with more
powerful fleets.

6. No method is or should be
permanent in its effects. No agree-
ments can be made that will last to eternity. Any method should contemplate
agreements for stated periods.

7 and 8. A country, when formulat-
ing its naval requirements, will state
the tonnage in submarines it considers
necessary. There is a clear-cut and
distinct difference between surface ves-
sels and submarines, and, unless this is
taken into account, there is a danger
that the stability of the Convention
will be easily disturbed. Such stability
is the aim of Application C, and the
necessity of increasing submarine ton-
nage would not arise.

It is also essential to draw attention
to the important distinction between this
class of vessel and any other on account
of the increased cost of construction per
ton in the case of submarines. Con-
sequently, the exclusion of submarines
from the Note is in the interests of
economy.

The delegation of CHILE made a declara-
tion regarding the method of reduction and
limitation of naval armaments by classes (see Section III, Part III, E, page 131).

Method 4. — Limitation of Naval Material in Reserve.

Submitted by the delegations of FINLAND, GERMANY, the NETHER-
LANDS, SPAIN and SWEDEN.

The above-named delegations consider it is necessary to limit not only
floating material but also naval material in store, in order to make the limitation
and reduction of naval armaments complete, since these delegations believe that
there can be no doubt that the material belongs to peace-time armaments. Only
essential materials can be dealt with, viz.:

(a) Reserve artillery;
(b) Machine-guns and small arms;
(c) Artillery ammunition;
(d) Reserve torpedoes and torpedo-tubes;
(e) Mines;
(f) Aircraft.

It is evident that, in deciding to what extent this material is to be limited, account must
be taken of the industrial resources of each country.

This limitation is consequently not meant to apply to countries, colonies and overseas
possessions which do not possess the means of manufacturing these armaments or of importing
them in war time.

As to the methods to be followed, these would be the same as those proposed for the reduc-
tion and limitation of material in reserve for land forces (see Part II, page 65.)
Advantages.

Submitted by the delegations of FINLAND, GERMANY, the NETHERLANDS, SPAIN and SWEDEN:

1. Expenditure would be limited.
2. The possibility of replacing the principal armaments of warships would be equalised for all navies.
3. Reserve naval material capable of use in land warfare would be limited.
4. As regards munitions, the possibility of any country committing acts of aggression would be reduced.
5. The possibility of fitting out an auxiliary fleet would be limited and equalised.
6. The possibility of hampering merchant shipping by mine-fields, and, in consequence, the danger arising therefrom at the beginning of a war, would be limited.

The delegations of the ARGENTINE, the BRITISH EMPIRE, CHILE, JAPAN and the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA do not support the above as a method of limitation of naval armaments.

Method 5. — Limitation of Naval Personnel.

Submitted by the delegations of BELGIUM, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, FINLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY, the NETHERLANDS, POLAND, ROUMANIA, the KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS and SLOVENES, SPAIN and SWEDEN:

1. The limitation of naval personnel must be considered in close relationship with the question of the limitation of naval material, for the following reasons:

(a) The importance of the personnel for the utilisation of naval material has been unanimously recognised by the Naval Committee, and it would therefore be illogical to consider methods for limiting material and to ignore so important a factor as personnel.

(b) If naval personnel were not limited, a fleet could be provided with any number of effectives in the shape of expeditionary and landing parties, effectives for coast defence and signals, naval police¹, the preventive service¹, etc., all of which could be employed by the land and air forces and thus give these forces an unexpected superiority.

(c) Naval personnel not subjected to limitation would not only enable the entire active fleet and the reserve vessels to be kept constantly in commission but it would also allow of a large number of commercial vessels, and particularly of auxiliary cruisers, being rapidly armed, as such vessels already possess their engine-room staff, stokers and other personnel, and only require a small additional personnel to enable them to be used for military purposes.

(d) Moreover, it should be stated that coast defence and aviation are placed under the navy in certain countries and under the army in others, while in some countries again the air force is a separate arm.

2. It should be understood that a limitation of naval personnel must never affect the lawful claim of a country to maintain in commission and, according to the needs of the case, the whole or a percentage of its fleet adequate to guarantee the security of the country.

3. A limitation of naval personnel should be effected by taking into account in particular:

(a) Material afloat and on shore (bases, arsenals, material for the defence of the coasts of the home country and overseas territories).

(b) Liaison between naval personnel and the personnel of the army and the air force (see (b) and (d) above), with a view to estimating the consequences of a measure, adopted in regard to any one of them, on the others.

(c) The special geographical and climatic conditions of the various countries.

(d) The special organisation of each navy and the services for which it is responsible.

These factors should be taken into account in the definite and quantitative proposals which each country will submit to the forthcoming Conference and in the statement of reasons which will accompany these proposals.

¹ The delegations of Finland, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden include under the police and preventive service in question only the organisations of this nature which receive military training and do not require any additional armament or equipment to enable them to be employed for military purposes.
4. A limitation of naval personnel may be effected by using the methods submitted in regard to effectives with the colours, the period of service and the annual contingent.

5. The question of the limitation of trained reserves assumes a form, as regards the navy, which differs from the problem of army reserves, and in most countries the greater proportion of the naval reserve is employed in the army or the air force. In the case of countries with a comparatively large merchant fleet, a considerable proportion of the trained reserves of personnel under the compulsory system will at the outbreak of war be either at sea or abroad and unable to join the naval forces. As a result, there does not seem to be any special advantage in dealing with this question from the purely naval point of view.

The delegations of the ARGENTINE, BELGIUM, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, FRANCE, ITALY, POLAND, ROUMANIA and the KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES made a declaration concerning this paragraph.

6. The choice of the methods employed for the limitation of its naval personnel at the level fixed must be left to the individual country.

The delegations of BELGIUM, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, FINLAND, FRANCE, ITALY, the NETHERLANDS, POLAND, ROUMANIA, the KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES and SWEDEN are of opinion that, in a general Convention on Disarmament, a limitation of the aggregate army, navy and air-force personnel should be contemplated.

Advantages and Disadvantages.

Submitted by the delegations of BELGIUM, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, FINLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY, the NETHERLANDS, POLAND, ROUMANIA, the KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, SPAIN and SWEDEN:

Advantages.

1. It prevents an unknown quantity of naval personnel being transferred to the land and air forces.

2. It may in certain cases lead to a decrease of the percentage of armed floating material, which thus reduces the possibility of sudden aggression.

3. It reduces the possibility of rapidly using merchant ships as auxiliary cruisers.

Disadvantages.

1. If this limitation was carried out to such an extent as to prevent the manning of the different units of the fleet by the effectives in service, it would lead to an appreciable reduction of the fighting value of that fleet, which might not then be sufficient to ensure the security of the country.

Note. — With reference to the advantages and disadvantages of the different methods of application see the Methods of Limitation of Land Armaments (Part II above).

The delegations of the ARGENTINE, the BRITISH EMPIRE, CHILE, JAPAN and the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA do not support the above as a method of limitation of naval armaments.

Chapter III. — General Remarks.

1. Transfer, Requisition and Traffic in Warships.

The delegations of BELGIUM, the BRITISH EMPIRE, ITALY, JAPAN, the NETHERLANDS, SPAIN, SWEDEN and the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA consider that the following should be taken into consideration in all methods of reduction and limitation of naval armaments:

The construction of, and traffic in, ships for other Powers should be considered in any agreement to the end that proper provision may be made covering the sudden increase of the naval strength of a country, in peace time or at the beginning of a war, by gift, purchase or any other mode of transfer of vessels-of-war of another Power or by taking over vessels-of-war constructed or under construction within its jurisdiction for another Power.

The delegation of CHILE does not agree with the above paragraph on account of its political character.


The delegations of BELGIUM, CHILE, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, FINLAND, FRANCE, the NETHERLANDS, POLAND, ROUMANIA, the KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES, SPAIN and SWEDEN consider that the limitation of naval war armaments cannot be equitably settled without taking into account the military value of the merchant vessels which, by reason of their build or equipment, show evidence of being convertible into auxiliary cruisers.
3. Commercial Fleets, Trained Reserves and Material in Reserve.

A. The delegations of the ARGENTINE, BELGIUM, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, FRANCE, ITALY, JAPAN, POLAND, ROUMANIA and the KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES are of opinion that commercial fleets, trained reserves and material in reserve must be regarded as forming part of the power of a country in time of war and should therefore be dealt with on the same footing.

B. The delegations of the BRITISH EMPIRE, CHILE and the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA express the following opinion regarding the above paragraph:

If "trained reserves and material in reserve", as stated in paragraph A above, refers to trained naval reserves and naval material in store, reduction and limitation of tonnage afloat automatically imposes a practical limitation on reserves trained for naval duties and also on material in reserve for the fleet.

If, however, the words quoted refer to trained reserves and material of all categories, as stated by certain delegations presenting this paragraph, the above-named delegations are of the opinion that an attempt to reduce and limit jointly land, naval and air armaments would tend to render more difficult definite achievement along any one line.

PART IV. -- AIR ARMAMENTS.

PREAMBLE.

The delegations of GERMANY and the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA are of the opinion that civil aviation as such is of comparatively little value as a possible war armament (see Declaration, Section III, Part IV, Preamble).

Sub-Commission A, with the exception of the delegations of GERMANY and the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, agreed (a) that the personnel and material employed in civil aviation constitute possible war armaments of very high value on account of the ease and rapidity with which they can in most cases be utilised for certain military purposes, and unanimously.

(b) That any limitation of civil aviation raises economic and political questions.

Three different views were taken, however, regarding the fundamental principle that should be followed in examining and applying the methods to be employed for the reduction and limitation of air armaments.

FIRST POINT OF VIEW. — LIMITATION OF MILITARY AND CIVIL AVIATION AS A WHOLE.

The delegations of BELGIUM, CHILE, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, FRANCE, ITALY, POLAND, ROUMANIA and the KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES stated that any method of limitation must fulfil the following condition:

In order to be efficient in practice, any method must provide for the limitation of military and civil aviation as a whole: the limitation of military aviation only would be ineffectual, for it could be balanced by a corresponding expansion of civil aviation.

The delegations of the ARGENTINE, GERMANY, the NETHERLANDS, SPAIN and the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA asserted that the limitation of civil aviation was impossible, because they thought that any method for the reduction or limitation of air armaments can apply only to the war air-craft of different countries, and should not interfere with the expansion of communication, commerce or the building of civil aircraft.

The delegations of the ARGENTINE, the BRITISH EMPIRE, FINLAND, GERMANY, JAPAN, the NETHERLANDS, SPAIN, SWEDEN and the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA declared that, even from the purely technical point of view of the possible utilisation of civil aviation for military purposes, Sub-Commission A was not competent to discuss such a limitation, on account of the economic consequences it might involve.

In these circumstances, Sub-Commission A adopted the following text:

Sub-Commission A desires to bring to the notice of the Preparatory Commission, for its information, that it has had under consideration a further method of limitation, which envisages the limitation of civil as well as of military aircraft.
Sub-Commission A was unanimously of opinion that civil aircraft might play a very important part in future warfare, but it considered that, since the primary role of civil aviation is economic, it was not qualified to pass an opinion on a question which had grave political and economic consequences.

It places on record, however, the fact that it has not discussed this matter in detail, not because it did not consider it a most important one but on account of its economic and political implications.

The delegations of Germany and the United States of America will make a declaration on the paragraph opposite to the Preparatory Commission.

The delegations of Belgium, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Finland, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Roumania, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenses, Spain and Sweden submit the following text: Sub-Commission A considers it desirable to suggest to the Preparatory Commission that this question might be considered by a Joint Economic and Military Committee.

SECOND POINT OF VIEW. — LIMITATION OF MILITARY AVIATION, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL AVIATION.

The delegations of the Argentine, Belgium, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Finland, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Roumania, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenses, Spain and Sweden either expressed or adopted the opinion that, in the application of a Convention for the Limitation of Armaments, whatever method or methods may be chosen for the limitation of air armaments, account should be taken of the importance and the possible development of civil aviation in the countries concerned, in accordance with the considerations set forth in the replies to Question (a) under II (b) and III and VI, but that this should not involve any limitation of the normal development of civil aviation.

THIRD POINT OF VIEW. — LIMITATION OF MILITARY AVIATION WITHOUT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT CIVIL AVIATION.

The delegations of the Argentine, the British Empire, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United States of America, while admitting that a method which does not take into account civil aviation is not comprehensive, were of opinion that a limitation confined to military aviation only has the advantage of rendering more simple the problem to be solved, and that this reduction can be considered as a first step towards the reduction of air armaments, and that it is the best practical solution which could be put forward at the present moment.

In adhering to the Third Point of View, the delegations of Germany and the United States of America desire to make their position clear, in that they strongly oppose and cannot accept any consideration or taking into account of the personnel and material of civil aviation in any method proposed for the reduction and limitation of air armaments.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS RELATIVE TO ALL THE METHODS.

The science of aeronautics is making rapid progress, and some new invention may revolutionise the material employed and bring about extremely rapid progress. Accordingly, any limitation of military aviation can only be accepted for a short period.

METHODS OF LIMITATION OF AIR ARMAMENTS.
They consider that their work will be of most advantage to the Preparatory Commission if they confine themselves to indicating their opinions on the broad general standpoints outlined in the Preamble above.

They have accordingly refrained from expressing a definite opinion on each of the various methods enumerated subsequent to the Preamble.

regarding the general conditions which are indispensable for the application of any method, they proceeded to consider all the methods submitted.

These delegations have also felt bound to indicate to the Preparatory Commission those methods which seem to them likely to give the best results. For this purpose, they have appended to the explanation of certain methods a note regarding their application.

CHAPTER I. — METHODS BASED ON THE LIMITATION OF PERSONNEL.

I.

The delegations of JAPAN and SWEDEN submit the following method:

LIMITATION OF THE TOTAL AIR PERSONNEL OF EVERY CATEGORY EMPLOYED IN PEACE-TIME (MILITARY, NAVAL AND AIR) EFFECTIVES, SPECIFYING SEPARATELY THE NUMBER OF PILOTS AMONG THE SAID EFFECTIVES.

These effectives are those defined in the reply to Question I, Section II, Part III, Chapter I, paragraphs (a) and (b), with the exception of the personnel of captive balloons and planes carried on warships and the personnel allotted to the captive-balloon service of the land forces, it being understood that this personnel can be limited directly or indirectly as part of the effectives of the land and sea forces.

Advantages.

(a) It is easy to determine definitely the number of personnel existing in air units.

(b) The personnel of air units consists largely of specialists, and the training of the personnel requires a long time.

(c) This method entails the limitation of the number of reservists who have received special training in the army air force.

Disadvantages.

(a) If this method were adopted, the difference between air organisations in the different countries might lead to inequitable results, in view of the fact that the conditions of applying the method would not be the same for different countries; they depend upon the organisation of military aviation, the system of recruitment, the period of service and the previous technical knowledge of the personnel.

(b) It does not take into account the personnel of civil aviation which, as has already been recognised, has a military value for purposes of war.

The delegations of GERMANY and the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA add the following Disadvantage:

(c) It does not take into account the existing trained reserves of army air forces.

The delegations of BELGIUM, CHILE, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, FINLAND, FRANCE, JAPAN, the NETHERLANDS, POLAND, ROUMANIA and the KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES are of opinion that this method is not acceptable for all countries unless due regard is paid to the personnel, and particularly to pilots in service in civil aviation. If this condition is fulfilled, disadvantage (c) disappears.

However, the delegations of the ARGENTINE, BELGIUM, CHILE, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, FINLAND, FRANCE, the NETHERLANDS, ROUMANIA and the KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES consider that this method would not be applicable except in combination with a method for limiting material.

The delegations of the NETHERLANDS and the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA are not in accord with this method, as it includes the limitation of the total air personnel as defined in reply to Question I, Section II, Part III, Chapter I, paragraph (b).

In regard to this method, the above delegations are of the opinion that the limitation of personnel should include only air-force personnel serving with the colours and trained reserves of the air force.
The delegations of GERMANY and the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA submit the following method:

LIMITATION OF TRAINEE RESERVES AS DEFINED IN THE REPLY TO QUESTION I, SECTION II, PART I, A.

The limitation of the trained reserves of every category belonging to the military air force may be affected according to the principles laid down for the limitation of the trained reserves of the armies (see Reply to Question (b) contained in the Commentary of the Preparatory Commission with regard to Questions II (b), and III given by the delegations of the British Empire, Chile, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United States of America (Part II).

Of these methods of limitation proposed for trained reserves of the land forces, the following take precedence of all others:

Second Method : Limitation of Trained Reserves through the Limitation of the Annual Contingent (see Part II, page 69), pilots to be considered separately.

First Method : Limitation of Trained Reserves by the Abolition of Compulsory Military Service (see Part II, page 74), pilots to be considered separately.

Fourth Method : Limitation of the Quality of Trained Reserves through the Limitation of the Period of Service (see Part II, pages 68 and 74), pilots to be considered separately.

Any limitation of the trained reserves of the air force must take account of the difficulties connected with the technical training of specialists. The technical principles specially laid down for the limitation of the trained reserves of the armies must therefore be modified to suit the special requirements of the training of military air personnel.

Unanimous Text.

Circumstances have prevented the Sub-Commission from examining in detail the advantages and disadvantages of this method.

CHAPTER II. — METHODS BASED ON THE LIMITATION OF MATERIAL.

Definitions. — By aeroplanes “in service” should be understood the regulation number fixed for each formation to the exclusion of all aeroplanes “in reserve”, whether the latter are at the immediate disposal of certain formations or are in stock as general reserve.

“First-line combatant units” are the essentially combatant units of an air force, and therefore exclude depots, schools, etc.

“Metropolitan forces” are all shore-based aircraft within the limits of the country whose Government is a party to the Agreement.

The delegation of the BRITISH EMPIRE submits the following method:

LIMITATION BY NUMBERS OF AIRCRAFT OF SERVICE TYPES TO BE MAINTAINED IN COMMISSION IN FIRST-LINE COMBATANT UNITS OF THE METROPOLITAN FORCES, NOT INCLUDING OVERSEAS FORCES.

Advantages.

(a) Freedom from complication.
(b) The location and function of each unit and the establishment of first-line aircraft held by each unit are all public knowledge.
(c) It avoids all necessity of control; in fact, it is the maximum step which can be taken without some system of control. The information included in the League of Nations Armaments Year-Book and such as is freely accorded to military, naval and air attaches would provide all the supervision necessary.
(d) It in no way interferes with commercial aviation activities.
(e) It does not interfere with the normal requirements of the mother country and of the overseas and colonial garrisons out of reach of the metropolitan area.
(f) It avoids the complication of attempting to limit personnel which, however, would for first-line units be limited to a certain extent.
(g) It limits that growth of first-line units which are at once available on the outbreak of hostilities.
(h) It is a definite “first step”, free from the dangers of attempting too much.
The delegations of the BRITISH EMPIRE, CHILE, FINLAND, GERMANY, ITALY, JAPAN, the NETHERLANDS, SPAIN, SWEDEN and the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA add the following Advantage:

As such, its prospect of success lies in the existence of "good faith", which is bound to be the basis of all international conventions.

Disadvantages.

(a) This method is not complete. The limitation applies only to some of the military aircraft. It does not cover the entire air forces, whether military or organised on a military basis in service in peace time.

(b) The relative military value of the material is not only dependent on the number of aircraft but also on their characteristics, such as horse-power, lift tonnage and design, which this method ignores.

(c) This method leaves the various countries free to increase the power of their aircraft; they would thus gain predominance while actually keeping within the letter of the Convention.

(d) It would encourage the building of large high-powered bombing aircraft, which is "par excellence" the offensive weapon of the air.

(e) It does not take into account the aircraft of civil aviation which has a military value for purposes of war.

(f) It would enable a State which at any future time had aggressive intentions to keep within the letter of the Convention but at the same time:

(i) To transfer combatant aircraft to civil aviation undertakings for storage and, by subsidising and creating civilian aviation enterprises beyond the normal requirements of the community, to build up a valuable reserve of aircraft of military value;

(ii) To accumulate reserves of material in depots far beyond the wastage requirements of the agreed establishments;

(iii) To create units which, though combatant in fact, are non-combatant in name;

(iv) To hold more aircraft overseas and in colonies than is necessary — sometimes perhaps as a form of advance-guard for distant operations. Note. — This disadvantage would be removed if the Convention were to embrace overseas and colonial establishments as a collateral agreement.

(v) This method does not strictly secure the limitation of personnel, which is a most important factor; the method is consequently incomplete.

2.

The delegations of FRANCE and ITALY submit the following method:

METHOD BASED ON THE LIMITATION OF THE TOTAL HORSE-POWER OF THE AIRCRAFT IN SERVICE WITH THE PEACE-TIME EFFECTIVES (MILITARY AND ORGANISED ON A MILITARY BASIS).

The horse-power of an aeroplane can be determined in various ways, both theoretical and practical, and the means utilised can be agreed upon by technical experts. We have already noted that, from the technical point of view, the principal characteristics determining the value of an aircraft bear a close relation to its horse-power.

Thus, by limiting the horse-power of any type of aircraft, one would tend to limit its characteristics; this type of limitation, however, involves such difficulties and drawbacks that the Sub-Commission has decided not to consider it.

On the other hand, the method based upon the total horse-power of the aircraft maintained in commission is attended by the following Advantages and Disadvantages:

Advantages.

(a) It permits of the simultaneous limitation of the number and characteristics of aircraft.

(b) It leaves the States free to distribute as best suits their needs the horse-power at their disposal, permitting them to have either a certain number of aircraft with a fixed horse-power or a smaller number of aircraft with a higher horse-power. When a State desires to increase the horse-power of all or any of its aircraft, it will be obliged to reduce the number, and vice versa.

(c) To be applied, this method necessitates only an interchange of information between the States concerned, within the framework of the Convention concluded by them. It is therefore relatively simple to apply.
Disadvantages.

(a) As this method only ensures the limitation of the material in use, it makes it possible to increase the material in reserve while keeping the latter at the immediate disposal of the units. If it is desired at the same time to limit the reserve material, this method must be supplemented by another.

(b) Aircraft can be prepared for the mounting of more powerful engines, provided, of course, the necessary engines are available or can be obtained.

(c) It does not take into account the aircraft of civil aviation which has a military value for purposes of war.

The delegations of BELGIUM, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, FINLAND, FRANCE, JAPAN, POLAND, ROMANIA and the KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES add the following Disadvantage:

(d) This method does not directly ensure a limitation of personnel, which is a very important matter. It is consequently incomplete.

The delegations of BELGIUM, CHILE, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, FRANCE, ITALY, JAPAN, POLAND and ROMANIA consider that this method may provide results on condition that, when fixing the limitation, due regard is paid to the total horse-power mounted in aeroplanes in service in civil aeronautics.

Disadvantage (c) would then be eliminated.

The delegations of BELGIUM, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, JAPAN, POLAND and ROMANIA consider, however, that this method can only be applied in conjunction with the method of the limitation of personnel.

3.

The delegation of SPAIN submits the following method:

METHOD BASED ON THE LIMITATION OF THE TOTAL HORSE-POWER OF ALL AIRCRAFT IN SERVICE AND IN RESERVE OF THE MILITARY FORCES AND THE FORCES ORGANISED ON A MILITARY BASIS.

Advantages.

(a) It permits of the simultaneous limitation of the number and characteristics of aircraft.

(b) It leaves the States concerned free to distribute as best suits their needs the horse-power at their disposal, permitting them to have either a certain number of aircraft with a fixed horse-power or a smaller number of aircraft with a higher horse-power. When a State desires to increase the horse-power of all or any of its aircraft, it will be obliged to reduce the number and vice versa.

(c) To be applied, this method necessitates only an interchange of information between the States concerned, within the framework of the Convention concluded by them. It is therefore relatively simple to apply.

(d) It would ensure more extensive limitation.

Disadvantages.

(a) This method involves an exchange of information between States on a much larger scale and more difficult to check than in the case of the previous method.

(b) Aircraft can be prepared for the mounting of more powerful engines, provided, of course, the necessary engines are available or can be obtained.

(c) It does not take into account the aircraft of civil aviation which has a military value for purposes of war.
The delegations of BELGIUM, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, FINLAND, FRANCE, JAPAN, POLAND, ROMANIA and the KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES add the following Disadvantage:

This method does not directly ensure a limitation of personnel, which is a very important factor. It is consequently incomplete.

4.

The delegation of SPAIN submits the following method:

**METHOD BASED ON THE LIMITATION OF THE TOTAL HORSE-POWER OF ALL ASSEMBLED AIRCRAFT ENGINES OF THE MILITARY FORCES AND OF THE FORCES ORGANISED ON A MILITARY BASIS, WHETHER MOUNTED ON AIRCRAFT OR KEPT IN RESERVE AS SPARE ENGINES.**

This method would consist in limiting the total assembled horse-power that a country may have at its disposal.

**Advantages.**

(a) It permits of the simultaneous limitation of the number and characteristics of aircraft.

(b) It leaves the States concerned free to distribute as best suits their needs the horse-power at their disposal, permitting them to have either a certain number of aircraft with a fixed horse-power or a small number of aircraft with a higher horse-power. When a State desires to increase the horse-power of all or any of its aircraft, it will be obliged to reduce the number and vice versa.

(c) To be applied, this method necessitates only an interchange of information between the States concerned, within the framework of the Convention concluded by them. It is therefore relatively simple to apply.

(d) It would ensure more extensive limitation.

**Disadvantages.**

(a) It does not take into consideration dis-assembled engines or their spare parts.

(b) It involves very great difficulties in application, and, to be efficient, would necessitate an exchange of information between States on a much larger scale and more difficult to check than in the case of Method 3.

(c) It does not take into account the aircraft of civil aviation which has a military value for purposes of war.

The delegations of BELGIUM, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, FINLAND, FRANCE, JAPAN, POLAND, ROMANIA and the KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES add the following Disadvantage:

(d) This method does not directly ensure a limitation of personnel, which is a very important factor. It is consequently incomplete.

Note. — Certain countries do not manufacture aeroplane or airship engines.

If it is to be equitable, therefore, any limitation of the horse-power of the reserve engines must take into account the fact that these countries might be quite unable in the course of a war to replace their worn-out reserve engines or to increase the number of their engines.

5.

The delegations of FINLAND and the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA submit the following method:

**METHOD BASED ON THE LIMITATION OF LIFT TONNAGE.**

**Definitions.** — By “lift tonnage” is meant the difference between the weight of the aeroplane with the heaviest load it can carry and its tare weight.
By "tare weight" is meant the weight of the aeroplane and its engine with radiator (if any) full.

Note. — The lift tonnage of an aeroplane varies according to the ratio between wing area and horse-power.

The limitation of lift tonnage may be employed either as a method of limitation applicable to certain types of aeroplanes or as a "total" method of limitation.

**Advantages.**

(a) This method makes it possible to limit the number of aircraft of large carrying capacity, and thus to restrict the expansion of bombing forces.

(b) The "total" method would permit a nation to construct the types of aeroplanes necessary for its particular requirements.

(c) The lift tonnage of an aeroplane can be determined in various ways, both theoretical and practical, and the means utilised can be agreed upon by technical experts.

(d) It includes the elements of horse-power and therefore some of the advantages of the horse-power method of limitation.

**Disadvantages.**

(a) This method only makes it possible to a small extent to limit the number of aircraft of small carrying capacity, i.e., fighting aircraft.

(b) The lift tonnage of an aeroplane could be varied by the rapid substitution of an engine or wings or both.

(c) It does not take into consideration dis-assembled engines or their spare parts.

(d) This method would require the exchange of detailed information between Governments as to the characteristics involved.

(e) This method ignores civilian aircraft, and, inasmuch as it limits military bombing aircraft, it confers a very high relative value on civilian aircraft of large carrying capacity, which can be used as bombers. It would be very much to the disadvantage of countries in which there is little or no civil aviation.

The delegations of BELGIUM, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, FINLAND, FRANCE, JAPAN, POLAND, ROMANIA and the KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES add the following Disadvantage:

(f) This method does not directly ensure a limitation of personnel, which is a very important factor. It is consequently incomplete.

6.

The delegations of FINLAND and FRANCE submit the following method:

**METHOD BASED ON THE LIMITATION OF MANUFACTURES AND IMPORTS OF MILITARY AIR MATERIAL.**

**Advantages.**

In view of the difficulties attending the direct limitation of material and especially of stocks of material, an endeavour can at least be made to limit the increase of stocks or their renewal and the rate of such increase in order to avoid manufacture or importation of war material on a large scale in a short space of time.

It is therefore possible to entertain the idea of limiting the quantity of material which a State may manufacture and import annually — of course, deducting its exports and taking into account the stocks in hand at the time of the conclusion of the Convention and any exceptional cases of destruction (earthquakes, fires, etc.) which may occur while the Convention is in force.

This method would be comparatively simple and equitable for all countries, whether producers of war material or not.

**Disadvantages.**

This method is only admissible:

(a) If an effective and international control of the trade in, and manufacture of, war material can be introduced.
(b) If all States which, for justified reasons, financial or other, have been unable in any given year to manufacture or import the quota of material allowed to them by the proposed Convention are allowed a corresponding increase in their manufactures and imports during the succeeding years.

(c) Any limitation of manufacture and imports of military air material would be very difficult to enforce, on account of the impossibility of drawing a clear line between military and civil air material. This disadvantage would disappear if the Convention contained a clause limiting civil aviation to its normal needs as estimated by the States. Sub-Commission A does not, however, feel competent to recommend such a limitation.

The delegations of BELGIUM, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, FINLAND, FRANCE, JAPAN, POLAND, ROMANIA and the KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES add the following Disadvantage:

(d) This method does not directly ensure a limitation of personnel, which is a very important factor. It is consequently incomplete.

The delegations of ARGENTINE, the BRITISH EMPIRE and the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA are of the opinion that any limitation of manufactures and imports of military air material is impracticable and unjustified, and are of the further opinion that this question is political and does not come properly within the purview of this technical Commission.

Chapter III. Combined Method Applying to the Whole of Military and Civil Aviation.

The delegations of CHILE, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, FINLAND, FRANCE, POLAND and ROMANIA submit the following method:

Combined Method Based on a Knowledge of the Development and the Possibilities of Development of Civil Aviation, Involving Direct Limitation of Air Armaments in Service in Peace-Time in the Military Forces and in the Forces Organised on a Military Basis, and Indirect Limitation of Air Armaments in War-Time.

Definition of the Method. — Inclusion in the General Convention for the Limitation of Armaments of an agreement on air armaments which will cease to bind the contracting parties if any of these modify the arrangements regarding the development of its civil aviation.

The Bases of the Agreement are the following: The various countries will inform each other of the maximum of their estimates for the normal needs of their civil aviation during the period in which the Convention is to be in force, and, if these arrangements prove inadequate in the course of the period of validity provided for in the Convention, they will notify to the co-signatories in advance, within a period to be fixed, any modifications which may be found necessary.

The Agreement embodies the following Limitative Clauses:

1. Limitation will apply:

(a) Separately to air armaments intended for the defence of the home country whether they form an organic part of the military, naval or air forces, and to air armaments specially intended to ensure the safety of foreign possessions.

(b) Inclusively to air armaments of the two classes indicated above; the inclusive limitation may, however, be less than the sum of the separate limitations in each of the classes.

2. The limitation will apply, separately in regard to each of the categories, and also inclusively in regard to the whole:

(a) To the total horse-power of all engines fitted in aeroplanes in service with the military forces or organised for military purposes, and to the total volume of dirigibles in service in these same forces;

(b) To the aggregate personnel of all classes of aircraft in service with the peace-time effectives, as the latter are defined in Chapter I of the Reply to Question I (b), the number of pilots among these effectives being indicated separately;

(c) To the importations and manufacture of military air material.

This method can produce results, because it takes account of civil aviation and allows important limitation by the combination of several methods.
Advantages and Disadvantages of this Method.

Generally speaking, this method possesses all the advantages of the various methods which are included in the combination and, at the same time, a number of the disadvantages inherent in each of them.

The principal Advantages and Disadvantages are as follows:

Advantages.

1. This method ensures very far-reaching limitation:
   By limiting the total engine-power in service, it affects directly the number and characteristic features of the aircraft in service.
   By limiting peace effectives, it affects directly the personnel in service and indirectly the trained personnel in reserve.
   By limiting manufacture and importations, it makes it possible indirectly to limit the material that may be stocked; prevents frequent renewal of material in service or reserve and the building up of stocks of engines intended to increase, should opportunity offer, the military value of aircraft.
   It limits the instruction of personnel in the active army and in the reserve.

2. It does not hamper the growth of civil aviation and it takes account of its possibilities of development.

3. It ensures limitation of all home and overseas air armaments, while leaving States free to distribute them to meet their normal requirements and even to provide for their increase to meet special needs.

Disadvantages.

1. If this method is adopted, the States concerned must agree to submit a uniform, clear, honest and detailed statement of their manufacture and importations.

2. It would impose on States an obligation to take the necessary steps to enable them to estimate accurately the probable maximum development of their civil aviation and to keep themselves informed of the extent to which this programme is being carried out during the period of validity of the Convention.

3. Any limitation of the manufacture and importation of military air material is extremely difficult to apply on account of the impossibility of drawing an accurate distinction between military and civil air material.

4. The fact that a State which has signed the Convention may have the option and the right to modify its provisions in all cases in which it may deem it desirable for the development of its civil aviation, and that in that case the other contracting States are no longer bound by that Convention, gives this method a character of instability which, under certain circumstances, may render the advantages enumerated above illusive.

Disadvantages 3 and 4 would be avoided if the Convention contained a clause limiting civil aviation within the limits of its normal requirements in accordance with the estimates made by the various States themselves. But the Sub-Commission did not consider itself competent to recommend such a limitation.

See Section III. Declarations by the delegations of the Argentine, Germany and the United States of America.

The delegations of the ARGENTINE, GERMANY and the UNITED STATES are of opinion that any consideration of civil aviation in all methods of limitation of material is impracticable.

They are opposed to and cannot accept any method which envisages the limitation of civil aviation.

Chapter IV. — System of Limitation of Military and Civil Aviation as a Whole.

The delegations of BELGIUM, CHILE, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, FRANCE, ITALY, POLAND, ROMANIA and the KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES submit the following system:

LIMITATION OF MILITARY AND CIVIL AVIATION AS A WHOLE.

Special Observation. — If the Preparatory Commission wishes to consider a wider limitation than that relating to air armaments in service in time of peace, the only practical solution from the purely military point of view is, owing to the importance of civil aviation for purposes of war, the limitation of military and civil aviation as a whole; it should be observed that such a limitation may involve economic consequences which Sub-Commission A is not qualified to determine or appreciate.