In the Committee of Experts, the Netherlands delegation had supported the text which had been adopted concerning the possibility of action against objectives of the battlefield, since, in its view, it appeared from the text that even seven-ton tanks possessed specifically offensive qualities. That applied also to the action of tanks against permanent fortifications; hence the Netherlands delegation's note to the answer to question 2 in the Committee of Experts' reply.¹

When one came to consider the possible action of tanks — even six or seven ton tanks — permanent fortifications which could not, throughout their whole length, be provided in time of peace with accessory defences against such weapons would be particularly exposed, especially at the beginning of a war. On that point, the Netherlands delegate supported General Galet's view. He accordingly endorsed General Nygren's suggestion for the abolition of all tanks and special armoured cars capable of being used on the battlefield.

The Netherlands delegation thought that such weapons, answering as they did to the criteria named in the resolution of April 22nd, should be made subject to qualitative disarmament. It had therefore submitted the following proposal:

"Tanks and armoured cars, provided with special appliances to enable their use on the battlefield, should be considered as having the most specifically offensive characteristics and the greatest effectiveness against national defence."

M. LOUNATCHARSKI (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) stated that, in the interests of simplification, the Soviet delegation desired to support the Hungarian proposal submitted at the close of the last meeting and to withdraw its own.

Referring to the Polish delegate's last speech, he maintained, while agreeing that the development of industry undoubtedly increased a country's war potential, that the importance attached to agricultural tractors as a potential weapon had been greatly exaggerated.

APTULAHAT Bey (Turkey) observed that the Turkish delegation had already submitted to the Conference a proposal advocating the abolition of tanks and armoured cars. Those weapons, it considered, possessed the three offensive characteristics named by the General Commission. Tanks, in particular, possessed great mobility and a wide range of action and were capable of attacking and destroying defensive works. The weapon in question was continually being perfected and constituted a great menace in the hands of an aggressor, especially in surprise attacks; it might also be a menace to the civil population if employed for incursions into the enemy's territory.

The Turkish delegation associated itself with the Italian delegation's observations,² the object of which was to include armoured cars among the weapons most specifically offensive and most threatening to civilians. It assimilated mobile armoured cupolas and armoured trains to tanks and armoured cars.

The discussions on the subject, both in the Committee of Experts and in the Land Commission itself, confirmed the soundness of the Turkish thesis.

General TARBUK (Austria) observed that the Austrian delegation had already submitted its observations when defending the proposals embodied in document Conf.D.102 of April 26th, and that it had repeated those observations on May 11th.³

He recalled that, on May 20th, 1932, his delegation had submitted the following proposal, to which he wished to add certain considerations:

"The Land Commission states that, apart from its proposals regarding artillery, all tanks, armoured cars, armoured trains and all methods of chemical and bacteriological warfare must be classed in the category of weapons 'whose character is the most specifically offensive or those most efficacious against national defence or most threatening to civilians'."

In the world war, after the stabilisation of the fronts, in the various theatres of military operations, all the belligerents had endeavoured to adapt themselves to the new war of "positions" — i.e., of general defence. Numerous offensives had shown the impossibility of breaking down the enemy's resistance with the weapons available at the beginning of the war, and new weapons were accordingly created, designed primarily to increase the offensive power. In addition to the strengthening of mobile and fixed heavy artillery, bombing planes and tanks were constructed, the latter being, in the

² See Minutes of the previous meeting.
³ See Minutes of the eighth meeting of the Land Commission.
Austrian delegation's view, the weapon of aggression par excellence, apart from the element of surprise and the moral effect which it produced. The same consideration explained the use of armoured cars and poison gases.

While armoured cars and armoured trains had existed before the war, tanks had actually been created during that period.

Definitions of tanks, armoured cars and armoured trains were given in the experts' reply. All those weapons, without exception, were prohibited as offensive weapons in certain armies employed simply for the defence of the national frontiers, and such armies possessed neither tanks, armoured cars, nor armoured trains.

The abolition of specifically offensive weapons — weapons most efficacious against national defence and most threatening to civilians, and without which an offensive on a big scale was impossible — constituted the most urgent requirement of international security.

In conclusion, the Austrian delegation supported the proposals of the Hungarian and Netherlands delegations, which were on the same lines as its own.

M. Pürschel (Denmark) stated that, as regards tanks and armoured cars, he supported the view of the Swedish delegation.

The Danish delegation had been somewhat concerned at the turn which the discussions in the Technical Commissions had taken, and which had undoubtedly aroused all over the world profound scepticism as to the results of the Conference as a whole. That statement implied no reproach as regards the Technical Commissions themselves, which had endeavoured, with highly laudable zeal, to go into all the technical details of the questions submitted to them. The Commissions had, however, ended by admitting that the terms "offensive" and "defensive" were relative — a fact which was undeniable, but which, if over-emphasised, would undoubtedly be fatal to the work of the Conference.

What was the object of the Conference? That was clear from its title: the reduction and limitation of armaments. That object was, however, secondary and was of no value in itself, except from a financial standpoint. What really conferred any value on the reduction and limitation of armaments and what really constituted the purpose of the Conference was the lessening of the danger of war and of the prospects of war. How could a reduction of armaments contribute towards that result? First, by the abolition of weapons and means of combat capable of rapidly crushing an adversary. History contained examples of bombardments carried out with the assistance of the fleet. Historians of future wars would have to concern themselves with the aerial bombardment of big cities, employed as the means best calculated to break down a people's power of moral resistance.

Undoubtedly, the possibility of the League and of public opinion exercising any influence in the direction of pacification and mediation would increase in direct proportion to the time at their disposal. A reduction of the possibility of sudden aggression would, in the Danish delegation's view, afford a not inconsiderable guarantee of peace.

The Commission must not lose sight of the object which had presented itself more or less clearly in the minds of all the speakers during the general debate, when the declarations of the big Powers in particular had aroused the highest hopes. It would find then that it would be easier to decide which weapons should be abolished. The Danish delegation proposed to refer simply to heavy artillery, but parallels could, he said, be drawn for tanks and various other weapons and means of combat.

To consider the beginning of the great war: what would the situation have been if mobile heavy artillery had not existed, a weapon which was later employed also by those fighting on their own territory — i.e., for purposes which might be described as defensive? Undoubtedly, the permanent fortified defences of certain small countries, for example, would have offered a much higher degree of resistance, and certain marches depending on the swift reduction of those defensive works could not have been carried out. From this it was justifiable to draw the conclusion that, at the moment when war broke out — and this was the moment which was of the greatest interest since it was of preponderating importance from a psychological standpoint — it was not mobile heavy artillery that made it possible to reduce the permanent defensive works; that factor was calculated to encourage any intention to disturb the peace, the absence of those weapons, on the other hand, being calculated to frustrate such an intention. True, if war broke out notwithstanding, and the aggressor invaded the territory of the country which he was attacking, that country might find itself without any heavy artillery, as indeed if it wished to carry out a counter-attack. That defect, however, would simply have to be admitted; it was the price of success, and which, if over-emphasised, would undoubtedly be fatal to the work of the Conference.

The decision now called for was not a technical one, but a political one. It was essential that the limit fixed should be low. Once it had been fixed, and provided the control was effective, military experts could easily construct permanent fortifications and improvised defensive works sufficiently powerful to withstand the aggressor and to constitute less tempting objectives! The lower the limit, the less armaments would cost.
The Danish delegate desired to submit one further observation. While the League of Nations had given the smaller States — particularly when grouped together for concerted action — an opportunity greater, no doubt, than ever before of influencing decisions of importance to the fate of the world and of modern civilisation, those decisions none the less always depended primarily on the big Powers. That statement, if it were desired to summarise it, might perhaps be expressed in a brief formula: the power was in the hands of the big Powers; power implied honour, and honour implied responsibility.

General Brind (India) stated that the delegation of India could not support the draft resolution submitted by the Hungarian delegation, since it disagreed with that resolution in three vital particulars. First, it did not consider that it fully or accurately answered the questions put to the Land Commission by the General Commission; secondly, it considered that the resolution was based on a purely local and special point of view; and, thirdly, it disagreed with the conclusions formed as regards the civil population.

As regards the questions put by the General Commission, the Land Commission had been asked to examine land armaments with a view to selecting those weapons which were the most specifically offensive, the most efficacious against national defence and the most threatening to civilians. It was, in the view of the delegation of India, neither helpful nor correct to say that all tanks and armoured cars were the most offensive, etc., when it was known that the offensive quality varied enormously with the size and type. It must be obvious to the Land Commission that a vehicle heavily armed and armoured, which could surmount almost any obstacle, was a more offensive weapon than a lightly armed and armoured vehicle which could go across country only with difficulty, and that a moderately armed and a moderately armoured cross-country vehicle was more efficacious against national defence than a light one which was confined to roads. In short, it seemed to the delegation of India to be absolutely incorrect to say that all armoured vehicles were the most offensive when it was known that some were more offensive than others, and, as the United States delegate had pointed out, that some were only of use for police work.

As regards the second objection — that the Hungarian resolution was based on a local and special point of view — the delegate for India noted that the General Commission's resolution to which the Land Commission was endeavouring to find a reply was based on a previous resolution, which said that the General Commission declared that the provisions of Article 8 of the Covenant were to be applied, that armaments were to be reduced to the lowest possible limit consistent with national safety, and that account had to be taken of the geographical situation and special circumstances of each State. That fact must not be forgotten.

Hitherto, the delegations had been viewing the problem from their own point of view and most speakers had visualised a European picture. The Persian delegate had given a glimpse of a more Eastern picture, and it was necessary that the delegation of India should express its point of view, which was based on conditions in some respects not unlike those referred to by the Persian delegate.

India had two main problems to consider in connection with the maintenance of order within her own frontiers: a frontier problem — i.e., defence against tribes living within her own frontiers — and the maintenance of order in the interior of the peninsula.

To consider first the frontier problem. There existed within the frontier a belt of unadministered, mountainous tribal territory several hundred miles long and some sixty miles across. The tribes inhabiting that belt were numerous; they were warlike, (mostly) skilful and well armed. They liked war, or rather raiding, they were not interested in disarmament conferences, and their rifles were their most cherished possessions. By degrees roads, which had a civilising influence, were being constructed through that belt, but the work was difficult and expensive and progress was slow. For the maintenance of order in that area, armoured cars and light tanks were essential, and were used for reconnaissance in place of cavalry patrols, for communication and liaison, for escorts and sometimes for rapid reinforcement.

As regards the rest of the peninsula, it must be remembered that the country was as large as Europe without the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, that it had a population of 350 millions consisting of as many races as there were in Europe, and that across the racial differences ran a great religious distinction which was the cause of constant strife between the communities from one end of the peninsula to the other. To maintain order in that vast country, troops were constantly employed to support the police, but the army was small for the task and was scattered; mobility was essential and armoured cars were of immense value in those police duties. Their rôle was much the same as on the frontier, though rapid reinforcement of the police or of the troops should come first in order of
importance — with liaison and escort work next in order — and then, in the case of disturbances on a greater scale (which unfortunately occurred from time to time and had occurred quite recently), reconnaissance and cavalry work. Far from being a threat to the civil population, armoured cars actually prevented different sections from killing each other, and had been found most effective in stopping communal strife. India had of recent years been compelled, for financial reasons, to reduce effectives and expenditure, and any reduction of armoured cars or light tanks would involve a considerable increase in effectives and expenditure.

The third objection noted by the delegate of India to the Hungarian resolution was that, as regards the alleged threat of tanks and armoured cars to the civil population, the statement was not only incorrect, but was at variance with the very carefully worded report on the subject drawn up by the Committee of Experts. In all the early discussions on the subject, the weapons which were criticised as being a menace to the civil population were bombing-aeroplanes, submarines and long-range artillery. Tanks had never been included in that category, and the speaker knew of no example in war of their having been so considered. Neither tanks nor armoured cars could be considered in the same category as aeroplanes or heavy artillery, for the following reasons: Quite apart from the possible indiscriminate use of the weapon, and with the best intentions in the world, an airman or an artilleryman might miss his target, and at great heights and long ranges very frequently he must miss it. In the case of tanks and armoured cars it was not the inaccuracy of the weapon or its long range that had to be considered, nor was it the weapon itself that might be a menace, but rather the personnel and the discipline of the personnel. If the discipline were bad, the case was analogous to that of a cavalry division or force of infantry conveyed in lorries whose discipline was bad, but in the case of tanks and armoured cars the numbers concerned were probably less.

For the various reasons put forward, the delegation of India was definitely opposed to the Hungarian delegation’s resolution. On the other hand, it supported the resolution of the United Kingdom delegation, because that resolution, in its view, answered the question asked, in that it differentiated between the armoured vehicles which were the most specifically offensive and those which were less so — its conclusions were sufficiently broad to apply to situations and circumstances outside the limitations of Europe — and the problem dealing with the menace to the civil population was accurately and clearly stated; while, finally, it made a definite and genuine contribution towards the cause of disarmament.

General KALEYS (Latvia) stated that the part played by armoured cars and armoured trains was not clearly brought out by the Commission’s discussions.

The efficacy of such armaments varied from country to country. Latvia, a small country unsuspected of aggressive designs, had no armaments industry. Indeed, her armaments were not sufficient to meet the needs of her national defence. Should she be forced into war, she would have to resort to improvised weapons, as had been the case during the war for her independence. For such a country as Latvia, with her slender resources and with the possibility of vast stretches of front very variable in character, armoured cars and trains would constitute useful armaments; they could, however, only be employed for national defence.

It had been stated that all defensive armaments could become offensive, since tactics necessitated continual changes from the defensive to the offensive in the form of counter-attacks, etc. Nevertheless, neither for offence nor for surprise attack had armoured cars and trains the importance that had been attributed to them. The part they could play was limited to the opening stages of an attack, and was smaller than the Commission seemed to think. These arms were linked to lines of communications — roads and railways. They could not operate at any great distance from the troops to which they were attached, and they constituted no threat to civilians, as they were rather for reconnaissance, patrol, or even liaison purposes. Further, they did not usually carry heavy guns.

In conclusion, he would point out that these weapons could never, alone, be used decisively in battle; the Latvian delegation considered them purely defensive.

Colonel MARTOLA (Finland) supported General Kaleys. In his view, neither armoured cars nor armoured trains could be considered as weapons most threatening to national defence or most dangerous to civilians. Armoured cars, which in wooded country and marshy districts could only operate along roads, and which were armed with small-calibre guns only, were mainly used for reconnaissance purposes. They were necessary in many countries for the maintenance of order. It was true that they were relatively easy to improvise.
As the experts had pointed out, the use of armoured trains was dependent upon the existence of railways. They could only be used by the defending State and could not venture far from their base, as the slightest obstacle could put them out of action. For these reasons, his delegation supported General Kaleys’ statements.

Colonel Tomberg (Estonia) also agreed with the Latvian delegation on the subject of armoured cars and armoured trains. Such arms were a means of defence for small countries unable to construct expensive fortifications to protect the key-points of their communications. They could scarcely be used for offence, since a handful of men or a few kilogrammes of explosives were sufficient to put an armoured train out of action. They could be used to the full in defence only; it was in any case impossible to use them for surprise attack, since roads and railways were guarded.

The Estonian delegation therefore considered that tanks and armoured cars could not be regarded as one of the most specifically offensive means of warfare.

Colonel Riazi (Persia) reminded the Commission that he had already stated why, in his opinion, it was impossible to consider armoured cars as offensive weapons. In Persia, such cars were used for purposes of liaison between the different police posts and bodies of troops responsible for the maintenance of order. This would be the case until such time as Persia was equipped with an adequate railway system.

The Committee of Experts had acknowledged that this view was sound, recognising that certain of the machines in question were not intended for use on the battlefield.

The Hungarian delegate had stated that the draft resolution submitted by his delegation had been drawn up in the spirit of the Committee of Experts’ report, and this draft resolution covered tanks and armoured cars of an aggressive nature and not less powerful or less heavily armoured machines not constructed for use on the field of battle.

Hence the Persian delegation was prepared to vote for either the Hungarian draft resolution or the Netherlands proposal.

Lieutenant-Colonel Crerar (Canada) stated that the Canadian delegation supported the draft reply proposed by the United Kingdom delegation at the last meeting; it also agreed with the text proposed by the Italian delegation1 to the effect that the measure of effectiveness of an armoured fighting vehicle was dependent upon “offensive power (armament and weight), protective efficacy (armour), speed, radius of action and capacity to move over ground”. As each of these factors was largely dependent on “weight”, weight was a logical basis for determining the effectiveness of tanks in their possible operation against field entrenchments and other elements of national defence.

If the Land Commission was not prepared to suggest to the General Commission that the factor of weight could usefully be applied as a measure of qualitative disarmament, the only alternative conclusion must be to ask that all tanks should be prohibited or that none should be.

The discussions had shown clearly that the dividing-line between commercial all-track, semi-track and wheeled vehicles and the military pattern tank or armoured car could not be clearly defined or recognised. As mechanical transport became more perfect, this distinction would become even more difficult to draw. The Land Commission would therefore be obliged to suggest that neither tanks nor armoured cars should be abolished, which would be regrettable.

For these reasons, the Canadian delegation supported the United Kingdom proposal, which expressed in some detail a useful and sound principle — namely, that the weight of a tank was a measure of its offensive capacity.

General Benitez (Spain) stated that, subject to the reservation already formulated and bearing in mind the Committee of Experts’ views, the Spanish delegation considered:

1 That light tanks constructed for co-operation with infantry in all phases of battle and over any kind of ground should be classed among the most specifically offensive weapons;

2 That they were efficacious against national defence if the country attacked had no fortifications;

3 That they were not threatening to the civil population;

4 That the most powerful tanks, such as those quoted in the experts’ reply, should be considered as specifically offensive and efficacious against national defence;

(5) That armoured cars carrying machine-guns, such as accompanied cavalry, should not come under any of the three heads given in the General Commission’s resolution;

(6) That mobile turrets, if armoured cupolas were understood as such, were fixed elements forming part of the permanent fortifications;

(7) That in view of the number of trains necessary for the transport of even a single division — seeing that the guns carried by an armoured train were never of large calibre, that the train could not leave the railway line, and that it was a very expensive weapon — it could be concluded that it was scarcely worth considering such trains as offensive armaments;

(8) That motor vehicles adaptable in varying degrees of perfection to military ends formed part of the potential war strength of each country.

The Spanish delegation considered that the question of the prohibition or non-prohibition of the armaments in question was within the competence of the General Commission.

M. Sato (Japan) stated that his delegation thought:

(1) That tanks and armoured cars should not be considered threatening to civilians unless employed in a way contrary to the rules of international law relating to war.

(2) Since the offensiveness of mobile cupolas and armoured trains depended upon the arms which they carried, the Japanese delegation considered that these vehicles did not come into any of the three categories mentioned in the General Commission’s resolution. It therefore held that these vehicles should not be included among the arms to which qualitative limitation should be applied.

(3) From the purely military point of view, the Japanese delegation agreed with the French delegation on the subject of the efficacy of tanks and armoured cars against national defence. Nevertheless, it considered that it would be well further to study the question of the minimum weight of such tanks and armoured cars.

(4) The Japanese delegation could not endorse the arguments raised in support of the total abolition of armoured vehicles, since it considered that these arguments were based on a confusion between the character of the material and its strategic use, or on considerations relating to the possibility of their illegal use, in violation of international law.

General Ferraz (Portugal) drew the Commission’s attention to the declarations made by his delegation during the plenary meetings of the Conference. His delegation was ready to support any proposal likely to lead to a reasonable reduction in the offensiveness of all armoured vehicles the characteristics of which rendered them specifically threatening to national defence and civil populations. The Portuguese delegation further considered that special measures should be taken to prohibit the improvisation of tanks of any kind whatsoever.

M. Steffens (Norway) said that his delegation considered that all tanks and armoured cars were essentially offensive weapons and among those most efficacious against national defence. In view of the fact that surprise attack constituted a grave danger for small countries possessing few means of defence — as the Belgian and Hungarian delegates had already explained — and since such attack could place these countries in a particularly disadvantageous position until such time as the organs of the League of Nations could come into operation, the Norwegian delegation was ready to support the Belgian amendment. It could not, however, support the British proposal, in which only tanks weighing over twenty-five tons were considered specifically offensive.

The Norwegian delegation could have supported the Netherlands proposal submitted earlier in the meeting, which had been accepted by the Swedish delegation, if that proposal had not omitted armoured cars not equipped with caterpillars. The Norwegian delegation considered that armoured cars were very effective offensive weapons against surprise attack. His delegation did not consider armoured trains essentially offensive, since their radius of action was limited by the existence of railway lines.

The Norwegian delegation considered that the Hungarian delegation’s proposal was the most nearly in accordance with its point of view and would thus vote in its favour, in spite of doubts as to the offensive character of armoured trains.

1 See Minutes of the fifteenth meeting.
General VATEFF (Bulgaria) said the Bulgarian delegation felt that, in view of the reasons which had led to their construction in the world war, their special features and their method of action and use, tanks were exclusively offensive weapons. Moreover, their great mobility favoured surprise attack, particularly at the beginning of the war.

The Bulgarian delegation was of opinion that tanks were most efficacious against national defence, because they could destroy temporary constructions, and because they could, by crushing obstacles, open passages for the attacking troops and, with their armament, could protect the advance of these troops. The heavier the tank, the more offensive and dangerous it was against national defence.

Tanks were more or less threatening to civilians according to the strength of their armament and the belligerents' respect for international treaties.

The Bulgarian delegation considered that armoured cars, which were very mobile and had a wide radius of action, were particularly suitable for offensive action. They could make surprise attacks and constitute a threat to civilians by invading the territory of the country. Finally, the Bulgarian delegation considered that armoured cars were not very efficacious against defence organisations.

Lieut.-General OMAR (Afghanistan) said that the Afghan delegation, in conformity with its proposal and with its statement made previously, was of opinion that tanks and armoured cars were the most specifically offensive weapons, the most efficacious against national defence, and the most threatening to civilians. It therefore approved and supported the Hungarian and Netherlands draft resolutions.

General DIMITRESCO (Roumania) pointed out that, in its report, the Committee of Experts had unanimously agreed that it was possible rapidly and easily to convert agricultural tractors or other vehicles into tanks or armoured cars.

The value of these vehicles converted for military purposes might be greater than that of old model tanks or armoured cars, and their use en masse by the armies of the countries in which a large number was available was certainly dangerous and very efficacious against national defence.

The Roumanian delegation was therefore of opinion that, in providing for the limitation, reduction or prohibition of tanks or armoured cars, it should be borne in mind that agricultural tractors or other vehicles could easily and rapidly be converted into tanks or armoured cars.

The Roumanian delegation did not intend, in making this remark, in any way to suggest that the development of the agricultural industry should be hampered. It merely desired to draw attention to the importance of bearing this fact in mind, as in the case of civil aviation.

The Roumanian delegation proposed that a special committee should be set up, at a suitable moment, to study this question, as had been done in the case of civil aviation.

Colonel ZÜBLIN (Switzerland) simply desired to state that the Swiss delegation intended to support the Netherlands proposal.

The Swiss delegate thought that armoured cars which could circulate only on roads should not be considered as more specifically offensive than a lorry for the transport of troops armed with machine-guns or guns.

The Swiss delegation could not accept the Hungarian proposal, nor did it consider that armoured vehicles were particularly dangerous to civilians. It did not feel that the danger of surprise attack should be attributed to armoured cars, since a strategic surprise attack depended not only upon tanks but also upon infantry. Obviously, an infantry battalion with machine-guns was as dangerous to civilians as an armoured vehicle.

Apparently, the Hungarian delegation had considered the danger to civilians in a somewhat different light from the General Commission, which understood it to cover the risks run by the population outside the field of battle. Surprise operations would inevitably create a new battlefield, but the same would apply to other material as well as to armoured vehicles.

Colonel Züblin felt that the question of tractors was rather within the General Commission's competence. It would be useful, however, if the Land Commission could bring it to the notice of the General Commission, in order that the latter might bear it in mind in discussing limitation or reduction. Colonel Züblin said that, in this sense, he could support the Roumanian proposal to set up a committee to consider tractors.

2 See Minutes of the fifteenth meeting.
The Swiss delegate supported the President’s proposal, and thought it impossible to draw general conclusions from the various views that had been put forward. He felt that, with regard to the distinction between tanks and armoured cars, the Commission should confine itself to saying that armoured cars could move only on roads, whereas other tanks could move across country.

Dr. Ruiz Guiñazú (Argentina) stated that the Argentine delegation maintained its previous statements and would support any proposal to prohibit tanks and assimilated weapons.

Lord Stanhope (United Kingdom) noted that Mr. Wilson had criticised the Committee of Experts somewhat severely because it had been unable to define tanks and armoured cars.

He pointed out that the United Kingdom delegation had submitted a proposal to the Committee of Experts, which that Committee had not accepted. In response to the President’s appeal, he again submitted a proposal which would perhaps meet, if not with unanimous approval, at least with the approval of the majority of the Commission.

Colonel Züblin had suggested an extremely simple definition, but one which was perhaps inadequate, for the ability of armoured cars to move across country depended on the country they had to traverse. In the vast, flat plains of the United States and Canada, it was as easy to move across country by car as to take the road.

Lord Stanhope read the United Kingdom delegation’s draft definition to replace the third paragraph of its original proposal submitted at the beginning of the previous meeting.

That amended text read as follows:

“The Committee of Experts did not find it possible to arrive at precise definitions of the various types of armoured fighting vehicles. It is recognised that it is difficult to make such definitions applicable to all cases owing to the fact that there is no clear technical distinction between light tanks and armoured cars. Generally speaking, however, it may be said that:

A tank is a fully armoured, armed self-propelled vehicle designed to cross broken ground, usually by means of tracks, and to overcome obstacles encountered on the battlefield. It is primarily intended for employment actually on the battlefield.

Armoured cars are armoured wheeled fighting vehicles primarily for employment on roads, with the possible addition of limited cross-country capacity conferred by multi-wheels, four-wheel drive or semi-track device. Their chief characteristics are great range and speed on roads, but they have practically no capacity for crossing trenches. Like the light tank, their rôle is reconnaissance, and they are useless for attack against any form of organised defensive position.

Armoured fighting vehicles might be further classified under three main categories.”

He added that the United Kingdom delegation could accept the Belgian delegation’s addition to the second paragraph, as it improved the text.

Mr. Wilson (United States of America) paid a tribute to the President’s efforts to draw up a definition making the discussions more clear.

He also thanked the United Kingdom delegation for making similar efforts. He would be wanting in gratitude if he did not immediately say that he readily accepted the United Kingdom proposal and the Belgian proposal with regard to surprise attack.

General Whang (China) pointed out once again that his country was in favour of the abolition of tanks and armoured cars. With a view to the adoption of a reply to the General Commission, the Chinese delegation supported the Hungarian proposal.

Colonel Lanskoronskis (Lithuania) said that Lithuania was one of the countries which not only possessed no permanent fortifications but had no fortifications of any kind. Her frontiers were all open and were exposed to surprise invasion. Bearing in mind the statements it had heard with regard to the danger of surprise attack by armoured vehicles, the Lithuanian delegation supported the Hungarian proposal, on condition that the words “any other similar appliances” did not include armoured trains, for the Lithuanian delegation

1 See Minutes of the fifteenth meeting.
did not consider these trains as offensive appliances, since their radius of action was limited by the existence of railways.

M. Aubert (France) asked that, without prejudice to the draft previously submitted by the French delegation, the following declaration, the object of which was to facilitate a comparison of the diverse views, should be inserted in the report.

“1. While in many respects tanks possess fighting qualities superior to those of other means of combat, they are nevertheless not capable of being used efficaciously, independently of other weapons, particularly of the infantry.

“2. Tanks and armoured cars are essential factors in the defence forces of certain countries whose geographical situation exposes them to immediate invasion, whose human resources are limited, who, further, are responsible for maintaining order in vast overseas territories, and whose security depends to a great extent upon materials enabling them to economise their effective.

“3. Tanks and armoured cars are among the weapons least threatening to civilians, as, owing to their precision of action, they must be directed at military objectives.

“4. Tanks and armoured cars are therefore not (a) the most specifically offensive; (b) the most efficacious against national defence; (c) the most threatening to civilians.

“5. In all cases the weight above which tanks could be considered as answering to the criteria (paragraph 4 (a) and (b) above) should be not less than the weight necessary to ensure adequate protection against appliances specially constructed to destroy them.

“6. The reduction and limitation of the weight of tanks and armoured cars do not come within the Commission’s present terms of reference, as they involve questions of principle which must first be discussed by the General Commission.”

M. Aubert pointed out that Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 were based on the statements of the United States, United Kingdom and Japanese delegations in the Naval Commission relating to capital ships, and that No. 5 was similar to a statement made in the Naval Commission by the French delegation (see pages 5 and 7 of the Naval Commission’s report)\(^1\).

General Burhardt-Bukacki (Poland) stated that he supported the Roumanian proposal, particularly as interpreted by the Swiss delegation. He asked that the following declaration be inserted in the report:

“1. The conversion of agricultural and other tractors into tanks;

“2. The utilisation of tractor factories for the manufacture of tanks.”

General Kossitch (Yugoslavia) also supported the Roumanian proposal with regard to the conversion of agricultural tractors. He did not think it necessary, however, to set up a special committee. It would suffice, in his opinion, to make suggestions to the General Commission, as Colonel Züblin had said.

Lieutenant-Colonel Němeček (Czechoslovakia) associated himself with the declaration made by the Polish delegate.

The President asked the Czechoslovak delegate whether he fully concurred in the Roumanian proposal, and whether he had any opinion to express on the idea to regard armoured fighting vehicles as answering to the three criteria contained in the resolution of April 22nd.

Lieutenant-Colonel Němeček (Czechoslovakia) replied that he accepted the proposal of the Polish and Roumanian delegations as regards the transformation of agricultural tractors.

So far as the offensive character of tanks was concerned, he did not desire to make any special declaration, seeing that the Czechoslovak army did not at present possess any tanks with the exception of a few such machines for instruction purposes.

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\(^1\) See document Conf. D./C.N.30.
The President, summarising the discussion, stated that twenty-six delegations had made declarations giving the information necessary for preparing the report. Two delegations were in favour of the procedure proposed by the President for the report to be sent to the General Commission. As no delegation had raised any objection, the President concluded that the Commission accepted his proposal.

The report, which would shortly be submitted to the Commission, would therefore contain a statement of the various points of view expressed by the delegations. The Rapporteur proposed, if necessary, to get into touch with the various delegations in order to ascertain their exact position.

The President noted that the various statements with regard to tanks could be divided into four classes, according to the extent to which they recommended that tanks should be classified among the arms answering to the three criteria of the General Commission’s resolution: this was the only task before the Commission. The latter was not required to express its views as to the limitation or abolition of these weapons: that was within the competence of the General Commission.

The President proposed that the Commission should consider at the next meeting the definition of tanks and armoured cars proposed by the United Kingdom delegation. 

Agreed.

SEVENTEENTH MEETING

Held on Thursday, June 2nd, 1932, at 10 a.m.

President: M. BUERO

22. APPLICATION TO ARMoured FIGHTING VEHICLES OF THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL COMMISSION ON APRIL 22ND, 1932: CONSIDERATION OF THE REPLY TO BE SENT TO THE GENERAL COMMISSION (continuation).

The President reverted to his suggestion of the previous day that the Commission should endeavour to define tanks and armoured cars, as certain delegations considered such a differentiation necessary. In this connection he recalled that, at the close of the previous meeting, the United Kingdom delegation had proposed an amendment to paragraph 3 of its original draft reply to the General Commission, submitted at the fifteenth meeting. The proposed amendment had been supported by the United States delegation, and the President proposed that his colleagues should now express their opinion regarding it. If the majority of the Commission approved this new definition, it might be incorporated in the report.

General GALET (Belgium) accepted the proposal that the definition of tanks and armoured cars submitted by the United Kingdom delegation be inserted in the report to the General Commission. That definition was identical in substance with a proposal already made by the Belgian delegation in the Committee of Experts.

General TARBUK (Austria) proposed that the definition of armoured cars be completed by the insertion of the words “self-propelled” before “fighting vehicles”.

General DE NÁNÁSY-MÉGY (Hungary) said that the Hungarian delegation supported the United Kingdom definition and was in favour of inserting it in the Commission's report. He suggested, however, that the words “Like the light tank” in the last paragraph but one be deleted.

M. VON WEIZSÄCKER (Germany) observed that the differentiation between tanks and armoured cars was not of capital importance to countries wishing to abolish both weapons. The German delegation accepted the United Kingdom definition, subject to the Austrian amendment, and also supported the Hungarian delegation’s suggestion to delete the words “Like the light tank”.

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General NYGRÉN (Sweden) observed that the important point was not to adopt this or that country’s definition, but to make sure, when employing a technical expression, that all the delegations meant the same thing.

In the Swedish delegation’s view, the simplest and the clearest definition would be to describe tanks as any fighting vehicle so equipped as to be able to move across uneven terrain, and armoured cars as any other armoured vehicle provided only with four ordinary wheels.

The Swedish delegation felt that the United Kingdom proposal would make it much more difficult to establish an exact distinction between two types of vehicle; it was prepared, however, to accept the United Kingdom definition, if the Commission was in favour of adopting it. The previous day’s discussion had clearly demonstrated the Commission’s mistake in not defining the terms “tank” and “armoured car” at the outset. A group of armoured vehicles evidently existed which, in the opinion of certain delegations, were tanks and in that of other delegations armoured cars.

It was impossible to agree on a joint text or even to compare different texts if the terms employed were not interpreted in the same way. The Land Commission might, however, obtain unanimity by saying that, in this or that text or document or reply, the terms “tank” and “armoured car” had been used in a specific sense.

Baron VAN VOORST TOT VOORST (Netherlands) stated that the Netherlands delegation accepted the United Kingdom definition. It thought, however, as regards armoured cars, that there was some inconsistency between its terms and the reference in the Experts’ reply to the capacity of armoured cars to cross trenches. He would suggest amending the United Kingdom proposal to read “only a very limited capacity for crossing trenches” instead of “practically no capacity for crossing trenches”.

Referring to the definition of a tank, he suggested adding, after the word “tracks”, the words “enabling it to cross intact trenches of at least 1.50 metre in width”.

Colonel ZÜBLIN (Switzerland) stated that the Swiss delegation was prepared to support the United Kingdom delegation’s text. The Netherlands delegate’s observations concerning that text were perhaps rather too detailed, and the United Kingdom delegation’s second document might be held to cancel its previous text. The Land Commission had not been asked to state all the technical possibilities of tanks and armoured cars, and it was sufficient to describe their main characteristics. Tanks were intended primarily for use on the battlefield and armoured cars for use on roads. Both those points were clearly brought out in the United Kingdom document.

Colonel DE CARVALHO (Brazil) said that the Brazilian delegation supported the definition proposed by the delegation of the United Kingdom; it recognised, nevertheless, that it was impossible to find formulas which were strictly applicable to every case, but it was essential to define at least the most characteristic tanks, as had been done in the British amendment. The Brazilian delegation also agreed that this definition should be inserted in the report.

General BENÍTEZ (Spain) stated that the Spanish delegation accepted the text proposed by the United Kingdom delegation, subject to the deletion of the phrase “Like the light tank”. That reference seemed out of place, especially as the tank was designed to cross rough ground and to overcome obstacles on the battlefield.

Colonel DE CARVALHO (Brazil) stated that, in accordance with the definition the Commission was about to adopt, a tank was a fully armoured, self-propelled vehicle, designed to cross broken ground, usually by means of tracks. It was primarily intended for employment on the battlefield. In the opinion of several delegations, such implements were capable of effective action against entrenchments, which they could generally cross and destroy, and were particularly useful for opening up infantry attacks. They were, in consequence, a means for reinforcing offensive action, and thus possessed the first two characteristics mentioned in the General Commission’s resolution of April 22nd.

The Brazilian delegation agreed that tanks could also be used for the purposes of a counter-offensive by the defender on the front or the flank or in the rear of an aggressor which, having invaded the national territory, had entrenched itself — a point very rightly brought out in the French draft reply. In view, however, of the fact that the use of such weapons considerably increased the offensive power of the attacker and that they were intended for purposes of attack while serving also for the defence, the Brazilian delegation was of opinion that all tanks, irrespective of weight, were specifically offensive and efficacious against national defence.
In the Brazilian delegation's view, tanks could not be included in the category of weapons threatening to civilians, since they were employed on the battlefield.

As regards armoured cars, which, according to the United Kingdom delegation's definition, were armoured, wheeled, fighting vehicles primarily for employment on roads, with a limited cross-country capacity but only a medium capacity for crossing trenches, the Brazilian delegation was of opinion that they were not specifically offensive or threatening to national defence, as they could be stopped more or less easily on roads if they penetrated far into the territory, while in the open they possessed no great capacity for crossing trenches. Further, such weapons were necessary for police purposes in peace-time, especially in countries of great territorial extent and with a scattered population in which the maintenance of public order might require the rapid transfer of forces to a considerable distance.

The Brazilian delegation was of opinion that armoured cars could not constitute weapons threatening to civilians, unless they were employed in violation of the rules of international law.

Lord STANHOPE (United Kingdom) said that the United Kingdom delegation would be glad to rectify an omission and to accept the Austrian proposal to insert the words "self-propelled" in the definition of armoured cars. It was also glad to accept the Netherlands proposal to amend "practically no capacity for crossing trenches" to "only a slight capacity for crossing trenches". It was not prepared, however, to accept the further amendments that had been proposed. The Hungarian delegate had suggested omitting the reference to the light tank in the paragraph concerning armoured cars, but the light tank, in the view of the United Kingdom delegation, did possess the power of reconnaissance, and it was essential that that point should be mentioned. If the Land Commission decided to embody the British text in its report to the General Commission, the Hungarian delegation might perhaps wish to submit a reservation.

Referring next to the Netherlands proposal that mention should be made of the capacity of tanks to cross trenches up to 1.50 metre, the British delegate observed that it was inadvisable to make the definition too concrete—as it would be if definite figures were inserted; it might, indeed, be misleading, since tanks were still changing. The first paragraph stated that the Committee of Experts had not found it possible to arrive at precise definitions of the various types of armoured vehicles, and that statement might serve to define the scope of the remainder of the document. The British delegation did not claim that its text offered a complete technical description, but hoped that the Commission might be able to accept it without too much further amendment.

Colonel TOMBERG (Estonia) stated that the Estonian delegation accepted the United Kingdom definition of armoured fighting vehicles, subject to the amendments approved by Lord Stanhope.

Lord STANHOPE (United Kingdom) suggested that the Commission might agree to adopt a proposal of Mr. Wilson to separate tanks and armoured cars entirely. The British delegate accordingly proposed adding, at the end of the second paragraph of its proposal the words "but tanks of a lighter pattern are also employed for reconnaissance", while the omission in the third paragraph of the words "Like the light tank" would make the words following—"their rôle, etc."—apply exclusively to armoured cars.

M. AUBERT (France) said that the French delegation would be prepared to adopt the distinction between tanks and armoured cars if it thought that that would mean a difference in the treatment of those two weapons. It felt, however, that, without unduly forcing technical facts, it was not really possible to establish a distinction; the experts had said so, and, according to the United Kingdom document, there was no virtual difference between the two types of vehicle. The only difference that could be established was between the use of those vehicles, and it believed the Commission to be careful, for if one of the two categories were prohibited, a premium would be put on the other, and armoured cars could rapidly be converted, by means of a semi-track device, for use on the battlefield. There was no guarantee against their being so used, and unless the Commission adopted for armoured cars a restrictive definition, saying that such vehicles could not leave the road, there seemed no object in endeavouring to establish a distinction, as it would not really serve the purpose in view.

General de NÁNSY-MÉGAY (Hungary) observed that his amendment, which the United Kingdom delegation had accepted, was simply designed to rectify the text.

M. VON WEIZSÄCKER (Germany) said that the German delegation endorsed the views of the United Kingdom delegation and accepted the latter's text with the amendments approved by Lord Stanhope.
Baron van Voorst tot Voorst (Netherlands) withdrew his second proposal; he thanked the United Kingdom delegate for his explanation and for accepting the first proposal he had made.

The President thought that it would be possible for the Rapporteur to establish a distinction, in his report, between tanks and armoured cars. He suggested that the first paragraph of the United Kingdom definition might stand, and that it might be added that the experts had not been able to agree more fully, but that certain delegations had reached an agreement. That would assist the General Commission in arriving at a conclusion.

Lord Stanhope (United Kingdom) said that he entirely agreed with the President's suggestions. He felt that all the delegations would wish to thank the President, whose personal efforts and pertinacity had enabled the Commission to reach an agreement.

General Galet (Belgium) stated that the Belgian delegation accepted the United Kingdom definition of armoured fighting vehicles.

M. Bourquin (Belgium), Rapporteur, reverting to the question of tanks and armoured cars, requested those delegations which had acceded verbally to any formula that had been proposed, subject to reservations or amendments, to forward such reservations or amendments in writing, in order to avoid any possibility of mistake.

General Benitez (Spain) stated that the Spanish delegation had only accepted the definition of tanks and armoured cars included in the British proposal. As regards the remainder of the document, it adhered to its declarations of the previous day.

The Spanish delegation requested the President to have the following declaration inserted in the Minutes:

“The Spanish delegation is of opinion that both light and heavy artillery should be included among the most specifically offensive weapons, for reasons of even greater force than apply in the case of tanks, since the said artillery, which is better ‘armed’ than tanks, is capable, owing to its mobility, of accompanying the infantry and co-operating at any stage of the battle. It is, moreover, intended for that purpose.

“The aforesaid artillery does not constitute a weapon most efficacious against national defence, if the country attacked possesses fortifications.

“Nor is it most threatening to civilians, if employed at a useful range, since the accuracy of its fire enables it to be directed exclusively against selected military objectives.”

23. Fortifications: Draft Questionnaire and Draft Reply Submitted by the German Delegation.

The President stated that the German delegation had submitted the following questionnaire concerning fortifications and draft reply:

“Draft Questionnaire.

“(1) What are the characteristics of fortifications, fortified towns and fortified works (with special reference to the maximum size of their organisations) which must be considered as offensive and which constitute a threat to the national defence of the neighbouring State?

“With regard to this question, the following must be taken into consideration:

“(a) The possibility of accommodating troops and material for the purposes of an attack;

“(b) The range and efficacy of their artillery;

“(c) Distance from the frontier.

“(2) What are the characteristic features of fortifications, fortified towns and fortified works (with special reference to the maximum size of their organisations) which constitute a threat to the civilian population of the neighbouring country?

“With regard to this question, the following must be taken into consideration:

“(a) The moral effect on the population of the neighbouring country in peace-time;

“(b) The range and efficacy of their artillery, with special reference to populous territories and to dense populations and to their vital centres and centres of communication;

“(c) Distance from the frontier.
"(3) What is the influence of the characteristics mentioned under 1 and 2, when:

"(a) The opponent has no permanent fortifications, fortified towns and fortified works or has only weak fortifications, etc.;

"(b) The opponent can rely only on prepared or improvised field fortifications for the defence?"

"Draft Reply.

"1. The Land Commission considers the 'extreme limit' of the organisations of a fortress to be the points at which the most advanced organisations of any kind capable of firing are situated.

"(a) Any fortress, owing to its considerable possibilities for lodging and protecting troops, enables men and material to be held in reserve. It follows that, in addition to its defensive importance, it must be regarded as having offensive possibilities, which are the more important in proportion as the frontier is near.

"(b) If the range of the artillery in the fortress is sufficient for effective fire across the frontier of the neighbouring State it will prejudice that State's defence. The effect against that defence is naturally increased in the case of guns of large calibre.

"(c) If a fortress is so close to the frontier that the troops assembled there can rapidly cross the frontier of the neighbouring State by starting from the extreme limit of the fortress, and if the range of the artillery enables it to fire across the frontier, the fortress must be regarded as specifically offensive and threatening to national defence.

"2. (a) The qualities referred to under (1) are sufficient to be a considerable menace to the population of the neighbouring State. The mere idea of a sudden and unforeseen attack by the troops of the aggressor and the fear that the national defence may be paralysed produces an unfavourable moral effect upon the civilian population.

"(b) This menace is all the greater when, owing to the range and effectiveness of the fortress's artillery, the life of the civilian population of the neighbouring State, its residential and business places and its centres of communication, are threatened and when the frontier territory in question is densely populated or industrial.

"(c) As regards the distance of a fortress from the frontier, the remarks contained under 1 (c) also apply as regards the threat to civilians.

"3. (a) When there are no permanent fortifications or even weak fortifications on the frontier territory of the neighbouring State the qualities referred to under (1) and (2) are all the more important in proportion as a surprise attack from a fortress close to the frontier, meeting with no prepared resistance, might penetrate deeply into the country; it would thus be not only most efficacious against national defence but also particularly threatening to civilians.

"(b) The same remarks apply where the other party has only prepared or improvised field fortifications, since the defensive power of such fortifications is much less than that of permanent fortifications; the former, owing, in particular, to the possibility of a surprise attack by a fortress close to the frontier, must be distant from the frontier and cannot be completed, occupied and put in a state of defence within the time necessary.

"Conclusion. — It follows from the above that fortresses possessing such characteristics are of an offensive nature, that they are specially efficacious against national defence and particularly threatening to civilians."

M. VON WEIZSÄCKER (Germany) stated that, by way of introduction to the questionnaire concerning fortifications, he desired to refer to the observations by which the German delegation had prefaced its proposals to the Conference. 1 Those proposals, it had explained, were not exhaustive, but were intended to render possible an effective reduction and limitation of armaments extending to all important factors of armaments. They included, in particular, measures of fundamental importance in regard to the prevention of aggression. With that object, the German delegation had included a paragraph relating to fortifications, framed as follows: 2

"The construction and maintenance of fortresses, field works and works which, owing to their proximity to the frontier, constitute a direct menace to the neighbouring country and might possibly obstruct measures taken for the prevention of war, shall be prohibited."

2 Idem, "C. Fortifications", paragraph 8.
In its resolution of April 22nd, the General Commission had asked the Land Commission which weapons were most specifically offensive, most efficacious against national defence and most threatening to civilians; its further decision of April 26th covered the German proposal relating to fortifications. The German delegation desired to state, in order to avoid all possible misunderstanding, that it had in mind those fortresses which, owing to their nearness to the frontier, constituted a menace to the neighbouring country. The General Convention to improve the Means of preventing War (September 26th, 1931) laid down in Article 3 that, in certain given circumstances, lines should be fixed beyond which the forces of the parties to the dispute might not pass. Some limit was necessary if a fortress was to be considered of a solely defensive character, otherwise the stipulation of Article 3 would be inoperative. The German delegation, in its draft questionnaire and draft reply, had endeavoured to direct the Commission's attention to various important points, and hoped that by so doing it had done something to further the aims of the Conference. He suggested that the Commission should proceed immediately to consider the two texts before it.

Lord Stanhope (United Kingdom) observed that the question of fortifications was not of very great interest to his country owing to the particular geographical configuration of the United Kingdom. He had expected the German delegation to quote historical instances proving that the existence of fortifications close to the frontier constituted a danger to the neighbouring countries. Fortresses, he said, did not come into play except in case of attack, being essentially non-mobile. The German proposal, moreover, concerned not so much the fortresses themselves as their garrisons and armaments. Again, fortresses were not the only military works capable of sheltering troops, which might be hidden in barracks or in woods, or indeed anywhere. As regards armaments, the Commission had already expressed its views on the different calibres of artillery pieces. The United Kingdom delegate thought, then, that it was unnecessary to revert to the question of garrisons and artillery. The German delegation would perhaps agree to withdraw its questionnaire, since the examination of that document would take up a great deal of the Land Commission's time and would not be of any very real value to the General Commission.

M. Aubert (France) endorsed Lord Stanhope's remarks. The fundamental idea underlying the German delegation's draft reply was that the existence of a fortress close to the frontier constituted a presumption of aggression. That idea was quite correct if, behind the fortress, there existed an absolutely empty stretch of country, but, generally speaking, fortifications were designed to cover regions which were thickly populated. The situation of fortresses was thus determined by the existence near the frontier of vital centres which it was important to protect. They must then be situated close to the frontier.

Secondly, it would appear from the German delegation's questionnaire that the actual characteristics of fortresses constituted a presumption of aggression, in that they possessed a garrison, armament, provisions, etc. There were, however, a thousand ways of bringing troops and arms up to the frontier for purposes of aggression. Indeed, it was preferable, if it were desired to protect them, not to shut them up in a fortress, but to hide them in woods or to make use of other natural places of shelter. If the existence of fortifications constituted a presumption of aggression, the term aggressive might just as well be applied to a policy of building roads, motor roads and bridges close to the frontier. Artillery might just as well be kept in fortresses as in barracks; its range was quite independent of the existence of a fortress close to the frontier.

As regards the German delegation's argument concerning the Convention to improve the Means of preventing War, the French delegate thought that the application of its provisions depended on the good faith of the signatory States. As regards the possibility of reverting to the question of fortifications in connection with the examination of the problem of demilitarised zones, the German delegate stated that, had he intended to discuss the question of such zones and their effects, the questionnaire would have been much more comprehensive.
The President enquired whether the British delegation wished the Land Commission to take a vote on the previous question. Lord Stanhope's proposal was to the effect that no discussion be held on the question of fortifications for reasons which the French delegation supported.

M. Aubert (France), while still endorsing the British delegate's views, said that he would be prepared to discuss the question if the German delegation so desired.

Lord Stanhope (United Kingdom) observed that his suggestions referred only to the questionnaire submitted by the German delegation. He repeated that the problem of fortifications was not of immediate interest to the United Kingdom.

The President thought that he would be interpreting the feeling of the Commission if he proposed that no decision be taken yet and that the question be referred to a later meeting, unless the German delegation insisted on an immediate discussion.

M. von Weizsäcker (Germany) stated that his delegation did not insist on an immediate discussion.

Lord Stanhope (United Kingdom) observed that one of his reasons for suggesting that the Commission should not examine the German questionnaire was that it must avoid all possible delay if it wanted its report to the General Commission to be ready in due time. If the question of fortifications were to be discussed, the British delegation would prefer the debate to be held there and then, or at latest on the following day.

The President replied that he hoped to be able to settle the question of procedure after consulting the German delegate privately. If, as a result of their conversation, it became necessary — though this he did not anticipate — for the Commission to discuss the problem of fortifications, a meeting would be held before the following Monday.

Lord Stanhope expressed his satisfaction with this arrangement.

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EIGHTEENTH MEETING

Held on Monday, June 6th, 1932, at 4 p.m.

President: M. Buero.

24. SELECTION OF THE ARMS POSSESSING THE CHARACTERISTICS ENUMERATED IN THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL COMMISSION ON APRIL 22ND, 1932. EXAMINATION OF THE DRAFT REPORT TO THE GENERAL COMMISSION.

The President invited M. Bourquin, Rapporteur, to address the Commission on the subject of his draft report to the General Commission under the terms of that Commission's resolution of April 22nd, 1932.

M. Bourquin (Belgium), Rapporteur, explained the structure of his draft report, which, after recalling the General Commission's resolution of April 22nd and the Land Commission's interpretation of that resolution, set forth the Land Commission's conclusions in regard to artillery and armoured fighting vehicles.

For the artillery, the Land Commission had unanimously adopted a common text which embodied all the essential features of the different views expressed. It had thus only been necessary for the Rapporteur to quote the text adopted by the Land Commission on May 23rd.

When he came to deal with the question of armoured vehicles, however, no unanimous text existed and a whole series of opinions had had to be classified in order to bring out the main currents. It had seemed advisable, for the purposes of the General Commission, to

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differentiate between tanks, armoured cars, armoured trains and armoured cupolas, and to state separately the conclusions reached for each of those categories.

Secondly, it had been necessary to explain somewhat fully the considerations on which the various conclusions were based. It was not possible merely to state the conclusions, as they were not unanimous and as in consequence the General Commission, whose duty it would be to take a decision regarding them, would need to know the arguments on which they were based. Further, certain delegations had sent in full written statements, so that, in the interests of impartiality, it had been judged advisable to state in the report the arguments formulated in support of the opinions expressed by other delegations.

Thirdly, in classifying the main groups of opinion, the Rapporteur had refrained from saying which delegations were represented in those groups, since the Land Commission had intentionally abstained from adopting the vote as part of its procedure. To specify the States which were in favour of any particular thesis would have been tantamount to recording their votes, and, as some States had not expressed their views on certain important points, to mention those which had done so would have given a false view of the Land Commission’s attitude; the names of delegations had only been mentioned in exceptional instances, for special reasons.

The Rapporteur explained that certain omissions which he had overlooked, owing to the limited time at his disposal, had now been made good in document Conf. D./C.T. 45 (a), consisting of an addition, and in document Conf. D./C.T. 45 (b) amending the order of a couple of paragraphs.

The President expressed the Commission’s sincere thanks to the Rapporteur for the impartiality, competence and precision which characterised his report.

M. Loukatcharski (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) made the following statement:

“The present report, instead of giving direct answers to the questions put by the General Commission, merely enumerates the opinions of the various groups of delegations, as formulated by the experts when questions concerning artillery and armoured vehicles were under consideration.

“The Land Commission had instructions to determine what calibres of artillery and what classes of armoured vehicle answered to the three criteria laid down by the General Commission on April 22nd. The Land Commission was to answer these questions; it was to say whether these classes of armament should be subject to qualitative reduction, and, if so, to what extent.

“Instead of answering the questions, the Land Commission, by repeating the opinion expressed by the Committee of Experts in an interminable series of technical arguments, is still further complicating the task of the General Commission. Land armaments, especially armoured vehicles and heavy artillery, offer sufficient material to be submitted to the General Commission for its decision in regard to qualitative disarmament. The Land Commission’s voluminous report is full of arguments about the relative value of different calibres of artillery, the impossibility of making an absolute distinction between a tank and a motor vehicle, and the efficacy of artillery and tanks against permanent fortifications; but all this is merely preparing the ground for bringing the whole principle of qualitative disarmament into question. Public opinion is beginning to realise this, and numerous protests are now being heard from every side against this tendency, which is visible in all the Commissions.

“The Soviet delegation quite realises that this total absence of positive results is not due to any bad work on the part of the experts. The experts are only expressing the ideas and wishes of their respective delegations. Be that as it may, the Soviet delegation cannot associate itself with this refusal to give any specific reply to the questions put, and is therefore unable to pronounce in favour of the report.

“While making this general reservation, the Soviet delegation proposes to continue to uphold its own view in the General Commission, maintaining that the following classes of arms should be subject to qualitative disarmament: all guns and howitzers of calibre exceeding about 100 mm., firing shells weighing more than 16 kg. and having a range exceeding 15 km., and all armoured vehicles — tanks, cars and trains.”

Lieutenant-Colonel Serrano (Bolivia) observed that the Land Commission’s report was an historical document and that every country must bear some measure of responsibility for the proposals and arguments set forth in it. The Land Commission’s views must be accurately portrayed before being placed before the General Commission, and if a true picture were to be given, some things must be made to stand out more distinctly than others; accordingly, each section of the report should, he thought, bear the names of the delegations whose views it represented. The Hungarian proposal, for example, concerning tanks had been supported by some twenty States.
M. Bourquin (Belgium), Rapporteur, assumed that the Soviet delegate's criticism was directed against the Commission rather than against the Rapporteur, whose report was simply intended to reflect the Commission's work.

He repeated his reasons for not thinking it desirable to specify the names of the delegations who had supported the various groups of opinion: some countries had not stated their precise attitude, and any record of names would thus have been incomplete.

The President, endorsing the Rapporteur's view, explained that he had himself been to some extent responsible for the procedure adopted by the Commission. The latter's work was in a sense a preparation for that of the General Commission; there still remained a long work of negotiation, and it had seemed to him preferable not to record the formal vote of any delegation, so as not to bind it to any particular opinion from which it might find it difficult to depart. He hoped that the Bolivian delegate would not insist on his point.

Lieutenant-Colonel Serrano (Bolivia) stated that he did not insist.

The President invited the Commission to examine the draft report paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraph 1.

Paragraph 1 was adopted without discussion.

Paragraph 2.

General Benitez (Spain) pointed out that the Land Commission had never taken a decision to the effect that the first two criteria named in the resolution of April 22nd might be held to form one single criterion. The Rapporteur had suggested at a previous meeting that "they might examine each weapon under each of the three heads specified in the General Commission's resolution, or they might take the series of weapons mentioned in the experts' replies and decide if those weapons should be included under one or more of those heads". He would prefer to amend the opening phrase of the second sub-paragraph of paragraph 2 which now read: "It was of opinion — without desiring to attribute to its interpretation a more general bearing — that for land materials . . . " to read as follows: "It was of opinion that generally . . . etc."

M. Bourquin (Belgium), Rapporteur, observed that, although no formal decision had been taken, the Commission had taken a virtual decision in the light of M. van Lanschot's and Mr. Wilson's statements at the meeting in question. He saw no objection to the proposed amendment, however, and suggested also deleting the words: "without desiring to attribute to its interpretation a more general bearing . . . ."

The President read the second sub-paragraph of paragraph 2 as amended to read:

"It was of opinion that generally for land materials the weapons which are 'most efficacious against national defence' should be considered as being those whose character is 'the most specifically offensive', and that the first two criteria named in the resolution of April 22nd might thus be held to form one single criterion."

Paragraphs 2 as amended was adopted.

Paragraphs 3 and 4.

Paragraphs 3 and 4 were adopted without discussion.

Paragraph 5.

M. von Weizsäcker (Germany), reverting to a previous statement of the German delegation, asked for the insertion, after the first sub-paragraph of paragraph (c) of the experts' report (embodied in paragraph 5 of the draft reply under consideration), of a sub-paragraph to the effect that the German delegation included under the terms "about 100 mm. " guns of a calibre of 77 mm. and over.

M. Bourquin (Belgium), Rapporteur, enquired whether the German delegation would be willing for that statement to appear as a footnote, as the text of the experts' report had already been adopted.

M. von Weizsäcker (Germany) agreed to the Rapporteur's suggestion.

1 See Minutes of the seventh meeting (May 10th, 1932).
Paragraph 5 was adopted, with the addition of the following footnote:

"The German delegation includes under the terms 'about 100 mm.' guns of a calibre of 77 mm. and over."

Paragraphs 6, 7 and 8.

Paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 were adopted without discussion.

Paragraph 9.

Lord Stanhope (United Kingdom) proposed an amendment in the definition of tanks: "tanks of a light type" to read "the lighter types of tanks". He pointed out, as regards armoured cars, that in the latter part of the definition which had already been approved by the Commission and which in the draft report read "...but they have only a very limited capacity for crossing trenches. Like the light tanks their rôle is reconnaissance and they are useless for attack against any form of organised defensive position" should read: "...but they have only a slight capacity for crossing trenches. Their rôle is reconnaissance and they are useless for attack against any form of organised defensive position."

Paragraph 9, as amended, was adopted.

Paragraph 10.

Paragraph 10 was adopted without discussion.

New Paragraph.

Following a suggestion of M. Aubert (France), a new paragraph was inserted after paragraph 10, as follows:

"Certain delegations consider that if a distinction was sought between tanks and armoured cars it should be sought rather in the direction of a difference of use than in that of a difference of definite technical characteristics. These delegations point out that in such circumstances, in the absence of effective means of control, it will always be possible to use these weapons for purposes different from those for which they were theoretically designed. In the opinion of these delegations, the only category of armoured vehicles of combat in regard to which a sufficiently definite technical distinction could be established would be that of armoured motor-cars which have not more than four wheels, only two of them being driving wheels, to the exclusion of caterpillars, and which are obliged to keep to roads."

Paragraph 11 (New Paragraph 12).1

Lord Stanhope (United Kingdom) proposed that paragraph 11 which now read as follows:

"The general characteristics described by the Committee of Experts as regards mobile armoured cupolas and armoured trains encountered no objection"

should be modified as follows:

"The replies of the Committee of Experts relating to the characteristics of mobile armoured cupolas and armoured trains received general endorsement from the Commission."

Paragraph 11, as amended, was adopted.

Paragraph 12 (New Paragraph 13).

Paragraph 12 was adopted without discussion.

Paragraph 13 (New Paragraph 14).

M. Lounatcharski (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) pointed out that the "One group of delegations" referred to in the first sub-paragraph had numbered some twenty delegations. He thought that fact should be brought out.

General Bonomi (Italy) endorsed M. Lounatcharski's observations, which, he said, represented the Italian delegation's views.

General Temperley (United Kingdom) observed that, if account were taken of the Soviet delegate's suggestion to differentiate more clearly between the views of the various groups of delegations in connection with tanks, a similar differentiation should also be made in connection with artillery; some fourteen delegations had been in favour of a 150 mm.

1 The numbers in parentheses correspond with those in the final text of the report (document Conf. D.122).
calibre limit. If the size of the groups were qualified in the one case, it must be qualified in the other.

General VAN TUINEN (Netherlands) supported General Temperley’s observations as giving a very accurate picture of what had happened in the Commission.

M. BOURQUIN (Belgium), Rapporteur, suggested that the first sub-paragraph of paragraph 13 should read: “A large number of delegations is of opinion . . . ” etc. Paragraph 15 could then read: “A second large group of delegations . . . ”

The proposals of the Rapporteur were adopted.

Lord STANHOPE (United Kingdom) proposed a slight amendment in the English text. He also proposed the removal, in the second sentence of the second sub-paragraph of paragraph 13, of the brackets, and the substitution, for the words “by means of cars, etc.”, of the words “by means of motor vehicles of all kinds”.

Lord Stanhope’s proposals were adopted.

The President observed that the following additions proposed by the Rapporteur after the distribution of the draft report referred to paragraph 13.

(a) To be inserted between the second and third sub-paragraphs of paragraph 13:

“Several of them point out that even modern fortifications are exposed to the attack of tanks because, while it is always possible to protect fortified works sufficiently to resist those attacks by the use of natural or artificial obstacles, it should be noted, on the one hand, that the action of tanks may strengthen considerably infantry attacks against troops and objectives placed at intervals either in front of or between those works, and, on the other hand, that the establishment, which is always very costly, of a complete system of artificial obstacles for the protection of forts is impossible in peace-time in certain districts, such as those under cultivation.

“Certain delegations point out, moreover . . . ”

(b) To be inserted at the end of paragraph 13: ¹

“It has been pointed out within the same group of delegates that, whatever the utility that tanks might sometimes offer for defensive purposes,² the menace which they constitute to the defence within the hands of the aggressor outweigh the advantages which they might confer on the defence, and that in any case such a menace was sufficiently serious to be regarded as decisive.”

These two additions were adopted.

Lord STANHOPE (United Kingdom) noted that several delegations had supported the United Kingdom opinion that tanks could only cross trenches if the latter had already been partly destroyed by artillery fire.³ He proposed that a sentence on the subject be included in paragraph 13.

M. BOURQUIN (Belgium), Rapporteur, explained that paragraph 13 set forth the views of delegations which considered that all tanks should be included among weapons which were most specifically offensive. The present text, which had been taken from a note submitted by the German delegation, reproduced that view exactly. The opinion to which Lord Stanhope had referred, however, represented the views of another group of delegations, and the Rapporteur feared that, if it were introduced in the paragraph describing the views of the first group, the very difficulty which he had wished to avoid might arise—namely, an impression of a series of replies and counter-replies. That explained the second addition which the President had just read. The sentence suggested by the United Kingdom delegate might perhaps be inserted as a footnote to show that the Committee of Experts was not unanimous on the point.

Lord Stanhope (United Kingdom) expressed his agreement with that suggestion.

Paragraph 13, with the above additions and amendments, was adopted.

Paragraph 14 (New Paragraph 15).

Paragraph 14 was adopted without discussion.

¹The addition of the above sub-paragraph to paragraph 13 necessitates the suppression of paragraphs 23 and 24 of the draft report.
²The Italian delegation, reiterating a reservation which it had already put forward in connection with the text relating to artillery material, expressed the opinion that any decision as to the arms required for the purposes of national defence was outside the Land Commission’s competence.
³See footnote 2 to the reply of the Committee of Experts (Question(3)) concerning Armoured Fighting Vehicles (document Conf. D.122, Appendix ²).

Paragraph 15 was adopted, subject to the amendment already adopted in connection with paragraph 13 — namely, to replace the words "A second group of delegations" by "A second large group of delegations".

Paragraph 16 (New Paragraph 17).

Lord Stanhope (United Kingdom) proposed the insertion, at the end of the sentence, of the following:

"They hold, however, that this power of surprise is not confined to tanks, but is shared by armoured cars and even by commercial motor vehicles converted to military uses."

Paragraph 16, with the above amendment, was adopted.

Paragraph 17 (New Paragraph 18).

Lord Stanhope (United Kingdom) pointed out that the sentence just inserted at the end of paragraph 16 made it necessary to replace the words "That explains, they add, why tanks possess" at the beginning of paragraph 17 by the words:

"For the purposes mentioned above, tanks, they add, possess."

Paragraph 17, as amended, was adopted.

Paragraph 18 (New Paragraph 19).

General Bonomi (Italy) thought that paragraph 18, which simply gave the opinion of the United Kingdom delegation, might appear in the form of a footnote, as had been decided in the case of the German delegation’s observation relating to paragraph 5.

M. Bourquin (Belgium), Rapporteur, pointed out that paragraph 18 did not, strictly speaking, represent the opinion of the United Kingdom delegation alone. That paragraph was required in order to explain the conclusions arrived at by the delegations belonging to the second group and to explain more particularly the figures “20 to 25 tons upwards” in paragraph 19 of the draft. The Rapporteur had used the expression “which the United Kingdom more particularly defines as follows: . . .”, as it was not quite certain whether the various delegations in the second group accepted all the arguments set forth in paragraph 18. The conclusions derived from those arguments had, however, been adopted by all the delegations in question.

On the proposal of General Bonomi (Italy), the phrase quoted by the Rapporteur was amended to read as follows:

". . . which some delegations define as follows: . . ."

Paragraph 18 as amended, was adopted.

Paragraph 19 (New Paragraph 20).

Lord Stanhope (United Kingdom) proposed the insertion in the second sub-paragraph, after the words “tanks of a lower weight”, of the words “are definitely less offensive in character and . . .”

Lord Stanhope’s proposal was adopted.

General Bonomi (Italy) thought that the limit of 20 to 25 tons upwards mentioned in the first sub-paragraph of paragraph 19 was not sufficiently precise and not in harmony with the preceding paragraph, in which the figures “25 tons” and “20 tons” referred respectively to heavy tanks and medium tanks.

M. Bourquin (Belgium), Rapporteur, explained that he had simply reproduced the texts submitted by delegations. He did not claim that the limit of 20 to 25 tons was very precise or that it was quite in harmony with paragraph 18, but he was not entitled to alter the figures given by delegations.

General Bonomi (Italy) thought that the General Commission might be perplexed by the lack of harmony between paragraphs 18 and 19; he did not, however, insist on that point.

He proposed the addition, at the end of paragraph 19, of the words “in time of peace.”

General Brind (India) thought that the addition would serve no useful purpose, as public order had to be maintained in time of war just as in time of peace.
M. LOUNATCHARSKI (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) stated that, in the Soviet delegation's view, the question of police measures should not be dealt with in the report, as that question was outside the Commission's terms of reference. The Soviet delegation had repeatedly expressed the same view in the Preparatory Commission and in the Committee on Chemical and Bacteriological Arms. It accordingly proposed the deletion of the last sentence of paragraph 19. If that were not agreed to by the Commission, it would ask that its protest be noted in the report.

M. BOURQUIN (Belgium), Rapporteur, thought that the last-named solution should be adopted, for certain delegations had referred to the use of tanks for police purposes, and the report should duly note that point. Similar reservations, moreover, had already been included in the report, such as the Italian delegation's opinion that it was not within the Land Commission's competence to specify the weapons required for national defence.

General BONOMI (Italy) endorsed the Soviet delegation's reservation and withdrew his own proposal relating to the amendment of the last part of paragraph 19.

It was agreed to add as a footnote to this paragraph the reservations made by the Soviet and Italian delegations.

Paragraph 19, as amended, was adopted.

Paragraph 20 (New Paragraph 21).

Paragraph 20 was adopted, subject to various drafting amendments.

Paragraph 21.

General BENIȚEZ (Spain) stated that the Spanish delegation's opinion might have been given simply in the form of a note. It was not quite accurately interpreted in the present text, and he proposed accordingly that the following text be substituted:

"The Spanish delegation is of opinion: (1) that light tanks, designed to co-operate with the infantry at any stage of the battle and on any terrain, should be regarded as specifically offensive weapons and, when no fortification exists, as particularly efficacious against national defence; (2) that heavy tanks fulfil these two conditions unreservedly; (3) that no tank is threatening to civilians."

M. BOURQUIN (Belgium), Rapporteur, explained that paragraph 21 had been inserted in the report as the result of an interpretation of the statement made by the Spanish delegate and appearing in the Minutes of the sixteenth meeting. The paragraph might accordingly be deleted entirely.

General BENIȚEZ (Spain) agreed to the deletion of paragraph 21 and withdrew the text he had proposed.

Paragraph 21 was deleted.

Paragraph 22 (New Paragraph 22).

General BONOMI (Italy) proposed that the contents of paragraph 22 appear in the form of a footnote, since the paragraph in question represented the opinion of a single delegation.

M. AUBERT (France) observed that the Italian delegation had concluded, from the fact that the Commission had decided to insert the German observation relating to paragraph 5 in the form of a footnote, that any opinion expressed by a single delegation must appear in that form. The French delegate did not think, however, that there was any analogy between the two cases. Paragraph 5 embodied a text which had been adopted by the whole Commission, and the German delegation had simply wished to explain its interpretation of that text. The part of the report now under discussion, however, described in succession the various opinions which had been expressed, and as paragraph 22 concerned one of those — the French delegation's opinion — the French delegate was opposed to the procedure proposed by General Bonomi, for which he thought there was no justification.

M. BOURQUIN (Belgium), Rapporteur, repeated that he had made a point of not mentioning the delegations by name save in certain exceptional cases when special circumstances rendered it necessary. As the French delegate had maintained, the paragraph under discussion concerned one of the theses put forward, one of the various systems between which the General Commission would have to decide. It was necessary that the thesis in question should be set forth in the report and, since it represented the opinion of one delegation, that delegation had had to be mentioned expressly by name.

General BONOMI (Italy) said that, if he remembered rightly, other delegations had supported the French thesis; he suggested that it might be possible to employ the formula adopted for paragraph 18 and to say "certain delegations".
He did not wish to insist on his proposal, but pointed out that otherwise the French delegation would be the only one expressly mentioned by name in the whole report.

The President proposed that the Bureau should ascertain whether certain delegations supported the French delegation's thesis. If that were the case, the formula "certain delegations" would be adopted; otherwise the French delegation's name would remain.

The President's proposal was adopted.

Subject to the foregoing reservation, paragraph 22 was adopted.

Paragraphs 23 and 24.

The President recalled that the Commission had agreed to the Rapporteur's proposal to replace paragraphs 23 and 24 by a text to be inserted at the end of paragraph 13.

M. LOUNATCHARSKI (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) stated that the Soviet delegation supported the Italian delegation's reservation, which appeared in the form of a note to the second addition proposed by the Rapporteur; it had supported the same reservation which the Italian delegation had put forward in connection with the text relating to artillery material.

Paragraphs 25 to 28 (New Paragraphs 23 to 26).

Paragraphs 25 to 28 were adopted, subject to various drafting amendments with the object of bringing the French and English texts into line.

Paragraph 29 (New Paragraph 27).

Lord STANHOPE (United Kingdom) proposed the insertion of the words "colonial or mandated" between the words "vast" and "territories" at the end of paragraph 29.

M. BOURQUIN (Belgium), Rapporteur, pointed out that the last sentence of paragraph 29 met the situation of certain countries such as Persia, to which the addition proposed by Lord Stanhope did not apply.

Lord STANHOPE (United Kingdom) withdrew his proposal.

Paragraph 29 was adopted without any change.

Paragraphs 30 and 31 (New Paragraphs 28 and 29).

Paragraphs 30 and 31 were adopted without observations.

Paragraphs 32 to 36 (New Paragraphs 30 to 34).

Lord STANHOPE (United Kingdom) proposed that the last five paragraphs be preceded by a sub-heading such as "Miscellaneous".

The sub-heading "General Remarks" was adopted.

Paragraphs 32 to 36 were adopted.

General Reservation by the Soviet Delegation.

M. LOUNATCHARSKI (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) asked that the general reservation which he had made at the beginning of the meeting should be annexed to the report.

The President proposed that the reservation should be inserted as a footnote to the chapter "Introduction", on the sole responsibility of the Soviet delegation.

The President's proposal was adopted.

The draft report as a whole was adopted.

25. Fortifications: Adoption of a Text to be Inserted in the Report to the General Commission.

The President stated that the Commission still had to examine the question of fortifications. He recalled that, following on the communication from the German delegation, he had requested the delegations to send in any observations on the subject to the Bureau. Eight delegations had submitted observations in writing.

The President now proposed, after having consulted the German delegation, that the Rapporteur should draw up a text, which would form the third part of the report to the General Commission, describing the facts and explaining that the Land Commission

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1 For the final text of the report, see document Conf. D.122.

2 See Minutes of the seventeenth meeting.
had realised that it would be difficult for it to arrive at practical conclusions in regard to fortifications and that it had decided simply to forward to the General Commission the German delegation's communication and the observations in question.¹

M. VON WEIZSÄCKER (Germany) thought that that was the most practical solution and thanked the Commission for its action in the matter. He asked that two supplementary passages might be added by way of explanation.

The first of those passages, endorsing the interpretation of the General Commission's questions which appears in the report of the Naval Commission to the General Commission,² was as follows:

"The German delegation took as a starting-point for its discussions the following interpretation of the questions raised by the General Commission: Supposing one State either (a) adopts a policy of armed aggression or (b) undertakes offensive operations against another State, what are the weapons which, by reason of their specific character, and without prejudice to their defensive purposes, are most likely to enable that policy or those operations to be brought rapidly to a successful conclusion?"

The second passage was as follows:

"The German delegation desires to direct the Commission's attention to the following passage in the report³ of Sub-Commission A of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference:

"(1) Organisations the principal purpose of which is obviously to enable long-range artillery or air attack to be brought to bear on the communications of a neighbouring country or its exposed points near the frontier, and which are not indisputably justified by the necessity of protecting specially exposed points in the country concerned;

"(2) Naval or air bases the principal object of which is not to defend the territory or vital communications of the State to which they belong, but either (a) to cover the assembling of supplies, materials for repairs, etc., in order to extend the striking range of the naval or air forces; or (b) to command for the benefit of a single country certain routes used by international sea-borne trade.""

M. BOURQUIN (Belgium), Rapporteur, read the following text, which he proposed adding at the end of the report under the heading "Fortifications":

"The German delegation submitted a note expressing its point of view on this question to the Land Commission.

"Certain other delegations also submitted, in writing, their observations on this proposal.

"The Commission, realising that it would be extremely difficult for it to arrive at practical conclusions for the time being on this point, decided to forward to the General Commission the above-mentioned documents for purposes of information."

M. VON WEIZSÄCKER (Germany) asked that the words "for purposes of information" might be replaced by the words "for any necessary action".

The text, with the foregoing amendment, was adopted.

26. CONVOCATION OF A MEETING OF THE BUREAUX OF LAND, NAVAL AND AIR COMMISSIONS TO COMPARE THEIR REPORTS TO THE GENERAL COMMISSION.

The President stated that the Bureaux of the three Technical Commissions would meet in order to compare the reports of those Commissions and to endeavour to bring them into line. Should any amendments to the Land Commission's report be deemed necessary, the President would convene a meeting of the Commission, so that the latter might express its views in the matter. Otherwise the report would be forwarded direct to the General Commission.

¹ For the text of the observations, see document Conf. D.122, Appendix 3.
² Document Conf.D.121.
DOUMENTS OF THE LAND COMMISSION.

Conf.D./C.T.1


REVISED LIST OF MEMBERS OF THE LAND COMMISSION,
FEBRUARY 27TH — JUNE 6TH, 1932.

President: M. E. Buero (Uruguay).

Vice-Presidents: General Laidoner (Estonia); M. van Lanschot (Netherlands).

Rapporteur: M. M. Bourquin (Belgium).

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<th>Country</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Substitutes</th>
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<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Lieut.-General Omar Khan.</td>
<td>M. A. Husein Aziz Khan</td>
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<td>Captain Mohamed Ali Khan</td>
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<td>Yusuf Khan.</td>
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<td>Union of South Africa</td>
<td>Major F. F. Pienaar.</td>
<td>Mr. H. Camp.</td>
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<td>Sa‘udi Arabia</td>
<td>Sheikh Hafiz Wahba.</td>
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<td>Argentine Republic</td>
<td>Dr. Enrique Ruiz Guinazu.</td>
<td>Lieut.-Colonel E. Florit.</td>
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<td>Major E. Forcher.</td>
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<td>Australia</td>
<td>Mr. J. G. Latham, or Sir G. de Laune Ryrie</td>
<td>Mr. F. G. Shedden.</td>
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<td>Austria</td>
<td>General Tarbuk.</td>
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<td>Belgium</td>
<td>M. Dens.</td>
<td>General Galet.</td>
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<td>Major-General Nuyten.</td>
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<td>M. Bourquin.</td>
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<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Colonel V. F. Serrano.</td>
<td>M. Ostria-Gutierrez.</td>
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<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Lieut.-Colonel E. L. de Carvalho.</td>
<td>Captain E. de Macedo Soares e Silva.</td>
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<td>United Kingdom of Great</td>
<td>Lord Hailsham.</td>
<td>Colonel Dawnay.</td>
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<td>Britain and Northern Ireland</td>
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<td>General Temperley.</td>
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<td>Colonel Marinoff.</td>
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<td>Canada</td>
<td>Lieut.-Colonel H. D. G. Crerar.</td>
<td>Mr. T. A. Stone.</td>
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<td>China</td>
<td>General Moo Song Whang.</td>
<td>Major-General Tcheng-Kai</td>
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<td>M. Lone Liang.</td>
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<td>Cuba</td>
<td>M. G. de Blanck.</td>
<td>Vice-Admiral H. W. Wenck.</td>
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<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>General Elias.</td>
<td>Captain A. C. C. Sorensen.</td>
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<td>Denmark</td>
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<td>Estonia</td>
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Country        | Members                          | Substitutes                          
---------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------------------
Ethiopia:      | The Badjirond Zelleka Aguedéou.  | Ato Tasfaê Tagagne.                   
Finland:       | Colonel Martola.                 | M. Holsti.                           
Germany:       | Baron von Weizsäcker             | General von Blomberg.                
Guatemala:     | M. Matos.                        | General Kunder.                      
Haiti:         |                                  | The Rt. Hon. Sir Samuel Hoare        
Honduras:      |                                  | Sir Henry Wheeler.                   
Hungary:       | Count A. Apponyi General de      | Major-General J. E. S. Brind.        
               | Siegler.                         |                                      
India:         | H.H. the Aga Khan.               | Mr. J. J. Hearne.                    
Irish Free State: | Mr. S. Lester.                 | General Bonomi. General de Marinis. 
Italy:         | M. Gazzera.                      | M. S. Yada. General Y. Tatekawa.     
Latvia:        | General A. Kaleys.               |                                      
Liberia:       | Dr. A. Sottile.                  |                                      
Lithuania:     | Colonel Lanskoronskis.           |                                      
Luxemburg:     |                                  |                                      
Mexico:        | Colonel Othon Léon.              | Major Mercado.                       
               | Tuinen. Baron van Voorst tot     |                                      
               | Voorst.                          |                                      
New Zealand:   | Sir Thomas Wilford.              | Mr. C. Knowles.                      
Panama:        | M. Narciso Garay.                |                                      
               |                                 | Moarefi.                             
Peru:          | General Burhardt-Bukacki.        |                                      
Poland:        | General Ivens Ferraz.            |                                      
               | Rear-Admiral J. de Souza e Faro. |                                      
Portugal:      | M. Constantin Antoniade.         |                                      
Roumania:      |                                  |                                      

The above list includes the members and substitutes of various countries participating in a specific event or organization. The list is organized by country, with the members and their roles (such as general or colonel) listed first, followed by the substitutes. Each entry includes the name of the individual and their rank or title. The substitutes are listed with their names and their roles. The list is comprehensive, covering a wide range of countries from Ethiopia to Roumania, and from Finland to Siam.
NOTE BY THE PRESIDENT.

The Chairman of the Technical Committee of the Land Commission has the honour to request the technical expert on land questions of your delegation to be good enough to attend the meeting of the Technical Committee of the Land Commission which will be held on Monday, March 14th, 1932, in Room L.

At 10.30 a.m.

Afghanistan
South Africa
Germany
Argentine Republic
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Bolivia
United Kingdom
Brazil
Bulgaria
Canada
Chile
China
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Denmark
Spain
Estonia
United States of America
Ethiopia
Finland
France
Greece
Hungary
India
Irish Free State
Guatemala

At 3.30 p.m.

Italy
Japan
Latvia
Liberia
Lithuania
Mexico
Norway
New Zealand
Netherlands
Peria
Poland
Portugal
Roumania
Siam
Sweden
Switzerland
Czechoslovakia
Turkey
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Uruguay
Venezuela
Yugoslavia
The Technical Committee was asked by the Land Commission to examine how the different Governments, in drawing up the particulars they have sent to the League of Nations, have interpreted the definitions given in Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the draft Convention and what difficulties they encountered and doubts they had in interpreting them.

The Committee first of all confined itself to examining the definitions contained in Articles 2 and 3. For the purposes of this examination, it adopted the following questionnaire, which served as a guide to each of the experts giving information as to the manner in which his Government interpreted these definitions.

"What meaning have you given to the word ‘effectives’? Theoretical, budgetary, legal, actual or other effectives?

"What have you counted as days of presence? (Short leave, long leave, illness, travelling, early discharge, etc.)

(a) For an officer;
(b) For a professional soldier;
(c) For a conscript serving with the colours;
(d) For a militiaman, reservist, etc., undergoing a period of service, or attending a drill, a training lecture, an annual muster-parade or a kit inspection.

"What have you counted in your effectives? (Different services, missions, persons attached to civilian services, etc.)

(a) Officers;
(b) Professional soldiers;
(c) Men called up with the annual contingent; militiamen, reservists;
(d) Young men subject to compulsory pre-regimental training (soldiers' sons and orphans educated for a naval or military career), etc.”

After hearing each of the experts members of the Committee, the latter invited the experts of the other delegations to make similar statements. A number of them responded to this invitation, and the result of the enquiry is given below.

From the replies received, it appears that three conceptions of the term “effectives” have been adopted, either separately or jointly, by the Governments in supplying the information requested—viz., “theoretical or legal effectives”, “budgetary effectives” and “real or actual effectives”.

The Committee proposes in the present report (1) to give for each of these three conceptions a list of the Governments which have adopted them in supplying information on their effectives, at the same time making clear the differences between the definitions; (2) to define the categories of persons which the several Governments have included or excluded from the general term “effectives”; (3) to reproduce certain general observations made by some of the experts on the methods and definitions contained in Articles 2 and 3 of the draft Convention.

I.

The Committee has not attempted to give a precise definition of the different meanings of the word “effectives”, applicable to all the individual cases and covering the different interpretations. It confines itself to reproducing as briefly as possible the essential points of these interpretations. Nevertheless, for greater convenience and for a better understanding of the replies given by the experts, an endeavour has been made to give a general idea of the three conceptions of effectives, legal, budgetary and actual, without attempting a precise definition.

LEGAL OR THEORETICAL EFFECTIVES.

Generally speaking, legal or theoretical effectives are expressed in terms of numbers fixed by the army law or regulations or numbers obtained by a full application of the legal provisions
concerning the personnel subject to military obligations and the duration of these obligations. These numbers, therefore, essentially represent a maximum, and hence they naturally do not, as a rule, take into account purely temporary and unforeseen absences.

1. The following countries have taken legal effectives as a basis in giving their information, and the manner in which they have applied this term is explained in each individual case. All the effectives shown in these countries' returns are calculated according to the method fixed in Article 3 of the draft Convention and they therefore represent average daily effectives.

Belgium. — The effectives are calculated on the assumption that the men regularly serve the period prescribed by law, leaving out of account absence for illness, leave, early discharge. Effectives of officers are fixed numerically by the law on cadres, and their presence has been reckoned at 365 days per annum. To this figure have been added the days of presence of reserve officers called up for periods of training.

Finland. — The professional personnel, officers and N.C.O.s, has been regarded as maintained throughout the year at the level fixed by the law relating to cadres. The average strength of a certain category of active officers in the reserve who have undergone a period of training and the average daily number of an annual class of reserve officers undergoing a period of training have been added to the number of officers.

In the case of other ranks, it was assumed that the actual number of conscripts found fit for service had accomplished the legal period of service. The actual number of cadet officers and the average effectives of a class of reservists undergoing training has been added to them.

No deduction has been made for absences or early discharge.

France. — The definition given is as follows: by legal effectives are meant the average strength which the armed forces can attain on the basis of the complete application of the legal provisions in force governing the conditions of service of military effectives (officers, men, and officials assimilated to them), whether volunteers or called up for service, during the first period of service or during subsequent periods of instruction, whatever the capacity in which those periods are served (as recruits, militia, reservists, territorials, etc.).

This definition has been applied to the whole of the personnel (active and reserve). The entire active personnel has been counted at the rate of 365 days of presence per year. Reserve personnel has been counted as undergoing the total legal days of training.

Greece. — The legal effectives given represent the figures that would be attained if the law on recruiting were fully applied. The number of professional soldiers is fixed by law. No deduction has been made for absences.

Italy. — Same definition as that given by the French expert. In furnishing particulars it has been applied solely to the conscript contingent, without deductions of any kind.

Japan. — Same definition as that given by the French expert. It has been applied to the personnel whose strength varies according to the budgetary resources, like the reservists, no deduction being made for absences.

Norway. — The average legal effectives have been calculated by taking the annual contingent fixed by law and the period of service fixed each year by Parliament, without any deduction for absences. Officers serving with the colours are regarded as present for the whole year, officers on restricted service and reserve officers being regarded as present only during the periods of service.

Roumania. — The legal effectives have been calculated on the assumption that the active personnel is present during the whole year, except in the case of officers' long leave exceeding six months and the usual short leaves granted to other ranks.

Czechoslovakia. — The legal effectives have been calculated without deductions of any kind on the basis of the legal possibilities for the year 1930. Details of the calculation are given in document C.654.M.266.1931.IX.

Yugoslavia. — The term "average legal effectives" applies solely to conscripted soldiers, no deductions of any kind having been made.

2. Definitions of Legal Effectives given by Other Experts.

The experts of the following countries, whose Governments did not base their data upon the legal effectives, have given the following definitions:

Argentina Republic. — In the case of officers the legal effectives represent the maximum number authorised by law. The theoretical effectives are the personnel shown in the table of peace-time establishments, on the basis of which the actual effectives are distributed among the various corps and services.

Austria. — The theoretical effectives consist of the number of persons liable to military service, of whatever kind and duration, and who have received military training.

Brazil. — The legal effectives represent the maximum which the number of troops present at any time of the year can attain.
United States of America. — The term “legal effectives” means the maximum number allowed by the law on national defence.

Persia. — The theoretical and legal effectives are the number of troops of all kinds, with the exception of municipal police, which the Government proposes to attain under its ten years’ programme, in accordance with the recruiting law.

Poland. — Same definitions as that given by the French expert.

**BUDGETARY EFFECTIVES.**

Generally speaking, budgetary effectives mean either the number of personnel on which the budgetary estimates are based, or the number which can be maintained with the credits opened in the budget. The budgetary effectives are therefore an estimated or probable average of the number of days’ maintenance. In countries in which the budgetary effectives may be exceeded, the examination of the final accounts shows whether they have actually been exceeded. When this happens, the accounts must be regularised by means of supplementary credits. In other countries, if in the course of the year it is anticipated that the budgetary effectives will be exceeded, this is remedied by means of the early discharge of conscript personnel so as to remain within the limits of the credits allotted.

1. The following countries have based their information on the average budgetary effectives, according to the definition and methods of application given by each:

   **Germany.** — No deduction has been made for absences and sickness. The figures given cannot be exceeded either as regards appropriations or as regards the number of men.

   **Spain.** — No deduction is made for absences, with the exception of early discharge when the leave exceeds two months.

   **Hungary.** — The budgetary effectives are the same as the legal effectives.

   **Italy.** — The definition given is as follows: the budgetary effectives of the armed forces are the average daily effectives which the armed forces can muster, calculated on the basis of the special credits for which provision is made each year in the budget law.

   The Italian Government has given the average budgetary effectives for officers, N.C.O.s, professional soldiers and men called up for training. These budgetary effectives are based on the number of days’ pay. The following have been excluded from the days of presence: in the case of officers and professional soldiers, days of special leave for personal reasons; in the case of reservists called up, days of leave, sick leave, early discharge.

   **Portugal.** — The average effectives given are based on the budgetary effectives and the authorised number of days of presence. The budget fixes the number of effectives, and the days of presence according to the category of personnel. No deduction has been made for absences, except early discharge of the contingent.

   **Turkey.** — The effectives given are the budgetary effectives based on the average days of presence in summer and winter. Officers are regarded as permanently present. No deduction has been made for absences, short leave, and sickness in the case of other ranks. Reservists have not been included in the budget.

   **Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.** — The effectives given are the maximum effectives corresponding to the number of rations (pay and provisions) provided for in the budget: this maximum may be exceeded, the accounts being regularised by means of supplementary credits. In practice, however, it has not been exceeded. Reservists of all kinds called up, and among them non-permanent effectives belonging to militia units to which special credits may be assigned, are not included.

   **Yugoslavia.** — The budgetary effectives have been given for reserve officers and reservists. No deduction has been made for absences.

2. **Definitions of Budgetary Effectives given by Other Experts.**

   The experts of the following countries whose Governments did not base their information on budgetary effectives have given the following definitions:

   **Argentine Republic.** — By budgetary effectives are meant the personnel included in the actual budget according to the sums placed at the disposal of the Ministry of War under the head: “Pay”.

   **Austria.** — The budgetary effectives are the effectives which can be attained according to the budgetary estimates for each year. An absolute figure is fixed for officers and N.C.O.s and an average figure for other ranks.

   **France.** — Budgetary effectives are calculated in France from the basic effectives which are for any given year the average daily effectives corresponding to the degree to which it is possible to apply the legal provisions during that year.
The budgetary effectives are arrived at from the basic effectives by applying co-efficients of reduction called "co-efficients of absence"

The actual effectives may be higher than the budgetary effectives, which are only an estimate. When this happens, supplementary credits are asked for.

_Greece._ — The budgetary effectives vary according to the credits voted, and leave granted by the Minister is taken into account.

_Persia._ — The budgetary effectives are made up of the total strength of troops and services whose expenditure is provided for in the State budget.

**Actual or Real Effectives.**

Speaking generally, real or actual effectives are the number of persons performing a day's duty. The number may be recorded on a given day, and we then have the actual effectives on that day, or it may be obtained by taking the average number of persons performing days of duty over a certain period, and we then have the average actual effectives for that period. The differences of interpretation are the result of differences in the definition of a day's duty.

1. The following countries have adopted the system of real effectives in giving their information and have applied it in the manner explained in respect of each of them.

_South Africa._ — The number of effectives given is the average number of daily effectives based on the total number of days' duty. The permanent personnel is regarded as performing 365 days' duty a year without deduction for absences of any kind. In the case of militia, days passed in camp are counted as days of duty, and the non-continuous periods of training are included on the basis of six drills being equivalent to one day's duty.

_The Argentine Republic._ — The number of effectives is equal to the average number of days' duty in the course of the year of all officers and men attached to units. All days passed with the colours are regarded as days of duty without deduction of any kind.

_Australia._ — The average daily effectives based on the total days of presence of the regular forces, and of the militia forces, without any deduction for absence. The professional personnel is counted as being present for 365 days per annum. For officers and other ranks of the militia forces, are counted—the days of continuous service in camp and non-continuous service on the basis of 6 hours' exercise equivalent to a day's presence; are also counted—certain voluntary all-day courses of instruction which N.C.O.s are encouraged to attend. Attendance at voluntary lectures and rifle matches is not counted.

_Austria._ — The number of effectives given is the actual number of effectives on December 31st, 1930. It includes all officers and men without exception who are entered on the lists with the exception of men who are on early discharge after six years of active service.

_Brazil._ — The number of effectives is that of the average effectives for the year of the permanent personnel and of the annual contingent actually incorporated without deduction for any absences except, as regards the contingent, days of absence resulting from early discharge.

_British Empire._ — The number of effectives given is the average of twelve numbers representing the average actual effectives of each month. This figure of average monthly effectives is obtained by taking the arithmetical average of the strength on the first day of a given month and on the first day of the following month. The number of days' duty is obtained by counting 365 days' duty per annum for all men inscribed in the registers of the regular army without any deduction for absences. As regards the territorial army, whole days passed in instruction camps are counted as days of duty; parades and lectures are counted on the basis of six drills being equivalent to one day's duty.

The British Government also gives the number of actual effectives calculated in accordance with the same definition of a day's duty on April 1st, 1931.

_Bulgaria._ — The number of effectives given is the average daily number of all the personnel at the disposal of the military authorities without deduction for any absences except the days of early discharge for reasons of health, discipline, etc.

_Canada._ — The number of effectives given is the number of average daily effectives without any deduction for absences.

_China._ — The same as Canada.

_Denmark._ — The same as Canada.

_Estonia._ — The number of average daily effectives is based upon the total number of days when officers, professional soldiers, conscripts and reservists are at the disposal of the military authorities, excepting only days representing early discharge.

_United States of America._ — The number of effectives given is the average number of actual effectives on the last day of each month of the year. All the personnel inscribed in the registers is counted as performing a day's duty, whatever the status of the individual and without any deduction for absences.
As regards the National Guard, the number of effectives is the average daily number of effectives calculated according to the method described in Article 3, days passed in instruction being counted as days of duty and periods of training of less than a day being counted on the basis of eight hours' training being equivalent to one day's duty.

**India.** — The number of effectives is the average daily number of the personnel registered in the armed forces either with the colours or in the reserve, days of duty being counted as follows: in the case of regular officers and professional soldiers, 365 days a year; in the case of reservists of the Indian territorial force, one day's duty for every day of service; in the case of the Indian auxiliary force, one day's duty for four hours' training; and in the case of the forces organised on a military basis, one day's duty for each day's service. No deduction is made in respect of leave of absence, sick leave, etc.

**Italy.** — The number of actual effectives is the average daily number of effectives actually present and performing duty. The number of days' duty is calculated on the basis of the actual presence of the individual, and consequently days of leave of absence or of sick leave, days spent in travelling or days of absence resulting from early discharge are not counted as days of duty. The Italian Government has applied this definition in calculating the average effectives of the conscription contingent for a period of five months in winter and seven months in summer. The average effectives for the year are obtained by multiplying the first figure by five and the second by seven, and by dividing the total by twelve.

**Japan.** — The number of effectives given is the average daily number of effectives for the year without deduction for absence, except in the case of early discharge. Muster-parades have not, however, been counted as days of duty.

**Latvia.** — The average daily effectives have been calculated by strictly applying Article 3 of the draft Convention for the twelve months of the year. The days of presence are in the case of the whole personnel, the days during which that personnel is at the disposal of the military authorities.

**New Zealand.** — The number of effectives is the average daily number of effectives calculated on the basis of 365 days' duty per annum for all ranks of the regular forces, six drills of one hour or four drills of an hour and a-half being counted as one day's duty in respect of the non-regular forces, without deduction for temporary absences.

**Netherlands.** — The number of effectives is the average daily number of effectives based upon the number of days' duty in the year. Days of sick leave, days of absence resulting from discharge and days of leave of absence exceeding four weeks in the case of officers and two days in the case of men, are not counted as days of duty.

**Persia.** — The number of real effectives is the number of officers, N.C.O.s and men inscribed in the register of the War Minister. Each day in respect of which the personnel receives either presence pay or availability pay is counted as a day of duty. In the case of recruits and reservists, duty is counted as beginning on the day of arrival at the barracks. Days of leave of absence without pay and days of absence resulting from early discharge are not counted as days of duty. Days of sick leave are counted as such.

**Poland.** — The number of effectives is the average daily number of effectives based upon the number of days' duty for 1930. No deduction is made for absence except in the case of early discharge for days of actual absence. As regards professional soldiers, days of absence are not counted as days of duty if the period of leave of absence exceeds six months.

**Siam.** — The number of effectives is the average daily number of effectives based upon the number of days' duty in the course of a year. No deduction is made for absences in counting the number of days' duty.

**Sweden.** — The number of effectives given is the average daily number of effectives based on the number of days' duty. Days passed in hospital or on leave with pay are counted as days of duty. Days of absence with reduced pay are not so counted.

**Switzerland.** — The number of effectives is the average daily number of effectives based on the total number of days' duty throughout the year. Men on sick leave are only counted as absent if they are sick for more than six days, if they then leave the unit to enter hospital.

**Yugoslavia.** — The actual number of effectives has been given in the case of officers and professional soldiers on active service. No deduction has been made for absences.

2. Definitions of Actual Effectives given by Other Experts.

The French expert, whose Government has not employed the system of actual effectives, defines it as follows:

**France.** — The number of actual effectives is based upon the number of day's pay by category of soldiers, distinguishing presence or availability pay from absence pay—that is to say, in practice half-pay.

Days on half-pay are converted into days on full pay and added to the latter. We thus obtain the total number of days on full pay.
The average number of actual effectives is then calculated as follows:

(a) In the case of officers and N.C.O.s in receipt of monthly pay, the total number of days is divided by 360, pay being issued to the said soldiers at monthly intervals of thirty days;

(b) In the case of men in receipt of daily pay, the number of days is divided by 365.

II. OBSERVATIONS BY VARIOUS EXPERTS ON THE CATEGORIES OF PERSONNEL COUNTED AS EFFECTIVES.

I. COMPOSITION OF EFFECTIVES (COMBATANT PERSONNEL AND AUXILIARY SERVICES: PERSONNEL DETACHED ON CIVILIAN DUTY: CIVILIAN PERSONNEL).

(a) The following are included in the effectives:

South Africa. — All the permanent personnel and the members of the citizen forces receiving military training, including civilian medical personnel serving in the army.

Germany. — All persons are counted as officers whom Germany is obliged by the treaties to count as such: doctors, chemists, veterinary surgeons, officials having the rank of officer. This also applies to N.C.O.s.

Argentina. — The military personnel of combatant units and services (medical, administrative, etc.), including the personnel detached from the army properly so called.

Australia. — Personnel which is in military employment for one day of twenty-four hours in the case of the regular forces, and, in the case of the militia forces, for a period of not less than six hours, either all in one day, or in a night, or in half-day parades aggregating this minimum period.

Austria. — Officers of administration (supply) are counted in the effective of officers. Men of the administrative, medical and veterinary services and bandsmen are counted amongst the other ranks.

Brazil. — The permanent personnel of units and services and the contingent enlisted or recruited by conscription.

Bulgaria. — All the personnel with the colours, including recruits, men of the auxiliary services, and bandboys.

Canada. — All the personnel belonging to the armed forces of Canada and of the Royal Mounted Police.

China. — All the fighting personnel and services.

Denmark. — Officers detached for duty with the Ministry are included in the effectives.

Estonia. — All personnel present with the units, including personnel seconded for the training of the civic guard or to the Ministry of Education.

United States of America. — All the personnel mentioned on the rolls—without exception.

Finland. — Officers and persons graded as officers, professional N.C.O.s and persons graded as such, men of the regular army, including the General Staff, the Ministry of Defence and organs dependent thereon.

France. — Officers and men of all services, including those seconded for missions or to civilian services; all those assimilated to the rank of officer in the medical services, including those detached from their units in order to carry on the health services of civilian populations overseas, officials of the supervisory service, officers of the intendance service, including those of the Pensions Civil Service, the personnel of the physical training service, the officers of the fire brigade of Paris.

Men employed in the auxiliary services who are unfit for armed service and receive only such training as is strictly necessary for internal discipline are included in the effectives of the other ranks.

Greece. — All the personnel performing military service and which is amenable to military jurisdiction.

Hungary. — Only the combatant army.

India. — All officers (British and Indian) and men serving on staffs or in units or services of the regular army (active and reserve), the Indian Auxiliary Forces, the Indian Territorial Army and the Indian State Forces.

Italy. — The following are included in the effectives: Officers on permanent effective service, of the budgetary complement or recalled from leave for training, including doctors, veterinary officers, chemists, employees of civilian offices, officers carrying out budgetary missions; professional
soldiers; soldiers belonging to the conscription contingent, including cadet officers and N.C.O's; soldiers called up for training.

**Japan.** — All the personnel present in the army, including personnel detached on duty or to civilian services.

**New Zealand.** — Commissioned officers, warrant officers, N.C.O's and men of the regular and non-regular forces.

**Netherlands.** — Personnel of all ranks seconded for duty to civilian services is included in the effectives.

**Poland.** — The effectives include officers and other ranks detached for duty or employed in the various services, as well as officers of the intendance service, treasury department, administrative staff, barracks personnel, and military chaplains of various creeds.

**Persia.** — All the personnel legally armed by the State and participating in the maintenance of order and security, in return for payment, reduction of taxation or a similar privilege.

**Portugal.** — All the permanent personnel and the men of the contingent during their periods of instruction.

**Romania.** — All the personnel of the army, including medical, administrative and inspection services; also personnel detached or seconded, and auxiliary personnel.

**United Kingdom.** — All officers (including military chaplains) soldiers, and reservists serving in accordance with the definition given by the British Government (see actual effectives), except personnel detached for service with the Air or Colonial Ministries and shown in the returns supplied by those departments.

Enlisted boys in the regular units below the military age, as tailors, drummers, etc., who will become soldiers on reaching the prescribed age, are included.

**Switzerland.** — All the personnel performing service in any capacity.

**Czechoslovakia.** — All soldiers, without exception, of the combatant units and services.

(b) The following are not included in the effectives:

**India.** — Nurses, civilians and "followers".

**Yugoslavia.** — Military personnel detached for civil duty.

2. Cadets and Pupils in Military Schools.

(a) The following are regarded as part of the effectives:

The pupils in military schools in the following countries: Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, France, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Romania and Sweden.

(b) The following are not regarded as part of the effectives:

**Australia.** — Young volunteers receiving cadet training.

**India.** — Cadets in the Prince of Wales’s Military College and King George’s Military School.

**Japan.** — Cadets of the military Prytannée.

**Portugal.** — Cadets in the Military College and in the Military Orphanage.

**United Kingdom.** — Cadets in the military colleges or in officers’ training corps, since they are not liable for service in peace or in war.


(a) The following are regarded as part of the effectives:

**Belgium.** — Pupils over 16 years of age in the military orphanages (children of soldiers killed or disabled in action).
The following are not regarded as part of the effectives:

Spain. — Youths undergoing compulsory pre-military instruction, which is at present in its infancy.

Estonia. — Pupils in the highest classes of secondary schools undergoing military training, seeing that they are not mobilisable.

France. — Pupils in the higher civil schools of the State; pupils in schools for children of soldiers, seeing that they are not available for active service.

Italy. — No information is given as regards youths subject to compulsory pre-regimental instruction, owing to the reservation made in regard to preparatory military training by the Italian delegation at the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference (document C.690.M.289, Section 194).

III. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS BY VARIOUS EXPERTS ON THE SYSTEM OF LIMITATION AND THE DEFINITIONS CONTAINED IN ARTICLES 2 AND 3 OF THE DRAFT CONVENTION.

Belgium. — In the view of the Belgian Government, Articles 2 and 3 of the draft Convention aim primarily at determining a maximum limit of the effectives of the armed forces and the formations organised on a military basis.

Secondarily, in order to fix a common standard of calculation for these forces, the draft Convention has adopted the average daily effectives, which it defines in Article 3 and has distributed the troops among various categories.

In our opinion, therefore, it was important in the first place to fix the limit which our effectives might not exceed, and for this purpose it appeared to us natural to take as a basis for our calculations the maximum permitted under our legal provisions on the subject. In other words, we took as a basis the legal effectives.

In so doing, we have not met with any difficulty or had any hesitation; we attribute this to the fact that we have adopted the method which appeared to us to be the simplest and clearest. This method has enabled us to steer clear of the danger of submitting to an international agreement data regarding effectives which might in fact be exceeded by a strict application of our legal provisions.

France. — The French Government was not sure what kind of effectives should be included. Should it be the effectives serving with the colours whatever the position of men in active service, whether present or absent? Should it be the effectives shown in the returns upon which pay and allowances of all kinds were allotted? Should it be the effectives immediately available —namely, the aforesaid effectives less the men in hospital—or should the effectives actually serving with the armed units be taken—that is to say, the aforesaid effectives less all absentees whatever the reason for their absence—leave, sickness or travelling?

Finally, it was considered that the Conference alone would be in a position to choose the best means of assessing effectives in order to take into account the various military organisations. But the meaning of the term “legal effectives” is extremely important from the point of view of limitation. It would not be understandable to States which had undertaken to limit their effectives under the terms of an international convention to a specified figure, to reserve the possibility of increasing them under their national laws. For this reason, France has stated the legal effectives—that is to say, those which can be attained in execution of the law. In the Convention, these legal effectives might of course be reduced, if the Conference decided not to include among effectives certain categories of absentees such as men in hospital or on long leave (the minimum duration to be fixed), men travelling for long periods (minimum duration to be fixed).

New Zealand. — It seems to New Zealand necessary that the terms “effective” and “day’s duty” should be defined.

Owing to the different methods employed in the various countries, I hesitate at this stage to make a suggestion for the definition of effective, especially as in drafting such a definition Article 31 of the draft Convention would have to be taken into consideration, and, in this article, the term “youth” has not been defined.

In defining the term “day’s duty”, two points seem to require consideration:

(1) Whether, in the case of non-regular forces, only complete days under military training (in camp, at courses of instruction, etc.) should be reckoned as days of duty, or whether drills, parades and attendances should be brought into the reckoning and, if so, how many or what duration of these should be considered as the equivalent of a day’s duty;

(2) In the case of regular and full time forces, whether or not periods of temporary absence (on leave, in hospital, etc.) should be counted as days of duty.
The terms "effective" and "day's duty" not having been defined in the draft Convention, my Government adopted a form of reckoning which seemed to it fair.

**Portugal.** — In the opinion of the Portuguese delegation, the principle of limitation on the basis of the effectives on a given date cannot be accepted without reservation by certain States. Theoretic effectives must be contemplated on account of the necessity of counterbalancing obvious deficiencies which make the reduction of armaments incompatible with national security and the execution of international obligations.

**United Kingdom.** — The system of making no deduction for absences was more convenient from the administrative point of view. If the General Commission decided to reckon these deductions, this would necessitate somewhat complicated calculations, and the British expert thought that it would be preferable to provide for an average number of absences. He pointed out that, generally speaking, there would always be differences of interpretation as between the different military organisations and that those difficulties could not be settled by the same formula. The best thing would be to take into account the special features of each army, assuming that they did not vary.

**United States of America.** — The United States Government felt some difficulty as to the National Guard, which is not a Federal armed force. It had considered it as being on the same lines as the trained reserves of countries with conscription and as regards the calculation of its effectives had treated it in the same way as the said reserves.

**Norway.** — The "average daily effectives" was an incorrect expression when applied to militia armies such as that of Norway, in which there were hardly any permanent units. Nevertheless, there had been no difficulty in stating the figure in accordance with the method indicated; this figure, however, was not regarded as expressing the situation of the army on each day of the year, but as expressing the relative weakness of the Norwegian army as compared with the large armies.

**Switzerland.** — The special system on which the Swiss army was based gave rise to fundamental difficulties for the Swiss Government in furnishing particulars as to effectives, owing to the fact that the conception of average daily effectives was not adapted to the militia system. The essential feature of the militia was not so much that the men served only for short periods, but rather that there were no units serving permanently. The number of effectives might vary very considerably from one year's end to another; there were even periods during which there were no effectives serving. The conception of average daily effectives accordingly gave quite a false idea of the militia army; the Swiss Government had therefore the intention, before applying the system recommended in Article 3, to give separately the number of recruits undergoing training during the year and the number of men who had followed refresher courses.

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Geneva, April 27th, 1932.


(Document Conf.D./C.G.28(2).)

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REPORT BY THE BUREAU.

The Land Commission decided at its meeting of April 26th to ask delegations which had made proposals for special treatment in the case of certain categories of armaments to state exactly what arms they had in view, taking into account the three specific characteristics enumerated in the General Commission's resolution of April 22nd. A certain number of delegations have replied to the Commission. Their replies deal with artillery material, tanks, armoured cars, fortifications and gases.

Certain delegations have explained the reasons for which they have adopted this or that limit in discriminating between materials, or the extent to which the materials they have in view possess one or more of the characteristics specified in the General Commission's resolution. The Bureau is of opinion that such explanations can be better made in the course of the Commission's discussions, and has accordingly confined itself in this report to recapitulating the means of discrimination proposed without giving the reasons submitted in justification of such discrimination.

I. Artillery Material.

1. In the first place, a certain number of delegations have proposed to distinguish between mobile material and fixed material for the armament of permanent fortification works:

   (a) The delegations of the following countries are of opinion that this category of artillery material does not call for a special regime: United States of America, Denmark, Italy (which
restricts the proposal to coastal defence artillery in naval fortifications), the Netherlands, Persia, United Kingdom, Switzerland and Sweden.

The delegations of Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden make reservations in the case of permanent fortification works which, owing to their proximity to a frontier, have an offensive value or are armed with material enabling them to fire across the frontier.

(b) Other delegations would impose certain restrictions on fixed artillery in permanent fortifications—viz., the German and Austrian delegations, which propose maximum limits of 150 mm. for guns and 210 mm. for howitzers and mortars.

2. A second distinction between artillery materials is made by certain delegations in accordance with the nature of such materials, the latter being classified for the purpose into three classes: guns, howitzers and trench mortars.

Maximum calibre limits are fixed for each of these categories. The German, Danish and Hungarian delegations propose a limit of 77 mm. for guns, 105 mm. for howitzers and 150 mm. for trench mortars. The Austrian delegation proposes a single limit of 105 mm. for guns and howitzers and a limit of 150 mm. for trench mortars.

3. A single calibre limit is proposed in order to distinguish materials calling for special treatment by the delegations of the following countries (which are arranged in the order of the calibres they propose, from the lowest to the highest): China, 80 mm.; Afghanistan and Italy, 100 mm.; Switzerland, 150 mm.; United States of America, United Kingdom, Spain and the Netherlands, 155 mm.; Sweden, 160 mm.; and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 204 mm.

Of these delegations, the Swiss delegation states that the limit it proposes is only given as a general guide, for the reason that it is essential to avoid fixing a limit which would involve certain countries in the obligation to replace at heavy expense arms of a slightly larger calibre than the limit fixed by new material below the limit. The Swedish delegation would be prepared to reduce its limit to 150 mm. or even lower, if the maximum calibre of warship artillery were reduced, since this would make it possible to reduce the calibre of coastal defence artillery. The Soviet delegation retains a free hand for the definition by another calibre of what it understands by long-range guns and high-powered guns.

4. Two delegations propose to distinguish between material by means other than the calibre—namely, the Swedish delegation, which refers to artillery the weight of which exceeds 4 tons in action, and the Soviet delegation, which refers to artillery with a range of over 15 kilometres.

5. Lastly, a certain number of delegations have replied without specifying figures. The Belgian delegation considers that discrimination between materials should be based on the power of such materials, as constituted by calibre, mobility and horizontal field of fire. The Belgian delegation would accept any definition of calibre or range unanimously decided by the Conference.

The French delegation considers that the material covered by the General Commission's resolution is heavy mobile artillery material of sufficient power to destroy permanent fortifications, and artillery material of sufficient range to reach civilian populations beyond the limits of the battlefields; the characteristics of these materials to be stated giving the reasons on the basis of the provisions of the current French regulations.

The Persian delegation is prepared to agree to the most radical proposal put forward, subject to guarantees in regard to the fulfilment of obligations assumed.

The Portuguese delegation proposes to abolish long-range artillery, but does not define the latter.

The Turkish delegation similarly proposes to abolish heavy artillery of all kinds, but does not define the latter.

II. Tanks.

The delegations which have proposed that tanks should be placed under a special regime have drawn no distinction between different types of tank. The United States and Netherlands delegations, however, have given the following definition of a tank: An armed and armoured vehicle, mechanically propelled, designed and constructed to move over uneven ground and obstacles. The Netherlands delegation adds that by “obstacles” are to be understood those which agricultural tractors cannot normally pass over. The United States delegation has specified that this definition does not include armoured cars.

III. Armoured Cars.

The delegations which have proposed the abolition of armoured cars, and to which has been added the Austrian delegation, have made no distinctions in this category and have proposed no definition.

Hungary has proposed the abolition of armoured trains.

IV. Fortifications.

Nothing more specific has been added on the question of fortifications. The Austrian delegation, however, has joined the delegations which propose that fortresses capable of threatening a neighbouring country should be abolished.
V. Gas.

Nothing more specific has been added on this question. It should be mentioned, however, that the Hungarian delegation has proposed the abolition of flame-projectors.


Geneva, May 7th, 1932.

MEMORANDUM BY THE ITALIAN DELEGATION ON THE ABOLITION OF TANKS AND ARMoured CARS.

With reference to the General Commission’s resolution of April 22nd, the Italian delegation considers it desirable to include among the weapons which are most specifically offensive and are most efficacious against national defence or against civilians tanks and armed and armoured cars of all kinds.

These weapons, which have great mobility and great power to attack and crush obstacles, are particularly suited for offensive purposes, for taking by surprise and destroying defences (barbed-wire entanglements, trenches, breastworks, etc.) constructed by the defender.

As the world war showed, these weapons were only employed against defences, and in all cases with the object of launching an attack.

Armoured and armed cars of all kinds are suited for surprise actions, which are particularly employed by an aggressor. In view of their wide range of action and their mobility, they may also be used for offensive raids into the interior of a country, and are thus particularly threatening to civilians. Consequently, they fulfil the first and third conditions laid down in the above-mentioned resolution.

Tanks are particularly suited to shock actions and for crushing opposition with the object of opening the way for attacking troops and making conditions as favourable as possible for them as against the defending troops. Consequently, they fulfil the first and second conditions of the resolution.

In the Italian delegation’s opinion, if the use of these categories of armaments in warfare were abolished, the offensive would be robbed of much of the probability of success, and the defence could be made more effective.

Moreover, tanks are particularly costly weapons and are constantly being improved, so that their abolition would considerably decrease military expenditure.

Accordingly, the Italian delegation, taking the above criteria as a basis, proposes the abolition of tanks and armed and armoured cars of all kinds.


MEMORANDUM BY THE HUNGARIAN DELEGATION RELATING TO THE QUALITATIVE LIMITATION OF TANKS, ARMoured CARS AND ARMoured TRAINS.

In accordance with the resolution adopted by the General Commission on April 22nd, 1932 (document Conf.D./C.G.28(2)), the Hungarian delegation proposed to the Land Commission that the following arms should be included in the series of weapons which are of the most specifically offensive character, are most efficacious against national defence, and are most threatening to civilians: tanks, armoured cars and armoured trains.

The Hungarian delegation submits the following arguments in support of its proposal:

No one who, in the light of the experience of the world war, has studied the problems connected with the conduct of modern warfare and is thus capable of forming an idea of what war will be in future can doubt the very important part which will be played by surprise attacks.

The supreme lesson of the great war must be obvious to everyone: “Against a successful surprise attack there is no defence.”
We are absolutely convinced that any State which has decided to embark upon a war will do everything possible—and even what is almost impossible—to surprise its adversary and thus expedite a favourable issue.

The conduct of offensive warfare, which is based *par excellence* on the art of surprising the enemy, is considerably facilitated by armoured weapons. We witnessed their appearance—when they were partly used for different purposes—during the great war. But since then, thanks to technical progress, they have ceased to be of use solely for tactical purposes, and are now capable of employment for strategical purposes also.

In the opinion of the Hungarian delegation, armed tanks and armoured cars and trains are particularly powerful weapons for the conduct of offensive warfare based on the element of surprise, and these weapons are called upon to play an almost decisive part on the outbreak of war.

With the help of these weapons, the aggressor is capable of hurling himself on his adversary and thus at once strangling any attempt at defence.

Consequently, these weapons can be regarded, not only as the most efficacious against national defence, but also as the most threatening to civilians, since they are brought into action by surprise on the outbreak of war and ravage ground on which it has necessarily been impossible as yet clearly to separate the civil and military elements.

The very existence of these weapons forces countries to take protective measures which are among the most costly items of national defence expenditure.

The fact that at a later stage of the war these arms can also be of great utility for the defence cannot—in the Hungarian delegation's opinion—counterbalance or even mitigate the immense danger which they represent.

No military counter-measures at the disposal of the defence can ever repair the damage to the national and private property of a country caused by an effective attack by the aggressor,

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Conf.D./C.T.44.

Geneva, June 2nd, 1932.

NOTE BY THE PRESIDENT.

Pursuant to the discussion on procedure which took place at the meeting of the Land Commission on June 2nd, 1932, with reference to fortifications, the President of the Land Commission, considering that the question of fortification is on the Agenda of the Commission and that it is to the interest of the Commission and of the Conference itself to expedite the work as much as possible, is of opinion that it would be advisable if written procedure were substituted for the oral discussion.

Consequently, the President requests the delegations who wish to submit observations on the question of fortifications kindly to send them in as soon as possible, and at latest on the afternoon of Saturday, June 4th. The observations submitted will be transmitted to all the delegations and to the Rapporteur. The President will submit proposals to the Land Commission on subsequent procedure.

The next meeting of the Land Commission has been fixed for Monday, June 6th, at 4 p.m.
INTRODUCTION.

1. The General Commission of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, at its meeting on April 22nd, 1932, adopted the following resolution (document Conf.D./C.G.28(2)):

"In seeking to apply the principle of qualitative disarmament, as defined in the previous resolution (document Conf.D./C.G.26(1)), the Conference is of opinion that the range of land, sea and air armaments should be examined by the competent special commissions with a view to selecting those weapons whose character is the most specifically offensive or those most efficacious against national defence or most threatening to civilians."

2. The Land Commission met on April 26th in response to the request thus addressed to it.

It was of opinion that generally for land materials the weapons which are "most efficacious against national defence" should be considered as being those whose character is "the most specifically offensive", and that the first two criteria named in the resolution of April 22nd might thus be held to form one single criterion.

3. The Commission rapidly decided that, instead of dealing successively with the whole series of land armaments, it would, without prejudice to the question, be effecting a considerable saving of time if it confined its examination to certain of those armaments already designated as requiring special treatment under the concrete proposals submitted to the Conference.

That was the case as regards: (1) artillery, (2) armoured vehicles, (3) certain fortifications, (4) chemical warfare gases.

The General Commission having decided, at its meeting on May 10th last, to entrust the study of that last item to a special committee, the Land Commission was able to confine itself to the first three categories of armaments.

I. ARTILLERY MATERIAL.

4. The general discussion which took place on the subject soon revealed the necessity of entrusting to a committee of experts the preliminary examination of certain technical aspects

1 The Soviet delegation makes the following reservation with regard to the present report:

"The present report, instead of giving direct answers to the questions put by the General Commission, merely enumerates the opinions of the various groups of delegations, as formulated by the Experts when questions concerning artillery and armoured vehicles were under consideration.

"The Land Commission had instructions to determine what calibres of artillery and what classes of armoured vehicle answered to the three criteria laid down by the General Commission on April 22nd. The Land Commission was to answer these questions; it was to say whether these classes of armament should be subject to qualitative reduction, and, if so, to what extent.

"Instead of answering the questions, the Land Commission, by repeating the opinion expressed by the Committee of Experts in an interminable series of technical arguments, is still further complicating the task of the General Commission. Land armaments, especially armoured vehicles and heavy artillery, offer sufficient material to be submitted to the General Commission for its decision in regard to qualitative disarmament. The Land Commission's voluminous report is full of arguments about the relative value of different calibres of artillery, the impossibility of making an absolute distinction between a tank and a motor-vehicle, and the efficacy of artillery and tanks against permanent fortifications; but all this is merely preparing the ground for bringing the whole principle of qualitative disarmament into question. Public opinion is beginning to realise this, and numerous protests are now being heard from every side against this tendency, which is visible in all the Commissions.

"The Soviet delegation quite realises that this total absence of positive results is not due to any bad work on the part of the Experts. The Experts are only expressing the ideas and wishes of their respective delegations. Be that as it may, the Soviet delegation cannot associate itself with this refusal to give any specific reply to the questions put, and is therefore unable to pronounce in favour of the report.

"While making this general reservation, the Soviet delegation proposes to continue to uphold its own view in the General Commission, maintaining that the following classes of arms should be subject to qualitative disarmament: all guns and howitzers of calibre exceeding about 100 mm., firing shells weighing more than 16 kg. and having a range exceeding 15 km., and all armoured vehicles—tanks, cars, and trains."