M. DE MADARIAGA (Spain), speaking as President of the Air Commission, pointed out that there was a solution for the difficulty raised by M. Sato, a solution which, in his opinion, would satisfy both the desire of the United States delegation—which was shared by all delegations—that air bombardment should be abolished, and the desire of the Japanese delegation that aircraft-carriers should be abolished; it was to adopt the Spanish proposal to abolish all military and naval aviation.

M. SATO (Japan) was very grateful to Mr. Wilson for saying that M. Sato's remarks at the morning meeting would be taken into consideration and carefully examined. His object had precisely been to place the question before the General Commission and to explain the misgivings which it caused in Japan. If the proposal which he had put forward at the previous meeting were examined thoroughly by the General Commission, especially those parts which were of direct interest, he would be very grateful to the Commission and would feel entirely satisfied.

There were, naturally, several points in Mr. Wilson's speech on which M. Sato could not, for the moment, share his views, but he did not wish to open a discussion on this subject at the present time. He must, however, state that the Japanese delegation connected the question of air bombardment with the naval question, because of the peculiar situation of his country, which was surrounded by the sea on all sides. Hitherto, the Japanese delegation had supported the principle, put forward by the French delegation, of the interdependence of the three forces. Japan was obviously in favour of that principle. In his country, the naval question could not be considered independently of the land and air questions. The connection between the question of air bombardment and that of naval forces might, unfortunately, cause prolonged discussions on the whole question of disarmament in the General Commission. But this was not the fault of the Japanese delegation, since the Commission had been obliged from the outset to accept the task of examining all questions which were common to naval, air, and land armaments.

Mr. Wilson had just stated—and on this point M. Sato could not share his opinion—that the solution of the difficulties peculiar to any country might compromise the solution of the general difficulties of all countries. Before sacrificing the peculiar requirements of one country to the general interest, an attempt must be made to determine the importance of the former. In the case of a question concerning the national defence of his country, it was very difficult for M. Sato to abandon the particular point of view of Japan in favour of the general interest, without receiving something in return, by means of some arrangement which would give Japan a feeling of national security.

He added that he had ventured to speak at the previous meeting, merely in order to put before the Commission the question of air armaments, which was of great importance in the view of the Japanese delegation, and to explain the misgivings and uneasiness which his country might feel in this respect. He was quite prepared to continue the study of this problem in private conversations, with a view to finding means of overcoming these misgivings. If it proved impossible to abolish aircraft-carriers entirely, possibly other means might be discovered. He therefore hoped that the question would come either before the Bureau or before the General Commission at the second reading.

The PRESIDENT said that M. Sato, in his statement, had made very serious reflections upon the London Treaty. As Mr. Henderson was one of those responsible for that Treaty, M. Sato must not expect him to accept those reflections.

144. DEPUTATION FROM THE INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF LEAGUE OF NATIONS SOCIETIES TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE.

The President stated that, in his capacity as President of the Conference, he had received that afternoon a very important and influential delegation—namely, that representing the International Federation of Leagde of Nations Societies. They had handed him two resolutions, one dealing with disarmament and security and the other with the question of moral disarmament. He had informed them that he would send the resolution relating to moral disarmament to the Chairman of the Moral Disarmament Committee, and that he would bring their main resolution to the notice of the General Commission at the present meeting. That resolution was as follows:

**DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY.**

*Resolution adopted by the Seventeenth Plenary Congress at its Meeting in Montreux on June 6th, 1933.*

I.

"The Seventeenth Plenary Congress,

"Convinced that the growth of a feeling of security based upon international solidarity and the loyal fulfilment of the obligations concerning mutual assistance contained in the Covenant of the League of Nations is of great importance both for disarmament and for economic recovery;"
Believing, further, that it is necessary that immediate measures of collective restraint should be taken against any Government which disturbs the peace of the world:

(a) Emphasises the importance of the progress achieved by the agreements not to resort to force, which ought to give full and satisfactory effect to the Pact of Paris, and by the declaration of the Government of the United States, which shows its willingness to consult with the League of Nations in the event of aggression and to renounce its rights of neutrality when it agrees in the designation of the aggressor;

(b) Urges that the Conventions upon improving the Means of preventing War and upon Financial Assistance should be ratified;

(c) Considers that, as a preventive measure, there is much value in the suggestion made by President Hoover and also by President Roosevelt, who have asked Congress for authority to place an embargo upon the export of arms;

(d) Is of opinion that, when an aggression occurs, the Members of the League of Nations ought at least to be able, without any delay, to prohibit all imports coming from the country which is the aggressor;

(e) Expresses the hope that the measures which may prove to be necessary may be swiftly adopted in all States in order to give the Governments sufficient powers to impose these prohibitions.

II.

The Seventeenth Plenary Congress,

1. While regretting the fact that the deliberations of the Disarmament Conference have been so protracted, partly owing to the excessive number of its commissions and committees:

Recognises that considerable progress has been made upon essential points and that the Conference at last has before it a definite draft Convention; and

Is confident that the delegates to the Conference, conscious of their responsibilities, will make every endeavour to reach a conclusion in the shortest possible time.

2. The Congress is glad to note that the Disarmament Conference has adopted several essential principles of the Federation's resolutions, such as the necessity for a substantial reduction of armaments, the direct limitation of all material, the suppression of aggressive weapons, the equality of status between States with a view to the general reduction of armaments and the establishment of an effective supervision;

Again recalls its conviction that the control of disarmament necessarily requires budgetary limitation, a measure which will also enable public opinion to estimate the financial importance of the reductions effected;

3. And notes that, under several heads, the principles accepted by the Conference are applied in the draft Convention in an incomplete or defective manner; especially:

(a) The Convention should provide for the abolition, within a fixed period, of the weapons already forbidden on account of their aggressive character to Germany, Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria by the Peace Treaties.

(b) This abolition should involve the actual public destruction of a substantial part of the material in question.

(c) Supervision should be made more effective, and, in particular:

(1) The Permanent Disarmament Commission and its several organs should not be composed of official delegates of Governments, but if they are they should at least be reinforced by the addition of independent persons, belonging to national and international organisations in favour of disarmament, such as certain organisations of workers and ex-servicemen;

(2) It should be the duty of the Commission to undertake periodical investigations;

(3) There should be provision in the Disarmament Convention safeguarding from any form of repression such persons as, in good faith, may give evidence as witnesses before the bodies entrusted with supervision.

4. On the subject of manufacture and trade in arms, the seventeenth Plenary Congress believes, that without prejudice to measures which might be taken to put an end to the evil effects of the commercial exploitation of war and dangers of war, any Disarmament Convention will be of negligible value unless it includes the international regulation of State and private manufacture of arms and of the traffic in arms;
"And is of opinion that private armament firms should not be permitted to manufacture or to retain stocks unless they have received orders from Governments and have been authorised to execute these orders by a single official organisation established by the State for the purpose of controlling the production, sale and export of arms; and that such orders should be made public under the authority of the Permanent Disarmament Commission.

"It follows that the quantity, types and value of arms manufactured, sold and stocked, whether by State factories or by private firms, should be kept strictly within the direct and budgetary limitations laid down in the General Disarmament Treaty."

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SEVENTY-NINTH MEETING

Held on Thursday, June 29th, 1933, at 11 a.m.

President: The Right Honourable A. HENDERSON.

145. TRIBUTE TO THE MEMORY OF M. DE AGÜERO Y BETHANCOURT, DELEGATE OF CUBA.

The President said that, before proceeding to the agenda, he desired to bring to the notice of the General Commission the messages that had been exchanged between the President and the Cuban Government with regard to the passing of the member representing that Government on the General Commission.

Telegram sent by Mr. Henderson to the Cuban Government on June 22nd, 1933.

"On behalf of the Disarmament Conference and in my own name request Your Excellency to convey to the Government of Cuba our great sorrow and heartfelt condolences on the sudden passing away of M. de Agüero y Bethancourt. — Arthur Henderson."

Reply received from the Cuban Government.

"In the name of the Government of Cuba, I beg Your Excellency to accept and convey to the Disarmament Conference our most sincere gratitude for your message of sympathy on the death of M. de Agüero y Bethancourt. — Alberto Herrera, Secretary of State ad interim."

All the members of the Conference would, the President felt sure, associate themselves with the message of condolence and sympathy he had sent to the Cuban Government. M. de Agüero y Bethancourt had been a very loyal member of the Conference from the beginning, and everyone knew how devoted he had been to the League and its work for many years. The Commission could remember how he had taken part in all their meetings, and his colleagues must all have learned of his passing with great regret.

M. DE ARMENTEROS (Cuba) thanked the President for the tribute he had paid to the memory of M. de Agüero y Bethancourt, who, as they all know, had been devoted to the League. He had from the outset been a loyal collaborator of that great institution, and all the delegates had been deeply grieved by his death.

M. de Armenteros desired, on behalf of his Government, the family of M. de Agüero y Bethancourt, and on his own behalf to thank the President and all the members of the Conference for the friendship which they had shown to the Cuban nation in its great loss.

146. FUTURE WORK OF THE GENERAL COMMISSION: PROPOSAL BY THE BUREAU TO ADJOURN THE COMMISSION UNTIL OCTOBER 16TH, 1933.

The President said that the General Commission would remember that, on June 8th, it had entrusted him with the necessary negotiations in order that a text might be prepared for the second reading of the draft Convention.

At the meeting of the Bureau on June 27th, he had stated that, in view of the pressure of work of the delegates to the Monetary and Economic Conference, it had not been possible

1 See Minutes of the seventy-seventh meeting of the General Commission.
2 See Minutes of the forty-sixth meeting of the Bureau.
to make such progress as would justify the preparation of a new text for the second reading. The Commission therefore found itself in the same position as when it had last adjourned. Such conversations as had been possible had impressed upon him the importance of everything being done to harmonise the outstanding differences before proceeding to a second reading, at which votes would have to be taken. He reminded the General Commission that divergences of opinion existed on many important questions, as was shown by the following list, which did not, however, include a number of secondary points of difference: non-recourse to force; European or universal pact; definition of aggression; supervision and control; sanctions to be used against any State violating the Disarmament Treaty; air bombardment; military and naval aviation; abolition of aggressive land material (suggested by President Roosevelt); size of tanks and artillery; trained reserves; period of training for short-term effective; colonial forces; period for destruction of aggressive weapons; budgetary limitation; manufacture of and trade in arms.

At its meeting on June 8th, the Commission had held the opinion that negotiations on important points were indispensable. The President had, he said, advised the Bureau on June 27th that the position remained unchanged and that the Bureau should consider the advisability of recommending the Commission to give him authority as President to start negotiations as soon as he could make contact with the heads of delegations. He had strongly urged that the Commission should be convoked for the second reading only after a greater measure of common agreement had been secured than was actually the case.

He had pointed out that the negotiations would occupy a considerable time, but had intimated that, if progress could be reported, or if he felt that consultation with the Bureau would be helpful, he would, as President, convoke the latter towards the end of July or during the Assembly. The session of the Assembly might prove a useful opportunity for completing the negotiations on any point not then settled.

If that programme worked satisfactorily, the General Commission could be convoked on October 16th to begin the second reading of the United Kingdom draft, with a text prepared having regard to the negotiations reported to the Bureau by the President. If success were secured earlier, the Commission would authorise him to convoke it at such earlier date as he and the Bureau might consider advisable.

He had made a frank statement to the Bureau as to the situation and the procedure which he contemplated. He had admitted that he had thought, at one moment, that it would be possible to continue work during the month of July on certain less controversial points, but he had come to the conclusion that the various questions were so closely linked up with one another that, if the Commission began an examination of the draft without taking a decision, adjourning chapter after chapter, little or no progress would be made, and that procedure would have a more disastrous effect upon the public than an adjournment for the purpose of giving the President a further opportunity to negotiate.

He had pointed out also that the delegates to the Conference would certainly want a holiday before the Assembly, and the date of October 16th did not seem, in the circumstances, too late, if the negotiations were to produce successful results.

After a discussion in the Bureau during which the considerations just outlined were carefully examined, it had been unanimously decided to recommend to the Commission that the President be authorised to start negotiations immediately with the heads of delegations, and, if the recommendation of the Bureau were accepted, he proposed to begin the negotiations the following week.

After seventeen months of working together, the members of the Commission would, he thought, agree that he had incessantly urged the continuance of their work towards the conclusion of a Disarmament Convention. His purpose had not changed. But after careful consideration of the question and consultation with representatives of Governments in London, Paris and Geneva, he had definitely reached the conclusion that the procedure proposed seemed most likely to render early and important decisions possible.

That procedure did not mean delay, since, in his opinion, it would facilitate the second reading of the draft which the General Commission was then considering and which it had decided to make the basis of a Convention.

Finally, he wished to remove any misapprehension in the minds of those who might think that what was recommended amounted to a cessation of the activities of the Conference with the intention of reviving it at a more suitable moment.

The Conference would, he said, continue to carry on its work in accordance with the recommendation made to it—a recommendation which, in the circumstances, seemed to him to be best calculated to promote those practical results which it was the desire of the General Commission to achieve.

He invited the Commission to discuss the recommendation of the Bureau.

M. NADOLNY (Germany) said that, after expressing in the Bureau his objections to the proposed procedure and his anxiety for the fate of the Conference, he considered it his duty to make a frank statement to the General Commission of the German views in regard to that proposal.

In the first place, he would like once again to thank the President for the efforts he had made to prepare, by means of negotiations in London, for the second reading of the Convention.
If, notwithstanding his best intentions, his efforts had been unsuccessful, that was solely because the Governments concerned had not been ready, in London, to begin those negotiations. He desired to point out, however, that the lack of success was not in any way the fault of the German Government, which had been ready at any moment to take part in such discussions. According to the proposal now submitted to the General Commission, the President was to continue his efforts towards a second reading, and the Conference was to adjourn until the negotiations had produced results which would enable preparations to be made for the second reading. Was not, however, the situation changed as compared with the resolution adopted on June 1st? The reason why the President had been obliged to institute negotiations in London was because the competent representatives of the Governments were all in London, where it might have been possible for them to confer together and for the Bureau of the Conference to have been convened.

As it was, the President would have to go from country to country and negotiate with the respective Governments. Was that method likely to be successful? While all the delegates were familiar with and appreciated the President’s perseverance and skill in negotiating, they knew from the experience of the past few weeks that that was hardly enough. The President had said that certain Governments had already promised to negotiate with him. In M. Nadolny’s view, it was quite clear that all the countries that accepted the Bureau’s resolution thereby undertook to participate in the proposed negotiations and to conduct them in a spirit calculated to ensure the success of the Conference. The German Government, whatever procedure was adopted by the Commission, would always be prepared to discuss controversial questions in that spirit, since its sole desire was that the Disarmament Conference should be brought to a successful conclusion as speedily as possible. Judging from previous experience, he very much doubted whether the proposed procedure would lead to the desired result in a short space of time.

As the proposed negotiations in London had not taken place, it was not only the right but also the duty of the Conference itself to undertake the preparations for the second reading. That, moreover, was in keeping with the resolution of June 1st, under the terms of which the Bureau, side by side with the President, was responsible for the preparations for the second reading. If the Bureau set about that task in a spirit of goodwill and with a desire to succeed, it might do most valuable work.

In the first place, the United Kingdom plan contained a whole series of mainly technical or legal questions which had been left open and did not involve a political decision but could be settled without it. Secondly, the solution of questions which were chiefly political in character and which were still pending was more likely to be expedited at Geneva, during the preparations for the second reading, by means of negotiations between delegations than by the President travelling from one capital to another. The representatives of all the States were at Geneva and a meeting at which decisions could be taken could be summoned at any moment. Had not the more important States always been anxious that all the questions should be dealt with by the Conference at Geneva? A rapprochement at least could certainly be reached on many points; if the questions were simplified and the essential points brought out, it would be easier at Geneva to elucidate them and pave the way for a decision. M. Nadolny thought, therefore, that the work of the Conference should go forward, at all events on those lines; even if the President’s conversations were successful, that particular work would still have to be done.

He very much regretted, therefore, the Bureau’s decision to propose to the General Commission an immediate adjournment until October 16th. If the General Commission approved that resolution, an essential part of the work of the Conference— which had already lasted seventeen months—would be put on one side for a further three months. The nations impatiently awaiting the results of the Disarmament Conference would never understand why such a lengthy adjournment was necessary to enable the Governments at last to agree upon the principal questions relating to disarmament, which had been prescribed fourteen years earlier in Article 8 of the League Covenant, which the Conference had met to bring about and which had been under discussion at Geneva for seventeen months. Still less would the world understand why, during the interval agreed upon for the discussion of political questions, the examination and settlement of other questions should be suspended. M. Nadolny would refrain from mentioning the disarmed States, which, for the past fourteen years, had been waiting for the other countries to meet their obligations in regard to general disarmament and for the re-establishment of their own national security. He was convinced that, not only by them, but on all sides, the reproach would be made that such an adjournment was nothing less than the first step towards the abandonment of the Conference’s task—the Conference, in other words, was being given a first-class funeral. He thought it his duty to call attention to the grave consequences which might ensue if, fostered by such decisions, doubts arose as to whether the Conference really desired, by means of loyal co-operation, to achieve its purpose.

The Conference had reached a stage when evasive tactics and procrastination were no longer possible. Its end could not be long delayed, and that end would not be a satisfactory one unless the States with which the decision rested gave proof of an earnest desire really to negotiate at Geneva, to meet their disarmament obligations, and to show, with a view to the conclusion of a Convention, a conciliatory spirit such as Germany had already displayed.

1 See Minutes of the seventy-second meeting of the General Commission.
Those Governments which approved the Bureau's proposal were taking upon themselves by so doing a grave responsibility. Germany in any case had done her utmost to enable the Conference to succeed.

M. Nadolny stated that, for the reasons he had given, he was unable to accept the Bureau's proposal to adjourn the Conference.

Mr. Wilson (United States of America) said that in the cause of disarmament the President had suggested undertaking a difficult and arduous task. There could be no member of the Commission who did not appreciate his motives. If the General Commission chose to confide that task to the President, it could not fail to be a satisfaction to him, not only as evidence of the Commission's belief in his advice and ability, but also as evidence that it was willing to help him in every way to carry on his task. The United States delegation was ready to give the President such help, and it was its most earnest hope that his work would bring about a situation in which, when the Commission re-assembled in October, it could carry on its work to a rapid and successful conclusion.

The Hon. Alexander Cadogan (United Kingdom) said that the United Kingdom Government warmly supported the proposal which the President had made for the future procedure of the Commission, a proposal which was in line with the decision it had taken earlier in the month when it had unanimously come to the conclusion that, before embarking on the second reading of the draft Convention, it was necessary to endeavour to reach decisions on some of the more important points of principle. All would regret that the procedure then proposed, which the President had undertaken to follow, had not yet met with success. The Commission had perhaps been rather optimistic in allowing the President a very short time in which to achieve a very difficult task; it need not, however, be so alarmist as to conclude that, because he had not succeeded in a fortnight, the Commission should abandon that method of procedure or change its ideas on the subject.

It seemed to the United Kingdom Government that there were two alternative methods. Either the Commission might at once begin the second reading of the draft, or, as it had decided a fortnight previously, an attempt might in the first place be made, by an exchange of views between Governments, to remove certain very difficult obstacles which stood in the way. All the delegates knew that certain differences existed on a number of the main questions raised in the draft, and the solution of most of the other points depended on the satisfactory settlement of those questions, which were interrelated. In order to arrive at the settlement of those large interrelated questions, it seemed plain that the best method was to attempt to do so by a direct exchange of views between the Governments concerned.

For those reasons the United Kingdom Government was convinced, as it had been a few weeks before, that the second proposal was the better.

Mr. Cadogan wished that he could in a few words dispel some of the doubts and remove some of the objections expressed by his German colleague. An answer to some of the latter's points might be found in the statement made by the President at the opening of the meeting. In particular, M. Nadolny had suggested that, although conversations might be pursued, it should nevertheless be possible for the Conference to continue in session and discuss a number of technical questions. Mr. Cadogan was not sure that experience had shown that to be a very good method. In the first place, the settlement of a number of those technical questions depended on agreement being reached on the main points, and he was convinced that, if that agreement could be achieved, the minor technical questions could very easily be settled in a short space of time. He believed, therefore, that the procedure proposed was not, as he thought M. Nadolny had rather insinuated, a delay in the work of the Conference, but that it would rather tend eventually to a more rapid achievement of the result which all desired—namely, a general agreement on the Convention.

M. Nadolny had also warned the Commission of the bad effects that the proposal—which would appear to be an adjournment of the Conference—might have on public opinion; but Mr. Cadogan had not noticed that the recommendation of the Bureau, which had been known for two days, had elicited in any quarter an expression of doubt or apprehension as to its effect on the ultimate success of the Conference.

In conclusion, he assured the President of the goodwill of the United Kingdom Government and of its best wishes for his success. The President might be assured that the United Kingdom Government would be ready at all times to afford him its wholehearted assistance in any way it could.

M. Massigli (France) observed that the President, fully realising the difficulties of the Conference and with a sense of his own responsibilities, had, with the Bureau's approval, laid before the General Commission a proposal as to its method of work.

The President knew better than anyone what the difficulties were which were holding up the work, and that should be sufficient to make any delegate, whatever his personal preferences, accept the President's proposals.
The French Government, for its part, did not propose to offer any objection. Indeed, if the President of the Conference, after having consulted a large number of delegations, came to the important decision to propose this new method of work in order to enable him to perform the heavy task which he had been good enough to undertake, the Commission owed it to itself and to him to approve that method. M. Massigli, moreover, pointed out, like his colleagues, the United States and United Kingdom representatives, that the President's proposal did not in any sense imply an adjournment of the Conference; it implied a new method of work, a temporary method better suited to the present phase and possibly also to the season of the year.

M. Massigli might have said no more—and, indeed, he wished that it had been unnecessary for him to say more—if the statements made a few moments before had not made it appear as if the decision to be taken by the Commission was a prelude to the last agony of the Conference; it had even been implied that, as a result of the new situation, responsibility would henceforth rest with the Governments that voted in favour of the proposal.

He did not wish his German colleague to imagine that only public opinion in Germany was disenchanted at the slowness of the Conference's proceedings. Public opinion in France and in many other countries would have been only too happy if the work could have been concluded in the first six months of the present year.

But public opinion, at all events when it was given an opportunity of enlightening itself, obtained information as to causes; it did not take effects for causes, and it liked to go to the root of things. He was convinced that public opinion realised quite well what was happening and that Governments, at the point that the Conference had reached, required time for reflection and an exchange of views before taking, with full knowledge of the facts, those grave decisions which they were now called upon to take.

Why was that so?

M. Massigli had just heard a reference—not for the first time—to the undertakings entered into in virtue of texts of which the French delegation did not repudiate a single line. But, just as it was not the first time that he had heard those undertakings mentioned and with an implication that certain countries had been found wanting and were responsible for the existing situation, so he felt obliged to repeat that perhaps one difficulty which the Conference had encountered—and which was looming particularly large at the present moment—was due to the fact that there was a certain contradiction between words and deeds.

If, at that moment, the situation had been that which had been contemplated by and regulated under the texts to which allusion had been made, the position would be very much easier and the work of the Conference very much more rapid. Unfortunately, that was not the case.

He did not propose for the moment to re-open that discussion. He wished, however, to point out that a mere comparison of a document relating to the work of the Conference—the report of the Committee on Effectives—and certain texts which appeared to be the law in some countries revealed strange contradictions. The contradiction between words and deeds, he repeated, was the real origin of the present difficulties, difficulties which were not perhaps insurmountable—he hoped not—but difficulties which once again justified Governments in taking thought, in deciding to exchange views with the President as to a method which should make it possible, without imprudence and with due reference to the testing period necessary for the solutions that might be adopted, to make further progress, as everyone desired, in the direction of the reduction of armaments.

For that, it was not sufficient to have the goodwill of diplomats. It was not sufficient, during the next three months, for their goodwill to get to work, with the enlightened assistance and advice of the President. What was necessary—for otherwise the Conference would find itself in a very difficult situation in October—was that public opinion in every country should really have the feeling that every country intended to fulfil its obligations. There must be none of that strange feeling, due to appearances, perhaps to words being used in a different sense from that in which they were used elsewhere, that while countries were being asked to sign disarmament agreements, situations were being created which were not only contrary to the spirit of other agreements already signed, but even—M. Massigli apologised for saying it—sometimes gave the impression that the violation of the Convention which the Conference was framing was organised in anticipation.

That was a decisive point. The responsibility of Governments, in the event of failure, would not ensue from any adjournment of the work of the General Commission, but would be determined by the realities, by the attitude adopted during the next few months by the various Governments represented at the Conference. If there were a feeling in every country that facts gave evidence of a desire for a détente, of a desire for the reduction of armaments, then the conversations now beginning would yield fruitful results and the Conference might be sure of success.

But if, while the President was holding conversations in different capitals, the newspapers every day reported facts which were a contradiction of the desire outwardly expressed, success would be doubtful, and—he added—in such an event, the responsibility would weigh, not on those Governments which might have voted in favour of the President's proposal, but upon those whose actions belied their words.

General DE ZIEGLER (Hungary) said that the Hungarian delegation fully endorsed the views which M. Nadolny had just expressed on behalf of the German delegation. It too was of opinion that only by continuing the work could the success of the Conference be ensured,
and that any adjournment, on no matter what grounds, was bound to delay that result. An adjournment, always involved serious consequences. That was true in general, and it was even more true for those unilaterally disarmed States which, having been deprived of all means of defence, found themselves in a state of insecurity which could not be indefinitely prolonged.

Hungary was waiting for the Conference to complete its task, and to complete it as quickly as possible; it was waiting for it to reduce the armaments of the whole world to the level laid down in Article 8 of the Covenant; it was waiting for it to eliminate the unjust inequality which now existed; it was waiting for it to put into practice as rapidly as possible the principle of equality of rights which had once more been recognised in the declaration of the five Powers on December 11th, 1932. 1

The Hungarian delegation was, therefore, opposed in principle to any adjournment of the Conference. In view, however, of the actual circumstances and of the fact that the atmosphere of the Conference was not at the moment particularly favourable to a successful continuance of the discussions, it did not intend to oppose the procedure suggested by the President, provided that every possible safeguard was adopted in order that the proposed negotiations should, pending the resumption of the General Commission's proceedings on October 16th, ensure the disappearance of all those obstacles which at the moment stood in the way of disarmament as laid down in Article 8 of the Covenant and prevented the application of the principle of equality of rights as admitted in the declaration of December 11th, 1932. For these reasons, the Hungarian delegation would abstain from voting on any proposal to adjourn the Conference.

M. DI SORAGNA (Italy) pointed out that, in matters of procedure, the Italian delegation always endeavoured to fall in, as far as possible, with what appeared to be the views of the majority of the members of the Conference, and more particularly with what appeared to be the President's views.

On the present occasion, when the procedure was a very delicate matter, the Italian delegation would maintain that attitude, especially as the proposal for adjournment had been submitted by the President direct and as the latter, by virtue of his personal qualities, his position and the vigour with which he had throughout directed the proceedings, was in a position to judge of the situation objectively and independently of the delegations. The President knew better than anyone what solution could best be adopted with a view to reaching the desired result.

Further, the Italian delegation had listened most carefully to the statements of the German delegate. It could not but stress the importance of those statements, and thanked the German delegate for having brought out what he had described as the "responsibility" that must attach to Governments by reason of such a decision. The Italian delegation's support of the President's proposal was given on the basis of a sentence of M. Nadolny to the effect that "it was quite clear that all the countries that accepted the Bureau's resolution thereby undertook to participate in the proposed negotiations and to conduct them in a spirit calculated to ensure the success of the Conference".

The Italian delegation accepted the procedure proposed that day in the sense of that passage and undertook to do its utmost to enable the Conference to meet again as soon as possible with a view to the successful framing of a Convention.

M. NADOLNY (Germany) said that, as the only member of the General Commission who had spoken against the Bureau's proposal, he wished, on the conclusion of the discussion, to submit a few observations.

He had naturally listened with much interest to the explanations of his colleagues and, in particular, to those in reply to his own statement. Those explanations, however, had not changed his opinion as to the method recommended by the Bureau. He did not regard that as the most practical method, and even considered it regrettable, viewed from the standpoint of the fate of the Conference.

He would refer more particularly to the observation of M. Massigli, who had mentioned as an obstacle to the work of the Conference a certain apprehension that might be felt as regards the loyal observance of the future Convention. M. Nadolny did not know whether that point had really anything to do with the procedure to be followed. But if an attitude of mistrust were adopted concerning the subsequent observance of the Convention, he wondered whether it was possible to expect a hopeful outcome of the negotiations with which it had been proposed to entrust the President. In any case, if M. Massigli's observation implied that doubt as to the loyal and faithful observance of the Convention might constitute an obstacle to the work of the Conference, M. Nadolny would say that, in his view, such a doubt should rather be a stimulus urging them on to arrive as quickly as possible at a Convention adopted unanimously. He felt sure that an international undertaking signed by all the nations would be faithfully observed by them. So far as Germany was concerned, he declared solemnly, on behalf of the present Government, and on behalf of the whole German nation, now and for the future, that the Convention which would be concluded at Geneva would be faithfully and loyally carried out by Germany.

The President said that, if there were no further observations, he would take it that there was practical unanimity— with one objection and one abstention—in favour of the adoption of the recommendation of the Bureau.

1 See Minutes of the twenty-eighth meeting of the General Commission, page 208.
He was very pleased that there was such a measure of unanimity. He was not surprised that there should be doubts in the minds of some delegations, but he hoped that the constant interest which he had displayed in trying to secure a Convention would be a guarantee that he was prepared to continue to the end only if he felt that the road he was taking was going to secure the desired result.

He would have thought that the interest he had displayed for seventeen months would hardly have led to the inference that the proposal of the Bureau amounted to giving the Conference a decent burial. If he had thought that that would be the result, he would have been far from making such a suggestion and agreeing to its adoption.

*The proposal of the Bureau was adopted.*

147. TRIBUTE TO SIR ERIC DRUMMOND.

The *President* said that the Commission had officially to say good-bye to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations. Sir Eric Drummond, during the last fourteen years, had devoted himself to the building-up of the League. As its first Secretary-General, he had rendered a great service honourably and faithfully. During those fourteen years, he had cared for the League's every interest, and no doubt he would be the first to admit that his ideal was yet very far from being reached. But, notwithstanding any defects that might have been seen in the working of that great international institution, it was the greatest political institution in the world, and, though much would have to be done before it was placed in that position of security that all League idealists had always had before them, they could not but pay a very great tribute to its first Secretary-General. Sir Eric would no doubt say that he felt that there was yet much to be done, and it would devolve upon his successor and all those associated with the League to carry on the good work.

Sir Eric had also been the Secretary-General of the Disarmament Conference from the moment it opened. As President of the Conference, having been in close touch with the Secretary-General from time to time, Mr. Henderson knew something of those great qualities that had characterised the whole of Sir Eric's association with the building-up of the League. Those qualities had been of great service to Mr. Henderson in his capacity of President, and he felt that he could not allow the Secretary-General's last official appearance at the Conference to pass without expressing, in the Commission's name, its very great appreciation of the work he had done and the most ardent and sincere wish that, in whatever new duties he had to undertake in the future, he might have long life and be able to look back with very happy memories to his association with the work at Geneva.

Sir Eric D*rummond* said that he was very deeply moved by the President's words, which had touched him greatly.

The President had been good enough to refer to the work which the Secretary-General had been able to do, as regards the building-up of the League. He felt that the President had given him too much personal credit for that. What he had been able to do had been done owing to the unfailing support he had received from his colleagues on the Secretariat and, above all, from the Governments Members of the League. But, apart from that aspect of the work, the Secretary-General had, he said, for a considerable time, had the honour of being Secretary-General of the Disarmament Conference. He hoped that the Conference would feel that the Secretariat arrangements had been good, and that that aspect of the Conference had always proceeded smoothly. If so, he would like to give the credit to M. Aghnides and his colleagues of the Disarmament Section. He had only been able to supervise generally.

It was with the deepest regret that he laid down his office before a Convention on the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments was definitely concluded. He had hoped that it might have been finished by that date. He had had to make a calculation a year ago, but unfortunately, along with the calculations of other people, his calculation had gone wide. Now, having followed very closely the discussions in the Conference, and having listened, as anyone was bound to listen, to expressions of opinion from outside, he had arrived at the definite conviction, in spite of all that had been said to the contrary, that the prospects were favourable, and he sincerely believed that before the close of the year 1933 the Disarmament Conference, under the energetic and wise guidance of its President, and with the goodwill of all the delegations, could not fail to reach a successful and adequate conclusion. That, after all, was what they all wanted, and it was his sincerest hope that it would be effected within the next six months. He wished that he could have been in office to see the signature. He thanked the Commission again.

The *President* announced that the General Commission stood adjourned until October 16th, 1933.