With regard to the provisions on supervision, M. Saavedra would venture at once to make reservations similar to those he had presented in July 1932, when he had reserved that question for the subsequent decision of his Government.

He concluded by expressing the hope that the United Kingdom draft Convention would prove to be the means by which the world could be led towards that tranquillity of mind necessary to the progress of humanity and to the prosperity of the nations.

M. Rio Branco (Brazil) said that, so far, the Brazilian delegation had observed, during the second phase of the Conference, the reserve incumbent on an almost disinterested observer; disinterested because it had long ago set the example of a country which, by principle, was under—rather than over-armed if account were had to its area of 8½ million square kilometres, its population of more than 43 million inhabitants and the great length of its coast-line and frontiers.

When international arbitration had still been regarded in Europe as a rather fortuitous and ideological means of solving international disputes, Brazil, which had never waged anything but a defensive war, had twenty years previously embarked boldly on this new course and had concluded thirty-five general arbitration treaties. The employment of international arbitration and of direct negotiations, to which it had often had recourse, had won for Brazil more substantial advantages than she could have gained even from a victorious war. It had enabled her to preserve as part of the national patrimony 750,000 square kilometres, the possession of which had been challenged, and to acquire 152,000, a total of over 900,000 square kilometres, or a larger area than that of many of the great Powers. These results had been achieved in twelve years without the shedding of a single drop of blood or a single mother's tears.

Having thus set an example of the systematic recourse to right rather than force, not only in words, but also what was perhaps more important, in acts, Brazil followed with interest the efforts made at the Conference to avert the return of the material devastation and, what was still graver in its eyes, of the possibly irreparable moral havoc that had filled close on five years of contemporary history.

Brazil's object in the present Conference, inaugurated under such brilliant auspices of pacification and conciliation, was to contribute so far as possible to the adoption of any general plan which in its view was capable of bringing about on the Continent of Europe as well that eminently desirable and advantageous state of affairs in which right would predominate over force of arms. The Brazilian delegation accordingly considered with interest and impartiality all proposals likely to conduce to the realisation of so noble an idea. In the present stage of the Conference, the Brazilian delegation did not think it would be desirable deliberately to wipe out all the arduous and often very instructive discussions that had taken place.

The Brazilian delegation associated itself with the expressions of gratitude to the United Kingdom delegation for the energetic initiative it had taken to extricate the Conference from the bog of scepticism and exaggerated criticism in which the discussions seemed to have been floundering. He thought that the general idea of the United Kingdom proposal deserved attentive study, allowance, however, being made for the remarks submitted by other delegations, in particular with regard to budgetary limitation, as strict and straightforward a system of supervision as possible, and the tangible guarantees of security which would considerably facilitate the unreserved adherence of some of the States most directly concerned. The Brazilian delegation had, however, found similar advantages in the French plan. It was in his opinion the best specimen of which was still, in its eyes, the Swiss military organisation.

The Brazilian delegation hoped that, without bias and without any undue reservations resulting from national pride, it would not be impossible for a meeting in which so much authority was combined with so much goodwill, to reconcile and amalgamate many of the fundamental parts of these two invaluable plans.

Finally, the Brazilian delegation had been struck by certain demonstrations, outside the Conference it was true, but which could not be disregarded by anyone who was not blind and deaf, and it hoped that the present Conference, inaugurated as it was under the auspices of disarmament, would not end in the re-armament of some, since that would unfailingly lead to irreparable disasters to the cause of Western civilisation, the edifice of which was already seriously compromised.

To conclude, the study of the United Kingdom scheme appeared to the Brazilian delegation to offer a good basis for discussion for the achievement of the aim before all nations represented at the Conference.

Mohamed Omer Khan (Afghanistan) said that his delegation had listened with the greatest interest to the noteworthy and moving address by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. The Afghan delegation had been particularly struck by the good sense and good spirit of the basic proposals made personally by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom at a time when the Conference was confronted with certain difficulties that had been foreseen. It welcomed the United Kingdom proposals with the greatest sympathy and highly appreciated the initiative taken by Mr. MacDonald and the United Kingdom delegation.

The United Kingdom draft, at present being subjected to a preliminary study by the delegations, deserved to be taken as a solid and final basis for sure and rapid discussion. The Afghan delegation was in favour of the draft as a whole. It earnestly hoped that once certain logical, tangible and fundamental amendments had been made in this valuable document, following
on the proposals made by the majority of the delegations during the detailed examination of the draft, the Conference would at last be able to place at the disposal of mankind an international instrument the application of which would really assure the peace of the world, a thing commended by both God and man.

The Afghan delegation, like the other delegations, had naturally studied the draft, and he would therefore have certain amendments to propose.

No one could deny that the Governments of the entire world who had co-operated at the present Conference had sincerely worked for the achievement of the result expected by all peoples. The United Kingdom draft would without doubt conduz to that result—an even more effective result might be desired—provided a few amendments were made in it. The Afghan delegation would not fail in due course to submit its observations or to support any that might be made by other delegations, according to their nature. For the moment, he would merely formulate a brief observation.

In the matter of effective, although no figures were proposed for Afghanistan, as for other countries outside Europe, the Afghan delegate reminded the Commission of its resolution concerning the need for making allowance for the special circumstances of the various countries, and hoped that, when the figure for the effective of the Asiatic Powers was determined, the special position of his country would be taken into consideration.

With regard to material, the Afghan delegation was already in favour of the total abolition of heavy mobile artillery and tanks of all categories, which were manifestly of an offensive character.

It favoured the absolute prohibition of bombing from the air, as suggested in Article 34 of the draft Convention, and was also in favour of such bombing being prohibited even for police needs in certain outlying regions, that was to say, it urged the deletion of the passage in brackets suggesting an exception to this vitally important article.

He had listened with great emotion to his colleagues Cemal Hüsnü Bey, delegate of Turkey, and M. Lange, delegate of Norway, and appreciated their very broadminded and humanitarian view. He formally supported their declaration in this matter.

With regard to the abolition of chemical, incendiary and bacterial warfare, the Afghan delegation accepted with pleasure the relevant provision in the draft Convention and noted with satisfaction the unanimity with which that measure was accepted.

M. Lanskoronskis (Lithuania) still believed, notwithstanding M. de Madariaga’s optimism, that there was no one, or almost no one, who failed to realise that the new plan proposed by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom had come at a critical moment. World opinion, which had been following the Conference’s work with anxious interest for more than a year, was already asking whether all the difficulties with which it was constantly meeting would not prove to be insuperable. Mention had already been made of an indefinite adjournment. It was difficult to predict all the harmful, the disastrous consequences that would follow from the Conference’s failure. The danger was averted for the time being, and the search for a solution capable of bringing appeasement and inspiring confidence was being continued.

On behalf of his country he associated himself with the thanks that had been addressed to Mr. MacDonald for his great effort. He ardently hoped that, with this new impetus, the Conference would succeed in moving from the period of discussions into that of final decisions.

While accepting the United Kingdom plan as a whole, prior to its detailed discussion article by article, the Lithuanian delegation would submit a few very general remarks.

The advantage of the plan was that it correlated security and disarmament in the tangible and concrete form of a draft Convention. Unfortunately, it did not represent a sufficiently balanced fusion of these two aspects of the problem. While, in its technical part, the plan constituted, or at least attempted to constitute, a true fusion of the results achieved hitherto, it did not make sufficient allowance for the guarantees of security. The part concerning security had, of course, the value of a solemn declaration reaffirming the principle of non-recourse to force, but it did not contain any precise legal obligation in the event of a breach of that principle.

Moreover, the procedure for the convening of a conference in the event of a rupture of the Pact of Paris, and the conditions as to the validity of the conclusions reached by such a conference, established de facto and de jure a legal inequality to the detriment of the countries not belonging to the group designated in Article 4. It followed that the consultations suggested might in certain cases appear as having the effect of pressure, at any rate of a moral pressure.

As Lithuania was anxious for the maintenance of the spirit of the League of Nations and of its Covenant, which assured equal legal rights to all States, she intended to support all suggestions in that direction. She also reserved the right to submit amendments or to support any she might think desirable or likely to increase the degree of security—for instance, non-recognition of a new situation resulting from an aggression.

With regard to the technical part, subject to its detailed examination, Lithuania was prepared to accept a Convention on the basis of the United Kingdom plan.

She believed that disarmament in itself was one of the factors of security, and noted with satisfaction that the draft Convention provided the reduction of the forces of aggression by a qualitative limitation and a quantitative reduction of armaments. During the subsequent discussion, she would support any amendments aiming at a still more substantial measure of disarmament.
Mr. Lester (Irish Free State) said that, for some months past, the work of the Conference had been moving in a circle. Points on the circumference of that circle had been marked security, naval disarmament, land disarmament, air disarmament, and so on. The Commission could not halt long enough at any one of these points to get agreement, because it was urged that agreement on one point could not be reached until agreement had been reached on another; indeed, it began to appear that the “traject” of the Conference was not only a continuous but an unbreakable line. The Conference had, however, not only been revolving like the earth on its axis; there had also been a forward movement, less perceptible, but enough to maintain the hopes of the Commission. The time had come to discover whether or not those hopes were vain.

Bold action with regard to any one of the half-dozen major problems before the Conference would, Mr. Lester thought, have broken the vicious circle and have given results on the other problems. In the absence of that, however, there was in his view only one way in which the aims of the Conference could be achieved. That way had been taken by the United Kingdom delegation in presenting a complete draft Convention in which its view of the solutions of the problems was presented simultaneously. The procedure difficulty had, he hoped, been solved by this valuable and welcome initiative. It had now, to use another geometrical expression, been reduced to a plane surface. If agreement were possible on the questions of substance—and he was sure that the alternative was not for a moment contemplated—then it seemed that the United Kingdom plan provided the possibility of at any rate comparatively successful results; and Mr. Lester could now see no other way.

He had referred to methods of procedure because of their importance, because, until such methods were agreed upon, the Conference could not come to close grips with the next and final stage of its work. With regard to the content of the United Kingdom draft Convention, which included so many valuable and positive proposals, he would withhold, for the present, the views of his delegation.

He could, however, indicate its general point of view very briefly if he said that it regarded with the utmost sympathy the constructive suggestions which had been put forward by the delegate of Norway.

Count Raczyński (Poland) said that his delegation would take part in the study of the important plan submitted by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom in the spirit in which it had always been prepared to participate in all the Conference’s efforts to draw up a definitive convention.

The important speeches of the many delegates who had preceded Count Raczyński had already brought out the great value of this preliminary exchange of views, which was in fact a general discussion. The Polish delegation had felt, in taking part in that discussion, that it should not content itself with words of praise, as was sometimes done in the Commission, subsequently adopting a less enthusiastic attitude in the technical committees. It felt it should immediately indicate its point of view on several questions raised by the United Kingdom plan, while trying not to go too far into technical details.

The advantage of the United Kingdom plan was that it recommended simultaneously solutions for land, air and sea. It might be that the interdependence of these three arms, the necessity for which was obvious, could be carried further. Mr. MacDonald had said that his plan would content no one. That, thought the Polish delegate, was a fact, unless the United Kingdom was an exception.

The discussion that had occurred since the resumption of the Conference’s work, at the time of the presentation of the French plan, showed that most of the delegations made the extent of disarmament to which they were prepared to subscribe in the present state of the world dependent on the extent of security they were offered in exchange. Their attitude was not the result of abstract and theoretical speculation; but they had in mind the practical and tangible needs of the moment. The Polish delegation had been glad to rediscover security in the MacDonald plan—in the first chapter of the draft Convention, a chapter that did not exist in the Preparatory Commission’s draft, and which preceded the chapter headed “Disarmament”. That was a step forward, though a perusal of Chapter I had not given the Polish delegation all the satisfaction for which it had hoped.

The first six articles of the draft Convention were clearly animated by the generous idea that the States which were outside the League of Nations should participate in the work of peace.

The United Kingdom plan tended, in Count Raczyński’s opinion, to give the form and weight of a formal juridical undertaking to the diplomatic practice invariably followed, which would certainly be followed in future in all great international disputes. But it went still further in proposing the creation of a permanent institution, which would have the right, if not the duty, to intervene in all litigious questions, and which would accept responsibility.

The Polish delegation had serious doubts as to whether the new system which this measure proposed was compatible with the system of the League of Nations, and the duty of the Members of the League with any subsequent decisions taken by a conference which was bound by no law in as far as its rights, duties and procedure were concerned. The only sentence in the six articles in question—which referred, moreover, not to the Covenant, the Assembly or the Council, but simply to the Secretary-General—would be found in Article 3 of the United Kingdom draft. It said that the request that a Conference of the States signatories...
to the Pact of Paris be convened might be addressed to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations. That Conference might meet either at Geneva or elsewhere.

Article 90 of the draft stipulated, it was true, that the "Convention is not to be interpreted as restricting the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations—in particular, those which fix the powers of the Council and the Assembly", but it was to be feared that that assurance was only theoretical.

As to Article 5, which called upon the States in conference to determine which party was the aggressor, Count Raczyński preferred the definitions contained in the Soviet and Belgian proposals.

Before passing to a very brief examination of Part II of the draft, he could not but remind the Commission of the point of view which the Polish delegation had already had occasion to put forward several times, to the effect that all the States should fully respect the obligations assumed in the sphere of disarmament which were, and must remain, in force. These obligations could certainly not vanish like smoke, in a way which, when it was not simply too explicit, the Polish delegate would venture to call discreet.

The Polish delegation had examined the disarmament clauses of the plan with a very sincere desire to collaborate constructively, taking as a guide the idea so authoritatively expounded by Sir John Simon in his speech in the Bureau of the Conference on November 17th, 1932, which could be summarised in two words: no re-armament. It asked that the detailed discussion of the technical provisions of the plan should give it the necessary appeasement on this point. The authors of the United Kingdom plan had made abundant use of the carefully prepared documents of the technical committees of the Conference. That was in itself the highest praise of the patient work of the experts, which there had sometimes been a tendency to underestimate. To mention one example only, it would have been very difficult, if not impossible, to lay down some of the definitions embodied in the report in the absence of the work of the Special Committee on Effectives, which had continued until the early days of the present month. It was essential, in Count Raczyński's opinion, that that Committee, as well as the other technical committees, should be able to continue its work, concentrating its efforts, in particular, on a study of the bases of calculation which the Conference would have to adopt.

In this connection, it would not be without value to remind those committees that it was absolutely essential not to depart from the principles laid down in Article 8 of the Covenant, which was the basis of the Conference's work. The experts must also not lose sight of their duty to avoid texts imposing vague obligations, easy to evade, the application of which would be difficult to supervise.

These remarks related more particularly to the figures, which, in the Polish delegation's opinion, would need to be reconsidered from the point of view of the concessions to be required of the different countries, with the object of preserving a salutary balance between the sacrifices offered by each in the field of disarmament.

The clauses in the plan concerning material were based on conceptions of which the chief recommendation was their simplicity. That did not, of course, mean that, during the detailed discussion, they would not have to be studied from the point of view of the principles they implied and the adjustments they necessitated. Mr. MacDonald had himself admitted that his plan would, without doubt, have to undergo modification.

It might perhaps be helpful if the forthcoming detailed discussion of this part of the plan were to bear in mind the questionnaire worked out by the Drafting Committee, which had just finished work under the chairmanship of M. Politis. That method would make it possible to make good certain deficiencies.

The parts of the plan referring to the countries not bound in the matter of naval disarmament by the Washington, London and other treaties in force would appear to require special study. The formulae proposed hardly appeared acceptable.

The authors of the plan had given special attention to the problem of military aviation in its present state and in its future development. Without going into details, he thought he could say that at first sight the plan appeared to attempt, in this category of armaments, to impose very heavy sacrifices as compared with those asked for in other categories, and that the sacrifices demanded were not applied in a uniform manner to all States. To put it briefly, the sacrifices did not appear to be sufficiently balanced. For countries which did not possess a considerable civil air fleet, military aviation presented, in the case of a threat from the military air force of another country, a defensive value which could not be challenged. In his speech on March 16th, Mr. MacDonald had dwelt on the dangers of a formidable development of civil aviation, and had admitted that the problem was still awaiting solution.

The figures proposed in Article 41 of the plan seemed to result from a rather abstruse calculation and not from the evaluation of the factors of security, which Article 35, point (b), of the plan very properly laid down as a future necessity.

As he had said at the outset, the Polish delegation was prepared to co-operate with the utmost goodwill in the study of the plan, but to those who took a realistic view it was plain that many of the articles would have to be changed, amended or even dropped. That was the fate of all individual schemes, especially if they had the magnitude and general character of...
than a year previously, Sir John Simon had himself ventured to observe that the difficulty upon the insertion of figures. At the very first meeting of the Bureau of the Conference, more in order to approach the end of the deliberations.

all-important thing would be to make good that advance, not to slip back into compartmental step which he believed the Commission was prepared to take unanimously. After that, the be deplorable—but, on the contrary, would be the making of an advance and the taking of a Commission would not be the calling of a halt—for, as Dr. Lange had said, that would indeed that advance, and that the consideration of such a draft Convention as was before the who were following its work with so much anxiety and attention—that the time had come for the results of the work must be integrated in a single connected scheme. The discussions of the that it would indeed be a pity if anybody supposed that the work done in the technical associated himself most warmly with what had been said by M. Massigli when he observed as all recognised, the great value of the work that had hitherto been done. Sir John Simon was necessary and wise had been reached. The Prime Minister, of course, recognised to the full, whole scheme, but keeping each point in a perspective and fitting it into its proper place. decisions, not on isolated points, without knowing the value of a given point in relation to the comprehensive, but at the same time precise, document, so that the Commission could take together the different compartments and departments of the discussion, so as to produce a comprehensive, but at the same time precise, document, so that the Commission could take decisions, not on isolated points, without knowing the value of a given point in relation to the whole scheme, but keeping each point in a perspective and fitting it into its proper place.

There appeared to be universal agreement that the stage when that method of treatment was necessary and wise had been reached. The Prime Minister, of course, recognised to the full, as all recognised, the great value of the work that had hitherto been done. Sir John Simon associated himself most warmly with what had been said by M. Massigli when he observed that it would indeed be a pity if anybody supposed that the work done in the technical examination of these questions was in any way wasted or out of date. But the time must come when compartmental discussion should come to an end, and when the results of the work must be integrated in a single connected scheme. The discussions of the past three days had shown the whole Conference—and, he thought, had satisfied those outside who were following its work with so much anxiety and attention—that the time had come for that advance, and that the consideration of such a draft Convention as was before the Commission would not be the calling of a halt—for, as Dr. Lange had said, that would indeed be deplorable—but, on the contrary, would be the making of an advance and the taking of a step which he believed the Commission was prepared to take unanimously. After that, the all-important thing would be to make good that advance, not to slip back into compartmental methods, very proper six months previously, and permanently to occupy the ground gained in order to approach the end of the deliberations.

There was a second feature of the United Kingdom plan which had been much remarked upon—the insertion of figures. At the very first meeting of the Bureau of the Conference, more than a year previously, Sir John Simon had himself ventured to observe that the difficulty

See Minutes of the thirty-first meeting of the General Commission.
about the draft Disarmament Convention was that there were gaps instead of figures, and that no secure and effective advance towards the goal would ever be made until some method of inserting figures had been found. He did not for one moment claim to be the inventor of that method. He had no desire to infringe the patent of the Soviet delegation, whose spokesman had quite correctly pointed out that the Soviet delegation had long ago suggested what one might call a numerical solution by the logical, but possibly rather extreme, method of a series of noughts. But though zero was undoubtedly a figure, it was also not infrequently the vanishing-point of a mathematical calculation, and it was possible that conclusions would not so easily be reached, at the present imperfect, confused stage of humanity's progress, by endeavouring immediately to advance to zero at once in every direction.

The Prime Minister had warned the General Commission that, when the tables of figures were put before them, many people would begin by feeling dissatisfied with the figure tentatively allotted to themselves, but he had wisely gone on to suggest that perhaps further examination might give some comfort, for was it not comforting, if one was not altogether satisfied with the figure allotted to oneself, to reflect upon the figure which had been allotted to one's neighbour? In any case, the table of figures was not, of course, put forward as a final pronouncement; very far from it. It was put forward as a suggestion, as an example of the method by means of which further work could be done.

There were two or three main criticisms which should be answered by the authors of the plan before the close of the discussion, though topics suggested by the wording of particular articles would more appropriately be dealt with when the articles themselves were discussed.

The Turkish delegate had observed that his country was omitted from the table of European effectives, and had even interpreted this as though it might have some political significance. Sir John Simon would at once, for the sake of both his own country and Turkey, remove any possible misapprehension on that score. It would be observed that the table of effectives was headed by a note to the effect that it contained only the figures suggested for the countries of continental Europe, and that Chapter 2 of Section I of Part II contained "Special Provisions as to the Organisation of the Land Armed Forces stationed in Continental Europe". In drawing up the table, regard had been had to the fact that, as the United Kingdom delegation understood it, the bulk of the Turkish armed forces were stationed outside continental Europe, and the delegation was not confident that it would be right in suggesting that the whole of the Turkish army should be subjected to the special regime contemplated for exclusively European continental armies. There was a certain analogy in this respect between the position of the United Kingdom and the position of Turkey. Both countries alike had major interests outside the continent of Europe. The Turkish delegate could be sure there was no political significance in the omission, and Turkey might rest assured that, if it were the desire of the Turkish Government, any error would willingly be repaired by the insertion of figures for that country in the table. In any event, before the work of the Conference was completed, the table would have to be extended to cover other regions of the earth.

The Turkish delegate had also noted that, while the draft Convention was destined to replace certain clauses in the peace treaties of Versailles, St. Germain, Trianon and Neuilly, there was no indication that it would replace clauses in the Treaty of Lausanne. That comment proceeded from a misapprehension as to the application of the final article (Article 96) of the United Kingdom draft Convention. The clauses of the peace treaties in question were defined in Article 96 as "those provisions . . . which at present limit the arms and armed forces of Germany, Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria respectively". But, as the Turkish delegation was aware, the Treaty of Lausanne contained no clauses of a corresponding character. The arms and armed forces of Turkey were not restricted by treaty, and since Article 96 of the draft effected a substitution only in respect of the limit of arms and armed forces, no corresponding provision was needed in the case of Turkey.

Passing to other broad criticisms of the United Kingdom draft Convention, Sir John Simon said that, from the beginning, his delegation had not been without hope that other delegations would recognise in it features which were most plainly and directly borrowed from suggestions made by themselves. The United Kingdom delegation acknowledged its theft. It asked to be forgiven; and it hoped that the General Commission as a whole would be the more inclined to look favourably upon the United Kingdom plan because his delegation would be the last to suggest that that plan was an original piece of work. On the contrary, it resembled one of those composite photographs of leading statesmen which at one time were popular in the magazines.

In the same way, it had been said that the plan did not deal with such very important matters as budgetary limitation or the trade in and manufacture of arms. Mr. MacDonald had warned the General Commission that the draft did not pretend to be complete in all its details, and Sir John Simon would like to echo the remarks of the delegate of Poland when he dwelt upon the importance of the work which the technical committees had done and of the great contribution which they had made. The omission of budgetary limitation and the trade in and manufacture of arms was not, of course, from any disrespect for the valuable work which had been done on those subjects. To speak frankly, the omission was rather due to the fact that, in both those cases, the special committees were still continuing their studies, and it was thought better to refrain from prejudging the results of their work, on which it was hoped that final reports might be available very shortly.
Sir John Simon would not attempt, at such a late hour, to trespass on the patience of his colleagues by going through any other detailed criticism, but would like to explain the principle upon which the United Kingdom delegation had proceeded in framing the draft Convention. Its method was, he thought, generally approved. It had tried to find the middle course between extreme and often contrasted views; it had tried to suggest a positive, definite result where hitherto there had been an indication of conflict, sometimes quite direct conflict, which, in the circumstances, could only result in negation.

M. Bourquin, in his most powerful and persuasive speech that afternoon, had made the wise observation that all compromise implies sacrifice, and the United Kingdom delegation had tried to suggest such a middle course as was most likely to lead to general agreement.

Sir John Simon ventured to make one reference, and one reference only, to M. Nadolny's speech. M. Nadolny had quoted Mr. MacDonald's insistence, in his speech ten days previously, that in any acceptable convention there must be give and take, and had suggested that in the matter of disarmament the great country which he represented had given all. That was quite true, in the sense that no further disarmament was asked of Germany. But the contributions of which the Prime Minister had spoken were not limited to the giving up of palpable, material, physical things like guns and ships. Indeed, the Prime Minister had emphasised that the contributions of which he spoke were not all of the same kind, and Sir John Simon would say most respectfully to M. Nadolny that there was a contribution which would weigh heavily in the scales of better international relations: the contribution of helping to establish confidence and mutual understanding; the contribution of patience and of faith in the goodwill of others; the contribution of recognising that for Germany, as for others, satisfaction could only be reached by stages and by compromise. With the most profound respect for M. Nadolny's great country, Sir John Simon would say that that was the contribution Germany was asked to make, and by making that contribution she could give great assistance to an agreed result in the Conference.

With regard to security, the United Kingdom delegation had been careful to insert in the draft Convention nothing to which it could not itself subscribe under that head. It would not have been candid or right to submit a draft Convention containing a number of clauses dealing with security which it would not itself be willing to sign. It had suggested what it believed to be a very real contribution indeed to security. If others, having regard to the regions in which they lived, could supplement that contribution, the United Kingdom delegation would be very happy: that was an arrangement between themselves in which it was not for others to dictate how they should proceed. If the value of the provisions under that head could be increased in such a manner as to contribute further to the establishment of a sense of security, to the firm establishment of peace, the United Kingdom's contribution would, to that extent, be completed and improved.

As he had said, Sir John Simon did not propose to discuss the merits of particular comments or suggestions which would be more appropriately considered under the particular article in connection with which they arose. For he assumed that, if the Commission unanimously adopted the method of a draft Convention, it would make good its resolve by considering the contents of that Convention, article by article. It was quite clearly understood, of course, that any delegation would be free to propose omissions, or additions, or alterations at any point.

He would venture, however, to ask his colleagues to be good enough to meditate upon one observation before deciding to propose amendments: that any change, any addition, however desirable, in one direction, was only too likely automatically and inevitably to provoke proposals for counterbalancing the change in another direction, just as the workman found every time he hammered out a bulge in one portion of a sheet of metal, that it had turned up in another portion of the sheet. This would set the whole balance swaying again and it would become impossible to measure calmly the real result of the deliberations.

The Italian delegate had observed, earlier in the debate, that if the Italian delegation had reason to propose amendments, that would probably be because of other amendments which it would have to discount and neutralise. Sir John Simon therefore ventured most respectfully to suggest that caution should be exercised, and he had the more right to say so because, as the Prime Minister had pointed out so clearly, what the Commission was good enough to call a British product was nothing more than a contribution made in all goodwill to the Conference as a whole composed of various streams of thought gathered from the French, American and many other proposals.

The United Kingdom delegation, as in some sort the authors and sponsors of the general plan, would do its best in future discussions to support the Convention and would be disposed to favour additions, amendments, or changes only if they were such as were calculated to receive general approval. Only by that means could the Conference avoid losing the advantage gained during the past three days; any other course, which caused the President's desk to be flooded with vast numbers of conflicting projects, was bound to throw it back into endless controversy over contradictory proposals.

Sir John Simon had intended to say what now became unnecessary, namely, that he very much hoped that, as the result of the favourable reception which had been given to the United Kingdom plan, a resolution might be adopted by unanimity, approving the draft Convention as a basis for future work, full right to propose amendments being reserved, and that it might be resolved to keep the future discussion of the Convention before the General Commission itself, so that from that time onwards it might have constantly before it the necessity of reaching a complete and articulated scheme, of adjusting the ideas of all to a common and accepted purpose.
In conclusion, Sir John Simon felt he must again gratefully express his thanks and the
thanks of the United Kingdom delegation for the generous treatment and the friendly welcome
the draft Convention had received. He hoped that henceforward the draft would not
be called the United Kingdom Convention, but the Convention adopted as a basis by the
General Commission as a whole. It was put forward as a means of entering upon the last
phase of the work of the Conference. It was put forward as providing a real and substantial
reduction of armaments. It was put forward as a contribution to peace. It embodied
the conception that a period of transition fixed, for example, at five years was about to begin.
It was an attempt to recognise and to embody what was possible by general agreement during
that period of transition.

Finally, Sir John Simon desired to remind the Commission of a passage in Mr. MacDonald's
speech which had touched him deeply, and which must have left its mark upon the memory of
everyone. All the greatest sentiments in the world could be expressed very simply, and the
Commission would recall that at the end of his speech, Mr. MacDonald had said that the risk
must be faced because the alternative was the certainty—a certainty hidden and unexpressed,
no doubt, but a certainty which, none the less, was the only alternative. Either the Conference
must strengthen its resolve to forge out of a draft Convention an agreement which all the
nations of the world could sign, or else, by its failure to do so, it would be guilty of a positive
act—the positive act of preferring to encourage the growth and development of those suspicions
and passions which might sweep the nations to catastrophe. By rejecting the one it chose the
other.

M. Beneš (Czechoslovakia), Rapporteur, presented the following draft resolution:

"The General Commission,

In view of the results of the general discussion concerning the draft Convention
submitted by the United Kingdom delegation;

Noting that this draft remains within the general framework of the draft Convention
drawn up by the Preparatory Commission and at the same time embodies new elements
resulting, on the one hand, from the studies undertaken in pursuance of the resolution
of July 23rd, 1932, and, on the other hand, from the decisions taken since the beginning
of the session on the basis of the previous proposals of other delegations, and notably of
the French delegation:

Decides:

(1) To take this draft as a basis for its subsequent discussions, the various
degagements retaining the right to propose modifications, amendments or additions
according to the wishes they manifested in their communications to the General
Commission;

(2) To proceed, at its next meeting, after the Easter vacation, to the
examination of this draft, chapter by chapter and article by article.

Delegations wishing to submit amendments to Part I of the draft are requested to
communicate them in writing to the Secretary-General of the Conference not later than
April 20th, 1933."

In this connection M. Beneš made the following remarks:

1. The discussion showed clearly that the United Kingdom plan had been adopted as
a basis for discussion; that was indicated in the text submitted to the Commission.

2. The draft resolution set out the conditions in which the United Kingdom draft could
be taken as a basis; these conditions were mentioned both in the second paragraph of the
considerations and in the first point of the decisions.

3. In point 2 of the decisions, the words "after the Easter vacation" clearly brought out
the idea of an adjournment of the work of the General Commission. The Rapporteur did
not make this proposal on behalf of the President of the Commission, but he had had occasion
to consult a very large number of delegations and he had ascertained that the general opinion
was in favour of an adjournment.

M. Dovgalevsky (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that his delegation had no
objection to adopting the decision contained in the draft resolution. It readily concurred in
point 1, and agreed to the suspension of the Conference's work if that were the unanimous
desire of the General Commission. It could not agree, however, to all the considerations; in
particular, it could not accept the reference to the resolution of July 23rd, 1932, against
which the Soviet delegation had voted when it was submitted to the Commission.

M. Nadolny (Germany) said he was in the same position as the delegate of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the German delegation having also voted against
the resolution of July 23rd, 1932. Furthermore, the draft resolution contained other points to
which the German delegation had raised a number of objections. For these reasons, M. Nadolny
could only adopt the first paragraph of the considerations and the text of the decision.
M. DI SORAGNA (Italy) said he would vote for the draft resolution, while observing that his delegation was in the same position as the delegations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Germany in as far as concerned the reference to the resolution of July 23rd, 1932, on which the Italian delegation had refrained from voting. In this connection, M. di Soragna associated himself with the reservations made by his two colleagues.

General TANCZOS (Hungary) said that his delegation was in the same situation as the Italian delegation with regard to the resolution of July 23rd, 1932. Consequently, he made the same reservations as that delegation with regard to the second paragraph of the considerations.

M. PFLÜGL (Austria) pointed out that the Austrian delegation had refrained from voting on the resolution of July 23rd, 1932. He was therefore obliged to adopt the same attitude as the delegates who had just spoken.

M. TITULESCO (Roumania) said he realised that there were technical reasons in favour of a suspension of the work for several weeks. He desired to point out that this adjournment was exclusively due to technical reasons. While agreeing to the suspension of the work he desired to be informed of the date on which it would be resumed.

The PRESIDENT said that M. Titulesco need have no fear; a date would be given before the meeting closed. As in his last speech he had deserted the President, however, there was nothing left but to put the resolution to the vote. The main point of that resolution was that after Easter the draft Convention submitted by the United Kingdom delegation would be taken as a basis for discussion; all the rest was a little superfluous.

The draft resolution was adopted by forty-two votes, no delegation voting against it.

The PRESIDENT then suggested that the General Commission should begin the consideration of the draft Convention, article by article, on Tuesday, April 25th, at 3.30 p.m.

The President’s proposal was adopted.


The President said that several speakers had raised the question of committee meetings. He felt sure the Commission would agree that it could safely be left to the Chairmen of the various committees or sub-committees, in whom the Commission had complete confidence, to decide whether it was desirable or essential that their respective committees should continue to meet during the vacation in order to do work which was likely to prove of value for the Conference’s further deliberations.

FIFTY-FIRST MEETING

 Held on Tuesday, April 25th, 1933, at 3.30 p.m.

 President: The Right Honourable A. HENDERSON.

97. AWARD TO MR. HENDERSON OF THE WATELER PEACE PRIZE FOR 1933.

Mr. Norman Davis (United States of America) said that, before the proceedings of the Conference began, he wished to make a few remarks concerning a very pleasing notice that was published in the Press that day to the effect that the President of the Conference had been awarded the Wateler Peace Prize for 1933. That prize was provided by a foundation established by a Dutch citizen, M. Wateler, who had laid down in his will that the annual revenue should be awarded as a peace prize to the person who had rendered the most valuable services in the cause of peace or had contributed to finding a means of combating war.

In choosing the President of the Conference, Mr. Henderson, as the third recipient of the peace prize, the Board of Directors made it plain that they had done so not only because of his lifelong work in the cause of peace, but principally because of his work as President of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments. Thus, in their letter making the award, they stated: ‘‘The energy, the persistence, the ability and the impartiality
with which, from the beginning of the Conference, you have conducted its arduous labours have caused the Board of Directors to choose you as the recipient of the prize for 1933."

Mr. Norman Davis was sure that, in expressing his own personal gratification and also that of his country at such a very well-deserved award, he was expressing the views of all those who had had the privilege of coming in contact with the President. The President had deserved the award, and the Conference was glad that the Board of Directors had appreciated the great service he had rendered and the persistence and enthusiasm with which he had continued to work.

The President said that, though he might not be believed, he desired to say without hesitation that this was one of the most embarrassing moments that came to public men during their attempt to serve the people. He had to thank Mr. Norman Davis very sincerely for his kind references to the great honour that had been conferred upon him in his capacity as President of the Conference. He had often thought that, in public affairs, one of the most difficult things to do was to have a secret kept, but he could assure the Commission that those who had had the matter in hand must be very capable of keeping a secret. Only on the previous day had a letter been handed to him by a member of the Secretariat which was the first intimation that anything in the nature of the award was under way. He must therefore compliment the Directors on their ability to keep a secret.

He could only hope that not only was the award of the prize an indication of the confidence of the Directors in him personally, but an indication that they still had confidence that the Conference would succeed in the task it had in hand. That, after all, was a matter of supreme and paramount importance.

The President very much appreciated that it should have fallen to him to be the recipient of the award. It would only strengthen his determination to continue during the remainder of his life to work for the cause of world peace, and more particularly for world peace to be secured through disarmament.

98. DEPUTATION FROM THE INTER-PARLIAMENTARY COUNCIL: COMMUNICATION BY THE PRESIDENT.

The President reported that, on the previous day, he had received a deputation representing the Inter-Parliamentary Council, which had presented to him the following resolution:

"The Inter-Parliamentary Council, at its meeting on April 24th, 1933, on the eve of the new session of the General Disarmament Conference;
Recalling its resolutions of April 13th, 1931, and of April 4th, 1932, and those of the Conferences of Bucharest (1931) and of Geneva (1932);
Faithful to the principles which have always been those of the Inter-Parliamentary Union with regard to disarmament:
Re-affirms that the general reduction of armaments and the development of the security of States are dependent one on the other;
That the work of reduction of armaments must be pursued on the basis of the principle of the equality of the rights and duties of States in the fields of security and disarmament, according to Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, provided, however, that the application of that principle does not result in an increase in present armaments;
That the work of moral disarmament must be sought in concrete solutions to that important problem, in order to bring about a détente among the nations and thus facilitate the peaceful settlement of disputes and contribute to the development of international solidarity and of the feeling of security;
Considering that the General Disarmament Conference has been sitting for more than a year and that it may be hoped that it will, during the coming session, reach decisions of principle on all the aspects of the problem submitted to it for study:
The Inter-Parliamentary Council considers it indispensable that the first Convention on the Reduction of Armaments resulting from the discussions within the Conference should include at least the following principles:

(1) A mass reduction of the armaments of the world of at least 25 per cent;
(2) The limitation of expenditure, in order to check the armaments race, whether qualitative or quantitative;
(3) The abolition of specifically aggressive arms, and particularly the total prohibition of bombardment from the air and of chemical, bacterial and incendiary warfare;
(4) The institution of a periodical and international control of the state of armament of the various countries and of a strict control of the manufacture of and traffic in arms;
(5) The creation of a permanent organisation for the preparation of the further stages of the progressive and accelerated work of disarmament."
The President urged the delegations to facilitate the business of the Commission by handing in any amendments to Parts II, III, IV and V as early as possible. That request especially applied to any amendments they might desire to move to Part II.

He then suggested that, in order that the Commission might obtain a broad view of the purport of the amendments to Part I, which had been moved by the Polish, Chinese, Soviet Union, Turkish, Norwegian and French delegations, the representatives of those delegations should first put before the General Commission the full effect of all the amendments of which they had given notice. The Commission could subsequently take up their discussion, article by article.

The President's suggestion was approved.

Count Raczyński (Poland) associated himself with the congratulations to the President on the award of the Wateler Peace Prize.

He had not expected to be called upon at the present meeting to give a full explanation of the scope of the Polish amendment; he would, nevertheless, comply with the President's request.

The Polish amendment to Part I of the United Kingdom draft Convention was very modest. It consisted of three articles which, on the one hand, did justice to the generous idea that States not Members of the League of Nations should be asked to collaborate in the efforts to preserve the peace of the world and, on the other hand, took account of the work already accomplished and the progress made by the League since its inception.

The Polish delegation had adopted a simple and flexible method in the light of the saying that the best is the enemy of the good, and with the conviction that the method proposed would be the more effective the more rapidly it was put into practice. The Polish delegation believed that, in giving the organs of the League, on the one hand, and the States not Members—particularly the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—on the other, power to agree on the action to be taken, it had taken account of what had already been done, and it considered that, in this way, it would be possible to follow the path that would eventually lead, later on, to fuller results.

The three articles proposed by the Polish delegation were as follows:

**Article 1.**

The following provisions agreed on between the States signatories of the Disarmament Convention, being Parties either to the Pact of Paris or to the Covenant of the League of Nations, shall constitute an integral part of this Convention.

**Article 2.**

It is declared under the terms of the present article that any recourse to force under the conditions in which recourse to war is forbidden by the Pact of Paris is a matter of interest to all the High Contracting Parties and shall be regarded as a breach of the obligations assumed towards each one of them.

**Article 3.**

In the event of recourse to force or threat of recourse to force in contravention of prevailing international undertakings, either the Council or Assembly of the League of Nations or one of the Contracting Parties which are not Members of the League of Nations may take the initiative with a view to immediate consultation between the Council or Assembly and the States which are not Members of the League of Nations, in accordance with such procedure as may be set up with a view to joint consideration of the proper means to prevent or render ineffectual any recourse to force as a means of national policy.

At the same time, the Polish delegation ventured to submit the following explanatory note concerning the above articles:

I. The Polish delegation considers that the discussion of Part I of the United Kingdom proposal cannot usefully take place without reference to Article 88 of the same proposal. The latter article, which reproduces almost verbatim the text of Article 50 of the draft Convention drawn up by the Preparatory Commission for Disarmament, provides for consultation of the contracting parties in the event of a derogation from the stipulations of the Disarmament Convention. Such a derogation may occur under this article in the event of war or any other menace to the national security of the contracting parties concerned. Consequently, joint consultation of the contracting parties under Article 88 will take place in approximately the same circumstances as joint consultation under Part I.

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"If Article 88 is not taken into consideration simultaneously and in conjunction with Part I, the result may be a regrettable confusion and possibly even the establishment of two parallel consultation procedures each independent of the other.

"II. The object of the Polish amendment to Article 1 of the United Kingdom draft is to fill a gap in this article which was no doubt not intended. Under the article as originally worded, Part I of the United Kingdom draft would only be open to the signature of those States parties to the Disarmament Convention which were also parties to the Pact of Paris. But some of the States taking part in the Disarmament Conference had not acceded to the Pact of Paris, though they are bound by the Covenant of the League. The Polish amendment allows of these States joining in the undertakings contained in Part I of the United Kingdom draft. At the same time, the Polish amendment expressly stipulates that Part I of the United Kingdom draft is to constitute an integral part of the Disarmament Convention.

"III. Article 2 of the United Kingdom draft is altered in the text proposed by the Polish delegation, the words 'recourse to war' being used in place of 'recourse to force'. The Political Commission has already approved a text prohibiting all recourse to force, and its decision should be taken into account accordingly in the subsequent work of the Conference.

"IV. The system proposed in Article 3 in its amended form differs from that of the original text in that, instead of providing for an international conference completely independent of the machinery of the League of Nations, it establishes a consultation procedure which fully safeguards the rights of the League and is based on the precedents of collaboration of States not Members of the League with the organs of the League. The Council or Assembly of the League, in considering various political problems which also concern certain States not Members of the League, has frequently thought fit to establish contact with the Governments of such States, with a view to action on common lines. It is only by such means that a consultation procedure can be established between the organs of the League as representing all the Members of the League on the one hand and States not Members on the other hand, while leaving intact the existing powers of the League.

"V. The initiative with a view to such consultation should rest either with the organs of the League acting on behalf of the Members of the League, or with the States not represented on the League. The forms of the consultation procedure might be established subsequently after the adoption of the principle of consultation itself. In any case, provision should be made so that States not Members have the same rights as States Members of the League, and in particular so that the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have the same rights as Members of the Council.

"VI. As, under the Polish amendments, it will be desirable to reserve for a future stage the elaboration of the forms of the consultation procedure, Article 4 of the United Kingdom draft should be omitted.

"VII. The general object of the consultation will be to ensure common action as between the Members of the League of Nations and States not Members, with a view to preventing any recourse to force or rendering such recourse to force inoperative. The final sentence of Article 3 in its amended form takes the place of Article 5 in the United Kingdom proposal.

"VIII. The Polish delegation reserves the right to state its views on the subject of Article 6 of the United Kingdom proposal at such time as the United Kingdom delegation sees fit to explain the meaning and scope of that article."

Count Raczynski added that the explanatory note on the Polish amendments was, he thought, sufficiently clear. As he had already said, the Polish delegation did not desire to set up too rigid a framework—on the contrary, it desired to maintain the utmost flexibility in the hope that in coming years and at subsequent meetings that framework would be supplemented. Count Raczynski believed this proposal took account of the facts, and he ventured to express the sincere hope that the members of the Conference, and in particular the United States delegation, would give it the welcome which the Polish delegation desired. Useful work could thus be done by following out that programme, which did not represent the maximum that might be achieved but constituted a concrete plan.

M. Wellington Koo (China) said he desired first to take the opportunity to associate himself with the congratulations to the President of the Conference for the honour conferred on him by the award of the Wateler Peace Prize, which he richly merited, because of his eminent services to the cause of peace.

M. Wellington Koo had not expected to be called upon to make a statement in explanation of the Chinese amendments.1 In compliance with the President's wishes, however, he would offer such elucidation as he was in a position to make.

Perhaps it was unnecessary to reiterate that, in general, the Chinese Government reserved its position with regard to the work of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments so long as the present unhappy situation in which China was involved remained unsolved; but wishing to contribute its best efforts to the work of the Conference, a work to which the Chinese Government and China were deeply attached, the Chinese delegation had proposed certain amendments to the excellent draft Convention submitted by the United Kingdom delegation.

These amendments consisted of four brief modifications. In general, their purpose was to bring about a better and—in the Chinese delegation’s view—a clearer relationship between the proposed Convention and the existing instruments of peace, particularly the Covenant of the League of Nations. With that end in view, the Chinese delegation had proposed, in the first place, that the words “war undertaken in breach of that Pact” in Article 2 should be modified to read “resort to war or to force for the purpose of resolving international differences”. The object of that suggestion was to promote peace and the peaceful settlement of international disputes. In the light of experience, the mere prohibition of war was not sufficient, and that point had been emphasised even in the Pact of Paris, which was the basis of Part I of the draft Convention. The phrase “resort to war or to force” included, not only war in its technical and legal sense, but also resort to armed action, which was just as menacing to the peace of the world and as dangerous to its order and tranquillity, and should be prevented as far as possible.

The second amendment was to replace the phrase “any five of them, provided that at least . . .” in Article 3 by “any one of the Parties to the dispute or, in the absence of a request from such a Party, of any five of the High Contracting Parties”. The object was not to restrict, as the original draft Convention appeared to do, the right of appeal for redress on the part of a State which might consider itself a victim of aggression. It would be recalled that in the League Covenant, an instrument of supreme importance in maintaining peace, the right of appeal was not limited in the sense now proposed. Under the Covenant, any Member had the right to bring a dispute before the League—namely, before the Council or the Assembly—without having to ask other Members to join in its request. The Chinese delegation believed that that right of appeal by any one contracting party was very important, and should be safeguarded under the Covenant. That was especially important, because where a situation arose in which one country might feel itself aggrieved and attacked, time was an important consideration. Delay might be of great disadvantage to the suffering party, and delay would necessarily follow if the consent of four other parties to the Convention had to be secured before a Conference could be held.

With regard to Article 4, it would be recalled that the conclusions reached at a conference called under Article 3 required the concurrence of the representatives of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and of a majority of the representatives of the other Governments participating in the conference, exclusive in each case of the parties to the dispute. In other words, it was necessary to obtain the concurrence of the seven Powers mentioned and a majority of the other Powers participating in the conference. There was an apparent discrepancy between that procedure and the procedure under the Covenant. For example, under Article 15 of the Covenant, where a dispute was brought before the Council or the Assembly, decisions, in order to be valid, required the concurrence of all the Members of the Council, exclusive of the parties to the dispute. It would be referred to the Assembly, the concurrence of the Members of the Council and a majority of the other Members was required. When the peace of the world was concerned, it was undesirable that there should be two procedures for arriving at conclusions. The Chinese delegation therefore proposed that the procedure suggested in Article 4 should be brought into conformity with the procedure under the Covenant, especially as the purpose was identical in both cases—namely, to arrive at conclusions as rapidly as possible for the maintenance of peace.

The Chinese delegation therefore proposed the following amendment to Article 4:

"After the words 'the United States of America', modify to read as follows: 'the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and of the High Contracting Parties who are Members of the Council of the League of Nations, together with a majority of the other Governments participating in the Conference, exclusive in each case of the parties to the dispute.'"

Finally, the Chinese delegation proposed the insertion, possibly between Articles 5 and 6, of the following article:

"It is hereby declared by the High Contracting Parties who are also Members of the League of Nations that the present Convention does not in any way prejudice the rights and obligations of the Members of the League, nor conflict with the powers of the Assembly and the Council under the Covenant."

That was in order to make it clear that the work of the Conference was intended to supplement and fortify the existing peace machinery, and not in any way, either directly or indirectly, to impair what already existed. When a decision was taken under the Covenant, whether by the Council of by the Assembly, in the case of a dispute, certain rights and duties accrued not only to the parties to the dispute, but also to the Members of the League in general. The Chinese delegation desired that these rights and obligations should not in any way be prejudiced by the Convention. It was quite true that Article 90 stated that the present
Convention was not to be interpreted as restricting the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations. But the Chinese delegation believed that on a point of such importance, where peace was involved, it was essential that the existing safeguards, especially the powers of the Council and the Assembly, as well as the rights and obligations of the Members of the League, should not be prejudiced. The Chinese delegation would be ready to give further explanations when Part I was discussed, article by article.

M. Dovgalevsky (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) would confine himself to a few very general explanations regarding the amendments proposed by the Soviet delegation.1 Article 3 of the United Kingdom draft Convention provided that in the event of a breach or threat of breach of the Pact of Paris, a conference between the High Contracting Parties should meet. It also provided that that conference should meet immediately at the request of any of those parties. The Soviet delegation proposed that the word "five" should read "three". In other words, it considered that it would suffice if three of the High Contracting Parties thought the conference should meet. Indeed, in the event of a breach or threat of breach of the Pact of Paris, a conference must obviously be able to meet without delay. To facilitate the procedure and to avoid any loss of time, the Soviet delegation therefore proposed to reduce from five to three the number of Powers which must join in the request for a conference.

The draft Convention also said that this request for a meeting of the conference "may be addressed to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, whose duty it will then be to make arrangements for the conference and to notify the High Contracting Parties accordingly". A special body, the Permanent Disarmament Commission, was, however, set up under the draft Convention for as long as the Convention was in force. A permanent body was therefore available, which should, in the Soviet delegation's opinion, make the necessary arrangements for the conference and notify the High Contracting Parties. The Soviet delegation consequently proposed that the request for a meeting should be addressed, not to the Secretary-General of the League, but to the Secretary-General of that permanent body. M. Dovgalevsky noted with satisfaction that on this question the Soviet delegation held the same view as the French delegation, if he had rightly understood the Note concerning Part I of the draft Convention submitted by the French delegation.2

Article 3 of the draft Convention said that the Conference should meet at Geneva, unless any other meeting-place was agreed upon. The Soviet delegation proposed that the following sentence should be substituted: "The place of the meeting of the Conference shall be decided by agreement between the High Contracting Parties". Indeed, it was not at all certain that a conference would actually meet. It was even to be hoped that it would not be necessary to call it. There would therefore be no point, in the Soviet delegation's opinion, in deciding immediately where it should meet. The conference would choose whatever place seemed the most practical, bearing in mind certain circumstances, such as, for example, the place where the dispute had occurred. It might also take into consideration the convenience of the different parties. It was obvious, in particular, that the work of the members of the Conference would be greatly facilitated if the meeting were held in a country in which each of them had a regular, recognised representative.

Finally, Article 3, as also Article 5, concerned, not only a breach of the Pact of Paris, but also the threat of breach of that Pact. Article 3 said that the Conference might meet "in the event of a breach or threat of breach of the Pact of Paris", and Article 5 was as follows:

1. It shall be the object of the said Conference, if called in view of a threat of breach of the Pact, to agree upon the steps which could be taken in respect of such threat and, in the event of a breach of the Pact of Paris being found to have occurred, to determine which party or parties to the dispute are to be held responsible.

The expression "threat of breach" was too vague. It would have to be decided at the time whether there was a threat of breach. Measures would have to be taken as rapidly as possible. In order to prevent a discussion as to whether there was or was not a threat of breach, a more precise definition of threat of breach must be laid down. The Soviet delegation therefore proposed to add at the end of Article 5 the following paragraph 2:

"The following shall be regarded as threats of breach of the Paris Pact:

1. Open and official threats to resort to military measures;
2. Handing in an ultimatum;
3. Severance of diplomatic relations;
4. Naval or air demonstration;
5. Concentration of large armed forces near the frontier;
6. Mobilisation;
7. Declaration of blockade or measures preparatory to a blockade;
8. Declaration of the existence of a state of war."

Those were the general explanations M. Dovgalevsky desired to put before the General Commission. He would, of course, take them up again when Part I and the amendments thereto were discussed.

M. Lange (Norway) warmly associated himself, on behalf of his delegation, with the very cordial tribute paid to the President by the United States delegate.

The amendment proposed by the Norwegian delegation consisted in the addition of a new Article 6(a) worded as follows:

"The signatory States agree to take the following preparatory legislative or administrative steps to enable them to apply the necessary measures of economic pressure immediately, more particularly:

(a) Authorisation enabling the Government to prohibit within the territory of the State the exportation and re-exportation of arms, war material and munitions, and raw materials capable of being used for the manufacture of arms, war material and munitions;

(b) Authorisation enabling the Government to prohibit the floating of loans in the territory of the State in the name and on behalf of a given State, or if necessary in the name and on behalf of residents in a given State;

(c) Authorisation enabling the Government to make correspondence and other means of communication with residents in a given State subject to special rules."

The above amendment was mainly of a technical character. It fell entirely within the framework of the first part of the United Kingdom delegation's draft, that referring to the great problem of security. In the speech he had made in the General Commission a month ago during the general debate on the draft, M. Lange had already said that this first chapter contained an idea of very great importance and very great significance—namely, the meeting of a conference which would be able to take decisions, decisions which, if not legally binding on the parties—that was a matter which could be discussed ad infinitum—would in any case have considerable moral weight. Under Articles 5 and 6, such decisions would refer, on the one hand, to the measures which could be taken with regard to a threat of war or to the use of force and, on the other, to the co-ordination of such measures.

It was in line with that idea that the Norwegian delegation had considered that it would be practical to lay down that such measures should be capable of having, without undue delay, consequences in the form of practical action on the part of the States. Needless to say, when there was a threat of war or even perhaps an outbreak of war, there was a whole series of measures of an international character that might be taken. The first thing, however, to be provided for was moral pressure, so as to call the attention of a country which had taken certain decisions concerning the opening of hostilities to the fact that, practically speaking, it would be isolated from all other States. Such pressure might make a State reflect, but it was not always enough. Everyone was aware of certain facts which proved that such moral pressure had not sufficed to avert tragic events. Hence, in accordance with the plan worked out by the second Assembly in 1921 for developing the measures with regard to sanctions, it would be desirable to make provision for the operation of diplomatic and also of economic and financial sanctions. That was the possibility to which the Norwegian delegation’s proposal referred. In the report submitted to the second Assembly in 1921 it had been suggested that the States should, in time of peace, prepare for this eventuality. There was no need to say that nothing was prejudged as to the use that might be made of such possibilities. It was only proposed that the States should undertake, so to speak, an engagement to mobilise. Just as all general staffs prepared mobilisation plans for the case of war, the Governments should prepare mobilisation plans for the application of the police measures that were required for the maintenance of peace.

The Norwegian proposal suggested three classes of measure. There would be first an embargo on exports and re-exports of arms. Next came measures devised for preventing the flotation or issue of a war loan in the territory of a State. Lastly, the Government would be empowered to decide that correspondence with residents in a given State subject to special rules.

He repeated that the Norwegian proposal did not in any way provide for the automatic operation of these measures. That would depend on the scope given to the decisions taken under Article 4 of the United Kingdom delegation’s draft. The aim in view was to ensure, if the Conference for which provision was made under Article 3 thought that certain sanctions should be applied, that no practical or legislative difficulties would arise which might hamper their operation. The Norwegian delegation had therefore framed its proposal in very elastic terms and, as he had already said, its proposal was purely practical in character and should not, he thought, give rise to any discussion of principle in the General Commission. To give practical effect to the suggestion, M. Lange proposed that it might be forwarded to the Sub-Committee that had already been set up to discuss problems connected with the question of security. He ventured to commend his delegation’s proposal to his colleagues’ consideration and was quite prepared, if that were considered useful, to take part in the Sub-Committee’s discussion on this particular matter.

2 See Minutes of the forty-seventh meeting of the General Commission, page 367.
M. Massigli (France) associated himself with the tribute paid to the President. He would recall that the French delegation had submitted the following note with regard to Part I of the draft Convention:

"In Part I concerning security, the United Kingdom draft contemplates two categories of measures: first, a consultative pact binding all the Powers signatories to the future Convention; secondly, special regional agreements concluded by certain of the High Contracting Parties.

"As regards the consultative pact, the French delegation does not feel that it need express an opinion on the matter until the delegations of the States non-members of the League of Nations have signified their point of view. It would simply point out that it stated its views on this question in Chapter I of its memorandum of November 14th, 1932. The Permanent Disarmament Commission seems to it the appropriate organ for the purposes of any consultations that may be necessary. The French delegation submits this suggestion to the General Commission.

"As regards the special regional agreements, referred to in Article 6 of the United Kingdom draft, which are designed to supplement and strengthen the existing factors of security—which cannot, of course, be interfered with—the French delegation notes that the Political Commission of the Conference, at its meeting on March 7th, passed a vote in favour of the principle of the conclusion of a European Pact of Mutual Assistance, leaving to a small Committee the task of framing the text of such a pact. It does not intend then to submit detailed or complete proposals before the constitution of that Committee; at the same time, with a view to facilitating its task, it will enumerate the principles which should, in its opinion, serve as a basis for the work to be done, principles designed at all events to govern the relations of the European States inter se.

" (a) Declaration of all the European States prohibiting inter se recourse to force as an instrument of national policy (in conformity with the text voted on March 2nd by the Political Commission).

" (b) Accession of the European States Members of the League of Nations to the General Convention to improve the Means of preventing War.

" (c) Right to mutual assistance:

" (1) For the States parties thereto, in the cases referred to in the security agreements now in force or subsequently concluded (Covenant of the League of Nations or regional security agreements registered with the Secretariat of the League of Nations).

" (2) For all the European States, in cases of flagrant aggression to be determined within a European regional framework. (In determining such cases, which should be limited to the most conclusive, the proposals of the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics might be taken as a basis.)

" (d) Creation, at the seat of the Government of each of the European States which may accept such an undertaking, of a commission appointed to establish any failure in respect of undertakings under the Pact of Paris and, further, the reality of the facts entitling to assistance in the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph.

" (e) Application of measures of assistance which the European States have agreed to take under the terms of the General Conventions or of the special agreements to which they are parties.

" (f) Accession of all the European States to the Convention concerning financial assistance.

"The fact that these special regional agreements will be incorporated in the General Convention means that all the High Contracting Parties, parties to that Convention, will thereby recognise the value of the said agreements in the matter of security in relation to disarmament. Consequently, they must undertake to do nothing that might impede their application."

M. Massigli would ask permission not to comply to the full with the request which the President had made to the Commission. The President had asked the movers of amendments to explain the general scope of the ideas they wished to submit to the General Commission. M. Massigli would beg leave not to do so, because the observations submitted by the French delegation dealt almost exclusively with the special regional agreements which were mentioned in Article 6 of the United Kingdom delegation's draft, but on which no details were given. This question of special agreements was entirely independent of that of the consultative agreements mentioned in Articles 1 to 5 of the draft. The French delegation, however, had already had many opportunities of stating its views on these special European agreements. The question

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2 Document Conf.D.146.
3 See Minutes of the seventh meeting of the Political Commission, page 45.
4 See Minutes of the fifth meeting of the Political Commission, page 22.
had been debated in the General Commission. The Political Commission had taken up a position in the matter. It had decided that agreements of this kind should be studied. When that study was taken up by such organ as was regarded as competent to do so, the French delegation would again have an opportunity of putting forward its opinion in detail. He therefore thought it useless to make any fresh commentary or offer any further preliminary remarks in connection with this debate which had already taken place and would begin again. He would accordingly confine his observations to the very brief remarks which the French delegation had submitted. To be more precise, he would like to explain why the French delegation had not thought fit to submit any amendments to Articles 1 to 5 at the present stage of the discussion.

The question of consultation between the States signatories to the Convention—an extremely important matter, which the French delegation warmly hoped would receive a positive solution from the General Commission—was rendered necessary by one fact—namely, that the States which would sign the Disarmament Convention were not all Members of the League. If they had been, there would have been no problem. An organisation for consultation would have existed. It seemed to the French delegation that as such consultation was desired—and the French delegation also desired it—the first point to ascertain before the discussion could be usefully inaugurated was the opinion of the countries not Members of the League. Why confront them with suggestions or demands which they could not accept, and, vice versa, why put forward unduly restricted proposals which would fall short of what such States, in their desire for international co-operation, might be able to accept? The French delegation would prefer in this matter to wait until it knew the views of the States to which he had referred.

M. Massigli wished to say at once that, when the debate had begun, the French delegation had been guided by two considerations. The first—and this had been reflected in the amendments submitted by many delegations, in particular those of Poland—would be to do nothing and to suggest nothing in the way of procedure or method which might result in weakening League organs or depriving them of subjects with which they were entitled to deal. The other would be to avoid over-weighting with new machinery the existing machinery or such machinery as could easily be completed. That was the reason why the French delegation had ventured to point out that, as the Convention was to contain a chapter on the organisation of a disarmament commission, the latter commission would perhaps be the most suitable body to undertake such consultations.

In this connection M. Massigli must apologise for not being entirely in agreement with the Soviet delegation. M. Dovgalevsky had stated that, in proposing that it should be the Secretary-General of the new commission to be set up and not the Secretary-General of the League of Nations who should take action he had been guided by the same idea as the French delegation. M. Massigli did not think that was the case. The French delegation's only aim in this matter was not to overweight the procedure, not to create useless machinery. If it were desired to set up special conferences for each urgent case that might arise, the probability would be that action would be taken too late. An endeavour must be made to take advantage of what existed and to use the simplest and most easily operated machinery.

That was the view which the French delegation had desired to put forward. Subject to this reservation, he desired to say that he earnestly hoped that the debate now beginning on the organisation of a really universal consultation would very speedily lead to a positive and concrete result which would mark a real progress in the international organisation of peace.

The PRESIDENT said that, as the Turkish delegation was not represented that day, he desired to place the following communication before the General Commission:

Amendment proposed by the Turkish Delegation

1. Communication from the Turkish Delegation.

"Ankara, April 17th, 1933.

I have noted the resolution adopted by the General Commission at its last meeting, inviting the States taking part in the Disarmament Conference to communicate their views on Part I of the draft Convention submitted to that Commission by the United Kingdom delegation.

I venture to suggest an amendment to Article 4, the new wording for which I enclose herewith, and will limit my remarks for the moment only to the procedure set up by the draft in question.

On the substance of the question I am not at present in a position to submit any observations, as the political situation, the developments of which we are closely following, is daily undergoing serious changes.

I feel that I must, however, take this opportunity of pointing out that, in his speech to the General Commission on March 24th, 1933, the Turkish delegate referred to the existing correlation and interdependence between the armaments of all categories and remarked that even the countries which had no navies were desirous that there should be

2 See Minutes of the forty-seventh meeting of the General Commission, page 364.
a corresponding reduction between the naval armaments of the States which are heavily
armed in this respect.

"In existing circumstances, pending the clearing of the political situation and the
restoration of calm, it would seem to be difficult and even risky to make any statement
whatever on the question whether the provisions regarding security as submitted in the
United Kingdom draft would or would not, in our opinion, be adequate.

"Like all the other States taking part in the Conference, Turkey of course will not fail
to explain to the General Commission her views on this question when the United Kingdom
draft, particularly Article 6 thereof concerning regional agreements, comes up for discussion
before the said Commission.

(Signed) Rüstü."

2. New Draft of Article 4 proposed by the Turkish Delegation.

"Any conclusions reached at such meeting shall, to be valid, require the concurrence
of a two-thirds majority of the representatives of all the Powers signatories to the present
Convention, exclusive in each case of the parties to the dispute."

Mr. Eden (United Kingdom) asked leave to make some observations in answer to the
amendments that had been put forward. He would, however, like to remind the General
Commission that the draft Convention under discussion was no longer that of the United
Kingdom delegation. The latter had been very happy to try and sponsor in a draft Convention
what it had thought were the ideas of many delegations, and as the General Commission had
a little while ago been good enough to adopt that proposal as its own basis of discussion, the
draft was no longer the United Kingdom Government’s child, but that of the General
Commission.

He was encouraged to find how comparatively few were the amendments that had been
presented, and he hoped that that might be taken as an indication that the greater part of the
delegations at least were sympathetic to the general purpose of the first five articles of the
draft.

With regard to the amendments themselves, the Polish delegation had submitted an
amendment to Article 1, proposing that the articles of Part I of the draft should be binding
on the Members of the League as well as on the signatories of the Pact of Paris. The object
was to bring within the scope of Part I certain countries which, though Members of the League,
were not signatories of the Pact. As a matter of fact, there would, even so, Mr. Eden thought,
be one country left out if an attempt were made to close the gap in that way. The United
Kingdom would welcome as an improvement any proposal to bring in as many as possible
of the States represented at the Conference, but he wondered whether it was reasonable that
States not signatories to the Pact of Paris should subscribe to articles prescribing action to be
taken in the event of a breach, or the threat of a breach, of that Pact. He could not at the
moment suggest words which would meet that situation, but he thought that an endeavour
should be made to do so.

With regard to the amendments to Articles 2 and 3, and also the Norwegian proposal
for a new Article 6a, he would like briefly to say that, in its original draft Convention, the
United Kingdom delegation had set out to find a basis for Part I which would have the widest
possible acceptance and the most general possible acceptance. Its choice of the Pact of Paris,
on which the draft Convention was based, had not been a fortuitous one. It was a basis which
a great many countries represented at the Conference had accepted. He would ask the General
Commission to consider before altering that very widely accepted basis, which had already
several years’ standing, whether it would be wise to seek to replace it by something that not
everyone yet agreed to accept as being of universal application. Therefore, he would say with
respect to the amendments to Articles 2 and 3, as also to the Norwegian amendment, that it
would not, in his judgment, be wise to overweight the chapter in question by those additions.
Particular care should be taken not to make it more difficult for States not Members of the
League to accept the articles in question. In that connection, Mr. Eden agreed with what had
been so well said by the French delegate. In framing Part I of the draft, the United Kingdom
degregation had kept in mind the necessity of making it as simple as possible, and, at the
present stage, the introduction of other factors, on which there was not at present universal
agreement, would complicate matters unduly. He would give an example to show why his
deggregation had followed the middle path. One of the Polish amendments was no doubt
intended to bring the League more closely into the operation of Part I, whereas one of the
Soviet Government’s was calculated to leave the League out. It seemed, perhaps, that the
United Kingdom proposal had chosen the middle path between the two. He would therefore
respectfully suggest that the Commission should be careful not to upset the balance of these
articles, particularly at present, and he would ask that these amendments to Articles 2 and 3
might not be pressed.

The Soviet Government had presented an amendment to Article 3 proposing that a
meeting might be summoned at the request of any three of the contracting parties instead of
five, the provision that one of these should be one of the Powers named in Article 4 being
apparently accepted. The difference between five and three seemed to be of no great moment,
and if the General Commission desired to substitute three for five the United Kingdom Government would, so far as Mr. Eden was concerned, have no objection.

The Chinese delegation had proposed an amendment to replace the phrase "any five of them" by the words "any one of the parties". He hoped that the suggested acceptance of the Soviet Government's amendment would satisfy the Chinese delegation on that point.

With regard to Article 4, the Chinese delegation proposed that the conclusions to be followed must require the concurrence of all the contracting parties who were Members of the League Council together with the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and a majority of other participating Governments. The objection to that proposal was that it would make it more difficult to obtain a decision. Mr. Eden did not think the General Commission would desire such a result.

With regard to Article 5, the Soviet delegation proposed to add a paragraph containing definitions of threats of breach of the Paris Pact. It was not quite clear to Mr. Eden what was the relation between this proposal and the Soviet proposal for the definition of an aggressor which was under consideration by a special committee. It was not known whether the former was to replace the latter, but, in any event, the new Soviet proposal seemed to be open to the same objection of principle as the old one—namely, that it laid down a series of rigid and automatic tests for establishing a breach or threats of a breach. The possibility of doing something of that kind had been the subject of many debates in the past, and hitherto the conclusion had always been that it was impossible to lay down any such rigid criteria for universal application, since it was impossible to foretell how they would work in any given set of circumstances, and there was serious risk that their application might result in the aggressor being pronounced the aggressor. Members were only too familiar with all these discussions. He would therefore suggest that, within the limits within which the Commission was at present working in regard to Part I, it would perhaps be wiser not to seek to add what would certainly be a very difficult, contentious and complicated subject.

The Turkish delegation had proposed that the conclusions mentioned in Article 4 should require the concurrence of only a two-thirds majority of the signatories. The United Kingdom delegation had chosen its method from a most respectable source—Article 15, paragraph 10 of the Covenant—and Mr. Eden thought that that was perhaps as good a method of voting as could be contrived. Subject to other views, therefore, he proposed that the Commission should adhere to the method of voting proposed in the draft.

The Chinese delegation had proposed to insert between Articles 5 and 6 a new article to safeguard the rights and obligations of Members of the League. He wondered whether perhaps this addition had been suggested because the Chinese delegation had not observed Article 90 of the draft Convention, which he thought covered the point in question. If it did not do so in the judgment of the Chinese delegation, it would, perhaps, be possible to go into the matter further.

So far as concerned the French delegation's amendments, which had only just been received, at a first glance Mr. Eden could see no reason why the Permanent Disarmament Commission should not be the appropriate organ for the purpose of consultation. That was a proposal which could be considered and which he thought might probably be accepted.

He would only add to his French colleague's appeal that the United Kingdom delegation had tried in Part I of the draft to achieve something that had hitherto never been achieved for universal world acceptance, and, in attempting to accomplish that during its present deliberations, the Commission should not lose sight of the wood for the trees, but should be content with a simple thesis which could be generally understood and universally accepted. If such a thesis were so accepted, its power and authority would rest on the universality of that acceptance.

The President hoped that the speeches made during the meeting might assist the General Commission when it came to deal with the various articles in Part I. He made an urgent appeal to delegations to send in as early as possible any amendments they might wish to submit to the other parts of the draft Convention.

The President was exceedingly anxious to get on with the work as quickly as possible, and if possible to finish the consideration of the draft Convention within the next two months. To do that, the Commission must work very hard, but he was convinced that, in the interests of the great cause that all delegates had at heart and the task that they had in hand, the sooner the discussion of the draft Convention could be concluded the better it would be.

1 See Minutes of the thirty-first meeting of the General Commission, page 237.
FIFTY-SECOND MEETING

Held on Wednesday, April 26th, 1933, at 3.30 p.m.

President: The Right Honourable A. HENDERSON.


Mr. Eden (United Kingdom) said that, so far as time had allowed, he had been able to see one or two of the delegations submitting amendments to Part I of the draft Convention. The result of their conversations was as follows:

First, there was the Polish amendment to Article I. The purpose of that amendment was to enable countries not themselves signatories of the Pact of Paris to accept Part I, but unfortunately even that amendment did not completely cover every case. If the following suggestion was acceptable to the countries which were not at present parties to the Pact of Paris, however, it would probably be agreeable to those which were signatories thereto.

The suggestion was to delete Article I as it stood in the draft Convention, and to begin with Article 2. A small verbal amendment would be required to Article 2, which would read: "It is hereby declared that any war undertaken in breach of the Pact of Paris . . ." That would cover every case and every country represented at the Conference. It was only necessary to discover whether this solution was agreeable to those countries which had not signed the Pact of Paris.

As the outcome of the discussion on Article 2, Mr. Eden was fully convinced that it was essential to continue to base Part I on the Pact of Paris, and he hoped that view would be accepted by the delegations which had proposed amendments. He did, however, fully appreciate the Polish delegate's anxiety—which he shared—to agree to nothing that might detract in any way from the scope or authority of existing League machinery. He had thought that the reference in Article 90 of the draft Convention—which, of course, referred to the whole Convention—would allay any anxiety on that score. To make sure, however, and to meet any anxiety which might still exist, such as that expressed by M. Massigli on the previous day, Mr. Eden would suggest the adoption of the fourth Chinese amendment, to be embodied, with a slight change of wording, as a new article immediately after the present Article 5, as follows: 2

"In conformity with Article 90 of the present Convention, it is hereby declared by the High Contracting Parties who are also Members of the League of Nations that the provisions of this part do not in any way prejudice the rights and obligations of the Members of the League, nor conflict with the powers of the Assembly and the Council under the Covenant."

Mr. Eden hoped that amendment would wholly meet the purpose of the Chinese amendment and would also go far to allay the very natural apprehension underlying the Polish amendment.

Mr. Eden further proposed the adoption of the third Chinese amendment, which was as follows:

"In Article 4, after the words 'the United States of America', modify to read as follows: 'the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and of the High Contracting Parties who are Members of the Council of the League of Nations, together with a majority of the other Governments participating in the Conference, exclusive in each case of the parties to the dispute'."

If that amendment met with general approval, the draft Convention might gain by its insertion.

Mr. Eden hoped it was clear that as a result of the above-mentioned conversations some real progress had been made in meeting the different points of view on the original draft, and he trusted that the measure of agreement secured was of good augury for future efforts to secure agreement on the draft Convention.

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2 See Minutes of the previous meeting.
Article I.

The Commission decided to delete Article I.

Article 2.

The President opened the discussion on the following amended text of Article 2:

"It is hereby declared that any war undertaken in breach of the Pact of Paris is a matter of interest to all the High Contracting Parties and shall be regarded as a breach of the obligations assumed towards each one of them."

Count Raczyński (Poland) said that the Polish delegation welcomed with satisfaction the suggestions of Mr. Eden, who had just informed the General Commission concerning the conversations held after the previous meeting with regard to the amendments proposed by the Polish delegation. The latter was of opinion that Mr. Eden's suggestions marked an advance, for they were inspired by a desire to take into account certain anxieties expressed by a number of delegations, in particular by that of Poland. Count Raczyński was, however, obliged to point out that the divergence between the thesis put forward by the Polish Government and the proposal contained in the first six articles of the draft Convention affected certain matters of principle and was unfortunately fairly wide. He was not therefore in a position to withdraw the proposal he had submitted on the previous day.

After the conversation held to-day, Mr. Eden had suggested to Count Raczyński that they should resume their discussions. Count Raczyński was unable to say whether it would be possible to find an acceptable compromise. He feared that there was a somewhat wide difference of principle and would not venture to make any prediction.

M. Dovgalevsky (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) observed that the Soviet delegation had proposed no amendment to Article 2. It had the satisfaction of being able to support that submitted by the Polish delegation.

The Polish amendment to Article 2 was designed, first to particularise the obligations assumed by the signatories to the Paris Pact along the guiding lines of the declaration of non-resort to force recently adopted by the Political Commission; secondly, to give substance to the declaration of non-resort to force suggested by the United Kingdom delegation a little while ago, but not mentioned in that delegation's draft; and, thirdly, to extend the declaration of non-resort to force so as to cover States outside Europe as well as those in Europe. The Soviet delegation had strongly pressed that point during the discussion of the draft declaration of non-resort to force.

He would also remind the General Commission that, during the discussion on that declaration, the Political Commission had itself recognised that the question of the extension of the declaration would have to be taken up again at a later stage.

Such were the reasons for which the Soviet delegation had great satisfaction in being able to support the amendment submitted by the Polish delegation.

M. Fotitch (Yugoslavia) said that before the beginning of the meeting he had submitted certain amendments to Part I prepared by the delegation of the Petite Entente. He apologised to the President and to his colleagues for having presented these amendments so late. He had been prevented from doing so earlier for certain technical reasons.

One of these amendments referred to Article 2. The delegations of the Petite Entente had reproduced the Polish amendment almost point by point, taking as their guide the decision adopted by the Political Commission with regard to non-resort to force, to which they attached exceptional importance.

For these reasons, on behalf of the three delegations of the Petite Entente, M. Fotitch warmly supported the Polish proposal.

M. Lo (China) said it was a matter of great satisfaction to the Chinese delegation that Mr. Eden had accepted two of its amendments. Their object was to make perfectly certain that the procedure proposed in Part I of the Convention would, in practice, always be interpreted in such a way as to harmonise and not to conflict with the machinery and obligations in connection with holding conferences, settling disputes peacefully, and taking joint action to keep the peace, to which the Members of the League were already committed under the Covenant. If the Commission accepted the amendments, they would be a very valuable addition to Part I of the Convention and a sign of progress in the important work on which it was engaged.

With regard to Article 2, M. Lo thought that he had not made it quite clear to the Commission hitherto that the object of the Chinese amendment was not to go beyond the Pact of Paris but to take account of the fact that Article II of the Pact forbade the use of any but
pacific means for the settlement of any dispute or conflict between States, whatever its nature or origin. The signatories of the Pact of Paris were already bound not to resort to force for the purpose of resolving international differences. The wording of the Chinese amendment had the further advantage of being in harmony with the declaration of non-resort to force adopted by the Political Commission some time previously and the universal application of which would be taken up later in the Conference. Moreover, experience had shown the importance of forbidding resort to force in any form, so that an aggressor might not escape his international responsibilities by legal quibbles as to whether or not he had technically resorted to war.

M. Lo added that he would gladly get in touch with Mr. Eden if he thought the Chinese amendment to Article 2 could be worded in such a way as to be satisfactory to him.

Tevfik Rüştü Bey (Turkey) said that the Turkish delegation associated itself with the Soviet delegation and supported with great satisfaction the amendment tabled by the Polish delegation. The Turkish delegation had adopted a similar attitude when a proposal of the same kind had been brought forward by the Persian delegation.

Mr. Norman Davis (United States of America) said that Part I of the United Kingdom draft Convention was designed to co-ordinate the efforts of Member and non-member States of the League to promote and establish peace through consultation and methodical co-operation when the peace might be threatened or broken. It was, he might now say, both the policy and the practice of the United States of America to confer where questions affecting peace were concerned. Part I of the United Kingdom plan, however, introduced a new element for the United States in the codification of the principle of consultation and its incorporation in a disarmament treaty.

The Government of the United States of America had that whole question under careful consideration at present. It appreciated the importance of harmonising the particular situation of the United States with any constructive efforts to meet the special needs, particularly on the continent of Europe, for the adequate organisation of the machinery for preserving peace. Mr. Norman Davis therefore anticipated taking occasion, at a later stage of the discussions, to indicate how it was considered that the United States might best associate itself in such efforts.

Its ability to make its collaboration effective would depend in a large part on the measure of disarmament which it might be possible immediately to achieve. It must be definite; it must be substantial. The United States of America was prepared to make very great efforts to assist in the maintenance of peace when the determination to preserve the peace was evidenced by the achievement of real measures for mutual and progressive disarmament.

It believed that, for the first time, the States of the world, and particularly in Europe, where the problem of armaments was most acute, were seriously desirous of taking effective steps to lower the level of armaments. It had reached that conclusion because of the growing conviction, particularly manifest in Europe, that armaments had become a source of political tension and instability and that there would be more security in measures of disarmament which would diminish the ability of any State to make a successful surprise attack on another. There was a realisation that that could be brought about especially by two means: the abandonment of weapons which facilitated aggression, and the establishment of effective and continuous supervision of armaments. To that end, it might be found necessary to reinforce those measures of supervision and control already envisaged.

The United States delegation agreed that the efforts of States Members of the League and of non-member States should be co-ordinated, not only in determining the measures of disarmament, but in their effective supervision. It agreed that all should work together for the maintenance of peace.

Before reaching a final decision with regard to Part I, Mr. Norman Davis suggested that the Commission might well pass on to other parts of the draft Convention, and in particular to Article 94 dealing with the duration of the treaty, which affected each and every decision it might take.

At the appropriate time, the United States delegation would be quite willing to revert to the general question dealt with in Part I with a view to giving a more precise indication of the manner in which it considered that the United States could most effectively co-operate.

The President felt it would be helpful if the United States delegation could have the full benefit of the discussion that was now proceeding and thought that, to that end, the Commission ought to proceed with the discussion of Part I and the amendments submitted. There was a further difficulty of a practical nature. The Commission could not act immediately upon the suggestion to pass on to Part II, inasmuch as the amendments to that part had not yet been circulated. Unless there was any decided objection, therefore, the President would advise the Commission to continue the discussion of Part I.

The Commission decided to continue its discussion of Part I.
M. ZUMETA (Venezuela) desired simply to say that he would vote in favour of the amendment submitted by the Polish delegation. He thought that, if that amendment were not taken into account, the General Commission would be failing to remain completely within the framework of the League Covenant.

General Mohamed OMER Khan (Afghanistan) said that his delegation had already supported the Persian delegation’s point of view with regard to the universal scope of non-resort to force. He was glad to support that point of view again and, consequently, associated himself with the declarations made by the delegates of Turkey and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

M. DE ACUERO Y BETHANCOURT (Cuba) said that his delegation supported the Polish delegation’s amendment, because it considered that, by substituting the term “non-resort to force” for “non-resort to war”, its wording was more explicit. The term “non-resort to war” always covered resort to force, whereas “non-resort to force” did not always cover resort to war. There were examples of that at the present moment. Several States were divided by disputes and had resorted to the use of force, although they had at the same time maintained diplomatic relations and had not declared war. For that reason, the Cuban delegation supported the Polish amendment which, in its view, was more explicit and more complete than the original text.

M. NADOLNY (Germany) reminded the Commission that before the Easter recess the German delegation had said that it was prepared to accept Articles 1 to 5 of the draft under discussion. He could add that his delegation was now prepared to accept the same articles with the changes proposed by Mr. Eden.

The object of the Polish proposal was to extend to the non-European States the decision already accepted for those of Europe. It followed that the German delegation would be prepared to accept that proposal, which, moreover, appeared also in the draft under discussion, but simply in the form of an annex to Article 6.

If it were desired to extend to the non-European countries the decision previously taken, it seemed to M. Nadolny that it was for those States to express their opinion on the matter and to intimate whether they were prepared or not to accept the Polish suggestion. The countries which had interests outside Europe should also be heard on this point. For the moment, therefore, he was unable to intimate his opinion on this proposal. He would have to wait until he knew the view of the non-European States and that of those with interests outside Europe.

M. MASSIGLI (France) found himself in a very embarrassing position, and he believed that that was true of some of his colleagues as well. On the previous day, he had said that, in the matter which the Commission was discussing, that of the Consultative Pact, the opinion of the States non-members of the League was an essential factor. The Commission had just heard an extremely important statement by the United States delegate. That statement contained certain positive factors of great value at which most of the members of the Commission would certainly feel great satisfaction. Nevertheless, Mr. Norman Davis had at the same time said, and his colleagues would appreciate his reasons, that his Government was not yet in a position exactly to define its attitude.

M. Massigli entirely appreciated the value of the conversations that were being conducted and, as the President had said, he was certain that the United States delegate himself might find it to his interest and advantage to hear the opinions expressed. M. Massigli would like to know, however, whether, in view of the existing circumstances, the President intended to take a vote. If so, M. Massigli feared that the result would be to hamper the adjustments or progress which everyone desired. While he was prepared to express an opinion in the Commission, on the understanding that that opinion embodied merely his Government’s general point of view and on condition that matters remained at that stage for the time being, he would be averse from giving a vote at the present moment. The members of the Commission were no longer working in the absolute plane; nor must any delegation expect to see all its contentions accepted in full. It was their duty to seek such adjustments as would enable progress to be made in the organisation of peace. As they were working within the realm of possibilities, one fundamental possibility in this matter was the unknown which existed and, as had just been pointed out, would exist for some time to come. He repeated, therefore, that if a vote were taken, he would be obliged to abstain for the time being.

The President, in reply to M. Massigli’s question, that he wished to make it clear immediately that he did not intend to take any definite vote on that or any other question at present. As he had already said, he attached very great importance to Mr. Norman Davis’s statement, and he thought the Commission ought to postpone its final decision until it knew what form the United States Government’s proposals would take. But unless all the delegations were prepared to state their views, it seemed to him that, in order to test the feeling of the Commission, he might, at a certain stage, ask the members to indicate by a show of hands whether they accepted the principle contained in the Polish amendment.
Mr. EDEN (United Kingdom) was in material agreement with what had just been said by his German and French colleagues. Mr. Norman Davis had extremely aptly described Part I of the draft Convention as an attempt to co-ordinate the views of Members and non-members of the League. That was, of course, exactly what the United Kingdom delegation had sought to do, and Mr. Eden sincerely welcomed Mr. Davis's statement and, still more, his assurance that he would have more to say at a later date. At the same time, Mr. Eden was somewhat doubtful whether anything was to be gained by discussing amendments until that date came.

The purpose of the United Kingdom delegation, as Mr. Eden believed he had made clear, had been to use the Pact of Paris as a basis, because it felt that basis was most likely to prove generally acceptable to every country represented, whether it was a Member or non-member of the League. Until the views of non-members had been ascertained, Mr. Eden frankly did not think any very useful purpose would be served by an expression of views, even by a show of hands. For his part, he could not possibly give a vote of any kind on any of the amendments until the views of the balancing elements—that was to say, of non-members of the League—had been made clear, and he would suggest to M. Massigli that, until those views were known, not even a temporary decision by a show of hands could be reached. While, therefore, he fully appreciated all the difficulties, he felt it would be a mistake to take a decision until the whole field was clearly in view.

M. DE VASCONCELLOS (Portugal) supported what M. Massigli and Mr. Eden had said. After the declarations that had been made, he thought it impossible for the Commission to take a decision. Furthermore, it was, in his opinion, difficult to discuss proposals which had only just been received and which the delegates had not been able to examine carefully. Moreover, certain proposals had not yet been circulated and had merely been read out. In such a matter, it was, he thought, essential to have the documents and to be able to study them carefully.

The PRESIDENT said that if there were objections to testing the feeling of the Commission in the way he had suggested, the only means of ascertaining its desires was for the members of the Commission to express their views. The point raised by M. de Vasconcellos would be quite in order if the President had proceeded upon an amendment that had never been circulated, but the amendments in question had all been in the hands of the members for some days.

101. DRAFT CONVENTION SUBMITTED BY THE UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION: PART I, SECURITY: ADDITIONAL AMENDMENTS SUBMITTED BY DELEGATIONS.

The PRESIDENT informed the Commission that, since the last meeting, further amendments to Part I had been submitted and were as follows:

(a) **Amendments submitted by the Delegations of the Petite Entente**: ¹

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(1) Article 2. — For ‘any war undertaken in breach of that Pact’, read ‘any resort to force in the circumstances in which the Pact of Paris prohibits resort to war’.

(2) Article 3. — For ‘any five of them, provided that at least one of the Governments mentioned by name in Article 4 joins in that request’, read ‘any of the Parties to the dispute or any five of the High Contracting Parties’.

(3) Article 4. — For ‘the representatives of the Governments of the United States of America, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and of a majority of the representatives of the other Governments’, read ‘a two-thirds majority of the Governments’.

(4) Article 5. — Add a new paragraph as follows: ‘The measures for which a special procedure is expressly prescribed by the Covenant of the League of Nations shall not be taken to this end.’

(5) Add a new Article 5(a) as follows: ‘In the event of a breach or of a threat of breach of the Pact of Paris, in so far as such breach or threat of breach is equivalent to a breach or threat of breach of the Covenant of the League of Nations and if the matter has been laid before the League of Nations, the procedure prescribed in Articles 2 to 5 of the present Convention shall not be applied until the procedure prescribed by the Covenant of the League of Nations has been exhausted or unless a decision has been taken in the matter by the Council or the Assembly of the League of Nations.’"
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Additional Articles 7 and 8 proposed by the Turkish Delegation: ¹

"Article 7. — The High Contracting Parties undertake to enter into no political or economic combination that might infringe the rights of any one or more of them.

"Article 8. — In the event of a breach or threat of breach of the undertaking embodied in Article 7, the matter shall be referred to the Permanent Disarmament Commission at the request of any one of the Parties.

"Should the Permanent Commission think fit to convene the conference provided for in Article 3, the conference shall meet immediately. It shall likewise meet at the request of any three of the Contracting Parties. Should the conference decide that the treaty or undertaking forming the subject of the request is incompatible with the spirit and letter of Article 7, such treaty or undertaking shall be deemed to be null and void."

The President added that, in view of M. de Vasconcellos's very proper objection to considering amendments which the delegates had not had an opportunity of studying, he proposed to adjourn the meeting. He must, however, point out, at this stage, that it would be quite impossible for the Commission to carry on its work if these delays in sending in amendments continued. The General Commission had itself decided that all amendments to Part I should be submitted by April 20th: that had not been done in the above two cases. The President must urge the delegations to send in as soon as possible any further amendments to Parts I, II, III, IV and V they might have to submit.

FIFTY-THIRD MEETING

Held on Friday, April 28th, 1933, at 3.30 p.m.

President: The Right Honourable A. HENDERSON.

102. Draft Convention submitted by the United Kingdom Delegation ²: Programme of Work: Recommendations made by the Bureau of the Conference at its Meeting held on April 27th, 1933.

The President informed the Commission that, at the close of the fifty-second meeting, he had given further consideration to the important statement made by Mr. Norman Davis, and he had come very definitely to the conclusion—and on this point he had consulted the Secretary-General—that it would be a mistake for the time being to continue to discuss Part I of the United Kingdom draft. It had therefore been decided to invite the Bureau to meet. The Bureau had met on the previous day, April 27th, and had discussed the question of procedure from every angle.³

In submitting the matter to the Bureau, the President had put before it one or two considerations that had influenced his opinion. First, there was the important statement made by Mr. Norman Davis at the General Commission's meeting on April 26th. Secondly, the suggested date of June 12th for the opening of the Monetary and Economic Conference in London meant that, if the Disarmament Conference was to be of such assistance as he hoped it might be to the Economic Conference in coming to decisions, it was absolutely essential that it should make very rapid progress in its work, more especially with Part II of the United Kingdom draft Convention, which dealt definitely with the question of disarmament. A third point that had to be kept in mind was that there were only a few weeks before Whitsuntide.

After giving the matter most careful consideration, the Bureau had decided to make three recommendations:

(1) That the General Commission should suspend for the present the examination of Part I of the United Kingdom draft Convention and pass on to the examination of Part II;

(2) That the Committee on Effectives should be requested to continue and accelerate its work, which Committee, he was happy to say, was discussing the question of effectives in the light of what was said in Part II of the United Kingdom draft Convention;

³ See Minutes of the fortieth meeting of the Bureau.
(3) That the Committee dealing with questions of security, which had previously been set up by the Political Commission to consider especially questions relating to the aggressor, should also examine the points raised by Article 6 of the United Kingdom draft Convention, as proposed by the French delegation.

The recommendations of the Bureau were approved.


"Article 7.

"The High Contracting Parties agree to limit their respective armaments as provided in the present Convention."

The President observed that there were no amendments to Article 7.

Article 7 was approved without discussion.

Section I. — Effectives: Chapter I. — Provisions as to Numerical Limitation.

"Article 8.

"The average daily electives in the land, sea and air armed forces of each of the High Contracting Parties shall not exceed the figures laid down for such Party in the tables annexed to this chapter."

The President said that no amendments to Article 8 had been sent in.

Mr. Norman Davis (United States of America) desired to say, now that the Commission was approaching the consideration of the actual disarmament provisions of the United Kingdom plan, that his Government regarded that plan as making a very valuable contribution to the Conference's work and as a very definite and excellent step towards the attainment of its objective—namely, a definite and progressive limitation and reduction of armaments. It should, however, be looked upon merely as a step which must be followed by progressive steps until armaments were brought down to the level at which they ought to be.

While the plan contained certain provisions that were unsuitable for his country, and undoubtedly contained provisions that were unpalatable to all countries, he felt that its many merits greatly outweighed any of its defects. It did not go so far in many respects as the United States Government would like; in fact, it did not go as far as some of the proposals which that Government itself had submitted to the Conference.

The United States delegation felt that every effort should be made to adopt the United Kingdom plan as a whole without offering any modifications which would unduly weaken it or jeopardise the nicely adjusted balance which it presented. Mr. Davis hoped that all delegations could approach its consideration in a real spirit of accommodation, concentrating their attention more upon the advantages which it offered as a whole than on some of the particular disadvantages which it might offer in minor respects. Amendments bred amendments, and each delegation that refrained from offering an amendment would prevent dozens of other amendments from being offered. The United States delegation would therefore join in resisting any modification which unduly weakened the plan and jeopardised its adoption as a whole and the success of the Conference.

Mr. Eden (United Kingdom) wished briefly to express, on behalf of the United Kingdom Government, its sense of deep appreciation of the extremely generous terms in which the United States delegate had welcomed that stage of the work upon which the Commission was now engaged. He would like to assure Mr. Davis how much the United Kingdom delegation appreciated the spirit in which his declaration had been made. Mr. Eden could not but think that it would find an echo among all those who might be judging the draft Convention.

He need not repeat that his delegation no longer regarded the draft as its child but as that of the General Commission, and though it knew full well that there were aspects of it unpalatable to all—there were some unpalatable to the United Kingdom delegation itself—that was bound to be the case in any document that was to effect any useful purpose to the end before the Conference. He would only add that, in so far as the document under discussion might be held not to go far enough, that was perhaps only because the United Kingdom delegation had been anxious to retain the balance. He might confess that, so far as he had seen or spoken

1 See Minutes of the eighth meeting of the Political Commission, page 56.
to colleagues in regard to amendments, it seemed that the United Kingdom delegation had gone too far rather than not far enough; but if the course of the present proceedings showed him to be in error, he could only say that the United Kingdom Government would cordially co-operate with those who wanted to go further than the draft Convention.

In reiterating his thanks for the words which the United States delegate had uttered, he would add the hope that the generous example which Mr. Norman Davis had set might be universally and speedily followed.

M. Rutgers (Netherlands) hoped that the few comments he had to offer on this article would not fall under the conditional condemnation contained in the United States delegate’s speech. Indeed, the point from which M. Rutgers set out in his present observations was to be found in the statement made by Mr. Norman Davis two days previously. Mr. Norman Davis had reminded the Commission that a greater measure of security would be obtained from disarmament measures capable of preventing surprise attacks, and he had added that the measures of control already contemplated needed strengthening. M. Rutgers wondered whether Article 8, which the Netherlands delegation accepted unreservedly, presented this double aspect of security against surprise attack and of supervision, and whether it should not be strengthened. Article 8 concerned the average daily effectives. Although the article did not say so, that must, of course, be taken to mean the average daily effectives per annum. A breach, resulting from failure to observe the obligation contained in that article, could only be established when, in any given year, the daily number of men attained by a State exceeded the number authorised by the Convention. Consequently, the calling to the colours in, say, the first half of the year, of a number of men exceeding the normal number could not be regarded as a breach so long as there was still a possibility that the State in question would not exceed, by the end of the year, the average effectives fixed in the Convention. Such a call to the colours, made perhaps for the purposes of manoeuvres, while not contrary to the obligations devolving from the Convention, might nevertheless constitute a serious menace to peace. That would be one way of making inoperative, in fact, the provisions of the Convention, and more particularly those of Article 8.

The Netherlands delegation had wondered whether it would not be wise to obviate this danger to which it had already called the Conference’s attention. For the moment, it had no amendment to submit on the matter, because the Committee on Effectives had been instructed to study the question whether there should be an absolute maximum of the number of men present with the colours at any period in the year. A maximum figure of that sort would, to a certain extent, diminish the danger to which he had just referred; but it must be remembered that, in order not to render manoeuvres impossible, the maximum contemplated would have to be appreciably higher than that of the average daily effectives.

The Netherlands delegation had further wondered whether it would not be possible to forbid States to exceed at any time the agreed maximum for the average daily effectives by more than 20 per cent, except, primarily, in the case of manoeuvres, on condition that the date of the commencement and end of the manoeuvres, and the number of the effectives taking part in them, were notified to the Permanent Disarmament Commission one or two months in advance.

For the time being, the Netherlands delegation would not submit an amendment on this point. It simply desired to call the Commission’s attention to the above considerations, and would await the result of the discussions in the Committee on Effectives.

Article 8 was approved.

Articles 9 to 13 and Tables: General Discussion.

The President observed that the German delegation had submitted two amendments\(^1\) to Article 9.

M. Nadolny (Germany) said that the German delegation had not hesitated to reply to the President’s invitation, and had submitted amendments to the second part of the United Kingdom draft within the period laid down. It felt that, in the interests of the speedy conclusion of a convention based on general agreement, all delegations desiring to modify the draft should make known their amendments as soon as possible, in order that the work of adjustment and conciliation, without which no convention could be achieved, might begin. While he appreciated the great importance of the explanations given by Mr. Norman Davis and Mr. Eden, M. Nadolny believed that there were a number of questions of detail as to which opinions were divided—that was shown by the proposals before the Commission—and which the Commission must discuss. It was above all natural that the disarmed States, which by that very fact were in a special situation, should have certain considerations to bring forward.

\(^1\) Document Conf.D./C.G.71. (See Minutes of the fifty-fourth meeting of the General Commission.)
As far as the German delegation was concerned, the Commission would have seen that it had confined itself, in the first place, to proposing amendments to Part II, Section I—that was to say, amendments with regard to effectives. M. Nadolny thought it more practical to comment on them as a whole, and asked the President’s permission to do so. The fact that the German delegation had confined itself to Section I did not mean that it had no amendments to the other chapters of the draft. Such amendments would be communicated to the Conference as soon as possible.

The German proposals were accompanied by the following summary of the considerations of principle underlying them:

"In formulating its amendments to Part II, Section I, of the United Kingdom proposal, the German delegation is actuated by the following considerations:

The provisions of the Disarmament Convention should be based on Article 8 of the Covenant. It is essential, under the terms of this article, to realise effective, substantial and general disarmament, and to base the determination of the armaments of each State on a proportion guaranteeing the national security of all.

For this reason, the German delegation considers it necessary to strengthen still further the measures of disarmament for which the United Kingdom proposal provides—in particular, by the prohibition and destruction of offensive weapons and military aircraft.

Further, while accepting in principle the idea of a transition period of five years, the German delegation considers that the equality of rights which is due to Germany should be given practical expression in the Convention.

For this reason, in the matter of effectives, the question of German armaments must be settled in relation to the armaments of the other States in such a way as to guarantee the national security of Germany.

Moreover, Germany should be authorised to possess any class of arms which other States consider necessary for the defence of their country.

Lastly, provision should be made to place Germany, after the expiry of the first Disarmament Convention, in the same legal position as the other States, and to arrange for the meeting of a conference in good time before the expiry of the Convention with a view to a further reduction of armaments."

The German delegation felt that it was essential to apply those principles to the General Disarmament Convention. They could be summed up in one sentence, which was to be found at the beginning of the statement. The German delegation desired the general realisation of Article 8 of the Covenant, no more and no less. That meant the realisation of a general limitation of armaments to a minimum guaranteeing to all States national security and, as regards Germany in particular, equality of rights and the safeguarding of her national security in the same way as that of the other Powers. M. Nadolny thought, moreover, that Germany’s right to that was no longer questioned.

The German delegation was very well aware, however, that if agreement was to be reached, it was necessary not only to urge one’s rights, but also to show goodwill. In replying to M. Nadolny’s observations on the United Kingdom draft on March 27th, Sir John Simon had expressed that idea in saying that Germany too must give something more—namely, patience and confidence. But had not Germany shown the greatest goodwill in taking account also of the points of view of the opposite party? M. Nadolny had no desire to repeat that Germany had waited for fourteen years for engagements to be fulfilled which, as was known, were not laid down by her in the first place, but by the opposite party, which party had freely affixed its signature thereto. Had not Germany agreed to a transitional period before complete equality of rights was reached, although, according to a decision taken by the League, progress by stages was provided for only for the reduction of the more heavily armed, but did not apply to the minimum national security provided for in Article 8? And it should be noted that, up to the present, Germany had not put forward all the claims following from equality of rights, seeing that she was disarmed?

Then again, had not Germany agreed to a transitional period before complete equality of rights was reached, although, according to a decision taken by the League, progress by stages was provided for only for the reduction of the more heavily armed, but did not apply to the minimum national security provided for in Article 8? And it should be noted that, up to the present, Germany had not put forward all the claims following from equality of rights.

She hoped that the moderation she had shown would induce the other States also to show goodwill in order that agreement might soon be reached on the Convention. All she asked for was justice and equality for all. That was at the root of all confidence, and she could not but ask that it should be borne in mind as far as was necessary to make quite clear Germany’s equality of rights as a great European Power, and to ensure to her a minimum of national security.

Those were the considerations underlying the German amendments relating to Section I of Part II of the draft. As could be seen, they concerned four points, and first of all Article 9.

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1 For the text of the amendments, see Minutes of the fifty-fourth meeting of the General Commission.
3 See Minutes of the fiftieth meeting of the General Commission, page 399.
The German delegation was obliged to move an amendment to Article 9 (a), which contained a definition of the word "effectives." It considered that the word "effectives" did not cover only reservists called to the colours at a given moment, but all trained reserves who, having completed their active service, remained on the rolls and were liable, under the law, to follow periods of training and to perform military service in time of war.

The German delegation had always adopted that point of view, and still thought that trained reserves constituted the decisive personnel element of conscript armies in time of war. It could not therefore agree that they should not be included in effectives. During the discussions in Sub-Commission A, several delegations had stated that trained reserves, although they remained in their own homes in normal times, were nevertheless military elements of the greatest importance in peace time, and were available for service immediately war was declared. Indeed, it was necessary to take into consideration the fact that trained reserves, incorporated in the units formed at the time of mobilisation, were the effectives, properly so called, of the mobilised land forces.

As to the method of calculating trained reserves, the German delegation had had in mind the following considerations. On the one hand, reservists who went through a period of training must be calculated, in accordance with the system of average daily attendances, on the basis of the number of days of training they actually served. Those reservists, however, who were not required to follow a period of training but who must be regarded as fully trained and could be called to the colours immediately on the outbreak of war, were of less value than reservists following periods of training; but they must nevertheless be included in the calculations on a basis corresponding more or less to their actual military value.

In order to keep within the framework of the system of daily attendances, the German delegation therefore proposed to include these reservists not called up for periods of training in the calculations as though they had performed seven days' duty a year. In that way, fifty-two of these reservists would be considered as equivalent to one soldier in continuous service for a whole year. As reservists called to the colours for a period of training were generally called up for from fourteen to twenty-one days, the difference as compared with reservists not undergoing periods of training was sufficiently clear.

Further, the German delegation proposed the insertion in Article 9, at the end of paragraph (c), of the definition of the term "military training" adopted by the Committee on Effectives and embodied in document Conf.D./C.S.E.22 (1). It seemed advisable to insert that definition there, in order to ensure that all States attached the same interpretation to Article 9 (c).

The German delegation moved an amendment to Article 12 similar to the amendment it had submitted in the Committee on Effectives on the criteria giving the police force a military character. As that question had already been discussed in the Committee on Effectives, M. Nadolny thought he might confine himself to a few brief observations as to the reasons why the German delegation had submitted the amendment.

It felt that, in view of the internal situation in all States, the provisions of the draft under discussion were too restricted. The internal conditions at the present time, particularly in the big, densely populated States, made it necessary to give the police force executive means greatly exceeding any they had previously possessed. That did not apply only to its rapid use in unforeseen emergencies, which required that it should to some extent live in barracks, but also to its equipment and training. That did not mean that the police force was thereby given a military character. The criteria set out in the draft under discussion could only render a police officer of that kind capable of use in modern war when all the criteria were present, not only one or another of them.

Consequently, the German delegation did not think it could be concluded that the formation in question was of a military character owing to the existence of one of the criteria contained in Article 12. On the contrary, it thought all the criteria must be present for a formation to have a military character.

With regard chiefly to the criterion of armament, the German delegation considered that that criterion was only important when the quantity and character of the collective arms enabled the formation in question to be classified, from the tactical point of view, with military units.

The German delegation proposed that military organisation should be taken as one of the chief criteria, and felt it would be a mistake to regard it as a secondary criterion. Military organisation, in as far as it concerned both the higher command and the fact that the formation was placed under the Ministry of War, undoubtedly constituted a criterion which strengthened the military character of a formation.

Further, the list of criteria would be incomplete if it did not contain the criterion mentioned in Article 4 of the original draft Convention submitted to the Conference as being the only criterion for determining military character—namely, the possibility of employing the formations in question for warlike purposes without measures of mobilisation.

If military organisations were omitted from the list of criteria suggested for doubtful cases, the German delegation proposed that another criterion should be added to the list—namely, training given by a training staff belonging to the army proper.

The next amendment concerned Table I. In the German delegation's view, that table should be prepared in such a way that the effectives entered in it for each State represented,
in comparison with the effective of the other States, a ratio of armed strength which would guarantee the national security of all States. The details would be examined when the ratio between the various effective of the States had been fixed. The German delegation would therefore await the result of subsequent discussions on that point, and only then would it be in a position to say whether the figure proposed for Germany did or did not correspond to the minimum required by her national security.

The German delegation's proposal with regard to the amendment of the heading of the table hardly called for explanations, as the reasons why the German delegation had made this proposal were contained in the document before the Commission.

It would be remembered that the German delegation had already asked more than once that the forces stationed in overseas territories situated near the home country should be included in the forces of the home country itself. The reasons in support of this argument had frequently been explained and were obvious. The overseas forces in question constituted part of the military forces of the country and could be transported rapidly and without difficulty to the home country to reinforce the troops in the latter. That consideration should be recognised by including, in the first column of the table, both the forces of the home country and overseas forces stationed near the home country conjointly.

A special provision must also be laid down with respect to armed forces stationed in distant overseas territories, to prevent their use outside such territories. The German delegation therefore proposed a new Article 14, according to which the contracting parties undertook to use the armed forces stationed in distant overseas territories in those territories only, and solely for the maintenance of order and for the defence of the frontier. In making this proposal, the German delegation had had in mind Article 22 of the Covenant.

The last amendment concerned the standardisation of the European armies dealt with in Chapter 2 of the draft. As was said in the document before the Commission, the German delegation felt that the question of the standardisation of European armies was not ripe for an immediate decision. The discussions on that question had brought out certain divergencies of opinion from which it must be supposed that no rapid decision could be reached at present. The German delegation had already stated that it viewed such a proposal with very great reserve and had the most serious doubts with regard to it. M. Nadolny did not desire to insist on the fact that those who, in the Treaty of Versailles, had forced a professional army on Germany in order to prevent any policy of aggression could not now ask that she should abolish that army and revert to the mass army with short-term service such as Germany had had formerly. On the contrary, it was rather Germany which might ask other States to adopt her type of army, and no one could question the logic of such a claim. But the German delegation would not go so far. It would be contrary to its principle that, as far as possible, each State should be free to develop in its own way, and that no army system which did not meet its special requirements or the social and economic conditions of the country should be forced upon it. M. Nadolny would rather point out that the question as to what system of army was most appropriate for offensive or defensive purposes was obviously still far from clear. Not so very long ago, Germany had been told, in reply to a question whether she should keep her present system or should change it, that she must keep it, and the reasons put forward during the recent discussion had shown that the experts were still very divided as to the character of any particular system. Further, it was desired to allow States outside the continent of Europe to retain their professional armies with long-term service. Nevertheless, it was not suggested that those States would pursue aggressive ends. It was for this reason, however, that the German delegation felt that the standardisation of systems of armies could not in any event be limited to continental Europe but would have to be universal.

In these circumstances, the German delegation thought it impossible to decide this question immediately, but felt, on the contrary, that it should be referred to the Permanent Commission, which should be asked to study it at once. The German delegation had made a proposal to this effect, which would replace Chapter 2 as it stood at present. This proposal did not mean that the German delegation was in principle opposed to the idea of introducing as standardised a type of army as possible. Nor did it mean that Germany was not prepared to make certain changes in her Reichswehr. But, as M. Nadolny had just explained, the German delegation considered that the question of setting up a system of standardised armies had not been studied sufficiently to enable it to accept the provisions of the United Kingdom draft on this point.

Those were the few explanations with which M. Nadolny wished to accompany the amendments the German delegation had had the honour to submit to the Commission. He hoped the Commission would recognise that they were reasonable and would find it possible to take them into account.

The President observed that, in his speech, M. Nadolny had not only introduced his amendment to Article 9, but had covered the whole ground of Part II, Section I. It therefore seemed necessary for the President to allow subsequent speakers to take the same line—i.e., not to narrow the discussion down but to allow it to have the widest possible character covering everything in Section I of Part II. In saying that, however, he
would venture to express the hope that, when the Commission came to deal with the amendments one by one, there would not be a repetition of the same speeches. That was no reflection upon M. Nadolny; it applied to subsequent speakers; but he thought that delegates would agree that it would be a mistake for him to encourage a general discussion over the whole section of the amendments raised by M. Nadolny and then have further long speeches when the Commission came to deal with each amendment separately.

M. MASSIGLI (France) said that, when he had come to the meeting, he had thought that he and his colleagues were going to take part in a debate similar to that of the previous days, and that they were going to discuss, in an atmosphere of calm and goodwill, the articles of the Convention and the amendments relating thereto. He regretted that this method had not been followed. But M. Nadolny, no doubt from motives of sincerity which M. Massigli appreciated, had desired to explain the system on which the amendments he was submitting were based; and, while submitting them, he had accompanied them by a commentary which went much further than the amendments themselves. M. Massigli might regret this method of discussion; but since it had been chosen, and while remembering the President’s recommendation, he also felt obliged, to his regret, to widen somewhat the scope of the debate.

He wished to say at the outset that he did not intend to reply point by point to the numerous arguments which had been put forward, nor to discuss at present the details of the German amendments. But it was his duty to endeavour to explain the impression which, in his opinion, was given by the declaration which the Commission had just heard and by the conclusions which would appear to devolve therefrom with regard to the subsequent course of the debate.

M. Nadolny’s speech had contained three themes: a vindication, an accusation and a programme.

Of the vindication M. Massigli would say nothing. Everyone was free to praise his delegation’s attitude; it was for the Commission alone to judge.

As regards the accusation, M. Massigli also had nothing to say, because he would be averse from improvising a debate which went beyond the subject of discussion. Nevertheless, when he heard it said that for fourteen years certain Powers, among them his own country, had failed to observe their undertakings, and although he did not know what undertakings were meant, he was entitled to ask those who made such an accusation to re-read the parable of the mote and the beam. This debate, if it were necessary—and M. Massigli unfortunately had the impression that it was desired to open it—would be held and the question would be fully thrashed out; but for the moment he would not press the point. He would pass to the part of M. Nadolny’s declarations which were alone relevant to the present discussion—to the programme and the spirit of the programme to which the system of amendments laid before the Commission belonged.

M. Massigli could not conceal the fact that he had been profoundly disappointed. He thought that at the present stage—not in February or April 1932, but in April 1933—all the members of the Commission had renounced broad statements of principle, and that, having gauged each other’s difficulties, they were simply seeking, in a modest and unobtrusive manner, to adjust conflicting points of view as far as possible. M. Massigli feared that the statements which the Commission had just heard, if they were the German delegation’s last word, were dictated by a different spirit.

He thought that, leaving any doctrinal controversy out of account, three ideas had emerged from the discussions: that a reduction of armaments not counterbalanced by any rearmament was necessary; that there must be a progressive reduction of armaments; and, lastly, that there must be a reduction of armaments in which sacrifices and advantages counterbalanced each other, a Convention to which everyone made a contribution and in which everyone took a share. The standpoint which the Commission had just heard put forward, and the arguments by which it was supported, did not seem to have this meaning.

While repeating that he did not wish to go into the various amendments, M. Massigli nevertheless felt obliged to point out the spirit underlying them.

Non-re-armament: that was the first principle. But he noticed that the German delegation, referring to the figure of effectives suggested for Germany in the draft under discussion—namely, 200,000 men—stated that it reserved its opinion on this figure. It did not accept it or reject it, but M. Massigli imagined that if it had found it too high it would have hastened to say so. Hence, it was the figure of 200,000 which for the moment was submitted by the German delegation as the minimum under discussion; and 200,000 was 100,000 more than the effectives to which Germany was at present entitled.

As, moreover, the Commission was told that there was no question for the moment of accepting the standardisation of armies; that, consequently, there was no question of abolishing the Reichswehr; that this abolition could only be considered on a universal footing and not for Western Europe only, the consequence was that, to the German delegation’s mind, the idea was for Germany, while keeping her present military status, to increase her effectives to 200,000. As the Commission was told at the same time that the police—and he supposed other organisations too—had no military character, the system must consist of adding something to the Reichswehr. That was rearmament.

And as in the note which had been circulated as an introduction to the German amendments, M. Massigli read that “Germany should be authorised to possess any class of arms which other States considered necessary . . .”, he asserted that here, too, rearmament was envisaged. So much for the first principle.
The second principle was the progressive equalisation of armaments. M. Massigli did not see anything progressive in the programme. A very far-reaching programme had been laid before the Commission. It had been told that a spirit of goodwill was entertained; but, in a parenthesis, it had also been indicated that not all the demands arising from equality of rights had as yet been put forward. If, in a few days' time, a supplement to this programme was laid before the Commission, M. Massigli did not really know where it would lead.

Lastly, balancing of advantages and sacrifices, equality of concessions. M. Massigli left it to the Commission to judge whether it had had the feeling that the proposals put forward allowed for such a balancing.

Such was the situation. It had been said, the French Government had said: "Let us make an effort of goodwill, an effort to reach an understanding. Let us be moderate in our respective programmes and let us try to agree." The response was a programme which entirely destroyed the plan under discussion, for it placed the Convention on a quite different basis, and which, to say the least, did not give the impression of a programme of moderation.

M. Massigli therefore had to come back to what M. Paul-Boncour and M. Pierre Cot had said in the Commission: a choice must be made; a solution could not be sought in a combination of the two systems; it could not be expected both to retain the advantages which experience had shown to result from the Treaty of Versailles and to them add others; it was not possible, if he might say so, to have it both ways.

In a spirit which the Commission, and, indeed, the whole world, had appreciated, the French Government had put forward certain proposals. It had submitted a system which it thought a generous one, a system which aimed at establishing equality of rights in a regime of security for all. To-day, there was no longer any question of the essential passage in the declaration of December 11th, 1932, concerning security, and quite a different tone was being adopted.

M. Massigli did not wish to say more for the moment. He wished, however, to express the hope that the statement of principles to which the Commission had just listened did not represent the German delegation's last word; otherwise, he did not very well see on what basis it would be possible to establish a convention.

M. MAXIMOS (Greece) said that the general discussion which had just been initiated on Part II, Section I, of the draft under discussion gave him an opportunity to make a brief declaration to supplement that which the Greek delegation had made at the meeting of March 25th.

The Greek delegation had then reserved the right to submit amendments to various clauses of the draft which were of special interest to Greece. Those amendments were now being worked out. They would be submitted to the General Commission as and when the various chapters of the draft came to be examined. But the Greek delegation wished to say at once that its sole consideration in submitting its amendments would be to safeguard the guarantees of security required by the "special conditions" peculiar to Greece.

But, in the treaties of peace which directly concerned her, and the modification of which was provided for in the draft under discussion, Greece found minimum guarantees of security. Hence she would be unable to consent to any diminution of these guarantees that might result from any modification of the said treaties, unless she obtained, both in the proposed organisation of security and in the new military clauses at least the equivalent of such existing guarantees as might be taken from her.

Mr. EDEN (United Kingdom) was extremely reluctant to take any part in the present phase of the discussions, the more so because the particular articles under discussion did not, in certain respects, directly affect the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, there was still a habit of calling the document under consideration the United Kingdom draft Convention, and to some extent, therefore, criticisms directed against it might be considered to be directed against its authors. He therefore felt compelled to seek to meet those criticisms as briefly, yet as firmly, as possible.

He would not conceal from his German colleague that he was both astonished and perturbed at the extent and significance of the amendments which he had brought before the Commission at the present meeting and at the difficulties which those amendments must create for the future work, if they were maintained in their present form.

He would briefly remind the General Commission of the history of the articles under discussion. They were not due to any sudden inspiration of any member of the United Kingdom delegation. They were, as the General Commission very well knew, the outcome of the work of the Committee on Effective, the result of a unanimous decision by the delegations which were represented there. The British Government, he fully appreciated that the German delegation had not been present during that work, but that did not really detract altogether from the significance which must adhere to articles bearing the impress of such a large measure of approval from the Conference as a whole. In approaching amendments to these articles, the delegations must therefore remember that they represented a very large consensus of agreed opinion.

To deal briefly with the German amendments, he would suggest that the difficulty which the amendment to Article 9 sought to meet was a difficulty that was due to the lack of unification among the armies. If there were uniformisation, that particular difficulty would not exist; so perhaps it could be met by bringing about uniformisation as soon as possible.
With regard to the second amendment, there would, so far as Mr. Eden could see, be no objection to adding the paragraph in question.

The amendment to Article 12 would seem to him to require the presence of all the characteristics enumerated in that article before any police could be termed military, and would mean virtually that no police could be so termed. He would like to give one or two examples. It was suggested in the German amendments that training given by the training staff of the army properly so called should be a criterion. That would mean that, so long as the training was given by retired officers, as opposed to serving officers, that training need not be reckoned, and the police so trained, however military their training, would not be reckoned as military. Again, there was the condition that the police should be administered under the authority of the Ministry of War; that meant to say that, however military the training of the police, if that took place under the Ministry of the Interior, they could not be reckoned as military.

He did not think those conditions could really be intended, and he could not but feel that the original draft was infinitely preferable to the amendments in this respect. The amendments would make it practically impossible to reckon any police, however military their training, as military.

There was next the problem of troops and effectives in overseas territories near Europe. Mr. Eden frankly confessed that the difficulty of defining "near" seemed to him almost insuperable, and in drafting these articles it had appeared to the United Kingdom delegation that the only just and possible solution was to limit the troops required in those particular areas to the minimum necessary for local needs, so that it would not be possible to reinforce, to any material extent, metropolitan troops from near-by overseas territories. That seemed to be a more just method of approach to this admittedly difficult problem than any other which the United Kingdom delegation could conceive.

He came, finally, to perhaps the most important amendment of all. He confessed that what the United Kingdom delegation sought in the chapter under discussion was to give justice and equality. He did not know what his German colleague would now interpret as equality, but he had thought that a changed system from that which had been in operation in Germany of recent years was definitely one of Germany's objectives. The United Kingdom table was, of course, based upon a uniform system. If a uniform system were not to be adopted, then the table would have to be withdrawn; for clearly, if armies were not standardised in continental Europe, though there might be uniformity in numbers, there would be inequality in fact. An army with 100,000 effectives with ten years' training was an infinitely more formidable army than one of 100,000 with eight months' training. Those were factors which could not be lost sight of and which were in the minds of the United Kingdom delegates when the table was drawn up.

He would apologise for intervening at the present stage, but he had felt that he should not have discharged the responsibility upon the United Kingdom delegation for the document under consideration, if he had remained silent. He would only say finally that he could not believe that this was the last word his German colleague had to say on this important subject. He believed that Germany was really desirous of bringing about disarmament, and he therefore appealed to his German colleague to make every effort to come with the other delegations along this path, a path not chosen by the United Kingdom or by any one delegation, but chosen almost unanimously by the Conference. Unless M. Nadolny could point to a better path which would meet with a similar amount of approval, Mr. Eden would ask him to believe that the work the Conference had done was the work it had best pursue, and he sincerely hoped that it was in that light that M. Nadolny would consider what he had said.

M. NADOLNY (Germany) asked permission to reply briefly to the remarks of M. Massigli and Mr. Eden.

M. Massigli, in his observations, had expressed regret that M. Nadolny had not confined himself in his statement to Article 9, but had covered the entire chapter on effectives. Within this wider framework M. Nadolny had desired to indicate the general character of the amendments presented by the German delegation, for it must not be forgotten that, in the matter of disarmament, Germany was in a special situation, which could not properly be appreciated unless all the factors involved were considered as a whole. It would therefore be impossible to form a correct idea of the German situation as contrasted with that of the other countries if the draft were taken piecemeal, article by article. It was on that account, in order to give the General Commission an opportunity of forming a better idea of the German amendments and enabling it to appreciate them better, that he had expanded his observations so as to cover the whole of the problems with which the Commission was concerned, before going into the details of the different amendments submitted by his delegation.

M. Massigli had said that M. Nadolny had uttered certain reproaches during his observations. M. Nadolny would venture to reply that he had always been far from wishing to reproach anyone at all; on the contrary, he had always desired to work with all his colleagues in a spirit of collaboration and mutual understanding. The remarks he had offered that afternoon contained merely a simple statement of fact; fourteen years ago the
Covenant of the League had been signed, and that Covenant included Article 8, which the present Conference was called to put into effect. That was all he had said. It was a fact that could not be altered.

M. Massigli had then said that the German amendments would mean re-armament. It had already been stated frequently enough by persons in an authoritative position that Germany had no idea of re-arming; that, on the contrary, by getting the other countries to make a substantial reduction in their armaments she desired to be able to pursue the absolute notion of peace to which she was devoted. She had no desire to re-arm. On the contrary, she desired that the other countries should disarm, and that the present Conference should thus achieve a result that would bring about the same degree of security for all States, in conformity with Article 8 of the Covenant, to which it was the Conference's duty to give effect. Germany, like all other countries, was entitled to claim that her national security be guaranteed. That was a right which could not be taken from her. It was a right which would find its fulfilment in the Convention if the present Conference were successful.

M. Massigli had further said that the German amendments were not imbued with the spirit of moderation which might have been expected of the German delegation, and which had animated the other delegations. M. Nadolny would point out that, since the beginning of the Conference, the German delegation had given evidence of the greatest goodwill, that all its acts in the Conference had been inspired by its great confidence in the goodwill of others and in their determination to achieve the only possible result. The German delegation had always desired to achieve—and it would continue to do so—in co-operation with the others and in a spirit of mutual understanding, the same security for all nations, for that was the only method of giving the world the tranquillity it so greatly needed.

At the end of his remarks, M. Massigli had drawn up a balance-sheet. He had spoken of a balance between the concessions that would have to be made on either side. But the Conference must not forget all that Germany had already placed in the scales. It must not be forgotten that the German delegation had raised no opposition to the first chapter. The Conference must not fail to recognise that that already represented a great concession on the part of Germany. It must also be emphasised that the German delegation had, with the greatest goodwill, discussed all the recommendations, amendments and plans presented by the other delegations. All these facts represented concessions made in a spirit of mutual understanding; they testified to the German delegation's faith in the success of the Conference.

He regretted that M. Massigli had said that the German delegation's amendments went so far that the Conference would be faced with insuperable difficulties. There were, of course, certain difficulties. That could not be gainsaid. The German delegation, for its part, entirely appreciated that the fact of having to make large reductions in the somewhat heavy armaments of other countries would mean certain sacrifices. On the other side, however, the disarmed countries, which were demanding equality with the others and the same security as the others, must not be forgotten. If all went to work with the same goodwill, M. Nadolny was certain that, however great the difficulties that existed—and they could not be denied—the Conference would succeed in smoothing them away and achieving a successful result.

With regard to the various points raised by Mr. Eden concerning the German amendments, he desired first of all to reply on the question of the police. Mr. Eden would allow him to point out that his remarks were obviously due to a misunderstanding, because the criterion "Training given by the training staff of the army properly so-called" was only a supplementary one, intended to elucidate doubtful cases.

With regard to colonial troops stationed near the home country, M. Nadolny desired simply to say that all the members of the present Conference, or at least many of them, had themselves been soldiers, and that the others were sufficiently familiar with military problems to understand him when he said that, thanks to the highly developed means of transport existing in the present conditions of the world, nothing would be easier, in the event of mobilisation, than to call up such troops stationed near the home country. That would be a perfectly natural thing to do and it would be done as a matter of course. He therefore considered that it would be an extremely grave omission if the Convention were silent on this point. He had no need to revert to the problem of equality of rights, as he had already spoken on that point at the beginning of his remarks. What the German delegation wanted, and what it was asking for, was the same national security for all countries. The Commission could, if it so desired, point out to the German delegation the path along which that security could be obtained. If it desired to go as low as nil on both sides, the German delegation was entirely at its disposal and would go to nil. But equality must find its expression in the tables. The latter could not be drawn up in such a way that it would be possible to say, "There is a strongly armed country, which cannot accordingly be asked to make any very substantial reduction, because that reduction would involve a great sacrifice for it." That was not the way in which the problem should be considered. Furthermore, there was also the case of countries which considered the figures suggested for them in the tables too high. All must be given the same security and the same equality, and the tables must be worked out on that basis.

He was fully aware that it was not possible at the first Conference to arrive at a perfect result in all respects. The results of the present Conference were to be a beginning, but national security must be achieved in the same spirit and it must be equal for all.

Mr. Eden had spoken next of standardisation. He had pointed out that many difficulties would be smoothed out if such standardisation were agreed. But what standardisation did he mean, and how was it to be brought about? The German delegation did not see why, after a certain type of army had been imposed on Germany, she should be told overnight, "You
have an offensive army, an army of aggression”. The German delegation was in no way opposed to the principle of standardisation, but it was anxious that the same measure should be applied to Germany as to the other countries, and that Germany should be given exactly the same consideration as the other countries. That was a matter which called for a very objective examination. It would obviously take some time, but the Commission might be assured that the German delegation would gladly co-operate in any objective study of it.

In conclusion, Mr. Eden had said that he hoped that the German delegation’s amendments were not its last word. M. Nadolny felt sure that Mr. Eden would not desire that it should be said of the United Kingdom plan that it was the last word. M. Nadolny was certain that yet other amendments to the plan would be submitted. Was that forbidden? Were delegations no longer entitled to submit amendments? M. Nadolny did not think so. The reverse was the case. If the delegations embarked upon this work in a desire to achieve a fair equilibrium between all the interests at stake, if they really were resolved to reduce the armaments of all countries to a minimum, the Conference would at last succeed in restoring to the world the tranquillity it so deeply needed after a terrible war and after the appalling distress of the post-war period.

The German delegation, therefore, was entirely prepared to come to an agreement and an understanding on reasonable bases, but it hoped that all delegations would have the same goodwill and the same desire to meet the other countries on an equitable basis.

Mr. Norman Davis (United States of America) had no wish to enter into a discussion of the technical questions involved as to effectives. His understanding was that the provisions inserted in the United Kingdom plan were the product of a unanimous agreement in the Committee on Effectives. He realised of course that Germany had not participated in the Committee’s work, and it was naturally perfectly proper for Germany to present her point of view and to explain her situation in this respect. On that, however, Mr. Davis had nothing to say.

What he did wish to say was that he was somewhat concerned and disturbed at the turn the discussions had taken at the present meeting. He felt that the Commission was not approaching the matter in the best kind of spirit, if it were to get what Germany and what everybody else wanted.

The world had never had so many serious problems confronting it as to-day. All countries had their special difficulties, unemployment, prejudices, resentments and preoccupations of every kind, and the hopeful thing at the present stage was that the statesmen of the world were really trying to tackle these problems in a new and constructive way. They were realising that most of the world’s troubles had come from excessive nationalism. All countries had concentrated upon their own particular interests, or what they conceived to be their own rights, until they had become unable to take anything but a very restricted point of view.

As the delegates were aware, on the initiative and under the leadership of the President of the United States, very important and hopeful efforts were being made to grapple with all these problems and to improve the condition of the people in every country of the world. The first subjects to be tackled had been the economic and monetary questions in the hope of relieving unemployment and of lightening the burden of debt, and an effort had also been made to reach certain bases of accord which would promote the success of disarmament, not only as a great end in itself, but as a contribution to the solution of the economic and social problems with which the world was faced.

Mr. Davis thought that if the delegates proceeded in the same spirit in the Disarmament Conference, if they realised that they had to work together and consider the various problems that confronted each, if they tried to rise above petty details or contentious questions, they would in that way be much more apt to get relief from the very things that were most troubling them.

He was quite gratified by M. Nadolny’s last speech, in which the German delegate had indicated that he thought a way could be found of bridging the differences. He was satisfied that, if the matter were approached in the proper spirit, it would be possible to bridge those differences. He wanted to say with all the earnestness of which he was capable that they must be bridged. The delegations must reach an agreement in the Conference. They must consider the great advantages that would come from a general agreement, and, if they approached the problem in the proper spirit and with goodwill, they would be able to overcome the differences. Germany would be able to obtain a considerable degree of satisfaction, which Mr. Davis would like to see her get, and other nations would feel more inclined to make the concessions which would give Germany that satisfaction. The delegations must, by approaching the question in the right spirit, remove some of the apprehensions that were preventing them from reaching agreement.

M. Rutgers (Netherlands) asked leave to make a few remarks concerning the standardisation of the land army systems of continental Europe.

Speaking personally, he did not think that one of M. Nadolny’s observations was justified. M. Nadolny had set out from the idea that the choice of one system for standardisation implied a censure of other systems. M. Rutgers had accepted the suggestion for standardisation and the system, proposed by the French delegation, of short-term-service armies. True, when
introducing this system and explaining the advantages of the different systems, M. Pierre Cot had told the Commission that the system at present existing in Germany was particularly dangerous. M. Rutgers did not think he was guilty of exaggeration in saying that that was not the unanimous opinion of the Conference or, at all events, that that had not emerged from the discussions. There had perhaps been, and there would continue to exist in the different countries, divergencies of opinion as to the advantages of the different systems.

It had been necessary to choose a uniform system in order to make comparison possible between the effectives, and so proceed to a limitation and reduction of armaments. That was the reason, M. Rutgers believed, for which the great majority of the Conference had accepted the French delegation's proposal. The system in question, moreover, was that previously chosen by the majority of the States of Europe. There was in that, according to M. Rutgers' view, no censure of other systems. The Conference's choice would, he admitted, entail considerable difficulties for Germany, but it must be remembered that, if Germany had to re-organise the Reichswehr, or if she had to abolish it entirely in its present form, there were other countries also which possessed a large number of professional soldiers. The problems with which France and other countries would be faced by reason of the considerable limitation contemplated for professional soldiers were, if not the same, at least of the same order as those which would confront Germany. The main point—and M. Rutgers believed that the German delegation would agree with the other members of the Commission that it was an advantage—was that standardisation made the armed forces comparable *inter se* and made it possible to bring forward a practical, concrete proposal like that of the United Kingdom delegation.

He would not venture to ask the German delegation to say that it was satisfied with the provisions of the draft Convention concerning effectives. Generally speaking, men did not express their satisfaction before concluding a bargain. He could, however, only express his great happiness at the fact that the German delegate had afforded a glimpse of the possibility that what he had said at the present meeting was not his delegation's last word.

M. NADOLNY (Germany) wished to say a few words only in reply to M. Rutgers. M. Rutgers had recommended the standardisation of armies not from the point of view of their offensive or defensive character, but from the practical point of view and with a view to facilitating comparisons. M. Nadolny would draw M. Rutgers' attention to the fact that it was not merely a question of a reduction of armaments for continental Europe, but throughout the entire world. Consequently, and precisely from the practical point of view, it would be desirable to recommend the standardisation of the armies of the entire world and not only those of Europe. If tables could be worked out for the armies of the non-European countries without it being necessary to standardise those armies, it seemed to M. Nadolny that the difficulty could be solved for the armies of continental Europe also.

M. Nadolny would venture to point out, further, that M. Rutgers had supported his observations regarding the difficulty which that system would involve. M. Rutgers had said that opinions were strongly divided as to the type of army to be adopted and that standardisation would cause great difficulties to many States. From this point of view, therefore, M. Nadolny considered that the question required further and exhaustive consideration.

The President suggested that the Commission should bring the meeting to a close, and if it were at all possible when the discussions were resumed at the next meeting the Commission might be able to take the various articles in Section I of Part II in the proper order, with the amendments associated therewith.

He wished to associate himself with the appeal made by Mr. Norman Davis, and also to reiterate what he had said at the meeting of the Bureau on the previous day1 and earlier during the present meeting—namely, that the Conference had a lot of work to do in the next few weeks if it was going to be a powerful factor in assisting the Monetary and Economic Conference in coming to a proper decision. He was certain that, if it did not do so, the General Commission would be making a profound mistake.

He ventured to suggest that Mr. Eden, who was in charge of the United Kingdom draft Convention, should try to get M. Nadolny, as the representative in charge of the majority of the amendments, and any others who had presented amendments, to meet together some time during the coming week-end, to see if it were at all possible to harmonise their differences. The President was encouraged to say that, because he had heard in the speech of M. Nadolny some reference about the last word not having been said by Mr. Eden; and he thought he had heard in Mr. Eden's speech a reference to M. Nadolny not having said the last word. That would give an opportunity for the difficulties to be bridged, and as President he might say that he was at the disposal of Mr. Eden, M. Nadolny and any others who might have amendments, if he could be of assistance in bringing them together.

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1 See Minutes of the fortieth meeting of the Bureau.
Article 9.

"It is understood that effectives consist of:

(a) All officers, officer cadets, N.C.O.s, soldiers, sailors, airmen, reservists and all other persons (such as military officials of the administrative, sanitary or veterinary services or military agents) of equivalent status who perform a day's duty in the land, sea and air armed forces;

(b) Persons who perform a day's duty in police forces or similar formations under the conditions prescribed in Article 12;

(c) All other persons of at least 18 years of age who receive military training under the control of the State."

Amendments proposed by the German Delegation.

Article 9 (a):

Delete the word "reservists".

Add at the end of the paragraph, after "armed forces":

... all the trained reserves who, having performed their active service, remain on the registers and are liable by law to training periods and military service in case of war, according to the number of days' duty performed during training periods in the course of a year, but having at least done seven days' duty."

M. NADOLNY (Germany) desired first to thank the United Kingdom delegation for the conversations it had had with the German delegation with a view to finding a means of harmonising the German amendments with the proposals embodied in the draft under discussion. He was also grateful to the President for being good enough to attend those discussions. Although full results had not yet been obtained, the conversations had shown that, with a little time and with patience and a spirit of mutual understanding, the agreement that must be reached before the German delegation could affix its signature to the Convention might very well be achieved.

Of the amendments proposed to Article 9, the first related to trained reserves. The members of the Commission were aware that all the soldiers of a conscript army became reservists. Particularly during the first few years after he had finished his active service, the reservist had a much greater military value than the soldier with the colours who was not fully trained. Naturally, that reservist lost his value after some time, but it must be recognised that it was he who was of most importance in the event of war.

To maintain their military value, reservists were required to undergo certain training each year in accordance with a fixed programme. In the draft under discussion, which estimated the strength of armies on the basis of the daily effectives—that was to say, the days which a soldier with the colours or a reservist was on active service—reservists who did not undergo a period of training during a year were not counted. It was obvious that the large body of reservists who did not undergo training during a year could not be omitted. It was also obvious that trained reserves must be taken into account in estimating a State's military strength. It was
had provided a method of calculation by which reservists who had done no training during the year would be reckoned as having performed one week's duty. It regarded that as a minimum. Naturally, if a reservist performed more than a week's duty, that would be reckoned in the calculations.

Such was the aim of the second amendment to Article 9. Under the text submitted by the German delegation, a reservist would represent one-fifty-second of a soldier on active service, or in other words the proportion would be one soldier on active service to fifty-two reservists.

The German delegation had also submitted a third amendment to Article 9, but it would appear to be preferable for the General Commission first to examine the above-mentioned amendments.

Viscount Mushakoji (Japan) said that M. Nadolny had just explained briefly why the German delegation proposed that reservists not called up for a period of training should be included in the calculation of effectives in accordance with the method he had put forward.

The Japanese delegation's attitude towards the problem of trained reserves had been clear and unambiguous since the time of the Preparatory Commission. Viscount Mushakoji was aware of the position adopted by the German delegation at the Preparatory Commission, and paid a tribute to the conciliatory spirit it had shown in abandoning to some extent its original claim with regard to this question. Under the Japanese law on the subject, however, reservists, taken separately, were not called to the colours every year. In other words, the average number of days' training a year which they were required to undergo was considerably lower than that laid down in the German amendment. If the German amendment were specially concerned with the problem from the European point of view, Viscount Mushakoji would not press his point, but if there was to be one universal method of calculation he was definitely of opinion that Article 9 of the United Kingdom draft should be adopted in its present form, which took account, as it seemed to him, of the diverse national legislations of the countries that had adopted the system of conscription.

M. Massigli (France) had no desire to reopen a controversy which would contain nothing new, in particular, for those members of the General Commission who had taken part in the Preparatory Commission's work. He believed, however, that gradually the conclusion had been reached that the aim of the Convention was to limit the forces immediately available for aggression, and that, consequently, the question of trained reserves did not arise.

For its part, the French Government took up a very clear position on this question: it had never agreed to the limitation of trained reserves, and it still held the same view. M. Massigli added, moreover, that the German amendment defined trained reserves so precisely that it might facilitate the unrestricted formation of trained reserves under other conditions.

The amendment destroyed the principle underlying the formula of average daily effectives in terms of days' duty actually performed, and laid down another principle for limitation. The French Government could not agree to that.

If the German delegation felt that the reservist was the best soldier, a very simple means of obtaining the advantages of that system was, in M. Massigli's opinion, open to it: it could agree to the conversion of types of armies on the basis of short-term service. As the German delegation had hitherto adopted the opposite standpoint, however, M. Massigli thought it might agree, not to insist upon, but to withdraw, its amendment.

Mr. Eden (United Kingdom) asked leave to explain briefly why Article 9 had been given the form in which it appeared in the draft Convention.

The Commission would be aware that this subject had been discussed at length during the work of the Preparatory Commission. Whatever the delegate's personal views, and however strong the theoretical arguments that might be advanced in support of the German amendment, it had become clear during the Preparatory Commission's work that no agreement was possible except in respect of peace-time effectives. The United Kingdom delegation had not been so ambitious as to hope to achieve in its draft Convention what the Preparatory Commission had found impossible, and therefore Article 9 did no more than embody a clause almost unanimously approved by the Committee on Effectives. Mr. Eden's delegation had seen very little prospect of improving upon the work of the Committee on Effectives, and he thought that the General Commission would agree that even the brief discussion at the present meeting had made it quite clear that if the Commission were to reopen the subject it would not get that universal agreement sought by all.

He very much hoped that, in the light of the fact that Article 9 as it now stood had been approved by the Committee on Effectives, his German colleague would be good enough carefully to reconsider his position and see whether he could not assist the Commission to pass the article in its present form.

M. Rutgers (Netherlands) pointed out that, in the Preparatory Commission, the Netherlands delegation had always taken a great interest in the question of trained reserves, and had given proof of that interest in its memorandum to the Conference, dated April 11th, 1932.¹

Theoretically, he thought M. Nadolny's arguments were, generally speaking, correct, but, on the other hand, sight must not be lost of the relation between Article 9, now under discussion, and the provisions of the draft Convention with regard to the armed forces of continental Europe, particularly the relation between trained reserves and the standardisation of the system of land armies. If the system set out in the draft Convention were adopted for continental Europe, the question of trained reserves would very shortly lose much of its importance, perhaps even almost the whole of its political importance. If, on the contrary, the Conference did not agree to the standardisation of the armies of continental Europe, and if short-term service armies and volunteer armies performing several years' service still existed side by side, the question would be quite different. It would then be right, as M. Nadolny had done, and as M. Rutgers himself had often done in the Preparatory Commission, to refer to the question of trained reserves. Other questions then arose. The armies would no longer be equal. In the armies with short-term service, the recruits were not of great value. It was quite otherwise for the men forming the armies with long-term service. If the standardisation of the armies of continental Europe were not accepted integrally, Table I of the draft under discussion would have to be revised, taking into account the fact that the armies were not comparable. It would then have to be arranged, for example, that a man serving five years would be reckoned as two, while a man serving less than a year would be reckoned as 0.50.

It therefore seemed to M. Rutgers that the German amendment could not be considered independently of the questions of principle arising out of the draft Convention. For his part, so long as it was possible that the system of the standardisation of armies would not be adopted, he hesitated to give his vote for a system which took trained reserves into account. He emphasised the fact that, if the standardisation of types of armies were agreed to, the question of trained reserves would very shortly lose its importance.

Consequently, with a view to simplification and on account of political considerations, it was important, in order to render the draft acceptable to all the delegations, not to complicate it by adding a provision relating to trained reserves. If the Conference reached agreement on another draft Convention, however, the Netherlands delegation might have to change its attitude.

M. Künzl-Jizersky (Czechoslovakia) said that the chapter of the United Kingdom draft now under discussion contained, inter alia, in Table I, figures for the effectives of the armies of certain States. The amendments hitherto submitted showed that certain delegations raised objections, as moreover had been foreseen by the United Kingdom delegate himself when he had explained the plan.

It was obviously difficult at the present time to take up a position with regard to the figures for effectives, although Article 9 contained a kind of list. The question to which it referred was one of the main points in the programme of the Committee on Effectives, and the great difficulty that that Committee was encountering must not be overlooked. It was clear that there was a close connection between Articles 9, 13 and particularly 16, which dealt with the period of service.

It would therefore be difficult to express a definite opinion with regard to the various articles of Part II until the Committee on Effectives had concluded its work. The delegations of the Petite Entente awaited the results of that work before proposing amendments to this part of the draft.

M. Nadolny (Germany) asked leave to reply briefly to the objections that had been offered. M. Massigli had pointed out, entirely correctly, in M. Nadolny's opinion, that the troops that were immediately available would have to be taken into account. Everyone, however, knew that, in case of war, the reserves were available in exactly the same way as the men with the colours, since in a modern military organisation every reservist was in possession of an order. On the day of mobilisation he went to the place designated in the order, and the troops marched away. M. Massigli had, moreover, been right in saying that this question depended on the system in force. In countries where there were no reserves, they could not be counted. When there was no conscript army, there were naturally no reserves. On the other hand, when there was a conscript army there were reserves. For fourteen years there had been no reserves in Germany—in other terms, Germany had to do without the fourteen classes of reservists which the other States possessed; whereas, calculating the strength of these forces in France, for instance, M. Nadolny reached the figure of at least three million reservists.

Furthermore, the Commission was aware that Germany had had no say as to the system she was to have or whether she could possess reserves or not. This remark brought him to the practical point of view of which Mr. Eden had spoken—namely, whether account was to be taken, in the calculations, of these fourteen classes of reservists or not. If Germany had had such reserves available, M. Nadolny felt certain that the German delegation would nevertheless have submitted its amendment, since it was equitable from a military point of view, as M. Rutgers had very properly pointed out. M. Nadolny believed even that it was unquestionably correct from the military point of view.

Furthermore, it was entirely proper that this question of the computation of a State's military forces should be taken in connection with the question of the tables and that of the standardisation of armies. For this reason, and for others also, M. Nadolny did not think—and on this point he was entirely in agreement with the Czechoslovak delegate—that the
Commission could take an immediate decision on the matter. He would therefore request the President to hold the matter over until the second reading of the draft Convention.

The President said that he intended to comply with M. Nadolny's request, on the same lines as those he had followed in the case of the Polish amendment to Part I. He accordingly ruled that the amendment to Article 9 (a) should stand over until the second reading.

Amendment submitted by the German Delegation.

Article 9 (c):
Add at the end of the paragraph:
"Military training is taken to mean any training given to persons of at least eighteen years of age under the military regulations in force in each country or under regulations containing similar provisions, with a view to preparing those who receive it for performing military duty in the armed forces.

"The main characteristics of this training are as follows:
"(1) Technical and tactical training in the use of the individual and other than individual arms used in war;
"(2) Training in field service over broken ground.

"Furthermore, in the examination of special cases account will be taken, in particular, of the following criteria:
"(1) Theoretical (by map) and field training of cadres;
"(2) Use of military methods of communication and signalling.

"Physical and sports training in the strict sense of the term, for whatever purpose given, shall not be regarded as military training."

M. NADOLNY (Germany) said that the amendment to Article 9 (c) was mainly a question of form. The German delegation simply desired that there should be added at the end of this article the definition of military training drawn up by the Committee on Effectives. He did not think that this would give rise to any objection, and he could say that he was glad to note his agreement with Mr. Eden on this point.

M. MASSIGLI (France) observed that M. Nadolny's amendment had been taken from the report by the Committee on Effectives. He had no objection to the proposed addition, but on one condition, to which he hoped the German delegate would agree. During the discussion in the Committee on Effectives, it had been understood that, in the examination of concrete cases, the matter would be considered case by case, and that, in order that an enquiry might be held, it would not be necessary for all the characteristics mentioned in the article to be combined. It would suffice if one of them was present. He thought that, in proposing this addition, M. Nadolny did not intend any change in the character of the decision taken by the Committee on Effectives. It would therefore be necessary to find some formula indicating clearly that the accumulation or adjunction of characteristics was not necessary for the operation of the article.

M. NADOLNY (Germany) replied that he had no intention of making any change whatever in the purport of Article 9. He had thought that it would be better to add the definition to Article 9 so that it might not be necessary to look for it elsewhere.

M. MASSIGLI (France) emphasised that agreement existed to the effect that, when the article was drafted in its final form, the attention of the Drafting Committee which would be instructed to draw it up would have to be called to the point he had just mentioned, in order that the final text adopted might leave no room for doubt.

The President thought that there was general agreement that the addition to Article 9 (c) proposed by the German delegation should be made.

"Article 10.

"The High Contracting Parties undertake to prohibit any military training whatsoever except in organisations under the control of their respective Governments."

The President observed that no amendment had been submitted to Article 10.