the naval Powers had concluded previous agreements and that they were continuing their conversations. That indeed was essential. Yet, as in all other questions, it was manifest that any decision reached by this means would have to come before the organs of the Conference and be placed before the General Commission in one way or another.

Thirdly, the United Kingdom programme introduced, in a certain sense, a different method in the case of air questions. It suggested that the Bureau should set up a committee of representatives of the principal air Powers. No doubt, the General Commission might find it necessary to set up from among its own members a special sub-committee, as was often done in the big commissions of the League, but only after an exchange of views which would make it possible to give certain instructions to the sub-committee. It was most important not to separate the different categories of armaments, because the factor of their interdependence must always be borne in mind.

To sum up, it seemed that the French delegation's point of view fitted in quite readily with the United Kingdom proposal, but the questions of procedure to be settled were so serious that it had been necessary to indicate clearly the spirit in which the French delegation visualised the programme submitted to the Bureau.

In conclusion, M. Paul-Boncour wished to make it clear that he was mainly concerned with the questions which would come first on the agenda, but, in considering the work as a whole, he observed that certain other matters, which must certainly not be excluded from the future programme of the Conference, were not mentioned in the United Kingdom programme. For instance, there was no reference to the consultative pact. That, however, was one of the French delegation's chief points. It had met with a measure of acceptance which the French delegation could not allow to be wasted. There was indeed some hope of obtaining its acceptance by countries outside Europe. Other important issues were those of supervision, expenditure and the private manufacture of arms. It would of course be the height of futility and unwisdom to attempt, at the present stage, to determine the whole programme of work, and the French delegation continued to attach great importance to those matters which had already been devoted to them and that it had, in consequence, been possible to record at least a very appreciable measure of agreement.

M. SANDLER (Sweden) emphasised the importance of the question of the limitation of budgetary expenditure. In the Swedish delegation's view, that point should be included in the programme of work. He entirely agreed with M. Paul-Boncour as to the mandate of the Bureau and as to the need for submitting matters of substance to the General Commission. Nevertheless, it was necessary to consider at the same time the future programme of work, as well as that already drawn up by the Bureau and now being carried out. The Bureau was entitled and it was its duty to watch over the progress of this work which was the outcome of the decisions already taken by the General Commission. M. Sandler drew attention to two disturbing facts. In the first place, the Committee on Effectives was complaining that it had no work to do because it was not in possession of the indispensable material with which it was to be supplied by the members of the Conference. Secondly, the Bureau, at its thirty-first meeting, had set up an Air Committee. This Committee had not yet begun work. The United Kingdom delegation was now proposing an entirely new air commission. The Bureau was engaged upon devising a method of work, but was it really the right course to change methods the whole time; would it not be possible to pass on to the necessary work, in certain matters at any rate?

M. LITVINOFF (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) thought that the best way to provide a useful contribution to the work of the Conference was to spend as little time as possible on questions of procedure. All programmes were equally good if they enabled all the important questions to be tackled and settled. That seemed to be the case as regards the programme of work proposed by the United Kingdom delegation, to which therefore he had no objections. The importance of any programme depended on the use made of it in practice, and the indications it contained might, according to circumstances, mean a great deal to the Soviet delegation, or they might mean nothing at all. As regards the question of effectives, for example, the important point was to know whether the Governments intended to reduce these by a third or more, or not at all, and also whether it was proposed to abolish tanks and military aircraft. Consequently, the essential point was to begin the actual work as soon as possible.

If, however, the programme at present under discussion were adopted, that would not mean that the delegations would be bound by any one of the formulæ it contained. The real point was simply to decide on a list of subjects to be placed on the immediate agenda. For example, as regards effectives, and, most particularly, the calculation of effectives, the United Kingdom programme mentioned the Hoover proposals and made a point of dividing effectives into elements of defence and police elements. But the General Commission had not discussed that question, and no decision on the subject committing the delegations had been taken.

Further, certain important questions were not included in the United Kingdom draft programme. M. Litvinoff had been glad to hear M. Paul-Boncour make special reference to the consultative pact. That was a part of the French plan in which the Soviet delegation was keenly interested. Moreover, in paragraph 1 of the first chapter of the United Kingdom programme, it was suggested that all European States should make a solemn affirmation not to have recourse to force in any circumstances. M. Litvinoff hoped that that declaration would
not supersede the first part of the French plan, and that the United Kingdom delegation would rather submit the suggestion as an addition to the consultative pact of the French plan or in the event of that pact not materialising; otherwise the Soviet delegation would have objections to raise. Again, it was not clear why such a declaration would apply only to European States, and why non-European States would be excluded from it. M. Litvinoff felt sure that any State would be only too happy to accede to such an affirmation. With these reservations, he declared his acceptance of the United Kingdom draft programme.

M. Moresco (Netherlands), referring to the naval question, noted that, according to the United Kingdom proposal, the Bureau would be asked to fix the maximum tonnage and maximum calibre of artillery for capital ships, aircraft-carriers, cruisers, destroyers and submarines. For the moment, however, M. Moresco thought it would be useless to ask the Bureau to attempt to do so. The Naval Commission had discussed all the questions referred to it by the General Commission, but it had been faced with divergencies between the great naval Powers, and the General Commission, by its resolution of July 23rd, 1932, had asked that the matter should be postponed until the great naval Powers parties to the Washington and London Treaties should have reached agreement on a reduction of the maximum figures. The only course, therefore, was to await the progress of events. In particular, it would be quite useless to discuss whether submarines should be kept or abolished until the decision on that subject by the States parties to the Washington and London Treaties was known.

Secondly, as regards the agreement to be reached between the States of continental Europe, the United Kingdom proposal suggested that those States should examine among themselves the continental agreement to be concluded. Such a procedure would perhaps be suitable if the principle were adopted, but it was, in fact, the principle itself on which a decision had first to be taken. It was very doubtful whether such a question could be discussed usefully without the United Kingdom. To go further still, it might even be asked whether the question should not be referred first to the Political Commission. Perhaps, indeed, the extra-European States should also be present, if only on account of the proximity of such States to European colonies. Consequently, M. Moresco thought that at least a commission comprising all the European States should be constituted. Naturally, the United Kingdom would have to decide what its attitude was to be and to see whether it wished to take part in the discussions as an observer only. If it were preferred to refer the question to the Political Commission, the extra-European States also would have to determine their attitude. In any case, these questions should preferably be treated by the Political Commission, or, if desired, by a Commission comprising all the European States.

M. Buero (Uruguay) said that, although he had refrained from taking part in the discussions of the French plan in the General Commission, it was because, in regard to both disarmament and political questions, the problems on the agenda were mainly European, and an extra-European State should not take part in their discussion, particularly if that State were a small one. The United Kingdom programme of work was concerned mainly, as was natural, with questions of current interest to Europe. M. Buero considered, however, that he was present in the Bureau of the Conference, not as the delegate of a small extra-European Power, but as Chairman of the Land Commission, and, in that capacity, he wished to make a few observations following upon the submission of the United Kingdom programme and upon certain speeches; in particular, that of M. Paul-Boncour.

M. Buero thought that the Bureau was about to set the Conference to work upon a task which was much more limited than that for which the States had been convened to the Conference. Doubtless European problems were the main concern, because, at the present time, Europe was really the storm centre of the world. M. Buero could only accept M. Paul-Boncour's affirmation that certain features of the United Kingdom programme, particularly in Chapter II, coincided de facto if not de jure with the French proposals, and the adoption of that programme at once made it possible to study the conditions which the French delegation considered indispensable for the examination of the disarmament problem. As M. Paul-Boncour had observed, however, the United Kingdom programme involved differential treatment for political questions and for questions relating purely to disarmament. The political questions were handed over to the Political Commission—that was to say, to all the delegations to the Conference, whereas the technical disarmament questions—in other words, the concrete questions of land, naval and air disarmament—were to be reserved for the Bureau, which would make the necessary proposals. In M. Buero's view, this difference of treatment was open to objections which M. Paul-Boncour had emphasised. The discussions would not proceed at the same rate in both directions. Although there were advantages in referring certain problems to a smaller organ, M. Buero could not see why there would not be the same disadvantages in studying political problems in exactly the same manner. His own preference would be for the reverse procedure—that was to say, to submit the examination of both categories of problems to the General Commission. If, however, it were thought very much easier to reach agreement in a smaller body; and, in view of the fact that the Bureau's meetings were public, M. Buero saw no objection to the Bureau studying both problems—that was to say, the political problem and the problem of effective. He thought it futile to pretend that certain purely technical questions could be settled without satisfying certain requirements in the political field.
M. Buero was Rapporteur for the question of offensive armaments, and he had not yet been able to finish his work. After having got into touch with the principal delegations, he had come to the very definite conclusion that the questions of security and disarmament were so closely interconnected, in the view of certain delegations, that it was useless to attempt to settle one without the other. If both sets of problems were examined by similar organs, all the delegations would have an assurance that the different views would be studied and weighed simultaneously. Whatever decision were taken by the organ to which the various problems were referred, it could not be allowed that a small body should study certain disarmament questions and that the political questions should be dealt with by a larger commission.

The continuation of the discussion was adjourned to the next meeting.

THIRTY-NINTH MEETING (PUBLIC)

Held on Friday, February 10th, 1933, at 3.30 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. HENDERSON.


The CHAIRMAN called upon the Bureau to continue the discussion opened at the last meeting on the basis of the United Kingdom proposals (document Conf.D.154).

M. Motta (Switzerland) took as his starting-point the idea that the delegations represented on the Bureau were only called upon to discuss questions of method and ought not therefore to deal with matters of substance. If that were admitted, two groups of problems arose, and the Bureau had to consider what would be the most rational method of dealing with them. In the first place, there were all the questions inseparable from what was formerly called security and was now given the wider appellation of organisation of peace; secondly, there were the questions directly connected with disarmament in the strict sense of the term. The proposals regarding the first group of questions were those contained in the French delegation's plan 1 and those which, without constituting a definite plan were nevertheless connected with the French plan—he referred to the United Kingdom proposals.

It was already practically agreed that all questions concerning the organisation of peace should be dealt with by the Political Commission, a concept which the Bureau had accepted. In this connection, he had only one objection to raise, but it was a serious one concerning the United Kingdom proposal to set up a Commission of continental European States to examine questions connected with the consultative pact. His objection to this proposal was that, if the delegations accepted it, their acceptance would imply that they had already settled a point, which in fact ought to be discussed: in other words, it would imply that, from the outset, they had eliminated the United Kingdom from the European States. A few days previously, however, in the General Commission, several States—not minor States, but countries like Italy, Germany, etc.—had said that the question of the inclusion of the United Kingdom was an essential one. Would it not be much simpler if the question of the organisation of peace, in all its parts, were referred to the Political Commission? All the European Powers were represented thereon. It would be of interest to non-European States, whose presence could not embarrass the European States, to learn how the latter intended to deal with the organisation of peace. Their presence was therefore desirable.

The other group of questions which referred to disarmament proper might be subdivided into several smaller groups—effectives, material, air forces, etc. Certain questions transcended the strict problem of disarmament—namely, supervision, chemical, bacterial and incendiary warfare, etc.—but M. Motta merely proposed to discuss disarmament proper. In this connection an extremely important question of principle had to be settled: the United Kingdom delegation, for reasons which he understood, proposed that all these questions should be decided by the Bureau, which, in any case, would be called upon to carry out all the preparatory work. Naturally, the delegation in question did not ask that the Bureau should settle these questions definitely. It was admitted that the Bureau's task was to prepare and facilitate the study of questions and to "sift" the various topics, so to speak, as it had already done in the case of questions of supervision of chemical warfare which, though not definitely settled, were nevertheless ready for discussion by the General Commission.

1 Document Conf.D.146.
He quite understood that very many delegates desired to apply this method to questions of disarmament proper. One serious objection, however, might be raised to this procedure: the Bureau had been able to proceed thus at a time when the Disarmament Conference had not yet really resumed its work. Now all the delegations had returned to Geneva and, since the Bureau consisted of only fifteen delegations at the most, it was to be feared that the delegations of more than forty countries would take no part in the discussions and would be reduced to the role of passive observers. Was such a procedure either opportune or wise? Was it not preferable to start back to the General Commission all the questions connected with disarmament proper? He could foresee the argument which would be advanced against this suggestion: the General Commission was too large a body and it would be better that these questions should be examined by a smaller number of persons; the discussion would be shorter and more to the point. M. Motta was not convinced of the value of this argument. All the delegations present felt that the time for speeches was past and that the delegations must now resign themselves to dealing no longer with general questions, in order that definite action might now be taken. He felt sure that, even in the General Commission, the discussions would not be more lengthy than in the Bureau. Obviously the Commission would be bound to appoint sub-commissions, but that was what the Bureau would also do if it decided itself to examine questions of disarmament.

The simplest procedure therefore would be to refer the questions of general policy to the Political Commission and questions concerning disarmament to the General Commission. This solution was the more indicated in that the decisions would have to be taken, not by technical experts, but by statesmen, who must represent in the Conference the opinion of their Governments. He admitted that the discussions would not always run smoothly, but they would not in the Bureau either.

One of the most serious obstacles in the way of satisfactory progress was that the work of the two Commissions would be parallel, or, at any rate, nearly so. For many countries, however, the measure of disarmament was determined by the degree of the organisation of peace. He did not think, though, that there were any delegations which stated that, if the organisation of peace made no progress, disarmament was not possible. Such a declaration would be contrary to the letter and spirit of Article 8 of the Covenant. On the other hand, many delegations, including in particular the French delegation, had stated that, so far as they were concerned, the measure of disarmament would depend on the progress achieved in the organisation of peace. It was perfectly clear that the moment of psychological crisis—a term not to be taken in its alarmist sense—the time when definite positions would have to be taken up was near. Perhaps the various countries would finally realise that they had placed their hopes too high and would have to be content with a modest achievement. If that achievement were a beginning, a first stage, the affirmation of a permanent and continuous intention, then such a result, in spite of the disappointment it might cause to public opinion, would, in his opinion, be of infinite value.

M. Nadolny (Germany) felt sure that the representative of the United Kingdom would not oppose the suggestion he had made at the previous meeting to the effect that Chapter I of the British proposals should be omitted. In the light of the statements made by the other delegations, he thought that his proposal would be accepted. He observed with very particular satisfaction that the French delegation had supported it.

Moreover, he had noted in the explanations given by M. Paul-Boncour on the previous day a certain number of points to which he was bound to refer. The French delegate had emphasised the scope of the agreement of December 11th, 1932, in relation to the work of the Conference. M. Nadolny did not feel that it was desirable to follow M. Paul-Boncour along this path, since a detailed explanation would only lead to a discussion of principle which both he and M. Paul-Boncour desired to avoid. He would merely state that the arrangement of December 11th was, and must continue to be, the basis for Germany's participation in the work of the Conference. His country would not depart from that basis as long as it participated in that work.

The French delegate had then set out clearly his Government's views regarding security; he had said that new contractual guarantees were a previous condition for an effective and considerable reduction in armaments. Germany's point of view was different; she held that the real task of the Conference was, not to provide fresh contractual guarantees, but to take one decisive step along the path of disarmament. That was the best means of increasing general confidence. This view was shared by other delegations. Nevertheless, Germany was prepared to enter with perfect goodwill into a discussion of the French proposals. M. Nadolny reminded the Commission that he himself had suggested the simultaneous discussion of these proposals and the more general question of disarmament. He thought that the questions of principle had been sufficiently discussed and that the moment had now come to achieve some practical result. In this connection, the German delegation desired to express its opinion regarding the question of procedure, although it did not attach very great importance to that point. Indeed, experience had shown that a small group might work very slowly and a large assembly very fast. It all depended on the manner in which the proceedings were conducted, and in this respect he had entire confidence in the will both of the President and of all the delegations to secure results.

As regards the contents of the programme, he did not know whether the details should be discussed immediately or later, but supposed that the President would, in due course, explain the procedure to be followed.
With regard to the programme as a whole, two questions called for explanations. He referred, in the first place, to the two points mentioned under the heading A of Chapter II ("Security"). Unless he was mistaken, the French delegate had proposed that the first point should be left on one side for a moment, so that the second—which referred to the plan of mutual assistance—might be dealt with immediately. The United Kingdom proposal, on the contrary, was that the question of non-resort to force should be settled first. The German delegation preferred the second method, and that for practical reasons. M. Nadolny was of opinion that this question could be settled very rapidly.

The second point concerned M. Paul-Boncour’s explanations regarding effectives and material. The French delegate proposed that the question of effectives should be settled first, the question of material being dealt with subsequently, because the settlement of the latter depended on the former. He agreed that the two problems were to a certain extent inter-dependent. As the Conference, however, had already made some progress in the matter of material, it would be preferable to take this question up immediately, since it was connected with qualitative disarmament, and its solution ought not to be delayed any longer.

Mr. Eden (United Kingdom) thanked the Bureau for its favourable reception of the United Kingdom delegation’s proposals, and proceeded to reply to the comments of the different delegates, beginning with the suggestions put forward by M. Paul-Boncour. M. Paul-Boncour had pointed out, amongst other things, that the programme proposed by the United Kingdom did not take all questions into account, and that some of those which it left out of account—for example, the question of supervision—were of immediate importance. But it was precisely because progress had already been made with the consideration of those questions that the United Kingdom delegation was not including them in its programme, and was concentrating on important problems with which no progress had been made. But the programme was not exclusive, and other points could be embodied in it, if desired. The United Kingdom proposals should be regarded merely as a series of suggestions with a view to a large programme.

M. Paul-Boncour and M. Nadolny had further stated that they preferred not to discuss Chapter I. He had no objection; the most important section from the practical point of view was, in fact, Chapter II. He was prepared therefore to agree to the immediate discussion of Chapter II. M. Paul-Boncour had made the point that the Bureau’s work must be submitted to the General Commission for approval. Mr. Eden entirely agreed; but that need not necessarily mean that every point in the programme must be discussed by the General Commission. On that he was not altogether in agreement with M. Motta. The United Kingdom delegation considered that the Bureau had a right to take part in all discussions, as it had done in the case of the question of supervision. The question of security should be referred to the Political Commission, which would no doubt appoint a sub-committee to consider the second point of the heading “Security” in the United Kingdom proposals in connection with Chapter III of the French plan. The French delegate had pointed out that the United Kingdom proposal did not cover the consultative pact. That was true; but Mr. Eden had pointed out on the previous day that the pact represented the kernel of the chapter in the French plan relating to security. The United States delegate at the time had said that it would be more helpful to discuss this question later, as it could be taken up at any point.

M. Paul-Boncour’s principal criticism was in connection with the question of synchronisation. Mr. Eden thought it would not be practicable, if rapid progress was to be made, to adhere to too rigorous a system of parallel advance. He saw no reason for moving with the slowest Commission, if any other Commission was prepared to go quicker. If certain delegations desired to maintain a connection between the consideration of certain aspects of disarmament and that of the question of security, they could always make their acceptance of one group of questions dependent on the acceptance of the other group. He personally had no objection to the reference of that part of the programme relating to disarmament to the General Commission, instead of the Bureau continuing to deal with it. It was not, in his view, a very important point. If his delegation had suggested its consideration by the Bureau, that was because it regarded the Bureau as a kind of sub-committee of the Conference. But there was one indispensable condition to the reference of this part of the programme to the General Commission—namely, that the General Commission must be asked at once to appoint the sub-committees to consider all the questions in Chapter II, B ("Effectives, Land War Material, Air, etc."). To deal with these questions one after the other in the plenary Commission would mean, amongst other serious disadvantages, that progress would be very slow. If the United Kingdom programme were referred to the General Commission with a recommendation in the sense he had indicated, the Bureau would have accomplished a serious and concrete effort to accelerate the work of the Conference.

The Swedish delegation had remarked that there was already a Committee on Effectives which, he suggested, was dying of inanition. Mr. Eden thought rather that it was suffering from indigestion. The United Kingdom programme would act on it like a tonic. It had also been pointed out that there was an Air Commission in existence; but it might be said never to have quitted the ground, and the object of the United Kingdom proposals was to enable it to fly.

Lastly, the Soviet delegation had pointed out that a programme was not a decision. That was true; Mr. Eden readily admitted it. But he hoped that the United Kingdom programme would make it possible to take decisions, and he might add that, in his delegation’s opinion, the decisions in question were urgently required.
Count Raczyński (Poland) noted Mr. Eden's statement to the effect that the United Kingdom delegation agreed not to discuss the first part of its proposals. The Polish delegation was glad to see the United Kingdom plan accepted as a starting-point for the future work of the Conference. He also shared the hope expressed by all the previous speakers that the work of the Conference would lead to a definite and concrete text as rapidly as possible. He was prepared to support the views expressed by the German and French delegations in favour of putting or one side Chapter I of the United Kingdom proposal, in which certain principles were laid down, particularly as the list of these principles was far from exhaustive, while certain questions were included which had not been discussed by the competent political organ of the Conference.

He entered the most explicit reservations as to the interpretations which had been given to certain passages of Chapter I; and he had been glad to hear the lucid and exact explanations given by M. Paul-Boncour with regard to the nature of the Agreement of Five in relation to the work of the Conference.

He entirely agreed with the arguments of various speakers as to the need of adhering to the procedure followed from the first, leaving it to the General Commission to regulate all the essential forms of the Conference's activities.

As regards Chapter II of the United Kingdom proposal, he was prepared to admit that the discussion had shown the desirability of making certain amendments or additions. He thought that the Chairman, with the help of the Vice-Chairman and the Rapporteur, might with advantage submit that chapter at a future meeting with such additions as had been suggested in the course of the debates in the Bureau.

M. de Madariaga (Spain) had five definite points to submit. In the first place, his Government was dubious as to the desirability, after thirteen years, of formulating a new solemn declaration. No doubt the proposal for such a declaration was based on motives of high policy, but there was reason to fear that the States were indulging in what might be called an "inflation of pacts". In his view, the fewer the pacts, the greater the belief in those which existed. If, however, it was held that such a solemn declaration was indispensable, the Spanish Government would agree to it.

In the second place, it might be wondered whether it was practical to discuss the narrower schemes before the wider schemes. There was a natural order of precedence in the matter of obligations assumed; and it would be difficult for the European countries to commit themselves before knowing what line was going to be taken by the countries regarded as non-European, if not in the geographical sense, at any rate in relation to the pacts. It would be a good thing to link up the two pacts proposed in such a way that the narrower of them should only come into operation when a pronouncement had been made in the wider one on the question of the aggressor.

His three last points related to Chapter II of the United Kingdom proposals. The Spanish Government was prepared to take part in the discussion of the suggestions contained in this chapter. But, in the first place, with regard to the United Kingdom proposal in connection with the air, he must repeat what he had already said in the Bureau—namely, that the constitution of a commission was useless, since the possibilities of complete abolition of military and naval aviation and bombardment from the air were already known. In reality, it was not so much a question of abolition as of obtaining the assent of the great Powers to a much more difficult task. As regards international supervision of civil aviation, the great air Powers would be compelled sooner or later to appeal to all the Powers, great or small, as no such supervision would be possible without the conclusion of universal arrangements. The Spanish Government was prepared to accede to the proposals put forward, but it was doubtful as to the outcome of any such possibility, since the United Kingdom proposal anticipated future decisions when it said that the Bureau should "fix the maximum unladen weight of military and naval aircraft; decide as to the disposal of machines exceeding that limit", and so on.

Fourthly, the Spanish delegation had something to say with regard to naval forces. It felt that the United Kingdom proposal under this heading was incomplete. There was no reference to the reduction of tonnage. When the gap between the most powerful of the secondary maritime nations and the least powerful of the great maritime nations were recalled, it could only be concluded that there would have to be a big effort of reduction on the part of the latter before the secondary Powers would be induced to reduce their tonnage.

His last point he regarded as the most important. The Spanish delegation continued to believe that the essential task of the Conference, which it must accomplish if it were not to fail, was the adoption of severe measures for the supervision of the manufacture of arms of all sorts. If the Convention did not contain a very detailed chapter of such a nature as to make it possible to know at any given moment at Geneva itself the whereabouts of arms, the ownership of them, and their quantity and destination, etc., the Conference would not have attained its aims. He was astonished, therefore, to hear the United Kingdom delegate say that, if there were no reference in the United Kingdom proposals to certain points, that was because a certain progress had already been made with the study of them. The question of the manufacture of arms had made less progress than any other. He accordingly urged the Chairman and the Rapporteur to give the requisite assurances that this question would not be forgotten in the course of the discussion of the programme.
M. SATO (Japan) said that, in the United Kingdom draft, it was proposed that a programme of work should be agreed upon which would take into account all the proposals made since the opening of the Conference. He thought that, in these circumstances, every proposal should receive equal and equitable treatment. The United Kingdom proposal provided, on the one hand, for the qualitative and quantitative limitation of all land and air armaments and, on the other hand, for a qualitative limitation of naval armaments. He thought that quantitative disarmament should also be contemplated in the case of naval armaments, and reminded the Bureau that the Japanese delegation had submitted a concrete proposal to this effect 1 which deserved careful study in the same way as all the other proposals regarding naval disarmament.

M. DE VASCONCELLOS (Portugal) said that he was speaking, not as the delegate of his country, but as the Chairman of the National Defence Expenditure Commission. He recalled the fact that, after arduous work, this Commission, which had been instructed to study the questions of budgetary limitation and publicity, had reached the conclusion that budgetary limitation was possible and was now considering how this might be effected. It had already examined about 80 per cent of the military budgets of the whole world, so that its reply would rest on a solid foundation. Unfortunately, the work of this Commission was being passed over in silence, and this was causing it some uneasiness, as it was still unaware, although it had put the question to the General Commission and to the Bureau, whether budgetary limitation was seriously contemplated. In any case, it earnestly hoped that the enormous amount of work which it had done would not prove useless and that the efforts of the past nine months would not have been in vain.

Reverting to the question now before the Bureau, the Portuguese delegate said that he was in favour of its discussion in the General Commission. It was doubtful easier to discuss the matter in the Bureau, which was a comparatively small committee, but he would point out that the majority of the members of the General Commission who spoke most often were also members of the Bureau, so that the latter's discussions did not advance any more rapidly. Moreover, whenever the Bureau failed to take a decision, the question was referred to the General Commission and passed through two stages instead of one: he personally was in favour of a single stage.

Mr. Gibson (United States of America) said that he had been one of the first to welcome the idea of a general programme, which should be mapped out in advance when rapid progress was desired. The question at issue was whether the Bureau would expedite matters by attempting to draw up a complete plan before the Conference was allowed to proceed on any single point. If this procedure were adopted, it would be necessary to add an infinite number of questions to the plan submitted to the Bureau, and the discussion of all those questions would necessarily involve loss of time and might even result in a new synoptic analysis. Better results could be obtained by adopting a different procedure.

The discussion showed that no delegation was opposed to the reference of points 1 and 2 of head A ("Security") of Chapter II to the Political Commission and of point B (a) ("Effective") of the same chapter to the General Commission. He proposed that these questions should at once be discussed in the General Commission. The Bureau would continue to sit from time to time, in order to pass on the other questions and to submit them, as and when they were ready, to the appropriate bodies.

This solution in no way prejudged the programme proposed by the United Kingdom; it merely provided that the Conference could pursue its work uninterruptedly, while study of the programme was being continued.

M. MELI DI SORAGNA (Italy) said that his delegation had approved the plan proposed by the United Kingdom, which it regarded as a further example of the empirical nature of the British mind. He was not opposed to the general conception of the procedure of the Conference. Since Mr. Eden had said that he was prepared to withdraw the first part of his proposals, the Italian delegation would not defend them. He was prepared to agree that the General Commission should examine all the points enumerated under head A of Chapter II and that the Political Commission should study points 1 and 2 of head A of the same chapter. As regarded the first of these two points, he shared M. de Madariaga's view. A solemn affirmation not to resort to force was extremely desirable, but it would be dangerous to formulate it unless it were accompanied by positive measures of disarmament. The absence of measures of this kind could only invalidate this declaration at the very moment it was made.

He confessed that he did not altogether understand the purport of Mr. Gibson's remarks. The United Kingdom delegate had agreed that the chapter of his proposals relating to disarmament should be referred to the General Commission, provided that each point was entrusted to a special sub-committee, so that the work might go forward on parallel lines. The delegate of the United States of America thought that the part relating to effectives should be referred to the General Commission, the question of war material being reserved for the Bureau, which would examine the question of procedure. In the opinion of the Italian delegation the question of land war material was possibly that which was ripest and should therefore be treated on absolutely the same footing as the question of effectives, instead of giving way to the latter. The Italian delegation reserved the right, at the moment when the delegations had before

1 Document Conf.D.150.
M. Nadolny (Germany) also thought that Mr. Gibson’s suggestion would only be acceptable if agreement had first been reached on the text of the proposals. As it had already indicated, the German delegation wished to propose some amendments. That was why it was desirable to begin by studying the programme so as to find out whether there was unanimity or not.

Mr. Gibson (United States of America), replying to the Italian delegate, recognised the importance of the question of land war material. The reason he had not suggested the immediate reference of this question to the General Commission was because the delegations would still have a great deal to say on this point, but he had no deep-rooted objection to it. The Bureau would doubtless continue to examine all the questions and would refer them, as and when they were ripe, to the General Commission.

In reply to M. Nadolny, he pointed out that, if the German delegation had amendments to submit, an examination of the text of the proposals to be submitted was obviously essential. He had thought that unanimity had already been reached as regards the reference of all the questions to the relevant Commissions.

M. Buero (Uruguay) said that the United States delegation had expressed exactly what he had intended to say. As Rapporteur on questions relating to land war material, he could say that those questions were not so ripe as the Italian delegation thought. They were, in fact, closely bound up with the political questions which would have to be referred to the Political Commission. Until the Conference had decided what action should be taken in regard to these questions, it would be very difficult to arrive at an agreement concerning land armaments. He therefore thought that Mr. Gibson’s proposal was a very good way out of the difficulty. The Bureau must also study the question of material. He had not yet been able to submit his report as bases of agreement were lacking. It was to be hoped that Mr. Gibson’s suggestion would enable those bases to be found.

M. Paul-Boncour (France) said that, as regarded the question of procedure, the French delegation was quite prepared to accept Mr. Gibson’s proposal. To prevent any misunderstanding as to his delegation’s views he added that it was solely concerned with the order in which the work would be taken. The United States and United Kingdom proposals constituted to some extent a guarantee that the States Members of the Conference definitely approved certain of the questions set forth in the French plan. He reminded the Bureau that he had clearly and frankly stated that the attitudes adopted by the delegations would depend on their acceptance or rejection of the essential parts of the French plan.

There were great advantages in referring first of all the question of effectives to the General Commission to be dealt with by the latter. It would only be possible for the French delegation to give its opinion as to a reduction of material when it knew what decision would be taken on effectives. The number of effectives could obviously be fixed far more definitely if it were known which arms would be allowed and which prohibited. In other words, the question of quantitative disarmament, to which the Conference had always attached great importance, should be dealt with first. The question of effectives should come afterwards. In this connection he shared the views of the Italian delegate.

He understood M. Nadolny’s observation concerning the wording of the United Kingdom draft, especially as he himself would have reservations to make. However, the delegations would be better able to propose amendments in the General Commission than in the Bureau.

M. Nadolny (Germany) regretted that he was not altogether in agreement with M. Paul-Boncour. As regarded the question of unanimity, it was not merely a matter of differences in wording, but of questions of substance which the German delegation considered of great importance. For that reason a preliminary discussion was essential.

As regarded the question of war material, he had already stated that his delegation attached great importance to this problem, which should not give way to the question of effectives. The number of effectives could obviously be fixed far more definitely if it were known which arms would be allowed and which prohibited. In other words, the question of qualitative disarmament, to which the Conference had always attached great importance, should be dealt with first. The question of effectives should come afterwards. In this connection he shared the views of the Italian delegate.

The Chairman, summing up the discussion, thought he could say that, in accordance with the suggestions made by Mr. Gibson and other delegates, head A of Chapter II ("Security") of the United Kingdom proposals should be referred to the Political Commission.
and head B (a) ("Effectives") to the General Commission, in which each delegate would have an opportunity of suggesting the manner in which he considered that the question should be studied. The Bureau would then decide what other question should be submitted to the General Commission and would draw up a series of further questions as and when they were ripe. Lastly, the Bureau would not lose sight of the question of the manufacture of arms. He was not yet aware whether it would be necessary to take a decision on the final text of the United Kingdom proposal. Personally, he would have preferred to refer the whole of head B to the General Commission, but, since unanimity had not been reached on this point, this would be done in the manner he had just indicated.

M. NADOLNY (Germany) was doubtful whether the Bureau was actually competent to transfer a question to the Political Commission. In his opinion, the whole programme should first be approved by the General Commission, which was alone competent to deal with the matter. He also was of opinion that it was preferable to refer the whole of head B to the General Commission, after first drawing up in the Bureau a final text of the programme.

The CHAIRMAN replied that the procedure he himself had indicated was quite correct. At the next meeting of the General Commission he would submit a report on the decisions taken that day by the Bureau, and in one of the recommendations it would be suggested that the Political Commission should be convened so that the political question in all its aspects might be submitted to that Commission.

The Chairman then asked whether the delegations had any objection to the convening by the General Commission of the Political Commission for the purpose of submitting to it the questions relating to security.

The Bureau adopted this proposal.

The CHAIRMAN asked whether opinions were divided in the Bureau as to head B. Should the whole of that head be referred to the General Commission or paragraph (a) alone and the other questions later?

M. MELI DI SORAGNA (Italy) thought that head B should be referred as a whole to the General Commission and that all the delegations were agreed on this point. However, if it were decided to refer the various points enumerated under head B as and when they were ripe, he would have no objection to this, but he preferred that they should be referred to the Commission en bloc, merely the headings being given so as to avoid a discussion on formal questions. He thought that by this procedure the difficulty could be got over.

Mr. EDEN (United Kingdom) thought that the simplest method would be to refer head B en bloc to the General Commission, which would be asked to take the questions in the order in which they were given in the United Kingdom proposal.

M. NADOLNY (Germany) agreed to this procedure, subject to the right to submit observations in the General Commission.

M. MELI DI SORAGNA (Italy) pointed out that the suggestion which Mr. Eden had just made was similar to that of Mr. Gibson. He regretted his inability to accept it and made a reservation which he asked to be inserted in the Minutes.

The CHAIRMAN said that note would be taken of this, but observed that the General Commission must obviously begin its work by examining one question or another. In his opinion the work of the General Commission and that of the Political Commission should go forward pari passu, in view of the importance of dealing with these kinds of questions jointly. He hoped that the Bureau would accept Mr. Eden's last proposal.

M. NADOLNY (Germany) thought that, in practice, the problem of the order of the questions could easily be settled: the General Commission would doubtless submit the question of effective to the Committee on Effectives, and would itself deal with war material. For that reason, the German delegation did not make the same reservation as the Italian delegation.

_The proposal made by the United Kingdom delegation was adopted._
FORTIETH MEETING (PRIVATE).

Held on Thursday, April 27th, 1933, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. A. HENDERSON.

56. QUESTIONS OF PROCEDURE ARISING OUT OF THE GENERAL COMMISSION’S EXAMINATION OF PART I (SECURITY) OF THE DRAFT CONVENTION SUBMITTED BY THE UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION.

The CHAIRMAN felt he should explain why he had convened the Bureau. After examining carefully Mr. Norman Davis’s important declaration before the General Commission,1 and considering its effects on the discussion of Part I of the United Kingdom plan2 and the amendments thereto, he had reached the conclusion that possibly nothing was to be gained for the moment by continuing in the General Commission the discussions on Part I of the plan. He did not know on what date Mr. Norman Davis would be able to make the statement to which he had referred on the previous day, and which would certainly have considerable influence on the subsequent work of the Conference. In these circumstances, the Chairman had felt that the Bureau should consider the possibility of suspending the discussion of Part I of the United Kingdom plan and passing immediately to Part II. He felt, moreover, that the greater the extent of disarmament achieved as a result of the examination of Part II, the greater would be the measure of security attained. He therefore thought it would be better to continue the work in the manner he had just indicated, for Part II of the United Kingdom plan would undoubtedly call for a fairly lengthy discussion.

The Chairman desired to draw attention to another point. The World Economic Conference would meet shortly, and June 12th had even been suggested for that meeting. The Disarmament Conference might possibly contribute to the success of the Economic Conference if it reached definite decisions on Part II of the United Kingdom plan—that was to say, on the extent of disarmament. To achieve that result the Conference must work quickly, for June 12th was fairly near, and, further, account must be taken of the Whitsuntide vacation, which might possibly be shortened as far as possible but which it would be difficult to do away with altogether. It might also prove necessary, as an exceptional measure, to hold two meetings of the General Commission a day.

In view of these considerations and after consulting the Secretary-General and various delegations, the President of the Conference had felt he should submit these various points to the Bureau.

M. DI SORAGNA (Italy) said that the Italian delegation was quite prepared to accept any procedure selected by the Bureau. It saw no objection to breaking off the General Commission’s examination of Part I of the United Kingdom plan and passing to Part II. During the Conference’s proceedings, the Italian delegation had always maintained that the chief aim was to bring about effective disarmament, and that security would be the result of the success achieved in the sphere of disarmament. M. di Soragna was therefore acting quite consistently in supporting the Chairman’s proposal.

He pointed out, however, that after taking cognisance of the United Kingdom plan, the Italian delegation had stated that it would refrain from submitting amendments, even on technical points, the integral acceptance of which appeared to its experts to be very difficult. Indeed, it felt that the United Kingdom plan was of such value for the Conference’s success that the Italian Government had decided that political considerations took precedence of all others, and that, in these circumstances, it was necessary to throw overboard all national and selfish preoccupations in the interests of the common cause. That attitude was naturally subject to the reservation that the other delegations acted in the same way.

If it were decided to examine Part II before adopting any definite resolution with regard to Part I, the Italian delegation would be in an embarrassing situation. It would be difficult for it to refrain from submitting amendments required in the national interest. Indeed, certain delegations took a very keen interest in Part I of the plan and had submitted amendments.3 The Italian delegation would be unable to maintain its altruistic attitude with regard to Part II if the other delegations did not adopt the same attitude with regard to those parts which more specially concerned them. Each of them must make sacrifices in the common cause.

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1 See Minutes of the fifty-second meeting of the General Commission.
3 See Minutes of the fifty-first and fifty-second meetings of the General Commission.
M. di Soragna, moreover, was not in the least pessimistic. He still hoped that Part I of the plan would be adopted without any fundamental change. In that event, any amendment which the Italian delegation might have to submit would be withdrawn, and the Italian delegation would maintain the attitude it had taken up in the General Commission.¹

M. Nadolny (Germany) noted that the General Commission was at present unable to complete its work on Part I of the United Kingdom plan by taking a vote. The Bureau must therefore seek a practical method by which the work could continue. He pointed out, with regard to Part I, that the General Commission had had before it the United Kingdom plan and various important amendments and had then been faced with Mr. Norman Davis’s declaration. If therefore seemed that the question was not ripe for a decision. The same situation would undoubtedly arise with regard to other parts of the plan. It was, in fact, impossible in a few days to reconcile divergent points of view on very important problems. In M. Nadolny’s opinion, the most practical procedure would be to adopt the Chairman’s proposal and to continue the examination of the United Kingdom plan. That examination would be a kind of first reading, and this procedure would, he thought, give full satisfaction to the Italian delegation, and enable it to ascertain the attitude of the other delegations. Generally speaking, it would thus be possible to see in what way a Convention could be worked out. When this first reading was concluded, the Conference would know the decision of the United States of America with regard to Part I, and would be able to take a final decision on the various parts of the United Kingdom plan.

M. Massigli (France) had been very much struck by M. di Soragna’s observations. He did not think, however, that the proposal to adjourn Part I was absolutely incompatible with M. di Soragna’s anxiety, which was perhaps rather connected with the political questions arising out of Article 6 than with the general problems raised by Articles 1 to 5. M. Massigli wondered whether the time had not perhaps come, seeing that there was some difficulty in continuing the examination of Part I, to start up the machinery for preparing Annexes X and Y mentioned in Article 6. The General Commission had already taken decisions of principle on these points. It might perhaps be possible to see what could be done by the European States without awaiting the declaration of the United States of America.

M. Massigli was entirely in favour of M. Nadolny’s proposal to proceed with a first reading of the United Kingdom plan. This idea of a first reading was, in M. Massigli’s opinion, fundamental. He recalled that, before the Easter vacation, he had often urged that the work of the technical Committees, and in particular of the Committee on Effectives, should be pursued actively. During the fiftieth meeting of the General Commission he had said that, when Governments had to estimate the effort of reduction demanded of them, they would need to know how it would balance out among the different countries in question. In other words, they would wish to know which among the various categories of national forces were those to which the limitations would apply.² But the Committee on Effectives had not appreciably speeded up its work and, in fact, had not resumed it up to the present. M. Massigli felt bound to point out that, until the Committee on Effectives had concluded its work, the work of the General Commission on Part II of the United Kingdom plan could only be quite provisional. When it was in possession of the conclusions of the Committee on Effectives, it would be able to ascertain the value of the proposed definitions, and to see whether they could be accepted or whether others must be sought.

In M. Massigli’s opinion, it would therefore be useful to do concrete work, but he felt bound to point out that, if it were desired that the technical Committees should speed up their work, difficulties might be encountered in connection with personnel. Most of the delegations had only a small number of technical advisers, so that when the General Commission was sitting the other Committees could not meet. It must therefore be ascertained whether it was desired that the work of those Committees should be continued slowly or whether, on the contrary, it should not be speeded up.

Mr. Eden (United Kingdom) said he had been very much struck by M. Massigli’s arguments in favour of accelerating the work of the Committee on Effectives. But he also saw the force of certain political considerations. On the previous day, the General Commission had adjourned the debate on Part I of the United Kingdom plan. It had had very good reasons for doing so, and there was no doubt that, when the debate was resumed, there would be more likelihood of reaching satisfactory results. But the psychological effect on those outside the Conference must also be borne in mind. To suspend the General Commission’s proceedings in order that the Committees might set to work would have a very bad effect on public opinion. Mr. Eden therefore proposed that the General Commission should continue its work, passing to Part II of the plan, and that, at the same time, the work of the Committee on Effectives should be speeded up.

M. Bourquin (Belgium) considered that Mr. Eden’s proposal, which he supported, took as much account as possible of the various aspects of the question. He also desired, however, to support M. Massigli’s suggestion with regard to the examination of the questions raised by

¹ See Minutes of the forty-eighth meeting of the General Commission, page 372.
² See Minutes of the General Commission, page 390.
Article 6 of the United Kingdom draft. These questions might be studied outside the General Commission. M. Bourquin recalled that various proposals in regard to this matter had already been made—in particular, the Soviet proposal for the definition of the aggressor and the Belgian proposal with regard to the Commission for establishing the facts. These proposals had all been referred already to a special Committee, which had begun its work. Consequently, if it were decided that the General Commission should suspend its examination of Part I of the United Kingdom plan, the special Committee in question might be asked to continue to examine the problems already before it, together with any others that might be referred to it.

M. Lange (Norway) agreed with M. Bourquin. As Vice-Chairman of the Air Committee, however, he desired the Bureau to clear up one specific point. Several delegations had asked that the Air Committee should resume its work. Personally, M. Lange thought that the moment the General Commission adopted the United Kingdom plan as a basis of discussion, it became necessary to suspend the Air Committee's discussions until the General Commission had expressed its views on the chapter of the plan relating to air questions. M. Lange desired to know the Bureau's opinion on this point.

M. Nadolny (Germany) fully approved the proposals of Mr. Eden and M. Bourquin, which he thought most practical. With regard to the question raised by M. Lange, however, M. Nadolny thought that it would be better for the Air Committee to continue its work. The latter was already at a very advanced stage, but the Committee still had to examine one fundamental question—that of the complete abolition of military aviation. As Article 35 of the United Kingdom plan dealt with this question, it would be advisable for the Air Committee to study it. M. Nadolny thought, in fact, that it would be better to settle this question in the Convention rather than to leave it to the Permanent Disarmament Commission, as provided by the United Kingdom plan.

M. Massigli (France) endorsed M. Nadolny's observations. He agreed with him that the Air Committee should be allowed to continue its work but that its task should not be confined to the United Kingdom plan, since it already had a definite programme of work.

Mr. Norman Davis (United States of America) did not think that the postponement of the discussion of Part I of the United Kingdom plan would be regarded with disfavour by public opinion. The United States of America were eager to find a means of collaborating with the League. The only question was in regard to the practical ways and means of this collaboration. In these circumstances, public opinion, or at all events intelligent public opinion, would doubtless recognise the wisdom of postponing the discussion of Part I. Moreover, public opinion was chiefly concerned about the absence of far-reaching discussions on disarmament in the proper sense of the term. Progress would therefore be made if, as M. Nadolny had suggested, the General Commission passed on at once to a first reading of Part II and the other parts of the United Kingdom plan. Moreover, decisions in regard to Part I would largely depend on the decisions taken on the other parts of the plan.

As regarded the Air Committee, he thought that it was difficult to get anywhere without knowing where one was going, and he considered it logical to wait until the General Commission had examined the part of the plan dealing with air armaments. Only then would it be known exactly what questions were to be referred to the Air Committee.

The Chairman wished to define the attitude he had adopted in regard to the work of the technical Committees. Those Committees had been set up before the General Commission had adopted the United Kingdom plan as a basis for discussion. Once this decision had been taken, the position was changed and he had not insisted that the Committees should continue their work. He had thought it best to leave it to the Chairman of each Committee to decide whether it could usefully discuss certain questions in the light of the United Kingdom plan. Whenever he had been consulted he had advised the Committees not to meet until some definite question had been submitted to them. He thought that this was a logical attitude, as the General Commission was not at present discussing a report but a draft Convention.

Mr. Eden (United Kingdom) shared the views expressed by the Chairman. At the present time the General Commission was working on the basis of a draft Convention, and he did not see what the Committees could do until the former had expressed its views. Moreover, the meeting of the different Committees gave rise to difficulties in the matter of personnel, and, in his opinion, the examination of the draft Convention should take precedence over all other work.

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1 See Minutes of the thirty-first meeting of the General Commission, page 237.
3 See Minutes of the eighth meeting of the Political Commission, page 56.
M. Dovgalevsky (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) agreed with the Chairman. The Bureau had been summoned to deal with a somewhat unexpected situation. When the General Commission resumed its work on April 25th, the President had expressed the hope that it would be able to get through that work quickly so as to complete the examination of the draft and have the Convention ready for adoption in two months' time. The very next day an obstacle had cropped up and the Bureau was now endeavouring to find a solution for this new difficulty. So far, only expedients had been proposed. The Soviet delegate agreed with the Chairman that these expedients should be rejected.

With reference to M. Nadolny's proposal, he pointed out that this was also an expedient. M. Nadolny had proposed an innovation—namely, the system of several readings. He did not think that this would serve any useful purpose, and to illustrate his contention he observed that the Italian delegate had already stated the course which he proposed to pursue; he would reserve his attitude until he knew what attitude would be taken by the other delegations. Under such conditions it was easy to be altruistic; at the first reading, which would be quickly completed, one would say nothing, but a second reading would be necessary later. He was therefore opposed to the innovation proposed by M. Nadolny, which he thought would be purely and simply a waste of time.

M. Dovgalevsky noted that it was impossible to continue the examination of Part I. He did not think it was feasible to pass on to Part II, in regard to which the delegations, and particularly the Soviet delegation, were not in a position to submit amendments.

As regards the work of the Committees, that matter had been definitely settled by the Chairman.

In conclusion, there was no use looking for expedients which would deceive no one; he made this statement at the risk of being accused of belonging to that unintelligent public opinion to which reference had been made. The Conference was faced with a situation for which it was not responsible—the impossibility of continuing its work. The obvious conclusion should be drawn.

M. Di Soragna (Italy) wished to reply to M. Dovgalevsky, who had criticised, although very courteously, the Italian delegate's attitude. He explained that this attitude was a consequence of the proposed procedure. The Italian delegation had undertaken to refrain from proposing amendments provided the United Kingdom plan was adopted without any substantial modifications. If, therefore, the General Commission passed on to Part II without taking any decision on the important modifications proposed to Part I, the Italian delegation would be obliged to cover itself by submitting certain amendments which it would withdraw if it were decided to return to the original plan or if a reasonable agreement were reached. He did not think that this clearly defined attitude of the Italian delegation would in any way impede the progress of the Conference's work.

M. Dovgalevsky (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that he had not wished in any way to criticise M. di Soragna's attitude. He fully understood and respected the Italian Government's anxieties. In mentioning M. di Soragna's name, he had merely wished to illustrate his own views. His criticism was directed chiefly against M. Nadolny. It was certain that, if the procedure proposed by M. Nadolny were accepted and all the delegations adopted an attitude similar to that of the Italian delegation, no progress would be made by the end of the first reading.

He repeated that the Conference was confronted with a situation which it had not created and for which it was not responsible, but the obvious conclusion must be drawn.

M. Nadolny (Germany), in reply to M. Dovgalevsky, said that he had merely wished to propose a procedure which should be as practical as possible. He thought it essential to ascertain the views of every delegation on the various points of the United Kingdom plan. It was therefore necessary to go ahead and see what amendments would be proposed.

As regards the technical Committees, different decisions might be taken in the various cases.

M. De Vasconcellos (Portugal) wished to point out that, strictly speaking, M. Nadolny's proposal that there should be several successive readings of the United Kingdom plan did not constitute a real innovation. This procedure had already been applied with excellent results by the Expenditure Commission. That Commission had drawn up a voluminous report, of which there had been three readings. The differences of opinion, which were very marked at the first reading, had been appreciably reduced in the course of the work, so that at the final reading the points of view of the various delegations had become much less divergent.

As regarded the technical Committees, he thought that some of them should continue their work. He reminded the Bureau that Sir John Simon had stated that the draft Convention contained no provisions relating to budgetary limitation nor to traffic in arms, because the relevant Committees had not finished their work. The same observation perhaps applied also to other Committees. In fact, the technical Committees might render valuable assistance to the General Commission if they continued their work within the framework of the United Kingdom plan.

1 See Minutes of the fiftieth meeting of the General Commission, page 399.
M. Westman (Sweden) shared the views expressed by Mr. Eden and supported his proposal. As acting Chairman of the Committee on Effectives he said that, when the General Commission had adopted the United Kingdom plan as a basis of discussion, the Committee on Effectives had at once examined its agenda and had unanimously agreed that many of the points submitted to it could be examined on the basis of the United Kingdom plan. The Committee had accordingly resolved to continue its work. It now remained to be decided whether it was advisable for the Committee to suspend its work, which was only half done, so as to enable the General Commission to continue its discussions, or whether it would not be better to allow the Committee on Effectives to continue its work. Personally, he was of opinion that the only practical solution was to expedite the work of the Committee on Effectives and to arrange for it to sit during the next few days.

M. Di Soragna (Italy) said that M. de Vasconcellos had indicated that the United Kingdom plan should be supplemented on certain points and in particular by a chapter relating to national defence expenditure. M. di Soragna did not deny that additional chapters could be added to the United Kingdom plan, but he wished to point out that this plan could also be considered as complete in itself and that there was nothing in it to show that such additions were necessary.

The Chairman drew the following conclusions from the discussion which had just taken place:

1. He proposed to recommend to the General Commission that the examination of Part I of the United Kingdom plan should be suspended and that the Commission should pass on to the examination of Part II. As regarded the amendments to Part II, he hoped that they would be sent to him without delay and, if possible, that same evening, so as to enable the General Commission to resume its work on the following day.

2. He proposed that the Committee on Effectives should be requested to continue and accelerate its work. The Committee on Effectives might meet in the afternoon of that day, on Friday morning and possibly on Saturday, if the General Commission was not sitting. The Committee would study the question of effectives in the light of the United Kingdom plan.

3. As regards the question of security, he proposed that the Committee previously set up by the General Commission to deal with the definition (in the widest sense of the term) of the aggressor should also examine the points raised by Article 6 of the United Kingdom plan, in accordance with M. Massigli's proposal. This Committee might meet at the same time as the Committee on Effectives, when the General Commission was not sitting.

The Chairman's proposals were adopted.

M. Nadolny (Germany) said that he had proposed that the Air Committee should continue its work. He asked the Bureau to take a decision on this point.

M. Massigli (France) supported M. Nadolny's proposal. If the Air Committee did not at once examine the question of air armaments in the light of the United Kingdom plan, there would be inevitable delay when the General Commission came to examine Chapter 3 of Section II of Part II.

M. Lange (Norway) recalled that the Committee had been instructed to consider the possibility of completely abolishing military aviation. The United Kingdom plan, which dealt with this problem in Article 35, raised a preliminary question—that of the Permanent Disarmament Commission. It would be difficult for the Air Committee to proceed with its work unless this preliminary question was settled. Further, as several speakers had already pointed out, it might perhaps be difficult, from the point of view of personnel, to organise the meetings of several Committees at the same time.

In conclusion, he requested M. Nadolny not to insist upon the immediate summoning of the Air Committee.

Mr. Eden (United Kingdom) fully agreed with M. Lange. He had himself been a member of the Air Committee for a long time and he thought it better to wait until the General Commission had expressed its views on the question in order to avoid confusion.

M. Nadolny (Germany) still thought that it would be highly expedient for the Air Committee to study the problem forthwith, so as to enable the General Commission to take a decision on Article 35. While leaving the decision on this matter to the Bureau, he wished to reserve the right to ask that the work of the Air Committee should be resumed when the examination of Article 35 was begun.

Viscount Mushakoji (Japan) fully endorsed M. Lange's observations.

The Chairman proposed that the Air Committee should not be asked to resume its work immediately.

The Chairman's proposal was adopted.
FORTY-FIRST MEETING (PRIVATE)

Held on Monday, May 8th, 1933, at 11 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. HENDERSON.

57. QUESTIONS OF PROCEDURE CONCERNING THE CONTINUATION OF THE EXAMINATION BY THE GENERAL COMMISSION OF THE DRAFT CONVENTION SUBMITTED BY THE UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION.

The CHAIRMAN reminded the Bureau that, on April 25th, the General Commission had started the discussion, article by article, of Part I of the United Kingdom draft Convention relating to questions of security.

On April 26th, the representative of the United States, Mr. Norman Davis, had made an important declaration concerning the principle of consultation and its incorporation in a disarmament treaty, and had concluded by suggesting that before reaching a decision with regard to Part I, the Commission might well pass on to other parts of the draft Convention, adding that:

"At the appropriate time, the United States delegation would be quite willing to revert to the general question dealt with in Part I with a view to giving a more precise indication of the manner in which it considered that the United States could most effectively co-operate."

The Bureau would also recall that, on the following day, April 27th, the Chairman had suggested that, as a result of the statement made by Mr. Norman Davis, it would be a mistake for the time being to discuss Part I. Acting on the Chairman's suggestion, the Bureau had decided to make, among others, the following recommendation to the General Commission:

"That the General Commission should suspend for the present the examination of Part I of the United Kingdom draft Convention and pass on to the examination of Part II."

That recommendation had been accepted by the General Commission at its meeting on April 28th.

The General Commission had therefore proceeded to consider Section I of Part II of the United Kingdom draft Convention concerning effectives, and it was probable that, that afternoon, the Commission would complete the last part of that Section—namely, Chapter 3, concerning the methods by which the reductions and reorganisations entailed by the preceding chapters should be effected.

At its first reading of the section on effectives, the General Commission had adopted Articles 7, 8, 10, 11 and 13. On the other hand, it had left over for further consideration several important items, notably Article 9 and its amendment concerning the question of trained reserves, Table I and the amendments thereto concerning actual figures of effectives and the question of the standardisation of European continental armies as provided for in Chapter 2. The amended Article 12 concerning police forces, thanks to the spirit of conciliation exhibited by the delegation most interested in that important question, had been adopted provisionally.

Three courses were now open for the future progress of the work. The Conference could return to Part I—concerning questions of security—but the Chairman understood that the United States was not yet in a position to enter into a discussion of such questions. On the other hand, it might take up for second reading Section I of Part II concerning effectives; or it might proceed with the first reading of the subsequent articles of the draft Convention, beginning with Section II of Part II, Articles 19 to 22, concerning land material.

The Chairman added that he had limited himself to setting out objectively the three possible courses. To his knowledge, the Bureau had never been called upon to take a decision so fraught with consequences as the decision it would have to take that morning. He asked the members of the Bureau to examine the question carefully before making up their minds.

Mr. EDEN (United Kingdom) said that as the draft had been submitted by his country, he must state the views of His Majesty's Government on the question before the Bureau. The United Kingdom Government thought that, when the first reading of Section I of Part II

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1 See Minutes of the fifty-first meeting of the General Commission.
2 See Minutes of the fifty-second meeting of the General Commission.
3 See Minutes of the fortieth meeting of the Bureau.
4 See Minutes of the fifty-third meeting of the General Commission.
was concluded, the Commission should immediately pass to the second reading. His Majesty's Government had never claimed that the draft Convention represented the point of view of the United Kingdom only; on the contrary, that document was a balanced text in which an effort had been made to reflect the different opinions which had emerged during the Conference. Mr. Eden drew attention in that connection to M. Bourquin's statement in the General Commission on May 3rd. The Belgian delegate had reminded his colleagues that "a little more than two months previously, the Commission had discussed the standardisation of the continental armies on the basis of the army with short-term service and limited effectives. There had been a thorough discussion, and every conceivable reason of substance and method had been brought forward. Each delegation had taken up a position, and, at the end, the General Commission had been in favour of the principle".

That was one reason why the principle appeared in the draft Convention; it did not express the point of view of the United Kingdom only, but that of the majority of the Conference. Mr. Eden hoped he had shown clearly that, far from desiring to oppose minor amendments, his delegation wished to do its utmost to help forward the Conference. Nevertheless, a clear distinction should be drawn between minor amendments and fundamental amendments. There were, so to speak, a certain number of important supports. If they were removed and not replaced by others, the whole edifice would be in danger of falling. The standardisation of the continental armies of Europe was one of those supports, as the Belgian delegate had himself recognised. If the Conference was able to solve the problem of continental armaments, it would have settled one of the most important and most complicated questions.

The German amendment not only undermined Chapter 2, but destroyed Table I of Chapter I, the fate of which depended upon the decisions taken with regard to Chapter 2. If the table disappeared, the whole of Section I would be compromised. Still further, the Conference would realise that the table of effectives depended on the question of material, the solution of which was dependent on the solution of the question of effectives.

The delay caused by the request of one delegation could not constitute a valid argument, seeing that the purpose of that delay was to some extent constructive. It was due to that delegation's need for sufficient time to make definite proposals.

The United Kingdom Government had examined the question carefully and was unable to suggest to the Bureau that the discussion of Section II, "Material", should begin, as an important part of the previous section had not been settled. It should not be forgotten that the Conference had accepted as a basis for discussion the draft Convention submitted by the United Kingdom. If an important part of the draft were to disappear, the discussion would become valueless. Several delegations had already stated that they would only accept the document if its final form were more or less the same as its present form. What would be their position if a negative amendment were formulated against a fundamental part of the draft? If the General Commission opened the discussion of a further section before it had settled the preceding part, it would probably compromise the success of its work.

M. Nadolny (Germany) said that, when the Chairman had convened the Bureau, he had not been aware of the reason. Only later had he understood that the object was to decide whether or not to open the discussion on Section II. The German delegate had been very surprised, seeing that, as the Chairman had just pointed out, the General Commission had decided to leave Part I of the draft Convention aside and to turn to Part II. M. Nadolny did not understand why it was now desired to take up the discussion from the beginning. All the delegates would agree that the questions of material and effectives were closely connected. If no final decision could be reached on one, no final decision could be reached on the other either.

The United Kingdom delegate had said that the draft Convention contained certain important chapters which were its main supports. For the German delegation, the question of equality of rights was also one of those supports and it would be unable to reach a definite decision on effectives or on other questions until it was aware of the attitude of the other delegations with regard to material and equality of rights. Obviously, the last word was not said at the beginning of a discussion, but that did not prevent the discussion being continued and an attempt being made to reach agreement instead of breaking off the discussion and going back to the beginning again. M. Nadolny was therefore very surprised that such a procedure should be suggested.

On the other hand, Mr. Eden had pointed out that, according to several delegations, the United Kingdom draft must be accepted more or less in its present form, with minor amendments. Frankly, M. Nadolny did not regard it in that light, and in this matter he based his opinion on the statements made by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom in presenting the draft. It was, above all, a basis for discussion with regard to which each delegate was free to propose such amendments as seemed to him expedient in his country's interests. No doubt, it would be impossible to arrive at a convention satisfactory to all, but the German delegation greatly hoped that at any rate an acceptable convention would be established.

The only method of arriving at that goal was to continue the discussion. At the end of the discussion of Part II, it would be time to decide whether it was necessary to take up the second reading of Part I or Part II. He hoped that the Government of the United States of America...
would then be in a position to make known its attitude. In any event, M. Nadolny did not think a decision could be taken until the United States Government was in a position to do that.

In conclusion, the German delegation felt that the best procedure would be to invite all the delegations to submit their amendments to the various articles in Part II. It would then be possible to ascertain their attitude. When the examination of Part II had been concluded, the General Commission would be in a position to adopt a resolution.

The Chairman noted that there were two proposals before the Bureau: the United Kingdom delegation's proposal that the Commission should return to the beginning of Section I of Part II, and the German delegation's proposal that it should discuss Article 19, which stood at the beginning of Section II, "Material".

M. Kunzli-Jizersky (Czechoslovakia) reminded the Bureau, as had been made clear in the numerous declarations made previously by his delegation, that his Government attached special importance to a solution of the question of security. Nevertheless, in order not to hold up the work of the Conference, the Czechoslovak delegation had not objected to the proposal to adjourn the discussion of Part I temporarily, and to open the discussion on Part II, Section I, "Effectives". It had, however, hoped that, in the interval, an approach would be made to a preliminary solution, at least of the question of effectives; that would have enabled the delegations, on the basis of the results secured in that sphere, to define their attitude as regards the question of the reduction of material. Unfortunately, no one knew to-day what was the position as regarded either security or effectives. It seemed essential therefore, before going on to discuss Section II, "Material", to know what the army of the future would be. That was a question of principle, coming within the province of effectives, which would have to be cleared up first, because the Czechoslovak Government's attitude to land armaments would depend on the solution given to this question. In his opinion, therefore, the Commission should for the time being proceed to a second reading to Section I, "Effectives".

Mr. Wilson (United States of America) agreed that, logically, the reasonable course to follow would be to give the remainder of the United Kingdom plan a first reading. Unfortunately, events had not taken a logical course. On the question of standardisation, an amendment had already been submitted to the effect that this should not be effected in the framework of the Convention but after the signature of the latter and by the Permanent Disarmament Commission. Similar amendments might, he feared, be expected if the Commission started the study of material in such circumstances. The German delegate had of course given it to be understood that he had not said his last word, and Mr. Wilson was glad to hear it. Would it not be possible either to enter a general reservation or to propose a positive amendment which would enable the Commission to take a decision? Such a solution would facilitate matters considerably. Mr. Wilson, in any case, was prepared to accept the decision of the majority of the Bureau.

M. Massigli (France) agreed with the Chairman that the Bureau was called upon to take decisions of the greatest importance for the future of the Conference's work. A point had been reached where the situation had to be frankly faced and where, over and above questions of procedure, consideration should be given to the realities which those questions sometimes concealed. In this connection, it was a matter for congratulation that the Bureau was sitting in private, and he trusted that delegations would thus be able to give frank expression to their views.

The situation was a follows: the General Commission had examined, at a first reading, the question of effectives. The German delegate had said that he was rejecting for the moment the chapter on the transformation of continental armies and that he proposed that it should be studied by the Permanent Disarmament Commission later. M. Nadolny had even definitely stated that there could be no question of such transformation in the present Convention. This was a very important problem and a decision regarding it would have facilitated the consideration of the problem of equality of rights. While a negative attitude was being adopted in regard to this question, the consideration was already being given to the application of the principle of equality to the following chapters.

What would be the position, M. Massigli wondered, of some delegations, including his own, if the Commission started to study Section II forthwith? That, moreover, was the idea underlying the question raised by the Czechoslovak delegate, when he stressed the necessity of knowing what would be the army of the future. It was not sufficient to say that each country would keep a certain type of army; the size of that army must also be known. What, for instance, was the German delegate's idea of his own country's army? On that point, the Committee still had no information. But, for several reasons external to the Conference, the moment had arrived when, behind diplomatic formulae, facts made themselves forcibly felt. It was necessary to know what was happening and what was being planned. During the last week, schemes had been suggested which appeared to have the effect of restoring conscription. Was it going to be introduced while still maintaining the present standing army? And it was at the same moment that countries which, he admitted, possessed numerical superiority in the matter of material were being asked to forgo some of that superiority; the thing, of course, was impossible.
The French delegation, nevertheless, did not ask for exact figures; it merely wanted to know whether or not certain delegations agreed to the standardisation of armies. That question, as had already been stated, was one of the main supports of the Convention. So long as it was not settled, the French delegate did not see how it was possible to open a discussion on another chapter. The General Commission, naturally, could decide its own procedure, but if it resolved to take up at once the examination of the question of material, M. Massigli would be obliged to confine himself to very vague generalities.

M. NADOLNY (Germany), in reply to Mr. Wilson and M. Massigli, pointed out that the German amendment was not in any way an ultimatum. For its form, he bore no responsibility; he had merely based his text on the form given by the United Kingdom delegation to its proposal on military aviation. As to its content, the amendment should be considered as a proposal pure and simple. It was clear, he repeated, that the last word was never said at the first reading. It was not very certain when it would be said; everything would depend on the attitude of certain delegations to other questions which Germany regarded as fundamental. If the German delegation obtained concessions on other points, in particular, that of the equality of rights, it would perhaps change its attitude. The French delegate has just said that the question of the transformation of armies was one of the main supports of the Convention. It was undoubtedly so for France, but there were other questions which, to the German delegation, were no less important supports of the draft Convention, particularly Article 8 of the Covenant, the basis of the whole Conference, which must, on no account, be violated.

Mr. EDEN (United Kingdom), referring to M. Nadolny's first statement, explained that, far from questioning the close connection between effectives and material, the United Kingdom delegation, not only recognised this connection, but even held that the draft Convention had been drawn up so as to emphasise it. M. Nadolny had also said that he could give no opinion on effectives until he knew what decisions would be taken on the question of material. If he had always argued on those lines there would have been no very deep divergencies. In point of fact, the German delegation had already expressed its view on the question of effectives; it had returned a negative answer. If it could substitute a constructive proposal for its negative amendment, the Commission would be able to continue the discussion. Without such a proposal, the United Kingdom delegate still thought it would be difficult to continue the discussion.

M. DI SORAGNA (Italy) thought that the Bureau should choose whichever of the two methods afforded the possibility of an opening which would enable the discussion to be usefully continued. The German delegation's arguments gave certain hints that the General Commission might have more chance of succeeding if it continued its examination of the draft Convention than if it went back to Section I. There were indeed certain connections between the various sections of the plan which might have a favourable influence. He did not see what would be gained by going back to the beginning. On the contrary, while there was nothing to lose by continuing, there might be something to gain. In any case, the delegates would at least feel that they had left nothing untried. The Italian delegation would agree to the procedure adopted by the Bureau.

M. MASSIGLI (France) appreciated M. di Soragna's point of view, but wondered whether any progress would be made by saying that, instead of Articles I to I8, Articles I to 41 would be examined. He personally did not think so. The reason why the General Commission had been able to obtain some results in connection with a particular point in the chapter on effectives was because it had had already before it the reports of the Technical Committees and account had been taken of these in the United Kingdom proposal. That was not the case as regarded material; in that matter, an advance could only be made on the lines of the resolution of July 23rd last; and that would not be going very far.

M. NADOLNY (Germany) explained that, on the question of effectives, his delegation's objections referred to three points: trained reserves, colonial troops, standardisation of armies. Those three questions had still to be examined. In the field of material, there were also three points: disarmament (qualitative limitation), the fixing of a figure, the effect to be given to equality of rights. The German delegation could not commit itself until it knew the attitude of the other delegations. It trusted therefore that the Bureau would unanimously decide to propose that the discussion should be continued up to the end of Part II.

M. MASSIGLI (France) said that no one rejected the principle of qualitative limitation as regarded material, but he did not know whether the principle of qualitative standardisation of armies would be accepted. That was where the difference lay and it was fundamental.

On the CHAIRMAN'S suggestion, the continuation of the discussion was adjourned until the following day.

The Chairman reminded the Bureau that, at its last meeting, it had been in a somewhat difficult situation. Two proposals had been submitted to it, and, at the end of the meeting, the Chairman had thought it better, in the interests of the Conference, not to proceed to a vote. He had also suggested that he should be authorised as Chairman to consider what would be the best solution, and the Bureau had accepted his suggestion. Since then, the Chairman had had an opportunity of conferring with the delegations more closely concerned. He had now to inform the Bureau that a further delay would be necessary in order that the private conversations might continue; he was convinced that that was the only means of finding a way out which would enable the Conference to continue its work. Two or three days longer might be required for those conversations, which the Chairman proposed to follow himself. If, on Thursday afternoon, he considered it likely that sufficient progress would be made, he would convene the Bureau for Friday morning and the General Commission for Friday afternoon. No one desired more than he that the Conference should be able to continue its work in spite of the unfavourable circumstances of the moment, and should, if possible, reach a conclusion which would enable a drafting committee to get to work and draw up a Convention towards June 12th.

The Chairman was more convinced than ever of the vital necessity of a Convention. He hoped that all the members of the Bureau still desired such a result, although according to the Press, from which the Chairman was obliged to obtain a certain amount of information, some members of the Conference appeared to have lost faith and to think that the delegations should abandon their efforts. That would be the most disastrous situation that could occur. The failure of the Disarmament Conference, after fifteen months’ work, would have a demoralising effect on the efforts to be made in London in the economic sphere. The world had need of a Disarmament Convention, and, far from growing less, its need increased from day to day.

The Chairman therefore hoped that the members of the Bureau would approve the suggestion which he had just made, and which he personally felt was the best solution at present. As he had said, he would continue to follow the conversations as well as he could. If it were humanly possible, the Bureau and the General Commission would meet on Friday, but the Chairman would not hide the fact that if it appeared likely that a better understanding would be reached by extending the time allowed for the present conversations, he would not hesitate to take the responsibility of recommending that those conversations should continue for the rest of the week. He hoped that, in that eventuality, the work would be resumed not later than Monday, May 15th. He counted on the Bureau to ask the General Commission to work continuously, sitting twice a day, if necessary, in order to show the London Monetary and Economic Conference that no effort had been spared to achieve results. He pointed out that, in 1924, work had continued until midnight. It was the duty of all, including the Chairman, to work uninterruptedly for the success of the Conference.

No observations having been made on the above statement, the Chairman said that he interpreted the silence of the delegations as signifying that his suggestions were approved unanimously.

FORTY-THIRD MEETING (PRIVATE)

 Held on Friday, May 12th, 1933, at 3.30 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. HENDERSON.


The Chairman reminded the Bureau of the difficulties as regards procedure with which it had been confronted at the beginning of the week when, as he had explained at its meeting on Tuesday, he had thought it better in the interests of the Conference not to proceed to a vote. The Bureau would remember that the questions on which the vote might have been taken were whether the Conference should resume the chapter on effectives in second reading, or
should proceed to the discussion in first reading of Part II, Section II, of the United Kingdom draft Convention. Having avoided the vote, the Chairman had informed the Bureau at its last meeting that a further delay would be necessary in the hope that, by private conversations, some understanding might be reached.

The conversations had not produced the desired results and he would presently ask Mr. Eden and M. Nadolny to make short statements on the position. He had therefore reached the conclusion that the best procedure would be to begin a preliminary discussion, in a very broad sense, of Part II, Section II, "Material" of the United Kingdom draft. No amendments would be moved during that discussion, but the delegations would, of course, be free to refer to the question of effectives in view of the close connection between effectives and material. They would also be free to refer to Article 94 of the United Kingdom draft which dealt with the conclusion of a convention. The moving of amendments would be reserved for a later stage.

That procedure would be likely to permit delegations to elucidate certain important problems the solution of which would greatly ease the situation and, unless another proposal was made, the Chairman would ask the Bureau to consider this suggested preliminary discussion and, if it approved, to recommend it to the General Commission.

If the preliminary discussion was approved, he proposed to convocate the General Convention for Monday, May 15th, at 3.30 p.m. He made that suggestion on the understanding that, in the interval, the United Kingdom delegation, which was responsible for the draft Convention adopted as the basis of the discussion, would make every effort to examine with the interested delegations the amendments submitted by the latter.

Mr. Eden (United Kingdom) said that the Chairman and certain of his colleagues had been good enough earlier in the week to charge him with the responsibility of entering into conversations with his German colleague in an attempt to find a basis of agreement upon the problems which were holding up the work of the Conference. Those conversations had taken place, but unfortunately they had not led to the discovery of a basis for agreement. Mr. Eden had therefore reported on the position to the Chairman and those of his colleagues who had asked him to enter into the conversations.

For his part, he could only add that he cordially agreed with the procedure suggested by the Chairman. It was clearly necessary that the Conference should examine at an early date the position in which it now found itself, and it seemed to him that the proposed procedure was admirably calculated to that end. He added that he was doubtful whether he would serve any useful purpose by examining amendments prior to the discussion, and would suggest that that examination should be held over until the results of the conversations were known.

M. Nadolny (Germany) said he had very little to add to Mr. Eden’s explanations. He and M. Nadolny had done their utmost to reach an agreement. Personally, M. Nadolny was fully conscious that he had done everything in his power to enable the Conference to proceed with its work, while bearing in mind the interests of his country. While the conversations had not been successful, M. Nadolny was nevertheless under the impression, which Mr. Eden doubtless shared, that something had been gained and that the subsequent procedure contemplated by the Chairman would facilitate the Conference’s progress.

He supported the Chairman’s proposal, and expressed the hope that it would enable the Conference to achieve its aim.

M. Massigli (France) simply desired to associate himself with Mr. Eden’s remarks. He thought the time had come to open a broad discussion such as that contemplated by the Chairman. It was essential to see clearly what was the situation, both in the Conference and outside. At the present time, it was no longer enough to hide the facts behind words; they must be faced. It was in that spirit that the discussion, to be opened on Monday, should take place.

The Chairman said he could assure M. Massigli that he had used the expression “broad” because he was anxious that the Conference should face up to all the realities of the situation and that the discussion should be on the widest possible basis. He felt the Conference had reached a stage when it was up against the big problem of disarmament, and after a broad discussion followed by a discussion on the articles and amendments relating to material, the Conference would be in a fair way to complete a convention.

The Chairman realised that another part of the draft Convention ought to be strengthened and he hoped it would be—that was to say the section relating to supervision. He was certain that that was absolutely essential and had heard sufficient from the different delegations to know that they felt the Conference must again see whether it could not add to the methods of supervision and control when that part of the draft, which was now Part V, was under consideration.

If there were no further observations, he would take it that the Bureau was prepared to recommend to the General Commission that the above procedure should be adopted. He hoped that this very happy ending was the beginning of serious work leading up to the conclusion of a convention.

The Chairman’s proposal was adopted.
FORTY-FOURTH MEETING

Held on Tuesday, May 23rd, 1933, at II.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. HENDERSON.

60. PROPOSAL BY THE BUREAU FOR THE EXAMINATION CONCURRENTLY BY THE GENERAL COMMISSION OF PART I (SECURITY) AND PART II, SECTION II (MATERIAL), OF THE DRAFT CONVENTION SUBMITTED BY THE UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION. ¹

The Chairman said that, as the Bureau was no doubt aware, the French delegation had proposed at the meeting of the General Commission on the previous day ² that the Commission should retrace its steps and discuss Part I (Security) of the draft Convention submitted by the United Kingdom delegation, while the United States delegate, Mr. Norman Davis, had been very anxious to discuss Part II, Section II (Material).

The Chairman had felt it necessary to consult with the heads of the delegations responsible for these suggestions, the authors of the plan upon which the General Commission’s discussion was based, and the representatives of Germany and Italy. They had discussed the matter at very great length and—he was happy to say—in a very good spirit, and had eventually adopted unanimously a suggestion he himself had made to the effect that the General Commission should continue its discussion on Part II, Section II (Material), that afternoon, and on the following afternoon should begin a discussion on Part I (Security). The two subjects would then be taken on alternate days, unless common sense indicated that two consecutive meetings were required for the same question.

Material, of course, was covered in part by Articles 19 to 22, and the Chairman desired to make it quite clear that those articles would be discussed in first reading only. It might be found advisable to continue the same alternate method of discussion further, but the Bureau need not concern itself about that for the moment.

Article I had already been deleted from Part I (Security), but Articles 3 to 6 had still to be discussed. Article 6 was closely connected with the work of the Committee for Security Questions presided over by M. Politis, which was considering what should be included in Annexes X and Y. The Chairman hoped that the Committee’s report could be distributed that day. He was sure its Chairman would realise the urgency of the matter.

The Chairman hoped the first reading of the articles on material would be brief. That also applied to the discussions on security. As much time as possible must be left for the second reading, when decisions of supreme importance would have to be taken.

He hoped very much that his suggestion would prove acceptable to the Bureau.

Sir John Simon had informed the Chairman that he would examine immediately the articles forming Part I of the United Kingdom draft Convention in the light of President Roosevelt’s important statement and Mr. Norman Davis’s speech of the previous day. If any consultations were necessary, Sir John Simon would see that they were carried through in the hope that he would be able to present a revised draft to the General Commission, if necessary, without delay.

M. POLITIS (Greece), Chairman of the Committee for Security Questions, desired simply to say a few words with regard to the position of the work of that Committee. The Committee had been instructed to study three questions: (1) the Soviet proposal with regard to the definition of the aggressor; (2) the Belgian proposal with regard to the establishment of the facts in the case of aggression; and (3) the French proposal with regard to the conclusion of a European Pact on Security.

During the past week, the Committee had held many meetings and had prepared three texts with regard to the above proposals. In view of the complicated political and technical questions involved, it had been understood that the Committee would present a report. That report was to have been prepared by M. Politis and submitted to the Committee for approval. M. Politis had thought that the work could have been carried out during the next few days in order that the three texts and the report might be submitted to the General Commission during the week.

As the Chairman had pointed out that the question was urgent, M. Politis stated that the first two parts of the report were finished. They could therefore be distributed that evening to the members of the Committee, who would be able to approve them on the following morning. Those two parts of the report could then be distributed to the General Commission on the following day.

² See Minutes of the sixty-first meeting of the General Commission.
With regard to the third part of the report, M. Politis would prepare it that day. Although it would probably be fairly long, it could no doubt be distributed to the Committee on the following day and examined on Thursday at the latest. The Committee would then have concluded its work and the whole of the report would be in the hands of the General Commission on Thursday evening. At its meeting on Friday, therefore—that was to say, at the second of the meetings devoted to the question of security—the General Commission would be in possession of all the texts prepared by the Committee for Security Questions together with the whole of the report.

The CHAIRMAN said he was sure the Bureau would appreciate the statement of the Chairman of the Committee for Security Questions and would await the completion of the programme he had outlined.

If there were no further observations, he would take it that the Bureau was prepared to recommend to the General Commission the proposal he had put before it.

The Chairman's proposal was adopted.

FORTY-FIFTH MEETING (PRIVATE).

Held on Wednesday, June 7th, 1933, at 5.30 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. HENDERSON.

61. PROCEDURE FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS PRELIMINARY TO THE SECOND READING OF THE DRAFT CONVENTION : DATE OF THE NEXT MEETING OF THE BUREAU.

The CHAIRMAN said that he had convened the Bureau in case the members might wish to take decisions which it would be necessary to communicate to the General Commission at its meeting on the following day; that would probably be the last meeting before July. He desired, moreover, to correct one or two misunderstandings. Various newspapers credited him with the intention of transferring to London certain discussions relating to the Disarmament Conference. He wished to make it clear that that had never been his intention. He simply hoped to take advantage of the presence in London of a large number of heads of delegations in order to institute with them the negotiations with which the General Commission had entrusted him. The list of the subjects for negotiation, to be found in document Conf. D./Bureau/47, was a long one. To it must be added the measures which the President of the Conference had just been instructed to take, at the instance of M. de Madariaga, regarding trade in and manufacture of arms. The sooner the negotiations were begun the better.

Lastly, it was being said very generally that the Bureau was to meet every day. Personally, he could not see the necessity for that until the negotiations entrusted to him should have reached a certain stage. Unless a meeting of the Bureau became necessary in the course of the negotiations (in which case he would not hesitate to convene it in London or even Paris), he proposed that the Bureau should meet on Tuesday, June 27th, in order that it might submit to the General Commission on July 3rd a revised text of a Convention.

M. DE MADARIAGA (Spain) supported the Chairman's proposal.

M. MASSIGLI (France) said that he would inform his Government of the Chairman's intentions. He did not know whether the French Government was proposing to send to London delegates who would able to take part in these negotiations.

The CHAIRMAN explained that, if necessary, he would carry on his negotiations in Paris also.

Count RACZYŃSKI (Poland) feared that the Polish delegation at the Economic Conference in London would consist solely of economic experts. Other delegations would no doubt be in the same position. It would be well then to inform Governments of the plan proposed by the Chairman, in order that they might, if necessary, supplement their delegations.

After an exchange of views, the procedure proposed by the Chairman, was adopted.

62. FUTURE CONDUCT OF THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE ON EFFECTIVES.

M. WESTMAN (Sweden) directed the Bureau's attention to the fact that there were still some questions on the agenda of the Committee on Effectives. He personally thought that those theoretical questions should be settled before June 27th.

There was a further point: Was the report which M. Politis was preparing on Article 16 to come first before the Committee on Effectives, or was it to be submitted direct to the General
Commission? The same question arose concerning the report which the United Kingdom and Hungarian delegations had been requested to frame on Section I, Chapter 3 (Standardisation of Continental Armies), of the draft Convention.1

The Chairman replied that, as regards the first point, he had always left the Chairmen of the several Committees quite free to organise the work as they thought best. He thought, in the circumstances, that the Chairman of the Committee on Effectives would convene that Committee in time for the Bureau to receive a report before the 27th.

With regard to the last two points, as the General Commission would not be meeting and as the Bureau would be responsible for framing a text, the reports could be addressed direct to the Bureau.

M. Massigli (France) wondered whether the suggestion was very practical. If it were proposed to frame a complete draft Convention in the space of one week, the Bureau must have very definite texts before it. Article 16, however, raised delicate questions, and M. Politis, who had been asked to report on that point, would certainly have very divergent opinions put before him. The same would be the case as regards Chapter III. The latter involved highly technical questions, and M. Massigli did not think that any country would forgo a technical examination. He felt, accordingly, that it would be better for the question to be submitted first to the Committee on Effectives.

M. Politis (Greece) gave certain information concerning the report which he had been asked to submit. Up to the present, he had received only eighteen replies, so that the documentary material was obviously far from complete. His impression was that it would be not so much a technical matter as a matter of method based on political considerations. He himself would probably submit in his report a previous question of a political character. If technical information were necessary, the Technical Committee concerned would be at hand. His impression, however, was that the question was not sufficiently clear to be settled independently of any technical body. In his opinion, the procedure proposed by the Chairman was the right one. The report which he was to frame would be submitted first to the political organ and then, if necessary, to the Technical Committee.

The above proposals were adopted.

FORTY-SIXTH MEETING (PRIVATE).

Held on Tuesday, June 27th, 1933, at 3.30 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Henderson.

63. TRIBUTE TO THE MEMORY OF M. DE AGÜERO Y BETHANCOURT.

The Chairman said that he would, he felt sure, be interpreting the unanimous feeling of all his colleagues in expressing the regret with which the Conference had learnt of the death of M. de Agüero y Bethancourt.

He read the following telegrams exchanged with the Cuban Government, which would be duly communicated to the Conference.

Telegram sent by Mr. Henderson to the Cuban Government on June 22nd, 1933.

"On behalf of the Disarmament Conference and in my own name request Your Excellency convey Government of Cuba our great sorrow and heartfelt condolences on the sudden passing away of M. de Agüero y Bethancourt. — Arthur Henderson."

Reply received from the Cuban Government.

"In the name of the Government of Cuba, I beg Your Excellency to accept and convey to the Disarmament Conference our most sincere gratitude for your message of sympathy on the death of M. de Agüero y Bethancourt. — Alberto Herrera, Secretary of State ad interim."

The Chairman added that the text of those messages would be duly communicated to the Conference.

1 See Minutes of the fifty-eighth meeting of the General Commission, pages 459 and 460.
The CHAIRMAN said that the Bureau would remember that, in accordance with a recommendation it had made on June 8th 1 to the General Commission, the latter had agreed to entrust him as President with the necessary negotiations in order that, on the resumption of the work, a text might be ready for the second reading of the draft Convention.

The Bureau would also recall that, in his statement made on June 8th before the General Commission, he had said that it should be understood that any Committee which still had work to do would continue to meet and that it would rest with the Chairman of the Committee to convene it when he thought fit. In that connection, Mr. Henderson had made special mention of the Committee on Effectives and the Technical Committee of the National Defence Expenditure Commission.

He was in a position to state that, in the interval between the last meeting of the General Commission and the present meeting of the Bureau, those two Committees had been working and that, in particular, the Committee on Effectives had finished the greater part of its work, as would be seen from the report it had submitted.

As regards the negotiations with which the President had been entrusted, he had to inform the Bureau that, in view of the pressure of work of the delegates to the Monetary and Economic Conference, it had not been possible for him to obtain any progress which would justify the preparation of a new text of the draft Convention for the second reading. The position, therefore, was much the same as when the General Commission had last adjourned. Such conversations as had been possible had impressed upon him the importance of everything being done to harmonise the outstanding differences before proceeding to a second reading of the draft submitted by the United Kingdom delegation. The following points, on which a divergence of opinion existed, referred only to the most important questions but did not include a number of secondary points of difference: Non-recourse to force; European or universal pact; definition of aggression; supervision and control; sanctions to be used against any State violating the Disarmament Treaty; air bombardment; military and naval aviation; abolition of aggressive land material (suggested by President Roosevelt); size of tanks and artillery; trained reserves; period of training for short-term effectives; colonial forces; period for destruction of aggressive weapons; budgetary limitation; manufacture of and trade in arms.

At its meeting on June 8th, the General Commission had held the opinion that negotiations on several important points were indispensable; the position remained unchanged, and the Bureau should consider the advisability of recommending the General Commission to give authority to him as President of the Conference to start the negotiations as soon as he could make contacts with the heads of delegations. The General Commission should be convened only after a greater measure of common agreement had been secured than was actually the case at present. It might be anticipated that those negotiations would occupy a considerable time. If progress could be reported towards the end of July, or if he felt that consultation with the Bureau would be helpful, he would, as President, convene the latter towards the end of July, or during September, when the Assembly would be in session. The session of the Assembly might provide a useful opportunity for completing the negotiations on any point not then settled.

If that programme worked satisfactorily, as everyone had reason to hope it would, the General Commission could be convened on October 16th to begin the second reading of the United Kingdom draft, having before it a text prepared with due regard to the negotiations reported to the Bureau by the President. If success were secured earlier, the General Commission might authorise the President to convene it at such earlier date as he and the Bureau might consider advisable.

The Chairman added that he had made a frank statement as to the situation and the procedure which he contemplated. He had thought at one moment that it would be possible to continue work during the month of July on certain controversial points, but the various questions were so closely linked up with one another that, if the examination of the draft were begun without decisions being taken thereon, chapter after chapter being adjourned, that procedure would have a more disastrous effect upon the public than a definite adjournment there and then.

Further, the delegates to the Conference would certainly want a holiday before the Assembly. The date of October 16th which had been proposed for the meeting of the General Commission did not seem, in the circumstances, too late, if the negotiations were to produce successful results.

M. NADOLNY (Germany) thought he could speak in the name of all his colleagues in expressing regret that the President had not been able to succeed in his negotiations, a fact which must have been a source of great disappointment to him.

M. Nadolny questioned whether an adjournment until the autumn offered any guarantee that the results obtained in the meantime would facilitate the resumption of the work in

1 See Minutes of the seventy-seventh meeting of the General Commission.
2 Document Conf.D.162.
October. Would the President have any better success in his efforts by then? Would Governments be ready to negotiate? M. Nadolny personally did not think so, nor did he think it was necessary to adopt that procedure.

The General Commission had to take a decision with regard to the draft Convention. Two possible means had been envisaged: the Bureau might be asked to prepare a text for second reading or, again, the President might be asked to negotiate with the Governments concerned. That second solution, which had been finally adopted, had not brought about the results hoped for, and, that being so, it would be far better to revert to the first proposal, especially as the questions which the President had just enumerated might very well be discussed by the Bureau. Those questions, in point of fact, were legal rather than political in character (for example, the definition of the aggressor). Such a procedure would make it quite possible to get on to the second reading, and, in view of the prevailing goodwill, all the points outstanding might be sufficiently cleared up for it to be possible to lay before Governments the results thus achieved and to reach a solution fairly rapidly.

Governments must be apprised of the consequences that would ensue from any delay in the work of the Conference. In that connection, M. Nadolny recalled that that had been done when his Government had submitted reservations regarding the standardisation of armies. If for other States there were questions on which they could not pronounce immediately, it would be possible, without bringing the slightest pressure to bear, at all events to point out to them the responsibility which they were incurring by delaying a decision.

Nor must it be forgotten that an adjournment of the Conference would produce a very unfavourable impression on the public. The Conference had already been sitting for eighteen months, and, if it adjourned until the month of October, public opinion would view that as an adjournment sine die.

The German delegation proposed, accordingly, that the Bureau should continue its work and do its utmost to prepare for the examination on second reading of the draft submitted by the United Kingdom Government.

The Chairman wished to dispel a misunderstanding. He had never said that he had not received assurances as to the possibility of success. On the contrary, he had said in his introductory statement that such conversations as had been possible had impressed upon him the importance of sparing no effort to harmonise outstanding differences before going on to the second reading of the draft submitted by the United Kingdom delegation. If he had not had assurances to that effect, he could never have said such a thing. He knew, however, for certain, that Governments were prepared to enter upon negotiations.

A further point. The delegate of Germany had implied that the President had not been successful after two weeks of negotiations. That was no reason for saying that he had failed.

The heads of delegations with whom he had been in touch had given him quite sound reasons for not discussing for the time being questions relating to disarmament, in view of the pressure of work which they had to handle at the Monetary and Economic Conference.

Mr. Eden (United Kingdom) thanked the Chairman for the frankness and clearness with which he had explained the situation. As M. Nadolny had said, two solutions were possible. A text might be prepared for the second reading, as had been decided some weeks previously, or the Bureau might there and then get to work without adequate preparation. Mr. Eden seemed to remember that the Bureau had unanimously decided that sound preparation was indispensable if it were desired to reach an agreement at the second reading. Since a few weeks previously, such preparation had been regarded as essential, he did not see why it should be less so now. In point of fact, it was even more necessary.

The reasons for which it had not been possible for the President to make in London any rapid progress in his conversations were perfectly sound. From those conversations it might be gathered, however, that Governments were desirous of pursuing such negotiations. Far from delaying the Conference, they would enable it to save time in preparing a text for the second reading. The method suggested by the Chairman seemed, then, safer and more rapid than that of engaging forthwith in the examination at a second reading of a text which was insufficiently prepared.

Lastly, M. Nadolny had spoken of the seriousness of the effects that an adjournment would have on public opinion. Everything depended on the way in which the matter was put before the public. Mr. Eden was convinced that, if the true reasons for the adjournment were explained quite frankly and simply, world opinion would experience no apprehension in the matter.

The United Kingdom delegation, he stated, supported the Chairman’s proposal unreservedly, convinced as it was that his method was the most likely to lead to successful results.

M. Nadolny (Germany) said that he was anxious to make it plain that his words were not intended to imply any criticism of what had been done in London by the President. He would be very grateful to the latter if he would give the Bureau details of the assurances which he had received and would state from which Governments he had received them.

Replying to Mr. Eden, M. Nadolny agreed that, according to the resolution adopted some weeks previously, it was understood that an agreement between Governments would do much to facilitate the work that still remained to be done. If, however, such a solution were not
possible, another solution must be adopted—namely, the one which M. Nadolny had just suggested. At the same time, if the Chairman could inform the Bureau of the assurances which he had received, the situation might, perhaps, assume a different aspect.

M. Massigli (France) said that the Chairman and Mr. Eden had so clearly stated the reasons which, in the opinion of the French delegation, militated in favour of the proposed decision, that he had nothing to add to what they had said. Like the Chairman, the French Government considered that, in the circumstances, the time would be better employed in negotiations between Governments than in meetings of the Bureau. The French Government for its part was ready to take part in those negotiations.

There must be no illusions as to the effect which an adjournment might produce on public opinion; the latter was interested, not in speeches, but in results. It was aware of the difficulties with which the Conference was faced and would take into account the fact that some little time would be necessary before a successful issue could be reached. Furthermore, it saw things as they were, it weighed present events, and realised that circumstances were not always favourable to the negotiations of the Conference; it well understood that a considerable number of Governments regarded as essential certain conversations and a little time for thought. If, in the coming months, it observed that the international atmosphere had grown even slightly less tense, it would realise that, far from having worked against the desired ends, the Conference had actually brought their achievement nearer.

The Chairman, in reply to the question asked by M. Nadolny, said he was in a position to state that, although his conversations had been of a private character, he had received assurances, not merely from the two Governments whose delegates had just spoken, but also from the United States of America, the Little Entente and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Reich.

M. Nadolny (Germany) thanked the President, but persisted in his belief that, in the present circumstances and in view of the general impression which would be produced more especially in the disarmed countries, which were impatiently awaiting the results of the Conference, it would be preferable to proceed at once with the second reading, while at the same time getting into touch with the various Governments. If, however, the Bureau accepted the Chairman's proposal, M. Nadolny had nothing more to say at present. At the same time, he wished to add that he regarded the assurances given by the Governments with regard to the opening of negotiations as an explicit undertaking on which it was possible to rely.

M. Massigli (France) asked what was to be understood by that last sentence.

M. Nadolny (Germany) replied that he regarded the assurances given by the Governments as an undertaking to enter into negotiations with the President of the Conference.

M. Massigli (France) thanked the German delegate.

*The Chairman’s proposals were adopted.*

The Chairman considered that, in the circumstances, the General Commission, which had originally been summoned for July 3rd, might assemble at an earlier date for a meeting at which the Bureau would recommend the programme adopted and inform it of the decisions taken.

Following an exchange of views, it was decided to convene the General Commission for Thursday, June 29th, at 11 a.m.