most complete preparation against the danger of attack which its national resources would permit;

"And that the whole object of the organisation of the League of Nations is to replace the protection which every nation expects only from its own armed forces by guarantees of security provided by an international treaty, which explains the indissoluble bond created by Article 8 of the Covenant between disarmament and security;

"And that, as was rightly stated in the speech of the President of the Conference, referred to above, unless the principle of a community of nations, upon which the League Covenant, the Locarno Treaties, and many other similar agreements had been founded, was genuinely embodied in the Disarmament Convention and made a real force in international life, it was highly improbable that nations would consent to make reductions in their armed forces;

"And that, in their recent memorandum, the delegations of Denmark, Spain, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland laid it down that the Disarmament Convention must contain certain proposals concerning security;

"And that the first delegate of the United Kingdom stated, in his speech on May 30th, that he agreed to these proposals in principle;

"And that this solicitude for security was likewise expressed by the first delegate of the United States of America in his speech on May 29th;

"And that this was the preoccupation underlying the whole of the speech delivered at the same meeting by the first delegate of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, who, after asserting that an increase in the number of supporters of the definition of aggression already incorporated in a series of treaties would facilitate the application of other proposals dealing with security which had been made at the Conference, added: 'There might be new proposals of a similar character—as, for example, proposals for sanctions of various kinds against an aggressor in the meaning of the Briand-Kellogg Pact', with a graduated scale of such sanctions which might not be pursued to the point of military measures in the case of all States; and that 'a more or less universal or European Pact of that kind might be supplemented by separate regional pacts of mutual assistance, as proposed on a former occasion by the French delegation'; 'there was no question of military alliances, or of the division of States into mutually hostile camps, or still less of a policy of encirclement; care must be taken not to create universal pacts which would exclude any State wishing to participate, or such regional pacts as would not admit all those interested in the security of the particular region concerned; in measures of security of this kind, the principle of equality of all States, without exception, could not arouse any doubts or hesitation';

"And that, as the first delegate of France observed in his speech on May 30th: 'the problem of security is to-day raised in such a form that henceforward no country can evade its terms', especially since, through the regional agreements contemplated by Article 21 of the Covenant, the solution of that problem does not necessarily involve the unanimous participation of all States;

"And that the President of the Conference, in his speech referred to above, interpreted the feeling of all the delegations when he said that 'it was vital that the Conference should endeavour to restore general confidence in the system of collective international action against aggression, which the Covenant was intended to create';

"Decides:

"(1) To prepare, in accordance with the proposal of the first delegate of the United Kingdom, protocols ready to be submitted to Governments for signature, on the following questions:

"(a) Chemical warfare,

"(b) Budgetary publicity,

"(c) Immediate creation of the Permanent Disarmament Commission, which would at the same time be responsible for the supervision of disarmament and of security;

"(2) To enter without delay upon an exhaustive study of the problem of security, with a view to arriving, especially on the European plane, by general or regional agreements based on the principles set down in the Pact of Locarno and in that of the Balkan Entente, at such solutions as might be best calculated to make it possible to conclude forthwith a first general Convention for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments;

"(3) To request the Bureau of the Conference to set up for that purpose a special committee, on which all the Powers or groups of Powers directly interested in the practical settlement of the problem of security and that of disarmament should be represented, on the understanding that that committee might invite any other Power to participate in any particular part of its work.

1 See Minutes of the eighty-third meeting of the General Commission.
2 See Minutes of the eighty-second meeting of the General Commission.
Joint Declaration by the Danish, Spanish, Netherlands, Norwegian, Swedish and Swiss Delegations concerning the memorandum submitted on April 14th, 1934

"The Danish, Spanish, Netherlands, Norwegian, Swedish and Swiss delegations declare that they maintain the standpoint outlined in the memorandum addressed to the President of the Conference on April 14th last, in particular as regards disarmament, security and equality. Being desirous of defining in a concrete manner their observations on the state of the Disarmament Conference's work, they desire to submit the following considerations to the General Commission for examination:

"(a) In view of the vital importance at the present time of reinforcing security to an extent going beyond the stipulations indicated in the United Kingdom's draft, as modified by the United Kingdom Government's memorandum of January 29th, a Special Committee should be appointed to examine without delay the question of the guarantees of execution of the future Convention, and to report to the Bureau;

"(b) The Bureau would study without delay the problem of the institution—in connection with the Convention—of an effective supervision of the trade in, and of the private and State manufacture of, arms and implements of war.

"(c) In order to permit of a final reading of the draft Convention of October 27th, 1933 (document Conf.D./Bureau 49) the Bureau would be requested to revise or to arrange as soon as possible for the revision of the text of the said draft, including the four problems alluded to by the first delegate of the United Kingdom in his speech on May 30th—namely, chemical warfare, publicity of budgets, the setting up of the Permanent Disarmament Commission, and the trade in and manufacture of arms and ammunition. In this connection, it should take into account the results of the studies referred to under (a) and (b) and the following main principles:

1. Unconditional prohibition of bombardment from the air, undertaking by the High Contracting Parties to prohibit in their territories any preparation for bombardment from the air and any training for this purpose;

2. Destruction, in the first period of application of the Convention, of a number to be determined for each State of the aeroplanes which would be prohibited in virtue of the United Kingdom draft (document Conf.D./157, Article 37);

3. Destruction during a second period of the remainder of such aeroplanes;

4. Study of the measures to be taken with a view to preventing the use of civil aircraft for military purposes;

5. Prohibition of any manufacture of material of greater calibre or tonnage than those authorised for all States;

6. Destruction, as provided in the United Kingdom memorandum of January 29th, 1934, of tanks and mobile land artillery during the second period of application of the Convention.

(d) In order to prevent a general increase in armaments, the Bureau would be responsible for causing the figures for land and air forces and material to be inserted in the tables appended to the draft Convention;

(e) In view of the necessity of consulting every State affected and especially of the fact that Germany is not taking part in the Conference proceedings, the Bureau would be empowered to take any steps that might enable it to complete the draft in respect of all countries.

"It would also rest with the Bureau to convene when it thought fit the General Commission, which would be called upon to take final decisions.

"The six delegations desire to observe that, while endeavouring to combine the various plans under consideration, they are anxious to maintain a proper balance and a state of equity. In complete good faith, they are asking for concessions from either side. They have greatly abated their aspirations in the matter of disarmament, and have sought to concentrate their efforts on preventing rearmament in the air; they have also contemplated an appreciable enlargement of their contribution to security by placing the question of guarantees for the execution of the Convention in the forefront.

"Considering that, since action is now essential, they must refrain from doing anything that might jeopardise the agreement they desire and making no vain return to the past, and pronouncing no judgment on the question of responsibilities, the six delegations offer no opinion as to how far any particular attitude by any Government may be justified; they desire to ask all the delegations this simple question: If all parties maintain their present positions, how is an agreement to be reached?

"The six delegations accordingly submit their concerted views to the other delegations for consideration. Pending such reception as may be given to their suggestions, they reserve their right to intervene in the course of the discussion in whatever manner they may think fit. They are attempting in this way to make their contribution to the common task, and they are firm in their conviction that only an act of prompt and generous solidarity can bring about the conclusion of a Convention and so contribute to the organisation of peace."

The General Commission had decided to transmit these proposals to the Bureau in order that the latter might consider them and make suggestions to the General Commission as to what further action should be taken upon them.

The questions raised by the three sets of proposals which had been distributed to the members of the Bureau could be classed under the three general headings, Security, Disarmament and Procedure.

Moreover, there was the Soviet proposal to transform the Conference into a Permanent Peace Conference. A unanimous vote of the Conference would be necessary to change a provisional international Conference into a permanent one. But the most adequate means of giving effect to the Soviet proposal would be for the Conference to adopt a special Protocol or Convention providing for a Permanent Peace Conference distinct from the present Conference. Even then, the League of Nations would have to deal with the change, not only because it had prepared for and convened the Conference with a specific mandate, but also because it provided both the Secretariat of the Conference and its budget and furnished the buildings. It would, of course, be for the Bureau to examine the question and make thereon the necessary recommendation to the General Commission.

As regarded security, the only question which had not been so far considered by the Conference or any of its organs was that of the guarantees of the loyal execution of the Convention.

The other questions enumerated in the three sets of proposals and falling under the categories of Disarmament or Security had been the subject of long discussions in the various Commissions of the Conference, and, although some progress had been made in connection with them, there seemed to be little prospect of further progress until such time as the main political difficulties revealed in the notes exchanged since January had been unequivocally disposed of.

Finally, there was the question of procedure.

The delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics proposed that the work on security should be resumed by the Conference at the point at which it had been left.

The six Powers proposed that the question of the guarantees of execution be examined without delay by a special Committee.

The Turkish delegation proposed that a special Committee be set up to make an exhaustive study of the problem of security with a view to arriving—especially on the European plane—by general or regional agreements based on the principles set down in the Locarno Pact and in that of the Balkan Entente, at such solutions as might be best calculated to facilitate the immediate conclusion of a first general Convention for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments.

The six Powers suggested that, in order to prevent a general increase in armaments, the Bureau should be responsible for causing figures for land and air forces and material to be inserted in the tables appended to the draft Convention. They also suggested that the Bureau should be empowered to take any steps that might enable it to complete the draft in respect of all countries, including Germany.

The proposals submitted by the Turkish delegation contained a similar suggestion consisting in the request that the Bureau set up a special Committee on which all the Powers or groups of Powers directly interested in the practical settlement of the problems of security and disarmament be represented, it being understood that that Committee might invite any Power to participate in any particular part of its work.

The six Powers proposed that, in order to permit of a final reading of the draft which the General Commission had adopted as the basis of the future Convention by its resolution of June 8th, 1933, the Bureau should be requested to revise, or to arrange for the revision of, the text of the said draft.

The analysis he had endeavoured to offer to the Bureau showed that, before making any recommendations to the General Commission on the points raised, it must find adequate answers to the following questions:

Was it possible, at the present stage, to start anew the work on security and disarmament which the Conference had been compelled to interrupt, recognising as it had that, unless a solution of the wide divergencies of opinion still existing could be secured, no progress could be made in respect of both security and disarmament in the Conference?

If the reply to that question were in the negative—and thirty months' experience should convince them of this—the question that arose was, What method should the Bureau recommend to the General Commission in connection with the solution of existing difficulties ?

He was sure that the members of the Bureau would have realised, as he did, that the thought underlying both the declaration of the six Powers and the resolution submitted by the Turkish delegation was the necessity of keeping in mind the urgency of securing Germany's participation in the work about to be undertaken.

In making that statement, he drew a distinction between the two categories of tasks to be performed. So far he had considered those questions which entailed a continuation of the work already dealt with in the Conference at various times. The Bureau was of course aware

1 See Minutes of the General Commission, Volume II, page 630.
that most, if not all, of the questions concerning disarmament and security dealt with in the proposals made to the General Commission had, at some time or other, been handled by the Conference or its organs. Most of them had been considered in the course of the first reading of the draft Convention submitted by the United Kingdom delegation.

He felt certain that the time had now come to deal with the main political difficulty which, both directly and indirectly, had frustrated all efforts, so far, towards securing a Convention.

Some of the delegates had pointed out to him that, from the point of view of precedence, the political difficulty should first be solved if any progress were to be expected.

Though the parallel and supplementary efforts had been discontinued, a careful examination of the notes exchanged between the respective Governments, in particular, those of January 1st by the French Government, January 29th by the United Kingdom Government, January 4th by the Italian Government, and April 16th by the German Government, revealed a serious endeavour to reconcile differences, and—what was important—they showed that the endeavour had in some measure narrowed the differences.

If his interpretation of the position were correct, it was most important to the future of the work that the Bureau should recommend to the General Commission some method whereby the differences which still remained might be further minimised, or removed, so as to secure, as the six Powers and the Turkish delegation suggested, Germany's participation in the Conference's future efforts to build up a Convention.

In this connection, the Chairman reminded the Bureau that France hoped for the return of Germany to the League and said that none of the problems examined by the two Governments could be solved outside the League and counter to the articles of the Covenant.

The United Kingdom considered Germany's return to the League an essential condition to the signature of a Convention.

Germany considered that her return to the League could not be considered until after the question of disarmament, and above all her equality of rights, had been decided.

The Chairman could not bring himself to believe that a reconciliation of those positions was impossible, though it might be difficult.

Surely then, in view of the tremendous issues involved in a failure of the Conference, the Bureau would prepare a resolution for submission to the General Commission asking for authority to take such steps—consistent with the decisions of the Conference—as might be necessary for securing the co-operation of all States in the completion of a Convention.

Finally, he added that he was aware of the desire of certain countries to enter into pacts of mutual assistance and non-aggression, and of the great amount of work implied by the Turkish and Soviet proposals, and he felt convinced that the Bureau was in complete sympathy with those delegations and their supporters as regarded the usefulness of securing such agreements on security as would render possible the task of concluding a Disarmament Convention. But the question was whether, at that juncture, the work should not wholly or partly be negotiated by the interested countries at least in a preparatory manner, before it was actually discussed in the Conference. Such a discussion could be usefully conducted only with the concurrence of all the Powers which had an interest in the matter.

In the event of the General Commission approving the procedure just referred to, the examination by the General Commission of the proposals submitted to it during the past week might be kept in abeyance, pending the accomplishment of the tasks outlined.

Perhaps the best procedure would be to throw the whole question open to general discussion before dealing with separate points.

M. Barthou (France) did not quite understand the conclusions which, in the Chairman's view, should be reached by the Bureau. He did not wish to deny the very real effort that had been made; but, for the moment, the conclusions were not apparent to him. In the absence of those definite conclusions, he proposed to endeavour to indicate the position of the French delegation. The Chairman, whose goodwill, good faith and fairness were recognised by all, had pointed out that the proposals before the Bureau were of two kinds, general and concrete. In the course of his speech the general proposals had disappeared. There remained the concrete proposals—namely, the Soviet proposal, the Turkish proposal, which had the support of all the States signatory of the Pact of Athens, and, lastly, the proposal of the neutral States.

These clearly constituted a body of proposals the importance of which the Bureau could not fail to be aware. These proposals came from a large number of States, which were important, not only for their quality, but also for their quantity. There were the neutral States, six in number; the States signatories of the Balkan Pact, five in number; and to these eleven States he must add the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and, he need hardly say, France. With these, from the special point of view adopted by the French delegation,
should be placed China. What did these fourteen States want? All, under different forms, wanted the work of the Conference to be inspired and governed by considerations of security. No one would deny that in the case of the Soviet Union. No one would deny it in the case of the Turkish resolution. No one would deny it in the case of the neutrals' proposal. In this connection, M. Barthou desired to point out that, between the neutrals' proposal of April 14th and the present proposal, there was more than a shade of difference in meaning. The neutrals' previous proposal represented security as in some sort an accessory condition of agreement. What had happened since then? The neutrals, who were independent, had retained their independence of judgment. They had reflected. And now the condition, which, in their former proposal, appeared to be accessory, had become the most important proposal, the indispensable condition—the first paragraph of the text said as much. Moreover, the neutrals showed no hesitation in expressing their idea, since they went on to say that the proposals with regard to security, the conditions of security, should go further than the proposals put forward by the United Kingdom delegation.

The attitude of France was well known. M. Barthou would merely say that he did not abandon that attitude. He had added China to his list of countries which had put forward proposals of this kind because the Chinese delegate had several times expressed the view that the condition of security took precedence of all others.

Honour to whom honour was due! The question of security had never been put in more closely converging circles of irresistible logic than in the first speech made by the distinguished and esteemed President of the Conference.

All the Powers whom M. Barthou had mentioned had referred therefore, directly and clearly, to security. Others had alluded to the subject; but he would speak only of those who had expressed themselves most definitely on the point. The Bureau now had before it a proposal which was lacking in precision and which would have the effect of referring the study of rapprochements between countries to individual negotiations. Once again, he must point out that the work of the Conference was governed and inspired by this problem of security. The Chairman, with his customary frankness and fairness, had pointed out that the question had been discussed for thirty months and that the Conference had met with differences which appeared to admit of neither reconciliation nor reduction. He concluded from that that something else must be tried. M. Barthou did not share that view. He found that there was at present in course of formation, not a majority, but an impressive number of delegations which favoured the idea of security. That notion of security was the foundation of the French attitude. He upheld that notion and did not abandon it.

M. Barthou agreed as to the need for bringing Germany back to the League and the Disarmament Conference. The United Kingdom delegation, moreover, held the same view, as was shown by the terms of the United Kingdom memorandum of January 29th. The United Kingdom delegation had said that the return of Germany to the League was the essential condition to the conclusion of a Convention. M. Barthou would take this occasion—it would not be the only one—to bring the British and French attitudes closer together. It was a mistake to suppose that there had been any irreducible conflict on the previous Wednesday between the French and the British position, or that the United Kingdom and France had definitely broken with one another. The United Kingdom and France were both great countries. They were entitled to express their opinions freely; and reference to the records would at once show all men of good faith that there was no conflict of doctrine as between the United Kingdom and the French delegations.

As to Germany's return to the League, agreement, he noted, was complete; but he wondered what were the conditions under which that return should take place, and he ventured to ask the Chairman to define his proposals. So far as he had understood, the Chairman's idea was to give the Bureau a roving commission. Was the Bureau to travel to Germany to ascertain her intentions and to bring her closer to France? If so, he must say clearly that any such journey was useless, as was shown by the visits which Mr. Eden had paid to Paris, Berlin, Rome and then to Paris again. These visits had not yielded the desired results. Was it conceivable that a new journey would succeed?

There was, he would emphasise, a French doctrine and a German doctrine. Were the two irreconcilable? It was possible that they were not. When that morning the question of the Saar had been settled in the Council, all the speakers had invited France and Germany to endeavour to develop and extend the agreement reached on the difficult problem of the Saar. For his part, he accepted that invitation. If agreement were possible between France and Germany, France would help to bring it about with the utmost goodwill; but, in so far as it was a question of giving a commission for the purpose to the Bureau or to any members of the Bureau, he must say, respectfully but firmly, that he saw no point in such a proposal.

On the other hand, there was one question before the Conference, the question of security. Why postpone its examination? Discussions had been going on for months, so far without success, but it might be that an understanding was not far off. He proposed accordingly to take the proposals relating to security and consider them in good faith. When they had been discussed, it would be time to see what next. If an agreement were not reached, it would perhaps then be desirable to invite the President to start on his travels again; but it would be preferable if agreement could be obtained. He therefore declared on behalf of France that she

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² See Minutes of the eighty-third meeting of the General Commission.
had taken up the attitude that security was a condition of disarmament; and, in so saying, he based himself on the very forceful remarks made by the President at the outset of the work now in hand. He repeated that the position of France had not changed. It was definite and clear; he believed it to be reasonable and he stood by it.

Mr. Norman Davis (United States of America) said that he had obtained a very different idea from the Chairman's clear and accurate analysis of the situation confronting the Conference. He did not think, however, that there was any real difference between M. Barthou, and the Chairman. He had not understood that the Chairman was proposing to adjourn the Conference in order to see whether Germany would return: that, he agreed with M. Barthou, would be a mistake. On the contrary, he understood that the Chairman recognised that the question of security had to be dealt with, but felt that it could be dealt with more effectively and satisfactorily if Germany were present to negotiate an agreement covering both security and disarmament.

It was perfectly true, as M. Barthou had said, that fourteen nations had indicated their great interest in and preoccupation over the question of security, and he believed every nation present recognised that it must be faced and dealt with as far as possible. On the other hand, there were more than fourteen nations that had a somewhat different idea as to the best means of obtaining security and felt, as did the United States, that the best way was in connection with disarmament. The United States was not interested in security alone as divorced from disarmament.

But the main desire of the United States delegation was that the work should proceed. It was not desirable that Germany should capitalise her absence, and agreement could not very well be negotiated if she remained at a distance. If the Bureau were to proceed along the lines indicated by the neutrals and the Turkish group, real progress could be made, and there would be no need to suspend the work. He understood the Chairman and M. Barthou to be in agreement on that point.

There was perhaps one difference in their points of view—namely, with regard to regional agreements. In his own opinion, the guaranteeing of the execution of any future Disarmament Convention was a matter with which the entire Conference should deal. It concerned every nation that became a party to such a Convention. At the same time, he was frankly of opinion that the whole Conference could not usefully enter into a full discussion of regional agreements in which only a few Powers were to participate. He saw no reason why negotiations should not be carried on concurrently with the Conference by the Powers concerned, but not under the Conference's wing. He did not think there should be any appreciable difference of opinion to prevent those Powers that thought fit to do so from proceeding along the lines he had indicated.

Mr. Eden (United Kingdom) pointed out that to some extent the three resolutions seemed to cover the same ground. In addition, a very large percentage of the subjects referred to were already dealt with in the draft Convention which the Conference had adopted as a basis for its future Convention and which had already been discussed at considerable length. Their future individual discussion, also at considerable length, would therefore hardly seem to serve any very useful purpose at the present time.

The essentials of the problem should be borne in mind, and, in this respect, he was in entire agreement with the Chairman's analysis of the problem and the course of action he had suggested.

In November 1933, the Conference had decided to overcome its main difficulties, if possible, by diplomatic negotiation outside the Conference, not because it preferred a course involving negotiation outside the Conference, but because it realised—to put it frankly—that Germany's presence was necessary from every aspect of the work relating to security or disarmament.

But the agreement sought was not reached and, as the Chairman had just reminded the Bureau, the essentials of the problem remained, in that the main political difficulties had still to be dealt with. In his own view, they must be dealt with if the Conference was to make any real progress in respect either of security or disarmament. While, however, it was quite true, as M. Barthou had said, that the main political difficulties had not been solved as a result of Mr. Eden's journeys and the many efforts of others, something had been achieved in that the issue had definitely been narrowed and clarified. It would be a great misfortune if all the value of that work were to be lost by the introduction of a large amount of sometimes minor and sometimes extraneous matter, as a result of which the fundamental issues might again become obscure.

The essentials of the problem were now known and found their place in the documents referred to the General Commission during the past few days. The Chairman had just mentioned the four most important. It was no exaggeration to say that, if means of reconciling the four theses contained in those four documents could be found, an essential measure of progress

1 See Minutes of the fifty-fourth meeting of the Bureau, page 200.
would have been recorded, but if they were not reconciled, very little progress would be achieved.

He therefore concluded that means, perhaps by negotiation, perhaps by some other method, must be devised to reconcile the four points of view expressed in the notes. The last thing he—or, he believed, any other member of the Bureau—would wish, would be to set up a large number of committees for the study of subjects which had already been exhaustively examined and as to which it could hardly be hoped to make any progress until the main problem that beset the Conference had been solved. Such a course would not earn respect for the Conference, nor would it achieve any useful result.

Referring briefly to the resolutions that had been moved, Mr. Eden said that M. Litvinoff had made a gallant effort to meet some of the criticisms of his proposals in the General Commission, for which everyone was grateful. Mr. Eden, however, doubted the wisdom of further extending the scope of the Conference's work: it had surely sufficient material upon which to work. If and when it was able to record some achievement in that sphere of disarmament for which it was responsible, it would have done the League and the cause of peace the greatest service in its power. M. Litvinoff's last proposal, more particularly, seemed to place upon the Conference a responsibility of the gravest character, which went far beyond the scope of the present work.

The Turkish representative had suggested the possibility of arriving—at regional agreements based on the principles set out in the Locarno Agreements and the Balkan Entente—at a solution which would facilitate the conclusion of a Disarmament Convention. There was much in that proposal which was constructive. Just as Locarno had served and still served its special purpose for one part of Europe, so other agreements concluded on similar lines between a limited number of Powers in several parts of Europe might serve a similar purpose. He welcomed the proposal more, since he understood that it was based on the same important principle as the Locarno Agreements, the principle that any such agreement must not be directed against any one Power or group of Powers. He fully appreciated that regional agreements of that kind might assist the final outcome of the Conference's work. At the same time, it did not seem to be any part of the duty of the Conference as a whole to take part in their negotiation, nor, indeed, was the machinery of the Conference best adapted for that purpose.

He therefore summarised the views of His Majesty's Government as follows. The United Kingdom Government was ready to take part in any useful work serving the main objective for which the Conference had been called and for which it still laboured. It believed that the immediate task should be to reconcile the points of view expressed in the four notes to which the Chairman had referred. The Bureau should consider how that could best be done, whether by negotiation or by any other means, but it must be done if any progress was to be achieved. He would be sorry to see the Conference indulge in prolonged discussion upon other matters, for he feared that, were it to do so in the absence of representatives whose attendance all desired, it would neither add to the Conference's authority nor conduce to the successful issue of its labours.

M. Sandler (Sweden) wished to give a few explanations on the general structure of the joint declaration of the six delegations. The declaration referred explicitly to the memorandum of April 14th, and, in its very first words, repeated the views expressed in that memorandum. While he greatly appreciated the French delegate's remarks, he was anxious to emphasise the fact that the views of the six delegations had suffered no change. Those views could be expressed briefly as follows: it was impossible to bring about disarmament solely on the basis of the United Kingdom delegation's plan, but it was possible to take from that plan certain governing lines of action. It was desirable, in the view of the six delegations, to limit the discussions to certain points, while at the same time providing for a substantial measure of disarmament. It was essential also to take into account the existing position, the principal feature of which was a de facto rearmament. Finally, the principle of equality of rights must be applied, but with moderation. That programme appeared to the six delegations not to be realisable without some strengthening of security over and beyond the United Kingdom delegation's original plan.

As regards the questions raised by the Chairman, he thought it essential, if the work were to continue, to concentrate on definite and practical points. An attempt must be made to reconcile the divergent points of view, while at the same time concentrating on certain essential points. The question of security had been raised. It was a question of primary importance which must be considered; but it would be desirable to direct the Conference's efforts into a field where there would be some chance of success, and, in his view, it would be advisable in this connection to consider the guarantees for the loyal execution of the Convention. M. Sandler emphasised the fact that he contemplated this discussion taking place within the framework of a general disarmament convention since, if all the questions relating to disarmament were dropped, he saw no use in embarking on such a discussion.

In regard to disarmament, a great deal of very valuable material was available. The United Kingdom memorandum of January 29th should, he suggested, be retained and combined with the other plans which it was clearly necessary to take into account. M. Sandler thought, however, that the Conference could not do any useful work until it had emerged from the
present deadlock. What was wanted was to complete the draft Convention more especially by filling in the figures. That implied the necessity of consulting each State, including a State which was not at the moment present at the Conference. No satisfactory results could be obtained without consultations in this sense. It was, therefore, urgently necessary to take steps to find some method which would allow of such conversations being initiated.

In conclusion, he associated himself entirely with the Chairman's point of view.

Count Raczyński (Poland) would confine his remarks to the question of procedure. He had the impression that, if all idea of disarmament were dropped and if the concrete proposals with regard to security—namely, the proposals of the Soviet Union, Turkey and the group of neutrals—were not to be discussed, the Conference would find itself back again in the void, and would be unable to do any work.

He believed, however, that there was one direction in which it might go forward with advantage. It was true that the question of security had already been discussed and analysed by a number of Committees, but it might be that the proposals to which he had just referred contained points which could be profitably discussed. He would not express any opinion on the substance of these problems, since the delegations would no doubt have an opportunity of expressing their views in the course of discussions. But he desired at once to say that there was no ground for undue pessimism, or for rejecting in advance all possibility of an agreement.

M. Motta (Switzerland) had naturally followed the discussion which had just taken place with the closest attention. It appeared to him to show clearly that the present difficulties could not be overcome without an effort at conciliation between the States principally concerned. Mention had been made of the French, Italian, British and German notes. He paid a tribute to the efforts made by all these Governments to define their ideas. Nevertheless, these notes possibly showed that the differences between the points of view were not as considerable as might be thought. M. Motta earnestly hoped that these States, and others which were equally concerned in the problem, would make an effort, either here or elsewhere, to bring their views more into line.

It was not for M. Motta to say what method should be adopted to arrive at such a rapprochement. But mention had already been made in the Bureau of the solution of the Saar problem and the success gained in connection with a question which had assumed such an acute aspect and under such disturbing circumstances. M. Motta therefore wondered whether it would not be possible to apply what he would call the Saar method, without defining it more closely, to the present differences. The important point was to find means for conversations. In his opinion, forms counted for little; what was of capital importance was to make an effort at rapprochement. For this purpose, the position of each would have to change, since it was only by movement that success was possible. With entire modesty and with all the prudence that was indispensable in such a debate, he stated that he would be very glad if an effort in this direction could be encouraged.

M. Motta then recalled that M. Sandler had defined the scope of the memorandum of the neutrals. It was true that the neutrals emphasised the importance of security and conferred on this question, if not entire priority, at any rate a certain degree of priority. The problem of security involved the question of regional pacts, pacts of mutual assistance and pacts of non-aggression, but this was merely a portion of the question which concerned only certain States or certain groups of States. On the other hand, the problem had a more general aspect—namely, the guarantees of execution of the Convention. These guarantees concerned all Powers. Emphasis had been laid on the means of giving satisfaction to those who demanded security, by guarantees as to the execution of the Convention, and, for this purpose, the procedure to be followed had been indicated. This problem should be considered as soon as possible by a special committee. M. Motta therefore wondered if it could not be agreed to propose that the General Commission should appoint a committee to deal with this particular task.

Obviously, action should not be confined to this point. The Bureau should give its attention to the other matters. It must, indeed, be admitted—and this was axiomatic, in M. Motta's view—that positive results could not be reached in the sphere of disarmament proper unless Germany came back to Geneva in one way or another. How could this be brought about? Would it be by a visit, by an appeal, or by some form of semi-official negotiations? M. Motta did not know, but he again recalled the Saar method, which had made it possible to reach a result of primary importance for the Disarmament Conference and for world peace. It was not out of the question that, by using a similar procedure, a Convention might be drawn up which, though mediocre and even insufficient, would nevertheless be a sign of appeasement and would in any case be infinitely better than a race for armaments or no result at all.

M. de Madariaga (Spain) wished to add some remarks to M. Sandler's statement regarding the memorandum of the neutrals. He pointed out that this memorandum represented, not the general ideas of the nations which had signed it, but the conclusions which they had reached with a view to endeavouring to extricate the Conference from its present unfortunate position. The proof was that this memorandum mentioned chemical warfare and aerial bombardment—two subjects of the Convention in which the Spanish Government had often expressed to him its absolute lack of faith.
The memorandum put forward the idea of security—that was to say, security going beyond that contemplated by the United Kingdom Government in its memorandum of January 29th. The neutrals had also recalled the necessity of applying the equality of rights conceded by the declaration of December 11th, 1932. It was essential to recall this point, since it was a fact which was binding on all, although none of the members of the Conference desired to see the level of armaments of any country rise above the lowest possible limit. In this connection, M. de Madariaga emphasised the fact that the reduction of armaments was an idea which existed in the minds of the neutrals as one of the aims to be attained. He did not share the recent pessimism of the Soviet delegation, and thought it necessary to maintain this aspect of the problem in the programme of work. Indeed, if the debate were restricted to security alone and disarmament proper were abandoned, public opinion would regard this as a confirmation of the sinister prophecies made concerning the Conference. Moreover—and this was a more important reason—the reduction of armaments must be the necessary accomplishment of security. The countries from whom security was demanded must receive guarantees by the progress of disarmament. If the cheque drawn on security had one day to be paid, the countries called upon to take part in economic or financial action would no doubt be in a much easier position if the level of armaments was at a lower point than at present.

M. de Madariaga did not conceal the fact that these problems were extremely difficult, but they were based on realities. One must not be lured away by abstractions. Behind the scenes of disarmament and security, very grave events were taking place, and the Governments should reflect deeply before committing themselves.

In his view, the reduction and limitation of armaments remained the basic idea of the Conference. The question of security had been raised merely in order to attain disarmament. The intention of the neutrals was to obtain the advantages arising out of disarmament. Spain, in particular, wished to be able to devote to more humanitarian objects the sums which, if the Conference failed, she would necessarily have to expend on armaments.

M. de Madariaga referred to a very important idea in Mr. Eden’s speech, which had already been emphasised by M. Motta—namely, the obvious necessity, if progress was to be realised, of reconciling the views expressed in the notes by the four Powers. Moreover, he wondered whether an effort at mediation was incompatible with the ideas underlying the memorandum of the neutrals. He did not think so. In his opinion, the two forms of action supplemented each other. Moreover, the method appeared to him to be fairly clearly outlined. A rapid and immediate procedure could be instituted at Geneva for examining the questions raised in the memorandum of the neutrals, without excluding questions of regional security. This work would be limited in time, and simultaneously an effort at mediation would be undertaken on the basis of the four notes. That would prevent this effort from assuming the character of diplomatic action which could only mature in the distant future. M. de Madariaga was not competent to state how this mediation would take place, but the question might be examined between now and to-morrow by the President, in consultation with the delegations principally concerned.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the main question was not whether disarmament or security should have precedence, nor what was the comparative value of the two problems, but what was to be done.

Everyone must desire Germany’s return to the Conference, and if that involved a journey to Berlin it might be worth taking. But, for his part, he questioned the wisdom of asking Germany to return to a Conference that had shown its inability to do anything without her. He wondered whether she could not be induced to return by some other method—namely, by continuing the work. It was hardly fair of M. de Madariaga to call him a pessimist for suggesting that, while nothing could be done in the way of disarmament, something could be done for security.

M. Litvinoff had made one proposal which stood by itself: the proposal to transform the Conference into a permanent peace conference. The Chairman had tried to discourage him by pointing out that a unanimous vote would be necessary: legally, that might be so. But why should it be assumed beforehand that unanimity would not one day be achieved? As to the special Protocol which would be necessary, according to the Chairman, to set up a new conference, that was not M. Litvinoff’s proposal. What he had in mind was that the work of the present Conference should be extended, and that the Conference itself should be made permanent. He was sure the jurists would take the necessary steps to that end if the General Commission accepted the Soviet proposal in principle. He fully realised that it was too recent to be put to the vote immediately, but was quite prepared to wait until the delegations had had time to consider it and to obtain instructions from their Governments.

The Soviet delegation had also made a proposal with regard to security, a proposal which found expression in the Turkish resolution and at least in the statements of the French and some other delegations. The United States delegate had said that the question could not be solved because some delegates might not be interested in it. It would be true of most of the

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1 See Minutes of the General Commission, Volume II, page 208.
questions to be discussed that some delegations were more interested than others. But the difference between disarmament and security was that the former required unanimity, while the latter only required agreement between a sufficient number of States. He was sure that if a practical attempt were made to deal with the problem along the lines he had indicated, some measure of success would be achieved.

He therefore supported the Chairman's proposal, in the General Commission, 1 to appoint a drafting committee for the purpose of ascertaining what was common to all the resolutions before the General Commission and submitting such a joint resolution as would meet with the approval, if not of all, at least of the majority of the delegations represented.

The Chairman assured M. Litvinoff that he had had no intention of prejudicing the Soviet proposal or discouraging the Bureau from accepting it. He had some responsibility, however, as Chairman of the Bureau and the President of the General Commission, and had felt it his duty to explain the exact position.

The drafting committee should, he thought, be small. He therefore suggested that it should consist of M. Politis as Chairman and M. Beneš as Rapporteur, together with the Secretary-General and four to six other members.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) proposed that the drafting committee should consist of the officers of the Bureau, together with those responsible for the various resolutions.

M. Lange (Norway) was somewhat embarrassed by the proposal just made by M. Litvinoff. What would be the terms of reference and the basis of the work of the drafting committee, the appointment of which was contemplated? In M. Lange's opinion, the very interesting debate which had just taken place did not enable the points of view of the various delegations to be clearly defined.

The Chairman pointed out that it was usual, when appointing a drafting committee at the end of a discussion, to leave it to focus that discussion in a resolution. He was assuming that that line would be followed in the present case.

Mr. Norman Davis (United States of America) did not think there was sufficient agreement to enable a drafting committee to do useful work. More progress might perhaps be made if the Chairman, together with the Secretary-General, were to draw up a statement, based on the discussion, for the Bureau's consideration.

Mr. Eden (United Kingdom) supported Mr. Davis's proposal. He felt that it would be extremely difficult for a drafting committee to draw up a resolution in the light of the discussion, which had not contained the necessary elements for such a resolution.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that what he had in mind was not that the drafting Committee should report on the Bureau's discussions, but that it should try to reconcile the three resolutions and to submit to the General Commission a common text acceptable to those responsible for them.

M. Sandler (Sweden) supported the proposal of the representative of the United States of America.

The Chairman explained that his idea was that the drafting committee should make recommendations to the Bureau as to how the resolutions should be handled in the General Commission. With due deference to Mr. Norman Davis, he was afraid it would be impossible for the Secretary-General and himself to do what was required. He had, in fact, intended to ask M. Politis to preside over the drafting committee. In taking the responsibility—as was his duty—of analysing the position as he found it, he had felt that he was making it easy for the advocates of security to discuss regional agreements, while, at the same time, efforts were being made to induce Germany to return. His suggestion had not been acceptable, at any rate to one important delegation, and he therefore felt that it would be better for him to stand aside.

He assured the first delegate of France that the idea of visiting Berlin had never occurred to him. As to the efforts made in the past, to which M. Barthou had referred, he might perhaps point out that there was a new Government in France—the ninth since the beginning of the Conference—and the latter was not quite sure of the position the French Government adopted on some of the questions. Action that had failed under previous Governments might succeed under the present one. He had therefore suggested that the Bureau should ask the General Commission to make every effort to get Germany to return, in order that the Conference's work might continue.

1 See Minutes of the eighty-fourth meeting of the General Commission.
Either a drafting committee could be appointed, or the discussion could continue on the following day, but, in the latter case, steps would probably have to be taken to adjourn the General Commission convened for the following Wednesday, and that would, in his opinion, have a very bad effect on public opinion.

M. Barthou (France) had the greatest friendship for the Chairman and would be sorry to hurt his feelings, but he wished to avoid any misunderstanding. The Chairman had referred to the French delegation and said that nine Governments had succeeded one another in Paris since the beginning of the Conference. He had been anxious as to the duration of the present Government and had wondered whether that Government’s views would be the same as those of the Government which would succeed it. M. Barthou pointed out, in this connection, that there were certain Governments which changed their Ministers without changing their opinions, but that it was also conceivable that there were some Governments in the world which changed their opinions without changing their Ministers.

Reverting to the point under discussion, M. Barthou agreed with the Chairman, since the latter had stated that there was no question of a fresh visit to Berlin.

As regards the procedure to be followed for the future work of the Conference, M. Barthou endeavoured, with the mentality of the “average Frenchman”, to draw certain conclusions from the discussion which had just taken place.

He did not think the proposal put forward by Mr. Norman Davis was acceptable; he agreed with the Chairman that the Chairman and Secretary-General should not be asked to undertake work which had no prospect of success. The other proposals might possibly be amalgamated in order to reach a practical solution. The Chairman had already mentioned the names of M. Politis and M. Benes as members of the drafting committee. Some years ago, M. Politis had been the author of a valuable report on security. M. Benes’s clear mind was entirely fitted to bring order into the confusion. M. Barthou therefore unreservedly approved these two appointments. This Committee would have to deal with three proposals; it was therefore advisable that its members should include one of the authors of each of the proposals.

Lastly, M. Barthou thought it was impossible to do useful work without the co-operation of the Chairman of the Conference and he urged him to join the drafting committee.

Mr. Norman Davis (United States of America) said that he had not the slightest objection to the appointment of M. Politis and M. Benes, but had felt that, in the circumstances, the authority and moral influence of the Chairman of the Conference, acting with the Secretary-General, might more speedily lead to a measure of agreement.

He had, of course, assumed that, if they thought fit, they would consult the delegations that had presented resolutions. However, he had no objection to amending his proposal to meet M. Barthou’s suggestion.

The Chairman proposed, for the following very substantial reason, that the delegations of France, Italy and the United Kingdom be represented on the drafting committee.

He was convinced that it was the desire of the great majority of the Bureau and the General Commission—and he did not intend this to be overlooked—that the notes should be harmonised and that everything should be done to bring about Germany’s return. That was essential, if a convention was to be achieved. Surely, therefore, those responsible for the notes should sit on the drafting committee; otherwise, that important aspect of the problem might be overlooked.

Baron Aloisi (Italy) said he had followed with close attention the proposals that had been made. It had been suggested that a drafting committee should be appointed. If the representatives of the three Powers whom the Chairman had just mentioned were now to be added to that committee, its character would be completely changed, and he did not see how they could do, in one night, what the Conference had not succeeded in doing in eighteen months.

The Chairman said that his position had been completely misunderstood. The work of the drafting committee would be to see that any programme of work for the General Commission suggested some method of narrowing the differences revealed in the notes. The actual work of narrowing those differences might take weeks to accomplish, and it was certainly not his intention that that should be done by a drafting committee.

Motta (Switzerland) supported the President’s proposal, and earnestly appealed to Baron Aloisi to agree to serve on the proposed Committee. He pointed out that Baron Aloisi stood for the Saar procedure, on which he had conferred such distinction, and he begged him to consent.

Mr. Norman Davis (United States of America) withdrew his proposal.

Mr. Eden (United Kingdom) had no objection to the procedure suggested by the Chairman, but desired to make it quite clear that, in his view, the lines of the speech with which Mr. Henderson had opened the meeting were the lines which the Bureau should follow if any useful conclusion were to be reached.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) thought the situation was somewhat complicated. He also had no objection to the composition of the drafting committee as suggested by the Chairman, but he doubted whether the Bureau realised what the drafting
committee was required to do. He had understood that it would reconcile the three resolutions. The Chairman had said something about harmonising the notes exchanged between certain States, but that would necessitate the presence of a fourth Power which had also sent in a note: that would not be easy to obtain.

There had been exchanges of notes and of visits, as a result of which the General Commission had been called together to decide what action was to be taken. It now seemed that the Chairman felt that the General Commission had been called prematurely, that there must be more memoranda and more visits. That being so, he wondered why the Bureau had been called at all.

In the meantime, what was to be done with the three resolutions? They dealt with the situation as it stood at the present time, and an attempt might be made to reconcile them. But the task was now being complicated by the proposal that the notes should be harmonised. That was a work of weeks, months and even years. He would like the situation to be made more clear.

The Chairman repeated that the drafting committee would not be required to harmonise the notes: it would recommend a method of dealing with the resolutions. Some of the points referred to in the latter were already contained in the draft adopted as a basis for a first Convention. The drafting committee would have to see which they were; it would have to consider whether, for example, the guarantees of loyal execution—to which some of the Powers attached great importance—should be referred to a special committee, and, if so, to what kind of committee, and so on. It would have to see which questions should have priority. It would have to consider whether—in accordance with a previous suggestion from the Chair—all security questions should be discussed in the Political Commission and all disarmament questions in the General Commission.

At least two of the resolutions raised the important question of the return of Germany. How was the Conference to bring that about? There had been some improvement as a result of the notes exchanged, but there were still differences. He desired to see them narrowed, minimised, removed if possible, and some method of doing that must be found.

On all these points, the drafting committee would make recommendations to the Bureau for subsequent discussion in the General Commission.

He hoped the position was now clear, and that the Bureau would allow a drafting committee to set to work as soon as possible.

Baron Aloisi (Italy) requested the Chairman, even after the explanations just given, to excuse him the honour of serving on the Committee.

M. Barthou (France) associated himself most firmly with Baron Aloisi's statement. He did not see what would be the use of his serving on a Committee of that kind. He had not tabled any resolution, and was therefore not qualified to serve on the drafting committee. He accordingly asked the Chairman not to press him to undertake a duty that he would not be able to perform.

The Chairman thought that, in the circumstances, the proposal to appoint a drafting committee had better be abandoned. The Bureau would continue its discussion on the following day in order to see whether agreement could not be reached. That would probably mean adjourning the General Commission. The position seemed gradually to be getting worse, and he did not think he had in the least exaggerated it.

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**FIFTY-EIGHTH MEETING (PRIVATE)**

*Held on Tuesday, June 5th, 1934, at 3.30 p.m.*

Chairman: Mr. Henderson.

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76. **ACTION TO BE TAKEN WITH REGARD TO THE PROPOSALS SUBMITTED TO THE GENERAL COMMISSION ON MAY 29TH, MAY 30TH, AND JUNE 1ST, 1934** (continuation).

The Chairman said that the position of the Conference when the Bureau closed on the previous evening was not only most unsatisfactory but almost hopeless. Not only had it failed to agree upon a drafting committee, but there was evidence of two distinct tendencies, which could only be reconciled if there existed such a measure of goodwill as would influence each to make some concession to the other.

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1 Tevfik Rüştü Bey (Turkey) was also present at the meeting (see footnote on page 211).
That goodwill would, he hoped, be shown at the present meeting. If the position as revealed throughout the previous day were fully maintained, the efforts of the Conference must inevitably be followed by disaster.

On the following day, the Bureau was expected to report to the General Commission a plan of work dealing with all the points comprehended in the three sets of proposals presented by the Soviet, Turkish and six-Power delegations.

In view of the impasse reached, he had taken the responsibility of preparing a programme which he thought dealt fairly with all the proposals.

If the terms of his resolution were recommended to the General Commission, it would enable the Conference machinery, either at once or at an early date, to deal with all the points contained in all three sets of proposals.

It must be kept clearly in mind that, in accordance with the General Commission’s decision, the draft Convention was still the basis of the Conference’s work, and several of the proposals made already found a place in the draft.

It was not his intention to exclude any proposal, or even any suggestion, from future consideration, but he honestly expressed his belief—after watching over the work for thirty months—that a settlement of certain important political issues was essential to any success which might eventually be achieved.

The Chairman then read the following draft resolution:

1. The General Commission;
2. Welcomes the marked desire which has been widely expressed that the Conference should continue its efforts to secure a Convention;
3. "Considers that the proposal of the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to convert the Conference into a Permanent Peace Conference should, prior to its discussion, be referred to the Governments for their consideration;
4. "Considers that the proposals with regard to pacts of mutual assistance might, in the first instance, be most usefully negotiated by the Governments immediately concerned, the results being reported to the President of the Conference;
5. "Concurs in the view expressed by the Turkish delegation that the participation in such discussions of any Power directly interested should be secured;
6. "Decides that the question of the guarantees of execution of the future Convention, raised in the first paragraph of the proposals submitted by the six delegations, should be referred to the Special Committee which has already dealt with the Miscellaneous Provisions of the Convention under the chairmanship of M. Bourquin;
7. "Observes that the views expressed by the French, Italian, United Kingdom and German Governments respectively in their notes of January 1st, January 4th, January 29th, and April 16th, 1934, offer some prospect of securing an agreement;
8. "Requests the Bureau to seek, by any means which it may deem appropriate and with the co-operation of such other Power or Powers as it may find it necessary or useful to invite to participate in its work, the reconciliation of such divergences as still exist in the above-mentioned notes;
9. "Decides, as regards all other questions raised in the General Commission at its meetings of May 29th, May 30th, and June 1st, 1934, to refer en bloc to the General Commission the questions relating to disarmament and to the Political Commission the questions relating to security, leaving it to them to co-ordinate these questions and to study them or have them studied by appropriate bodies created for the purpose as soon as there seems to be a likelihood of securing useful results;
10. "Considers, however, that, in order to enable the above Commissions usefully to discuss these questions, some prior political preparation is necessary and that a premature examination would inevitably give rise to the same difficulties as in the past;
11. "Accordingly instructs the President to keep in touch with this work of preparation and authorises him to initiate the study of the questions relating to disarmament or security, when sufficient progress on the special political problems has been made."

M. Lange (Norway) paid a sincere tribute to the effort which the Chairman had made to provide the Bureau with a basis for discussion at the present meeting. In the text before the Bureau, M. Lange had found a number of ideas which had also occurred to him since the debate on the previous day. The text made a praiseworthy effort at distinguishing between the various proposals. It was clear that they could not all be placed upon the same footing.

In the first place, M. Lange was happy to find that the proposal put forward by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which went beyond the Conference’s mandate, was to be referred to the Governments for examination. Its immediate discussion would be impossible.

Similarly, it was undoubtedly wise to refer the examination of the problem of the conclusion of regional agreements to the Powers most directly concerned. It was not until a later stage that the results of the efforts thus made could be brought up for consideration within the framework of the Conference.

M. Lange went on to stress the outstanding merit of the Chairman’s proposal, which was that it placed the questions of security and disarmament upon the same footing. To M. Lange and the group of countries in whose name he had the honour of speaking, it would be

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inadmissible that the Conference should confine itself, even for a limited period, to considering the question of security while abandoning the problem of disarmament in the strict sense of the term. It was only by pursuing its examination of these two questions pari passu that results could be achieved.

Turning to the question of the guarantees for the execution of the Convention, M. Lange recalled that the draft prepared by the six delegations contained a reference to this problem, and that the suggestion had, in the first instance, been put forward by the French delegation. Examination of that proposal would be a valuable contribution to the activities of the Conference in relation to disarmament. For the consideration of this problem, the Conference might rely upon the Special Committee presided over by M. Bourquin. M. Lange attached great importance to this proposal, as the suggested procedure would make it possible to guard against war or threats of war as soon as the first clouds appeared upon the horizon, whereas the other measures grouped under the notion of security would only come into play when a conflict had already broken out.

Upon certain other points in the Chairman’s proposal M. Lange was in some doubt. He feared that, by using expressions suggesting a more or less protracted adjournment of the work on disarmament proper, a very unfortunate impression might be made on public opinion. There would thus be a risk of opening the way to the armaments race which M. Motta had so eloquently conjured up the previous day. That was a very serious issue, and he would refrain from dwelling upon the dangers that were even now apparent in the schemes under consideration in various countries.

M. Lange had not had time to prepare any precise amendments to the Chairman’s text. He nevertheless pointed out that the next to last paragraph of the resolution should be amended, as in his opinion it was desirable that the work should to a certain extent be begun in the Conference itself, and that, while such preparatory work was in progress, the political negotiations should be continued. In this way the prospects of success would be greater than if the Conference were to adjourn until results had been achieved in other respects.

In conclusion, M. Lange stated that, subject to certain changes, the text before the Bureau might be regarded as a satisfactory expression of the general attitude of the group of delegations which he represented.

M. BECK (Poland) said he had made a rapid study of the draft resolution proposed by the Chairman. But he must say at once that he had certain reservations to make with regard to the sixth and seventh paragraphs. Those paragraphs referred to views expressed by France, Italy, the United Kingdom and Germany in various notes. Those notes, he must point out, only committed the respective Governments concerned. They had never been officially before the Conference; the Conference had not been called upon to study them. Consequently, it was not entitled to express an opinion. He therefore considered that the seventh paragraph should be amended or omitted.

M. DE MADARIAGA (Spain) proposed, in order to meet M. Beck’s argument, to omit the sixth paragraph and to simplify the seventh paragraph so as to read:

"Requests the Bureau to seek, by any means which it may deem appropriate, the reconciliation of such political divergencies as still exist.”

The reference to the eventual co-operation of one or more other Powers appeared to him to be useless, and he felt that what was useless was dangerous and would be better omitted. Similarly, in paragraph 8, he proposed to omit the words “as soon as there seems to be a likelihood of securing useful results”, which were useless in view of the contents of the following paragraph.

As regards paragraph 9, he proposed the following text:

“Considers, however, that, except for the question of the supervision of the trade in and manufacture of arms, which can be examined forthwith, some prior political preparation is necessary to enable the above-mentioned Commissions to succeed in their work.”

Further, in the last paragraph, he proposed to substitute for the word “when” the expression “as and when”.

M. BECK (Poland) said that it would simplify the proceedings if he accepted the observations and amendments proposed by M. de Madariaga.

The CHAIRMAN proposed the adjournment of the meeting to allow of the preparation by the Secretariat of an amended text on the basis of the foregoing observations.

The Chairman’s proposal was adopted.

(The meeting rose at 4.25 p.m. and resumed at 5 p.m.)

The CHAIRMAN read the following revised text of the draft resolution:


1. “The General Commission:

(1) Welcomes the marked desire which has been widely expressed that the Conference should continue its efforts to secure a Convention;
(2) Decides that the proposal of the Soviet delegation to convert the Conference into a Permanent Peace Conference should, prior to its discussion, be referred to the Governments for their consideration;

(3) Considers that the proposal with regard to pacts of mutual assistance might, in the first instance, be most usefully negotiated by the Governments immediately concerned, the results being reported to the President of the Conference;

(4) Concurs in the view expressed by the Turkish delegation that the participation in such discussions of any Power directly interested should be secured;

(5) Decides that the question of the guarantees of execution of the future Convention, raised in the first paragraph of the proposals submitted by the six delegations, should be referred to the Special Committee which has already dealt with the Miscellaneous Provisions of the Convention under the chairmanship of M. Bourquin;

(6) Requests the Bureau to seek, by any means which it may deem appropriate, the reconciliation of such political divergencies as still exist;

(7) Decides, as regards all other questions raised in the General Commission at its meetings of May 29th, May 30th and June 1st, 1934, to refer en bloc to the General Commission the questions relating to disarmament and to the Political Commission the questions relating to security, leaving it to them to co-ordinate these questions and to study them or have them studied by appropriate bodies created for the purpose;

(8) Considers, however, that, except for the question of the supervision of the trade in and manufacture of arms, which can be examined forthwith, some prior political preparation is necessary to enable the above-mentioned Commissions to succeed in their work;

(9) Accordingly instructs the President to keep in touch with this work of preparation and authorises him to initiate the study of the questions relating to disarmament or security as and when sufficient progress on the special political problems has been made.

Mr. Eden (United Kingdom) first desired on behalf of his Government to say, in the simplest and most categorical terms, that he was ready to accept without amendment the Chairman's draft resolution. He said that, without wishing to enter in anyway into what might be the merits or demerits of the resolution, but simply because he shared the Chairman's view. In the Conference's present serious situation, it was a duty to rally round the proposal which was most likely to meet different points of view without attempting detailed amendments, however desirable, to a document that was not, after all, an Act of Parliament, but a means of assisting the Conference at a time of great difficulty that might very easily turn into disaster.

In the second place, he was prepared to support the Chairman's draft resolution because it did emphasise the need for a settlement of certain political issues, a settlement that was essential to any ultimate agreement upon other issues.

The representative of Norway had made the very natural comment that he feared the effect of public opinion, in that, while other negotiations were taking place, only one Committee of the Conference would be at work. With conditions as they were at present, Mr. Eden did not believe the world would be impressed by anything which did not deal with realities. The time was long past when talking could impress anyone. The realities that had to be dealt with were expressed in the four documents to which many references had been made.

Mr. Eden preferred the original text for the following reason. Paragraph 6 of the new text referred somewhat umemphatically, if he might say so, to what he believed to be the task before the Conference: "the reconciliation of such political divergencies as still exist". From having been, as it were, the dominating theme of the original resolution, that had become a subsidiary theme in the amended resolution. Since it was the dominating issue, he preferred it to dominate in words as well as in fact.

But that was a matter to which he did not attach undue emphasis; all he would say on behalf of his Government was that the original resolution was an earnest attempt to get the Conference out of a difficulty from which otherwise it might perhaps have found no escape. For that reason he would wholeheartedly accept it, together with any drafting amendments, provided they would be registered with the least possible delay.

M. Di Soragna (Italy) agreed in large measure with Mr. Eden's observations. He would have endeavoured to facilitate an issue from the present deadlock of the Conference by refraining from intervening, if the Bureau had been unanimous on the first text submitted by the Chairman; but he could not maintain that attitude in regard to the revised text.
He shared Mr. Eden's opinion with regard to paragraph 6 of the new text, but did not attach capital importance to the point. On the other hand, he was not prepared to accept the substitution of "as and when" for "when" in the last paragraph.

Further, he did not like the new wording of paragraph 8. He thought political preparation was necessary also for the study of the question of the supervision of the trade in and manufacture of arms.

He could not accept the amendments to the Chairman's original text.

M. DE MADARIAGA (Spain) thought it was too early to express an opinion as to the possibility of achieving unanimity by withdrawing the amendments in question.

He must point out, however, that in the re-drafting of the text of the draft resolution the French of the new paragraph 6 had been changed by mistake. It would be desirable to re-establish the old text as follows:

"Prie le Bureau de rechercher, par tous les moyens qu'il jugerait appropriés, la conciliation des divergences politiques qui existent encore."

M. BARTHOU (France) was sure that no one present could have imagined that his silence was an expression of his indifference in regard to the proposals of the Chairman and Bureau.

He agreed entirely with his colleague and friend, Mr. Eden, in saying that this was no time for speeches. Nevertheless, since men had not yet found any other means of expressing their thoughts, Mr. Eden would not be surprised if he expressed, by means of phrases, what he had to say on behalf of the French delegation. He would endeavour, like Mr. Eden, to be brief and clear.

He would say at once, and in the clearest possible terms, that the French delegation was not prepared to vote for the text before the Bureau. In the first place, he had a preliminary observation to make which, in his view, governed the whole matter—namely, that the question which the Conference had discussed for a number of meetings, and which appeared to have dominated its work, was now placed at the end of the draft resolution before the Bureau, instead of at the beginning. In other words, what had appeared to the majority of delegates to be an essential condition for the signature of a Convention had become an accessory condition; he referred to the question of security.

M. Barthou did not propose to repeat—at least, to insist upon—what he had said on the previous day; but he would not hesitate to repeat until the last moment that, from the first day, all the observations that had been exchanged had been dominated by the problem of security. He might add that, on the day when the Conference took up again its work, he had had the liveliest satisfaction in hearing the President place the problem of security before all others. He had noted that the individual and collective proposals put to the Conference reinforced the attitude of the President; security came before all else.

But what was the present position in regard to security? Security figured towards the end of the first, as of the second text, as a secondary and accessory condition. Thus, the terms of the problem were radically altered. The Conference was no longer where it had been on the first day. He for his part, speaking on behalf of the French delegation, could not accept such a mutation. And why? It was not a question of shading, but of substance. If it were thought that the security problem came before all else, let it be said so and the problem put in the forefront for consideration. If security were considered to be a secondary problem, let that be said with equal clearness. But a choice must be made between two standpoints: that of the first day—namely, that the security problem was the foundation of all else—and the standpoint which seemed to have emerged at the last meeting, that the security problem could be treated as a secondary issue.

It would not be alleged that on this point—or, he hoped, on other points—the French delegation had modified its opinion. The French standpoint was the same to-day as it had been on the previous Wednesday when he had had the formidable honour of laying it before the General Commission. There was no change in the attitude of the French delegation.

The Chairman's proposal relegated security to a secondary or a tertiary place. The French delegation persisted in saying that security should be a primary consideration. These two ideas, in consequence, were different, and M. Barthou, for his part, was not prepared to agree to any compromise which, on the pretext of effecting a reconciliation, endeavoured to bring together that which should not be brought together.

Two different standpoints! Two different attitudes! The attitude of the French delegation, which coincided with that of fourteen other delegations, had not changed.

Having shown that on this point the proposed text was of such a nature that, in substance, it was not acceptable, he felt obliged to add certain observations regarding other parts of the text.

It was clear that all the delegates would vote in favour of the first paragraph, and would "welcome the marked desire which has been widely expressed . . ." He would himself have preferred that the amendment proposed by M. de Madariaga should be introduced at this point. That, however, had not been done; but it was of small importance. Let it be supposed that Conference circles were meant. He did not desire to raise difficulties in regard to the form. The Bureau was not dealing with questions of form.
He would continue with the first paragraph: “... that the Conference should continue its efforts to secure a Convention”. The fact of continuing to take part in the discussion at the present time indicated a desire that the Conference should succeed.

The second paragraph was in the following terms:

“Decides that the proposal of the Soviet delegation to convert the Conference into a Permanent Peace Conference should, prior to its discussion, be referred to the Governments for their consideration.”

That proposal should be borne in mind. But the draft resolution continued:

“Considers that the proposal with regard to pacts of mutual assistance might, in the first instance, be most usefully negotiated by the Governments immediately concerned, the results being reported to the President of the Conference.”

The proposal was such as to deserve attention. There would appear to be two stages in this connection. M. Barthou was not concerned with the second stage; but what of the first stage? There must be negotiations by the Governments either in connection with the proposal of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or that for the negotiation of pacts of mutual assistance. What, then, was the meaning of paragraph 4, the terms of which were as follows:

“Concurs in the view expressed by the Turkish delegation, that the participation in such discussions of any Power directly interested should be secured”?

What discussions? Discussions with regard to the previous paragraph? There could be no question of any other proposals. So it was the Governments who were to examine these proposals; and then one was asked to share the views expressed by the Turkish delegation and so ensure that every Power directly interested took part in those discussions. But that was not matter for the Conference. The proposal referred to the Governments questions of the highest importance. Let the Governments be left to take such initiative as they might desire!

What was meant, moreover, by “Power directly interested”? He was perfectly aware of what was meant. He proposed to come to the point. Obviously, the expression referred to Germany.

He did not recoil before the problem. He had not waited for M. Motta’s youthful audacity to say the word “Germany”. He had mentioned Germany before M. Motta. He had been the first to refer to Germany when he alluded to Powers whose absence constituted a presence weighing on the Disarmament Conference, and he was not sorry he had done so. The reference, then, was to Germany.

What was wanted? The text of the resolution said that the Governments were to negotiate, to examine one proposal, to negotiate on another. That was understood.

If that was what was meant, it was no longer a matter for the Conference, and M. Barthou had no further motive for referring to the first four paragraphs which the Bureau was asked to discuss. He had nothing against these paragraphs; they left the Governments entirely free to negotiate. But he asked what relation there was between these independent negotiations, the freedom of which was to be assured, and the work on which the Conference was engaged. There was no objection, therefore, to the text; he was prepared to admit it. But there was nothing to be gained from the text; and he felt that, in work of this kind, anything that was useless might be dangerous, and he was not prepared to lend his co-operation to anything which was useless and at the same time dangerous.

The fifth paragraph referred to guarantees of execution. Guarantees of execution? Very good! M. Bourquin would have the task of submitting a report on this subject to the General Commission. M. Barthou condoled with his distinguished colleague. He knew these guarantees of execution, because he had been seeking for them.

There was a moment, before the German budget was officially revealed to the world, when the French Government had endeavoured to give the Government of the United Kingdom the reply for which the latter had pressed. The United Kingdom Government then said to the French Government: “What guarantees of execution does France want?” M. Barthou had considered the question in all good faith. But he had found that guarantees of execution in the vague were an entirely acceptable thing; but the difficulties arose as soon as it was necessary to deal with realities. It was therefore a task of whose dangers, and, he must almost say, of whose quasi-impossibility, he was aware. It meant covering the ground from the most minor offence to the most serious, from a contravention involving a benevolent reproof to a contravention leading to war; and M. Massigli knew well the efforts which the French Government had made in this connection. He would not say that the avowals of the German Government had relieved the French Government of a difficult task; but, if the day should ever dawn when he was in a position to express his gratitude to the German Government, he might say that the latter’s avowal, by rendering the French Government’s labours useless, had relieved it of the difficulties with which it had been contending.

He wished better luck to M. Bourquin. But he doubted whether M. Bourquin would prove any more successful than the French Government.

Paragraph 6 was the central point of discussion. It had been amended at the request of M. Beck and M. de Macariaga. M. Barthou fully appreciated the motive of both delegates. M. Beck was not concerned to know what had been the subject of discussion between the great Powers. Poland—he spoke in the friendliest spirit—was a very great Power, and did not care for being left outside discussions between other great Powers. That explained M. Beck’s statement that the Polish Government had no knowledge of all these negotiations and notes
exchanged between the Powers. It did not wish to talk of them; they were not Poland's affair.

M. de Madariaga in his turn proposed a text, in agreement with M. Beck, in which all mention of the notes exchanged between the Powers was suppressed. M. Barthou was not opposed to that text; but would such a text solve the problem? Certainly not. No one could think so.

M. DE MADARIAGA (Spain) said that, if he had thought it would result in dropping the question, he would not have proposed the text.

M. BARTHOU (France) learned from M. de Madariaga that interruptions were permissible. He had never yet interrupted. M. de Madariaga was creating a dangerous precedent.

M. DE MADARIAGA (Spain) remarked that it was an old habit at Geneva.

M. BARTHOU (France), continuing, said he had not heard M. de Madariaga's interruption because M. de Madariaga had not interrupted him.

Resuming his speech, he said that a text had been proposed which did not do away with the difficulty, because it avoided and dissembled it. He agreed with Mr. Eden, who, in a spirit of compromise, had accepted the wording of the proposal which originated in the Bureau. But he had added that it contained in paragraph 6 a central and essential problem; those were his actual words.

M. di Soragna, the Italian delegate, in his turn, had agreed, first of all, that this point was of importance and then he had added that it was not vital. He disagreed with Mr. Eden but no matter. M. Barthou quoted the view of Mr. Eden because it was his own. Mr. Eden was right in saying that it was an essential and a central problem.

What was that problem? Had they reached the point where they were afraid to mention names? Would they recoil from historical or geographical facts? The problem indirectly raised in paragraph 6, if that paragraph were completed and made clear, was the problem of Germany. The problem that arose now, still under paragraph 6, was again the problem of Germany.

What was it proposed to do? Let it be said clearly without sheltering behind texts—he would use a mild term to express his thoughts—behind obscure texts. Let them look at the facts.

The return of Germany to the League of Nations? Granted.

What had the French Government replied to the United Kingdom Government's memorandum of January 29th? What had it replied after Mr. Eden's visits to the three capitals?

It had sent a reply on March 17th, the text of which he would read in order to make France's position quite clear and to prove once again how consistent she still was. When M. Barthou had read this passage he would make no further reference to the subject, as it clearly defined the French position:

"In the last resort, one must always come back to the League of Nations and to the Covenant on which the League is based. Whatever may have been said against the League, whatever attacks may have been made on it, the League is still the only organisation capable of furnishing a collective guarantee of peace. The Government of the Republic is still faithfully attached to that organisation. Accordingly, it was gratified to find that the United Kingdom Government made the return of Germany to the League of Nations an 'essential condition' for the signature of an armaments convention. Germany can offer no better guarantee to world equilibrium than her return, free from all constraint, to the community of States to which she was admitted. Such a return would relax tension and thus permit of preparing and promoting agreements, of which France, wholeheartedly devoted to the cause of peace, once more affirms the utility."

M. Barthou did not think words could be clearer. They were the words used on January 1st and afterwards on April 6th and on April 17th.

They must not therefore avoid the difficulty; they must face the question. They desired Germany to return to Geneva. Agreed. France held the same view. But what was to be done? Were negotiations to be opened with Germany? Once more the reply was, Yes. On what basis? Would they wait for Germany to lay down conditions to the League which she had left unnecessarily, as the Chairman had said, and without justification, as Sir John Simon had said? Would they countenance negotiations of a kind which would humiliate the League? M. Barthou would wait for someone to make the proposal before he discussed such an attitude. No one would propose it.

Then, would Germany be asked to come and would conditions be imposed on her? He personally would not go so far. There was his note, the note of the French Government. Speaking for the French delegation and for his Government, he desired Germany to return to the League of Nations. He would like her to return without any kind of constraint. She had closed the door behind her; let the door open to admit her. Let her come and take her place, and then the question would be discussed. They would discuss positions, they would discuss

1 Document Conf.D.166(a).
security, they would discuss re-armament, they would consider all the various conditions in respect of equality of rights which were antagonistic one to the other, and make an effort at conciliation; but they must not shirk the problem. He personally would not accept paragraph 6 because, whatever might have been intended, that paragraph was ambiguous.

That being so, M. Barthou need not dwell on the following paragraphs; not that he scorned the prohibition of the manufacture of and trade in armaments, a problem which could be examined forthwith, and he had even said so in his first speech on Wednesday last. Let the Bureau therefore give the Chairman a vote of confidence; he would support this vote, for he had great respect and sympathy for Mr. Henderson.

On that point also there were two attitudes: the attitude of his friend Mr. Eden, which, while he understood it, he did not share. It was an attitude which was close to that of M. Motta. Yesterday, M. Motta had said that it was better to have a bad convention than no convention at all. M. Barthou would say: better no convention than a bad one.

Mr. Eden had said that the Conference was not a Parliament where the delegates made laws and precise and strict texts. He was quite right, but the Conference was a gathering which had heavier responsibilities to the whole world than any Parliament had.

Mr. Eden had said that the Conference should face the real facts. M. Barthou would take his stand beside him. What were the real facts?

The Disarmament Conference saw before it such difficulties that a failure was to be feared and that this failure would be a disaster. That failure and that disaster could be avoided only by both sides searching for clarity, light, truth. An accommodating text? That spelt illusion and disappointment. To-morrow the whole world, which perhaps would have hailed as a relief what at Geneva would be called success, would say, "Is that all? We are being fooled, not intentionally—delegates are all equally sincere—we are being fooled, there is no agreement on anything, the Conference is being prolonged by artificial means."

No! He was not for accommodation. He was not for unanimity when unanimity was impossible. The delegates present were familiar with the unanimities of the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference! He had not been there, he had either been a Minister at home carrying his responsibilities or a free citizen listening to the discussions and trying to make out what was happening at the League or in the Disarmament Conference. In what had their unanimity consisted? Misunderstandings, clashes of views! The next day facts, the true facts, reasserted their rights and then the unanimity broke down; there was a majority and there was a minority. Their intentions had been excellent; but, whatever their intentions, they had acted badly.

M. Barthou therefore said: "If I am not part of the unanimity, it can't be helped! I prefer to be alone if I think I am right. I uphold my view, the view of the French delegation!"

Did that mean that he was asking his colleagues to admit failure or to go back on their views? Quite the contrary. He asked them to return to their principles, those principles which had been laid down on many occasions and always, in any case, in the French notes. Yes! Let Germany come back to the League of Nations with equality of rights and assume her responsibilities. Security? Yes! For without it no convention was possible. But security was mentioned at the very end as if it were a secondary issue, whereas in reality it was the starting-point, the bridge, as it were, which should connect the various proposals with one another.

Germany? She was not even mentioned, but she would understand. He therefore said, "Yes! Let Germany come back; let the League assert its rights; let the League uphold the principle of security which had seemed to him at one moment to have the support of a large majority." In any case, that was the position of the French delegation. M. Barthou believed the Bureau would do it the justice of admitting that the attitude was definite, clear and consistent.

He had perhaps wearied his hearers. He had perhaps spoken overlong, when he would have liked to be quite simple; but, in a discussion of that kind, in which each speaker committed his country and in which each knew at the same time that he was engaging the League's responsibility towards the world, it was not a bad idea that each in his own way should say exactly what he thought. In his own way—it was not perhaps the best way; but M. Barthou had at least been frank, he had spoken his own mind and that of the French delegation.

The CHAIRMAN said that his remark that the Conference's position was most unsatisfactory and almost hopeless could not have had stronger confirmation than it had had in the last speech. He had felt responsible for trying to correct a very definite misunderstanding; he admitted that he had accepted the responsibility of trying to assist the Bureau of the Conference out of an impasse. He had done so with strict impartiality. He was now told that the subject that had been the outstanding question throughout the discussions, not only of the Bureau, but also of the General Commission, had been relegated to the end of the document. He must refuse to accept that statement, and, lest it should be repeated in the Press, must challenge it and challenge it with all the force of which he was capable.

What was the position with which the Conference was confronted? It had been necessary to fix a programme of work arising out of the resolutions submitted to the General Commission. The first resolution had been presented by M. Litvinoff, who—as the Chairman had understood from his speech in the General Commission on the first day—raised two very important questions. As it was the first resolution to be submitted, he had naturally dealt with it first. Its first point related to the conversion of the Conference into a permanent peace conference. In referring to that point in the Bureau on the previous day, the Chairman had used
M. Litvinoff's own words, and so far M. Litvinoff had raised no objection. The next point concerned pacts of mutual assistance and non-aggression, which the Chairman had placed second, as it was in fact part of the first resolution. He objected to aspersions, either by M. Barthou or by anyone else, on his impartiality, and if M. Barthou took up that position he would resign. So soon as his impartiality was impugned by any delegation he was prepared to leave the Chair. He was happy to say that, after the first six months of the Conference, one of the members of the present French Government had made a resolution congratulating him upon his impartiality.

Coming back to the statement that security had been relegated to the background, the Chairman said that it was a new argument to him that pacts of mutual assistance had nothing to do with security; they were a most important part of security. But if world security—which he himself desired and for which he had been fighting ever since he had assisted to build up the Geneva Protocol in 1924—could not be secured immediately, there must be regional security schemes. Yet, although that was mentioned in the second paragraph of his draft resolution, he had had to listen to a statement that the President of the Conference—who ought to be impartial—had relegated that big question to the end of the document. He carried his challenge still further. What was the meaning of paragraph 3? "Considers that the proposal with regard to pacts of mutual assistance might, in the first instance, be most usefully negotiated by the Governments immediately concerned, the results being reported to the President of the Conference." Was it not common sense to suggest that, if pacts of mutual assistance and non-aggression between seven, eight or nine Powers were to be secured, those Powers should themselves, in the first instance, discuss what the pacts should cover? They would then report to the President of the Conference, who would in turn bring the matter before the entire Conference. In spite of that, again he was told that the question of security was relegated to the background.

Paragraph 4 said that the General Commission "concurs in the view expressed by the Turkish delegation that the participation in such discussions of any Power directly interested should be secured." How could there be real security, a proper pact of mutual assistance, if someone living in the region the pact was to cover was ignored? Paragraph 4 was rightly included, and he did not intend to be a party to the encircling of any nation, whatever its name might be, by means of mutual assistance pacts. As long as he had to guide the Conference, he would guide it to act fairly to anyone in a region for which a pact of mutual assistance was concluded.

Had the next paragraph—which dealt with guarantees of execution—nothing to do with security? During his presidency of the Conference a French Government had attached the greatest possible importance to them as involving a very definite form of security, and had said that, if it could obtain strict control, effective supervision and penalties for the violation of the Convention, it would begin to feel that security was coming nearer.

That was his reply to the charges brought against him. He really thought there might have been some appreciation of his efforts to get the Conference out of a difficulty, instead of an attack. That was the second day on which he had been attacked. He had, moreover, been attacked more in those two days than in the two and a half years during which he had presided, and he did not intend to tolerate it.

After the last speech the position seemed absolutely hopeless. All M. Barthou had said with reference to the Chairman's opening speech was correct, but was he willing to take the speech as a whole? After all, it was not fair to refer to one part of it, leaving the other part aside. Anyone who cared to examine the speech would see that he had suggested that security and disarmament should be dealt with simultaneously, and that had been his position since the Conference opened. He had tried—and some of the speeches bore him out—to weigh up the whole position. He knew better perhaps than most the position of the different delegations and what was in their minds; they constantly came to him and had no hesitation in telling him. He had tried to state the position impartially.

M. Barthou had declared that he could not support the resolution. Where, then, was the Conference? On the previous evening it had proved impossible to form a drafting committee. Rather than allow the Bureau to meet with nothing to work on, the Chairman had spent a great deal of time well into midnight and early that morning, to see what was the best course to follow. He had presented suggestions in the draft resolution, which M. Barthou was unable to accept. In all friendliness he asked M. Barthou to prepare a programme of work himself. Meantime he would adjourn the Bureau, though he was sorry that would mean postponing the General Commission. If M. Barthou could not see his way to accept, there was only one course left open—to convene the General Commission for the following day and to report that the Bureau had spent nearly eight hours in trying to prepare a programme of work and had failed to reach agreement.

The Chairman did not know how the Bureau would feel about that, but he knew how he would feel himself. He did not regard the Conference as a debating assembly. The Conference had the lives of the entire youth of the world in its keeping. That was how it had appeared to him for the two and a half years during which he had sat in the chair. He did not view the closing down of the Conference lightly, but it was no use trying to delude the public too long. He believed it was already very impatient, felt that the Conference could do nothing but make speeches, that it could never take any practical decisions. Resolutions and telegrams poured in to him, pleading for decisions which could not be taken. Let the Conference admit it!
M. Barthou would try to prepare a programme of work, the Chairman would readily give it most careful consideration and would do all he could to influence others, provided it gave a fair, square and impartial representation of all the points referred to the Bureau by the General Commission and was not a one-sided programme, placing security on one footing and disarmament on another.

The Conference was a Disarmament Conference, a Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments. While security was important, it was only important in so far as it led to reduction. He had been a member of several Governments himself, and had long come to the conclusion that, as long as some Governments had destructive weapons at their disposal, there could be no security. He believed, therefore, that the crux of the whole question was to get those weapons reduced to the lowest possible level, and then perhaps people might begin to sleep in their beds feeling that they were secure.

If he had spoken with some heat, it was because he felt the hopelessness of the position. He felt he could do nothing to satisfy certain delegations, and, that being so, he could only put forward two suggestions: (1) that the French delegation should try its hand at providing a programme of work acceptable to the other delegations; or (2) that the Bureau should decide to call the General Commission on the following day and report that it had failed to agree, which meant that the Conference would close.

M. Barthou (France) said that he also appreciated the seriousness of the position. He had said, before the Chairman had done so, that the question had taken tragic form and that the members of the Conference bore a heavy responsibility to posterity and to the world. It was the first time in the forty-five years during which he had belonged to a parliamentary assembly that he had found himself, outside that assembly, in the position of having to discuss the substance of things with the Chair. He admitted that that might cause him some embarrassment, but his embarrassment was dissipated in face of the responsibility which he assumed. Even if he could express regret for the speech he had made, his fault would be greatly mitigated by the speech the Chairman himself had made. M. Barthou had thus had an opportunity of appreciating the resourcefulness, vigour and flexibility of the Chairman's great gifts as a speaker.

It was necessary to make a distinction between the substance and the form and the personal question.

As regards the form, M. Barthou asked the Chairman to refer to the official Minutes in which, he gave his word, he would not change a single word. If, after reading them, the Chairman considered that he had exceeded the limits of courtesy, he would be willing to apologise, but he was sure that no criticism could be levelled at his speech.

As regards the substance, M. Barthou had a draft resolution before him. He had examined that draft. He had felt that it did not give him, from the point of view which he considered to be essential, a solution of the question. He held that it did not accord him the satisfaction which his reason and his responsibility required. He had dissected it, analysed it, discussed it. That was his right. If he had erred in the discussion, it was for the Bureau and the General Commission to tell him so, but he maintained that he had not exceeded his rights.

The Chairman had told him that, since he rejected the draft resolutions before the Bureau, he should himself submit a text.

M. Barthou would reply that that was his business. As the head of an important delegation, he accepted all his responsibilities. He fulfilled his duties. He assumed his rights. It was for him and for him alone, on his own responsibility and being accountable to his Government, to adopt a course, and he had the right to decline an invitation, however high the quarter from which it came. Moreover, was that invitation necessary? Had he not, as delegate of France, adopted a definite attitude to-day, as at the previous meetings? Had he not only yesterday asked the Bureau to adopt a method which seemed to him good—namely, to refer to a special committee all the draft resolutions that had been placed before the Bureau.

He maintained that proposal. He only asked that questions foreign to the proposals should not be blended with them.

He agreed with M. Beck, as he had just said, that neither the Bureau nor the General Commission was concerned to discuss notes exchanged between Governments, even in order to reconcile them with one another. That was the affair of the Governments, not of the General Commission of the Bureau. M. Barthou therefore maintained his proposal. It was possible that, if it had been put to the vote yesterday, it would have obtained that majority which he had believed to exist.

He would say no more on the question of substance. He did not desire to continue the discussion in private. He was ready to resume it in public. In public, responsibilities became apparent and public opinion weighed carefully everything that was said. He fully realised the seriousness of the mission he had accepted. He knew also that he had not said just now one word which could hurt anyone's feelings. He had used the right of discussion. That right he maintained. He would exercise it with moderation but firmness in public session. He would not appear in the rôle of a member of a delegation arguing on the substance of things with the President of the General Commission and Chairman of the Bureau.

There remained now the personal question and there he was perfectly easy in his mind. He also desired to appeal to Mr. Henderson's sense of fairness which M. Barthou was glad to
recognise. He asked him to read over his extemporisation in which he would make no change. Mr. Henderson would see that not for a single moment, either directly or indirectly, had he questioned the Chairman's impartiality. Bias on the part of a Chairman meant that he favoured one side at the expense of the other, that he sought to bring pressure to bear on the assembly over which he presided, that he was not entirely independent in the way he presented matters or that he did not present them in their true light. Had he said anything of the kind? The Chairman had referred to the thanks which had been addressed to him on behalf of the French delegation. M. Barthou maintained those thanks. It cost him no effort either of polite observance or of complaisance to renew his thanks and his congratulations. He had belonged to parliamentary bodies for forty-five years. He had never met a President who exercised his powers with the authority Mr. Henderson had displayed in directing the business of the Conference. Mr. Henderson was fair, brave, hard-working; he had made a very great effort to arrive at a text which would find unanimous agreement. In doing so, the Chairman had obeyed the dictates of his conscience. M. Barthou's conscience imposed upon him the duty of declining to accept that text; but he had not criticised Mr. Henderson personally in any way or at any time, and he would ask him to read over his extempore speech as it had been delivered. The worst of attitudes was hypocrisy. He would have been a hypocrite had he cast any doubt directly or indirectly on the Chairman's impartiality. He had not done so, but the Chairman had taken him to task—severely at first and then in a friendly manner—and said that, if his impartiality was questioned, he would relinquish the presidency of the Disarmament Conference. M. Barthou, who was a newcomer, would not care to take the responsibility for such a misfortune. The President, who was, like himself, an old parliamentary hand, must acknowledge the right to exchange views and offer objections in the most courteous and friendly manner. He favoured freedom of speech. M. Barthou had used that freedom. That was all he had done, and he desired to tell the President as clearly as possible, as one man to another and as one old parliamentary hand to another, that he had not challenged his impartiality. He had the greatest respect for the President's authority and the greatest personal sympathy for him. The President would not resign. There might be a clash of opinion between the President and himself, but there could be no personal dispute. He would ask the President to remain at his post for the successful issue of the Disarmament Conference.

The CHAIRMAN said that he was content to leave M. Barthou in the position of the editor, who always had the last word.

The last speech, however, did not relieve him of this difficulty. On the previous day he had proposed a drafting committee, to which he had sought to add M. Barthou. The committee would have had to prepare a programme of work. M. Barthou had declined to act. The Chairman had therefore tried to provide a programme of work himself. M. Barthou declined to accept it. The Chairman had proposed that M. Barthou should prepare a programme of work. M. Barthou had again declined. It appeared that the only thing to do was to allow the debate to continue on the following afternoon. In the meantime, he would take steps to adjourn the General Commission to a date to be fixed later when the position was clearer.

FIFTY-NINTH MEETING (PRIVATE).¹

Held on Wednesday, June 6th, 1934, at 3.30 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. A. HENDERSON.


The CHAIRMAN said that when the meeting closed on the previous evening, the Bureau was discussing a programme of work which had been presented by him and which remained before the Bureau. Another programme of work had been handed in on behalf of the French delegation: he took that as an augury that the storm was over, that M. Barthou and himself both realised the seriousness and importance of the work, and that out of the resolutions they were going to try to prepare a programme upon which the Bureau and the General Commission could work. He understood that a third set of proposals might be submitted.

¹ Cemal Hüsnü Bey (Turkey) also attended the meeting.
It therefore appeared that at some stage a committee would have to be appointed, not so much for drafting purposes as to try to co-ordinate the three sets of proposals.

He further understood that some delegations felt that it might be necessary for them to consult their Governments on certain points. If so, the opportunity could not possibly be denied them.

He therefore suggested that when the French resolution had been submitted and a discussion had taken place—if the Bureau desired—a co-ordinating or drafting committee should be appointed. It might then be advisable, in order to enable delegations to consult their Governments, not to convene the Bureau before the following Monday (June 11th). In that matter, he was entirely in the hands of the Bureau, but, if consultations had to take place, two or three days would not appear to be too long a period. If it were considered too long, however, he would be pleased to have an intimation from the drafting or co-ordinating committee that it had finished its work and that the Bureau could be summoned earlier.

He would like the delegations to consider whether it would not be advisable to give a little time to everybody to examine the whole position. If the Bureau met on Monday, June 11th, to receive the report of the co-ordinating or drafting committee, the General Commission could start work on the following day.

M. Barthou (France) said there was one point only on which he proposed to reply to the Chairman's appeal. Questions of procedure would come up for consideration in due course; but it was not on questions of procedure that he wished to make his statement. He referred to the Chairman's remark that the storm of yesterday had passed over. Outwardly, it had passed over—at any rate, he hoped so. Inwardly, he was sure it had passed over. The fact was that, on the previous day, he and the Chairman, being of approximately the same age, had been concerned to prove each in his turn the vigour of his youth. They had now demonstrated what they wanted to demonstrate, and had no intention of continuing their exertions, which were only too liable to lead to profitless fatigue. He would content himself therefore with expressing the hope that all present would remember the example they had given of their ardour, no less than the lesson now to be derived from the exhibition of their wisdom.

He had said that there would be questions of procedure on which there would be something to say. One question of procedure would arise at the outset as to the conditions in which the Bureau was to continue its work. Was there any use in prolonging these more or less public "secret" meetings, which had all the disadvantages of secrecy and none of the advantages of publicity? That was a point on which he reserved the right to submit certain considerations which he considered essential.

Secondly, there would be the question of procedure, on which he was in agreement with the Chairman, and thirdly the question of the date—too distant for his wishes—on which he would have something to say.

M. Barthou then read the draft resolution proposed by the French delegation 1 and proceeded to comment on it paragraph by paragraph.

conformity with the statements he had made on the previous day. The statement was as follows:

"The question of the return of Germany to the Conference weighs on our discussions. I have already explained my attitude on this point. I repeat that no country will be more gratified than France if Germany returns to the Conference. No door has been shut. In the matter of the Saar, France has just shown her readiness to participate in an international engagement to which Germany is a party. But a number of delegations have implied that, without Germany, the Conference could not continue its work. The French delegation does not share that view. In presence of this difference of opinion, I say on behalf of my delegation that it would be possible to draw up a programme of immediate work, side by side with which those Governments which think fit can keep a free hand to take such diplomatic steps with the German Government as may be calculated in their opinion to induce that Government to resume its place at the Conference."

There was consequently one initial idea which was perfectly clear. All had the strongest interest in Germany resuming her place on the General Commission and in the League. He had said on the previous day that this opinion had been expressed in the clearest possible manner by (amongst others) the French memorandum of March 17th. He had also said on the previous day that the Conference should neither submit to Germany's conditions nor impose conditions on Germany. The door must be left open, and the great Power which had passed out through that door must be free to pass in through it again, and take her place in the Conference on a footing of complete equality, and shoulder those responsibilities which, as from that moment, she would share with the present members of the Conference.

The French delegation considered that the absence of Germany was no obstacle to the continuation of the work of the Conference. But it hastened to add that the presence of Germany would place that work in its true aspect, and would possibly enable a solution to be reached.

The French Government had exchanged notes with the German Government which were not for the moment the concern of the Conference. But there might be Governments which would be in a position to take steps to invite Germany to return. The French Government could not raise the slightest objection to such steps; and it was not to qualify but to affirm the complete freedom of these Governments in this connection that the French delegation had inserted in its declaration the sentence to which he was drawing the Conference's attention.

The French delegation continued:

"I.

' Having regard to the peculiar importance attaching to the prompt solution of certain problems to which attention was drawn at the beginning of the general discussion: 'Takes the following decisions:

" (1) Security.

" (a) Since the results of the Conference's earlier investigations have enabled certain regional security agreements to be concluded in Europe during the past year, the General Commission requests the Political Commission to resume those investigations forthwith by such procedure as it may consider appropriate with a view to the conclusion of further agreements of the same nature, and in order to determine their relationship, if any, to the General Convention."

" (b) The General Commission further requests the Political Commission to supplement if necessary the provisions adopted in the matter of supervision, and to proceed to devise guarantees of execution, the study of which has hitherto been held over."

M. Barthou said that on at least two occasions he had explained the importance of security. He had nothing further to add.

" (2) Air Forces.

" The General Commission instructs its Air Committee to resume forthwith the study of the questions set down in its resolution of July 23rd, 1932, under the heading: (1) 'Air Forces' (internationalisation of civil aviation, abolition of bombardment from the air, reduction of military air forces, etc.)."

This paragraph dealt with a point which, in the opinion of the French delegation, had been somewhat neglected in the preceding discussions. It was of very great importance, at any rate for his delegation. He thought that it would present, for all delegations, the same importance as air rearmament carried out in violation of the treaties. In that connection, the Spanish representative had made suggestions, the importance of which the Conference would realise.
"(3) Manufacture of and Trade in Arms.

"The General Commission requests its Special Committee on Questions relating to the Manufacture of and Trade in Arms to resume its work forthwith and, in the light of the statements made by the United States delegate at the meeting of May 30th, to report to it as early as possible on the solutions it recommends."

In this connection, M. Barthou drew attention to the statements he had made at the eighty-third meeting of the General Commission, on behalf of the French delegation, when he had explained that that delegation attached importance to a consideration of the manufacture of and trade in arms. He had nothing to add on that point, except that the French delegation remained faithful to the French Government's previous action and to the statements M. Barthou had made on its behalf during the same meeting.

"These three Commissions will carry on their work on parallel lines, and it will be co-ordinated by the Bureau."

Here explanations were less necessary, as M. Barthou could not but agree, in principle, with the Chairman's proposal. The paragraph specified that the Commissions should work on parallel lines, but their work would only achieve its purpose if it were co-ordinated, and the General Commission should ask the Bureau to undertake that task.

"II.

"Having thus defined the most urgent tasks, the General Commission leaves it to the Bureau of the Conference to take the necessary steps at the proper time to ensure that, when the President convenes the General Commission, it will have before it as far as possible a complete draft Convention."

Section II was brief, but important. What was the scope of that proposal? The French delegation had felt—and still felt—that there should be a complete draft Convention, that was to say, a serious and efficacious Convention. M. Barthou did not intend to revert to the previous day's discussion, but would confine himself to saying that the French delegation did not consider a bad convention better than no convention. It had always thought that a convention could be concluded. It wanted a complete convention. It defined the method of securing it in the second part of the draft resolution.

"III.

"Being anxious that the new elements contributed to its efforts by the proposal of the Soviet delegation—that the Conference be declared a permanent institution under the title of the Peace Conference—should not be lost, the General Commission requests the President to submit that proposal (document Conf.D./C.G.163) to the Governments."

At first sight it had appeared to the French delegation that M. Litvinoff's proposal had fallen on the Conference like a bombshell. But, on reflection, it had realised that the bombshell might be beneficent. It had examined the proposal with an entirely open mind. Some objections, which had seemed to it very strong, had been less so. Consequently, the French delegation considered that, from the point of view of peace, it was an extremely interesting initiative. The delegations were not in a position to examine it at once and, above all, were not in a position to reach a decision. It was one of those questions which were outside their instructions. It was a question for the Governments, to whom it had not yet been referred. But the French delegation desired to emphasise its importance, and for that reason had found a special place for it in the draft resolution.

In conclusion, M. Barthou desired to remove a misunderstanding which, he had just been warned, his statements had created in the mind of one of his hearers. He had said that the French and German notes could not be discussed in the Bureau. He would explain: The French Government and the German Government had taken up certain positions. Up to the present, their positions had seemed to be irreducible, and although attempts had been made, and one delegate present had made a special effort, the two Governments had not succeeded in reaching agreement. Nobody could put himself in their place and impose upon them an agreement which they had been unable freely to conclude.

Mr. Norman Davis (United States of America) said that, while the Bureau must be grateful for the efforts that had been made in the various resolutions to get an agreed programme of work, unfortunately none of them had removed all the differences.

He felt there had been enough discussion of the differences and that a little time for thought was needed. He suggested that it would really be dangerous, and not helpful at any rate, to try to settle them by open discussion and argument. He therefore proposed that the Bureau be adjourned until Friday, June 8th, in the hope that, in the meantime, there could be exchanges of views for the purpose of reconciling the differences. After all, the differences that had been accentuated in the Bureau were mainly differences of method, and they could be reconciled if dealt with in the proper spirit.
M. Motta (Switzerland) thought the Bureau could congratulate itself that the French delegation, to whom the Chairman had addressed a friendly invitation on the previous day, had submitted a draft. M. Motta would not venture for the moment to examine the draft in detail or to criticise it. That would be quite inadvisable and even out of place.

He noted that there was a second draft, the draft submitted by the Chairman on the previous day, which had not been supported unanimously, but at all events still constituted a very important contribution to the Bureau's work. The Chairman had been kind enough to say that there might perhaps be another proposal. M. Motta thought he had in mind a proposal which might have been handed in by the group of six Powers. It was true that the six Powers, on behalf of whom M. Motta had the great honour to speak, had met again in an endeavour to make a new contribution to the Bureau's work.

The delegates of those Powers had felt on the previous evening that the difficulties were very great. Perhaps there had been only a storm, which had passed, and the very lofty words of the Chairman on the one hand and the eminent leader of the French delegation on the other hand had completely dispersed it. If so, the delegations would all be very glad. They had, in fact, endeavoured to make a contribution, but, after a more thorough examination, they had wondered whether, in the interests of prudence—which for countries such as they represented was a necessary and wise rule—it would be advisable immediately to hand in a proposal of that kind. Had M. Motta handed it in on behalf of the six Powers, the Bureau would, he thought, have noticed that it had a fairly close connection with the draft just handed in by M. Barthou, just as it had a certain connection with the Chairman's draft of the previous day.

These were the conclusions at which the representatives of the six Powers had arrived. It would inevitably, in their view, be necessary to set up a drafting committee. It was impossible usefully to discuss the two plans that had been submitted without too easily raising the difficulties which everyone desired to avoid. If, as the Chairman seemed to have suggested at the beginning, a drafting committee could be set up, the Bureau would then allow the group of six Powers to make its contribution to the drafting committee so that, in a spirit of friendship, a draft acceptable to all might be produced.

M. Motta apologised for not having handed in the proposal immediately, but the group of six Powers reserved its right to do so, and hoped that results would then be achieved.

Mr. Norman Davis, the eminent representative of the United States of America, had just said that time for reflection was required. M. Motta was obliged to admit that all the questions discussed were of very great importance, were sometimes even incalculable—that it was a little difficult to ask even men accustomed to business, who had already acquired some experience, to decide such difficult matters immediately. Consequently, he thought Mr. Norman Davis's suggestion was perfectly legitimate. But perhaps the drafting committee could also set to work as soon as possible, if the Bureau agreed to appoint it. And as M. Motta had referred to the drafting committee, perhaps he might be permitted to add at once another observation which seemed to him essential. It would appear that the officers of the Bureau—that was to say, the Chairman, who was himself responsible for a proposal, the Vice-Chairman, the Rapporteur-General and the groups that had submitted proposals—should be represented on the drafting committee. But that was not sufficient. All the delegates were aware—that there was convincing evidence—that the work of drafting could only be successful—and he spoke with the greatest respect and friendship—if France, the United Kingdom and Italy were members of the drafting committee. Furthermore, it seemed to him that the French delegation, which was responsible for a proposal, could not refuse to sit on the committee. And, if France were represented, the other countries which he had mentioned should also be represented.

Subject to those observations, M. Motta supported the Chairman's suggestion. He therefore invited him to ask the Bureau to vote on a proposal to set up a drafting committee similar to that which M. Motta had just outlined.

The question when the Bureau should meet again was one which only the Chairman could usefully decide.

M. Barthou (France) said that there were two points in the proposals before the Bureau which he could accept.

The first concerned the United States proposal. He understood that a decision could not be reached immediately on extremely important questions. He would therefore make a very discreet recommendation: that the Bureau should not meet at too late an hour on the following Friday, and that the meeting should begin punctually at the time indicated.

The second point related to M. Motta's proposal. Circumstances had changed France's position. So long as no draft resolution had been handed in by the French delegation, M. Barthou considered that there was some objection to its sitting on a drafting committee, particularly as the work might bear on other points than those referred to the Disarmament Conference. He had asked that all the countries who had handed in draft resolutions should sit on the Committee. But France had now handed in a draft resolution. M. Barthou was consequently acting consistently with himself and with the French delegation in replying to M. Motta that France would sit on the Committee.

Mr. Eden (United Kingdom) shared Mr. Davis's view that prolonged discussion in the Bureau of the details of the resolutions would have certain disadvantages which all the tact of the speakers and the patience of the audience could hardly serve to balance. He did not
intend to enter into a detailed discussion of the French resolution, but there were one or two observations which he must make in order to prevent any misunderstanding as to the position of the United Kingdom Government.

In the first place, on a technical point, rather than on a matter of policy, it was not quite correct to say that there were three resolutions to be sent to a drafting committee, if there was to be such a committee. In his opinion, there was a very real distinction between the Chairman's resolution and the three resolutions referred to in the French text. The former was a just and equitable attempt to meet the divergent points of view expressed in the three resolutions which had been submitted, not to the Bureau, but to the General Commission. If therefore a co-ordinating committee was appointed, its business would be to co-ordinate the text of the Chairman's resolution, the French resolution and M. Motta's resolution, should he submit one.

He must also comment briefly on the general situation as it had been revealed to the Bureau. He made no concealment of the fact that he preferred the Chairman's resolution to the French resolution, but he did not propose to enter into their rival merits, although there were many comments he might make. There was one point of substance, however, as to which he wanted the delegates to be quite clear. In his opinion, the four notes in which the points of view of four Governments were recorded definitely concerned the Conference. They were the outcome of an invitation extended to the Powers by the Bureau in November 1933 to try, by diplomatic means, to overcome the difficulties in which the Conference then found itself. They belonged to the Bureau as much as any other documents which were the direct outcome of its work. He respectfully but firmly maintained that attitude. It was not a question of four Powers who had ventured to enter into conversations among themselves. They had entered into conversations because the Bureau had asked them to do so. They had brought back the results of their efforts, which were recorded in the documents, and with all respect he submitted that those documents could not be ignored.

In conclusion, he said that he had no objection to the proposed committee, although he reminded the Bureau that one of its chief difficulties some hours previously had been the setting up of a committee.

While the Conference was debating at Geneva with the best intentions but not always with the best results, conditions outside did not stand still; and he would not conceal his ever-increasing sense of anxiety at the present situation and the responsibility which lay heavily upon all the delegations. For his part, if accord was to be found between the two resolutions, he would do his best to find it, but he must reaffirm his regret that the Bureau had been unable to accept the Chairman's attempt to reconcile the three original resolutions.

Mr. Norman Davis (United States of America) renewed his suggestion that there be no further discussion that day. A drafting committee might be necessary later on, but he did not think the moment had arrived. Some time must be allowed for reflection: if a committee were to ask him for information as to the position of the United States of America, he would at present be unable to supply it.

M. de Madariaga (Spain) said that he had no intention of discussing the question of substance which M. Motta had just cleared up. If he spoke, it was because the remarks just made by the United Kingdom delegate, particularly with regard to the four notes, forced him to do so. In order to clear up a misunderstanding that had occurred on the previous day, the Spanish delegate said that he had done his utmost to make it clear that his country was in complete agreement with the point of view of the United Kingdom representative. The four notes were an integral part of the Conference's work. The Conference had specially entrusted the nations concerned with the negotiations, and, consequently, he fully recognised that the four notes must be studied in some way.

He added that if, on the previous day, he had proposed a drafting amendment, he had acted in the same spirit as the group to which he belonged had acted in proposing a draft resolution, with the idea of facilitating the solution of the problems with which the Conference was faced. Had he thought that his amendment would have been somewhat obscure to some delegations he would have refrained from moving it.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that, if the two new resolutions, forming a kind of compromise between the three original proposals, had been discussed and had rallied around them certain groups of delegations, he would be prepared to agree with Mr. Eden that the resolutions submitted by the Chairman and the French delegation and the as yet unborn resolution conceived by M. Motta should be co-ordinated by a drafting committee. But that was not the case. There had been no actual discussion of the original resolutions, and therefore the attitude of the authors towards the compromises submitted by the Chairman and the French delegation was not known. The authors of the original resolutions should certainly reserve the right therefore to maintain them and to defend them before the General Commission, unless they could accept a compromise.
As regarded the United States proposal, other first delegates might, like M. Barthou, be unable to stay long in Geneva. The departure of many first delegates would hardly facilitate the General Commission's work; if therefore an adjournment were inevitable, it should be as short as possible. An adjournment of the Bureau until Friday, June 8th, would give delegates nearly two days in which to consider the situation, communicate with their Governments and obtain instructions. In the meantime, a drafting committee might prepare a document to be presented at the next meeting.

Count Raczynski (Poland) said that the representative of the United Kingdom had expressed an opinion in his last statement with which the Polish delegation did not agree. Up to a point, it was a question of procedure. It could not be denied that, during a meeting held in November 1933, certain Powers had been asked to enter into negotiations for the purpose of facilitating the future work of the Conference. The results of those conversations had been put on record in documents submitted to the Parliaments of those countries, or brought to the notice of the public. But the documents as such had never been submitted to the Disarmament Conference and had never been discussed at a plenary meeting of the General Commission.

It was difficult to understand why some documents, rather than others, should be regarded as documents to be considered by the Conference. The reports submitted contained numerous documents, reported many conversations. He did not see why four documents in particular should be regarded as submitted to the Conference, while others were not. The Conference could deal with them only in so far as they contained certain arguments: if it was to deal with them, all the ideas and information to be found in them should be submitted to the General Commission by the delegations concerned. The others would then be in a position to indicate their views. So long as that was not done, the Conference could not take them into account.

The Chairman said that he had great sympathy with M. Barthou's suggestion that the Bureau might meet in public: the same suggestion had been made to him many times during the past few days. While he did not wish to establish a rule that the Bureau should always meet in public, because on some occasions the Bureau, like the Council, must meet in private, he thought that at any rate until the next meeting of the General Commission it might do so, unless its officers recommended otherwise. He hoped that would meet M. Barthou's point.

M. Barthou (France) said that he was satisfied.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) suggested that, as some first delegates might have to leave Geneva, the General Commission should be convened instead of the Bureau, in order to save time. If a drafting committee should prove necessary, it could be appointed by the Commission.

The Bureau decided to meet at 10.30 a.m. on Friday, June 8th, and that the General Commission should be convened for 2.45 p.m. on the same day.

SIXTIETH MEETING (PUBLIC).1

Held on Friday, June 8th, 1934, at 2.45 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. A. Henderson.


The Chairman reminded the Bureau that it had concluded its work on the previous Wednesday, June 6th, on the understanding that an effort would be made to co-ordinate the two resolutions which then stood before the meeting.2 A serious effort had been made to accomplish that task, and he proposed to call upon the head of the French delegation to submit an amended text of his resolution. But, in order to clear the way, he wanted to ask those who had moved amendments to his own draft to agree with him to withdraw that draft entirely, in order that the Bureau might have before it only the French delegation's new text.

1 Cemal Hüsnü Bey (Turkey) also attended the meeting.
2 Draft resolution submitted by the Chairman (document Conf.D./Bureau 62) and draft resolution submitted by the French delegation (document Conf.D./Bureau 63) (see Minutes of the fifty-eighth and fifty-ninth meetings of the Bureau).
During the negotiations that had taken place, his child had been under a foster-mother, but he was sure it had been in very good hands, and he was quite prepared to accept the new conclusions incorporated in the French text. He could not carry his simile any further; so long as the child was not torn limb from limb he was satisfied. And, to enter into the spirit that he believed would characterise both the Bureau and the General Commission, he would ask those who had been associated with him in that text to allow him to withdraw it.

M. Lange (Norway) said that, as the Chairman's proposal had been withdrawn, there was no further reason for the amendments, and, for his part, he withdrew those he had moved.

M. de Madariaga (Spain) associated himself with M. Lange's statement.

The Chairman reminded the Bureau that the General Commission would meet at four o'clock. It might therefore be as well for the delegates to reserve their remarks until then, where possible.

M. Barthou (France) pointed out that, at the meeting held on the previous Tuesday, June 5th, the Chairman had asked the French delegation to take the initiative. M. Barthou had then reserved his right to do so. However, the Chairman's advice was advice which must be listened to and respected. On the following day, therefore, the French delegation had brought a new child to the Conference. Was it altogether the same child as the Chairman's? Had it changed? M. Barthou did not intend to go into that point. In any event, he could say, following upon the remarks by the President of the Conference, that the French delegation had been most careful to spare, not only the child's limbs, but also its head and its heart. It therefore resembled on many points the child Mr. Henderson had handed to the Bureau.

M. Barthou thanked the Chairman for the procedure he had recommended and, in compliance with his suggestion, would confine himself to reading the amended text of the French delegation's draft resolution. He would reserve for the General Commission the brief comments which appeared to him to be necessary.

M. Barthou then read the amended text of the French delegation's draft resolution as follows:

"The General Commission,

Taking into consideration the resolutions submitted to it by the delegations of the six Powers, the Turkish delegation and the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics respectively;

Taking account of the clarification of its work resulting from the French memorandum of January 1st, 1934, the Italian memorandum of January 4th, 1934, the United Kingdom memorandum of January 29th, 1934, and the German declaration of April 16th, 1934;

Convinced of the necessity of the Conference continuing its work with a view to arriving at a general convention for the reduction and limitation of armaments;

Resolved to continue without delay the investigations already undertaken:

I.

Invites the Bureau to seek, by whatever means it deems appropriate and with a view to the general acceptance of a Disarmament Convention, a solution of the outstanding problems, without prejudice to the private conversations on which Governments will desire to enter in order to facilitate the attainment of final success by the return of Germany to the Conference;

II.

Having regard to the peculiar importance presented by the study and solution of certain problems to which attention was drawn at the beginning of the general discussion:

Takes the following decisions:

(1) Security.

(a) Since the results of the earlier work of the Conference have enabled certain regional security agreements to be concluded in Europe during the past year, the General Commission decides to appoint a special committee to conduct such preliminary studies as it may consider appropriate in order to facilitate the conclusion of further agreements of the same nature which may be negotiated outside the Conference. It would be for the General Commission to determine the relationship, if any, of these agreements to the General Convention.

(b) The General Commission decides to appoint a special committee to study the question of guarantees of execution, and to resume the work relating to supervision.

1 Document Conf.D./Bureau 64.
"(2) Air Forces.

"The General Commission instructs its Air Committee to resume forthwith the study of the questions mentioned in its resolution of July 23rd, 1932, under the heading: 'Air Forces'."

"(3) Manufacture of and Trade in Arms.

"The General Commission requests its special Committee on Questions relating to the Manufacture of and Trade in Arms to resume its work forthwith and, in the light of the statements made by the United States delegate at the meeting of May 30th, 1934, to report to it as early as possible on the solutions it recommends. These Committees will carry on their work on parallel lines; and it will be co-ordinated by the Bureau.

"III.

"The General Commission leaves it to the Bureau to take the necessary steps at the proper time to ensure that, when the President convenes the General Commission, it will have before it as far as possible a complete draft Convention.

"IV.

"Recognising that the proposal of the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that the Conference be declared a permanent institution under the title of the Peace Conference calls for careful study, the General Commission requests the President to submit that proposal (document Conf.D./C.G.163) to the Governments."

Mr. Eden (United Kingdom) said that, in accordance with the Chairman's advice, he would speak in the General Commission.

Mr. Norman Davis (United States of America) also intimated that he would speak in the General Commission.

M. Di Soragna (Italy) stated, after a hasty though careful examination of the draft resolution just submitted to the Bureau, that the Italian delegation's attitude could be based on one principle only—namely, that the Conference could not resume its work, work commensurate with its real spirit and purpose, until a preliminary and favourable solution had been found for certain fundamental political problems. That having been categorically laid down, it followed that the Italian delegation could accept no draft resolution that did not contain an equally categorical expression of that principle. Any other formula, whether framed to contradict or modify or avoid the clear expression of that principle, or to combine it with principles inconsistent with it, was of no interest to the Italian delegation. The latter believed that that principle was more than a principle: it was a fact with which the cleverest and best adjusted of formulas had nothing to do.

The Italian delegation's attitude would be based on that principle in so far as the meetings contemplated in the draft resolution before the Bureau were concerned.

M. Sandler (Sweden) also reserved his remarks for the General Commission.

Count Raczyński (Poland) apologised for his lack of discipline, but added that, after speaking in the Bureau, he would not weary the General Commission with a speech. He pointed out that the eminent representative of France, in his brilliant extempore speech a few days previously, had interpreted the reservations made by the Polish delegate and had undoubtedly formed very avowable reasons for them which might even be of some interest to certain other delegations. Count Raczyński thought, however, that, to avoid any misunderstanding, he should make the real meaning of the reservations more clear.

1 "The Conference, deeply impressed with the danger overhanging civilisation from bombardment from the air in the event of future conflict, and determined to take all practicable measures to provide against this danger, records at this stage of its work the following conclusions:

1. Air attack against the civilian population shall be absolutely prohibited;
2. The contracting parties shall agree as between themselves that all bombardment from the air shall be abolished, subject to agreement with regard to measures to be adopted for the purpose of rendering effective the observance of this rule.

These measures should include the following:

(a) There shall be effected a limitation by number and a restricting by characteristics of military aircraft;
(b) Civil aircraft shall be submitted to regulation and full publicity. Further, civil aircraft not conforming to the specified limitations shall be subjected to an international regime (except for certain regions where such a regime is not suitable) such as to prevent effectively the misuse of such civil aircraft."
In expressing doubts as to the advisability of mentioning the memoranda and documents exchanged between certain Powers, the Polish delegation had, in the first place, been concerned only with procedure pure and simple, seeing that, in so far as it was aware, not all the documents mentioned had as yet been distributed to the members of the Conference.

After that first remark, Count Raczynski returned to the question of substance. It should be noted that, during the discussions that had taken place, the General Commission had hitherto accepted the United Kingdom draft as a basis for the future Convention. It had done so in its resolution of June 8th, 1933—that was to say, exactly one year previously. Its decision was as follows:

"That the draft Convention submitted by the United Kingdom delegation and accepted as a basis of discussion by a formal decision of the General Commission should be accepted as the basis of the future Convention. This acceptance would be without prejudice to amendments or proposals submitted before or during the second reading, particularly as regarded additional chapters concerning the manufacture of and trade in arms and budgetary limitation."

During the discussions on the United Kingdom draft, the delegations represented had had occasion to submit amendments, and the Polish delegation was among those who had done so. Reverting to the texts submitted to the Bureau, he said that it would be difficult for the Polish delegation to agree straight away that the opinions—divergent, moreover—expressed in those documents could be placed on the same footing, in the resolution before the Bureau, as the United Kingdom draft, which had been accepted, after a full discussion in the General Commission, as a basis for the Conference's work.

The suggestions or points of view set out in the documents in question had not been discussed. The delegations had had no opportunity of taking up a position in the General Commission. It was true that, on November 22nd, 1933, the Bureau had invited certain Governments to undertake parallel and supplementary conversations. But there was no doubt on that subject; the Bureau could not undertake to accept the results of those conversations, any more than it could now, after the conversations had taken place, take up a position as to their substance.

The Polish Government had itself shown its willingness to work in the sphere which interested it more particularly, to work for a political détente which was the essential condition of any success. It did not intend to hamper the Conference's work. It appreciated the efforts that had been made by the Governments that had entered into conversations for the purpose of facilitating final success; but it could not agree that the results of those conversations should immediately be adopted as a basis for decisions. Care must be taken to avoid a possible misunderstanding; it must not be supposed that the divergencies of opinion between all the delegations represented at the Conference were limited to those found in the documents mentioned in the draft resolution.

For the above reasons, Count Raczynski was instructed to make a reservation in the meeting of the General Commission which would follow that of the Bureau, explaining the Polish Government's point of view.

The CHAIRMAN explained that, as agreed when the parallel and supplementary efforts were launched, he had been kept informed of their progress, and, in his turn, had done all that was possible to keep, not only the members of the Bureau, but also the members of the General Commission informed. There were two very extensive memoranda dated April 9th and May 23rd, which contained full information on the documents that had been referred to in the Bureau, which documents had been sent in either in full or in a summarised form.

Count Raczyński (Poland) said that he had had no intention of criticising the Chairman's action. What he had intended to convey was that the documents referred to had hitherto been studied in private by the various delegations. Only during a debate in the General Commission would the delegations be able to express their opinions upon them.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that he was in sympathy with much of what the Polish delegate had said with regard to procedure. He might have extended his observations to some of the parallel and supplementary negotiations which had accompanied the Bureau's proceedings. But it would be difficult to do so, as there had been no regular procedure. He would not have dwelt on the point were it not that he felt convinced that one day that procedure—or rather the substitution of irregular for regular procedure—might cause confusion and lead to unpleasant consequences.

As to the substance of the resolution, he would follow the Chairman's advice and reserve the short speech he had to make until the meeting of the General Commission.

The Bureau decided to send forward to the General Commission the draft resolution moved by the French delegation.

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1 See Minutes of the General Commission, Volume II, page 630.
2 See Minutes of the fifty-fourth meeting of the Bureau, page 200.
SIXTY-FIRST MEETING (PUBLIC).

_Held on Monday, June 11th, 1934, at 5 p.m._

Chairman: Mr. HENDERSON.

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79. **Action to be taken by the Bureau in pursuance of Paragraph I of the Resolution adopted by the General Commission on June 8th, 1934.**

The **Chairman** recalled that in the resolution adopted by the General Commission on June 8th, 1934, paragraph I read as follows:

"Invites the Bureau to seek, by whatever means it deems appropriate and with a view to the general acceptance of a Disarmament Convention, a solution of the outstanding problems, without prejudice to the private conversations on which Governments will desire to enter in order to facilitate the attainment of final success by the return of Germany to the Conference."

He had two observations to make: (1) The resolution contemplated that the Governments were going to do something on the question, and he fervently expressed the hope that they would do so; (2) it contemplated that the Bureau would do something, but he thought that that body would have to wait until it had seen what the Governments had been able to accomplish. If the latter were too long about it, the Bureau would have to meet, and the Chairman would take the liberty of intimating to the members of the Bureau that he would have to be left with the power to call them whenever he thought the business necessitated it. If there were no objection, he would take it that the members of the Bureau agreed to the foregoing suggestion.

The suggestion of the Chairman was approved.

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SIXTY-SECOND MEETING (PRIVATE).

_Held on Tuesday, November 20th, 1934, at 10.30 a.m._

Chairman: Mr. HENDERSON.

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80. **Tribute to the Memory of Certain Personalities who have died since the Last Meeting of the Conference.**

The **Chairman** said that he felt it to be his duty, as President of the Disarmament Conference, to make a brief reference, before the Bureau began its ordinary work, to certain sad and disturbing events which had happened since the last meeting.

As all his colleagues were aware, several countries had lost leading statesmen under particularly tragic circumstances, and the Bureau had been deprived of the counsel and co-operation of highly-valued colleagues.

He was sure he was voicing the sentiment of all the members of the Bureau in expressing his horror and regret at the dastardly attacks which had cost the lives of King Alexander and M. Barthou, and of Dr. Dollfuss.

He felt it necessary to make a special reference to the death of M. Barthou, who, during the last months of his life, had been so closely associated with the work of the Conference, and he took the opportunity of saying how much he personally deplored the loss to the Bureau and to the Conference caused by that sad event.

The more he had been brought into contact with M. Barthou, the more he had appreciated his extensive experience and his profound insight into international affairs. For his years, he had displayed extraordinary vitality, and in all his efforts he had been moved by a great single-mindedness of purpose: to promote the honour, security and well-being of his country.

The Chairman remembered so well his last conversation with him in June, when M. Barthou had spoken to him with almost affectionate regard and had invited him, on the termination of his proposed visit to Rome, to come to Paris to be his guest at his home.

He would venture to say one further word.

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1 See Minutes of the eighty-fifth meeting of the General Commission.
The resolution moved by M. Barthou in the Bureau on June 8th, 1934,\(^1\) might be regarded as his last will and testament, so far as the Disarmament Conference was concerned. Everyone knew how, with such remarkable energy and devotion, he was preparing the way for the realisation of all he hoped for from the operation of his resolution. Could not the Conference best honour his memory by carrying to fruition the work on which he had actually been engaged at the time of his death?

The Conference had also to regret the death of M. Dovgalevsky, the Ambassador in Paris of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, who had acted as substitute delegate for M. Litvinoff on several occasions. M. Dovgalevsky, still in the prime of life, had brought to the service of the Conference a knowledge of men and things far beyond his years. If the Chairman might be permitted one personal remark in that connection, it was a pleasant memory that M. Dovgalevsky and himself had opened the negotiations which had eventually led the United Kingdom to recognise the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

*(At the Chairman's suggestion, the members of the Bureau then stood for a moment in silence as a tribute to the memory of those whose loss it so deeply deplored.)*

M. MASSIGLI (France) expressed his appreciation of the moving tribute which the Chairman had paid to the memory of Louis Barthou. The French Government and France as a nation would be deeply touched. On behalf of the French delegation, he desired to thank the Chairman most sincerely.

It was not for him to recall all that M. Barthou had stood for, or the place that he had occupied in their midst—the Chairman himself had done so better than M. Massigli could ever hope to do. Nor was it for him to speak as a friend: that too the Chairman had done.

Louis Barthou had been a tower of strength to his country, to Europe and to the cause of peace. He had fallen at the side of a great sovereign who had been at the same time an eminent statesman and one of the pillars on which the peace of Europe rested.

That was no moment to point the moral, but, as the Chairman had so rightly said, Louis Barthou had left behind him a work for others to accomplish. That work was to ensure peace in Europe by consolidating the reign of order, whatever obstacles might stand in their path and whatever elements of disorder might rise up to dismay them. The Conference, as all members knew, had it in its power to collaborate in such a work. He need not tell the Chairman how unreservedly to-day, as in the past, the French delegation offered him its help in bringing that work to a successful conclusion.

M. LITVINOFF (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) sincerely thanked the Chairman and the members of the Bureau who had joined with him for their kind expression of sympathy to his Government. In his friend, M. Dovgalevsky, the Bureau had lost a very devoted worker for international peace and for good international relationships. He had been in the service of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs for a number of years, and wherever he was sent he had worked in the same spirit and with the same devotion to strengthen the relations between his country and the rest of the world. He was very fortunate in bringing about a rapprochement and friendship between the Soviet Union and the French Republic, which M. Litvinoff regarded as one of the corner-stones of European peace. He had also contributed to the success of the work of the Disarmament Conference, in which he had worked as M. Litvinoff's nearest collaborator, and was instrumental in bringing about the acceptance by one of the Committees of the Bureau of the definition of aggression. As the Chairman had rightly said, to continue the work of the Conference and bring it to a successful conclusion would be the highest tribute that could be paid to his memory.

M. PFLÜGL (Austria) thanked the Chairman for his brief allusion to the death of Dr. Dollfuss, who, at the moment he had fallen before the bullets of his assassins, had been head of the Austrian delegation to the Disarmament Conference.

81. Communications from the Disarmament Committee of the Women's International Organisations and from the International Consultative Group.

The Chairman drew the Bureau's attention to two communications which he had received. The first was from the Disarmament Committee of the Women's International Organisations. He understood that it had been addressed to every member of the Bureau, and there was therefore no need for him to read it.

The International Consultative Group had sent him a letter dealing with the present position of the Disarmament Conference, and he begged the Bureau's leave to read out a part of it, which seemed to him particularly opportune:

"We greet with keen satisfaction your plan that the Conference should achieve agreements quickly on publicity and regulation for the manufacture and sale of arms and munitions for war by air, land or sea, also on armament budget publicity, and on a

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\(^1\) See Minutes of the sixtieth meeting of the Bureau.
permanent commission charged—as we understand it—to supervise the execution of these agreements and to continue efforts for further accords completing the structure of a general treaty on disarmament and peace.

"Against the abuses of the arms traffic, the memberships of our organisations throughout the world are particularly stirred. These bodies of people in many lands, aware of their danger after the disclosures of existing evils, have risen to action as never before in a determination to get this perilous trade checked and controlled."

82. EXAMINATION BY THE BUREAU OF THE PROPOSALS MADE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON NOVEMBER 5TH, 1934.

The Chairman recalled that since the last meeting of the Bureau, held on June 11th, 1934, he had transmitted to his colleagues certain communications.

The first, dated July 13th, 1934, read as follows: 1

"The General Commission, in its resolution adopted on June 8th, 1934, invited the Bureau to seek, by whatever means it deemed appropriate and with a view to the general acceptance of a disarmament convention, a solution of the outstanding problems without prejudice to the private conversations on which Governments would desire to enter in order to facilitate the attainment of final success.

"At a meeting of the Bureau held on June 11th, 1934, the President pointed out that the resolution adopted by the General Commission on June 8th contemplated that the Governments would continue their efforts to secure a solution of outstanding problems. Action by the Bureau was contemplated by that resolution, but it seemed necessary to await the results of the steps to be taken by the Governments.

"The Bureau at that meeting authorised me to inform its members whenever it might be considered that the situation made it necessary for them to meet.

"In the light of the information which he has received as to the progress of the conversations between the Governments which are still continuing, the President has the honour to inform the members of the Bureau that he has decided that it may most usefully be convened for September in the early days of the forthcoming session of the Assembly of the League of Nations. The President will notify the members of the Bureau of the exact date on which it will be invited to meet."

The second, dated September 12th, 1934, read as follows: 4

"You will perhaps remember that in my communication to you of July 13th, 1934, I promised to notify the members of the Bureau of the exact date on which I would invite them to meet.

"My intention at the time was to consult the representatives of the Governments engaged in the conversations foreseen last June, so that I might fix a date for the next meeting of the Bureau likely to permit it to carry out the duties entrusted to it by the resolution of June 8th, 1934.

"I therefore thought it necessary to come to Geneva on September 9th, when I consulted nearly all the members of the Bureau, discussing with each of them the situation in general and the selection of a date at which the Bureau could usefully meet.

"It appeared from these conversations that the work entrusted to the Bureau under the resolution of June 8th could best be undertaken following on the efforts to be made by the Governments to secure a solution of the outstanding political problems and make it possible for the Bureau to take the necessary steps at the appropriate time to ensure that when the President convenes the General Commission it will have before it as far as possible a complete draft Convention.

"You are of course aware that, since the Bureau adjourned on June 11th, negotiations have been in progress between the principally interested countries with a view to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics joining the League of Nations and the conclusion of an all-inclusive Eastern Pact of Mutual Assistance and Non-Aggression.

"The negotiations for an Eastern Pact are still continuing and other negotiations are also contemplated in the very near future. It seemed to me undesirable, while these efforts are being made, to convene the Bureau."

3 See Minutes of the sixty-first meeting of the Bureau.
"Having been informed that the month of October would be devoted to these activities, I have decided that, while in principle the first week of November might be a likely date for the meeting of the Bureau, I should proceed to further consultations towards the end of October and reconsider the position in the light of such further information as I might receive.

"As regards the work entrusted to the various committees in June last by the General Commission, I shall shortly be circulating a note summarising the action so far taken.\footnote{Document Conf.D./Bureau 67.}

Finally, on November 5th, 1934, the following communication was sent to the members of the Bureau:\footnote{Document Conf.D./Bureau 68.}

"I. Referring to his communications of September 12th and 24th, 1934, the President of the Conference has the honour to bring to the notice of the members of the Bureau the following:

"2. As several months have elapsed since the Conference last met, the President ventures to remind the members of the Bureau of the fundamental commitments entered into by the Conference under the resolution of June 8th, 1934.

"3. That resolution put on record the General Commission's conviction that it is necessary for the Conference to continue its work with a view to arriving at a general Convention for the reduction and limitation of armaments.

"4. For that purpose, the General Commission decided that, on the one hand, certain Committees should endeavour to make progress in various special fields: security, air forces, manufacture of and trade in arms; and, on the other hand, it contemplated amongst other things securing the solution of the outstanding problems by whatever means it deemed appropriate.

"5. It was, however, realised that the fundamental problems of disarmament could not be effectively dealt with until certain preliminary conversations between Governments had taken place, and it had been hoped that by this time a condition would have been brought about in which we could pursue our efforts successfully. The disastrous assassination of M. Barthou, who was conducting the conversations with such devotion and diligence, has most unfortunately delayed their happy conclusion.

"6. It will be remembered that, as stated in the President's last report,\footnote{See above.} the work allotted to the Committees has been satisfactorily, if partially, carried out. There is further work awaiting the Committee's attention.

"7. In the opinion of the President, the changes which have taken place since June last, and the probable trend of political events in the near future, make it incumbent on the Bureau to reconsider its method of work without prejudicing the principles underlying the commitments entered into by the General Commission in virtue of the resolution adopted last summer.

"8. It is therefore the opinion of the President that conditions are now such as to make it necessary to postpone until after the beginning of the coming year an attempt to deal with the problems of disarmament, and to modify the procedure of the Conference both as regards the questions which should become the immediate concern of the Conference and also the manner in which they should be approached.

"9. Consequently, the President ventures to put forward for the consideration of the members of the Bureau the following proposals:

"The Conference and its various organs have so far produced a certain amount of work in which agreement has either been reached or is in sight. The procedure which has been followed so far has in view the conclusion of a complete text of a Convention which would have been submitted as a whole for the signature and ratification of the countries represented at the Conference. In the opinion of the President, the time has come when such questions as are considered ripe may be advantageously embodied in separate protocols coming into force one by one without the Conference having necessarily to wait for the completion of the entire Convention.'

"10. Some of the subjects which are sufficiently advanced to come within this category are the following:

"(a) The question of the regulation of the manufacture of and trade in arms;

"(b) The question of budgetary publicity;

"(c) The setting-up of the Permanent Disarmament Commission.

"The President thinks that there are other questions which the Conference may find so mature as to be susceptible of similar treatment.
to the final success of the Conference.

It was believed that without disarmament there was no sound basis for peace. It had never wavered that the proposal of the Soviet delegation that the Disarmament Conference should be declared a permanent institution under the title of the Peace Conference. That proposal, in accordance with the decision of the Bureau, had been forwarded to the Governments for their consideration.

The replies so far received were limited in number, and it was to be hoped that other Governments would forward their replies, which might be considered and reported upon by the Bureau, at its next meeting, which it convokes for the middle of January.

There remained one other question on which action was required by the Bureau—namely, the question of Air Forces. He hoped that arrangements might be made for that Committee to meet in due course.

The outstanding problems to which reference was made in that resolution included the negotiation of an Eastern European Pact, which was to have been the subject of consultations to be undertaken by the late M. Barthou in Paris and in Rome. The assassination of King Alexander of Greece by M. Barthou had interrupted the efforts to provide solutions for the outstanding political difficulties.

There remained one other question on which action was required by the Bureau—namely, the proposal of the Soviet delegation that the Disarmament Conference should be declared a permanent institution under the title of the Peace Conference. That proposal, in accordance with the decision of the Bureau, had been forwarded to the Governments for their consideration.

The replies so far received were limited in number, and it was to be hoped that other Governments would forward their replies, which might be considered and reported upon by the Bureau.

The purpose of the present meeting was to consider the suggestions made in the statement of November 5th, and the procedure to be adopted.

Mr. Wilson (United States of America) said that he was happy to express his appreciation of the frank statement which the Chairman had made on the present situation. His speech was another proof of that unflagging zeal with which, for the past three years, he had guided the deliberations of the Conference. It was a speech characterised by the wisdom and fairness which Mr. Henderson had shown in the management of the work.

Mr. Wilson concurred most heartily in the emphasis which Mr. Henderson had placed, in his statement, on the fact that, in spite of his suggestions for immediate procedure, the fundamental aim of the Conference had been and remained the completion of a general disarmament convention. The Government of the United States had stated, and firmly believed, that without disarmament there was no sound basis for peace. It had never wavered from that conviction, and in the future, as in the past, it would work earnestly to contribute to the final success of the Conference.

Mr. Henderson had stated that there was at the moment little hope of the General Disarmament Conference reaching definite conclusions on the fundamental problems of disarmament. Mr. Wilson deferred to the Chairman's knowledge in that matter, and indeed his conclusions checked with what appeared to be the definite opinion of many European statesmen. Mr. Henderson believed that it was possible to seize immediately upon certain sections of the work in which a large measure of accord had been realised and to put those sections into such form that they might be embodied concretely and immediately in autonomous treaty forms, while recognising at the same time that such results were bricks in the final edifice of a general disarmament convention and indispensable additions thereto. The subjects which Mr. Henderson had mentioned were the manufacture of and trade in arms, the establishment of a Permanent Disarmament Commission, and publicity on budgetary expenditure. There was reason to hope that these three items could rapidly be brought into the shape of a contractual obligation.

The Government of the United States attached peculiar importance to the work which had been done on the manufacture of and trade in arms. The Committee dealing with that subject, as a result of a suggestion made by Mr. Norman Davis in his speech of May 29th last, had presented a text of draft articles which had received general favour, not only in the Conference itself but throughout the world. Since then there had been an ever-growing demand that something be done, and done without delay, to regulate the manufacture of and trade in arms.

The American delegation had endeavoured to study how much change would be essential in the draft articles on that subject, and in the draft articles for the establishment of the Permanent Disarmament Commission, to render them capable of forming an autonomous treaty including as well a chapter on the publicity of budgetary expenditure. It had had the temerity to prepare a text. That text presented very little that was new. In its essence it was drawn from the Bourquin report, from the report of the Committee on the Manufacture of and Trade in Arms of July 1934, from the 1925 Treaty on the Traffic in Arms, as well as from portions of the United Kingdom draft disarmament convention. Its fundamentals had already been considered, and considered favourably, by the various organs of the Conference. Its sources, while unchanged in principle, had been altered or amended in detail only to fit the necessity of making an autonomous treaty without awaiting the realisation of a general disarmament convention.

With the Bureau's permission, he would have the text distributed, and would therefore not enter in detail into its conception. It would suffice to state very generally what his delegation had tried to bring out. It had endeavoured so to amend the categories of the 1925 Convention on Traffic in Arms as to fit modern circumstances. It had endeavoured to bring the full light of publicity to bear upon the production of arms, both State and private, upon the export and upon the import of arms. It had endeavoured to provide that that publicity should be transmitted to a permanent central organisation functioning in Geneva. It had endeavoured to provide that that organisation should have the duty of collecting, examining and publishing the information received; of questioning the Governments further, if necessary, on those matters within the scope of the Convention; of inspecting the accuracy of such reports. As a corollary to publicity, it had endeavoured to put in a system of graded regulation which bore heaviest upon armaments primarily designed and intended for war, and to a lesser extent upon a middle field which might, in case of an emergency, be used for war, and which bore lightest upon those articles which were primarily designed and intended for peaceful commercial production, but which, in the event of a great emergency, might serve some purpose in war.

Thus, in the conception of the United States delegation, the Permanent Disarmament Commission was designed for the purpose of carrying out a specific task and was thus inescapably bound up with the treatment of the manufacture of and trade in arms. Thus, the various sections, which might be worked out under Mr. Henderson's suggestion, formed an inseparable whole and should be subject to one ratification. While the three Committees—that on the Manufacture of and Trade in Arms, the Permanent Disarmament Commission, and the Committee on Budgetary Publicity—would work separately, in the opinion of the United States delegation it would be essential that the progress and results should be co-ordinated into a single document submitted to the Governments for single ratification. Indeed, he was emboldened to suggest to Mr. Henderson that, in consulting with the Chairmen of the various Committees, he should give them instructions that, during its progress as well as at the end of their task, the work of the three Committees should be co-ordinated.

In his remarks about the indivisibility of the work of the Committees, he by no means contemplated that the work of the Permanent Disarmament Commission should, in the final analysis, be confined to the treaty which was now in contemplation. Indeed, he believed that

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1 See Minutes of the General Commission, page 656.
sufficient elasticity had been provided in its suggested constitution to enable it to operate also in connection with further treaties which it was hoped would be agreed to in the future.

All his colleagues would fully realise that a draft text could not hope to be the final word on any subject. It was, of course, open to modification and amendment, and, indeed, he would be much surprised if his own delegation did not feel it advisable in subsequent stages of negotiation to suggest changes. Particularly was that true of certain articles on which there had been a minimum of profound discussion. He cited as an example Article 30 of the draft.

The draft his delegation was presenting covered only two parts of the proposed treaty. The third part—budgetary publicity—it felt, needed more elucidation and precision. Further committee work should bring about a crystallisation of ideas and enable that final section of the treaty shortly to be ready for agreement.

He believed that such a document as Mr. Henderson had suggested, to which the draft of the United States delegation might give elements of precision, would constitute an achievement of the highest value. It should satisfy measurably the insistent demand of the peoples of the world for a special regulation of arms production and traffic. It should go far in eliminating many of the evils of the trade. It would shed light into murky corners. It would tend to lessen between States that constantly increasing fear of the unknown—a fear which was one of the profoundest causes of anxiety and distrust between nations. He went even further, and stated that the adoption of such a text would greatly facilitate the eventual adoption of a general disarmament convention. Furthermore, agreement upon such a document by the States of the world would mean a lessening of anxiety and increased confidence, and might even be the turning-point in the present deplorable situation.

It was submitted with the hope that it might expedite the immediate objective in mind, and that, after reflection, it would be found desirable to adopt it as a basis for discussion for the portion of the treaty with which it dealt.

The Chairman suggested that two courses should be followed with regard to Mr. Wilson's statement.

First, he would ask the Bureau's permission to send the text prepared by the United States delegation to all the Governments represented at the Disarmament Conference. Secondly, he would ask for authority to submit a copy to the Chairman of each of the three Committees referred to in his speech, so that they could select from it any points that bore upon the work which he hoped the Bureau would that morning ask the Committees eventually to undertake.

M. Litvinoff (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) reminded the Bureau that, at the fifteenth session of the Assembly of the League of Nations, he had suggested that stock be taken of the work of the Disarmament Conference and that it be decided in what directions, if any, it should proceed. He would not flatter himself that his suggestion had in any way contributed to the convocation of the Bureau, but in any case he was very glad that the latter had been convened and that the question of disarmament was once again being dealt with.

Not much could be done at the present time. It would be remembered that the great obstacle that had been encountered throughout was the impossibility of ensuring universality of the obligations and restrictions which the States took upon themselves. That obstacle still existed, and he wondered whether it might not also obstruct the work suggested by the Chairman with regard to the manufacture of and trade in arms, budgetary publicity and the establishment of a Permanent Disarmament Commission.

He was afraid that few delegations would be willing to accept any restrictions—for example, on the manufacture and purchase of arms—unless those restrictions were accepted by all the other more or less important States. The same remark applied to budgetary publicity. Consequently, he did not know what recommendation it was proposed to make on the regulation of the traffic in arms.

The Bureau should be grateful to Mr. Wilson for his suggestion on behalf of the United States delegation, that some of the articles of the draft Convention on the Traffic in Arms should be separated and made quite independent of the future General Disarmament Convention. It would be easy for his own Government to adhere to such articles, as there was no private manufacture of arms in his country, and his Government would be glad to sign a convention if other Governments would come into line with its views. He was not sure that that suggestion would be acceptable to other delegations without regard being had to universality, but in any case the matter could be proceeded with.

With regard to the setting-up of a Permanent Disarmament Commission, he did not see what it would be able to do if its work were restricted to disarmament problems and there were no obligations and no restrictions on armaments. To establish a Permanent Disarmament Commission without a convention on disarmament would be to put the cart before the horse. He had himself proposed the establishment of a permanent peace conference precisely because he was aware that for some time to come it would not be possible to deal with the question of...

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1 See record of the twelfth plenary meeting of the Assembly, Official Journal, Special Supplement, No. 125.
disarmament proper. He had proposed that the scope of that permanent body should be widened so that it could deal with other questions akin to disarmament: questions dealing with peace and security. He was very grateful to the Chairman for recalling to mind the suggestion he had made in the General Commission. That suggestion was still before the General Commission in the form of the draft resolution he had submitted. It would seem hardly practical or expedient to allow one body to deal with permanent disarmament and later on to ask another body to deal with security and peace. To restrict the scope of the activities of the permanent body would be to prejudice the solution of other problems.

If it were the Chairman's intention to instruct some committee of the Bureau to deal simultaneously both with the proposal for a Permanent Disarmament Commission and with the other parallel proposal to establish a Permanent Peace Conference, whatever form it might take, he would be content. Otherwise, he would have further remarks to make.

The Chairman recalled that he had suggested that the Committee on Miscellaneous Provisions should deal with the question raised by M. Litvinoff in the General Commission. He had also suggested that the Governments that had not replied might do so, and he was quite prepared to appeal to them—since the question must be faced and settled in one way or the other—to send in a reply of some kind to be dealt with by the Committee. There was no reason why it should not also consider the statement just made by M. Litvinoff.

He could not agree, however, that there was little or no work for a Permanent Disarmament Commission to do. It was quite true that if it were set up as speedily as possible, as he hoped it would be, its powers would, for the time being, be strictly defined and limited, but he hoped that as the work of the Disarmament Conference proceeded the powers and scope of the Commission's work would be extended.

He suggested to M. Litvinoff that the time might come when the permanent body might be called by another name. It would always be within the competence of any delegation to raise the issue as to what it should be called.

So far as the delegation of the powers of the present Conference to the Permanent Disarmament Commission was concerned, he pointed out that it had very extensive powers. It was only necessary to consider the number of subjects discussed at the first reading of the draft Convention presented by the United Kingdom delegation. He himself remembered taking out at one time fifteen or sixteen different subjects that had been discussed and might be embodied in separate articles in a comprehensive Convention.

He desired to make it quite clear that, so far as he was concerned, as President of the Conference, it would not be allowed to die. Even if a Permanent Disarmament Commission were set up—and he hoped it would be—the Conference must, in his judgment, continue. There was an English saying: 'The longest way round is sometimes the nearest way home.' Perhaps the Conference was taking the longest way round to reach the nearest point to a Disarmament Convention. The members were dealing, as practical men, with the actual circumstances with which they were confronted at the moment. They were giving up nothing; they were trying to do a piece of work which they hoped would assist in creating a better atmosphere, so that after January, or during January, as he would arrange if he was authorised to do so, the Conference would really get down to work. The three Committees, as the United States delegation had suggested, might meet together occasionally, and also their Chairmen, and try their hands eventually at co-ordinating their work. But the final co-ordination must be left to the Bureau, as was stated very definitely in the resolution of June 8th, 1934.

He hoped he had made the position clear. He did not think there was very much difference between M. Litvinoff and himself. Both wanted some form of permanent organisation. M. Litvinoff wanted that organisation to have extensive powers: it could have whatever powers the Disarmament Conference delegated to it; it could be given whatever name the Conference decided upon.

The Chairman added that, in suggesting that the Governments' replies on the Litvinoff proposal should be considered by the Committee on Miscellaneous Provisions, he had, of course, intended that the whole question of the position and powers of the Permanent Disarmament Commission should be reconsidered in the light of what was done that morning, so that the whole question would be before the Committee—namely, M. Litvinoff's proposal to set up a Permanent Peace Conference and the question of the Permanent Disarmament Commission, as changed if need be as a result of the points of view put forward that morning.

M. de Madariaga (Spain) said that he desired first to associate himself with the proposals submitted by the Chairman. Seeing that circumstances were not favourable for work on a bigger scale, the Bureau must confine its immediate action to such objects as were within its reach at the moment.

As regards the definition of those objects, he was also in agreement with the Chairman. He was very glad that the United States delegation had submitted to the Bureau a document summing up the possibilities of achievement in regard to three questions. He

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1 See Minutes of the Bureau, page 212.
regretted, however, that it had not been able to submit a text on budgetary publicity. That question, the Spanish delegation had always maintained, was an essential element in any practical solution of the disarmament problem.

He was glad, too, that the United States delegation had proclaimed the necessity of adopting a single instrument. Work dating back three years had not yet led to results, and the Chairman's proposal for separate protocols was naturally very attractive. Nevertheless, the arguments put forward by the United States delegate in favour of a single text were compelling, and that text would stand a far better chance of acceptance if it contained something concrete.

In support of that view, he would refer to the observations submitted by M. Litvinoff. As regards trade in and manufacture of arms, he had been somewhat disconcerted by the modesty of Mr. Wilson's suggestions in that sphere. Mr. Wilson had spoken only of publicity. While reserving judgment until he had had an opportunity of examining the document which had been announced, he feared that Mr. Wilson might not have gone far enough. The Spanish delegation had always attached great importance to that question, and, in its opinion, a Disarmament Convention without any supervision over manufacture of and trade in arms would be of less use in the cause of peace than a sound Convention on manufacture of and trade in arms without a Disarmament Convention.

That view, he was convinced, would be confirmed by experience, provided that the Convention on control of manufacture of and trade in arms was really effective.

In that connection, he pointed out that any form of supervision that concerned only the statistics of the respective Governments on the tonnage, value, or even the calibre and type, of the arms exported would simply serve to throw dust in people's eyes. Supervision must be based on a system of licences. There must be a licence for every weapon manufactured and that licence must accompany the weapon at the time of manufacture, sale, transport in transit, and import. It was essential that all licences should form the subject of a system of control at Geneva and that that system should constitute what was meant by publicity.

M. de Madariaga referred next to the enormous difficulties met with in all the serious political issues that had arisen at Geneva when there had been any question of defining the conduct to be adopted by States Members and non-members of the League as regards the supply of arms and implements of war to countries parties to a conflict. He hoped that it would be possible, in one form or another, to insert definite provisions on the subject when drawing up the Convention on Trade in and Manufacture of Arms.

As regards M. Litvinoff's observations on the Permanent Disarmament Commission, he fully endorsed what the Chairman had already said. In his opinion, the Permanent Commission could not do really useful work in the matter of disarmament unless it also possessed political powers. It was essential, however, to draw a distinction between the political powers of that Commission in the matter of disarmament and the general political powers of the League, which constituted the real Permanent Peace Conference.

In his capacity as Chairman of the Air Committee, he desired to point out that it had been impossible for him to convene the Committee with any conviction that it could do really useful work. If the delegations represented in the Bureau could enable him usefully to convene the Air Committee, he would do so without delay.

He desired next to consult the Chairman in regard to a question of procedure. He wished to know whether the draft submitted by the United States delegation would be sent to the Committee appointed to deal with that question as a basis for its work or for its information.

The Chairman said, in reply to M. de Madariaga's question, that he could not take the responsibility, since the Bureau had not yet seen Mr. Wilson's document, of asking the Bureau to send it to the Committees as a basis for their work. He would, however, be prepared to ask the Governments to whom it was sent—many of whom would not be represented on the Committees which would deal with it—to send to the Chairman of the Committee any observations they might have to make on the various points raised by the United States delegation. That should meet M. de Madariaga's point.

M. Pflügl (Austria) emphasised the fact that six months had passed since the adjournment of the General Commission and no progress had been made in the work of the Conference. That setback, together with the armaments race which was the outcome of it, created a very real danger for peace. It was a situation which Austria, like the other countries, could not ignore and which necessarily influenced her attitude in the field of disarmament. M. Pflügl would like to give a brief account of that attitude. Austria had spared no efforts to promote the conclusion of a general convention for the reduction of armaments. She had never failed to accede to measures for ensuring security as an essential condition for the restoration of equality of rights.

In the meantime, however—and that time must now be measured by years—she herself had been deprived of all security in face of the growth of armaments throughout the world.

That situation, paradoxical in itself, was not all, however. Austria had her own independence to defend, and no State placed in that situation had yet shown her an example of how to remain strong and independent abroad as well as at home without possessing proper means and without equality of defence.

For that reason, the Austrian Government was compelled to take that opportunity to ask the Bureau in its wisdom that the equality which was indispensable to Austria should be