Annex 11.

PREAMBLE TO THE DRAFT PROTOCOL.

Draft Amendment submitted by M. Lange (Norway).

Inspired by the firm intention of assuring the maintenance of world peace and the security of peoples whose existence, independence or territory might be threatened,
Recognising the solidarity that unites all members of the community of nations,
Declaring that a war of aggression is a breach of this solidarity and an international crime involving the outlawry of the State guilty of such a war,
Desirous of furthering the complete application of the system laid down in the Covenant for the peaceful settlement of disputes that might arise between States, and of assuring the repression of international crimes,
Determined, accordingly, to effect the reduction and limitation of armaments laid down in Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations:
The States represented by the undersigned, duly authorised, have agreed to accept the following provisions:

Annex 12.

PROTOCOL FOR THE PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES.

Adopted by the Fifth Assembly on October 2nd, 1924.

(For text, see Fourth Part, Annex 2, pages 363-367.)


ARBITRATION, SECURITY AND REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS.

General Report submitted to the Fifth Assembly on behalf of the First and Third Committees by M. Politis (Greece), Rapporteur for the First Committee, and M. Benes (Czechoslovakia), Rapporteur for the Third Committee.

(For text, see Fourth Part, Annex 1, pages 345-363.)
Annex 14.

ARBITRATION, SECURITY AND REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS.

Resolutions adopted by the Fifth Assembly at its meeting held on October 2nd, 1924, on the Reports of the First and Third Committees.

(For text, see Fourth Part, twenty-eighth Plenary Meeting of the Assembly, page 343.)

Annex 17.

REPORT OF THE THIRD COMMITTEE TO THE FIFTH ASSEMBLY.


Rapporteur: M. SKRZYNSKI (Poland).

The Committee discussed the question of co-ordinating the work of the two Commissions included in the Report which the Temporary Mixed Commission had addressed to the Council. The Fourth Assembly had adopted the following Resolution:

"The Assembly requests the Council to invite the Temporary Mixed Commission to continue for a further period of one year the work which it has undertaken and to submit its report as early as possible before the meeting of the next Assembly.

"The Assembly is of opinion that it is henceforth the duty of the Council to establish direct co-operation with the Governments with a view to formulating the general plan for the reduction or limitation of armaments which, under Article 8 of the Covenant, must be submitted for the consideration and decision of the several Governments.

"The Assembly requests the Council to regulate and co-ordinate the work of the Temporary Mixed Commission and of the Permanent Advisory Commission, in anticipation of the possible expiration of the mandate of the Temporary Mixed Commission at the next Assembly."

This resolution, which was communicated by the Council to its two Advisory Commissions on disarmament questions, resulted in the drawing-up by the two Committees of a report recommending the maintenance of the status quo. At the moment when this question is before the Assembly, the problem of the reduction of armaments is entering into a new phase which calls for special attention on the part of the Council.

The Committee has come to the conclusion that it would be desirable to refer the question of the co-ordination of the work of the two Commissions back to the Council, which, according to Article 8 of the Covenant, is responsible for the preparation of plans for the reduction of armaments.

Nevertheless, the Committee feels that it would be desirable for the Assembly to submit to the Council some general principles concerning the composition of the Commission for the reduction of armaments.

The Committee particularly wishes to draw the Council's attention to the desirability of the political members of the Commission being Government representatives, taking into account those States which are not, in any other capacity, called upon to submit their views concerning the drawing-up of the programme of the Conference for the Reduction of Armaments.
As regards the composition of the new Commission, it would seem to be desirable to take into account those countries which, by reason of their geographical, political or historical situation, may be able to furnish particularly useful information regarding the problem of disarmament.

In view, therefore, of the above considerations, the Committee proposes to the Assembly that it adopt the following draft resolution:

**Draft Resolution.**

"Whereas the work of the League of Nations in connection with the reduction of armaments is entering this year upon a period of re-organisation which requires the direct attention of the Council:

"The Assembly entrusts to the Council the question of the co-ordination of the work of its Commissions for the Reduction of Armaments.

"The Assembly recommends the Council to re-organise the Temporary Mixed Commission in conformity with the following principles:

"(1) The Commission shall include the representatives of a certain number of Governments;

"(2) The Commission shall include qualified delegates of the technical organisations of the League of Nations, that is to say:

Representatives of the Economic Committee,

Representatives of the Financial Committee,

Representatives of the Transit Committee,

Representatives of the Permanent Advisory Commission,

Representatives of Employer's and Labour Groups of the International Labour Office,

Experts, jurists or others elected by the Council.

"(3) Delegates of States not represented on the Commission may be invited to attend whenever the Commission thinks fit.

"(4) The Council will invite any States not Members of the League of Nations which may have notified their intention of taking part in the Conference for the Reduction of Armaments to appoint representatives to participate in the work of the Commission."

**Annex 18.**

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**DRAFT RESOLUTIONS CONCERNING THE CONFERENCE ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS.**

**REPORT OF THE THIRD COMMITTEE TO THE FIFTH ASSEMBLY.**

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**Rapporteur: M. BENES (Czechoslovakia).**

As is said in the Report on Arbitration, Security and Reduction of Armaments, the Committee was of opinion that it was not entitled to lay down forthwith the programme of the Conference for the Reduction of Armaments contemplated in the Protocol. It believes, moreover, that this task falls within the special competence of the Council as provided for in Article 8 of the Covenant. Nevertheless, the Committee had more than once to touch upon questions which, so to say, presented themselves as naturally belonging to the programme of the Conference. Thus, when discussing the question of Regional Agreements aiming at the limitation or the reduction of armaments, the Committee decided to submit to the Assembly the following draft resolution:

"The Assembly recommends the Council to place the question of Regional Agreements for the Reduction of Armaments on the agenda of the International Conference for the Reduction of Armaments."
The Third Committee also considered the proposals made by the Temporary Mixed Commission on the question of the limitation of military expenditure, and on this point, seeing that the majority of the States which have replied to C. L. 82 have stated that, with certain exceptions, they have not exceeded the expenditure on armaments shown in their last budgets, and that the recommendation addressed to the Governments relates to the period which must elapse before the meeting of the International Conference for the Reduction of Armaments, which is to take place next year, it submits to the Assembly the following draft resolution:

"The Assembly does not consider it necessary to repeat the recommendation regarding the limitation of expenditure on armaments, as this question is to be placed upon the agenda of the International Conference for the Reduction of Armaments."

Finally, having considered the report of the Naval Sub-Commission, which held a special meeting in Rome to study the question of the limitation of naval armaments, the Third Committee decided to submit to the Assembly the following draft resolution suggesting also the inscription of this item on the agenda of the General Conference for the Reduction of Armaments:

"That the question of naval disarmament should be discussed as part of the general question of disarmament dealt with by the International Conference proposed in the Resolution of September 6th adopted by the Fifth Assembly, and that it rests with the Council to settle the programme."

Having thus considered the programme of the Conference from several points of view, and while wishing entirely to respect the liberty of the Council in this matter, the Committee thought it advisable to recommend to the Assembly, for submission to the Council, the following resolution. In this resolution, the Committee has summed up several points which, in its opinion, might be brought to the attention of the Council and of the bodies to which the Council might wish to entrust the study of this question:

"The Assembly requests that the Council, in preparing the general programme of the Conference for the Reduction of Armaments provided for in Article 17 of the Protocol should consider the advisability of including in that programme the following points:

1. General plan for a reduction of armaments in accordance with Article 8 of the Covenant, in particular:

   "(a) Basis and methods of reduction (budget, peace-time effective, tonnage of naval and air fleets, population, configuration of frontiers, etc.).
   "(b) Preparation of a typical budget for expenditure on armaments.

2. Special position of certain States in relation to the reduction of armaments:

   "(a) Temporary reservations by countries exposed to special risks;
   "(b) Recommendation of regional agreements for the reduction (or limitation) of armaments.

3. Recommendation of the establishment of demilitarised zones (Article 9).

4. Control and investigation of armaments in the contracting States.

"The Assembly also requests the Council to instruct the competent organisations of the League to examine the schemes relating to the above questions which have already been submitted to the Third Committee, or which may subsequently be received by the Secretariat, and to take them into consideration in preparing the programme of the Conference."
Annex 19.

LIMITATION OF NATIONAL EXPENDITURE ON ARMAMENTS

Replies from Governments.

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LIMITATION OF NATIONAL EXPENDITURE ON ARMAMENTS

ACTION TAKEN BY THE COUNCIL AND THE COMMISSIONS
OF THE LEAGUE ON THE RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE ASSEMBLY
AT ITS FOURTH SESSION.

Resolution II. — Limitation of National Expenditure on Armaments.

"The Assembly:
"Notes with great satisfaction that in the course of the last three years the States Members of the League have, with very few exceptions, been able to reduce their expenditure on armaments;
"Desires that this fortunate development should become more marked and more general;
"Recalls the resolutions of the preceding Assemblies concerning the limitation of expenditure on armaments;
"And requests the Council to recommend to the Members of the League not to exceed, during the period necessary for the elaboration and the adoption of the general scheme for the reduction of armaments, the total expenditure on military, naval and air armaments provided for in the budget of the present fiscal year;
"Subject to the reservation, however, that allowance shall be made:

(a) for all contributions of effectives, material, or money recommended by the Council for the execution of the obligations provided for in Article 16 of the Covenant;
(b) for all exceptional situations brought to the notice of the Council and recognised by it as such."

During its twenty-ninth session, in June 1924, the Council considered this resolution of the Assembly and gave effect to it in the following decision:

"The Council, endorsing the Assembly's resolution recommending the Members of the League, subject to certain reservations, not to exceed, during the period necessary for the elaboration and adoption of the general scheme for the reduction of armaments, the total expenditure on military, naval and air armaments provided for in the budget of the present fiscal year:
"Decides to instruct the Secretary-General to send the above recommendation to all State Members of the League and to request them to state what action they propose to take with regard to the recommendation."

The Secretary-General, by a letter dated June 27th, 1924, communicated this decision of the Council to the States Members of the League.

The replies received to this enquiry are included in the present Annex.
REPLY FROM THE PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT.

Lisbon, July 15th, 1924.

In your letter of June 27th last, you were good enough to communicate to the Government of the Republic the decisions of the Council of the League of Nations with regard to the limitation of expenditure on armaments, and you enquired what action the Portuguese Government proposes to take in pursuance of the recommendation of the Council adopted on June 14th, 1924.

The Government of the Republic has devoted its efforts during the last few years to overcoming a serious financial crisis which had arisen as a direct consequence of the participation of Portugal in the Great War. In consequence of the depreciation of the currency, the Government has not only been compelled to refrain from any sort of renovation of the country’s armaments but it has not even been able to maintain those armaments up to the strength prescribed in the constitutional laws regarding the organisation of the military and naval forces of Portugal.

The situation is an exceptional one and is of the kind provided for in paragraph (b) of the Assembly’s resolution.

In view of the persistence of the financial crisis, the Government of the Republic does not at the present moment intend to incur any further expenditure on armaments, but it must make every reservation, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (b) already referred to, regarding the necessity of renewing its war equipment as soon as the budgetary position improves.

(Signed) Augusto DE VASCONCELLOS.

REPLY FROM THE ROUMANIAN GOVERNMENT.

Bucharest, July 23rd, 1924.

In reply to your letter of June 27th last, I have the honour to inform you that the Royal Government has carefully considered the resolution adopted by the Council of the League of Nations on June 14th, 1924.

Although, as you are aware, the Roumanian Government is anxious to do nothing which might stand in the way of the objects which the League has in view in recommending Governments not to exceed, during the period required for the elaboration and adoption of the general plan for the reduction of armaments, the total amount provided for military, naval, and air expenditure in the budget of the present financial year, it feels that it cannot conform at present to this recommendation. The continual threats to which Roumania is exposed oblige the Roumanian Government to take all measures dictated by the requirements of national defence.

(Signed) J. S. DUCA,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

REPLY FROM THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT.

Paris, July 28th, 1924.

In reply to your letter of June 27th last, I am instructed by my Government to inform you of its views regarding the fourth Assembly’s resolution transmitted by the Council, and recommending the Members of the League of Nations not to exceed, during the period necessary for the elaboration and adoption of the general scheme for the reduction of armaments, the total expenditure provided for military, naval, and air armaments provided for in the budget of the present fiscal year.

The principle of the Assembly’s resolution has also been adopted by the Spanish Government, which has so closely observed it that not only has there been no increase but the total expenditure provided for in the budget has been reduced. The Spanish Government firmly intends to continue to observe this principle. It must, however, make the reservation that it is not in its power to guarantee that the necessity of providing for the defence of Spanish interests in Morocco may not at some time and under certain circumstances compel it to increase its military expenditure.

(Signed) QUÍONES DE LEÓN.
REPLY FROM THE ESTHONIAN GOVERNMENT.

[Translation.]  
Reval, August 8th, 1924.  

I have the honour to inform you that, in drawing up its military budget for 1924, the Esthonian Government bore the recommendation of the fourth Assembly in mind, and it is glad to be able to point out that not only is the military expenditure in the budget for the current financial year not larger but it has been very considerably reduced. For instance, on the Army alone expenditure has been reduced by about 180 million Esthonian marks, while expenditure on the Navy and Air Force has been reduced proportionately.

(Signed) PUSTA,  
Minister.

REPLY FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF LIBERIA.

[Translation.]  
Monrovia, August 8th, 1924.  

With respect to Secretariat Document C.L. 82, 1924, IX, on the subject of limitation of expenditure on armaments, I have the honour to say that the Liberian Government accepts absolutely the principle contained in the resolution of June 4th dealing with this matter.

(Signed) E. BARCLAY,  
Secretary of State.

REPLY FROM THE LATVIAN GOVERNMENT.

[Translation.]  
Riga, August 9th, 1924.  

In reply to your letter C.L. 82, dated June 27th, regarding the limitation of expenditure on armaments, I am instructed by my Government to give you the following information:  
While the Latvian Government is in full sympathy with the efforts of the League of Nations to establish universal peace, it considers that the recommendation forwarded by the Council cannot be applied in the strictest sense by new States whose military organisation is in process of development and whose geographical position exposes them to a constant threat of aggression on the part of Powers which do not belong to the League of Nations.  
Moreover, military expenditure amounts to only 18.16 per cent of the Latvian Budget; this percentage is one of the lowest in Europe. Although the actual expenditure figures show an increase of 10 per cent over those of the 1923-1924 financial period, this is only an apparent increase due to the rise in the cost of living and in the cost of purchases made at home and abroad for the equipment and arming of the troops. Actually the real value of the expenditure has decreased by 15 per cent. Latvia is therefore pursuing a policy in conformity with the recommendation adopted by the Assembly of the League of Nations, and will always do her best to give effect to the wishes of the Assembly in so far as the requirements of her national security permit.

(Signed) L. SEJA,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

REPLY FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES.

[Translation.]  
Belgrade, August 11th, 1924.  

The Royal Government has noted the resolution adopted by the fourth Assembly regarding the reduction of expenditure on military, naval and air armaments.  
Conscious of its duty to maintain peace and national security, the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government has had to take the necessary steps to provide its army with modern and complete equipment. When peace was concluded, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovences only possessed the army of Old Serbia reduced by six years of warfare to a seventh of its
normal strength, and provided with the most inadequate armament and equipment. It should be remembered that, when the country was evacuated, the entire stores of war material were destroyed. The financial crisis and the depreciation of the currency have only rendered it possible to replace the material and equipment very gradually, and these have not yet attained the minimum required for the defence of a country three times as large as formerly. The Royal Government has entered into certain undertakings with manufacturers at home and abroad which it is obliged to fulfil. These considerations render it impossible to limit this expenditure to the sum at present provided in the budget.

In view of this exceptional situation — which is, indeed, provided for in paragraph (b) of the Assembly's resolution — the Royal Government regrets that for the moment it is unable to give effect to the resolution in question. As soon as circumstances permit, it will endeavour to restrict its expenditure on armaments, the more so as such restriction cannot fail to benefit the general economic situation of the country.

(Signed) MARINKOVITCH,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

REPLY FROM THE CZECHOSLOVAK GOVERNMENT.

[Translation.]

Prague, August 14th, 1924.

...... I have the honour to inform you — that — the Cezchoslovak Government, in loyal observance of the Peace Treaties and the Covenant, of which it was one of the signatories, is taking all measures calculated to ensure peace and a general reduction of armaments.

In the military budget submitted to the Chambers, the Government has even kept below the limits required for the essential needs of national defence and has undertaken a further reduction, the importance of which may be seen from the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Military budget</th>
<th>Percentage of general budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>1,740,166,000 Czech Crowns</td>
<td>20.20 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>2,364,518,000</td>
<td>15.47 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>2,561,796,000</td>
<td>14.20 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>3,108,846,000</td>
<td>15.62 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>2,775,137,000</td>
<td>14.32 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>2,299,973,000</td>
<td>13.53 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures show both an absolute reduction and a reduction in the percentage of a very remarkable character.

I also desire to point out that the credits voted in respect of previous years have not been entirely used up by the Ministry of National Defence. This will enable considerable economies to be effected of which I shall be able to give exact details when the accounts for the years 1922 and 1923 have been closed.

Moreover, as regards effectives and length of service, the Government of the Republic has given orders for the period of obligatory military service to be reduced this year from two years to 18 months. Further, by the law of December 7th, 1922, regarding recruits whose family circumstances are particularly difficult and who may be released on that account after six months' service, the Government has further reduced the strength of the army by about 4,000 men.

It is a particular pleasure to me to be able to bring to your notice these various measures for a reduction of armaments. The Republic, in spite of the difficult situation in which it was placed at the time of its constitution, and the necessity imposed upon it, if it was to ensure its existence, of providing itself with at least a minimum of armaments and equipment — a minimum which is still far below the level maintained during the past few years by other countries — has not hesitated to enter upon the path marked out by the League of Nations, and has thus supplied further clear proof of its pacific aims, to which it has given practical expression to the extreme limit compatible with the national security.

I feel it necessary, however, to observe that the measures so far taken have been based on the assumption that the clauses of the Peace Treaty and of the Covenant will be strictly observed. The development of such measures in the future will depend directly both upon the extent and efficacy of control and upon the conclusion in the near future of a treaty of mutual guarantee.

(Signed) Dr. Eduard Benes.
REPLY FROM THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT.

London, August 18th, 1924.

In your letter C.L. 82. 1924. XI of June 27th last you enquired, by direction of the Council of the League, what action His Majesty's Government proposed to take with regard to the resolution of the Council of June 14th last, recommending that, during the period necessary for the elaboration and adoption of a general scheme for the reduction of armaments, Members of the League should not exceed the total expenditure on military, naval and air armaments for which provision is made in their budgets for the present fiscal year.

2. The attitude of His Majesty's Government towards this recommendation has already been explained by their representative on the Council. They have deeply at heart the desirability of reducing expenditure on armaments to a minimum, and the figures given in the League of Nations "Statistical Enquiry into National Peace-time Armaments" (A. 20. 1923. IX) show with what success the United Kingdom has pursued this policy in recent years. They are happy to be able to point to a further prospective decrease in such expenditure in the current year and they earnestly trust that further reductions will be possible in the future. The recommendation, however, applies to an indeterminate period and His Majesty's Government consider it impossible to bind either themselves or their successors not to exceed in any circumstances the expenditure actually incurred in the present fiscal year. The aim of His Majesty's Government will continue to be directed towards a reduction of expenditure to the lowest level consistent with the requirements of national security, and as this must depend upon policy His Majesty's Government will continue to strive to create and maintain international relationships which will conduce to progressive disarmament. As Members of the League are aware, much of the world's military expenditure is purely competitive and can be limited only by mutual agreement. His Majesty's Government are always ready to consider such agreements with a view to increase national security by international reduction of armaments.

For Mr. Ramsay MacDonald:
(Signed) G. VILLIERS.

REPLY FROM THE POLISH GOVERNMENT.

Warsaw, August 26th, 1924.

I have the honour acknowledge receipt of your letter of June 27th, 1924, and to inform you that the military budget of the Polish Republic for the year 1925 shows no increase, and does not in its main features differ from that of 1924.

I venture to draw your attention to the fact that the military budget of the Polish Republic, which covers the period during which the finances of the Treasury are being set in order by the Polish Government, by no means answers to actual requirements and to the present situation of the country, and that consequently it cannot be regarded as a fixed basis for the framing in future of the normal peace budget.

It will not be possible to frame this normal budget before 1927, by which time the work of re-establishing the Treasury finances will have been finally completed. It would therefore be premature as yet to pass judgment upon the figures of the military budget, in view of the fact that the latter will depend entirely upon the country's future conditions of security.

I can, however, assure you that the Polish Government, seeking as it does to co-ordinate its endeavours as closely as possible with those of the League of Nations with a view to preserving the peace of the world, will do its utmost to comply with the decisions taken by the League of Nations, and there is no doubt that a happy solution of the problem of general disarmament will be reflected also in the military budget of Poland.

(Signed) Al. SKRZYŃSKI,
Polish Delegate to the League of Nations.

REPLY FROM THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT.

[Translation.]

Rome, August 28th, 1924.

In a letter dated June 27th, 1924, in which you notified me of the resolution adopted by the Council of the League of Nations on the 14th of that month with reference to the limitation of expenditure on armaments, you requested me to inform you of what action the Italian
Government proposed to take on the recommendation that the total expenditure on military, naval and air armaments provided for in the budget of the present financial year should not be exceeded during the period necessary for the preparation and adoption of the general armament scheme.

The statistics published by the League of Nations show that Italy, with 46 per cent, takes first place among the countries which have effected large reductions in their total expenditure on armaments as compared with pre-war figures, account being, of course, taken of the depreciation of the currency.

It will be seen quite clearly from these facts that the Italian Government is following a pacific policy and has deferred to the recommendations of the League not merely formally but in a practical manner.

Nevertheless, while the Royal Government is sincerely anxious to continue this policy, it cannot, as a matter of principle, neglect to consider the attitude which may be taken up or maintained in the future by other States, whether Members of the League or not.

(Signed) Mussolini.

REPLY FROM THE BULGARIAN GOVERNMENT.

[Sofia, August 29th, 1924.]

In reply to your letter of June 27th, 1924, No. C.L. 82. 1924. IX, I have the honour to remind you that the armaments policy of Bulgaria is governed by the Treaty of Peace of Neuilly. The budget of the Ministry of War, which provides for an expenditure of 1,167,961,980 levas for the financial year 1924-1925, is more than one-sixth of the total budget of the kingdom. This is due not to an increase in the establishment or armaments of the military forces of Bulgaria, which are still below the limits laid down by the Treaty of Peace, but to the system of recruiting by means of voluntary enlistment which has been imposed upon Bulgaria. Apart from its other defects, this system has proved extremely expensive.

The Bulgarian Government has at all times been at pains to comply with the recommendations of the Council of the League of Nations regarding the limitation of expenditure on armaments. If its efforts in this direction have not proved as successful as was hoped, it must be recognised that this is due in the first place to the recruiting system.

It is beyond dispute that the surest way of effecting a substantial reduction in the military expenditure of Bulgaria would be to replace the system of voluntary enlistment by one of compulsory recruiting. The relief which would thus be afforded to the budget would be of the first importance in assisting the economic and financial recovery of Bulgaria.

(Signed) Ch. Kalfoff,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

REPLY FROM THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT.

[Berne, September 2nd, 1924.]

Her Majesty's Government has the honour to inform the Secretary-General that, while maintaining the reservations stated in the letter from Jonkheer van Panhuys dated May 17th, 1921, No. 2932, notably as regards the exceptional situation of the Dutch navy, Her Majesty's Government is prepared to conform with the above recommendation.

The Netherlands Government would observe that the budget of the Ministry of War for 1924 is less than that for 1923 by 1,400,000 florins, and it is hoped that a further reduction may be possible in the budget for 1925.

(Signed) W. Doude van Troostwyk.

REPLY FROM THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT.

[Geneva, September 5th, 1924.]

It is a matter of common knowledge that the Japanese Government has, during the last two years, resolutely entered on the path of reduction in its military and naval expenditure, and, as a result of the great disaster of last year, it has reduced its expenditure to the strictest minimum.
In these circumstances, as the financial situation of the country improves, the Government hopes, while remaining faithful to the new policy of decreasing military burdens, eventually to be able to make good the present losses in the matter of armaments. The Japanese Government, therefore, confirms the reservation made by its representative on the Council at its meeting of June 14th last.

(Signed) Matsuda,
Head of the Japanese Permanent Delegation to the League of Nations.

REPLY FROM THE DANISH GOVERNMENT.

[Translation.]
Danish Legation, Berne, September 6th, 1924.

The Army Organisation Law of August 7th, 1922, provides for a considerable reduction in the Army and in the budget of the Ministry of War.

The items in the budget for the fiscal year 1923-24, which are governed by the Law of 1922, are limited in principle to the appropriations provided on the adoption of the Law; in the absence of any exceptional rise in prices this will continue to apply in future years, so that there will be no appreciable variation in the ordinary expenditure. The changes in accounting entailed by the fact that the budget for April 1st, 1924, may include expenditure arising out of the interest on and amortisation of capital sunk in army buildings, depots, etc. are not taken into account.

Also governed by the Law of 1922 are the appropriations provided for by the Law of March 12th, 1923, regarding credits for the reconstruction and completion of army buildings, training grounds and depots. The amount of such credits is fixed by the Law for a certain number of years and cannot be exceeded. It is intended that such credits as the Ministry of War may require during the next few years under the Supplementary Credits Law shall cover only the amount necessary for the execution of earlier army legislation, which is to be completed within the five years following August 17th, 1922.

As regards the Navy, the Minister of Marine states that the appropriations assigned to him for the current year will not be exceeded during the period necessary for the preparation and adoption of the general scheme for the limitation of armaments.

(Signed) A. Oldenburg.

REPLY FROM THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT.

[Translation.]
Stockholm, September 11th, 1924.

I have the honour to inform you that the total sum of Sweden's military, naval and air expenditure, as provided for in the budget 1924-1925, is less than that for the period 1923-1924.

(Signed) Erik Saöborg,
For the Minister.

REPLY OF THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT.

Ottawa, September 23rd, 1924.

I have the honour to state that the Canadian Government has the greatest sympathy with the general principle of the universal reduction of armaments, and has accordingly based its policy as regards defence on the principles stated in Article 8 of the Covenant, to the effect that national armament should be reduced to the lowest point consistent with national safety.

I might point out that very substantial reductions in expenditure for defence have already been effected by the Dominion, our appropriations for this purpose being amongst the lowest in the world, and it is regretted that the Government cannot give the required assurance not to exceed, during the period necessary for the elaboration and adoption of the general scheme for the reduction of armaments, the total expenditure on military, naval and air armaments provided for in the budget of the present fiscal year.

Although forced to reject the proposal for the arbitrary fixation of Defence Estimates at their present figures, the Dominion Government would be pleased to give consideration to any proposals which the League of Nations may put forward to serve as a logical basis for the future determination of national armaments.

(Signed) H. H. Walker,
Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.
REPLY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF URUGUAY.

[Translation.]

Montevideo, September 19th, 1924.

In reply to your note No. C. L. 82. 1924. IX of June 27th, 1924, I have the honour to lay before you the position taken up by Uruguay towards the Fourth Assembly’s Resolution on military, naval and air expenditure.

In the first place, Uruguay confirms her adhesion to that Resolution in its general aspects and in so far as it embodies, although in provisional form, the principle of the limitation of expenditure on armaments.

The Government of Uruguay has given practical effect to the principle underlying this Resolution. The expenditure of the Ministry of War and Marine for the financial period 1923-1924 amounted to $7,054,517.99; in the draft budget laid before the Legislature, the estimated expenditure under the same heading for the financial period 1924-1925 amounts to $6,783,822.36.

Instead, therefore, of merely keeping within the limits of expenditure of the previous financial period, it has proposed a comparatively large reduction.

The Government has been guided in its action by the Resolution referred to, and intends to maintain its attitude; at the same time it must make express reservations in view of the exceptional position in which it is placed by the almost defenceless condition of the country. Its military power falls, in fact, far below the strict minimum consistent with national safety.

(Signed) MÁNINI RíOS.

REPLY OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT.

Pretoria, September 24th, 1924.

In reply to your letter C. L. 82.1924 of July 27th, 1924, on the subject of the limitation of expenditure on armaments, I have the honour to inform you that the Union Government has taken note of the Resolution of the Council of the League of Nations adopted on June 14th, 1924.

With reference to paragraph 2 of the Council’s Resolution, I enclose Estimates of Expenditure of the Union Defence Department for the financial years 1923-1924 and 1924-1925—showing a net increase in expenditure of £79,801, full particulars of which are also shown.

(Signed) B. M. HERTZOG,

Prime Minister.


Revenue Account.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>1923-24 £</th>
<th>1924-25 £</th>
<th>Increase £</th>
<th>Decrease £</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>62,647</td>
<td>60,867</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1,780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quartermaster-General’s Section</td>
<td>111,826</td>
<td>113,900</td>
<td>2,074</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Services</td>
<td>15,570</td>
<td>15,266</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South African Military College</td>
<td>27,052</td>
<td>25,303</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1,749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent Force (R. Heights)</td>
<td>228,260</td>
<td>213,744</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>14,516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent Force (Cape Peninsula)</td>
<td>77,223</td>
<td>81,182</td>
<td>3,959</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.A. Air Force</td>
<td>98,190</td>
<td>100,877</td>
<td>2,687</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.A. Naval Service</td>
<td>71,949</td>
<td>68,765</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3,184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen Forces and Cadets</td>
<td>222,545</td>
<td>254,389</td>
<td>31,844</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Services</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>38,850</td>
<td>18,850</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telegraphs and Telephones</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>8,600</td>
<td>8,600</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>£935,262</td>
<td>£981,743</td>
<td>£68,014</td>
<td>£21,533</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Actual net increase

This increase is accounted for as follows:

(a) Services taken over from the Public Works Department on April 1st, 1924

(b) Payment from April 1st, 1924, for telegrams and telephones formerly rendered as a free service by the Postmaster-General

(c) (i) Personnel of Active Citizen Force for Peace Training increased by 1,744 all ranks at additional cost of £31,844

(ii) Additional flight for South African Air-Force. £10,000

Less (iii) General reductions and economies. £27,963

Loan Funds.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>1923-24 £</th>
<th>1924-25 £</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Construction of Oil Fuel Tanks, Simonstown</td>
<td>37,000</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>Required for the completion of the tanks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Store and Workshop Accommodation, Simonstown</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>47,770</td>
<td>Increase due to provision for electric generating station.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision of Fuel Oil...</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>First of four annual instalments due to Admiralty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingencies</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>War Records Office now provided for under Revenue Vote.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alterations and Additions, Artillery Barracks, Pretoria</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>Office Accommodation for Headquarters, Defence Department. An additional £25,000 is provided under the Defence Endowment Account for this service.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

£66,000 £113,270

Net Increase: £47,270.

Endowment Account.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>1923-24 £</th>
<th>1924-25 £</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Permanent Defence Works and Buildings</td>
<td>40,950</td>
<td>42,700</td>
<td>The provision in 1924-25 includes £25,000 for office accommodation of Headquarters, Defence Department. The remainder is for married quarters for troops, electric light, installations, roads through cantonments, etc. at Pretoria and Cape Town.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repairs, etc.</td>
<td>36,250</td>
<td>20,550</td>
<td>The provision covers expenditure on cantonments at Cape Town £7,700, Pretoria £10,850, Tempe, Pietermaritzburg and Potchefstroom £2,000.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

£77,200 £63,250

Net Decrease: £13,950.
REPLY FROM THE FINNISH GOVERNMENT.

[Translation.]

Helsingfors, October 18th, 1924.

In your letter dated June 27th last, you informed me of the resolution adopted by the Council of the League of Nations on June 14th, 1924, by which the Council instructed you to request the Members of the League to state what action they proposed to take with regard to the resolution of the Fourth Assembly relating to the limitation of expenditure on armaments. In that resolution the Assembly recommended the Members of the League not to exceed, during the period necessary for the elaboration and the adoption of the general scheme for the reduction of armaments, the total expenditure on military, naval and air armaments provided for in the budget of the fiscal year in question, subject to the reservation, however, that allowance should be made, inter alia, for any exceptional situation which might be brought to the notice of the Council.

The Government of the Republic, actuated by an earnest desire to contribute to the achievement of the great object which the League of Nations is pursuing and of which the above resolution is a proof, again expresses its firm resolve to perform its part in carrying out the work of the League with a view to establishing a durable peace between the nations and the security of individual States.

In thus declaring its acceptance in principle of the Fourth Assembly's Resolution on the limitation of expenditure on armaments, the Government of the Republic feels called upon at the same time to point out the exceptional situation in which Finland is at present placed. Before the declaration of her independence she had no army, and she has so far been unable finally to complete the organisation of her national defence. The credits for national defence entered in the budget for the present fiscal year, and also the credits in the budgets for previous years, have, on financial grounds, been on too small a scale to allow of the satisfactory organisation of the new Finnish army; these credits, indeed, have hardly been sufficient for the maintenance and training of the army on a peace footing.

In view of these considerations, the Government of the Republic feels it necessary to take advantage of the reservation in regard to exceptional situations until such time as the indispensable organisation of the national defence is finally completed.

(Signed) J. Procopé.

REPLY FROM THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT.

[Translation.]

Christiannia, October 28th, 1924.

I have the honour to inform you that the total figure of the military, naval and air expenditure provided for in the Norwegian budget adopted by the Storting for the current financial year (July 1st, 1924 to June 30th, 1925) represents a very considerable reduction in all kinds of expenditure, and that the budget must therefore be regarded as being a strictly minimum one.

In these exceptional circumstances, the Royal Government cannot undertake to limit its military expenditure for an indefinite period on the lines laid down in the Council resolution of July 14th, 1924.

On the other hand, the Government believes that, so long as no improvement takes place in the present financial situation of Norway, the expenditure in question will probably not exceed the total sum budgeted for in the current year — subject to possible increases given in the form of cost-of-living bonuses.

(Signed) Mowinckel.

REPLY OF THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT.

London, November 11th, 1924.

I am to state that the policy of the Government of India is in harmony with the resolution adopted at the Fourth Session of the Assembly regarding the limitation of armaments and that, subject to unforeseen contingencies, it is not the intention of the Government of
India to increase their expenditure on armaments in future years beyond that provided for in the budget of the current financial year.

It must, however, be understood that this statement of policy is subject to the adoption by other countries of the recommendations contained in the resolution.

(Signed) E. J. Turner.

REPLY OF THE NEW ZEALAND GOVERNMENT.

November 11th, 1924.

I am directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to inform you, at the request of the Prime Minister of New Zealand, and with reference to your letter C. L. 82. 1924. IX, of June 27th last, addressed to Mr. Massey, that the Government of New Zealand will, during the current fiscal year, restrict its expenditure on naval, military and air defence to the amount appropriated for that purpose.

(Signed) Alexander Cadogan.
Annex 20.

LIMITATION OF NAVAL ARMAMENTS

Replies from Governments.

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LIMITATION OF NAVAL ARMAMENTS.

The question of the limitation of naval armaments has, during this year, been considered in its technical aspects by the Permanent Advisory Commission.

The aim of this work and the procedure to be followed was determined by the third Assembly, as summarised in the following passage from the report of its Third Committee:

"The Third Committee is entirely in agreement with the Temporary Mixed Commission in thinking it desirable that a Conference should be summoned at an early date and that all States, whether Members of the League or not, should be invited to take part. It considers, however, that a certain elasticity with regard to the programme for this Conference should be allowed, and that it should be made quite clear that the Conference would not be in any way bound by the draft Treaty, but that, on the contrary, it should be free to take into consideration the special circumstances in any country, and, in particular, the special circumstances of new States which as yet have no navies. While agreeing to this view, however, the Third Committee feels strongly the great desirability of securing immediate limitation of the naval forces maintained by all countries, in order that the peoples of the world may be spared the economic burden which would be laid upon them by increases in the total tonnage or in the size of the warships maintained by their Governments. The Third Committee therefore recommends for the adoption of the Assembly the following resolution:

'(a) That an International Conference should be summoned by the Council as soon as possible, to which all States, whether Members of the League or not, should be invited, with a view to considering the extension of the principles of the Washington Treaty or the limitation of naval armaments to all non-signatory States, it being understood that any special cases, including that of the new States, shall be given due consideration at the Conference;

'(b) That the report of the Temporary Mixed Commission, together with the report and the draft Convention prepared by the Permanent Advisory Commission, as well as the text of the Washington Treaty, should be forwarded immediately to the various Governments for consideration.'"

In view of this report and of this resolution, the Temporary Mixed Commission requested the Council "to consider the advisability of issuing to the Permanent Advisory Commission the necessary instructions for examining the extension of its technical scheme to States not Members of the League."

The Council considered this question in September 1923 during the fourth session of the Assembly.

The Italian representative, reporting on the matter to the Council, expressed the following views:

"It would seem desirable that the necessary instructions should now be issued to the Commission to proceed with this work.

"At the same time, I would draw the attention of the Council to a point in connection with the draft scheme itself which is, in my opinion, of importance. This scheme, which takes the form of a draft Convention for the extension of the principles of the Washington Treaty to non-signatory States, was not unanimously adopted by the members of the Naval Sub-Commission who drew it up. As the report which accompanies the draft shows, the Spanish representative accepted it under reserve and the representative of Brazil opposed it entirely.

"Thus the representatives of two Powers belonging to the group of nations to which the Convention would be applied were not prepared to accept it.

"I think my colleagues will agree with me that it is of importance for the success of the International Conference on this subject which is eventually to be held that the draft Convention to be taken as a basis of discussion should be one on which naval expert opinion is as far as possible unanimously agreed.

"I would therefore suggest that the Naval Sub-Commission should be asked to re-examine their draft scheme in the light of the foregoing observations, and, at the same time, should invite to sit on the Commission such technical experts of States Members of the League as may be affected, and call into consultation naval experts from such of the nations not Members of the League — other than those whose naval armaments are already fixed by the Washington Treaty or by Treaties of Peace — as they may consider desirable."
"I therefore propose the following resolution:

"1. The Council, on the recommendation of the Temporary Mixed Commission, instructs the Permanent Advisory Commission to consider the question of the extension of its technical scheme, with regard to the application of the principles of the Washington Naval Treaty, to those States which have not signed the said Treaty, and which are not Members of the League of Nations.

"2. The Council further requests the Permanent Advisory Commission to reconsider its original draft Convention with a view to its universal acceptance from a naval technical point of view, and for this purpose suggests that the Commission should call into collaboration naval experts of such nations concerned — other than those whose naval armaments are already fixed by the Washington Treaty or by Treaties of Peace — as they may consider desirable."

The Naval Sub-Commission, to which the matter was referred by the Permanent Advisory Commission, decided that invitations should be addressed to all non-signatory States possessing "capital ships" as described in the Washington Treaty. Invitations were accordingly despatched to the following States, asking them to nominate naval experts to co-operate with the Naval Sub-Commission in the work preliminary to the International Conference:

- Argentine
- Greece
- Netherlands
- Union of Socialist Soviet Republics
- Norway
- Turkey
- Union of Czechoslovakia

With the exception of Turkey, all the nations invited accepted the invitation and a meeting of the Naval Sub-Commission and representatives of the States mentioned above was held in Rome from February 14th to 25th. The results of the work of the naval experts are contained in Document C. 76. 1924.

In March, 1924, the Council examined the results of the Rome meeting, and, while reserving the examination of the report to a subsequent session, decided to request the Secretary-General to forward a copy of the report to all States Members and non-Members of the League, and to invite those States to communicate through the Secretary-General, if possible before the June session of the Council, any observations or suggestions concerning their countries which they might think desirable, in order to enable the Council to take a decision as to a second technical meeting and to determine the final date of the International Conference for the purpose of concluding the Convention.

A letter was accordingly despatched by the Secretary-General on April 4th, 1924. The replies received from the Governments are given below.

The Council, during its June session, again examined the question, and the representative of Czechoslovakia presented a report, which was adopted by the Council and which included the following paragraphs:

"Certain States, notably Roumania and Portugal, expressed the desire to take part in the preliminary technical work for a new conference. In a letter dated May 30th, 1924, the Roumanian Government again advocated a new preliminary technical conference 'which will take the necessary steps to reconcile different interests involved, as far as is practicable'. On the other hand, several of the replies which the Secretariat has received are definitely against this proposal; the British, Swedish, Danish and Netherlands Governments state that they are opposed to the holding of any further technical conference on the question.

The Rome Conference revealed the existence of two quite different points of view among the countries which were represented. According to one view, the question was that of the extension pure and simple to non-signatory Powers of the two principles of the Washington Treaty, namely: first, the fixing of the tonnage of capital ships on the basis of the status quo, the date for which was still to be determined, and the naval holiday.

"According to the other view, the question was, independently of the status quo, one of the limitation of naval armaments to figures determined for each of the States concerned, regard being paid to national security and to the intention of Article 8 of the Covenant.

"It seems difficult to reconcile these two views. Considering the difference of opinion in regard to the principles and also in regard to the procedure to be followed in the matter of the limitation of naval armaments, I am of opinion that the Council would be well advised again to lay the question before the Assembly, in order that the Assembly may consider whether the original scope of the International Conference should be maintained, or whether it should be enlarged so as to admit of a discussion of the two points of view mentioned above.

"The Assembly might also give the Council its advice as to the most suitable date for the International Conference."

In view of the above considerations, the Council adopted the following resolution, which was duly communicated by the Secretary-General to all the Governments concerned on June 25th, 1924:

"The Council, in view of the differences of opinion which have come to light in the course of the preliminary technical discussions in regard both to the principles and to the procedure to be followed in the matter of the limitation of naval armaments:

"Decides to send the present report to the Governments of States Members of the League, and to lay the question before the fifth Assembly, in order to enable the Assembly to define the essential principles on which a general Conference on the limitation of naval armaments might be based."

The question has accordingly been placed on the Supplementary List of Questions for the Agenda of the Assembly.
REPLY FROM THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT.

London, April 11th, 1924.

In connection with the recent meeting of Naval Experts at Rome to discuss questions connected with the extension of the principles of the Washington Naval Treaty to non-signatory States, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Ramsay MacDonald to inform you that he observes, from the League of Nations document C. 107. 1924. IX./C.P.C. 30. 1924, that the Chairman of the Naval Sub-Commission, in his letter to you of February 7th, suggested that "a second meeting of the Naval Sub-Commission might, at the request of any Powers not represented at the meeting of the Naval Sub-Commission, be held prior to the full International Conference.

2. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald observes further from the document quoted above, and from League of Nations Document C. 106. 1924. IX., C.P.C. 31, that such a request has now been made by both the Roumanian and Portuguese Governments.

3. Furthermore, by a resolution passed by the last session of the Council, copies of a report of the Rome Conference are to be forwarded to all States, Members or non-members of the League, inviting observations or suggestions in order to enable the Council to take a decision as to a second technical meeting and to determine the final date of the International Conference.

4. I am to inform you that, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, there would be no object in holding a second preliminary conference of naval experts, as they consider that such a conference would be most unlikely to lead to agreement on matters which are primarily of a political nature, and should therefore be dealt with by the International Conference when it meets.

(Signed) Alexander CADOGAN.

REPLY FROM THE BULGARIAN GOVERNMENT.

[Translation.]

Berne, May Ist, 1924.

I am instructed to inform you that the Bulgarian Government is watching with sympathy the efforts which are being made to limit naval armaments. The success of such efforts would constitute an important step towards the suppression of the danger of war and towards the consolidation of general peace.

Since, however, Bulgaria's naval status is fixed by the Treaty of Peace of Neuilly-sur-Seine and since, in practice, therefore, the proposed Convention on the Limitation of Naval Armaments must, as far as Bulgaria is concerned, be inapplicable, the Bulgarian Government has no proposals or observations to offer on the report of the Naval Sub-Commission which met in Rome from February 14th to 25th, 1924.

(Signed) D. MIKOFF,
Chargé d’Affaires.

REPLY FROM THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT.

Translation.

Brussels, May 10th, 1924.

I have the honour to communicate the opinion of the Belgian Government on the report presented by the Naval Sub-Commission of the Permanent Advisory Commission on Armaments as to the possibility of extending to non-signatory States the principles of the Washington Naval Convention.

The Belgian Government would desire an amendment to Article 12 of the draft Convention, which reads as follows:

"No vessel of war of any of the High Contracting Parties hereafter laid down, other than a capital ship, shall carry a gun with a calibre in excess of 8 inches (203 millimetres)."

Furthermore, in Part 4 a capital ship is defined as follows:

"A capital ship, in the case of ships hereafter built, is defined as a vessel of war, not an aircraft-carrier, whose displacement exceeds 10,000 tons or which carries a gun with a calibre exceeding 8 inches (203 millimetres)."

Owing to the necessities of her coast defence, Belgium requires three monitors of a total tonnage of 14,000 tons or perhaps only 12,000 tons, but carrying guns of a calibre between 204 mm. and 406 mm.

It would therefore be necessary that either Article 12 should be modified as regards the calibre of guns or that Belgium should be permitted to possess three capital ships as defined above.

(Signed) HYMANS.
REPLY FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF SALVADOR.

[Translation.]
San Salvador, May 15th, 1924.

I have the honour to inform you that Salvador has no observations to offer on the subject of the decision of the Council of the League of Nations to convene an international conference nor as to the report of the Naval Sub-Commission which met in Rome from February 14th-25th, 1924.

(Signed) R. Arrieta Rossi.

REPLY FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA.

Pretoria, May 28th, 1924.

The report of the Naval Sub-Commission dated Rome, February 25th, 1924, and the decisions taken by the Assembly and the Council, have been noted by the Government of the Union of South Africa, which has no observations to make on the report in question.

(Signed) U. Smuts,
Prime Minister.

REPLY FROM THE ROUMANIAN GOVERNMENT.

[Translation.]
Berne, May 30th, 1924.

I am instructed by my Government again to call your attention to the astonishment felt in Roumania when it was known that my country had not been summoned to the preliminary Naval Conference which was held at Rome in February last, a feeling which was all the stronger since other countries not Members of the League of Nations were invited to attend and since questions of vital importance to my country were to be discussed.

I have already had the honour, in various documents which I forwarded to the Secretariat during February last, to acquaint you with my Government’s point of view.

In expressing her earnest desire to take part in a preliminary conference on naval disarmament, Roumania had in mind Article II of a resolution of the Council of the League of Nations (Rome Session, May 19th, 1920), which reads as follows:

"Any other States which are Members of the League may be invited to send a similar number of representatives to sit on the Commission temporarily when a question directly affecting them is under discussion."

Moreover, her request was supported by a resolution of the third Assembly, which explicitly provides that "... any special cases, including those of the new States, shall be given due consideration at the Conference."

On observing that an invitation had been extended to Powers whose interests conflicted with our own, especially in regard to the regime to be established in the Black Sea — to Powers which were not Members of the League of Nations and did not even fulfil the conditions previously laid down — the Roumanian Government felt justified in pressing the demand that its experts should also be heard.

It learnt to its regret that the Commission of Experts, ignoring the clear terms of the documents referred to above, had refused its request, and that the Council had decided that the question of convening a new preliminary Conference should be considered at a later date.

The Roumanian Government is of opinion that it is absolutely indispensable to summon a second preliminary conference which will take the necessary steps to reconcile competing interest as far as is practicable and thus ensure that any international conference will not from the first be doomed to failure.

With a view to obviating certain insurmountable difficulties and to achieving a durable peace, my Government has on several occasions advocated disarmament on that sea in which it is more particularly interest, namely, the Black Sea. Its peaceful aims therefore cannot be questioned. Nevertheless, should other riparian Powers secure the right to rebuild their pre-war fleets, my Government also will feel compelled to lay down vessels of the same design, tonnage and armament.

It will be understood that the problem of this equilibrium of naval strength in the Black Sea presents special difficulties when it is realised that, as the Straits are now open to any war vessels, a concentration of naval forces on this sea may easily be effected by any riparian Power possessing warships in seas other than that in which we are interested.
The maintenance of the status quo is an absolutely unacceptable solution in the case of Roumania, as in the case of a certain number of countries which have been restored or the territory of which has been increased since the war, a situation which the Third Assembly fully realised.

In regard to the employment of submarines against merchant shipping and the use of asphyxiating gases, Roumania is prepared to accede to the provisions of the Washington Convention, subject to reciprocity on the part of the Black Sea riparian Powers, whether or no these Powers are Members of the League of Nations, and on the distinct understanding that effective penalties are provided against any Power which has violated the obligations laid down in the Convention.

In concluding these observations, I must, however, repeat once more that my Government desires the convening of a new conference of technical experts for the purpose of discovering the basis of an agreement which may be submitted at a later date to a full international conference for discussion.

(Signed) N. P. COMNÈNE,
Roumanian Minister.

REPLY FROM THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.

Berne, May 31st, 1924.

Acting under telegraphic instructions from my Government, I beg to transmit to you herewith the text of the acknowledgment by the Secretary of State of the United States of the communication addressed to him under date of April 4th, 1924 (C.L. 47. 1924. IX), enclosing a copy of the report on the Conference which met at Rome in February 1924 to consider the question of the extension to non-signatory maritime States of the principles of the Washington Naval Treaty and inviting the Government of the United States, as a State not a Member of the League of Nations, to communicate to you its observations or suggestions on the report.

The mail acknowledgment of the Secretary of State will be transmitted to you as soon as it is received.

(Signed) Hugh GIBSON.

COMMUNICATION FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

The Secretary of State of the United States of America has received with due appreciation the communication dated April 4th, 1924 (C.L. 47. 1924. IX) by which the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, in pursuance of a resolution of the Council of the League, forwarded a copy of the report on the Conference which met at Rome in February 1924 to consider the question of the extension to non-signatory maritime States of the principles of the Washington Naval Treaty and inviting the Government of the United States, as a State not a Member of the League of Nations, to communicate to the Secretary-General any observations or suggestions on the report which that Government may think desirable, in order to enable the Council to take a decision as to a second technical meeting and to determine the final date of the International Conference for the purpose of concluding the Convention.

The question of the limitation of naval armament is one, as the Secretary-General is aware, in which a deep interest has been and continues to be taken by the Government of the United States, which would view with satisfaction the acceptance by all maritime Governments having capital ships of the principles controlled by the Washington Naval Treaty. The attentive examination which has been given the report discloses the fact, however, that there were at the Rome meeting a want of accord and a diversity of views which would seem to make it undesirable for the Government of the United States to make any suggestions in response to the courteous invitation extended by the Secretary-General.

REPLY FROM THE GREEK GOVERNMENT.

[Translation.]

Berne, June 3rd, 1924.

In conformity with instructions which I have received from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Athens, I am instructed by my Government to make the following declaration regarding the proposed extension of the principles of the Washington Treaty on the Limitation of Naval Armaments to non-signatory countries.

Greece is desirous of co-operating in the limitation of naval armaments and is accordingly prepared to accept the tonnage of 36,000 tons for her capital ships on condition that Turkey’s tonnage does not exceed this figure. Further, if for any reason the construction of the cruiser Salamis is not completed, Greece reserves the right to replace her by another ship of the same type; in compensation she would, however, disarm the cruisers Kilkis and Lemnos.

(Signed) COLOGOTRONIS,
Chargé d’Affaires.
LETTER FROM THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT.

[Translation.]

Stockholm, June 6th, 1924.

By letter dated April 4th last, you were good enough to furnish me with a copy of the report submitted to the Council by the Naval Sub-Commission of the Permanent Advisory Commission for Military, Naval and Air Questions, which met at Rome from February 14th-25th, 1924, with naval experts of certain States, in order to study the possibility of extending the principles of the Naval Treaty of Washington to States non-signatory to that Treaty.

At the same time you were good enough to ask me, in conformity with the resolution taken by the Council on March 14th last, to communicate to you any observations or proposals which the Royal Government might wish to present in order to enable the Council to take a decision as to the convocation of a second technical conference and to fix the definite date of the International Conference entrusted with concluding the Convention.

In conformity therewith, I have the honour to inform you that, in the opinion of the Royal Government, it does not appear necessary to convoke a second preliminary conference of experts. The divergencies of opinion manifested at the Rome Conference, as regards the most important points of the Draft Convention which were submitted to the Conference, appear to be so important that no satisfactory result could be expected from a further conference of experts.

(Signed) E. Marks von Wuertemberg.

REPLY FROM THE DANISH GOVERNMENT.

[Translation.]

Berne, June 10th, 1924.

In reply to letter C.L. 47. 1924. IX, dated April 4th, which you were good enough to address to the Danish Government, I have the honour, by order of my Government, to inform you that the Royal Government has no observations or proposals to make on the subject of the draft Convention drawn up by the Naval Meeting at Rome with a view to the extension of the principles of the Naval Treaty of Washington to States non-signatory to that Treaty.

The Danish Government is of opinion that the convocation of a further meeting of experts is unnecessary, and desires that an International Conference should be called shortly for the purpose of concluding the Convention.

(Signed) A. Oldenburg.

Minister for Denmark at Berne and Representative of the Royal Government accredited to the League of Nations.

REPLY FROM THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT.

[Translation.]

Paris, June 13th, 1924.

I have the honour to communicate to you the following observations, which represent the views of the French Government on the result of the Conference held at Rome last February.

The Naval Sub-Commission had been instructed to consider "the possibility of extending the principles of the Washington Naval Treaty to States non-signatory to that Treaty". At its meeting at Geneva in 1922, it realised the impossibility of obtaining any practical result by applying the principles of the status quo and of the "Naval Holiday", which were the bases of the Washington Treaty.

From that time onwards, the attitude adopted by Brazil and by Spain had resulted in introducing the conception of national security, as defined in Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, as a factor in the discussion.

Bearing in mind this consideration, and desiring that the principles of the Covenant should be applied in their widest possible sense, the Government of the Republic instructed its representative on the Naval Sub-Commission at Rome to support the view that the requirements of national security should be taken into account.

In conformity with his instructions, Admiral Jehenne urged the adoption of a system by which the present requirements of the national security of any State could be estimated by means of a comparison with the naval situation of that State at a given period — namely, the period at which the naval forces of the State in question might be taken as corresponding to the true requirements of its security.
Such a method appeared, and in our view still appears, to be one which would enable technical experts — who are not qualified to discuss the political aspects of the limitation of armaments — to arrive at a workable solution.

Unfortunately, this view did not commend itself to the majority of the States which were to be invited to limit their naval armaments. Accordingly, the Conference, having abandoned the principles of the Washington Naval Treaty and not being willing to accept the procedure suggested by our expert, was left without any satisfactory basis for a technical discussion.

The verbatim reports show the results of this situation; the delegates were constantly confronted with political problems with which they were not qualified to deal. In these circumstances, it is not astonishing that the Conference was unable to reach an agreement on the tonnage figures which should be allotted to all the Powers concerned and represented at Rome.

Any further meeting of the Naval Sub-Commission to discuss the same matter would presumably encounter the same difficulties and would inevitably be doomed to failure, unless the technical experts who take part in it were enabled to take their stand on principles previously agreed to by all the States concerned.

For these reasons, I consider that it would serve no useful purpose to convene another technical conference unless it is to be held solely with the object of enabling certain States — such as Roumania and Esthonia, who have asked for such a conference, and who were not represented at Rome — to explain their views on the question at issue.

(Signed) E. LEFEVBRE DU PREY.

REPLY FROM THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT.

[Translation.]

Berne, June 16th, 1924.

The Netherlands Government entirely concurs in the standpoint adopted by the Netherlands delegate at the Rome Conference, except that it must reserve its opinion on the Swedish delegate's proposal regarding the condition imposed upon the tonnage allowed for "capital ships", and also on the Greek delegate's proposal with reference to the "Naval Holiday".

I am further instructed to state that the Royal Netherlands Government accepts the British Government's view set forth in document C. 187. M. 55. 1924. IX, to the effect that the settlement of the problem would in no way be advanced by holding a second preliminary conference of naval experts on the limitation of naval armaments, as these experts could not deal with the political and legal aspects of the question. For this reason, my Government does not consider that it would be desirable to summon a second conference of experts.

The report submitted by the Rome Conference to the Council of the League gives a summary of the desiderata suggested by the naval experts, and this report might serve as the starting-point for the discussions of an international conference at which the participating States would be represented by diplomats, jurists and experts. In the opinion of my Government, a conference on these lines might reasonably be expected to reach a compromise which would make it possible to conclude a convention extending to non-signatory Powers the principles of the Treaty of Washington on the Limitation of Naval Armaments.

(Signed) W. I. Doude van TROOSTWYK.

REPLY FROM THE KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES.

[Translation.]

Belgrade, June 18th, 1924.

The Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs has the honour to inform you that the Royal Government has considered the report on the work of the Conference of Naval Experts held at Rome in February 1924 and would be glad to co-operate in the efforts of the League of Nations to bring about a general reduction in naval armaments and to take part in the International Conference which the Council of the League proposes to convene in order to consider the possibility of extending to non-signatory States, by means of an International Convention, the principles laid down in the Washington Treaty on the Limitation of Naval Armaments. It does not, however, think that any good purpose would be served by holding another preliminary conference before the International Conference.
REPLY FROM THE HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT.

[Translation.]

Budapest, June 18th, 1924.

The Hungarian Government has no observations to make regarding the report of the Naval Meeting at Rome.

Concerned as it is for the maintenance of world peace, towards which the extension of the principles of the Washington Convention would be an important step, the Hungarian Government earnestly hopes that the League of Nations will be able to bring to a successful conclusion the task it has undertaken.

As, however, the subject of the proposed Conference is of only indirect concern to Hungary and as the Hungarian Government is obliged to exercise the strictest economy in every department, it regrets that it will be unable to send representatives to this Conference.

(Signed) DARUVARY.

REPLY FROM THE ALBANIAN GOVERNMENT.

[Translation.]

Tirana, June 21st, 1924.

The Albanian Government is following with the greatest interest every effort towards the limitation of naval armaments and the consolidation of general peace which should result therefrom. As Albania does not, at present, possess warships of any kind, and does not at the moment intend to build any, the Government has no observations to make; it adheres to the principles laid down in the Convention proposed by the Naval Sub-Commission.

(Signed) Suileman DELVINA,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

REPLY FROM THE POLISH GOVERNMENT.

[Translation.]

Geneva, June 23rd, 1924.

The Polish Government is prepared actively to co-operate with the League of Nations in limiting naval armaments, being convinced that the stipulations of the proposed Treaty will provide satisfactory safeguards for the naval communications of Poland with other countries.

My Government is accordingly prepared to undertake to limit its naval armaments and to specify the composition of its future navy, on condition that similar undertakings, providing effective guarantees, are assumed simultaneously by all the other Baltic States.

(Signed) Al. SKRZYNSKI,
Delegate to the League of Nations.

REPLY FROM THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT.

[Translation.]

Christiania, June 28th, 1924.

The Norwegian Government has no observations to offer as regards the report presented to the Council of the League by the Naval Sub-Commission of the Permanent Advisory Commission on the possibility of extending the principles of the Washington Treaty to States non-signatory to that Treaty.

(Signed) C. F. MICHELET.

REPLY FROM THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT.

[Translation.]

Paris, July 3rd, 1924.

With reference to your letter of April 4th last (C.L. 47, 1924. IX), to which it much regrets that it has not been able to reply until now, the Royal Government instructs me to inform you that it regards with misgiving the proposal to summon a second technical conference to consider the extension of the Washington Naval Treaty to States non-signatory thereto.
The questions raised would be political rather than technical in character, and such a conference would be liable to lead to a repetition of the deadlock which was reached at the first meeting of experts at Rome. In regard to the holding of the new conference, however, Spain will fall in with the views of the majority of the States consulted.

The Royal Government takes this opportunity to emphasise its views that it is essential for Spain to have capital ships of a total tonnage of not less than one hundred and five thousand (105,000) tons, and that it cannot therefore accept any agreement by which this figure would be reduced.

**REPLY OF THE FINNISH GOVERNMENT.**

Helsingfors, July 25th, 1924.

In reply to your letter dated April 4th last, in which you requested the Finnish Government, in accordance with the resolution adopted by the Council of the League of Nations on March 14th, 1924, to communicate any observations or suggestions it might think desirable concerning the report of the Naval Conference at Rome, which was attached to your letter, I have the honour on behalf of the Finnish Government to offer the following observations.

The Finnish Government has noted with the utmost satisfaction the report of the Permanent Advisory Commission of the League of Nations on the limitation of naval armaments, with the draft Convention annexed thereto, and it regards this report as a further evidence of the League's efforts to bring to a successful conclusion one of its most important tasks. The Finnish Government, having been invited to express its opinion on the draft Convention in question, has the honour to set forth below the views which it would wish taken into account when the Convention is being finally drafted. In doing so, the Finnish Government feels that it is explicitly justified by the resolution of the third Assembly, which recognised the necessity of paying regard to the special circumstances of newly-constituted States.

Finland, which has been able only during the past few years to draw up a programme for the creation of a fleet to defend her exceptionally long seaboard, is incontestably placed in special circumstances of the kind referred to. Her political and geographical situation and her economic resources do not enable her to concentrate all her moral and material strength on efforts to increase the prosperity of her people unless she is secured against all threats to her independence and territorial integrity from the sea.

It is regrettable that the present draft Convention is not such as to afford Finland that security which is essential to her. It would seem, however, from Article 20 of the draft, that the object of this general Convention, and of the Convention now in preparation regarding the reduction of land armaments, is directly connected with the provisions of Article 8 of the Covenant. Doubtless, therefore, the procedure best calculated to secure the desired result would be the procedure already adopted with a view to the reduction of land armaments. However, considering in conjunction the results of the Rome Conference and the special situation of Finland, the Finnish Government feels convinced that the Washington Treaty, though it has solved the problem of limiting the naval armaments of five great Powers while maintaining the balance between them would not be so successful if it were applied almost without amendment to the second-rate naval Powers. It would be of no value to countries which cannot afford to build and keep up a proper high-sea fleet or are not forced to do so by their political and commercial interests.

Now Finland belongs to this latter class of country, which, notwithstanding the above-mentioned resolution of the third Assembly, the present draft Convention in no way concerns. A reduction in the total capital-ship tonnage of the principal neighbouring States would obviously in no way increase Finland's security, nor would it lessen the financial burden imposed upon her by the necessity of defending her seaboard, so long as these States were free to build and maintain an unlimited number of warships of a displacement less than 10,000 tons.

In view of these considerations, the Finnish Government is of opinion that, in order to secure completely the object to which Article 8 of the Covenant and the resolution of the third Assembly were directed, the draft Convention should be supplemented by more effective safeguards for the interests of the lesser Powers.

An important step in this direction would apparently be the introduction into the draft Convention of provisions which would allow of the limitation of naval armaments on the basis of regional agreements, taking account of the special circumstances of a given geographical group. The Finnish Government considers that, with such additions, the draft would be more completely in the spirit of the third Assembly resolution in question than if it contemplated the reduction of naval armaments in its technical naval aspect alone. In many cases the adoption of the regional principle would certainly offer a sounder basis for the solution of the problem. As the Permanent Advisory Commission's report shows, serious obstacles have arisen owing to the impossibility of finding an accepted standard on which to base the calculation of the tonnage of warships to be allocated to the various countries, which, because of their geographical, political and strategic situation, are difficult to compare.

One example — that of Russia — clearly demonstrates the necessity of applying the principle of regional agreements in certain cases. As the coasts of Russia are washed by
several seas between which there is no direct communication, it is obvious that the balance of naval power on those seas will be affected by the distribution of her naval forces among them and not by her actual capital ship tonnage; moreover, Russia's requirements for naval defence in those seas will of course depend upon the strength of the naval forces maintained in them by the other riparian States.

Again, measures for the limitation of naval armaments should not form an isolated system, unconnected with the League's programme for the general limitation of armaments. They should be a part of that general programme, or should at least follow the same broad principles by which the League is guided in connection with the limitation of land armaments.

In the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance the object of which is the limitation of land armaments, the obligation of limiting such armaments is counterbalanced by the provision of adequate guarantees for the national security of the contracting countries. The Finnish Government is of opinion that the same principle should be followed in the draft Convention on the Limitation of Naval Armaments; in other words, that the draft convention should also include a general guarantee system based upon the authority of the League of Nations. Here again the contracting States should be given the option of concluding regional agreements.

Another necessity of the same kind would seem to be that of determining, more strictly than has actually been done, the maximum tonnages to be allocated to countries in the same geographical group. Within such a group, which may (as in the case of the Baltic States) contain both great and small Powers, equilibrium, — the essential condition of peace — cannot be attained merely by limiting the number, displacement and armament of capital ships; similarly, for obvious reasons, the same test cannot be applied to the armed naval forces of small countries as to the fleets of Powers whose chief interests are bound up with the high seas. To fix the total tonnage to be allocated to States in the same geographical group, and to lay down maximum limits, varying according to local circumstances, for the displacement of warships and the calibre of their guns, is the only means of ensuring an adequate degree of security to countries which have coasts on the same sea; and this method would also reduce the cost of security to a minimum.

Again, the Finnish Government thinks that every country should be left complete latitude in the use of the tonnage allocated to it within the limits laid down. Equity would seem to demand that every country should be free to organise its own naval defence in accordance with its individual needs and with the special configuration of its coast line.

Moreover, the Finnish Government considers that no satisfactory solution of the question can be reached unless those countries which, though having no capital ships, are directly concerned in the questions connected with the limitation of naval armaments are afforded an opportunity of taking part in any international conferences or meetings of experts which may be held for the further consideration of those questions.

The Finnish Government earnestly hopes that the Council will give its favourable consideration to the foregoing suggestions, which it has advanced with the single object of helping towards an equitable and practicable solution for the question of the limitation of naval armaments.

(Signed) H. J. Procopé.
DISCUSSION AND ADOPTION OF THE REPORTS OF THE FIRST AND THIRD COMMITTEES IN PLENARY MEETING OF THE ASSEMBLY

(October 1st and 2nd, 1924).
FOURTH PART.

Discussion and Adoption of the Reports of the First and Third Committees in Plenary Meeting of the Assembly.

TWENTY-FIFTH PLENARY MEETING

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 1st, 1924, AT 10.30 A.M.

CONTENTS:

98. ARBITRATION, SECURITY AND REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS; PROTOCOL FOR THE PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES:

Report of the First and Third Committees.

President: M. Motta

98. — ARBITRATION, SECURITY AND REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS; PROTOCOL FOR THE PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES: REPORTS OF THE FIRST AND THIRD COMMITTEES.

The President:

Translation: Ladies and gentlemen—This morning the Assembly will discuss the most important question on the agenda of this session, that concerning arbitration, security and the reduction of armaments, on which the First and Third Committees were instructed to report to us.

The Chairman of the First Committee is Sir Littleton Groom. The Third Committee elected as Chairman M. Duca, but his place was afterwards taken by the Vice-Chairman, M. Politis.

The Rapporteurs are M. Politis for the First Committee and M. Benes for the Third Committee. I will ask Sir Littleton Groom, M. Benes and M. Politis to take their places on the platform.

(Loud applause.)

M. Politis (Greece), Rapporteur:

Translation: Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen—My distinguished colleague, M. Benes, and myself are here to-day to report on the work of the First and Third Committees. In your resolution of September 6th you instructed those Committees to study the first two factors in the great problem which the Fifth Assembly was called upon to study, arbitration, security and the reduction of armaments.

We appear upon this platform together, because you associated your two Committees in a common task. We have therefore submitted to you a joint report and we will in turn give you at this meeting the additional explanations which will, we hope, gain your unanimous approval of the work that we have done.

I propose to put before you as briefly as possible the conclusions which were reached by the First Committee.

The resolution of September 6th instructed us to examine the two following questions: First, to consider, in view of possible amendments, the articles in the Covenant relating to the peaceful settlement of international disputes and, secondly, to examine the terms of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute establishing the Permanent Court of International Justice and to define them more precisely in order to facilitate the more general acceptance of the clause by all States.

I will begin with the second point, which requires less explanation. Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court provides States which, in principle, could only recognise the jurisdiction of the Court as optional, with an opportunity of accepting it as compulsory in some or all of the classes of disputes enumerated in Article 13 of the Covenant.

Up to the present only a few States have adhered to the special Protocol opened in virtue of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court provides States which, in principle, could only recognise the jurisdiction of the Court as optional, with an opportunity of accepting it as compulsory in some or all of the classes of disputes enumerated in Article 13 of the Covenant. (1) See Annex 1, pages 345 to 363.

Careful examination of Article 36 showed that the elasticity of its terms was such as to admit of a large number of reservations and that States having serious reasons for refusing compulsory arbitration in certain special eventualities are able to do so by means of a formal reservation. Upon these grounds, therefore, we have considered it possible to insert a clause in the Protocol inviting the States to undertake to accept within the month following the entry into force of the Protocol the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice in some or all of the classes of dispute covered by Article 13.
of the Covenant, subject to reservations which will, we hope, be confined to what is strictly necessary. Pending the coming into force of the Protocol States will retain the right conferred upon them by Article 36 of adhering to it on their own initiative, optionally and subject to reservations, and we propose that you should recommend them to adhere to Article 36 even before the Protocol has come into force and consequently before the obligation to sign the Article has thereby devolved upon them. It should not be too hastily concluded that the recognition of the right to adhere to Article 36 with reservations is likely to diminish unduly the rationality and compulsory character of the Covenant. We are entitled to hope that countries adhering to Article 36 will exercise great circumspection in regard to the reservations they make; it may even be hoped that many of them will be willing to adhere without any reservation other than that of reciprocity. (Applause.)

In any case, whatever the sum total of the reservations made by the States adhering to the special Protocol of Article 36, a great advance will have been made which until quite recently appeared impracticable.

So much for the first point submitted to the First Committee for consideration. I now come to the second, which is much more important and which calls for somewhat fuller explanation. Your First Committee was asked to examine the system set up by the Covenant for the settlement of international disputes, in order to see what improvements or additions could be made with a view to extending the application of pacific arbitration and upon the procedure, the Council will have been made which until quite recently appeared impracticable.

You are all familiar with the system set up by the Covenant. I need only summarise it very briefly.

Article 12 of the Covenant imposes on the Members of the League the general obligation of submitting any disputes which may arise either to arbitration or to enquiry by the Council. Arbitration, therefore, remains optional, but the parties do not agree to have recourse to arbitration they are obliged to appear before the Council. The Council makes an enquiry into the case, and the dispute is only definitely settled if the Council is unanimous in recommending a solution. A unanimous recommendation by the Council is binding, and a country having resort to war against a State which complies with such a recommendation is regarded as violating the Covenant and incurs the sanctions provided in Article 16.

Such, briefly, is the system established by the Covenant. Its imperfections and omissions are self-evident. These imperfections and omissions we have endeavoured to remove and we firmly believe that we have succeeded.

In the Protocol which we submit for your approval a system has been organised which is applicable to all international disputes without exception. It lays down a certain number of rules which will be compulsorily applied as between States which sign the Protocol. To begin with, the system will be a two-fold one; there will be the system of the Covenant, which will be applicable between the States Members of the League, and the special system of the Protocol, which will be applicable between the States who have accepted this diplomatic instrument.

There will not, however, always be two systems. It is true that the main provisions of the Protocol should sooner or later be converted into amendments to the Covenant according to the normal procedure of revision laid down in Article 26.

One of our resolutions invites the Assembly to request the Council to appoint a special Committee to draft the amendments to the Covenant contemplated by the terms of the Protocol, which will then be submitted for final approval to the next Assembly.

At the root of all the rules contained in the Protocol there is the general principle that, henceforward, wars of aggression are condemned. Henceforward, no war of aggression will be tolerated; only acts of legitimate defence or acts undertaken on behalf of or with the authorisation of the community of the signatory States will be allowed, and every private war, every war of aggression, will not only be condemned and regarded as an international crime, but will be attended by sanctions and accompanied by the necessary penalties to prevent it, and, in case of need, to suppress it.

In order to secure this result, the Protocol establishes a series of procedures covering every kind of dispute and which, in all cases, result in a definite decision.

This is how the system works. Suppose that under Article 15 of the Covenant a dispute which has proved impossible to settle by judicial means or by arbitration comes before the Council, the Council fails to reconcile the parties, and the latter do not agree, despite a last urgent appeal, to have recourse to optional arbitration. Arbitration then becomes compulsory on the following terms:

Arbitration becomes compulsory first of all if one of the parties demands it. If the parties fail to agree upon the constitution and powers of the tribunal, they will be compelled to agree to an international court of experts.

If the Council is not unanimous as to the solution to be imposed upon the parties, the dispute will automatically be submitted to arbitration—the second case of compulsory arbitration—the organisation of which is left entirely in the hands of the Council.

You will notice that under the system provided in the Protocol a final and binding settlement is certain to be reached in all disputes either under the first case of arbitration, if requested by either party or by a unanimous decision of the Council, or under the second case of arbitration, which follows automatically if the Council is not unanimous.

It has been possible to give such wide range to the principle of compulsory arbitration owing to the fact that the Protocol has removed an obstacle which had hitherto prevented the extension of this principle.

At the Assembly meeting on September 6th, I had the honour of pointing out that, whereas with optional arbitration guarantees were needless, with compulsory arbitration they were indispensable.

It is only because we have succeeded in surrounding it in all cases with effective sanctions that we have been able to provide for compulsory arbitration in the cases I have just indicated.

The sanctions enforcing arbitration and, in general, the final decision by which every dispute will eventually be settled, will vary according to the extent of the resistance offered to the execution of that decision.

If the resistance is purely passive, the sanction...
prior to the coming into force of the Protocol and arbitrators have decided that a question comes
unanimous recommendation taken by the Council. It is thus agreed that, when the Council or the
categories of disputes: disputes arising out of a somewhat more flexible in application.
allowed for a certain number of exceptions. Article 11 is referred to in the Protocol in order,
adaptable in all circumstances. We have accordingly best means for safeguarding the peace of the world.
to make the system sufficiently elastic to be interested party, meet forthwith and consider the
diverse exigencies of international politics and of war, the Council will, on the request of any
elaborated, we were obliged to take into account terms of which, in the event of war or a threat
under the system laid down in the Protocol order to make its application more flexible, to
competence of the Assembly as laid down in Council and adapted to the case of procedure before
arbitrators, consultation of the Permanent Court. While, however, the Committee considered it
executive action as may be necessary in the course award without examining the substance of the
into a dispute and cannot recommend a solution, compulsorily, and that its opinion in the matter
the terms of Article 15 of the Covenant, it will legal nature, it was desirable that the Permanent
assembly to the dispute be signatories and others not signatories.
In such an event the State Member of the League which is not a signatory of the Protocol will be invited to accept the pacific procedure provided in the Protocol. If, however, this Member refuses, it cannot be compelled to accept this procedure, and the arbitrators will be invited to apply the system provided in the Covenant. The system will apply strictly to States which are neither signatories of the Protocol nor Members of the League. As regards relations between signatories and non-signatories, the Protocol adapts the rules provided in Article 17 of the Covenant. The non-signatory will be invited to conform to the pacific procedure of the Protocol. If it refuses and has recourse to war, the sanctions of Article 16 of the Covenant, as interpreted and amplified in the Protocol, will be applied to it.
The application of this system does not in any way affect the powers of the Council or of the Assembly. Should the Assembly be in a position to intervene in the settlement of disputes under the terms of Article 15 of the Covenant, it will retain its full powers. It can undertake an enquiry into a dispute and can recommend a solution, which, if it fulfils the requisite conditions laid down in that Article, will be as final and as binding as a unanimous decision by the Council. It has, however, been thought necessary to leave it exclusively to the Council to take such purely executive action as may be necessary in the course of pacific procedure, such as the appointment of arbitrators, consultation of the Permanent Court of International Justice and so forth, as the Council, is much better qualified than the Assembly to take action of this kind. The general principle of the competence of the Assembly as laid down in Article 15 of the Covenant is, however, retained under the system laid down in the Protocol.
For the purpose of the practical application to all international disputes of the system we have elaborated, we were obliged to take into account the diverse exigencies of international politics and to make the system sufficiently elastic to be adaptable in all circumstances. We have accordingly allowed for a certain number of exceptions.
The Protocol provides for the following categories of disputes: disputes arising out of a unanimous recommendation taken by the Council prior to the coming into force of the Protocol and
accepted by a least one of the parties; disputes arising out of acts of violence committed in the name or with the authorisation of the League; and disputes which relate to treaties in force and which would jeopardise the existing territorial integrity of States.
The Committee decided that it was quite useless to make explicit mention in the Protocol of the third category, as it was obvious that the pacific procedure laid down in the Protocol would not apply in a case of this kind; the procedure in such cases will be the special procedure stipulated in Article 19 of the Covenant for the reconsideration of treaties and the consideration of international obligations.
There is, finally, another category which does not fall within the terms of application of the Protocol, namely, the cases referred to in Article 15, paragraph 8, of the Covenant.
This clause provides for the protection of national sovereignty. It prescribes that, if in proceedings before the Council one of the parties to the dispute claims that the question is solely within its domestic jurisdiction, and if the Council unanimously recognises that the claim is justified, the latter must stop the proceedings and must restrict itself to recording the fact without making any recommendation to the parties. This constitutes what I may call a preliminary question, which must be answered first and which, if answered in the affirmative, will preclude the examination of the substance of the dispute for the reason that such examination is barred under international law.
The Protocol, of course, maintains this rule for the protection of national sovereignty. To avoid any possible ambiguity we decided to mention the fact explicitly in the case of disputes submitted to the Council. We considered it only logical, therefore, that the same rule should apply to the case of disputes submitted to arbitrators.
Should one party claim in proceedings before the arbitrators that the question is solely within its domestic jurisdiction, the arbitrators must, like the Council, restrict themselves to ascertaining whether the claim is correct and must refrain from further action, that is to say, from examining the substance of the matter.
In the case of arbitration procedure, however, we held that, as the disputes in question were of a legal nature, it was desirable that the Permanent Court of International Justice should be consulted compulsorily, and that its opinion in the matter should be binding on the arbitrators—that is to say, if the Court pronounced the question to be really within the domestic jurisdiction of one of the parties, the arbitrators would be bound to confine themselves to recording the fact in their award without examining the substance of the matter.
While, however, the Committee considered it essential that the rule contained in Article 15, paragraph 8, of the Covenant should be explicitly referred to in the case of procedure before the Council and adapted to the case of procedure before the arbitrators, we also thought it necessary in order to make its application more flexible, to make a reference to an important provision of the Covenant, that contained in Article 11, under the terms of which, in the event of war or a threat of war, the Council will, on the request of any interested party, meet forthwith and consider the best means for safeguarding the peace of the world.
Article 11 is referred to in the Protocol in order, as it is said in Article 15, paragraph 8, somewhat more flexible in application.
It is thus agreed that, when the Council or the arbitrators have decided that a question comes
solely within the jurisdiction of a State, any interested party will have full and unrestricted right to apply for the intervention of the Council or the Assembly under the terms of Article 11 of the Covenant.

It is further agreed that the reference to Article 11 does not in any way modify the situation contemplated in the Covenant. There is no intention of increasing the powers of the Council or the Assembly in any way whatsoever in cases of this nature. These bodies can only give opinions which will in no way be binding upon the parties. The settlement recommended by the Council will only become binding, if the parties consent.

Lastly, it is agreed that the final resort to conciliation contemplated in Article 11 will only be applicable in cases where the substance of the dispute has not been examined. In all cases, however, in which a final decision has been taken upon the substance of the dispute, whether by the Council, the Court, or by arbitrators, Article 11 is inapplicable.

Only one more stone was wanting to complete the principal idea which we had attempted to build. The Protocol condemns wars of aggression and offers all parties in all cases a pacific procedure involving a final and binding decision which is enforced by sanctions. With a view to the immediate and infallible application of these sanctions, we had to decide which was the State originally responsible for a war of aggression—in other terms, to define and determine the aggressor in each case.

This decision is an easy matter and we found it without difficulty. It is sufficient to say that any State is the aggressor which resorts to war in violation of the engagement contracted by it either under the Covenant or under the Protocol. It is, however, extremely difficult to apply this definition in each particular case. Once war has broken out, once hostilities have commenced, the question of determining which side began them is a question of fact concerning which opinions may differ.

The Committee accordingly attempted to devise an automatic procedure which would obviate any discussion whatever and would make it possible to determine forlornth, by a combination of various external criteria, which was the State originally responsible for a war of aggression. We believe that we have found a solution by means of a system of "presumption".

Our proposal is that you should say that there is a presumption, which shall hold good until the contrary has been established by a unanimous decision of the Council and which arises in a series of hypotheses, the importance of which I commend to your careful attention.

These hypotheses are three. The first is that of a State which resorts to war after refusing arbitration or refusing to submit to the decision by which the dispute was finally settled. The next hypothesis is that of a State which resorts to war in violation of the provisional measures enjoined by the Council during proceedings for a pacific settlement. The third and last hypothesis is that of a State resorting to war in disregard of the armistice. The only action to be taken by the Council in these three cases is that of a State which violates the armistice or rejects the conciliation offered in Article 11 of the Covenant.

We considered that it was only just that a State, which was prevented under the terms of Article 15, paragraph 8, of the Covenant, from having the substance of a dispute discussed, should be given a last chance of conciliation before it was abandoned to itself and so driven to make war on the country which had reserved the question as being within its domestic jurisdiction.

I must ask your careful attention to the intricate machinery, which I have just described. Show me a single case in which the conditions would not exist, and I will undertake to solve the problem of determination of the aggressor automatically. The Protocol condemns wars of aggression and offers all parties in all cases a pacific procedure which was prevented under the terms of Article 15, paragraph 8, of the Covenant, a last resource for obtaining conciliation.

The Protocol contains three hypotheses, the importance of which I commend. These hypotheses are three. The first is that of a State which resorts to war after refusing arbitration or refusing to submit to the decision by which the dispute was finally settled. The next hypothesis is that of a State which resorts to war in violation of the provisional measures enjoined by the Council during proceedings for a pacific settlement. The third and last hypothesis is that of a State resorting to war in disregard of the armistice. The only action to be taken by the Council in these three cases is that of a State which violates the armistice or rejects the conciliation offered in Article 11 of the Covenant.

It will be noticed that there is an essential difference between the first two and the third hypotheses. Whereas in the first two a presumption of aggression exists if the state of war is accompanied merely by a single condition, in the third hypothesis two conditions are required, first, that a State has disobeyed a decision which recognises that the question is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of another State and, secondly, wilful failure to take advantage of the special provision contained in Article 11 of the Covenant.

This difference is due to the consideration that in the matter of defining aggression it is necessary to render Article 15, paragraph 8, of the Covenant more flexible by showing a State which has been non-suited that it still has, in Article 11 of the Covenant, a last resource for obtaining conciliation. We had therefore to find some means of reconciling the article in the Protocol which contemplates the application of Article 15, paragraph 8, of the Covenant with that which I am now analysing in the article of which I have just spoken.

We must now ask your attention to the intricate machinery, which I have just described. Show me a single case in which the conditions would not exist, and I will undertake to solve the problem of determination of the aggressor automatically.
the signatory States that it is their duty forthwith to apply against the State thus declared the aggressor the sanctions contained in Article 16 of the Covenant as interpreted by the special provisions of the Protocol. In order to leave no room for doubt, it has been formally laid down that States, which at the invitation of the Council and in execution of their international obligations apply sanctions against the aggressor, should, if and in so far as they are authorised to use force, be regarded as belligerents and should benefit by the prerogatives attaching to their status as such.

I have given you a brief survey of the Committee's work and the conclusions to which it has come. A complete system which will henceforth guarantee the maintenance of peace to those States which sign the Protocol.

An important advantage inherent in this system is, first, that States who might be tempted to have resort to war will fear the sanctions which will be immediately applied against them. This deterrent effect of the Protocol will, I am sure, prove most efficacious in practice and will in itself prevent many wars. And even if that were not the case, if a State possessed by the evil spirit of war did not fear the sanctions but had recourse to force, its action would be considered an international crime and would immediately be exposed to the collective punishment of the States signatory to the Protocol.

I repeat that those States which sign the Protocol may henceforth be considered as holding a guarantee of peace. War will be either averted or suppressed. A State which is threatened with aggression will, in the great majority of cases, be safeguarded. And if war were unhappily declared against it, it would have the certainty, as the statement on the work of the Third Committee will shortly show you, that it would be surrounded by every possible security that could induce its adversary to come to terms at the earliest possible moment.

Nevertheless, although our system thus affords an immediate guarantee of peace, it does not yet fulfil every requirement as regards justice. It marks a first step in that direction. It certainly checks wars, it strives by indirect means to prevent them, but it cannot claim to be certain of success in preventing all wars.

The essential reason for this powerlessness, which we could do nothing to remedy, is that for a long time to come there will continue to exist general causes of war not arising out of questions of law. These causes will continue to exist, because there is a certainty, as the statement on the work of the Third Committee will shortly show you, that it would be surrounded by every possible security that could induce its adversary to come to terms at the earliest possible moment.

The League of Nations is now entering upon a new phase. It has given the nations a guarantee of peace; it must now give them justice.

In dealing with the difficulties which we had to surmount at the close of our work we were all, lawyers and statesmen alike, fully awake to the dangers to which peace was exposed as a result of the deficiencies of international law, and we realise that if our work is to be complete, if we desire that it should give the nations justice as well as peace, we must soon endeavour to determine how we can remedy these deficiencies in the law.
nature of these sanctions. The Protocol says quite clearly in Article 11 that as soon as the Council has called upon the signatory States to apply sanctions, the obligations of all kinds they incur under Article 16, sub-paragraphs 1 and 2, immediately become operative in order that such sanctions may forthwith be employed against the aggressor. This means that economic and financial sanctions, as well as military, naval and air sanctions, must be applied if the occasion is considered to demand them.

If we compare the Protocol with the Covenant, we see that in the Protocol the problem of sanctions has been solved in a very clear, precise and decisive manner.

But there is one last question relating to sanctions: how far is each State obliged to apply sanctions? What forces should it place at the League's disposal to defend a State which is attacked? I think that Article 11 of the Protocol states this sufficiently clearly and explicitly: "These obligations shall be interpreted as obliging each of the signatory States to co-operate loyally and effectively in support of the Covenant of the League of Nations and in resistance to any act of aggression in the degree which its geographical position and its particular situation as regards armaments allow."

We therefore have a standard fixed for us: "loyally and effectively". This standard may not be a mathematically exact one, but it is all the same sufficiently definite to serve as a guarantee. I am well aware that doubts might arise on this point. But do you not think, gentlemen, that when the system of arbitration is set in motion and acquires prestige, and when the signatory States decide to take action against the aggressor, the force of international public opinion and their own moral sense, to say nothing of their own interests in putting an end as soon as possible to a dangerous dispute, will induce them to meet their obligations loyally and effectively? I personally am prepared to believe that they will do so. If not, we have to consider the replies to these disturbing questions concerning the application of sanctions to be satisfactory, provided, as I have already said, that the rest of the system works properly and is applied in good faith.

In my report I have explained the differences between the system of sanctions embodied in the Protocol and the system embodied in the Covenant. I will not return to that point, but it must be borne in mind, because we have made considerable progress.

I now pass to the second fundamental question dealt with in the Protocol.

In the system of security which we have developed in the Protocol, the Signatory States are concerned with the aggressor on the one hand and with the party attacked on the other. The system of sanctions of all kinds is applied against the aggressor; but we have not wished to establish a system of punishment alone: we have also wished to provide a definite scheme of assistance to the victim of the attack.

We have completed the system of sanctions against the aggressor by a system of economic and financial assistance to the State attacked, which would clearly render the system of sanctions doubly effective. The Protocol gives a sufficient account of the details of this assistance. I think I may confine myself to drawing your attention to this aspect of the system and I hope that we have a decisive influence on the course of events.

The text of the passage in Article 11 of the Protocol dealing with the question of the assistance to be given to the State attacked sufficiently demonstrates the true significance of our proposal. It reads as follows:

"In accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 16 of the Covenant the signatory States give a joint and several undertaking to come to the assistance of a State attacked or threatened and to give each other mutual support by means of facilities and reciprocal exchanges as regards the provision of raw materials and supplies of every kind, openings of credits, transport and transit, and for this purpose to take all measures in their power to preserve the safety of communications by land and by sea of the attacked or threatened State."

The third important point in our system consists, on the one hand, in the preparation and application of economic and financial sanctions against an aggressor State and, secondly, plans of economic and financial assistance to the State attacked or threatened.

In view of the complexity of the conditions in which the system of sanctions and the system of economic and financial assistance might have to be applied, the necessary preparations should be made in advance. Accordingly, the Council, through its Committee of the Peace, undertakes to take action for the application of the economic and financial sanctions against an aggressor State and, secondly, plans of economic and financial co-operation between a State attacked and the different States assisting it.

In addition to these purely economic and financial preparations, we have provided for measures of a military character without at the same time transforming our system into a military machine. Hence, in Article 13, we have stipulated that the Council shall be entitled to receive undertakings from States, determining in advance the military, naval and air forces which they would be able to bring into action immediately to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations in regard to sanctions which result from the Covenant and the present Protocol.

In order to make the system complete, we have embodied in the Protocol provisions concerning special treaties as a means of carrying out obligations resulting from the Covenant and as an addition to the general guarantees provided for in the Protocol. From this point of view, separate treaties are embodied in our system as a species of military preparation similar to the economic and financial preparations provided for in the Protocol.

As you will observe, the scheme of sanctions constitutes a complete and comprehensive system of security; it unquestionably offers guarantees to that end, which are, I repeat, fully sufficient in themselves, if the rest of the system works smoothly and regularly.

As I desire to show the Assembly the working of the system laid down in the Protocol, I will not enter into questions which we have already debated time and again. I will not revert to the principle of the interdependence of arbitration, security and disarmament, as this has already been definitely approved and accepted by the Assembly. I may confine myself to this aspect of the system, the subject of special treaties. The system of arbitration will remedy their chief defects, and as they will be incorporated in the system of obligations arising...
out of the Protocol, they will become servants of the good cause. I think therefore that we need never again discuss their legitimacy or expediency.

We have still to consider a fourth group of questions. The definition and determination of the aggressor is so difficult a problem that special methods have had to be evolved in order to facilitate the fixing of responsibility for aggression. Three special methods have been taken into consideration, namely:

1. The establishment of demilitarised zones, the violation of which can readily be determined and will therefore be regarded as equivalent to an act of aggression.
2. The adoption by the Council of so-called provisional measures, such as orders to withdraw troops, to declare an armistice, to stop movements of troops, and so on. In this way it will be relatively easy for the Council to determine the aggressor.
3. The provision of means for keeping a watch on preparation for war; certain provisions of the Protocol are aimed not only at definite acts of aggression but also at threats of aggression. In such cases the Council can bring into play the system of provisional measures accompanied by enquiries and investigations, and we shall thereby obtain sufficient security against States guilty of bad faith.

In addition to these three questions concerning the aggressor, there is a fourth, namely, the punishment of the aggressor. The penalties provided for in the Protocol do not include annexation of the aggressor’s territory or curtailment of his political independence. He will be required to make economic and financial reparation up to the extreme limit of his capacity, not excluding measures of all kinds which will provide guarantees against further aggression.

I have still to deal with the last fundamental question in the Protocol: the reduction of armaments.

In view of the close interconnection between the three great problems before us—the pacific settlement of disputes, sanctions against disturbers of the peace of the world, and the reduction of armaments—the Protocol itself provides for the summoning by the Council of a General Conference on the Reduction of Armaments and for the preparation of the work of this Conference. Moreover, the clauses regarding arbitration and sanctions do not come into force unless a plan for the reduction and limitation of armaments is adopted by that Conference.

Moreover, in order to preserve the connection between these three great problems, the Protocol is to become null and void if the plan adopted by the Conference is not carried out. This point will have to be determined by the Council according to conditions laid down by the Conference itself. We are all agreed that it would have been preferable to bring the system into operation more rapidly, but for a number of political reasons it is impossible to do so for the moment.

The last paragraph of Article 21 provides for the contingency of the Protocol partially lapsing after it has been put into force. Should the plan adopted by the Conference be regarded as having been put into effect, and should any State fail to carry it out in so far as it is concerned, that State would not benefit by the provisions of the Protocol.

But, just as we have established a special parallel between the principle of sanctions against the aggressor on the one hand and the principle of affording protection to the victim of aggression on the other, we endeavoured, in accordance with the principle of the progressive reduction of armaments, to mark out a kind of parallel in drawing up the plan of disarmament, that is to say, to indicate briefly the conditions under which the reduction of armaments would be carried out. The reduction of armaments will be brought about principally through the general security resulting from the establishment of the danger of war—a consequence of the system of the compulsory pacific settlement of all disputes.

It will also be brought about by the fact that the State attacked can rely upon receiving economic and financial aid from all the signatory States.

Nevertheless, in the case of States which, owing to their geographical situation, are particularly exposed to acts of aggression, the dangers of a sudden attack are so great that they will not be able to lay down their scheme for the reduction of armaments solely upon these two political and economic factors.

Consequently, as has been frequently pointed out, a number of States will desire, before the Conference is summoned, to know the extent of the military assistance on which they can rely if they are to lay before the Conference proposals for a reduction of armaments on any considerable scale. For this reason the Governments may possibly be led to enter into negotiations among themselves and with the Council regarding the reduction of armaments before the Conference is held.

The Council will have to take all these points into account, as well as a number of other factors, in drawing up the general programme of the Conference.

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Such are the essential principles of the second part of the Protocol, to which your attention is specially drawn in the resolution at the end of the report of the First and Third Committees. M. Politis and I submit this resolution for your acceptance; if it is adopted it will fitly crown the work of the Fifth Assembly.

Moreover, in view of the necessary preparations for the Conference on the Reduction of Armaments having been entrusted to the Council, I venture to submit for your acceptance the second resolution, which will probably be better to enter into negotiations among themselves and with the Council regarding the reduction of armaments before the Conference is held.

In conclusion, gentlemen, let me say this: The Fifth Assembly has taken in hand a great work, fraught with incalculable consequences and well-nigh limitless hopes. It has at a stroke assumed responsibility for the pacific settlement of all disputes. It will also be brought about by the fact that the State attacked can rely upon receiving economic and financial aid from all the signatory States.

In other words, we have endeavoured to create a system of arbitration such that no international dispute, whether juridical or political, can possibly lie outside its compass.

But the scheme must necessarily be complete in every part, and it must be applicable to every type of question. A single loophole, a single door of escape, and the whole structure is threatened with ruin. It was, above all, essential that the term “aggression” should be so clearly defined that there could be no possible ground for hesitation if the Council were called upon to take a decision.

For the same reasons we have endeavoured to make good the deficiencies of the Covenant and to define the sanctions so precisely as to allow no possibility of evasion and to give a sense of definite and absolute security.

It is hard for us to-day to say positively whether the system we have established is really as watertight and complete as it should be. Already we
hear critics expressing their doubts. If the Protocol once comes into force we shall soon learn by practical experience whether we have succeeded.

I venture to say, however, even at this stage, that if it is dangerous to trust solely to the good faith of others, it would be equally dangerous entirely to exclude moral considerations and good faith from our system. In any case the Czechoslovak Government is prepared to sign and ratify the draft Protocol at once. (Loud applause.)

Lastly, the Conference on the Reduction of Armaments is indissolubly bound up with the whole system. There can be no arbitration or security without disarmament, and there can be no disarmament without arbitration and security.

In terminating my report, I will venture to point to three facts which are both interesting and important.

Like many of my colleagues, I have taken part from the outset in the work of the League of Nations at Geneva, and I can assure you that never before has the Assembly been animated by such sentiments as it has this year. Never before has the spirit of international solidarity and true humanity permeated our work so profoundly as during the last five weeks. The heavy work of the two Committees has called for the utmost efforts of all, and if I were to do justice to all our colleagues who have untiringly laboured with us on this task my speech would never come to an end.

I am sure you will pardon me, however, if, as the representative of a small country, I venture to refer more particularly to the invaluable work done by the delegates of France, the British Empire, Italy and Japan. I say this because I desire to recall now, when we have completed our work, what was said in this Assembly during the memorable discussions of the first week, that the peace of the world largely depends on the situation of the small nations, and that the small nations will not be safe until the Great Powers can ensure the operation of a system of compulsory arbitration and sanctions. We must offer the small nations our heartfelt thanks and congratulations for the courage they have shown in discussing problems which are of so critical a character both for themselves and for us all and which have vexed every nation in the world for centuries.

I now come to the second important fact. In the discussions of the last five weeks we have given voice to ideas which, once launched, will make their way across the world with the irresistible power of an avalanche. We must, I think, frankly recognise the position: the idea of the peaceful settlement of disputes, with all the consequences which we have deduced from it, has made such progress in the last five weeks that it can never again be lost sight of.

The third and last fact, and the most important of all for us, is this: that in the work of the Fifth Assembly we have definitely linked together three ideas: arbitration, security and disarmament.

We have built these up into a system which we embodied in a Protocol. We hope that the Protocol will be ratified and will come into force. But it would be a great mistake to suppose that the whole system would be reduced to naught if for any reason the Protocol were not applied.

The only result would be that the difficulties which would then arise would be greater than those which faced us when we began.

Then we should inevitably find ourselves confronted again next year, at the Sixth Assembly, by the same problems as those which we had to face this year. Just as this year we had to settle the question of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, so next year we should have to settle that of the Protocol. The Third Committee would inevitably raise once more the question of Article 8 of the Covenant, and we should have to begin all over again the work which we have been engaged upon this year—possibly, in circumstances less favourable for our success than to-day.

We are, therefore, I think, in spite of everything, nearer the goal. Our work, it is true, is not perfect, but it can be improved by degrees. The Protocol deserves to be signed and ratified and to be put into force, for it embodies a number of just principles which ought to prevail.

I firmly hope and believe that they will prevail. (Loud and prolonged applause.)

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen—The discussion is adjourned until half-past three o'clock this afternoon.

The Assembly rose at 1.15 p.m.
Treaty was unacceptable. And why? Because it was devised solely with a view to security, while the reduction of armaments was relegated to the background and seemed to be a mere shadow. In the discussions which took place on the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, Spain, through her representative, Admiral de Magaz, expressed similar views, while quite recently our American friends, General Bliss, Mr. Shotwell and others, submitted to the League a valuable scheme based on the same principle.

It is, however, due solely to the memorable agreement reached between Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and M. Herriot that we now have before us a draft settling forth in detail a great scheme, of which a denuclear, an Emeric Cruce or an Abbé de St. Pierre, all three Frenchmen—might well have been proud, and which, inspired by our inviolable Covenant, enshrines the three-fold article of our immortal creed—arbitration, security and disarmament.

M. Politis gave a masterly definition of this three-fold article of faith in his report, in which he says: "The object of the Protocol is to facilitate the reduction of armaments, provided for in Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Council has hitherto been too likely to remain a dead letter, now become practicable except in so far as armaments may still be considered necessary in order to ensure the application of the sanctions involved in common action. This constitutes a very considerable, nay, an immense advance upon last year, by making the parties once more submit to compulsory pacific settlements by defining some- provision in Article 12 of the Covenant for recourse to judicial or arbitral settlement by defining some- thing which is, to borrow a term of M. van Karne- beek’s, the key-stone of the whole edifice, namely, the conciliatory functions of the Council.

If the Council’s efforts at conciliation fail, in the first instance, it can go further and exercise its authority, first, by recommending arbitration, and, secondly, if the parties refuse to accept it, by imposing on them its own decision, provided that decision is unanimous or, if it is not unanimous, by making the parties once more submit to arbitration.

Whatever happens, a solution will be found and, if the parties seek to evade it, there will be appropriate sanctions.

These sanctions are defined in principle by Article 12 of the Protocol, which confirms Article 16 of the Covenant. The wording of Article 12 makes it quite clear that hencedefore the measure of economic and financial sanctions necessitated by the circumstances will become operative immediately the Council has pronounced a formal order.

It is clear that the fourth provision of the Assembly resolution of October 4th, 1921, which left the States Members of the League of Nations free to judge whether or not a breach of the Covenant had been committed, could not be retained under the new system, which defines the aggressor State so clearly that the Council can have no difficulty in determining aggression and so denouncing it to the States Members with a view to the applica- tion of the sanctions.

As regards military measures, the Protocol defined the Covenant and prescribes that the signatories must co-operate therein loyally and effectively in the degree which their geographical position and their particular situation as regards armaments allow. The part to be borne by each State in the repression by force of an act of aggression committed in violation of the Covenant is to be determined in agreement with the Council, and is due to the growth of the idea that compul- sory methods of procedure. It supplements the provision in Article 12 of the Covenant for recourse to judicial or arbitral settlement by defining something which is, to borrow a term of M. van Karnebeek’s, the key-stone of the whole edifice, namely, the conciliatory functions of the Council.

The Protocol is a buttress to the Covenant. It supplements it, particularly in regard to concilia- tory methods of procedure. It supplements the provision in Article 12 of the Covenant for recourse to judicial or arbitral settlement by defining something which is, to borrow a term of M. van Karnebeek’s, the key-stone of the whole edifice, namely, the conciliatory functions of the Council.

The basis underlying the system of the Protocol is, as M. Politis has said, the compulsory pacific settlement of disputes. There will be no more wars of aggression and no more legalised wars in the event, contemplated in Article 15 of the Covenant, of the Council failing to settle the dispute. Defensive war alone is allowed, and, as M. Politis rightly pointed out, a State having resort to this legitimate form of war would be, so to speak, the Mandatory and organ of the community.

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I would say in conclusion, let us not forget that, thanks to our united efforts, we have here inaugurated the beginning of a great work. It rests with our Governments, and with us by the advice which we give them, to make it a work which mankind can never forget and which it should put effect in its entirety. (Unanimous and prolonged applause.)

The President: Translation: M. Briand, first delegate of France, will address the Assembly. (Loud applause.)

M. Aristide Briand (France): Translation: Ladies and gentlemen—I am here on behalf of the French delegation and with the full assent of my Government to say, in response to the appeal of your Committees: “France adheres to the Protocol. France is prepared to sign it.” (Loud applause.)

This message should have come from other lips than mine, from one who is better fitted to speak here than I—the head of the French delegation, my friend M. Léon Bourgeois, who has devoted his life to the cause of peace. (Renewed and loud applause.)

His health does not permit him to be here. It is one of life’s ironies that the man who has ploughed, harrowed and sown the field does not always reap the harvest, and it is an injustice of this kind which has brought me to this platform in place of M. Léon Bourgeois. You will not think it strange, therefore, that my thoughts should turn to him at this moment and that I should express to him my gratitude and that of the members of the French delegation.

Ladies and gentlemen, we may truly say that the Fifth Assembly of the League of Nations opened the door to a scheme of sanctions which will addre Assembly.

The Netherlands delegation will vote in favour of this resolution, but not without a certain degree of hesitation, now that Articles 10 and 11 of the Protocol, formerly Articles 5 and 6, have been modified in consequence of the recent discussions. It is possible that various questions will have to be settled and that there will be delays before all the Governments have signed. It is also possible—as experience has shown in the past—that the amendments to the Covenant involved in the Protocol will not be ratified as promptly as we desire.

We must be ready for disappointments; we must prepare the world for them and, above all, we must not let the world believe that the ideal to which we aspire is attained. We are still only at the first stage.

In the question of principle, however, what has been done cannot be undone. The main points that have been carried will remain and, thanks to the motion of the French and British Governments, this Fifth Assembly has been marked by the most notable achievement that the nations of the world have ever accomplished for the prevention of future war. All the delegates have contributed to this result in a sincere spirit of conciliation and good-will, striking proof of which has been furnished by the discussions of the last few days.

But at this moment, ladies and gentlemen, let us not forget the valiant champions of peace who in previous years have assiduously laboured to solve the problem that confronts us. I refer in particular to Lord Cecil (prolonged applause), who, I am sure, would be the first to rejoice with us over the work which it has been given to us to accomplish.

I would say in conclusion, let us not forget that, thanks to our united efforts, we have here inaugurated the beginning of a great work. It rests with itself, and not the Council, directs them, although the Council is called upon to give the States its opinion in regard to the best method of fulfilling the different obligations arising when a case of aggression is notified.

As regards the partial agreements mentioned in the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, the Protocol marks another very real improvement, which I am specially glad to note. These agreements, duly registered and published, and therefore in no case secret, will henceforth only become operative by order of the Council. The provision for “automatic operation”, therefore, which excited such lively criticism has been eliminated. These agreements, while being in force, will be of a relatively well-character. It is perfectly legitimate that they should serve to ensure the rapid application of measures of coercion. But it is also conceivable that one of the signatories of these agreements might be declared the aggressor, and that its allies would be obliged to take up arms against it on behalf of the community.

The desire to reduce or at any rate to limit armament is fully accorded in the Protocol by the decision to convene an International Conference for the purpose on June 15th next, to which all States non-Members of the League will also be invited. The Disarmament Conference will continue the work of the Fifth Assembly, and their joint achievement will constitute, so to speak, a second edition of the Covenant, which will be a great improvement upon the first.

The Protocol will be submitted to our Governments for adoption. The fact that we vote for the resolution does not bind our Governments, although, as the text says, we recommend the acceptance of the Protocol to their most earnest attention. This point was particularly emphasised yesterday at the last meeting of the First Committee.

The Netherlands delegation will vote in favour of this resolution, but not without a certain degree of hesitation, now that Articles 10 and 11 of the Protocol, formerly Articles 5 and 6, have been modified in consequence of the recent discussions. It is possible that various questions will have to be settled and that there will be delays before all the Governments have signed. It is also possible—as experience has shown in the past—that the amendments to the Covenant involved in the Protocol will not be ratified as promptly as we desire.

We must be ready for disappointments; we must prepare the world for them and, above all, we must not let the world believe that the ideal to which we aspire is attained. We are still only at the first stage.

In the question of principle, however, what has been done cannot be undone. The main points that have been carried will remain and, thanks to the motion of the French and British Governments, this Fifth Assembly has been marked by the most notable achievement that the nations of the world have ever accomplished for the prevention of future war. All the delegates have contributed to this result in a sincere spirit of conciliation and good-will, striking proof of which has been furnished by the discussions of the last few days.

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I would say in conclusion, let us not forget that, thanks to our united efforts, we have here inaugurated the beginning of a great work. It rests with our Governments, and with us by the advice which we give them, to make it a work which mankind can never forget and which it should put effect in its entirety. (Unanimous and prolonged applause.)

The President: Translation: M. Briand, first delegate of France, will address the Assembly. (Loud applause.)

M. Aristide Briand (France): Translation: Ladies and gentlemen—I am here on behalf of the French delegation and with the full assent of my Government to say, in response to the appeal of your Committees: “France adheres to the Protocol. France is prepared to sign it.” (Loud applause.)

This message should have come from other lips than mine, from one who is better fitted to speak here than I—the head of the French delegation, my friend M. Léon Bourgeois, who has devoted his life to the cause of peace. (Renewed and loud applause.)

His health does not permit him to be here. It is one of life’s ironies that the man who has ploughed, harrowed and sown the field does not always reap the harvest, and it is an injustice of this kind which has brought me to this platform in place of M. Léon Bourgeois. You will not think it strange, therefore, that my thoughts should turn to him at this moment and that I should express to him my gratitude and that of the members of the French delegation.

Ladies and gentlemen, we may truly say that the Fifth Assembly of the League of Nations opened the door to a scheme of sanctions which will addre Assembly.

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mind and what he must inevitably be led to think. He could not but say to himself: "Then war is inevitable: it is a disaster which we cannot avert", and he would be driven to wonder in his inmost mind whether the evidence of bankruptcy on the part of his rulers, he should not turn to the peoples themselves for the key to the problem.

When the man in the street learns this evening that the nations assembled here have publicly and solemnly adhered to the Protocol submitted to them, that they have definitely turned their faces towards peace, that they have at last declared war on war and have shown what methods they have decided to employ to close the road to war, there will arise a movement of enthusiasm which will sweep away scepticism and criticism alike.

War has driven its roots deep and far into the hearts of the nations. It is hard for us, even if our outlook is pacifist, to habituate ourselves to the thought that war can ever be destroyed. War is an old enemy whom we have grown accustomed to fight, and our minds cannot at once grasp the fact that it is no longer there.

There are some who still do not admit that we are on the eve of a lasting peace. They have mental reservations that prevent them sharing our sentiments or participating in our work. But it matters little. The peace movement has gone forward. Follow its evolution and you will realise how it has grown.

It was born under a dark cloud. At that time, its protagonists were talked of with pitying but of humanity and the world. France, the daughter of the Revolution, knew that not merely her own existence but the whole future of international life was at stake.

These are the ideas that she cherishes.

Of course she defended her national soil, of course she urged her patriotism to the utmost limit. And if she has remained armed since, it is for the very justifiable reason that, having experienced the horrors of invasion and the blood-stained barbarism of war twice in less than fifty years, she is resolved that it shall never occur again.

Yet when the League of Nations appealed to her to organise a system of peace and security, she did not hesitate for a moment. She responded to your appeal, and you have never once found her unwilling to work with you for the establishment of this pact of mutual assistance which will enable her to throw off the grievous burden of armaments which weighs so heavily upon her.

France desires to remain hedged with bayonets? France a menace to peace and a danger to the human race? Ladies and gentlemen, that is the bitterest of insults, the most unjust of criticisms. As soon as it was possible for her to reduce her military service by twenty-five per cent., and when at Washington the call came for naval disarmament, she at once responded to that call. She reduced her navy by nearly fifty per cent.

When, at the coming Disarmament Conference, you have shown her that every preoccupation has been taken and every loophole secured; that by the application of the system laid down in the Protocol her security is made certain, you will find her collaborate with the members of that Conference just as she has helped in the work of your Committees from the beginning of this Assembly. It was only natural that she should be anxious for her liberty, and she has shown her confidence in you by collaborating with the British Prime Minister and explained our policy, you understood his position, and when you decided to combine in one the three terms of the