LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference.

MEMORANDUM

SUBMITTED BY THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES OF
THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA, IN THE NAME OF THEIR
GOVERNMENT, TO THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION
FOR THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE, ENTRUSTED
WITH THE PREPARATION FOR THE CONFERENCE FOR
THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS.

[Translation.]

QUESTION I.

What is to be understood by the expression "armaments"?

Reply:

By "armaments" should be understood all the factors which make up the defensive and
offensive power of a country.

QUESTION I (a).

Definition of the various factors — military, economic, geographical, etc. — upon which the
power of a country in time of war depends.

Reply:

The factors — military, naval, aerial, economic, geographical, etc. — which make up the
power of a country in time of war are:

Military Factors.

i. The Human Factor.

The most important military factor is indisputably the human factor — the qualities of the
combatant, of the directing and executive personality. The influence of this factor depends on:

Numbers. — A country or army which has more men than another obviously has an advantage.

Training. — An army, however large, has no value if it is not well organised, trained and
disciplined.

Moral. — There is great power in a nation or army mainly composed of men who are con-
scientious and filled with courage, patriotism and the spirit of self-sacrifice.

Intelligence. — An intelligent and versatile people increases the military power of its country.

Physique. — A people, whatever its moral and intellectual qualities, which is deficient in
physique loses 50 per cent of its efficiency for military purposes.

Occupational training. — A people which is highly trained in the variety of occupations to
which civilisation gives rise — e.g., physicians, surgeons, engineers, chemists, mechanics, electrici-
cans, meteorologists, farmers, pilots, seamen, metal-workers, miners, telegraphists, wireless
operators, photographers, hospital attendants, cooks, engine-drivers, chauffeurs, etc. — has a
valuable weapon which gives it the advantage in a contest with a people of less professional
efficiency. An intelligent and courageous people which has not had a thorough and varied pro-
fessional training, however well trained its peace-time army may be, will be at a disadvantage in
sustaining a long campaign if it has to rely upon its own resources without help from outside.

2. **Arms.**

Any implement or machine which can be used either defensively or offensively is a weapon. There is no need to give a list of arms, since they are well known to all of us. An army is considered to be well armed when it is sufficiently provided with arms, in proportion to its numbers, and has adequate depots for the complete mobilisation of the entire nation. The constant advance of military science renders it impossible for a country to possess at any time enough arms of the latest patterns for all its units on a war footing; for what is the last word in military science during one period is almost antiquated in the next. The definition of arms includes ammunition and such chemicals as are employed as auxiliary weapons. The quality and quantity of the weapons of an army are a vital factor in war, since war is daily becoming more scientific, and a well-equipped army commands respect.

3. **General Equipment.**

This includes:

**Clothing.** — An army with comfortable and durable clothing, suited to the season, has an advantage over others less fortunate.

**Field equipment.** — An army with convenient, useful, durable, light and simple field equipment has an advantage over an army less well equipped.

**Barrack equipment for camps and trenches.** — An army properly installed is better able to recuperate than an army in less comfortable circumstances.

**Medical equipment.** — An army which has an adequate supply of medical and surgical equipment, complete and of the highest quality, inspires confidence in the combatant forces, has a smaller percentage of deaths, and cures its sick and wounded more rapidly and thoroughly.

**Cooking equipment.** — Proper cooking arrangements are of considerable importance, for a soldier will fight much better if he is regularly given palatable meals than if he is obliged to subsist on tinned food.

**Communications.** — The telegraph, telephone, wireless, etc., are essential for communication between the line and the higher commands. The better this equipment is, the greater the security and speed with which orders and information can be transmitted, and the greater the distance they can be despatched.

4. **Permanent Defences.**

Forts in strategic positions near frontiers, towns, coasts, etc., are an important element in the military defence of a nation in time of war.

5. **Military Industries.**

Factories for all kinds of war material, and all factories for other industries which can be converted into factories for war material or accessories, also constitute a most valuable military asset. A country which cannot produce its own war material and accessories will be at the mercy of its enemies, or completely dependent on foreign industry, and for all practical purposes will be disarmed.

6. **Means of Transport.**

The most important are:

**Railways.** — These are of great assistance to a nation in time of war, inasmuch as large bodies of troops can be rushed to reinforce any sector or to strike a decisive blow wherever necessary, and can then rapidly return to their earlier positions. This mobility can to some extent compensate for any shortage of troops.

**Motor-cars and lorries.** — Motor-cars transporting men, war material and supplies can take the place of railways where good roads are available. Consequently, a system of roads with convoys of motor-lorries is as good as a railway system.

**Sea transport.** — An efficient mercantile marine is of value to a nation, not only for importing necessaries but also for transporting men and material to or from the colonies. No colonial Power can exist without a mercantile marine and a battle fleet; they form an important part of the strength of a nation.

**River transport.** — Since they help to meet important needs, the craft plying on large rivers or lakes may be regarded as a military factor.

7. **Communications.**

The following are of capital importance as military factors:

- Telegraphy,
- Telephony,
- Wireless telegraphy,
- Wireless telephony,
- Radiophony,
- Submarine cables.
A plan of campaign cannot be properly developed unless there is rapid communication between the troops in the line and the commands, and unless news can be transmitted, since pre-arranged plans may have to be modified at any moment owing to the uncertainties of war.

**Naval Factors.**

1. **The human factor.**
2. **Arms.**
3. **General equipment.**
4. **Coastal batteries.**
5. **Naval industries.**
6. **Auxiliary merchant fleets.**
7. **Communications.**

What has been said regarding the military factors may be applied, *mutatis mutandis*, to the naval factors, with the addition of the following:

8. **Naval units.**
9. **Arsenals.**
10. **Dry docks.**
11. **Artificial harbours.**

We need not dwell upon the subject of naval tonnage, as this has been to some extent limited by the Washington Treaty between the principal naval Powers.

**Aerial Factors.**

1. **The human factor.**
2. **Arms.**
3. **General equipment.**
4. **Anti-aircraft defences.**
5. **The aircraft industry.**
6. **Communications.**

These factors are similar to those mentioned above as naval and military factors, but the following should be added:

7. **Aircraft Units.**

In a very short space of time these have greatly increased in importance as a factor in war, and the skill of pilots in managing their machines, and their knowledge of the medium in which they operate, have increased in a like proportion. Inventors and constructors are displaying greater activity than ever before, and it is impossible to predict how powerful air squadrons may become, and what degree of personal safety may be attained, since the scientific efficiency of pilots and aircraft is daily improving, now that aircraft engineering is an expert profession. Owing to their number, power, and radius of action, air squadrons — whether consisting of aeroplanes, seaplanes or airships — have become one of the principal factors in war.

8. **Hangars and Aerodromes.**

These are in use in peace as in war, and are highly important, since aircraft depend upon them for upkeep and repairs.

9. **Aircraft-Garriers.**

These are the most modern element in warfare and are of the greatest assistance to air squadrons, inasmuch as they take the place of hangars and aerodromes in mid-ocean. Aeroplanes can travel such a short distance with complete safety that without aircraft-carriers they could not make long flights over the sea.

10. **Commercial Air Fleets.**

The development of commercial aviation is of great value to a country, not merely from the point of view of trade but also as a military asset. Both pilots and aircraft can readily be converted to war purposes, quite apart from the immense service they can do under war conditions by transporting munitions and supplies, and officers of the higher commands.

**Economic Factors.**

1. **State Finances.**

A rich country can undertake and prosecute a war much more easily than a poor country; consequently, this is an important element in any estimate of the power of a nation.

2. **Private Wealth.**

A poor State may have rich nationals, with much wealth hoarded or accumulated at the banks. This wealth can readily be transferred to the State by loan, voluntary or forced as circumstances may require, or by legislative measures.
3. Natural Wealth and State Property.
These may be employed as security for loans.

4. Capacity for Food Production.
An essentially agricultural country, self-supporting as regards food, has a considerable advantage in war.

5. Capacity for Production of Raw Materials.
A country which possesses the raw materials necessary for the maintenance and development of its industries has an important factor in its favour.

A nation which has an abundance of iron, copper, coal, petroleum, manganese, etc., is in a safe position as regards its metallurgical industries and the motive power of its ships, aircraft and industrial plant. This in itself is a war asset of inestimable value. A country lacking these minerals is completely dependent on foreign trade and can never become a great nation.

7. A further important factor in war is the capacity or power of a country to supply its deficiencies either from its colonies or from neighbouring allied or neutral countries, or even from the enemy in the course of the war.

Geographical Factors.

1. Frontiers.
These must be considered in several aspects. A country’s only frontier may be the sea; or it may be bounded both by the sea and by neighbouring countries. These latter may include allies, neutrals and enemies, and also countries which are simply friendly but may, owing to unforeseen developments, fall later into any of those three categories. Geographically speaking, the frontiers may be formed by the sea, rivers, lakes, canals, marshes or swamps, mountains, forests, plains, deserts, etc. All these factors are of great importance, for differences in the configuration of the ground entail different defensive and offensive methods. If in the neighbourhood of the frontiers there are factories, mines, centres of population, areas devoted to agricultural production, etc., defensive and offensive conditions in time of war will vary accordingly.

2. Harbours.
Every harbour is a place of safety and shelter both for warships and for merchant vessels engaged in international trade or coastwise navigation, and accordingly constitutes an asset for the country in time of war. In adverse conditions, however, harbours and accessible coasts favour hostile invasion. These factors must be taken into account in estimating the defensive strength of a country, for, if a weak country has numerous harbours and accessible coasts, it is obliged to pay greater attention to their protection, thus weakening its defensive power.

3. Water-power.
A country which is rich in large waterfalls possesses a source of electric power which can be employed for industrial and transport purposes and to economise man-power.

4. Large Rivers, Canals and Lakes.
These geographical elements are of great value to a country, both as facilitating transport and as constituting natural defences in case of need.

5. Marshes and Swamps.
If the natives of a country are thoroughly acquainted with its marshes and swamps, these may on occasion prove to be valuable defences.

6. Mountains and Passes.
Mountains sometimes form an almost insuperable obstacle to the advance of an invading army, and can only be crossed by passes. These natural defences are of great assistance to a nation in arms.

7. Forests.
Forests provide excellent cover from scouting aeroplanes and airships, and also form strong points of defence.

8. Deserts.
These have their own special characteristics and, owing to the difficulty of advancing over arid ground, the lack of water, and the inhospitable nature of the country, they are of advantage to a
people at war. The natives of the desert, being accustomed to its conditions, are unequalled in their own region as offensive and defensive troops.

9. Other important geographical factors are the normal atmospheric phenomena of the different seasons, such as storms, hurricanes, torrential rains, drought, snow, and intense heat and cold.

**DISEASE.**

As a general rule, disease causes as many casualties as fighting, and every country has its own particular endemic disease which spreads in time of war, apart from the epidemics by which war is always accompanied. This factor is one which must not be overlooked.

**QUESTION I (b).**

Definition and special characteristics of the various factors which constitute the armaments of a country in time of peace; the different categories of armaments — military, naval and air — the methods of recruiting, training, organisations capable of immediate military employment, etc.

Reply:

The factors described above constitute the power of a country in time of war, and, so far as concerns armaments, the same factors, reduced to their normal proportions, represent its strength in time of peace; these armaments are proportionate to the wealth, area, population and degree of armament of the neighbouring countries. The following factors (not mentioned above) must also be regarded as part of the peace-time armament:

1. Military schools;
2. Training-grounds;
3. Rifle-ranges;
4. Barracks;
5. Hospitals.

**Methods of recruiting.** — There are two methods, the compulsory and the voluntary.

1. The compulsory method, in the form of conscription, which is employed in most countries, has from the military point of view the advantage of enabling a larger army to be maintained at less expense than under the voluntary system. It has also the immense advantage that large contingents are periodically trained as soldiers and pass into the reserve at the end of their time. In the space of a few years, the reserve becomes so large that, in the event of general mobilisation, a considerable army could be formed of men already trained in the use of arms.

2. The voluntary method is followed in few countries. Those which have adopted it maintain small armies, which are very costly as compared with conscript armies. Neither method affects the quality of the fighting man. Countries with voluntary armies appear to live in no danger of war and cherish no dreams of conquest. They are peaceful and rich. In conscript armies, since the period of service with the colours is shorter, the strength of the reserve increases more rapidly; but the efficiency of the first line is lessened, because a man who has served one year with the colours has not the same experience and self-confidence as a man who has served two years. Moreover, from the point of view of officers and non-commissioned officers, military service under the system of short periods with the colours becomes an eternal recruits' course. Under the voluntary system, long terms of service are an advantage, inasmuch as the army is always made up of experienced soldiers, and much work is saved by spacing out the periods of enlistment.

**Methods of Training.** — The two principal methods of training are:

1. The training of recruits, whether conscripts or volunteers, joining the army for a term of service with the colours. This is the oldest method, and is still in general use in most countries.
2. The method of compulsory training for a few days every year. One method is as good as the other; each country adopts that which is best suited to its needs and its special character.

**Organisations capable of immediate military employment.** — Having regard to what has been said above concerning methods of training, there is an advantage in the system of compulsory training for the whole nation, for a certain number of days every year, provided always that there is a standing volunteer army which represents the first line. The reason for this is that, in view of the immense and continual progress of military science at the present time, which involves constant changes in army organisation, the reservist in any country which now has a conscript army is not merely out of training when recalled to the colours but is unacquainted with the details of the latest inventions and methods which have been introduced. On the other hand, a man who is called to the colours after undergoing short annual periods of intensive training is already familiar with the latest advances in the military industry and in tactics. Since officers need more complete training, the proportion of officers in the peace establishment of
the army must be twice as great. This is also true of those non-commissioned officers and others attached to the army who have specialised in some particular branch of military science or kindred subjects.

**Question II (a).**

Is it practicable to limit the ultimate war strength of a country, or must any measures of disarmament be confined to the peace strength?

**Reply:**

Any limitation of that part of the ultimate war strength of a country which does not constitute an immediate danger would involve the restriction of industrial progress and the limitation of the inventive spirit of man. The effects of any such attempt would be deplorable, and it would be doomed to failure. The limitations imposed should be confined to peace-time armaments. For the moment, this should be the object in view, for to attain it would be a considerable achievement. Other gradual restrictions should be postponed to a later stage, when every breath of suspicion has been dispelled by the growth of mutual confidence between peoples.

**Question II (b).**

What is to be understood by the expression "reduction and limitation of armaments"? The various forms which reduction or limitation may take in the case of land, sea and air forces: the relative advantages or disadvantages of each of the different forms or methods: for example, the reduction of the larger peace-time units or of their establishment and their equipment, or of any immediately mobilisable forces: the reduction of the length of active service, the reduction of the quantity of military equipment, the reduction of expenditure on national defence, etc.

**Reply:**

The reduction or limitation of armaments must be the outcome of a general measure applying to all the countries of the world, fixing for each, in a just proportion, its military effective on land and sea and in the air, its war material, its mobilisable reserves, its period of service with the colours, the quantity of war material to be manufactured and the quantity to be held in reserve, and its budgetary expenditure on national defence.

1. Those countries which maintain an unduly large establishment should reduce to the quota allowed them the number of peace-time units, such as divisions, brigades, regiments, battalions, etc., it being understood, however, that the units remaining shall be kept up to an adequate strength, which may be lower than the strength actually fixed but must never be higher. No country should be allowed to form and maintain incomplete units on a peace footing with the intention of reinforcing them and increasing their strength when they are placed on a war footing, since this system would enable an aggressive country to double or treble its army secretly and with despatch. If, on the other hand, the units are kept up to their full strength in armament, officers and men, the formation of new units will be much more difficult and harder to conceal, and this will constitute a check on warlike ambitions.

2. The quantity of equipment for each type of unit should be fixed; the equipment of units may, however, be maintained below this quantity but never above, and in the former case the surplus equipment may be kept in the depots.

3. If the various countries agree to limit their peace-time effectives, with the object of preventing any possibility of war and fostering the brotherhood of nations — since this is the ideal of modern civilisation and the true purpose of mankind — there will be no necessity to maintain reserves capable of immediate mobilisation even when not serving with the colours. For the time being, however, we may agree to the maintenance of reserves up to the approved strength of the land, sea or air forces assigned to each country. These reserves, when not mobilised, will retain their organisation and may be assigned their share of material and equipment. Those countries whose standing armies are below the strength allotted to them may increase their reserves until that strength is reached; and, in the event of internal disturbances, they may mobilise part of their reserves not exceeding the total strength allowed. Those countries, however, which keep their full allotted strength with the colours may in no case mobilise their reserves except with the permission of the League of Nations. Reserves may undergo training and carry out manoeuvres at any time in the year, but such time must be fixed in advance and notified to the League.

4. The reduction of the period of active service for conscripts is a question which may be regarded in several lights. A one-year term of service would be satisfactory to the young men, and would be welcomed by a large section of public opinion, which is tired of war and preparations for war, and thinks that young men should not waste their time in military service when they have other things to do which constitute their real business in life; and it is also quite rightly felt
that one year’s apprenticeship to arms is enough to make a man efficient as a prospective defender of his country. These arguments operate in favour of a shorter term of service for conscripts, but the system has a number of disadvantages: (1) If the personnel of the army changes every year, or if half of it is renewed every six months, the whole army will become an immense school for recruits in their early months of service, and will consequently be of little value for defence; (2) each levy causes some slight disturbance in the country, which will be greater in proportion to the frequency of the levies; (3) officers and non-commissioned officers would not have time to study and practise the new tactics which are constantly being introduced, or to acquaint themselves with scientific improvements adaptable to war purposes, with which it is the soldier’s duty to be familiar, however peaceful his country may be; and they would be overwhelmed with work occasioned by the levies and by the training and schooling of recruits, so that their duties would become more tedious and monotonous year by year. At the same time, these circumstances might damp the ardour of the officers and non-commissioned officers and stifle the aspirations of that section of the youth of a country which is inclined to take up soldiering as a career. The two-year period is recommended for countries which have the conscription system; if the armies are reduced and exemption is granted on payment of a certain fee (which will in most cases be paid by men in easier circumstances and more highly educated), there will still always be enough recruits to furnish the annual contingents, and they will belong to that class of mentally undeveloped men to whom the army will afford valuable schooling, and whose careers will not be damaged by two years of military service. Those countries which have the voluntary system maintain, as a general rule, a smaller standing army, and one that may quite possibly be below the limit fixed when the reduction takes place. For a voluntary army, a longer term of service — varying from two to four years, with the option of re-enlistment for one year — is an advantage.

5. The production of war material in State factories should be limited to the quantity strictly necessary for the use of the authorised units or for sale to countries which have no such factories, provided that all sales of this kind are authorised in advance by the League of Nations. There is no justification for the existence of a war material industry under private management, and it should therefore disappear. Its retention would be equivalent to the maintenance of centres for the encouragement of war; for, as is generally admitted, the private manufacture of war material has contributed greatly to the development of the warlike spirit. If private manufacture were permitted subject to limitation, whether because some countries have no State factories or for any other reason, their output of war material should be controlled by the State, and also by the International Supervisory Commission for the Limitation of Armaments. The accumulation of stocks of war material, apart from material required for the allotted forces and the reserve, should be prohibited, and all surplus stocks should either be sold or destroyed within a fixed time-limit.

6. If a country reduces its army, it will obviously also reduce its army estimates. The League of Nations should be informed of the defence estimates voted by the various countries, so that it may examine them and draw attention to any infringements. An increase in the estimates for the purpose of raising pay or retired pay and pensions is quite legitimate, provided that the additional funds are used for the purpose stated. What has been said above with reference to land forces is also applicable to naval forces, and those units which are not affected by the Washington Naval Treaty between the principal naval Powers should be equitably and proportionately reduced. The same considerations apply to air forces, and an equitable and proportionate limitation should take place in all countries.

Question III.

By what standards is it possible to measure the armaments of one country against the armaments of another, e.g., numbers, period of service, equipment, expenditure, etc.?  

Reply:

As the principles on which the proportions between the armaments of the different nations should be established are already dealt with by Question V, we recommend that the following should be taken as a general basis:

1. The total effective of the land, sea and air forces respectively, without subdivision into their component parts, since the proportion of men to the total population of each country is the first and most important point for comparison.

2. The majority of countries with conscript armies keep their soldiers with the colours for the same length of time, and the difference in strength of the various nations does not affect the duration of service, except where a country faced with imminent danger of war prolongs the period for the purpose of keeping trained soldiers with the colours, because its strength would be diminished if the latter were disbanded and replaced by recruits. Accordingly, there can be no objection to the proposal recommended in paragraph 4 of the reply to Question II (b), that two years should be fixed as the period of service for nations maintaining compulsory service.
3. In paragraphs 2 and 5 of the reply to Question II (b), recommendations are made with regard to the reduction and limitation of war material.

4. If a reduction and limitation of land, sea and air forces is achieved, expenditure on national defence will automatically diminish. The recommendations made in this connection will be found in paragraph 6 of the reply to Question II (b).

**QUESTION IV.**

Can there be said to be "offensive" and "defensive" armaments? Is there any method of ascertaining whether a certain force is organised for purely defensive purposes (no matter what use may be made of it in time of war) or whether, on the contrary, it is established in a spirit of aggression?

**Reply:**

1. The definition required by the first question is as follows:

"Defensive" armaments are those which are maintained on a prudent estimate in proportion to the population, territorial area, coast-line, and the internal or external dangers that may exist, and in proportion to the general expenditure of the nation. Armaments are "offensive" when, owing to their size and strength, they exceed the requirements of national defence and the dictates of prudence in effective, allowance of war material, stocks of war material, over-production of war material, number of naval and air units, and expenditure on the land, sea and air forces, thus constituting a heavy burden on the nation and generally creating a sense of insecurity for its neighbours and for world peace.

2. As regards the second question, we doubt whether, at the present time, when an equitable reduction in the armaments of each country has not yet been achieved, there exists any absolute standard for ascertaining whether the forces of a country are organised for purely defensive purposes or whether they are established in a spirit of aggression. When a country possesses forces exceeding the requirements of its national security, and more powerful than those of its neighbours, it is obvious that these armaments are organised in a spirit of aggression; but the absolute standard which it is desired to establish is one which will make it possible to determine in the case of each country where defensive armaments end and aggressive armaments begin.

**QUESTION V (a).**

On what principle will it be possible to draw up a scale of armaments permissible for the various countries, taking into account particularly:

- Population;
- Resources;
- Geographical situation;
- Length and nature of maritime communications;
- Density and character of the railways;
- Vulnerability of the frontiers and of the important vital centres near the frontiers;
- The time required, varying with different States, to transform peace armaments into war armaments;
- The degree of security which, in the event of aggression, a State could receive under the provisions of the Covenant or of separate engagements contracted towards that State?

**Reply:**

As regards the principle on which it will be possible to draw up a scale of armaments permissible to the various countries, taking into account the specific points mentioned in the question, we would make the following proposals:

1. **Population.** — The population of each country is the only real factor on which the scale of its defensive armaments can be based.

   If Cuba, with three million inhabitants, has a land and air force of 12,000 men (including the Rural Guard), that represents 0.4 per cent of its population. If France, with forty million inhabitants, has a land and air force of 600,000 men (including gendarmerie), that represents 1.5 per cent of its population. If Spain, with twenty million inhabitants, has a land and air force of 200,000 men (including the civil guard), that represents 1 per cent of its population. If the United States of America, with 110,000,000 inhabitants, has a land and air force of 225,000 men, that represents 0.204 per cent of the population. These four nations quoted by way of example show quite different percentages, and similar results would be obtained if a like calculation were made for other countries. It is therefore recommended that 0.5 per cent of the population of each country should
be taken as the standard strength for its land and air forces. The four nations mentioned above could then have armies of the following sizes:

- Cuba, not exceeding 15,000 men
- France, 200,000
- Spain, 100,000
- U.S.A., 550,000

2. This standard percentage could be applied to the colonies of colonial Powers and to the territories administered by such States or subject to the mandate system of the League of Nations.

3. This percentage would not be applicable to those countries which are subject to the armament restrictions laid down by the Treaty of Versailles, which restrictions would be maintained until the Allied Powers which signed the said Treaty removed them. The standard percentage would thereafter apply to those countries also.

4. The establishment of an army may be increased as the population of the country increases, provided the authorisation of the League of Nations is first obtained.

5. In the case of disturbances in a colony or mandated territory, the administering country may provisionally reinforce the army of the said colony or territory with troops of its own or from its other colonies or mandated territories, but such reinforcements may not be replaced by other troops in the country of origin during their absence.

6. No country may without good cause reinforce its troops with units from its colonies or mandated territories so as to bring them above the limit assigned.

7. Countries bordering on a State or States not members of the League of Nations which may constitute a danger to international peace may be authorised provisionally to maintain larger forces than those normally assigned to them.

8. Special consideration may be given to the case of countries with a small population in proportion to their area, which may require larger effectives than those normally assigned to them.

9. Forces with organised police lines and performing police duties, but having the character of tactical units, will be included in the standard percentage.

10. We have no observations to make with regard to naval strength, this question having been partly settled by the Washington Convention; but the effectives of the naval forces of the signatories of this Convention, and also of countries which did not take part in the Washington Conference, must be fixed, since, even if the number of vessels fixed by the Treaty were adhered to, the crews might exceed the proper limits.

Resources.—A country’s natural resources, or lack of such, and its general wealth or poverty, must never be made a pretext for increasing its armed forces.

Geographical Situation.

1. Except in the case referred to in paragraph 7 of the reply to Question V (a), the geographical situation of a country must not be taken as a pretext for increasing its army.

2. An island country with a long coastline may have justification for maintaining a larger number of naval units and seaplanes than would normally be assigned to it on the basis of its population, or than other countries not placed in similar circumstances maintain.

3. The number, importance and distance of colonies or mandated territories may also be taken as justification for a larger number of naval units and seaplanes than would normally be assigned to the country on a population basis.

The length and nature of the maritime communications, which are of vital importance to a country and require constant protection and defence, will entitle the country to a greater tonnage of ordinary naval units without prejudice to the provisions of the Washington Conference, and also to a larger tonnage of submarines and to a larger number of seaplanes, provided this necessity is based on the same considerations as those put forward in paragraph 3 of the reply to Question V (a) under the heading “Geographical Situation”.

The density and character of the railways should not be taken as a factor in drawing up the scale of armaments of a country. The assets created by the industry of a nation, even if it would profit by them in time of war, should not be turned to its disadvantage for the reason that a neighbouring country has not a good railway system, whether constructed for strategic purposes or not. There is nothing to prevent the neighbouring country from constructing a similar system of its own. The reduction of armaments must be accomplished on a genuinely pacific basis, and the principles on which the scale of armaments is drawn up in time of peace must be based on peace-time conditions and not on the conditions which might arise in time of war as a result of the civilising activities of a nation or its natural advantages.

For the same reasons as those given in the previous paragraph, the vulnerability of frontiers, and of important vital centres near the frontiers, should not be taken as the basis of a scale for the reduction of armaments.
At the present time, when most countries are not subject to any armament restrictions except those imposed by the Treaty of Versailles or the Washington Convention, the time required, varying with the different States, to transform peace armaments into war armaments depends on their preliminary mobilisation arrangements. If these arrangements are perfect as regards safety, ease, and rapidity of recruitment and transport to the points of concentration, and as regards the supply of general equipment, war material, food, etc., the transformation will be a matter of days if the troops mobilised are veterans, of weeks if they have had some previous training, and of months if they have had no military training.

The degree of security which, in the event of aggression, a State could receive under the provisions of the Covenant or of separate engagements contracted towards that State can only be that provided for in Article 16 of the Covenant; thus if the effective of an international military force, drawn in due proportion from all the Members of the League, are fixed in advance, this force will be able in case of emergency to come to the help of the victim of aggression, either by reinforcing the latter's army or by attacking the aggressor State. Without such a force, which might be termed an International Police and whose members could fight in defence of world peace with no less heroism than they would display in defence of their own countries, there can be no effective guarantee of security. Another guarantee of security, already proposed to the League in a memorandum by M. Cobian, contains a proposal for an "international organism", which may be termed an International Supervisory Commission for the Limitation of Armaments, and which would be given full authority to control and supervise the observance of the limits fixed as regards armaments in each country and as often as it might consider necessary. If this guarantee provided by an international force were established on a firm basis of mutual sincerity, treaties of mutual guarantee negotiated between two or more nations for defensive or offensive purposes would have to be denounced and abrogated; for their maintenance (except that of the Treaty of Versailles) would frustrate the ideals of the League of Nations by diminishing the power and authority of the International Police and by making a dead letter of Articles 16, 17, 18 and 20 of the Covenant.

**Question V (b).**

Can the reduction of armaments be promoted by examining possible means for ensuring that the mutual assistance, economic and military, contemplated in Article 16 of the Covenant shall be brought quickly into operation as soon as an act of aggression has been committed?

**Reply:**

If the majority of the Members of the League accepted the organisation of the International Police provided for in Article 16 of the Covenant, not as a stipulation of a Treaty which is little respected and has hitherto been almost disregarded but as a living and effective organism, like the proposed Supervisory Commission for the Limitation of Armaments, whose power would be a guarantee of safety for all, the result would clearly be to promote the reduction of armaments, with the additional help of the mutual economic assistance provided for in Article 16 of the Covenant; for these measures would be sufficient to allow of rapid action if aggression took place.

**Question VI (a).**

Is there any device by which civil and military aircraft can be distinguished for purposes of disarmament? If this is not practicable, how can the value of civil aircraft be computed in estimating the air strength of any country?

**Reply:**

Although aeroplanes of any kind may be used as instruments of aggression, the method of distinguishing civil and military aircraft should be decided upon without any restriction being imposed on the freedom of commercial aviation, which must be allowed to carry on its activities unhindered, except in so far as its machines present the characteristics of military aircraft. The dimensions of the commercial air fleet must never be made a reason for reduction on the sole ground that it could be converted into a military force. In assigning to each country the military air forces which it may maintain, no military value should be attached to commercial aircraft; for, as in the case of the mercantile marine, no nation will have more than it needs, and if any country maintained an excessive number which brought it into ill-odour, the League of Nations would have sufficient authority to investigate, judge and decide the matter at issue.

**Question VI (b).**

Is it possible or desirable to apply the conclusions arrived at in (a) above to parts of aircraft or aircraft engines?

**Reply:**

Parts of aircraft and aircraft engines belonging to the military air forces should be limited in the same proportion as the air forces assigned to each country. Parts of aircraft and aircraft engines belonging to civilian machines should not be subject to any limitation.
QUESTION VI (c).

Is it possible to attach military value to commercial fleets in estimating the naval armaments of a country?

Reply:

No military value should be attached to commercial fleets in estimating the naval armaments of a country; for these fleets have never been formed or maintained in a spirit of aggression or aggrandisement. There are countries which maintain a large mercantile marine without any navy, and others whose navies are very large in proportion to their commercial fleets.

QUESTION VII.

Admitting that disarmament depends on security, to what extent is regional disarmament possible in return for regional security? Or is any scheme of disarmament impracticable unless it is general? If regional disarmament is practicable, would it promote or lead up to general disarmament?

Reply:

As regards the first question, assuming that the region in question is Europe or America, there would be sufficient regional security if the standing peace-time armies did not exceed 0.5 per cent of the population of each country. As regards the second question, we are of the opinion that general disarmament is attainable by way of regional disarmament.

(Signed) J. Cruz BUSTILLO, M.M.

Lieut.-Colonel commanding the 7th District, Chairman of the Commission, Rapporteur.

(Signed) F. FERNANDEZ, M.M.

Lieut.-Colonel, General Staff, Chief of the Information Section, Member of the Commission.

(Signed) J. M. BONICH,

Major commanding the Corps of Engineers, Member of the Commission.